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Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988

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PREM 19/278

MT

PART 1

SECRET.

Confidential file

Internal Situation. Iraqi / Iranian relations

Iraqi / Syrian Relations.

The threat to Oil supplies from the Gulf.

IRAQ

September 1979

~~April 1980~~

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~10.4.80~~							
~~16.4.80~~							
~~19.6.80~~							
~~21.6.80.~~							
~~19.8.80~~							
~~15.9.80~~							
~~19.9.80~~							
27.9.80.							
29.9.80							
30.9.80							
ENDS.							

PREM 19/278

PART 1 ends:-

Press Office Bulletin 30/9/80

PART 2 begins:-

Schmidt to PM T189/80

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
JIC (79) (N) 61	27.9.79
CC (80) 24th Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	19.6.80
JIC (80) (1A) 15	24.9.80

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed M Wayland Date 2 June 2010

PREM Records Team

Might it not be better to ring P. Cunnyliffe up as soon as this meeting is over?

Yes: but I'm not happy about the telephonic conversation has been. (:) rather get him a telegram as well.

[Notes found on front inside cover at review]

In addition to the above
we should need to obtain
a copies Rel: to Cannington
as soon as this working
is over.

Has he

talked to

E-Poncet?

I don't really understand why we aren't making more active efforts to activate the quadripartite machinery now with a view to taking action with the various participants. I do not believe that unilateral action by the UK will have the slightest effect on Oman or anyone else.

I agree: but a) time is v. short and I think we should get the action with Canning Jr taken now.
b) I'd rather talk about it on paper
Can't agree [illegible]

from Gibraltar to me

I will raise the

French point when

this is out of the

way.

AF
Spares
Guards

Navy

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

1. Kabul - JIC assessment.

2. Afghan talks in Lon.

3. Oil. TEA - Stocks

4. Further action required now.

5. Daily Briefing?

Quadripartite Consultations

Chairman's Dinner for 22nd Sept

Brian

Owen Evans Inquiry

Lord Armitage ?

Defence Chiefs.

Political.

Political
Defence
Presentation.

P.J

PRESS OFFICE BULLETIN

Mr Alexander

date: 30.9.80

Iraq

IRAN/IRAQ

Inquiries from journalists say that President Carter last evening gave a briefing to Congressmen in which he said that the US was making military preparations in concert with Britain and other allies to protect the Straits of Hormuz. There was a possibility that the Americans would send some advance communications and control planes to the area.

Senator Javits, who may be the source of all this, is reported to have made a strong plea for military support from the United States's allies

In response to these inquiries, press officers should take the following unattributable line:

> The United Kingdom is in consultation with the United States and other Governments about the Iran/Iraq situation. These consultations are continuing. There prime objective is to secure a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement and to safeguard oil supplies.
>
> Any talk of sending military forces to the area is premature. In any case, they are not needed at this tage. Moreover a report in the Guardian this morning suggests that the US now believes it may have over-sold the danger in the Gulf.
>
> The prime objective of British policy is to end the war; secure a lasting ceasefire; and to secure a negotiated settlement. Those objectives, if achieved, would of course be the best and surest way of safeguarding oil supplies.

Attached for background are cuttings from today's Guardian and International Herald Tribune and FCO guidance of yesterday.

BI

THE GUARDIAN

30 SEP [illegible]

cutting dated 19

X

Iran/Iraq

Keeping the Gulf open

MUCH of the official concern in the United States over the Iran-Iraq war has focused on the potential threat to the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passageway at the southern end of the Gulf that carries a third of the non-Communist world's oil.

But, in private, US officials are a great deal less worried about the freedom of navigation through the strait. Military and Intelligence analysts say it is their best guess that neither Iran nor Iraq is capable of blocking the strait physically. What is more, they assert, it is in neither country's interest to attempt such a move.

President Carter said last week that the war might lead to the blocking or closing of the strait, cutting off the West's key oil lifeline. US officials hinted that an international naval force might have to be formed to assure oil tanker passage through the strait, which is the only maritime exit from the Gulf.

In a television interview, Carter vowed that the US would do "whatever is required" to keep the strait open to navigation.

But one Pentagon official concedes: "I think maybe we oversold the importance of the Strait of Hormuz in this. Right now, looking at the players and the situation out there, we don't see any real threat to the strait."

The strait is physically less constricted than most casual observers believe. "Looking at the thing on a world globe, it seems pretty tight," says a military source. "But it is really too wide and too deep to close very easily."

The strait, which is about 170 miles long, averages 50 miles in width, and even at its narrowest point is about 30 miles wide. For most of its length the depth is between 246 and 738 feet, and it is nowhere shallower than 148 feet.

Thus, Pentagon sources say, even if Iran — which has several small naval ships in the strait — should sink one or more huge oil tankers, the shipping channels probably would not be impassable. Iraq, which has no ships there, is even less capable of blocking the strait. Neither nation is believed to have the mine-laying ability to close the strait.

One Pentagon official asserts that only the US and Soviet navies are really capable of bottling up the Gulf, and the Russians, who always have a single frigate on patrol at the strait, do not show any signs so far of attempting such a move.

Walter Mossberg

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE

cutting dated 30 SEP 1980 19

Iran/Iraq

West Switches Tactic on Hormuz

Quiet Diplomacy Seen More Effective Than Threats

By Joseph Fitchett
International Herald Tribune

PARIS — The United States and other industrial countries have decided that the Strait of Hormuz can be better protected by quiet diplomacy than by threats of Western intervention, diplomats said Monday.

But Western leaders are on record as saying that any attempts to block the strait would threaten the West's vital interests.

"As long as the oil tankers keep moving, speculation about allied moves or an allied force in the Gulf can only hurt, perhaps even becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy," according to an official involved in U.S.-European contacts about the current fighting in the Gulf.

It seems clear that the United States, France and Britain are determined to use force as a last resort to keep the strait open, but all these governments have concluded that talk about such an eventuality is likely to be counterproductive.

The Carter administration has denied earlier, apparently distorted reports that it tried to organize a crisis meeting with other industrial countries: Britain, France, Italy, Japan and West Germany.

Western hints of possible naval action to keep the strait open drew criticism both from the Soviet Union and from Saudi Arabia. Now Western governments are concentrating their diplomatic efforts on trying to contain the Iran-Iraq conflict and insure that other Arab governments are not drawn into it, diplomats said.

Iran's President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr said in an interview with Newsweek that Iran would block shipping in the strait if the country was attacked from all sides — an apparent reference to the possibility of other Arab governments supporting Iraq if the undeclared war becomes a military stalemate.

In the Gulf, ship captains quoted on French radio said that several tankers have been intercepted by the Iranian navy and asked their destinations but none has been stopped. Both the United States and France have said publicly that any interference with shipping in the strait would jeopardize their vital interests — a phrase implying readiness to use military force.

Local Navies

Both countries have sizable Indian Ocean fleets cruising near the strait and Britain has dispatched two ships to join the U.S. task group. These forces, separately or combined, would be more than a match for local navies in a crisis. However, both the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia assert that any U.S. move to increase the level of forces in the Gulf is liable to spread the conflict.

Reflecting European doubts about the wisdom of an allied force there, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said that his government cannot deploy war vessels outside Europe. Japan, which had said it was ready to attend a U.S.-sponsored Gulf meeting, announced Monday that such a meeting was unnecessary because a threat to Gulf shipping appeared unlikely.

Japan was the source of a leak in garbled form of a letter from President Carter last week to other leaders about the Gulf. But the letter was not a formal invitation or a call to action, French and U.S. officials said.

The Strait of Hormuz is too wide to block by simply sinking ships in the waterway. The two channels used by tankers entering and leaving the Gulf both lie in Oman's territorial waters but that country has no force capable of repelling an Iranian naval interdiction of the channels.

N.F.

cc. R.W.
P.T.

We might do worse than recommend this piece to our clients. Mr. Fitchett has it just right.

30/9

NOTE TO PRESS OFFICERS

IRAN/IRAQ

Secretary of State's Movements

Lord Carrington decided to return to London because of the continuing conflict between Iran/Iraq.

[As necessary]. The decision was not occasioned by any specific aspect of the crisis. (Iraqi air movements in the Southern Gulf - FT story: US proposals for a Western Conference: the conclusion of Mrs Thatcher's meetings at Chequers: British intervention to dissuade Oman etc.)

The situation on Iran/Iraq is serious. Quite clearly the potential dangers are very grave indeed. It was clear in New York that the peace making efforts of the Security Council and the Islamic Conference were unlikely to achieve immediate success. In these circumstances Lord Carrington quite simply decided that the right place to be was at his desk in London.

[As necessary] The decision had nothing whatever to do with Lord Carrington's health.

See also Spokesman for 29 September

Straits of Hormuz (FT story)

It is not for us to confirm or deny reports of Iraqi troop movements, or to speculate about the intentions of combatant governments.

Unattributably: We are aware of these reports and are in touch with Gulf Governments.

The thrust of British policy is clear from the public record:

(a) Statement of the Nine on 23 September: Paragraph 4 ''They recall the capital importance for the international community of freedom of navigation in the Gulf which it is imperative not to infringe.''

(b) Security Council Resolution of 28 September: Paragraph 3 ''calls upon all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict.''

(c) Sir A Parsons' explanation of the vote on 28 September: ''It is essential that all States exercise the utmost restraint to avoid any escalation of the current perilous situation, an escalati with incalculable consequences not only for the parties, but for us all.''

Like other governments, we are anxious to avoid this conflict spreading and attach great importance to free navigation in the Straits. We should be extremely concerned at any development which threatened to impede this.

Q: Have we made representations?

A: We are in touch with many governments in the area. Our views are reflected in the public statements above.

US Sponsored Meeting/Meetings

We are already in the closest possible consultation with our partners and allies and with a wide range of governments about the serious situation deriving from the conflict between Iraq and Iran. We shall continue to participate in such consultatio

Questions about messages to the Prime Minister should be referr to Number Ten. Unattributably: It is true that Mrs Thatcher has received a message from President Carter and that she has replied to it. The exchange is confidential. You will have noted the statement from the White House on 26 September that the President was in touch with ''key friends and allies on a wide range of issues related to the conflict''. In the context

of the economic effects of the conflict, the US '' would be willing to host a meeting to review these issues if that should seem desirable. If it is determined that a meeting of experts is required, we will work out timing and location. No such meeting has been set. In the meantime our consultations are continuing.''

That remains the position. We have no details of timing, location or level of any such consultation.

The urgent priority remains to stop the war. We fully endorse the efforts of the UN and of the Islamic Conference to this end, and support the goodwill mission of President Zia.

Naval Deployment

Talk of a joint naval task force is premature. Asked about this on ABC TV in New York on 26 September, Lord Carrington said: '' obviously we have all been talking about every possible eventuality, but I do not think that that at the moment is what we ought to worry about''. He went on to talk about the commercial risks involved in sending ships into the Gulf.

Questions about the movements of HM Ships are for the Ministry of Defence. Unattributably: HMS Coventry, in company with Royal Fleet Auxiliary Tanker Olwen, has indeed been detached from the Task Group currently in the Far East. The two vessels are now off Singapore and are moving into the Indian Ocean. This is purely a precautionary move.

NF
29 September 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 180
CONFIDENTIAL
FM DUBAI 300604Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 37 OF 30 SEPTEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK MUSCAT BAGHDAD
INFO PRIORITY JEDDA KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA

IRAN/ IRAQ

1. I ACCOMPANIED MR JENKIN TO CALLS ON THE RULERS OF SHARJAH AND DUBAI YESTERDAY. THE FORMER WAS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE WAR SITUATION. THE IRAQIS HAD SERIOUSLY MISCALCULATED IRANIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES, AND WOULD FACE INCREASINGLY STIFF RESISTANCE AS THE IRANIANS TRANSFERRED FORCES FROM OTHER AREAS.

2. SHAIKH SULTAN SAID THAT IT WOULD BE MADNESS FOR THE U A E TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT. IRAN STILL HAD 300 WARPLANES: THE SMOKE FROM ONE OF THEM WOULD BE ENOUGH TO FINISH OFF THE U A E. THE IRAQIS HAD KNOWN BETTER THAN TO ASK HIM FOR FACILITIES TO ATTACK THE GULF ISLANDS, BUT OF COURSE SHAIKH SAQR OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH WAS DEEPLY INVOLVED WITH THEM.

3. SHAIKH RASHID, WHO HAD SPENT MOST OF THE DAY IN ABU DHABI, AT A CABINET MEETING AND RECEIVING THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR, WAS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THE U A E SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED: IT WAS NOT THEIR QUARREL.

4. YOU WILL SEE FROM DA'S SIC U2H OF 300620Z TO MODUK THAT RAS AL-KHAIMAH HAS INDEED BEEN HEAVILY INVOLVED WITH THE IRAQIS BUT IS NOW HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS. ALL IN ALL, IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE U A E HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM THE BRINK.

HASKELL

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD		ADDITIONAL DISTN.
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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 711 OF 29 SEPTEMBER
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS UKDEL NATO UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL OECD
INFO ROUTINE ROME

SCHMIDT ON IRAN/IRAQ

1. ON 26 SEPTEMBER CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT GAVE HIS LAST SCHEDULED PRESS CONFERENCE BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS ON 5 OCTOBER. PRESS REPORTING HAS FOCUSSED MAINLY ON HIS COMMENTS ON THE IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE.
2. SCHMIDT SAID IT WAS INCORRECT THAT CONSULTATIONS WERE TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THE GERMAN AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO ESTABLISH A NAVAL PRESENCE TO PROTECT THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN APPROACHED BY HER ALLIES IN THIS CONNECTION. IN ANY CASE THE CONSTITUTION FORBADE THE USE OF GERMAN SHIPS OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA. BESIDES, IT WAS NOT THE VIEW OF THE WESTERN POWERS THAT FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IN THE STRAITS COULD BE AFFECTED. ASKED WHETHER THE FRG WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXTEND ITS NAVAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE NATO AREA TO ENABLE ALLIES TO SEND A PRESENCE INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN, SCHMIDT SAID IT WAS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE GERMANS SHOULD TAKE OVER TASKS IN THE SEA AREAS ADJACENT TO THE NORTHERN PARTS OF THE NORTH SEA. THERE WOULD BE NOTHING NEW IN THIS. HE DENIED PRESS REPORTS THAT DURING HIS RECENT CONVERSATIONS IN BONN THE AMERICAN DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, CHRISTOPHER, HAD RAISED THIS QUESTION. SCHMIDT HAD HOWEVER REMINDED HIM OF THE GERMAN POSITION.
3. THE LOSS OF IRAQI OIL WOULD HAVE MORE EFFECT THAN THE LOSS OF IRANIAN SUPPLIES TO THE WORLD MARKET BUT THIS WOULD NOT BE A CAUSE FOR ACUTE CONCERN. THE BLOCKING OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WOULD BE MORE SERIOUS BUT AT PRESENT THERE WAS NO ACUTE DANGER OF THIS. TOO MUCH ATTENTION SHOULD NOT BE PAID TO THE EFFECTS OF SPECULATION ON OIL PRICES IN THE SPOT MARKET.

WRIGHT

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4138 OF 29 SEPTEMBER

INFO UKDEL OECD.

Read in full.

IRAN/IRAQ: OIL

COUNSELLOR (ENERGY) AND HEAP (ESSD) CALLED ON THE STATE AND ENERGY DEPARTMENTS TODAY. TREAT (ENERGY) SAID HIS DEPARTMENT WELCOMED THE MANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS PLAYING DOWN THE LIKELIHOOD OF EARLY SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES. NEVERTHELESS HE THOUGHT THAT ALTHOUGH THE OVERALL POSITION WAS SATISFACTORY, IT WAS NOT EVIDENT THAT SOME DIFFICULTIES MIGHT ARISE BECAUSE OF THE PARTICULAR DISTRIBUTION PATTERN FOR OIL FROM IRAN AND IRAQ. FOR INSTANCE MOZAMBIQUE AND SOMALIA OBTAINED ALL THEIR OIL FROM THESE SOURCES AND OTHER LDC'S WERE ALSO UNUSUALLY DEPENDENT EG: SRI LANKA (68 PERCENT), TANZANIA (59 PERCENT), BANGLADESH (52 PERCENT). OTHER SERIOUSLY RELIANT COUNTRIES, EITHER IN TERMS OF VOLUME OR PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SUPPLIES, INCLUDED FRANCE, BRAZIL, TURKEY, YUGOSLAVIA, SOUTH KOREA, SPAIN, ROMANIA, INDIA, AND GREECE. IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW MANY OF THESE COUNTRIES CARRIED ADEQUATE STOCKS. IN MANY OF THEM THE MAJOR OIL COMPANIES NO LONGER PLAYED A ROLE AND WERE THEREFORE UNLIKELY TO HELP OUT IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS. TO SOME EXTENT THESE PROBLEMS MIGHT BE OVERCOME IF VARIOUS OPEC PRODUCERS INCREASED PRODUCTION LEVELS, OR RESTORED RECENT CUTS IN PRODUCTION, AND GAVE PREFERENCE TO LDC'S IN MARKETING THEIR EXTRA OUTPUT. BUT THERE COULD STILL BE A NEED TO TAKE SPECIAL ACTION TO HELP SOME AFFECTED COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY TO PREVENT THEIR ENTERING THE SPOT MARKET. ONE OBVIOUS WAY OF DOING THIS WOULD BE TO ENLIST THE HELP OF THE INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES. IN THE CASE OF THE US, HOWEVER, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION OF THIS SORT MIGHT BE CONSTRAINED BY ANTI-TRUST PROBLEMS.

2. MORSE (STATE) ALSO EMPHASISED THIS PROBLEM BUT THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT TO SOME EXTENT BE DEALT WITH BY OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES ON A REGIONAL BASIS. FOR INSTANCE VENEZUELA OR POSSIBLY MEXICO MIGHT WELL ASSIST BRAZIL. THE FACT THAT IRAQ HAD REQUESTED OTHER OPEC COUNTRIES TO INCREASE PRODUCTION IN THE CURRENT SITUATION MIGHT PROVE HELPFUL.

3. MORSE SAID THAT IT WAS NO LONGER THE US INTENTION TO PROMOTE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT OIL TANKER INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MARGINS OF THIS WEEK'S SLT MEETING IN PARIS. THIS SUGGESTION HAD ARISEN BECAUSE OF A MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE US MESSAGE TO CERTAIN CAPITALS LAST WEEK. THEY HAD SINCE SENT A FURTHER MESSAGE TO CAPITALS OVER THE WEEKEND MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THEY WERE NOT AT THIS STAGE IN FAVOUR OF A FORMAL MEETING, BUT IN DOING SO HAD FELT IT NECESSARY TO OFFER TO ARRANGE DISCUSSIONS IN THE MARGINS OF SLT IF

CONFIDENTIAL / ANYONE

ANYONE WANTED THAT. TO DATE NO SUCH REQUEST HAD BEEN MADE. STATE DEPARTMENT'S FEELING AT PRESENT WAS THAT ALTHOUGH TANKER INSURANCE RATES WERE INCREASING THE CASE FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION DID NOT AS YET EXIST. FOR INSTANCE TANKER INSURANCE RATES DURING THE KOREAN WAR HAD BEEN SEVERAL TIMES HIGHER THAN THOSE NOW IN FORCE IN THE GULF AREA.

4. PLEASE ADVANCE TO D LE B JONES AND KELLY IN DEPT OF ENERGY AND HEAP, ESSD.

HENDERSON

(ADVANCED AS REQUESTED)

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTN.
IRAQ/IRAN

COPIES TO
MR JONES
MR KELLY
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FM WASHINGTON 292210Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4137 OF 29 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE MUSCAT, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, MODUK
PRIORITY AMMAN, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, UKMIS
NEW YORK

Read in full

MUSCAT TEL 276: IRAQ/IRAN

1. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH TODAY WITH STATE DEPARTMENT AND NSC. WHILE STILL KEEPING THEIR FINGERS CROSSED, THE AMERICANS THINK THAT WE MAY HAVE QUOTE SQUEAKED THROUGH UNQUOTE THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS. THEY ATTRIBUTE THIS PARTLY TO OUR JOINT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND PARTLY TO IRAQI SLOWNESS IN LAUNCHING THE OPERATION ONCE THEY HAD SECURED OMANI AGREEMENT. THEY THINK THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO PREVENT IF THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN READY WHEN THEY ORIGINALLY SAID THEY WOULD BE. THE DELAY AND THE FINANCIAL TIMES LEAK WOULD HAVE MADE IT EASIER FOR THE OMANIS TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS.

2. THE AMERICANS ARE NOT HOWEVER CONFIDENT THAT THE EVIDENCE SO FAR AVAILABLE, WHICH IS BASED ONLY ON INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, DEMONSTRATES CONCLUSIVELY THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE CALLED OFF THEIR OMAN OPERATION. THEY HAVE NOT, THEREFORE, ACCEPTED AMBASSADOR WILEY'S SUGGESTION THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO DELIVER THE VERBAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO SULTAN QABUS AND HAVE INSTRUCTED HIM TO SPEAK TO THE SULTAN, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT AMERICAN MISGIVINGS ABOUT OMANI INVOLVEMENT COME FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL. THEY BELIEVE THAT EVEN IF THE INDICATIONS THAT THE OPERATION HAS BEEN CALLED OFF TURN OUT TO BE CORRECT, THE OMANIS COULD STILL CHANGE THEIR MINDS AGAIN.

3. AMERICAN ATTENTION IS NOW INCREASINGLY CONCENTRATED ON THE SAUDI REQUEST, SO FAR ONLY INFORMALLY CONVEYED, FOR US HELP WITH AIR DEFENCE IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE, PARTICULARLY AROUND THE OIL TERMINALS. PRINCE SAUD, IN TALKING TO MUSKIE STUCK TO THE LINE THAT THE SAUDIS ARE STILL ONLY INTERESTED IN QUOTE INVISIBLE UNQUOTE US SUPPORT. THE AMERICANS ARE HOWEVER, HEARING ON THE MILITARY NET THAT THE NEED FOR INVISIBILITY DOES NOT OUT-WEIGH THE NEED FOR A PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE US CONTRIBUTION. THEY HAVE THEREFORE INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR WEST TO SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM PRINCE FAHD AND AWAIT HIS ACCOUNT OF THE TALKS HE AND GENERAL JONES (CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS WHO IS IN SAUDI ARABI AS A RESULT OF A LONG-STANDING INVITATION) SHOULD HAVE HAD IN TAIF TODAY. IF IT TURNS OUT THAT

SAUDI PRIORITIES HAVE CHANGED, THE FIRST STEP MIGHT BE TO FLY SOME AWAC MISSIONS FROM SAUDI ARABIA. THE AMERICANS COULD, THOUGH NOT EASILY, DEPLOY QUITE RAPIDLY SOME MOBILE HAWK UNITS IN THE RIGHT PLACES IF THE SAUDIS WERE ABLE TO DIVERT MEN FROM TRAINING TO MANNING THEM. ANY REQUEST FOR US PERSONNEL TO BE PROVIDED IN WHAT AMOUNTS TO A COMBAT ZONE, EITHER TO MAN THE HAWKS OR TO FLY F15S, WOULD PRESENT MUCH MORE SERIOUS POLITICAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMPLICATIONS

4. AMBASSADOR WEST HAS ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ENSURE AND TO CONFIRM TO WASHINGTON THAT THE SAUDIS ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THEM AND OTHER PENINSULA STATES OF ALLOWING THEMSELVES TO GET INVOLVED IN THE IRAN/IRAQ FIGHTING.

HENDERSON

IRAQ/IRAN	STANDARD	ADDITIONAL DISTN.
MED	MAED	IRAQ/IRAN
NENAD	TRED	
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IRAN/IRAQ

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PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM Sir A Acland
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
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HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D

GR 640
CONFIDENTIAL
FM AMMAN 291038Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 365 OF 29 SEP
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, BAGHDAD, JEDDA, MUSCAT, UKMIS NEWYORK AND WASHINGTON.
PRIORITY ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ISLAMABAD, KUWAIT, PARIS AND TUNIS.

IRAQ/IRAN

1. THE PAKISTANI PRESIDENT ACCOMPANIED BY MR HABIB CHATTI, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, ARRIVED IN AMMAN YESTERDAY EVENING FROM TEHRAN AND LEFT FOR BAGHDAD THIS MORNING IN AN IRAQI MILITARY AIRCRAFT. THEY ARE DUE TO RETURN TO AMMAN THIS AFTERNOON SEMICLN PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ IS EXPECTED TO MAKE ONLY A BRIEF STOP HERE AND THEN GO ON TO PARIS TO SEE PRESIDENT GISCARD: AFTERWARDS HE GOES TO NEW YORK WHERE HE IS TO ADDRESS THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON WEDNESDAY. AGENCY REPORTS CARRIED IN TODAY'S JORDANIAN PRESS QUOTE AN IRANIAN PRESIDENCY OFFICIAL AS STATING THAT THE MISSION HAD ACHIEVED NOTHING AND THAT IRAN WOULD FIGHT ON UNTIL THE LAST IRAQI SOLDIER WAS OFF IRANIAN SOIL.
2. EMPHASISING THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN PRESENT DURING A LENGTHY TETE-A-TETE DISCUSSION BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT ZIA (THEY ARE OLD AND CLOSE FRIENDS, AS ZIA HEADED THE PAKISTANI MILITARY MISSION TO JORDAN FOR SOME YEARS), THE PAKISTANI AMBASS- ACCOUNT OF HIS PRESIDENT'S MISSION

MILITARY MISSION TO JORDAN FOR SOME YEARS), THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR HAS GIVEN ME THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF HIS PRESIDENT'S MISSION SO FAR BASED MAINLY ON HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DELEGATION ACCOMPANYING HIM. PRESIDENT ZIA HAD HAD TWO LONG MEETINGS WITH MR BANI SADR AND HAD ALSO SEEN THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO SEE THE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. AMONG ALL THE IRANIANS THEY HAD MET, PRESIDENT ZIA'S DELEGATION HAD FOUND THE UTMOST DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE UNTIL IRAQI TROOPS WERE OFF IRANIAN SOIL AND A REFUSAL TO CONTEMPLATE A CEASEFIRE WHILE IRAQI TROOPS REMAINED IN OCCUPATION OF IRANIAN TERRITORY (PRESIDENT ZIA AND HIS DELEGATION HAD OF COURSE LEFT TEHRAN BEFORE THE IRAQI PRESIDENT'S OFFER OF A CEASEFIRE WAS MAKE KNOWN). HOWEVER THE PAKISTANI DELEGATION FORMED THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS WAS NOT NECESSARILY THE IRANIANS' LAST WORD AND THAT, IF THE IRAQIS WOULD AGREE TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS, THE IRANIANS WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1975 ALGIERS TREATY. THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR REMARKED THAT PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN WERE NO LONGER ANYTHING LIKE AS CLOSE AS THEY HAD BEEN IN THE PAST AND THAT THE IRANIANS NOW TENDED TO REGARD THE PAKISTANIS AS BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICANS. THIS HAD RESULTED IN PRESIDENT ZIA'S MISSION BEING RECEIVED BY THE IRANIANS INITIALLY AT LEAST WITH SOME SUSPICION.

3. THE JORDANIANS HAD BEEN PUT OUT BY WHAT PRESIDENT ZIA'S DELEGATION HAD HAD TO SAY CONCERNING IRANIAN DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE WAR AND ALSO BY THE WIDE GAP BETWEEN THE PAKISTANI DELEGATION'S ESTIMATE OF IRANIAN ABILITY TO DO SO AND IRAQI REPORTS THAT THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES WERE ON THE EDGE OF COLLAPSE. THE PAKISTANIS HAD NOT MUCH LIKE WHAT THE JORDANIANS HAD TOLD THEM CONCERNING IRAQI INTENTIONS IN RELATION TO KHUZESTAN AND OTHER PARTS OF IRANIAN TERRITORY, BUT IT HAD AT LEAST GIVEN THEM A GOOD IDEA OF WHAT THEY COULD EXPECT OT HEAR WHEN THEY REACHED BAGHDAD. THE PAKISTANI DELEGATION WERE NATURALLY ANXIOUS TO STAY ENTIRELY NEUTRAL ON THESE MATTERS AND NOT TO JEOPARDISE ANY CHANCE THEIR MISSION MIGHT HAVE OF SUCCEEDING.

4. SUMMING UP THE IMPRESSIONS HE HAD OBTAINED FROM THE DELEGATION, THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY DID NOT EXPECT PRESIDENT ZIA'S MISSION TO PRODUCE RESULTS ON THE PRESENT ROUND BECAUSE THERE WAS AS YET NO COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE IRANIANS AND IRAQIS ON THE BASIS ON WHICH A CEASEFIRE MIGHT COME ABOUT. BUT HE THOUGHT THE MISSION MIGHT NEVERTHELESS STILL HAVE A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY AT A SUBSEQUENT STAGE. A POINT WHICH KING HUSSEIN APPARENTLY REPEATEDLY MADE TO PRESIDENT ZIA WAS HIS FEAR THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM'S OFFER OF A CEASEFIRE MIGHT BE INTERPRETED BY THE IRANIANS AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS.

BUCK

SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT

1. Soviet policy in the Middle East aims to extend Soviet influence while avoiding military confrontation with the US. The Soviet Union has a long-term interest in securing a share of Middle East oil supplies but recognises that access to Middle East oil is a vital Western interest of which it must take account.

2. The current conflict places the Soviet Union in a difficult position. It has a friendship treaty with Iraq[(i)] and is that country's main supplier of arms. It will wish to avoid putting pressure on Iraq of a kind which would put at risk its influence in Baghdad and antagonise other Arabs. It will also be conscious of the need to be seen to live up to its treaty commitments. However, one of the Soviet Union's major objectives in the Gulf Area is to gain a high degree of influence in Iran. While its efforts to get on terms with the Khomeini regime have been unsuccessful, it may be reluctant to see a breakdown of government in Iran and a struggle for power while the Tudeh Party is too weak to have a decisive say in the outcome.

3. So far, while maintaining normal arms supplies to Iran and acknowledging their treaty obligations, the Russians have been reasonably even handed in their attitude to the conflict between Iraq and Iran. Mr Gromyko assured Mr Muskie in New York on 25 September that the Russians would not intervene as long as others did not.

Possible Scenarios

4. If the fighting between Iran and Iraq remains at a fairly low level the Russians are likely to maintain their present attitude. They might offer to mediate in the dispute, but only if they thought this could be done successfully. They would in any case hope to be

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(i) The Soviet Iran Treaty of 1921 is not of the same degree of relevance. The Iranians have denounced it, and the Russians could use it to justify military intervention only if they could plausibly claim that Iranian territory was being used to threaten the Soviet Union.

associated as much as the United States in any negotiated settlement of the crisis. Behind the scenes, they may put some quiet pressure on the Iraqis to accept a negotiated settlement which would allow them limited territorial gains.

5. If the Iraqis press on they may succeed in taking over the oil-producing province of Khuzestan and in setting up a nominally independent 'Arabistan' with a regime sympathetic to Baghdad. It would then be a major Soviet objective to gain influence over the new regime.

6. An Iraqi take-over of Khuzestan could well be accompanied by nationalist risings in areas of Iran such as Kurdestan and Azerbaijan. If a pro-Soviet grouping with a reasonable degree of popular backing were to emerge in Azerbaijan and request Soviet assistance the Russians would find it difficult to refuse. But they would see the establishment of a puppet republic in Iranian Azerbaijan, or more ambitious moves to take parts of Iran, in the light of their major objective of increasing their influence over Iran as a whole. If the cost of a lesser move were to decrease the chances of attaining the major prize the Russians might restrain themselves. But if the chance of attaining the major prize was deemed slight, the lesser moves might be undertaken.

7. Were the Iranian regime to seek Soviet military assistance, the Russians would find themselves in a dilemma. They would be offered the opportunity of an internationally defensible military intervention with the prospect of eventual control, either directly or by proxy, of Iranian oil. But the cost would be correspondingly high: the risk of confrontation with the US, and the alienation of Iraq and other Arab states. On balance, we doubt whether the Russians would embark on such a course.

8. If Iran suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Iraqis, which led to the distintegration of the Khomeini regime, the Russians would face a new set of problems. A collapse of the regime could lead to a military take over, anarchy or civil war. In the short term the Russians would probably be content to settle for the first: the risks would be less, and they would hope to be able to extend their influence in the longer term.

9. The Russians must also consider how they would react to any US move to protect its interests in the area. If there were an attempt by Iran to close the Straits of Hormuz, and the US were to take naval or other military measures to keep the Straits open, the Russians would probably recognise this to be in pursuit of a vital Western interest and would confine their response to a propaganda and diplomatic onslaught. Much, however, would depend on how the Arabs reacted.

Conclusions

10. By maintaining a reasonably even-handed attitude to the Iran/Iraq crisis, the Russians can hope:

(i) to minimise the risk of a major East-West crisis in the run up to the US elections;

(ii) to avoid damaging their relations with the Arabs and other Islamic countries (particularly important post-Afghanistan); and

(iii) to keep their longer term options open.

A successful Soviet effort to promote a settlement - like Tashkent in 1966 - would be a triumph and would greatly increase Soviet influence in the area. But the Russians will undertake one only if they can be confident of success, and may be more concerned to ensure that they are not excluded from any international peace-making efforts in which the US is involved. In short, they may see greater scope for extending their influence in the longer term if the present crisis can be played in a relatively low key.

EASTERN EUROPEAN & SOVIET DEPARTMENT

29 September 1980

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22 21

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
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SIR A. ACLAND
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL
FM JEDDA 290954Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 711 OF 29 SEPTEMBER
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MUSCAT, AMMAN, BAGHDAD.

WASHINGTON TELNO 4129: IRAQ/IRAN

1. THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WILL CARRY OUT HIS INSTRUCTIONS TODAY AT 15.30 GMT WITH PRINCE FAHD IN TAIF. HE WILL BRIEF ME ON THE RESPONSE TOMORROW.

2. THE SAUDIS ARE BY NOW AWARE OF THE IRAQI APPROACH TO OMAN: THE AMERICANS BRIEFED PRINCE SULTAN ABOUT IT YESTERDAY SO THAT HE COULD BRIEF PRINCE FAHD IN PREPARATION FOR THIS EVENING'S MEETING. GENERAL DAVID JONES, CHAIRMAN OF JOINT DEFENCE STAFFS, WILL BE WITH THE AMBASSADOR. HE HAPPENS TO BE HERE ON A ROUTINE VISIT ARRANGED SOME TIME AGO.

3. YOU WILL BE AWARE FROM MY DA'S REPORTING THAT IRAQI AIRCRAFT HAVE been SIGHTED ON THE GROUND AT RIYADH AND TAIF.

CRAIG

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 28

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO(2)

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
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CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
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HD/DEF D
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SIR A ACLAND
RESIDENT CLERK

MO

GR 270
RESTRICTED
FM BAGHDAD 291028Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 452 OF 29/9/80
AND IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT, JEDDA, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, ANKARA, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, ABU DHABI AND MUSCAT.

IRAQ/IRAN: MY TEL NO 432 (NOT TO ALL)

1. IN A SPEECH TO THE NATION BROADCAST ON THE EVENING OF 28 SEPTEMBER PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN ANNOUNCED THAT IRAQ WAS READY TO END THE FIGHTING AND TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS. IRAQ WAS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY, THROUGH A THIRD PARTY OR THROUGH ANY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION IN WHICH IT HAD CONFIDENCE IN ORDER TO REACH A JUST AND HONOURABLE SOLUTION THAT WOULD GUARANTEE IRAQ RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY.

2. IRAQ WOULD NOT BE TEMPTED BY ITS STRENGTH OR BY ITS VICTORIES TO IMPOSE UNJUST CONDITIONS. BUT IT DEMANDED THE FOLLOWING:

(A) THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S OPEN, DE JURE AND DE FACTO, RECOGNITION OF IRAQ'S LEGITIMATE HISTORICAL RIGHTS TO ITS LAND AND WATERS:

(B) THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S ADHERENCE TO A POLICY OF GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS AND RENUNCIATION OF RACISM, AGGRESSION AND

(B) THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S ADHERENCE TO A POLICY OF GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS AND RENUNCIATION OF RACISM, AGGRESSION AND EXPANSIONISM, AS WELL AS ALL ATTEMPTS TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION:

(C) THE RETURN OF "EVERY INCH OF USURPED IRAQI LAND AND THE OBSERVANCE OF IRAQI AND ARAB RIGHTS ON THIS BASIS."

(D) RESPECT BY IRAN FOR INTERNAIONAL LAWS, CONVENTIONS AND TREATIES.

3. AFTER A DIGRESSION ABOUT IRAQ'S DESIRE TO LIVE IN PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP WITH IRAN, SADDAM CALLED ON THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO END ITS OCCUPATION OF THE THREE GULF ISLANDS SEIZED BY THE SHAH. IT IS NOT QUITE CLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER THIS IS A SPELLING OUT OF CONDITION (C) ABOVE, OR AN ATTEMPT TO PLAY TO THE ARAB GALLERY.

4. A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE SPEECH, TAKEN FROM THE ARABIC TEXT, WILL FOLLOW SHORTLY.

EGERTON

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DWF

G 132/29

LFH 223/29

CO FCO (DESKBY 291500Z)

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
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SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
HD/CONS D
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

Sir I Gilmour

SECRET UK COMMS ONLY
SIC
GR 350

IMMEDIATE

SECRET UK COMMS ONLY
FM MUSCAT 291350Z SEPT 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 276 OF 29 SEPTEMBER 80
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON UKNMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD JEDDA BAHRAIN KUWAIT ABU DHABI DUBAI DOHA

IRAN/IRAQ

YOU WILL NOW HAVE SEEN FROM A MESSAGE ON OTHER CHANNELS (NOT TO ALL) THAT THE IMMEDIATE DANGER OF AN IRAQI OPERATION MOUNTED FROM OMAN MAY NOW BE SUBSIDING AS A RESULT OF A DECISION BY THE IRAQIS THEMSELVES THAT THE LOGISTICS WERE TOO UNCERTAIN . UNTIL THE IRAQI AIR FORCE UNITS CURRENTLY HERE ARE REMOVED, WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN THAT THEY WILL NOT THINK AGAIN AND WE SHALL REPORT

BE CERTAIN THAT THEY WILL NOT THINK AGAIN AND WE SHALL REPORT ANY AIR MOVEMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. IF THE ABOVE PROVES CORRECT, IT LOOKS AS THOUGH A VERY SATISFACTORY WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE MAY HAVE BEEN FOUND. THE OMANIS WILL BE ABLE TO CLAIM TO HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR ARAB CREDENTIALS TO THE FULL BY OFFERING THE IRAQIS THE ASSISTANCE REQUESTED ONLY TO HAVE THE LATTER DECLINE THEIR HELP AT THE LAST MOMENT. THEY MIGHT ALSO IF THEY WISH CLAIM TO HAVE STOOD UP TO BE COUNTED IN THE FACE OF WESTERN ADVICE TO THE CONTRARY. IN ADDITION THE IRANIANS MAY BELIEVE THAT THEIR WARNINGS ABOUT ARAB GULF STATES ASSISTING THE IRAQIS HAVE HAD SOME EFFECT.

3. MY U.S. COLLEAGUE TELLS ME THAT THE AMERICANS WILL NOT NOW BE DELIVERING PRESIDENT CARTER'S MESSAGE TO QABOOS AND THAT THEY WILL TRY TO AVOID RUBBING OMANI NOSES IN THE DIRT. IT WOULD BE PLEASING TO THINK THAT QABOOS HAD LISTENED TO OUR ADVICE BUT THIS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN A DECISIVE FACTOR.
IT MAY HOWEVER BE RELEVANT THAT WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE SULTAN HAS BEEN MOST DISPLEASED BY SUGGESTIONS THAT THE OMANI AIR DEFENCES MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN UP TO MARK AGAINST THE DEGREE OF RETALIATION ENVISAGED SEMI COLON SO THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT OUR MESSAGE (AND POSSIBLY WARNINGS BY HIS AIR FORCE COMMANDER) HAVE BEEN HEEDED.

4. WE SHALL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO WATCH DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY. FOR THE FUTURE I BELIEVE THAT THE OMANI HANDLING OF THIS POTENTIALLY GRAVE CRISIS (WHICH HAS TO A LARGE EXTENT REINFORCED MISGIVINGS OVER THEIR ''SHOOT FROM THE HIP'' APPROACH TO PREVIOUS PROBLEMS, E.G. THE INITIATIVE ON PROTECTION OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ LAST YEAR) INDICATES A NEED FOR REASSESSMENT OF OUR HANDLING OF THIS REGIME. THE OTHER GULF STATES WHATEVER OUR MISGIVINGS ABOUT THEIR POLICIES IN GENERAL APPEAR FROM HERE TO BE HANDLING THIS PARTICULAR CRISIS IN A MUCH MORE REALISTIC MANNER.

TUNNEL
BT

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 September 1980

Dear Michael,

I enclose the paper on Soviet attitudes which it was agreed at Chequers yesterday the FCO should prepare for this afternoon's meeting on the Iran/Iraq conflict.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to PS/Secretary of State for Defence, PS/Secretary of State for Energy, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London

CONFIDENTIAL

SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT

1. Soviet policy in the Middle East aims to extend Soviet influence while avoiding military confrontation with the US. The Soviet Union has a long-term interest in securing a share of Middle East oil supplies but recognises that access to Middle East oil is a vital Western interest of which it must take account.

2. The current conflict places the Soviet Union in a difficult position. It has a friendship treaty with Iraq(i) and is that country's main supplier of arms. It will wish to avoid putting pressure on Iraq of a kind which would put at risk its influence in Baghdad and antagonise other Arabs. It will also be conscious of the need to be seen to live up to its treaty commitments. However, one of the Soviet Union's major objectives in the Gulf Area is to gain a high degree of influence in Iran. While its efforts to get on terms with the Khomeini regime have been unsuccessful, it may be reluctant to see a breakdown of government in Iran and a struggle for power while the Tudeh Party is too weak to have a decisive say in the outcome.

3. So far, while maintaining normal arms supplies to Iraq and acknowledging their treaty obligations, the Russians have been reasonably even handed in their attitude to the conflict between Iraq and Iran. Mr Gromyko assured Mr Muskie in New York on 25 September that the Russians would not intervene as long as others did not.

Possible Scenarios

4. If the fighting between Iran and Iraq remains at a fairly low level the Russians are likely to maintain their present attitude. They might offer to mediate in the dispute, but only if they thought this could be done successfully. They would in any case hope to be

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associated as much as the United States in any negotiated settlement of the crisis. Behind the scenes, they may put some quiet pressure on the Iraqis to accept a negotiated settlement which would allow them limited territorial gains.

5. If the Iraqis press on they may succeed in taking over the oil-producing province of Khuzestan and in setting up a nominally independent 'Arabistan' with a regime sympathetic to Baghdad. It would then be a major Soviet objective to gain influence over the new regime.

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7. Were the Iranian regime to seek Soviet military assistance, the Russians would find themselves in a dilemma. They would be offered the opportunity of an internationally defensible military intervention with the prospect of eventual control, either directly or by proxy, of Iranian oil. But the cost would be correspondingly high: the risk of confrontation with the US, and the alienation of Iraq and other Arab states. On balance, we doubt whether the Russians would embark on such a course.

8. If Iran suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Iraqis, which led to the distintegration of the Khomeini regime, the Russians would face a new set of problems. A collapse of the regime could lead to a military take over, anarchy or civil war. In the short term the Russians would probably be content to settle for the first: the risks would be less, and they would hope to be able to extend their influence in the longer term.

9. The Russians must also consider how they would react to any US move to protect its interests in the area. If there were an attempt by Iran to close the Straits of Hormuz, and the US were to take naval or other military measures to keep the Straits open, the Russians would probably recognise this to be in pursuit of a vital Western interest and would confine their response to a propaganda and diplomatic onslaught. Much, however, would depend on how the Arabs reacted.

Conclusions

10. By maintaining a reasonably even-handed attitude to the Iran/Iraq crisis, the Russians can hope:

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(ii) to avoid damaging their relations with the Arabs and other Islamic countries (particularly important post-Afghanistan); and

(iii) to keep their longer term options open.

A successful Soviet effort to promote a settlement - like Tashkent in 1966 - would be a triumph and would greatly increase Soviet influence in the area. But the Russians will undertake one only if they can be confident of success, and may be more concerned to ensure that they are not excluded from any international peace-making efforts in which the US is involved. In short, they may see greater scope for extending their influence in the longer term if the present crisis can be played in a relatively low key.

EASTERN EUROPEAN & SOVIET DEPARTMENT

29 September 1980

IRAN/IRAQ

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MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
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CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
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NEWS D
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

Sir It Acland

GRS 327
CONFIDENTIAL
FM DOHA 290603Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO PRIORITY MUSCAT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT AND JEDDA.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. THE AMIR ASKED ME TO CALL YESTERDAY EVENING TO BRIEF HIM ON DEVELOPMENTS. HE WAS CHEERFUL AND RELAXED SEMI CLN BUT HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH CURRENT HOSTILITIES WOULD COME TO AFFECT THE GULF AS A WHOLE, AND QATAR IN PARTICULAR. HE QUESTIONED ME CLOSELY ON HOW WE SAW THE SOVIET ATTITUDE, AND WHETHER U.S. NAVAL UNITS WERE LIKELY TO INTERVENE IN ANY HOSTILITIES AT THE MOUTH OF THE GULF. HIS MAIN FEAR, UNDERSTANDABLY, GIVEN THE LOCATION OF QATAR'S OFFSHORE OIL-FIELDS, WAS THAT ANY MILITARY ACTION MOUNTED AGAINST IRAN FROM THE ARAB SIDE OF THE GULF MIGHT PROMPT THE IRANIANS TO GENERAL AND IRRESPONSIBLE REPRISALS AGAINST OFFSHORE ARAB OIL INSTALLATIONS ALL ALONG THE GULF. HE WAS AWARE THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT WELL BE UP TO SOMETHING: THEY HAD APPROACHED HIM TWO DAYS AGO FOR (UNSPECIFIED) ''FACILITIES'' FOR THEIR FORCES - WHICH HE HAD REFUSED. THE QATARIS HAD SPOTTED THE TWO IRAQI MILITARY HELICOPTERS SNEAKING ALONG THEIR FRONTIER WITH SAUDI ARABIA AS THEY

MOUNTED AGAINST IRAN FROM THE ARAB SIDE OF THE GULF MIGHT PROMPT THE IRANIANS TO GENERAL AND IRRESPONSIBLE REPRISALS AGAINST OFFSHORE ARAB OIL INSTALLATIONS ALL ALONG THE GULF. HE WAS AWARE THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT WELL BE UP TO SOMETHING: THEY HAD APPROACHED HIM TWO DAYS AGO FOR (UNSPECIFIED) ''FACILITIES'' FOR THEIR FORCES - WHICH HE HAD REFUSED. THE QATARIS HAD SPOTTED THE TWO IRAQI MILITARY HELICOPTERS, SNEAKING ALONG THEIR FRONTIER WITH SAUDI ARABIA, AS THEY MADE FOR THE EMIRATES AND SEEB. THE GOVERNMENT HERE HAD ALSO RECEIVED REPORTS THAT SAQR OF SHARJAH MIGHT BE PLAYING A DOUBLE GAME.

2. I BELIEVE THAT I REASSURED HIM ABOUT YOUR READING OF SOVIET INTENTIONS. I LEFT A COPY OF THE AMENDED JIC SUMMARY IN YOUR TEL. 513 TO MOSCOW, WHICH DEALS WITH THIS POINT, WITH HIS CHEF DE CABINET, FOR TRANSLATION AND STUDY. THE AMIR ALSO EXPRESSED UNCERTAINTIES INITIALLY ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS: MY U.S. COLLEAGUE WILL BE TAKING UP THE RUNNING ON THAT POINT.

3. I AM TO SEE THE AMIR AGAIN ON 30 SEPTEMBER WITH MR JENKIN, AND CAN THEN PASS ON ANY FURTHER ASSESSMENT BY H M GOVERNMENT. IN THE MEANTIME THERE HAS BEEN NO MILITARY PREPERATIONS OF ANY KIND HERE: GHQ ARE TOO BUSY DIGESTING THEIR ARMS DEALS WITH OURSELVES AND THE FRENCH EXCLAMATION.

4. IRONICALLY, AT HIS REQUEST MY IRAQI COLLEAGUE HAD FOLLOWED ME IN TO SEE THE AMIR. I LEARNED LATER FROM THE CHEF DE CABINET THAT HE CONVEYED THE DOUBTLESS WELCOME AND RELIEVING MESSAGE TO THE AMIR THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED HIS ATTITUDE OVER ''FACILITIES''. SO I ASSUME THAT THESE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN VITAL TO WHATEVER PLANS THEY MAY HAVE LAID FOR ACTION IN THE LOWER GULF.

BRANT.

NNNN

SUBJECT

27

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T189/80

T189/80

ZZ 281610Z SEP 80
BONN FROM LONDON
SECRET GOVERNMENTAL 0022
BT
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

DEAR HELMUT,

I SHOULD HAVE LIKED TO TALK TO YOU ON THE TELEPHONE ABOUT THE VERY SERIOUS SITUATION IN THE GULF BUT I KNOW HOW BUSY YOU MUST BE WITH YOUR ELECTION CAMPAIGN. I AM THEREFORE SENDING YOU THIS MESSAGE INSTEAD.

APART FROM THE FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN AT THE HEAD OF THE GULF, WITH ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON OIL SUPPLIES, WE NOW HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY ACTION AT THE SOUTHERN END OF THE GULF. THIS COULD LEAD TO THE CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ TO ALL OIL TRAFFIC INTO AND OUT OF THE GULF, WITH THE GRAVEST REPERCUSSIONS FOR US ALL. OBVIOUSLY IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NONE OF US SHOULD SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THIS IN PUBLIC, FOR FEAR OF DAMAGING CONFIDENCE IN THE OIL MARKETS AND EVEN OF PRECIPITATING EVENTS WHICH WE ALL WISH TO AVOID. THE AMERICANS AND WE ARE DOING WHAT WE CAN BEHIND THE SCENES TO ENSURE THAT THESE DANGERS ARE UNDERSTOOD IN THE REGION, AND I AM SUGGESTING TO PRESIDENT GISCARD THAT HE MIGHT CONSIDER THE DISCREET USE OF FRENCH INFLUENCE WITH THE IRAQIS IN THE SAME DIRECTION.

THESE DEVELOPMENTS UNDERLINE THE NEED FOR CLOSE AND CONTINUING QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATION ABOUT THE SITUATION. YOU WILL HAVE HEARD FROM HERR GENSCHER OF THE PROPOSAL THAT A QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATIVE GROUP SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN PARIS. I HAVE TOLD PRESIDENT GISCARD THAT I THINK THIS IS AN EXCELLENT IDEA, AND I HAVE EXPRESSED MY HOPE THAT THE GROUP CAN MEET URGENTLY. WE ARE READY TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO PARIS IMMEDIATELY A MEETING IS CONVENED.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS.

MARGARET THATCHER

SENT AT 1709 28/9

0022 SECRET 281610 z. 279

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

Dear Helmut,

I should have liked to talk to you on the telephone about the very serious situation in the Gulf but I know how busy you must be with your election campaign. I am therefore sending you this message instead.

Apart from the fighting between Iraq and Iran at the head of the Gulft, with its potential effects on oil supplies, we now have reason to believe that there is a possibility of military action at the southern end of the Gulf. This could lead to the closure of the Straits of Hormuz to all oil traffic into and out of the Gulf, with the gravest repercussions for us all. Obviously it is important that none of us should say anything about this in public, for fear of damaging confidence in the oil markets and even of precipitating events which we all wish to avoid. The Americans and we are doing what we can behind the scenes to ensure that these dangers are understood in the region, and I am suggesting to President Giscard that he might consider the discreet use of French influence with the Iraqis in the same direction.

These developments underline the need for close and continuing quadripartite consultation about the situation. You will have heard from Herr Genscher of the proposal that a Quadripartite Consultative Group should be established in Paris. I have told President Giscard that I think this is an excellent idea, and I have expressed my hope that the Group can meet urgently. We are ready to send a representative to Paris immediately a meeting is convened.

With warm personal regards.

MARGARET THATCHER

SECRET

SUBJECT

26

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T188/80

ZZ 281547Z SEP
PARIS FROM LONDON
SECRET GOVERNMENTAL ØØ22
BT
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GISCARD.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 25 SEPTEMBER ABOUT YOUR MEETING WITH M. TAREQ AZIZ. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR HAVING KEPT ME INFORMED. IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE TOUCH AS THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPS.

THE POSITION IS IF ANYTHING MORE WORRYING NOW THAN WHEN YOU SENT YOUR MESSAGE. YOU WILL HAVE LEARNT, THROUGH OUR AMBASSADOR, OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S PLAN TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK, USING OMANI FACILITIES, AGAINST THE TUMBS AND ABU MUZA AND POSSIBLY AGAINST BANDAR ABBAS. SUCH AN OPERATION, WHICH MAY WELL BE IMMINENT, WOULD BE BOUND TO HAVE THE GRAVEST REPERCUSSIONS FOR US ALL. WE OURSELVES, WHO HAVE A PARTICULAR CONCERN BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH SERVICE PERSONNEL IN OMAN, HAVE BEEN URGING CAUTION ON THE OMANIS. I BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICANS ARE DOING LIKEWISE AND THAT THEY ARE MAKING REPRESENTATIONS IN JEDDA AND AMMAN.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE WHETHER THE OMANIS WILL DRAW BACK. THEY MAY CONSIDER THEMSELVES COMMITTED TO THE IRAQIS. BUT I GATHER THAT THERE ARE SOME SIGNS THAT THE IRAQI'S THEMSELVES MAY BE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS. I WONDER, WHETHER YOU HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING MAKING AN APPROACH DIRECT TO BAGHDAD. I NOTE FROM YOUR MESSAGE THAT THE IRAQIS WERE SAYING ON THURSDAY THAT QUOTE AT THAT STAGE UNQUOTE THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF UNDERTAKING MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GULF ISLANDS. THIS MIGHT OFFER A BASIS ON WHICH TO GO BACK TO THEM AND URGE RESTRAINT.

IF YOU DECIDE TO DO SO, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD BE GOOD ENOUGH NOT TO REVEAL THAT WE HAD DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF IRAQI INTENTIONS THROUGH THE OMANIS. THERE HAS, OF COURSE, BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION AT THE SOUTHERN END OF THE GULF. MOVEOVER THE IRAQIS MUST ASSUME THAT THEIR AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS WILL HAVE BEEN OBSERVED.

THESE DEVELOPMENTS UNDERLINE, IN MY VIEW, THE NEED FOR CLOSE AND CONTINUING QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATION ABOUT THE SITUATION WHICH HAS ARISEN. YOU WILL HAVE HEARD FROM M. FRANCOIS PONCET OF THE PROPOSAL THAT A QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATIVE GROUP SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN PARIS. THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE AN EXCELLENT IDEA. I WOULD HOPE, IF YOU AGREE, THAT THE GROUP COULD MEET URGENTLY. WE ARE READY TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO PARIS IMMEDIATELY A MEETING IS CONVENED. I PLAN TO BE IN TOUCH WITH HELMUT SCHMIDT ABOUT THIS LATER TODAY.

YOURS SINCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER.

BT

Sent at 1611Z/28 Pm.

Mynkod 16.35, No. 10.

SECRET

26a

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GISCARD

MY DEAR PRESIDENT,

Thank you for your message of 25 September about your meeting with M. Tareq Aziz. I am grateful to you for having kept me informed. It is clearly important that we should keep in the closest possible touch as the situation in the Middle East develops.

The position is if anything more worrying now than when you sent your message. You will have learnt, through our Ambassador, of the Iraqi Government's plan to launch an attack, using Omani facilities, against the Tumbs and Abu Muza and possibly against Bandar Abbas. Such an operation, which may well be imminent, would be bound to have the gravest repercussions for us all. We ourselves, who have a particular concern because of the presence of British service personnel in Oman, have been urging caution on the Omanis. I believe that the Americans are doing likewise and that they are making representations in Jedda and Amman.

It is difficult to judge whether the Omanis will draw back. They may consider themselves committed to the Iraqis. But I gather that there are some signs that the Iraqi's themselves may be having second thoughts. I wonder whether you have been considering making an approach direct to Baghdad. I note from your message that the Iraqis were saying on ~~Wednesday~~ THURSDAY that "at that stage" they had no intention of undertaking military operations against the Gulf Islands. This might offer a basis on which to go back to them and urge restraint.

If you decide to do so, I should be grateful if you would be good enough not to reveal that we had direct knowledge of Iraqi intentions through the Omanis. There has, of course, been a great deal of press speculation about possible military action at the Southern end of the Gulf. Moreover the Iraqis must assume that their aircraft movements will have been observed.

/These

These developments underline, in my view, the need for close and continuing quadripartite consultation about the ~~critical~~ situation which has arisen. You will have heard from M. Francois Poncet of the proposal that a Quadripartite Consultative Group should be established in Paris. This seems to me to be an excellent idea. I would hope, if you agree, that the Group could meet urgently. We ~~here stand~~ ARE ready to send a representative to Paris immediately a meeting is convened. I plan to be in touch with Helmut Schmidt about this later today.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher.

28 September, 1980

XXX

FLASH

(4)

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25

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPY

ADVANCE COPIES 22 28

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
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SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
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CABINET OFFICE DIO

Prime Minister
29.9.80

S.R.A. Acland Mr Adams

FM MODUK
TO RBDWDFG/BRITDEFAT MUSCAT
INFO RBDWDFA/FCO LONDON
RBDWW/PRODROME WASHINGTON
BT
S E C R E T
SIC 13D
FOLLOWING INFO REQUIRED BY 280800Z SEP BY DIPTEL TO FCO AND MODUK AND INFO WASHINGTON
1. SOAF ALFA BREAKDOWN OF NUMBER OF PILOTS FOR JAGUAR, HUNTER AND STRIKEMASTER AIRCRAFT IN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ROLE BY LSP, CONTRACT AND OMANI PILOTS.
BRAVO. ARMAMENTS. DETAILS OF WEAPON LOADS BY TYPE IN PARTICULAR AIR TO AIR MISSILES
2. ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE NUMBER OF BRITISH PERS INVOLVED IN WEAPONS IN GROUND TO AIR ROLE AND ASSESSMENT OF RAPIER OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
BT

IRAN/IRAQ

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ADVANCE COPIES 22 33

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FLASH BAGHDAD
FLASH MUSCAT
FLASH WASHINGTON
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DOHA DESKBY 281800Z SEP
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KUWAIT DESKBY 281800Z SEP
UKMIS NEWYORK DESKBY 281800Z
WASHINGTON DESKBY 281800Z SEP
FM AMMAN 281600Z SEP 80
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 363 OF 28 SEP
INFO FLASH MODUK (FOR COSSEC, DI4 AND DNOT - MODUK PSE PASS),
CINC FLEET, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT.
IMMEDIATE ABUDHABI, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, UKMIS
NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

FLASH

IMMEDIATE ABUDHABI, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON
PRIORITY ANKARA, DAMASCUS AND TRIPOLI.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I WAS SUMMONED TO SEE KING HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON SEMICLN HE HAD SEEN THE US AMBASSADOR HALF AN HOUR PREVIOUSLY. THE KING SAID HE HAD SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE TO THE IRAQI PRESIDENT TODAY. PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD CLAIMED TO BE WELL SATISFIED WITH THE RESULT OF THE FIGHTING AND HAD SAID THAT, NOW THAT IRAQ'S MILITARY OBJECTIVES HAD BEEN LARGELY ACHIEVED, HE INTENDED OFFEREING IRAN I CEASEFIRE LATER TODAY. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT SADDAM THAT HE WOULD WARMLY WELCOME THIS.
2. REFERRING TO HIS OWN CONTACTS WITH OTHER ARAB LEADERS, KING HUSSEIN SAID KING KHALID WAS SUPPORTING IRAQ FULLY. SHEIKH ZAID OF ABU DHABI HAD ALSO OFFERED IRAQ ANY FINANCIAL OR OTHER HELP SHE NEEDED SEMI CLN HOWEVER WHEN PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD ASKED THROUGH KING HUSSEIN FOR THE LOAN OF SOME FRENCH MIRAGE AIRCRAFT SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE IRAQI AIR FORCE, SHEIKH ZAID HAD SHIED AWAY AND OFFERED MONEY INSTEAD. SYRIA WAS BEING EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, REFUSING TO SUPPORT IRAQ AND CONTINUING TO ACCUSE JORDAN OF INTERFERENCE IN SYRIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE HAD HAD SOME VERY DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD ON THE TELEPHONE IN WHICH ''WE REALLY SHOUTED AT EACH OTHER.'' BUT HE CLAIMED THAT ASSAD HAD CALMED DOWN IN THE LAST DAY OR TWO. THE KING ALSO REFERRED TO IRAQI INTEREST IN THE USE OF OMANI AIRBASE FACILITIES AND HIS OWN INTERCESSION WITH SULTAN QABOOS ON BEHALF OF IRAQ. WHILE I WAS WITH HIM, KING HUSSEIN RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM QABOOS TO SAY THAT HE WAS SENDING A EMISSARY TO AMMAN IMMEDIATELY, FROM WHICH THE KING DEDUCED THAT HE MIGHT BE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT OFFERING THE IRAQIS DIRECT MILITARY ASSISTANCE.
3. THE KING SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHERE, FOR EXAMPLE, LIBYA AND ALGERIA NOW STOOD IN RELATION TO THE CONFLICT. BUT HE AND OTHER ARAB LEADERS HAD BEEN DISTURBED BY REPORTS THAT IRAN WAS SEEKING WEAPONS FROM MANY SOURCES, INCLUDING LIBYA (SEE ALSO PARAGRAPH 8 BELOW) AND EVEN THE UK, ALTHOUGH HE REALISED THAT SUCH REPORTS WERE PROBABLY WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS. I SAID I FELT QUITE SURE WE WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO ACCEDE TO SUCH REQUESTS EVEN IF WE HAD RECEIVED THEM. THE KING SAID HE HAD HAD NO DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE LIBYANS SINCE THE CONFLICT BEGAN.
4. I ASKED KING HUSSEIN WHETHER THE IRAQIS HAD ASKED JORDAN FOR ANY FORM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE KING SAID HE HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY SUCH REQUEST.
5. KING HUSSEIN EMPHASISED HIS FULL SUPPORT FOR WHAT IRAQ WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE. THE JORDANIANS HAD GARRISON [illegible]

ANY SUCH REQUEST.

5. KING HUSSEIN EMPHASISED HIS FULL SUPPORT FOR WHAT IRAQ WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE. THE JORDANIANS HAD CAREFULLY EXAMINED THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR THE IRAQI POSITION ON THE SHATT AND BELIEVED THE IRAQIS WERE FULLY JUSTIFIED IN THEIR CLAIMS. THE WHOLE RELATIONSWHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND THE ARAB STATES MUST BE PUT ON A NEW AND SOUNDER FOOTING, WITH AN END TO IRANIAN THREATS TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES OF THE REGION AND PRETENSIONS TO ACT AS A POLICEMEN FOR THE GULF. HE ALSO HOPED THAT THE FLEETS OF THE SUPERPOWERS COULD BE REMOVED FROM THE GULF AND THAT IT MIGHT CEASE TO BE AN AREA OF TENSION. I ASKED ABOUT THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA SEMICLN THE KING SAID HE HOPED THESE MIGHT BE RETURNED TO THE ARABS TO WHOM THEY UNCOUBTEDLY BELONGED.


6. THE KING WENT ON TO REFER TO IRAQI IDEAS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF KHUZESTAN, WHICH THEY HAD FIRST RAISED WITH THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER WHEN HE VISITED BAGHDAD EARLIER THIS WEEK AND WHICH PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD RAISED AGAIN WITH THE KING ON THE TELEPHONE YESTERDAY. THE IRAQI PRESIDENT CLAIMED OT HAVE NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS FOR IRAQ IN KHUZESTAN BUT WANTED, IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER ARAB STATES, TO FIND SOME WAY OF ALLOWING THE INHABITANTS TO EXPRESS THEIR IDENTITY (HE RECALLED THAT KHUZESTAN WAS ONCE A SELF-RULING SHEIKHDOM, HAD BEEN RUTHLESSLY SUPPRESSED BY THE SHAH'S FATHER AND THAT THE DESCENDANT OF THE LAST ARAB FULER OF KHUZESTAN WAS NOW LIVING IN, HE THOUGHT, THE UAE). THE IRAQIS HAD NO FIXED IDEAS AND WERE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE AN ARAB SOLUTION OR AN AUTONOMOUS, SEMI-INDEPENDENT STATE WITHIN AN IRANIAN FRAMEWORK. THEIR THINKING WAS THAT, IF AS SEEMED QUITE LIKELY THE REST OF IRAN WERE EVENTUALLY TO FALL UNDER COMMUNIST RULE, IT SHOULD THEN PROVE POSSIBLE TO SALVAGE KHUZESTAN. PRESIDENT SADDAM MIGHT BE SENDING AN EMISSARY WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO TO A NUMBER OF ARAB STATES IN ORDER TO SOUND OUT THEIR VIEWS ON THESE IDEAS.

7. WHEN KING HUSSEIN INVITED MY COMMENTS, I EMPHASISED THAT I WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS BUT THAT SPEAKING PERSONALLY I FELT BOUND TO ADVISE HIM THAT ACCORDING TO OUR OWN BEST ESTIMATES THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE AND THE BULK OF THE IRANIAN NAVY WERE STILL OPERATIONAL SEMICLN ANY MOVES WHICH MIGHT SPREAD THE CONFLICT FURTHER DOWN THE GULF COULD THEREFORE HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS. I FELT SURE THAT HE AND THE OTHER ARAB LEADERS CONCERNED WOULD WEIGH THESE FACTORS VERY CAREFULLY IN CONSIDERING ANY MOVES THEY MIGHT BE CONSIDERING. I WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT ARAB IDEAS FOR AN AUTONOMOUS OR INDEPENDENT KHUZESTAN, IF THEY BECAME KNOWN, WOULD ONLY BE LIKELY TO PROLONG THE CONFLICT SEMICLN THE KING SAID HE ENTIRELY AGREED. I SAID THAT THE ESSENTIAL THING SEEMED TO ME TO BE TO IMPLEMENT A CEASEFIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND TO DO NOTHING IN THE MEANWHILE WHICH MIGHT MAKE THIS MORE DIFFICULT. I THEREFORE

IN THE MEANWHILE WHICH MIGHT MAKE THIS MORE DIFFICULT. I THEREFORE FELT SURE YOU WOULD WELCOME HIS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT SADDAM'S PROPOSAL TO OFFER A CEASEFIRE LATER TODAY.

8. I HAVE SINCE COMPARED NOTES WITH MY US COLLEAGUE, WHO ON INSTRUCTIONS HAD ONCE AGAIN WARNED THE KING IN THE STRONGEST TERMS OF THE DANGERS THE AMERICANS SAW IN INVOLVING OMAN IN THE CONFLICT. HE HAD FOUND HIM MORE RECEPTIVE TO US ARGUMENTS ON THIS OCCASION AND ALTOGETHER LESS EUPHORIC AND MORE REALISTIC ABOUT THE SITUATION AND IRAN'S ABILITY TO CONTINUE THE WAR. WITH REFERENCE TO PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE, THE KING MENTIONED TO VELIOTES THAT HE HAD HEARD THE LIBYANS WERE PRESSING THE TURKS TO OFFER THE IRANIANS MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND THAT HE HAD THEREFORE SUMMONED THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR TO ENQUIRE IF THERE WERE ANY TRUTH IN THE STORY. VELIOTES HAD REMINDED THE KING THAT MOST OF THE TURKISH EQUIPMENT WAS OF US ORIGIN, WAS SUBJECT TO STRICT END-USER CONTROLS AND THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW THE AMERICANS HAD RECEIVED NO REQUEST FROM THE TURKS CONCERNING IT.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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PS/MR HURD
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CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 281455Z SEP 80
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4129 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE TO MUSCAT JEDDA AMMAN BAGHDAD

1. IRAQ/IRAN

SAUNDERS TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT THE AMERICAN CHARGE IN MUSCAT HAS NOW SPOKEN TO ZAWAWI. ZAWAWI INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH A DECISION TO ACCEDE TO THE IRAQI REQUEST HAD IN PRINCIPLE BEEN TAKEN, THERE MIGHT BE ROOM FOR RECONSIDERATION. ZAWAWI ASKED IF THE AMERICAN APPROACH WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO BRITISH THINKING. THE AMERICAN CHARGE REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH HIS BRITISH COLLEAGUE UNTIL AFTER THEY BOTH HAD BEEN SUMMONED BY ZAWAWI ON 27 SEPTEMBER. HE BELIEVED THAT THE BRITISH ALSO HAD SERIOUS MISGIVINGS BUT THAT HIS OWN APPROACH REPRESENTED INDEPENDENTLY HELD AMERICAN VIEWS.

2. THE AMERICANS HAVE ALSO SENT INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR EMBASSIES IN AMMAN AND JEDDA TO SPEAK TO THE JORDANDIANS AND SAUDIS. SAUNDERS HAD HAD NO REPORT OF THE OUTCOME OF THESE REPRESENTATIONS.

3. SAUNDERS TOLD ME INCIDENTALLY THAT AMBASSADOR VELIOTES HAD REPORTED HIS CONVERSATION WITH HM AMBASSADOR, AMMAN ABOUT HIS 24 SEPTEMBER DISCUSSION WITH KING HUSSEIN (AMMAN TEL 362).

HENDERSON

FLASH

IRAN/IRAQ

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPIES 22

To Chequers 28-9-80 - 24

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
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SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
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Sir A. Acland - Mr Adams -

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FM WASHINGTON 280527Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4126 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR ACLAND

1. PLEASE ENSURE THAT THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS, WHICH REFLECT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEWS, ARE AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPANTS AT TOMORROW'S MEETING AT CHEQUERS.

2 IT IS CLEAR THAT THE IRAQIS ARE NOW GETTING MORE ACTIVE SUPPORT FROM THE ARABS (NOTABLY SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS) IN THEIR STRUGGLE WITH IRAN. THE POSSIBLE IRAQI ATTACK ON BANDAR ABAS SHOULD BE SEEN IN THIS CONTEXT, AS SHOULD OUR OWN REACTION TO THIS PROSPECT.

3. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN SLOW TO REACT TO EVENTS, BUT APPEAR TO BE DOING SO NOW. THEY HAVE SENT STRONG MESSAGES TO KING HUSSEIN AND THE SAUDIS. (THE SAUDIS INCIDENTALLY HAVE APPARENTLY PUT OUT FEELERS TO THE AMERICANS ASKING FOR HELP WITH AIR DEFENCE IF - AS THEY SEEM TO EXPECT - THEY ARE AT SOME STAGE ATTACKED BY IRAN).

APPARENTLY PUT OUT FEELERS TO THE AMERICANS ASKING FOR HELP WITH AIR DEFENCE IF - AS THEY SEEM TO EXPECT - THEY ARE AT SOME STAGE ATTACKED BY IRAN).

4. WE KNOW THAT THE IRAQIS ARE ALREADY MOVING EQUIPMENT INTO OMAN. FROM THIS AND ZAWAWI'S ATTITUDE IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE OMANIS HAVE ALREADY PROMISED THE IRAQIS THAT THEY WILL COOPERATE, AND WOULD FIND IT HARD TO RETRACT.

5. JUDGING BY THE MILITARY ASSESSMENTS WE HAVE SEEN HERE, HOWEVER, THE OMANIS WOULD BE RUNNING SERIOUS RISKS OF WHICH THEY HAVE NOT TAKEN FULL ACCOUNT. THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN DRAWING THESE TO THEIR ATTENTION. IT NOW SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE AMERICANS WILL BE MAKING A STRONGER PITCH THAN HITHERTO TO CONVEY THEIR OWN SERIOUS MISGIVINGS. THERE THEREFORE SEEMS A CHANCE THAT OUR ACTION AND THEIRS MAY GIVE THE OMANIS CAUSE FOR SECOND THOUGHTS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECOMMENDS THAT THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRS IN MUSCAT MAKE A FURTHER APPROACH TO ZAWAWI. HE COULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT H M G HAVE AN OBVIOUS INTEREST IN THE MILITARY CONTEXT IN WHICH BRITISH L.S.P. WILL OPERATE, AND HAND OVER A PIECE OF PAPER MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. ACCORDING TO OUR INTELLIGENCE, THE IRANIAN AIRFORCE, THOUGH POTENTIALLY SHORT OF AVIATION FUEL, ARE STILL CAPABLE OF MOUNTING SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS FROM A NUMBER OF AIRFIELDS NOT PREVIOUSLY ACTIVE IN THE FIGHTING WITH IRAQ, AND WITHIN RANGE OF MUSCAT SEMICLN

B. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE IRANIANS WILL HAVE DETECTED IRAQI AIR MOVES TOWARDS OMAN, AND MIGHT SOON TAKE OBVIOUS EVASIVE MEASURES E.G. BY DISPERSING THEIR SHIPS FROM BANDAR ABAS. ANY NAVAL FORCE SURVIVING AN INITAL ATTACK WOULD FIND OMAN AN EASIER TARGET THAN IRAQ SEMICLN

C. FROM WHAT WE KNOW OF THE U.S.-OMANI ACCESS AGREEMENT THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD FEEL COMMITTED TO COMING TO OMAN'S DEFENCE AGAINST RETALIATORY ATTACK FROM IRAN, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE PROBLEM OF THE HOSTAGES.

6. IN CONVEYING THIS PIECE OF PAPER, MR TUNNELL SHOULD HOWEVER AVOID ANY SUGGESTION THAT WE MIGHT PREVENT OUR LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL FROM TAKING PART IN THE DEFENCE OF OMANI TERRITORY, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. WE WOULD LOSE ALL CREDIBILITY WITH THE OMANIS IF OUR LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL STAND BY WHILE THEY GET A BLOODY NOSE SEMICLN

PERSONNEL STAND BY WHILE THEY GET A BLOODY NOSE SEMICLN

B. WE WOULD TURN THE ARABS AS A WHOLE AGAINST US SEMICLN

C. CONVERSELY, WE SHOULD GAIN CREDIT IN ARAB OPINION IF OUR LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL WERE KNOWN TO HAVE PLAYED THEIR PART IN DEFENCE OF OMANI TERRITORY.

7. LORD CARRINGTON THINKS THAT OUR GUIDING PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE TO DISCOURAGE THE OMANIS AS UNATTRIBUTABLY AS POSSIBLE SEMICLN TO MINIMISE THE RISK OF RETALIATION BY IRAQ OR OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WHO MIGHT THINK THAT WE ARE FRUSTRATING A BLOW AGAINST IRAN SEMICLN AND TO AVOID GETTING TOO FAR IN FRONT OF THE AMERICANS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

IMMEDIATE P/B 2809002

Telegrammed

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22 28

PS (6)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
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NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

IMMEDIATE

Prime Minister
28-9-80

Sir A Acland Mr Adams

UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 280900Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 280116Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1398 OF 28 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PRIORITY BAGHDAD ROUTINE PARIS BONN MOSCOW NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD UKDEL NATO

MIPT: IRAQ/IRAN.

TEXT OF THE REVISED OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS IS:

1. CALLS UPON IRAN AND IRAQ TO REFRAIN IMMEDIATELY FROM ANY FURTHER USE OF FORCE AND TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND IN CONFORMITY WITH PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
2. URGES THEM TO ACCEPT ANY APPROPRIATE OFFER OF MEDIATION OR CONCILIATION OR TO RESORT TO REGIONAL AGENCIES OR ARRANGEMENTS OR OTHER PEACEFUL MEANS OF THEIR OWN CHOICE THAT WOULD FACILITATE THE FULFILMENT OF THEIR CHARTER OBLIGATIONS:
3. CALLS UPON ALL OTHER STATES TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT WHICH MAY LEAD TO A FURTHER ESCALATION

THE FULFILMENT OF THEIR CHARTER OBLIGATIONS;
3. CALLS UPON ALL OTHER STATES TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT WHICH MAY LEAD TO A FURTHER ESCALATION AND WIDENING OF THE CONFLICT;
4. SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE OFFER OF HIS GOOD OFFICES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THIS SITUATION;
5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS.

PARSONS

NNNN

D/B 280900Z

Telegraphed

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

IMMEDIATE

22-28

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
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Prime Minister
29.9.80.

S. A. Adams Mr Adams

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DESKBY 280900Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 280115Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1397 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PRIORITY BAGHDAD ROUTINE PARIS BONN MOSCOW NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD UKDEL NATO

MY TEL 1394: SECURITY COUNCIL: IRAQ/IRAN

1. THE NEWS OF PRESIDENT ZIA'S ARRIVAL IN TEHRAN WAS BROKEN TO US BY NAIK (PAKISTAN) WHEN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ASSEMBLED THIS MORNING (27 SEPTEMBER).

NAIK ADDED THAT HIS PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THAT NO RESOLUTION SHOULD BE ADOPTED DURING HIS TALKS IN TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD, PRESUMABLY FOR FEAR OF ADVERSE IRANIAN REACTION. MEANWHILE KITTANI (IRAQ), IN THE PLUNTEST POSSIBLE TERMS, ARGUED AGAINST THE ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION UNTIL AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF HIS FOREIGN MINISTER (CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR 30 SEPTEMBER).

SCHEDULED FOR 30 SEPTEMBER).

2. BETWEEN THEM THEY SUCCEEDED IN FRIGHTENING OF THE NON-ALIGNED. AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE (WHICH EVENTUALLY BEG AT 6 PM) MUNOZ LEDO (MEXICO), SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF HIS GROUP, SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION WAS ACCEPTABLE HE COULD NOT AGREE TO FIXING A TIME FOR IT TO BE PUT TO A VOTE. ALGARD (NORWAY) HAD PREVIOUSLY SAID THAT HE COULD ONLY AGREE TO A POSTPONEMENT OF THE VOTE UNTIL TOMORROW (28 SEPTEMBER) ON CONDITION THAT ALL AGREED THAT A VOTE WOULD BE TAKEN AT 11 AM OUR TIME. MUNOZ LEDO AND THE OTHER NON-ALIGNED ALL REFUSED TO ACCEPT THIS CONDITION AND WERE ADAMANT THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD ACCEDE TO ZIA'S REQUEST.

3. SINCE NO TIME FOR A VOTE WAS AGREED ALGARD REFUSED EVEN TO TABLE THE RESOLUTION. IT WAS THEN DECIDED THAT, WITHOUT A RESOLUTION OR VOTE, IT WAS POINTLESS TO CONVENE IN FORMAL SESSION TONIGHT MERELY TO HEAR A FEW SPEECHES.
MCHENRY (US) WHO HAD EARLIER ARGUED STRONGLY FOR A VOTE ON THE DRAFT TODAY PUT UP NO FURTHER FIGHT. A FORMAL SESSION OF THE COUNCIL HAS BEEN FIXED FOR 281900Z BY WHICH TIME THE RESULTS OF ZIA'S EFFORTS MAY BE KNOWN. FIRST RADIO REPORTS FROM TEHRAN ARE NOT ENCOURAGING.

4. TEXT OF THE SLIGHTLY REVISED OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IS IN MIFT.

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FM BRITNAVAT MUSCAT 280533Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
TELEGRAM NUMBER LAA/UAJ OF 280533Z SEPTEMBER
AND TO CINCFLEET, FCO
INFO PRIORITY CTG 318.2, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

FOR DNOT. FCO MED.
STRAITS OF HORMUZ. SITREP 280200Z SEP.
1. DURING LAST 24 HOURS TRAFFIC IN AND OUT OF STRAITS HAS BEEN NORMAL. NO INTERFERENCE OR INTERROGATION BY IRANIANS.

2. OMANI FORCES NOT IN CONTACT WITH IRANIAN SHIPS BUT RADAR TRACKING INDICATES ONLY ONE IRANIAN ON EAST WEST PATROL 15 MILES NORTH GREAT QUOIN ISLAND. NOTHING HEARD IRANIAN PATROL ABU MUSA/TUNBS. WHEN SNV AL SAID PASSED ISLANDS NIGHT 25/26 SEP AN IRANIAN FLASHED HER UP AND WARNED HER TO KEEP SOUTH OF ISLANDS AND CLEAR IRANIAN WATERS. ASSESS ONE IRANIAN ON

SEP AN IRANIAN FLASHED HER UP AND WARNED HER TO KEEP SOUTH OF ISLANDS AND CLEAR IRANIAN WATERS. ASSESS ONE IRANIAN ON PATROL STRAITS AND ONE OFF ISLANDS. OTHER UNITS PROBABLY RETURNED BANDAR ABBAS TO REPLENISH.

3. OMANI UNIT IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH IRANIANS IN OMANI WATERS PM 22 SEP REPORTS THAT IRANIAN WAS OPERATING SEARCH AND NAVIGATIONAL RADARS BUT NOT FIRE CONTROL. 35MM GUNS WERE TRAINED TOWARDS OMANIS BUT DID NOT TRACK THEM. THEY ASSESSED IRANIANS AS NOT AT FULL OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY.

4. KRIVAK REMAINS ABSENT.

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Prime Minister
28.9.80

J.A.A. Adam

GR 148
SECRET
FM BRITNAVAT MUSCAT 280825Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
TELEGRAM NUMBER U2H/KAG/LAA OF 280825Z SEPTEMBER
AND TO FCO, CINCFLEET
INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FCO MED.
IRAQI HELOS MUSCAT. SITREP TWO.
BRITNAVAT MUSCAT U2H/KAG/LAA 270915Z SEP.
1. TWO IRAQI SUPER FRELONS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED REMAIN SOAF SEEB. NO SIGN OF STORES LANDED BY IRAQI AN 12 CUBS NIGHT 26/27 SEP BUT BELIEVED TO HAVE INCLUDED AIRCRAFT MISSILES. NO KNOWLEDGE OF TYPE LANDED BUT FRELONS CAN BE FITTED TO CARRY EXOCET FOR GROUND/SHIP ATTACK. MISSION RADIUS WITH TWO EXOCET IS 350 NM. UNABLE TO GET SIGHT OF HELO WEAPON STATIONS.

2. DURING EVENING 27 SEP SKYVANS/DEFENDERS/HELOS NORMALLY STATIONED SOAF SEEB WERE DISPERSED TO FIRQ/SAIQ/NIZWA/IZKI AIRSTRIPS AND RETURNED SOAF SEEB AM 28 SEP.

3. NO IRAQI AIR MOVEMENT INTO SOAF SEEB NIGHT 27/28 SEP DESPITE SOAF DISPERSAL.

4. SOAF DISPERSAL FROM SEEB AGAIN PROGRAMMED FOR NIGHT 28/29 SEP.

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GR 600
SECRET
FM MUSCAT 281741Z SEP 80
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO FLASH MODUK (FOR COSSEC DI4 AND DNOT), CINCFLEET, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI,.2977-8,
INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 370 OF 28 SEPTEMBER: IRAQ/IRAN

1. I WAS ABLE TO SEE QAIS ZAWAWI THIS EVENING SHORTLY BEFORE HE LEFT TO SEE THE SULTAN IN SALALAH. HE WILL BE RETURNING TO MUSCAT TOMORROW EVENING (29TH).

2. I THANKED ZAWAWI FOR SEEING ME AT SHORT NOTICE AND FOR HIS FRANKNESS WITH US THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS. I SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD A NATURAL INTEREST IN THESE MATTERS NOT

BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD A NATURAL INTEREST IN THESE MATTERS NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH OMAN BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL AND THAT IT WAS NATURAL THAT WE SHOULD WISH TO BE CLEAR ABOUT ANY MILITARY OPERATIONS. QAIS SHOWED NO DISPOSITION TO RAISE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF LSP AND I LEFT THE MATTER THERE. FROM OUR CONVERSATION YEMTERDAY (MY TELNO 268) I WOULD JUDGE THAT THE OMANIS ARE CONFIDENT THAT LSP WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY DEFENSIVE OPERATION WITHIN OMANI TERRITORY.

3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS GOOD THAT WE COULD, AS OLD FRIENDS, SPEAK FRANKLY. MY GOVERNMENT'S VIEW REMAINED THAT OMAN MIGHT BE BITING OFF MORE THAN IT COULD CHEW AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE WERE URGING RESTRAINT AND FURTHER CONSIDERATION. I STRESSED THAT WE HAD NO AXE TO GRIND ABOUT IRAQI ACTIONS IN GENERAL BUT THAT OUR SOLE CONCERN WAS OMAN'S WELL-BEING.

4. I THEN HANDED OVER A PIECE OF PAPER CONTAINING THE POINTS IN PARA 1 OF TUR. IN THE BRIEF CONVERSATION WHICH FOLLOWED I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT QAIS HIMSELF HAD SERIOUS WORRIES ABOUT THE OPERATION. I SAID THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE IRANIANS STILL HAD A SURPRISING AMOUNT OF FIRE-POWER LEFT AND THAT IT MIGHT BE PRUDENT TO WAIT AND SEE HOW LONG THIS STRENGTH WOULD LAST. QAIS SEEMED TO AGREE ABOUT THE IRANIAN STRENGTH AND COMMENTED THAT THE LATTER STILL APPEARED TO BE HOLDING OUT IN AHWAZ. IN RESPONSE TO POINT B IN PARA 1 OF TUR HE ARGUED RATHER WEAKLY THAT IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE THAT THE IRANIANS MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE POINT OF DEPARTURE OF THE HELICOPTERS. I SAID THAT I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THEY HAD NOT ALREADY PUT TWO AND TWO TOGETHER. (IN THIS CONNECTION MY US COLLEAGUE HAS TOLD ZAWAWI OF A US REPORT FROM LONDON TO THE EFFECT THAT THE BRITISH PRESS - ?MONDAY'S FINANCIAL TIMES - WILL BE REPORTING THE MOVEMENT OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT TO OMAN OR THE UAE).

5. FINALLY I SAID THAT IF HIS MAJESTY REQUIRED ANY FURTHER INFORMATION OR WISHED HIMSELF TO PASS ANY MESSAGES TO LONDON I WOULD OF COURSE BE AVAILABLE.

6. I AM MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACT WITH MY US COLLEAGUE. HE MADE PARALLEL REPRESENTATIONS TO ZAWAWI ON 28 SEPTEMBER AND HANDED OVER A MESSAGE URGING RESTRAINT FROM THE US SECRETARY OF STATE. BUCK SHARES MY VIEW THAT THE OMANIS ARE BEING EXTREMELY NAIVE IN FALLING IN WITH IRAQI PLANS WITH NO SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO ASSESS THE STRENGTH OF LIKELY IRANIAN REACTION.

ATTEMPT TO ASSESS THE STRENGTH OF LIKELY IRANIAN REACTION.

7. BUCK ALSO SHARES MY IMPRESSION THAT ZAWAWI AND OTHERS ARE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE OPERATION BUT HAVE LITTLE PROSPECT OF PREVAILING ON QABOOS. THERE IS SOME SUGGESTION THAT THE US MAY CONSIDER SENDING OUT A SENIOR OFFICIAL TO SEEK TO DISSUADE THE OMANIS. BUT TIME IS SHORT. FROM A REMARK DROPPED BY ZAWAWI TO BUCK IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE ORIGINAL TIMING FOR THE OPERATION MAY HAVE BEEN TOMORROW MORNING (29 SEPTEMBER). ZAWAWI'S DEPARTURE FOR SALALAH WILL WE HOPE RESULT IN SOME DELAY, BUT THE OMANIS ARE PLAYING THIS CLOSE TO THE CHEST.

8. I HAVE THBXIMPRESSION THAT MY US COLLEAGUE HAS BEEN FAIRLY TOUGH IN HIS REPRESENTATIONS TO ZAWAWI AND I DO NOT THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE GETTING IN FRONT OF THE AMERICANS (Q RA 3 OF TUR).

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Sir A Acland.

GR 90

CONFIDENTIAL
FM JEDDA 280922Z SEP 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 710 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, DEPT OF ENERGY.

IRAQI OIL

1. ZAKI YAMANI SEEMED WELL INFORMED LAST NIGHT ON THE IRAQI OIL SITUATION. HE ANTICIPATED THE BBC REPORT OF THE DAMAGE DONE TO THE PIPELINE THROUGH TURKEY. HE SAID THAT DAMAGE DONE TO THE OIL INSTALLATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ WAS MINOR. HE SAID THAT THE PIPELINE THROUGH SYRIA TO THE MEDITERRANEAN HAD NOT BEEN OPERATING FOR SOME MONTHS EXCEPT FOR MINOR SUPPLIES FOR SYRIAN DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION. IT WOULD TAKE TWO OR THREE WEEKS TO GET IT BACK INTO FULL RUNNING ORDER.

CRAIG

Telegramed.
28-9

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IRAN/IRAQ

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IMMEDIATE

Prime Minister
29.9.80.

Mr Adam

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 281400Z
FM JEDDA 280800Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 709 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MUSCAT, BAGHDAD.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.558: IRAN/IRAQ

1. I RECOGNISE THAT THE PROS AND CONS OF TELLING THE SAUDIS OF THE PROPOSED IRAQI/OMANI OPERATION ARE FINELY BALANCED. BUT WE ARE COMMITTED TO KEEPING THE SAUDIS INFORMED OF MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1364 PARA 4) - A PROCESS WHICH I BEGAN YESTERDAY WITH THE MFA. AND NOW THAT THE RULER OF DUBAI HAS BEEN TOLD (DUBAI TELNO 34 TO ABU DHABI) AND WE KNOW THAT KING HUSSEIN IS IN THE PICTURE (AMMAN TELNO 362) I WONDER WHETHER WE CAN AFFORD NOT TO TELL THE SAUDIS.

2. WE NEED NOT URGE THEM TO ANY PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION,

NOT TO TELL THE SAUDIS.

2. WE NEED NOT URGE THEM TO ANY PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION, BUT SIMPLY SAY THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR COMMITMENT TO PASS INFORMATION TO THEM WE THOUGHT THEY OUGHT TO KNOW OF THIS LATEST DEVELOPMENT. IF ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS, WE COULD EXPRESS DISQUIET BUT ADD THAT THE DECISION WHAT TO DO WAS UP TO THEM.

3. PRINCE SAUD IN NEW YORK WOULD STILL BE THE BEST CHANNEL OF APPROACH; ALTERNATIVELY, OR IN PARALLEL, PRINCE TURKI HERE.

CRAIG

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AD ANOTHER

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GR 160

CONFIDENTIAL
FM JEDDA 280709Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 708 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE DEPT. OF ENERGY, WASHINGTON AND CARACAS.

WASHINGTON TELNO 4123: SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

1. YAMANI, WHOM I SAW LAST NIGHT WITH MR LAMONT, MADE NO REPEAT NO MENTION OF ANY DECISION TO INCREASE PRODUCTION. ON THE CONTRARY, WHILE AGREEING THAT THE LOSS OF IRAQI AND IRANIAN EXPORTS OF CRUDE WOULD NOT FOR THE TIME BEING CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS PROBLEM, HE SAID THAT THE WAR WOULD STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF THOSE PRODUCERS (E.G. LIBYA AND NIGERIA) WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN FORCED BY THE GLUT TO REDUCE THEIR PRICES BY THE END OF THE YEAR. HE ADDED THAT PROVIDED THE WAR DID NOT LAST MORE THAN, SAY, A MONTH, THE GLUT MIGHT WELL RETURN BY SPRING/SUMMER 1981. UNLESS HE WAS BEING VERY DISINGENUOUS HE SURELY WOULD NOT HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT WITHOUT AT LEAST MENTIONING A DECISION BY SOME OPEC MEMBERS TO INCREASE PRODUCTION, IF SUCH A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN.

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Prime Minister
28.9.80

S.A. Adams

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FM JEDDA 280704Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 707 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, MUSCAT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI.

MUSCAT TELNOS 269 (PARA 4) AND 270.

1. IT SEEMS TO ME UNLIKELY THAT THE SAUDIS HAVE AGREED TO COOPERATE IN THIS WAY. THE MFA, SHAIKH ZAKI YAMANI AND PRINCE TURKI (HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE) ALL CONFIRMED TO US YESTERDAY THAT KING KHALID, IN SPEAKING BY TELEPHONE TO SADDAM HUSSAIN, HAD EXPLAINED SAUDI INABILITY TO ISSUE A STATEMENT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT. INDEED, RPINCE TURKI SAID THAT SADDAM HAD ASSURED THE KING THAT HE QUITE UNDERSTOOD THE REASONS FOR THIS.

CRAIG

IRAN/IRAQ

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SECRET UK COMMS ONLY
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FM MUSCAT 281741Z SEP 80
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO FLASH MODUK (FOR COSSEC DI4 AND DNOT), CINCFLEET, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI,.2977-8,
INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 370 OF 28 SEPTEMBER: IRAQ/IRAN

1. I WAS ABLE TO SEE QAIS ZAWAWI THIS EVENING SHORTLY BEFORE HE LEFT TO SEE THE SULTAN IN SALALAH. HE WILL BE RETURNING TO MUSCAT TOMORROW EVENING (29TH).

2. I THANKED ZAWAWI FOR SEEING ME AT SHORT NOTICE AND FOR HIS FRANKNESS WITH US THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS. I SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD A NATURAL INTEREST IN THESE MATTERS NOT

BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD A NATURAL INTEREST IN THESE MATTERS NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH OMAN BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL AND THAT IT WAS NATURAL THAT WE SHOULD WISH TO BE CLEAR ABOUT ANY MILITARY OPERATIONS. QAIS SHOWED NO DISPOSITION TO RAISE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF LSP AND I LEFT THE MATTER THERE. FROM OUR CONVERSATION YEMTERDAY (MY TELNO 268) I WOULD JUDGE THAT THE OMANIS ARE CONFIDENT THAT LSP WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY DEFENSIVE OPERATION WITHIN OMANI TERRITORY.

3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS GOOD THAT WE COULD, AS OLD FRIENDS, SPEAK FRANKLY. MY GOVERNMENT'S VIEW REMAINED THAT OMAN MIGHT BE BITING OFF MORE THAN IT COULD CHEW AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE WERE URGING RESTRAINT AND FURTHER CONSIDERATION. I STRESSED THAT WE HAD NO AXE TO GRIND ABOUT IRAQI ACTIONS IN GENERAL BUT THAT OUR SOLE CONCERN WAS OMAN'S WELL-BEING.

4. I THEN HANDED OVER A PIECE OF PAPER CONTAINING THE POINTS IN PARA 1 OF TUR. IN THE BRIEF CONVERSATION WHICH FOLLOWED I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT QAIS HIMSELF HAD SERIOUS WORRIES ABOUT THE OPERATION. I SAID THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE IRANIANS STILL HAD A SURPRISING AMOUNT OF FIRE-POWER LEFT AND THAT IT MIGHT BE PRUDENT TO WAIT AND SEE HOW LONG THIS STRENGTH WOULD LAST. QAIS SEEMED TO AGREE ABOUT THE IRANIAN STRENGTH AND COMMENTED THAT THE LATTER STILL APPEARED TO BE HOLDING OUT IN AHWAZ. IN RESPONSE TO POINT B IN PARA 1 OF TUR HE ARGUED RATHER WEAKLY THAT IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE THAT THE IRANIANS MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE POINT OF DEPARTURE OF THE HELICOPTERS. I SAID THAT I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THEY HAD NOT ALREADY PUT TWO AND TWO TOGETHER. (IN THIS CONNECTION MY US COLLEAGUE HAS TOLD ZAWAWI OF A US REPORT FROM LONDON TO THE EFFECT THAT THE BRITISH PRESS - ?MONDAY'S FINANCIAL TIMES - WILL BE REPORTING THE MOVEMENT OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT TO OMAN OR THE UAE).


5. FINALLY I SAID THAT IF HIS MAJESTY REQUIRED ANY FURTHER INFORMATION OR WISHED HIMSELF TO PASS ANY MESSAGES TO LONDON I WOULD OF COURSE BE AVAILABLE.

6. I AM MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACT WITH MY US COLLEAGUE. HE MADE PARALLEL REPRESENTATIONS TO ZAWAWI ON 28 SEPTEMBER AND HANDED OVER A MESSAGE URGING RESTRAINT FROM THE US SECRETARY OF STATE. BUCK SHARES MY VIEW THAT THE OMANIS ARE BEING EXTREMELY NAIVE IN FALLING IN WITH IRAQI PLANS WITH NO SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO ASSESS THE STRENGTH OF LIKELY IRANIAN REACTION.

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8. I HAVE THBXIMPRESSION THAT MY US COLLEAGUE HAS BEEN FAIRLY TOUGH IN HIS REPRESENTATIONS TO ZAWAWI AND I DO NOT THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE GETTING IN FRONT OF THE AMERICANS (Q RA 3 OF TUR).



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IRAN/IRAQ

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GR 174
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MUSCAT 280920Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 274 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD

JEDDA TELNO 558: IRAN/IRAQ

1. AS YOU KNOW THE OMANIS HAVE PUT GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE SECRECY OF THIS OPERATION, AND I HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE NO REPERCUSSIONS ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THEM FROM THE DISCLOSURES ALREADY MADE IN THE UAE. FOR THIS REASON I WOULD PREFER THE SAUDIS NOT TO BE TOLD BUT I RECOGNISE THAT IN OUR WIDER INTERESTS IT MAY BE DESIRABLE.

2. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO WHAT EXTEND THE IRAQIS HAVE BRIEFED OTHER ARAB STATES IN THE AREA OR FOR THAT MATTER WHICH STATES THEY HAVE USED FOR STAGING THEIR HELICOPTERS. IT MAY BE THAT THE IRAQIS WILL NOW HAVE TOLD THE SAUDIS. WHATEVER DECISION IS TAKEN WE SHOULD BE AWARE THAT ANY SUBSEQUENT CRITICISM OVER

IS TAKEN WE SHOULD BE AWARE THAT ANY SUBSEQUENT CRITICISM OVER LEAKS APPEARS LIKELY ON PRESENT FORM TO BE DIRECTED AT US RATHER THAN THE AMERICANS. IN ANY EVENT I THINK WE MIGHT CONSIDER DISCUSSING WITH AMERICANS A JOINT APPROACH ON DISCLOSURES IN GENERAL.

TUNNELL

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FOCAB 006/28

GR 115
SECRET
DESKBY FCO AND WASHINGTON 281030Z
FM MUSCAT 280855Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 273 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
AND TO WASHINGTON (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

YOUR TELNO 369 OF 28 SEPTEMBER: IRAQ/IRAN
1. I TOOK ACTION ON PARAGRAPH 2 BY TELEPHONE WITH ZAWAWI WHO IS AT HOME INDISPOSED THIS MORNING. SINCE HE APPEARED TO TAKE THE NEWS OF A LEAK SURPRISINGLY CALMLY AND SUGGESTED THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT HAVE TOLD RASHID I DID NOT MAKE THE POINT THAT WE WERE RESPONSIBLE BUT MERELY SAID THAT WE WISHED THE OMANIS TO BE AWARE OF THIS DEVELOPMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. QAIS SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER THIS MATTER FURTHER WITH THOSE RESPONSIBLE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND WOULD CONTACT ME AGAIN IF HE REQUIRED ANY FURTHER INFORMATION.

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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 23 ~~22~~

PS (6) ADVANCE COPY NO 10 DOWNING STREET -
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PS/MR HURD
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SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
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Mr A Adams Mr A Adams

SECRET
FM MUSCAT 280658Z SEP 80
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 272 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
AND TO MODUK
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

1. MODUK 13D 272137Z SEP DELAYED HEAVY HIGH PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC. RECEIVED DEFENCE SECTION 280400Z.

2. PILOTS.
A. HUNTER. 2 BRIT LSP. 3 BRIT CONTRACT. 5 OMANI (1 UK).
B. JAGUAR. 2 BRIT LSP. 5 BRIT CONTRACT. 1 OMANI DOING CONVERSION.
C. STRIKEMASTER. 3 BRIT LSP. 3 BRIT CONTRACT. NIL OMANI QUALIFIED BUT 11 STUDENTS.

3. WEAPONLOADS.
A. HUNTER. 4 X 30MM. 2 X 1000 LB OR 18 SURA. NO AAM.
B. JAGUAR. 2 X 30MM. UP TO 8 X 400 KILO. NO AAM.
C. STRIKEMASTER. 2 X 7.62MM. 24 SURA OR 4 X 550 LB.

4. AA DEFENCE. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RAPIER FIRE UNITS

C. STRIKEMASTER. 2 X 7.62MM. 24 SURA OR 4 X 550 LB.

4. AA DEFENCE. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RAPIER FIRE UNITS VERY GOOD BUT OPTICAL ONLY. CREWS WELL TRAINED AND PRACTICED. 4 BRIT CONTRACT.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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RESTRICTED
FM BAGHDAD 281050Z SEP 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 446 OF 28/9/80
FOR INFO TO PRIORITY KUWAIT JEDDA DAMASCUS ANKARA MOSCOW AMMAN
WASHINGTON TOKYO(FOR SEC OF STATE)

IRAQ/IRAN SITREP: MY TEL NO 442

1. BY THE EVENING OF 27 SEPTEMBER, IRAQ HAD CLAIMED THAT ITS TROOPES WERE IN AHWAZ CAPITAL OF KHUZISTAN, AND WITHIN SIGHT OF DEZFUL. THERE WERE THREE MINOR AIR RAIDS ON MILITARY TARGETS IN BAGHDAD YESTERDAY (27 SEPTEMBER), AND TWO FALSE ALARMS.

2. THE GENERAL COMMAND OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES ISSUED SEVEN STATEMENTS DURING 27 SEPTEMBER. MAIN POINTS AS FOLLOWS:-

STATEMNET 39

BY THE END OF 26 SEPTEMBER, IRAQI FORCES HAD MADE THE FOLLOWING GAINS:

ING GAINS:

NORTHERN SECTOR:

IRAQI FORCES IN CONTROL OF THE KHUSRAWI - QASR-I-SHIRIN - SAR-I-PUL ZUHAB ROAD AND ALL IRANIAN RESISTANCE BETWEEN NAFTSHAH AND SUMAR WIPED OUT.

CENTRAL SECTOR:

IRAQI FORCES WITHIN SIGHT OF DEZFUL AFTER TAKING CONTROL OF THE IMAM ZADA ABBAS, AL KANANEH AND AL BISAITIN AREAS.

SOUTHERN SECTOR:

IRAQI FORCES WITHIN SIGHT OF AHWAZ AND SUSANGERD AFTER TAKING CONTROL OF THE AL SHARIF AND AL SHATLIYAT AREAS. HEAVY LOSSES INFLICTED ON THE IRANIANS IN ALL SECTORS.
FORTY-FOUR TANKS CAPTURED (FORTY IN THE KHUSRAWI AREA) AND SIXTY THREE DESTROYED. ONE HELICOPTER SHOT DOWN AND ONE PATROL BOAT SUNK OPPOSITE ABADAN.

IRANIAN CASUALTIES: ALLEGEDLY EIGHTY DEAD AND A LARGE NUMBER CAPTURED. IRAQI LOSSES: SIXTEEN DEAD, FOURTEEN WOUNDED.

STATEMENT 40.

IRAQI ADVANCED IN THE KHAFAJIYA AREA AND THE IRAQI FLAG WAS RAISED OVER SUSANGERD.

STATEMENT 41

IRAQI FORCES IN AHWAZ. THE OBJECTIVE SET BY THE LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN ACHIEVED.

STATEMENT 42.

AT 1000 HOURS ON 27 SEPTEMBER, IRANIAN FORCES OPENED FIRE WITH HEAVY ARTILLERY AND ROCKETS ON IRAQI FORCES IN SURBIL ZAHAB. OUR FORCES RETURNED THE FIRE, KILLING EIGHTY IRANIANS.

TWO IRANIAN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN OVER ZAIN AL QAWS.

STATEMENT 43.

THE IRAQI AIRFORCE TODAY ATTACKED THE FOLLOWING TARGETS:
SANANAJ AIRPORT
ALRADA'IYA AIRPORT
A CONCENTRATION OF VEHICLES IN DEHLARAN
ENEMY ARMOUR IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR
AN OIL DEPOT IN MASJID-I-SULAIMAN (ONE HELICOPTER DESTROYED NEARBY)
TWO IRAQI AIRCRAFT LOST.

STATEMENT 44.

FIERCE FIGHTING ALONG THE FRONT LINE: ENEMY FORCES FLEEING AND HEAVY LOSSES INFLICTED.
THE COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF MOHAMMARAH (KHORRAMSHAHR) NAVAL BASE. TEN AIRCRAFT AND ONE HELICOPTER SHOT DOWN OVER THE BATTLEFIELD. THIRTY TANKS CAPTURED.
IRANIAN CASUALTIES: THIRTY DEAD
IRAQI ,, : NINE DEAD, 26 WOUNDED.

STATEMENT 45

IRANIAN AIR ATTACKS ON BAGHDAD AT 1255 HOURS AND 1630 HOURS. MATERIAL DAMAGE ONLY . (MENTION OF THE EARLY MORNING RAID WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING REPORTED IN MY TUR SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SUPRESSED).

3. THE STATEMENTS DO NOT REPORT AIR ATTACKS ELSEWHERE IN IRAQ. THE IRAQIS MAY BE TRYING TO SUPPRESS MENTION OF THEM. ALTERNATIVELY, THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO MOUNT ATTACKS WITH THE SAME FREQUENCY AS IT DID IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE FIGHTING: OR THEIR AIRCRAFT ARE BEING USED MORE TO SUPPORT TROOPS IN THE FRONT LINE: OR BOTH.

4. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN A NUMBER OF FALSE ALARMS (TWO YESTERDAY AND TWO THIS MORNING, 28 SEPTEMBER). THE AUTHORITIES MAY SIMPLY BE JUMPY AFTER THEIR FAILURE TO PROVIDE WARNING OF THE DAWN RAID ON 27 SEPTEMBER. IT MAY, HOWEVER, BE A DELIBERATE IRANIAN PLOY: BY USING THEIR AIRCRAFT TO TRIGGER THE RADAR DEFENCE SYSTEM AND THE ALARM SIRENS IN BAGHDAD WITHOUT PRESSING HOME AN ATTACK, THEY CAUSE ALMOST THE SAME AMOUNT OF DISRUPTION TO LIFE IN THE CITY AS A GENUINE RAID, THEREBY UNDERMINIG CIVILIAN MORALE.

5. DRIVING HIS OWN CAR, SADDAM HUSSAIN CONDUCTED A MUCH PUBLICISED MORALE BOOSTING TOUR OF BAGHDAD AT NOON ON 7 SEPTEMBER. SHADES OF QASIM AFTER THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT IN 1959. NOT TO

MORALE BOOSTING TOUR OF BAGHDAD AT NOON ON 7 SEPTEMBER. SHADES OF QASIM AFTER THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT IN 1959, NOT TO MENTION HARUN AL-RASHID WHEN CHECKING UP ON THE BARMECIDES

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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

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RESTRICTED
FM ISLAMABAD 280935Z SEP 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1304 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO WASINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, DELHI.

UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 1397
IRAQ-IRAN: PRESIDENT ZIA'S MISSION

1. BEFORE HE LEFT ISLAMABAD FOR TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD ON 27 SEPTEMBER, PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ TOLD REPORTERS THAT HIS MISSION WAS QUOTE PURELY EXPLORATORY UNQUOTE. TODAY'S PAKISTAN PRESS REPORTS FROM TEHRAN THAT HE TOOK THE SAME LINE WITH THE IRANIANS ON ARRIVAL AND HAD BEEN WELCOMED BY KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVE AS HEAD OF A BROTHERLY COUNTRY NOT AS A MEDIATOR. A PAKISTAN FOREIGN OFFICE STATEMENT HAD EARLIER SAID THAT THE MISSION WAS MEANT TO ASCERTAIN THE VIEWS OF IRAN AND IRAQ IN REGARD TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR CONFLICT IN THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY.

2. BRIEFING THE RCDS TODAY, RIAZ PIRACHA, FOREIGN SECRETARY, SAID THAT ZIA HAD BEEN IN DIRECT TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH THE TWO HEADS OF STATE TO SEE IF HE COULD HELP, BEFORE THE SUGGESTION OF A MISSION WAS RAISED. THERE WERE [illegible]

HEADS OF STATE TO SEE IF HE COULD HELP, BEFORE THE SUGGESTION OF A MISSION WAS RAISED. THERE WERE TALKS LAST NIGHT OVER DINNER WITH THE IRANIANS, AND THEY WERE TO BE RESUMED THIS MORNING, THE PAKISTANIS HAD NOT YET HAD A REPORT. ZIA'S PLANE HAD BEEN SENT TO PICK UP HABIB CHATTY, WHO WAS STRANDED IN DHAHRAN. ZIA WAS AIMING TO LEAVE FOR BAGHDAD TODAY, 28 SEPTEMBER, GOING ON TO PARIS TONIGHT OR TOMORROW.

3. PIRACHA EMPHASISED THAT IT WAS ENTIRELY A GOODWILL MISSION AND THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF MEDIATING OR OFFERING GOOD OFFICES: THE OBJECT WOULD BE TO SEE IF THERE WAS THE BASIS FOR A CEASE FIRE AND THEN HAND OVER THE PEACE MAKING PROCESS TO OTHERS. THE PAKISTANIS HAD NO PARTICULAR SOLUTION IN MIND, AND HAD NO AXE TO GRIND, BEING ANXIOUS ONLY TO END A DANGEROUS SITUATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MOST OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES WERE SUPPORTING IRAQ, BUT PAKISTAN HAD BEEN ACCEPTED (APPARENTLY RATHER RELUCTANTLY BY THE IRANIANS) AS A NEUTRAL. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, PIRACHA SAID THAT PAKISTAN WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN ISLAMIC PEACE KEEPING FORCE IF INVITED TO DO SO, BUT NO SUCH SUGGESTION HAD BEEN MADE AND ANYHOW THIS WAS A WORLD PROBLEM AS WELL AS AN ISLAMIC ONE.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.

FORSTER

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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22 33

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NO 10 DOWNING STREET
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Sir A Acland

Prime Minister
28-9-80

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CONFIDENTIAL
FROM ABU DHABI 281900Z SEP 80
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 302 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD
MUSCAT JEDDA KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA AND DUBAI
MIPT IRAQ/IRAN.

1. SUROOR CLEARLY KNOWS MORE ABOUT IRAQI/OMANI INTENTIONS THAN HE CLAIMS. HE CAN HARDLY HAVE ALLOWED THE IRAQIS TO TRANSIT ABU DHABI WITHOUT ENQUIRING WHAT THEY WERE UP TO.

2. HE OBVIOUSLY THINKS THAT THE SOURCE OF OUR INFORMATION IS BRITISH OFFICERS IN MUSCAT, I DID NOT ENLIGHTEN HIM.

3. I JUDGE THAT IT HAS DONE NO HARM TO LET THE UAE SIDE KNOW THAT WE ARE AWARE THAT SOMETHING IS AFOOT, IF NOTHING ELSE IT WILL HAVE CAUSED THEM TO THINK AGAIN ABOUT ANY ACTION TO RECOVER THE ISLANDS WHETHER THEY ARE OVERTLY INVOLVED OR NOT

FLASH

ROBERTS

21

S E C R E T

GR 350

SECRET
FM F.C.O. 281308Z SEP 80
TO FLASH MUSCAT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 370 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO FLASH MODUK (FOR COSSEC DI4 AND DNOT), CINCFLEET, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, DUBAI,
INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 269: IRAN/IRAQ

1. YOU SHOULD FORTHWITH MAKE A FURTHER APPROACH TO ZAWAWI. YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT H.M.G. HAVE AN OBVIOUS INTEREST IN THE MILITARY CONTEXT IN WHICH BRITISH L.S.P. WILL OPERATE, AND HAND OVER A PIECE OF PAPER MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

A. ACCORDING TO OUR INTELLIGENCE, THE IRAN AIRFORCE, THOUGH POTENTIALLY SHORT OF AVIATION FUEL, ARE STILL CAPABLE OF MOUNTING SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS FROM A NUMBER OF AIRFIELDS NOT PREVIOUSLY ACTIVE IN THE FIGHTING WITH IRAQ, AND WITHIN RANGE OF MUSCAT:

B. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE IRANIANS WILL HAVE DETECTED IRAQI AIR MOVES TOWARDS OMAN, AND MIGHT SOON TAKE OBVIOUS EVASIVE MEASURES E.G. BY DISPERSING THEIR SHIPS FROM BANDAR ABBAS. ANY NAVAL FORCE SURVIVING AN INITIAL ATTACK WOULD FIND OMAN AN EASIER TARGET THAN IRAQ,

C. FROM WHAT WE KNOW OF THE US- OMANI ACCESS AGREEMENT THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD FEEL COMMITTED TO COMING TO OMAN'S DEFENCE AGAINST A RETALIATORY ATTACK FROM IRAN, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE PROBLEM OF THE HOSTAGES.

2. IN CONVEYING THIS PIECE OF PAPER, YOU SHOULD HOWEVER AVOID ANY SUGGESTION THAT WE MIGHT PREVENT OUR LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL FROM TAKING PART IN THE DEFENCE OF OMANI TERRITORY, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:-

A. WE WOULD LOSE ALL CREDIBILITY WITH THE AMANIS IF OUR LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL STAND BY WHILE THEY GET A BLOODY NOSE.

B. WE WOULD TURN THE ARABS AS A WHOLE AGAINST US.

/ C. CONVERSELY

C. CONVERSELY, WE SHOULD GAIN CREDIT IN ARAB OPINION IF OUR LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL WERE KNOWN TO HAVE PLAYED THIER PART IN DEFENCE OF AMANI TERRITORY.

3. OUR GUIDING PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE TO DISCOURAGE THE AMANIS AS UNATTRIBUTABLY AS POSSIBLE, TO MINIMISE THE RISK OF RETALIATION BY IRAQ OR OTHER ARAB COUNTIRES WHO MIGHT THINK THAT WE ARE FRUSTRATING A BLOW AGAINST IRAN, AND TO AVOID GETTING TOO FAR IN FRONT OF THE AMERICANS.

4. YOU SHOULD KEEP YOUR US COLLEAGUE INFORMED AND REPORT ABOUT PARALLEL ACTION HE IS TAKING.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD		ADDITIONAL DISTN.
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File No. .....

Department .....

Drafted by (Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn. .....

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Security Classification: SECRET 20(A)

Precedence: FLASH

DESKBY ..... Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) ..... Z

POSTBY ..... Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.)

(Security Class.) SECRET

(Codeword) .....

(Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Caveat/ Privacy Marking) .....

(Deskby) ..... Z

TO FLASH (precedence) MUSCAT (post) Tel. No. ..... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) FLASH MODUK (FOR COSSEC D14 & DNOT) CINC FLEET WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD ABU DHABI DUBAI AND IMMEDIATE KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA AMMAN

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO 269: Iran/Iraq

1. You should forthwith make a further approach to Zawawi. You should make it clear that HMG have an obvious interest in the military context in which British LSP will operate, and hand over a piece of paper making the following points:-

A. According to our intelligence, the Iran airforce, though potentially short of aviation fuel, are still capable of mounting significant attacks from a number of airfields not previously active in the fighting with Iraq, and within range of Muscat;

B. It seems likely that the Iranians will have detected Iraqi air moves towards Oman, and might soon take obvious

/evasive

evasive measures e.g. by dispersing their ships from Bandar Abas. Any naval force surviving an initial attack would find Oman an easier target than Iraq;

C. From what we know of the US - Omani access agreement there is no guarantee that the Americans would feel committed to coming to Oman's defence against a retaliatory attack from Iran, particularly given the problem of the hostages.

2. In conveying this piece of paper, you should however avoid any suggestion that we might prevent our loan service personnel from taking part in the defence or Omani territory, for the following reasons:-

A. We would lose all credibility with the Omanis if our loan service personnel stand by while they get a bloody nose.

B. We would turn the Arabs as a whole against us.

C. Conversely, we should gain credit in Arab opinion if our loan service personnel were known to have played their part in defence of Omani territory.

3. Our guiding principles should be to discourage the Omanis as unattributably as possible; to minimise the risk of retaliation by Iraq or other Arab countries who might think that we are frustrating a blow against Iran; and to avoid getting too far in front of the Americans.

/4.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

4. You should keep your US colleague informed and report about parallel action he is taking.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

IRAN/IRAQ

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PS/MR HURD
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HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

Sir A Acland

Prime Minister
28-9-80

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM ABOU DHABI 281835Z SEP 80
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 301 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD MUSCAT JEDDA KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA AND DUBAI

FLASH

MUSCAT TELS NOS 268 AND 269 AND DUBAI TEL NO 34 TO ME

IRAQ/IRAN

1. I PAID A COURTESY ON THE PRESIDENTIAL CHAMBERLAIN, SHAIKH SUROOR, THIS AFTERNOON WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOCIAL SERVICES.

2. SUROOR IMMEDIATELY ASKED ABOUT MR HASKELL'S CONVERSATION WITH SHAIKH RASHID REPORTED IN DUBAI'S TUR. HE HAD BEEN TELEPHONED ABOUT THIS BY RASHID.

3. I EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD HEARD THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT IRAQ AND OMAN WERE PLANNING AN ACTION TO EVICT THE IRANIANS FROM THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA. WE WERE CONCERNED, AS FRIENDS, THAT IF THE UAE BECAME INVOLVED IN SUCH AN ACTION IT COULD PROVOKE AN ESCALATION OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT AND HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE EMIRATES.

MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE EMIRATES.

4. SUROOR SAID IT WAS TRUE THAT HE HAD GIVEN PERMISSION TO THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO ALLOW ''IRAQI ILLYUSHINS TRANSPORTING HELICOPTERS'' TO PASS THROUGH ABU DHABI ON THEIR WAY TO MUSCAT HOWEVER HE HAD NO IDEA WHAT THEY WERE TO BE USED FOR. HE PERSONALLY HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO BOTH THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR AND THE IRANIAN CHARGE THAT THE UAE DID NOT INTEND TO INTERVENE IN THE CONFLICT OTHER THAN TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, THE IRANIAN HAD ORIGINALLY BELIEVED THAT RAS AL KHAIMAH WAS BEING USED AS AN IRAQI BASE BUT HAD NOW ACCEPTED SUROOR'S ASSURANCE THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. THE IRAQIS HAD IN FACT ASKED FOR THIS ORIGINALLY.

5. I THANKED HIM FOR THIS EXPLANATION AND SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY OUR DEEP CONCERN FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE UAE WHICH HAD LED US TO RAISE THE MATTER AT ALL WITH THE FEDERAL PRIME MINISTER.

6. I ASKED SUROOR WHAT HE THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN NOW. HE SAID THE IRAQIS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THEY HAD ALREADY ACHIEVED THEIR OBJECTIVES AND WERE READY TO START NEGOTIATING, THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF HOLDING ON TO MOST OF THE TERRITORY THEY HAD OCCUPIED IN KHUZISTAN BUT WOULD USE IT TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS. IT WAS NOW UP TO THE IRANIANS TO STOP FIGHTING, HE HOPED THAT THE OFFERS OF MEDIATION BY PRESIDENT ZIA AND THE REST WOULD HAVE SOME EFFECT.

7. SUROOR SEVERAL TIMES SAID THAT HE HOPED THE UK WOULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO ANY JOINT OPERATION WITH THE AMERICANS TO POLICE THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. THIS WOULD BE BOUND TO BRING THE RUSSIANS ON THE SCENE. THE SITUATION DID NOT WARRANT IT.

8. SEE MIFT

ROBERTS
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FLASH

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IRAN/IRAQ

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
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SIR J GRAHAM
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GPS 280
CONFIDENTIAL
FM DUBAI 280820Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 35 OF 28 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO MODUK MUSCAT BAGHDAD WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA KUWAIT AMMAN

IRAN/IRAQ

1. I CALLED ON THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE, SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN RASHID, THIS MORNING TO COMPARE NOTES ONCE AGAIN. MOST OF OUR CONVERSATION CONCERNED IRAQI MILITARY OBJECTIVES. SHAIKH MOHAMMED THOUGHT THAT IN THE SHATT AL-ARAB AREA THESE WERE CONFINED TO SEIZING SUFFICIENT GROUND ON THE EAST BANK TO ENFORCE THEIR CONDITION THAT ANY SETTLEMENT MUST INCLUDE RECOGNITION OF IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WHOLE WATERWAY. HE BELIEVED THERE WAS NO IRAQI INTENTION PERMANENTLY TO OCCUPY ABADAN OR KHORRAMSHAHR. HOWEVER IRAQ WAS LOOKING FOR TERRITORIAL GAINS FURTHER NORTH, AS WAS SHOWN BY YESTERDAY'S ADVANCE ON AHWAZ.

2. SHAIKH MOHAMMED SAID THAT HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THE IRAQIS HAD ANY SERIOUS INTENTION OF OCCUPYING THE GULF ISLANDS, WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GARRISON ON A PERMANENT BASIS GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE AND NAVY AROUND BANDAR ABBAS. A HIT AND

ANY SERIOUS INTENTION OF OCCUPYING THE GULF ISLANDS, WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GARRISON ON A PERMANENT BASIS GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE AND NAVY AROUND BANDAR ABBAS. A HIT AND RUN RAID WAS A POSSIBILITY. ALTERNATIVELY, YESTERDAY'S MOVEMENTS OF IRAQI TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND HEPICOPTERS TO THE LOWER GULF MIGHT BE INTENDED ONLY AS A DECOY, TO DETER THE IRANIANS FROM TRANSFERRING AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS TO REINFORCE THEIR HARD-PRESSED FORCES FURTHER NORTH.

3. SHAIKH MOHAMMED SAID THAT THE IRANIANS HAD NOW ADMITTED YESTERDAY'S 3 PHANTOM OVERFLIGHTS OF THE U A E (RAS AL-KHAIMAH, SHARJAH AND AN AREA BETWEEN DUBAI AND ABU DHABI). THEY HAD STATED QUITE OPENLY THAT THE FLIGHTS WERE MADE TO RECONNOITRE WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE U A E, AND HAD REFUSED TO GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE OTHERS.

4. ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS HAVE SUDDENLY APPEARED AROUND SHARJAH PORT, BUT NO OVERT MILITARY PRECAUTIONS ARE APPARENT IN DUBAI. (EVEN THE GUARD ON THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE IS BACK TO NORMAL).

HASKELL
BT

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Mufaxed 2719.

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 2231.

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

PS 5
PS/SIR I GILMOUR 3
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
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CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Mr Adams

GRS 500
RESTRICTED
FM BAGHDAD 271125Z SEP 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 442 OF 27/9/80
FOR INFO TO PRIORITY KUWAIT JEDDA AMMAN DAMASCUS ANKARA
WASHINGTON MOSCOW TOKYO

IRAQ/IRAN SITREP: MY TEL NO 436 (NOT TO TOKYO):

1. BY THE EVENING OF 26 SEPTEMBER , IRAQ CLAIMED TO HAVE SHOT DOWN AFURTHER FOURTEEN IRANIAN AIRCRAFT AND BOMBED TEHRANS OIL REFINERY, BUT HAD NOT (NOT) CLAIMED FURTHER ADVAMCES INTO IRANIAN TERRITORY.

2. THE GENERAL COMMAND OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES ISSUED SIX STATEMENTS ONLY DURING 26 SEPTEMBER , A FRIDAY. MAIN POINTS AS FOLLOWS:

STATEMENT 33

FIERCE FIGHTING ALONG THE FRONTIER WITH HEAVY LOSS OF LIFE AND MATERIAL SUSTAINED BY IRANIAN FORCES.
NINE IRANIAN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN OVER THE BATTLE FIELD AND AN IRANIAN CAMP INCLUDING NINTEEN SERVICEABLE TANKS CAPTURED.
IRANIAN LOSSES PUT AT TWENTY SEVEN TANKS, TEN ARMOURED VEHICLES AND EIGHT 155 MM GUNS DESTROYED.
IRAQI LOSSES GIVEN AS SEVEN SOLDIERS KILLED, TWENTY EIGHT WOUNDED.
THREE IRAQI JETS AND ONE HELICOPTER SHOT DOWN.

STATEMENT 34

IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED ON 26 SEPTEMBER AS FOLLOWS:-

0755 HOURS		MOSUL ONE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN FOUR CIVILIANS WOUNDED.
0806	"	OIL INSTALLATIONS IN KIRKUK
0836	"	THREE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN
1035	"	MOSUL, KIRKUK, QAIYARA, DIRBANDIKHAN. FIVE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN.

STATEMENT 35

ONE IRANIAN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN OVER AMARA AND ONE AIRCRAFT AND ONE HELICOPTER OVER THE FRONT LINE.

STATEMENT 36

IRAQI JETS LAUNCHED A STRIKE AGAINST TEHRAN'S OIL REFINERY AT 1600 HOURS. THE ATTACK WAS IN RETALIATION FOR IRAN'S REPEATED ATTACKS ON CIVIL AND ECONOMIC TARGETS IN IRAQ.
SAID TO TBE SECOND LARGEST REFINERY IN IRAN AFTER ABADAN COMPLEX.

STATEMENT 37

ALL IRAQI JETS RETURNED TO BASE SAFELY FOLLOWING ATTACK ON THE TEHRAN REFINERY.

STATEMENT 38

AT 0455 HOURS AN IRANIAN MINE SWEEPER AND GUN BOAT APPROACHED THE HEAD OF THE GULF AND WERE SUNK BY IRAQI NAVAL FORCES.

3. THE REPORT THAT IRAQ HAD HALTED ALL OIL EXPORTS (REFERRED TO ON THE BBC WORLD SERVICE BUT NOT (NOT) ANNOUNCED HERE) SUGGESTS THAT IRANIAN STRIKES AGAINST OILINSTALLAIONS IN KIRKUK HAVE BEEN DAMAGING.
A BRITISH ENGINEER WORKING ON THE OIL FIELDS IN KIRKUK WHO PASSED THROUGH BAGHDAD YESTERDAY CONFIRMED REPORTS OF EXTENSIVE DAMAGE. THIS, THE FAILURE TO RECORD ANY TERRITORIAL ADVANCES IN FIGHTING ON 26 SEPTEMBER AND THE DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER IRAQIS HAVE IN FACT CAPTURED KHORRAMSHAHR INDICATE THAT THE IRAQIS MAY BE MEETING STIFFER RESISTANCE THAN THEY EXPECTED IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE WEEK.

4. SHORTLY BEFORE 0400 HOURS (LOCAL) THIS MORNING (27SEPT) IRANIAN AIRCRAFT RAIDED BAGHDAD. FOR THE FIRST TIME THERE WAS NO ADVANCE WARNING FROM THE AIR RAID SIRENS WHICH MAY MEAN THE AIRCRAFT MANAGED TO ESCAPE RADAR DETECTION. THE IRAQIS HAVE NOT YET ISSUED ANY STATEMENTS ON TODAYS FIGHTING OR ON THIS RAID, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN CASUALTIES: WE HEARD THE AMBULANCES. THERE ARE NO (NO) REPORTS OF BRITISH CASUALTIES.

EGERTON

NNNN

FLASH

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22 32

minuted to Chequers. 27.9

PS 5
PS/SIR I GILMOUR 4
PS/MR HURD
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SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM Ev. A Acland
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
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FM AMMAN 271830Z SEP 80
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 362 OF 27 SEP 80
AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON
IMMEDIATE MUSCAT
INFO PRIORITY MODUK ABU DHABI BAGHDAD BAHRAIN DAMASCUS DOHA
DUBAI JEDDA AND KUWAIT

WASHINGTON TELNO 2 TO MUSCAT: IRAN/IRAQ

Mufaxed 27/9

1. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS JUST TOLD ME OF A DISCUSSION HE HAD WITH KING HUSSEIN ON 24 SEPTEMBER. THE KING REVEALED THAT THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ HAD ASKED HIM TO INTERVENE WITH SULTAN QABOOS IN SUPPORT OF AN IRAQI REQUEST TO OMAN FOR REFUELLING FACILITIES TO ENABLE THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TO TAKE OUT THE IRANIAN NAVAL BASE AT BANDAR ABBAS (AN ATTACK ON ABU MUSA AND THE TUNBS WAS NOT APPARENTLY MENTIONED). KING HUSSEIN TOLD AMBASSADOR VELIOTES THAT IN RESPONSE TO THIS REQUEST HE HAD SENT AN EMISSARY TO OMAN TO ASK SULTAN TO DO AS THE IRAQIS WISHED. ACCORDING TO THE KING, THE IRAQIS HAD MADE A PREVIOUS DIRECT APPROACH TO OMAN BUT HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN. WE KNOW THAT TARIQ AZIZ WAS IN AMMAN ON 24 SEPTEMBER (SEE MY TELNO 354 OF 25 SEPTEMBER NOT TO MUSCAT), BUT NOTHING HAS BEEN MADE PUBLIC HERE ABOUT THE DESPATCH OF A JORDANIAN EMISSARY TO SULTAN QABOOS.

2. VELIOTES, WHO WAS OF COURSE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, ARGUED STRONGLY AGAINST THE INVOLVEMENT OF OMAN IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN, DRAWING ON SIMILAR ARGUMENTS TO THOSE DEPLOYED BY MR TUNNELL WITH THE OMANI MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MUSCAT TELNO 268 OF 27 SEPTEMBER) AND HE THINKS HE MAY HAVE MADE SOME IMPACT ON THE KING. BUT HE WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY TOO LATE, AS THE KING HAD ALREADY DESPATCHED HIS EMISSARY TO SULTAN QABOOS. VELIOTES HAS SINCE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON APPROVING THE LINE HE TOOK WITH KING HUSSEIN AND ASKING HIM TO REINFORCE THE POINTS HE HAD ALREADY MADE TO THE KING AND ALSO TO DRAW HIS ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON THE LIVES OF THE US HOSTAGES IF OMAN WERE THOUGHT TO BE IN ANY WAY ACTING IN CONNIVANCE WITH THE US, TO THE INPORTANCE OF KEEPING OMAN NEUTRAL BECAUSE OF THE STRATEGIC POSITION SHE OCCUPIED IN RELATION TO THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND TO THE DANGERS FOR OMAN OF IRANIAN RETALIATION.

3. AMBASSADOR VELIOTES HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO SEE KING HUSSEIN AGAIN (HE IS APPARENTLY SPENDING MOST OF TODAY WITH HIS ARMED FORCES). I TOO THIS MORNING ASKED IF I MIGHT SEE THE KING WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO: IF I HAD SPECIFIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS, I AM SURE HE WOULD RECEIVE ME QUICKLY.

4. PARAS 1 AND 2 ABOVE. THIS IS PRESUMABLY WHAT LIES BEHIND THE INFORMATION IN WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 4115 OF 26 SEPTEMBER TO FCO. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF VELIOTE'S CONFIDENCE COULD BE PROTECTED. HE WAS INCIDENTALLY MOST

4. PARAS 1 AND 2 ABOVE. THIS IS PRESUMABLY WHAT LIES BEHIND THE INFORMATION IN WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 4115 OF 26 SEPTEMBER TO FCO. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF VELIOTE'S CONFIDENCE COULD BE PROTECTED. HE WAS INCIDENTALLY MOST APOLOGETIC THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO LET ME KNOW SOONER: WE HAVE BOTH BEEN HEAVILY INVOLVED WITH EVACUATION FROM IRAQ.

URWICK
BT

FLASH

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

Mufaxed 27-9

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

6

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR 3
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
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CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

Sir A Helm

GR 150
RESTRICTED
FM AMMAN 271250Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 360 OF 27 SEP
AND TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI MUSCAT AND NEWYORK
ROUTINE TO BAHRAIN BAGHDAD JEDDA KUWAIT AND WASHINGTON
WASHINGTON TELNO 4115 IRAQ/IRAN

1. JORDANIAN PRESS REPORTED ON 27 SEPTEMBER THAT AN UNDER-SECRETARY AT THE OMANI MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, COLONEL GHAZZAWI IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE SHORTLY IN AMMAN. TARIQ AZIZ VISITED AMMAN ON HIS WAY BACK FROM PARIS (MY TELNO 354 OF 25 SEPTEMBER TO FCO). HE LEFT FOR BAGHDAD ON 26 SEPTEMBER.

2. THE JORDANIAN PRESS REPORTED THIS MORNING THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD HELD TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS ON THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN AND THE NEED FOR A UNIFIED ARAB POSITION ''IN SUPPORT OF JUST IRAQI DEMANDS'' WITH KING KHALID OF SAUDI ARABIA, THE RULERS OF KUWAIT AND ABU DHABI, PRINCE KHALIFAH OF QATAR, SHEIKH ISSA BIN SULTAN OF BAHRAIN AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE YAR. LITTLE FURTHER EMERGED IN THE PRESS ABOUT WHAT IF ANYTHING RESULTED FROM THESE TALKS.

URWICK

ADVANCE COPY Mr Passed to Chequers 27-9-80

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

PS (4)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR (3)
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
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CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

GRS 90
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BAHRAIN 270847Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 157 OF 27 SEPTEMBER
INFO ROUTINE ABU DHABI DOHA JEDDA KUWAIT DUBAI

YOUR TEL 549 TO JEDDA: IRAN/IRAQ

1. MY VIEW IS THAT THERE WOULD BE LITTLE IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON THE BAHRAIN ECONOMY OF A COMPLETE CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.
2. WHILE LARGE QUANTITIES OF FOODSTUFFS ARE IMPORTED BY SEA, THE PRIME MINISTER, WITH WHOM MR PATRICK JENKIN HAD A MEETING THIS MORNING, VOLUNTEERED THAT THERE WERE SUFFICIENTLY LARGE STOCKS OF ESSENTIAL FOODSTUFFS TO LAST FOR SOME MONTHS. FUEL FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND WATER DESALINATION IS LOCALLY PRODUCED.
3. THE LONGER-TERM EFFECT WOULD BE THAT ALMOST ALL ITEMS EXCEPT FUEL WOULD HAVE TO COME VIA MORE CIRCUITOUS AND COSTLY ROUTES.

WALKER

NNNN

D/B 272002Z (RED 09202)

ADVANCE

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22 28 Unfaxed

PS (6)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
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CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
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HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE

Faxed

RESTRICTED
DESKBY TOKYO (NEXT CONTACT)
DESKBY F C O 272300Z
DESKBY HONG KONG (NEXT CONTACT)
FM WASHINGTON 272130Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 6 OF 27 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE F C O (FOR RESIDENT CLERK) HONG KONG (FOR GOVERNOR)
PRIORITY PEKING BAGHDAD MUSCAT DUBAI DAMASCUS AMMAN JEDDA BAHRAIN
UKMIS NEW YORK KUWAIT PARIS BONN.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MOVEMENTS.

1. AS THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONTINUES TO CAUSE CONCERN, LORD CARRINGTON HAS DECIDED TO REMAIN IN WASHINGTON FOR A FURTHER 24 HOURS SO THAT HE CAN KEEP IN CONTINUOUS TOUCH WITH LONDON AND WITH THE AMERICANS. DEPARTURE OF THE VC10 HAS THEREFORE BEEN POSTPONED FOR THE TIME BEING UNTIL NOON WASHINGTON TIME ON SUNDAY 28 SEPTEMBER, WHICH WOULD GIVE AN ETA AT TOKYO AIRPORT OF 17.55 ON MONDAY 29 SEPTEMBER. LORD CARRINGTON WILL PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE A FINAL DECISION TO PROCEED WITH HIS VISIT TO TOKYO UNTIL THE MORNING OF SUNDAY 28 SEPTEMBER.

2. IF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST DOES NOT OBLIGE HIM TO

2. IF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST DOES NOT OBLIGE HIM TO RETURN TO LONDON, HE WOULD LIKE TO GO AHEAD WITH THE TOKYO PROGRAMME ARRANGED FOR TUESDAY 30 SEPTEMBER AND WEDNESDAY 1 OCTOBER.

3. PRESS LINE IS IN MY TEL NO 4125 TO F C O, REPEATED TO YOU BUT NOT TO ALL. YOU WILL DOUBTLESS WISH TO SPEAK IN SIMILAR TERMS TO THE JAPANESE. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO WARN THEM THAT THERE IS SOME RISK THAT LORD CARRINGTON MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT THE VISIT (THOUGH HE WOULD GREATLY REGRET THIS) AND TO APOLOGISE FOR THE CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY, FOR REASONS WHICH THEY WILL DOUBTLESS UNDERSTAND. SIR A PARSONS HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO WARN THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER IN NEW YORK THAT THIS EVENTUALITY MIGHT ARISE. ITO WAS UNDERSTANDING.

HENDERSON

NNNN

D/A 272002Z (REGD 809112)

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

Mujaxed 28/9

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22 28

PS (1)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
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CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
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HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

S.A.A. Acland

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 272300Z TO ALL
FM JEDDA 272115Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 706 OF 27 SEPTEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MUSCAT TELNO 268 AND MY TELNO 705: IRAN/IRAQ

1. I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM A TRIP TO YAMANI IN TAIF AND SEEN THESE TELEGRAMS. BOTH PRINCE SAUD AND HIS DEPUTY ON THE POLITICAL SIDE ARE IN NEW YORK. IF YOU WISH ME TO SPEAK TO THE SAUDIS I SHALL HAVE TO TRY TO LOCATE PRINCE FAHD WHOSE WHEREABOUTS I DO NOT AT THIS MOMENT KNOW.

2. THE QUICKEST METHOD OF LOBBYING THE SAUDIS WOULD BE THROUGH SAUD IN NEW YORK. I COULD REINFORCE SUCH AN APPROACH AS SOON AS I COULD FIND FAHD. BUT IT IS NOW 2415 HOURS HERE.

3. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE REPEAT DESKBY TO TOKYO IF NECESSARY.

HOURS HERE.

3. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE REPEAT DESKBY TO TOKYO IF NECESSARY.

CRAIG

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

~~32~~ D/B 271800Z

PS (5)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR (4)
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM Sir A Acland
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
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HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

IMMEDIATE

SECRET
DESKBY 271800Z

FM JEDDA 271705Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 705 OF 27 SEPTEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE (DESKBY) WASHINGTON.

MUSCAT TELNO 268 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 002. IRAN/IRAQ.

1. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTION ON WHETHER WE SHOULD, IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR TELNO 555, INFORM THE SAUDIS OF THE OMANI'S INTENTIONS AND OF THE SECRETARY OF STATES RESPONSE.

2. ALTHOUGH THE SAUDIS COULD NOT PUBLICLY CONDEMN AN IRAQI MILITARY TAKE OVER OF THE ISLANDS, THEY PROBABLY WOULD SHARE SOSFA'S FEELINGS. THEY MIGHT BE WILLING TO RAISE THE MATTER WITH THE OMANI'S.

CRAIG.

Confirmed to Cheques 27.9.80

ADVANCE COPY

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 25 22

PS (6)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR (5)
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
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RESIDENT CLERK

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CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

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GR130
CONFIDENTIAL
FM JEDDAH 270915Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 704 OF 27TH SEPTEMBER 1980.
REPEATED PRIORITY KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, DOHA.

MY TELNO 703: IRAN/IRAQ

WHEN I ACCOMPANIED MR LAMONT ON A VISIT TO JEDDA REFINERY TODAY THE FOLLOWING FACTS EMERGED: THE REFINERY BRINGS IN BY SEA FROM RAS TANOURA 100 PERCENT OF ITS REQUIREMENTS OF CRUDE AND 40 PERCENT OF PRODUCTS, STOCKS HELD ARE 15 DAYS OF CRUDE AND 10 DAYS OF PRODUCTS. PETROMIN HAVE 5 TANKERS UNDER THE SAUDI FLAG (2 OWNED AND 3 CHARTERED). THE DIRECTOR OF THE REFINERY SAID ALL THESE COULD BE ORDERED TO SAIL INTO THE GULF IF NECESSARY. AT THE MOMENT THERE WAS NO PROBLEM WITH THEIR TANKERS IN THE GULF. BUT THEY WERE WATCHING THE SITUATION CLOSELY.

2. DIRECTOR SEEMED TO ASSUME THAT THE 60 PERCENT OF PRODUCTS IMPORTED WOULD CONTINUE TO ARRIVE.

IMMEDIATE

IRAN/IRAQ ADVANCE COPY

Sir M. Palliser has a copy a Cheques

ADVANCE COPIES 22 23

PS (6)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
HD/CONS D
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

D/D 280902Z

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

IMMEDIATE

Prime Minister
29.9.80

Sir A Acland Mr Adams

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 280500Z
FM DUBAI 272155Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 34 OF 27 SEPTEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 280400Z)
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD MUSCAT JEDDA KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA

YOUR TELNO 19 TO ME AND WASHINGTON TELNO 2 TO MUSCAT: IRAN/IRAQ.
1. WITH YOUR AGREEMENT, I CALLED ON SHAIKH RASHID AT 2300 HOURS TONIGHT. I SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY INFORMED OF THE LIKELY USE OF OMANI FACILITIES BY IRAQI FORCES FOR AN IMMINENT ASSAULT ON THE GULF ISLANDS OCCUPIED BY IRAN BUT BELONGING TO THE U A E. THIS CLEARLY TOUCHED THE U A E'S VITAL INTERESTS VERY DEEPLY. WE DID NOT KNOW HOW FAR THE U A E MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE OMANI AND IRAQI GOVERNMENTS ON THIS MATTER, BUT ALTHOUGH THIS EMBASSY HAD NO DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS, WE BELIEVED THAT THE U A E SHOULD BE AWARE THAT H M G VIEWED THE PROPOSED ACTION WITH THE GRAVEST MISGIVINGS, AND WERE URGING CAUTION ON THE OMANI GOVERNMENT IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS.
2. THE NEWS CLEARLY CAME AS A TOTAL SURPRISE TO SHAIKH RASHID. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONSULT SHAIKH ZAID AND OTHER

2. THE NEWS CLEARLY CAME AS A TOTAL SURPRISE TO SHAIKH RASHID. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONSULT SHAIKH ZAID AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE U A E GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT HE HAD REPEATEDLY TAXED SHAIKH SAQR OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH WITH PLOTTING SOME MISCHIEF WITH THE IRAQIS, BUT SAQR HAD ALWAYS ASSURED HIM THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF USURPING THE AUTHORITY OF SHAIKH ZAID AS PRESIDENT OR THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF RULERS, AND HAD EMPHASISED THAT HE NO LONGER HAD ANY ARMED FORCES UNDER HIS PERSONAL CONTROL. I SAID THAT I HAD NO INDICATION OF ANY INVOLVEMENT BY SHAIKH SAQR IN THE SCHEME, WHICH APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN EVOLVED SOLELY BY THE OMANI AND IRAQI GOVERNMENTS.

3. SHAIKH RASHID CLEARLY APPRECIATED ALL THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PLAN FOR THE SAFETY OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND THE STABILITY OF THE WHOLE GULF AREA. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS ALREADY DUE TO SEE SHAIKH MOHAMMED AT 1000 LOCAL TIME TOMORROW, 28 SEPTEMBER (0600 G M T), BUT HE MAY WELL SUMMON ME HIMSELF. I SHALL TELEGRAPH AGAIN AS SOON AS I SEE EITHER OF THEM.

4. SHAIKH RASHID MENTIONED, INCIDENTALLY, THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL OVERFLIGHTS OF U A E TERRITORY BY IRANIAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT TODAY. A PROTEST HAD BEEN MADE TO THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR, WHO HAD SIMPLY DENIED THE FLIGHTS OCCURRED AT ALL. I IMAGINE THEY MAY HAVE BEEN IN REACTION TO MOVEMENTS OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT TO SIBA IN WHICH CASE, THE IRANIANS WILL ALREADY BE AWARE THAT SOMETHING IS AFOOT.

HASKELL

BT

NNNN

GR 600

SECRET UK COMMS ONLY

FM MUSCAT 272200Z SEPT 80

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 269 OF 27 SEPT 80

AND TO FLASH MODUK (FOR COSSEC D14 AND DNOT) CINC FLEET

WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD ABU DHABI DUBAI

AND IMMEDIATE KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA

AMMAN

MY TELNO 268 OF 27 SEPT AND TELECON S OF S/TUNNELL.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I SAW QAIS ZAWAWI AGAIN AT MY REQUEST ON THE EVENING OF 27 SEPTEMBER. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ALI MAJID, THE SULTAN'S EQUERRY.

2. I SAID THAT THE REACTION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS ONE OF HORROR THAT THE OMANIS SHOULD CONTEMPLATE PARTICIPATION IN THE PROPOSED OPERATION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD PERSONALLY REQUESTED ME TO URGE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT. THE ACTION CONTEMPLATED COULD NOT ONLY ENDANGER THE ADMIRABLE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS WHICH OMAN HAD BEEN MAKING OVER THE PAST YEARS BUT COULD ALSO ADD TO THE DANGERS OFPASSAGE OF SHIPPING THROUGH HE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. I ADDED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HD DEMONSTRATED OVER RECENT MONTHS HIS SUPPORT FOR THE LEGITMATE RIGHTS OF THE ARABS IN THE REGION AND HIS PARTICULAR ATTACHMENT TO OMAN. HE WAS SPEAKING AS A PERSONAL FRIEND OF OMAN WHICH HE SAW AS PERHAPS OUR MOST RELIABLE AND SENSIBLE ALLY IN THE AREA. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT, ALTHOUGH WE SYMPATHISED WITH OMANI/IRAQI DESIRES TO BRING ABOUT A MORE AMENABLE REGIME IN IRAN, WE COULD NOT GO ALONG WITH THE MEANS ENVISAGED TO BRING THIS ABOUT. I HINTED THAT THE OMAN APPRECIATION OF IRAN'S ABILITY TO STRIKE BACK AGAINST THOSE WHO HELPED IRAQ TO REGAIN THE ISLANDS MIGHT BE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAT THE FACTS SUGGESTED AND THAT THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON, WHERE THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOW WAS MIGHT SUGGEST GREATER IRANIAN MILITARY STRENGTH THAN THE OMANIS SUPPOSED. FINALLY I URGED THAT THE OMANIS SHOULD DELAY ANY DECISION UNTIL WE AND THE US HAD TIME TO PRESENT TO THE OMANIS A MORE CONSIDERED APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION. AT MY URGING ZAWAWI UNDERTOOK TO PASS THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MESSAGE URGENTLY TO THE SULTAN IN SALALAH.

3. ZAWAWI'S RESPONSE WAS THAT HE WAS SURPRISED AT THE STRENGTH OF BRITISH OPPOSITION TO THE OPERATION. HE ACCEPTED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF OMAN AND WAS GENUINELY CONCERNED WITH THE COUNTRY'S WELL-BEING SEMI COLON BUT WE WERE ALWAYS URGING THE OMANIS TO COOPERATE MORE CLOSELY WITH THEIR BROTHER ARABS, AND WHEN, AS IN THIS CASE, THEY DECIDED TO DO SO, ALL THEY GOT WAS CRITICISM.

4. I SAID THAT, IN GENERAL TERMS, WE WERE TALKING ABOUT PEACEFUL CO-OPERATION WITH NEIGHBOURS. WOULD IT NOT BE BETTER FOR THE OMANIS IN THIS CASE TO ACT LIKE THEIR NEIGHBOURS, GIVE VOCAL SUPPORT TO THE IRAQIS AND STAY OUT OF THE CONFLICT? ZAWAWI DISMISSED THE EXAMPLE OF THE GULF STATES WHICH WERE TOO DISORGANISED AND HAD TO MANY INTERNAL PROBLEMS TO ACT IN A POSITIVE MANNER. WHEN TAXED WITH THE SAUDI EXAMPLE, HE REPLIED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD ALSO AGREED TO PROVIDE ''FACILITIES''. I SAID THAT I FOUND THIS SUGGESTION UNBELIEVABLE (ALTHOUGH SOMEONE MUST AT LEAST BE REFUELLING THE HELICOPTERS.)

5. I HOPE I WAS ABLE TO BUDGE ZAWAWI TO SOME EXTENT ON THE QUESTION OF THE POTENTIAL APPRECIATION WHICH A SUCCESSOR IRANIAN REGIME MIGHT SHOW TO OMAN. BUT MY FEELING IS THAT THE OMANIS HAVE THE PAN-ARAB BIT BEYWEEN THE TEETH AND WILL TAKE SOME SHAKING. ZAWAWI WENT SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT OMANI ASSISTANCE IN THIS OPERATION IS TO SOME EXTENT DESIGNED TO BRING ROUNF THE IRAQIS TO THE VIEW THAT THEY SHOULD FOLLOW THE OMANIS IN BACKING CAMP DAVID.

6. MORE OMINOUSLY ZAWAWI SUGGESTED IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT THE IRAQIS IN THEIR GRATITUDE MIGHT CEDE THE ISLAND TO OMAN INSTEAD OF THE STATES OF THE UAE SHOULD THE OPERATION BE SUCCESSFUL. I SAID THAT I COULD SEE NO POSSIBLE BENEFIT TO OMAN FROM SUCH A SOLUTION, WHICH WOULD SET THEM AGAINST NOT ONLY IRAN BUT THEIR CLOSEST NEIGHBOURS ALSO.

7. THIS WAS A FREE-RANGING CONVERSATION WITH NO HOLDS BARRED. T CAN ONLY HOPE THAT ZAWAWI AND/OR MAJID REPEATS THE FULL FLAVOUR TO THE SULTAN IN SALALAH. IN ANY EVENT I BELIEVE THE DANGER IS THAT, AS USUAL, XZHE SULTAN HAS MADE UP HIS MIND IN ADVANCE OF CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS ALLIES AND THAT, TO BACK DOWN NOW WOULD INVOLVE UNACCEPTABLE LOSS OF FACE WITH THE IRAQIS. WE CAN, I IMAGINE, ENVISAGE A DEMARCHE BY THE AMERICANS TODAY, BUT I STILL CONSIDER THAT OUR BEST BET TO CALL OFF A POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS AND NAIVE ADVENTURE IS TO ENLIST KING HUSSEIN'S SUPPORT IF POSSIBLE.

8. SINCE I HAVE BEEN URGED TO KEEP THE ABOVE CONFIDENTIAL BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE US, I HAVE NOT APPROACHED THE SERVICE COMMANDERS. IF TIME PERMITS HOWEVER (AND I STILL HAVE NO CLEAR IDEA OF THE TIME-SCALE ENVISAGED FOR THE OPERATION) U I CONSIDER THAT I SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO MENTION OUR MISGIVINGS TO THEM.
GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.
TUNNELL
BT

NNNN

FLASH

19

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES ~~22~~ 32

Mrfaxed to Chequers 27.9.80

PS 5
PS/SIR I GILMOUR 4
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
HD/CONS D
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO 2

Sir A Acland
Mr Adams

FLASH

SECRET UK COMMS ONLY
FM MUSCAT 271230Z SEPT 80
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 268 OF 27 SEPT 80
AND TO FLASH MODUK (FOR COSSEC DI4 AND DNOT) CINC FLEET WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD ABU DHABI DUBAI IMMEDIATE KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA

WASHINGTON TELNO 4115 OF 26 SEPT: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I WAS SUMMONED TO SEE THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS THIS MORNING. QAIS ZAWAWI EXPLAINED THAT A HIGH-LEVEL IRAQI DELEGATION HAD VISITED THE SULTAN IN SALALAH YESTERDAY TO REQUEST ASSISTANCE IN THEIR CONFLICT WITH IRAN. WHEN I PRESSED HIM HE ADMITTED THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN IN PRINCIPLE TO OFFER THE IRAQIS FACILITIES TO MOUNT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA AND ALSO TO "TAKE CARE OF" IRANIAN NAVAL UNITS. HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON THE TIMESCALE BUT IT IS ALMOST CERTAINLY IMMINENT (SEE NAVAL ATTACHES TELNO U2H/KAG/LAA OF 27 SEPT NOT TO ALL. OMAN HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, SUCH WAS THE DEGREE OF INSTABILITY IN THE GULF AREA CAUSED BY THE KHOMEINI REGIME THAT THEY FELT OBLIGED TO GIVE ASSISTANCE TO THE IRAQIS.

2. I SAID THAT I WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS BUT

2. I SAID THAT I WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS BUT THAT THE BRITISH VIEW WAS THAT THE AREA OF CONFLICT SHOULD BE LIMITED AND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION SOUGHT. I DID NOT THINK THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IN FAVOUR OF THE OPERATION. WE HAD ADMIRED THE EVEN-HANDEDNESS SHOWN BY THE OMANIS IN THE FIRST DAYS OF THE CONFLICT. I ASKED WHETHER THE OMANIS HAD CONSIDERED THE DANGERS OF RETALIATION FROM IRAN AND ALSO THE DANGERS OF THE IRANIANS HAMPERING FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IN THE STRAITS OF

HORMUZ. ON RETALIATION, ZAWAWI SAID THAT THIS HAD OF COURSE BEEN CONSIDERED. THE OMANIS HAD FAITH IN THEIR AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM, AND "THIS WOULD BE A GOOD TEST". HE SEEMED TO BELIEVE (UNREALISTICALLY IN MY VIEW) THAT IT WOULD BE SOME DAYS BEFORE THE IRANIANS DISCOVERED THE BASE FROM WHICH THE OPERATION WAS LAUNCHED. ON HORMUZ, ZAWAWI THOUGHT THAT THE OPERATION WOULD HELP GUARANTEE FREE PASSAGE. I ASKED WHETHER THE OMANIS EXPECTED THE US FLEET TO COME TO THEIR ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF DIFFICULTIES. HE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE ACCESS AGREEMENT. MY US COLLEAGE , WHO WAS ALSO SUMMONED FOR THE SAME PURPOSE TODAY, CLAIMS HOWEVER THAT ZAWAWI'S ASSUMPTION MAY BE PREMATURE.

3. FINALLY I MADE THE POINT THAT OMAN WOULD XVE TO LIVE WITH ANY FUTURE IRANIAN REGIME AND THAT THE LATTER, WHATEVER COMPLEXION IT MIGHT TAKE, COULD WELL HARBOUR A GRUDGE AGAINST OMANI PARTICIPATION IN THIS ADVENTURE. SINCE THE ISLANDS WOULD PRESUMABLY EVENTUALLY REVERT TO THE STATES OF THE UAE, WHY SHOULD NOT THEY, RATHER THAN THE OMANIS PROVIDE THE FACILITIES? QAIS MERELY COMMENTED THAT THE SULTAN HAD DECIDED AND THAT THESE WERE RISKS THE OMANIS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE. IN ANY CASE THE UAE COULD NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE FACILITIES. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE THOUGHT KHOMEINI WOULD REALLY BE OUT OF THE PICTURE IN A MATTER OF DAYS HE SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY A QUESTION OF MONTHS AT THE MOST AND THAT HE WAS CONVINCED ANY FUTURE REGIME WOULD SEE THE WISDOM OF THE OMANI ACTION.

4. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER, IN GIVING US AND THE AMERICANS THIS FOREWARNING THE OMANIS GENUINELY WISH TO HEED OUR VIEWS. THERE MAY IN ANY CASE BE LITTLE TIME, AND I WOULD JUDGE THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO CHANGE THE SULTAN'S MIND NOW THAT HE HAS GIVEN SOME SORT OF UNDERTAKING TO THE IRAQIS. NEVERTHELESS I HAVE URGED DELAY ON ZAWAWI AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR URGENT INSTRUCTIONS.

BE DIFFICULT TO CHANGE THE SULTAN'S MIND NOW THAT HE HAS GIVEN SOME SORT OF UNDERTAKING TO THE IRAQIS. NEVERTHELESS I HAVE URGED DELAY ON ZAWAWI AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR URGENT INSTRUCTIONS. ZAWAWI HAS INVITED OUR FURTHER VIEWS AS SOON AS THEY ARE RECEIVED. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS RESPONDED IN SIMILAR VEIN SEMI COLON AND IT MIGHT WELL BE PRODUCTIVE IF WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A JOINT DEMARCHE TO THE OMANIS. MOREOVER, IF WASHINGTON TUR IS TO BE BELIEVED, ANY FURTHER CALLS FOR RESTRAINT MIGHT ALSO BE DIRECTED AT KING HUSSAIN, WHO HAS GREAT INFLUENCE WITH QABOOS.

5 ZAWAWI ALSO MENTIONED IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION THAT LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL WOULD BE EXPECTED TO TAKE PART IN ANY OPERATIONS WITHIN OMANI TERRITORIAL LIMITS WHICH MIGHT ARISE FROM IRAQI ACTIONS. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT ALSO.

TUNNELL
BT

FLASH

NNNN

FLASH

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 32 ~~22~~

Registered 27/9 18

PS (5)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR (4)
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
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CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~
CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

Sir A. Acland
MR ADAMS

FLASH

SECRET
FM DUBAI 271500Z SEP 80
TO FLASH ABU DHABI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 33 OF 27 SEPTEMBER
AND TO FLASH FCO
RFI FLASH MUSCAT, MODUK, WASHINGTON
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN AND DOHA

MUSCAT TELS NO 268 TO FCO AND U2H/KAG/LAA 270915Z TO MODUK: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE AT 1000 LOCAL TIME (0600 GMT) TOMORROW, 28 SEPTEMBER. PURPOSE WAS TO COMPARE NOTES ON THE SITUATION, DRAWING ON JIC ASSESSMENTS ETC (FCO TEL NO 555 TO JEDDA).

22. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS DESKBY 280500Z ON WHETHER I SHOULD RAISE THE OMANI ACTION. I THINK WE CAN TAKE IT THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (THOUGH NOT THAT OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH) WILL BE DISMAYED AT THE POSSIBILITIES THIS OPENS UP, BUT I DOUBT WHETHER THEY HAVE THE CAPACITY OR THE WILL ACTIVELY TO INTERVENE.

reply attached

HASKELL
BT

Mulfaxed 279.

FLASH

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES ~~22~~ 32

PS (5)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR (4)
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
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HD/DEF D
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NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

~~NO~~ 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

Sub. A. Acland

FLASH

GR 30
RESTRICTED
FROM ABU DHABI 271525Z SEP 80
TO FLASH DUBAI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 19 OF 27 SEPTAMBER
AND TO FLASH FCO.
INFO ROUTINE DOHA AND BAHRAIN

YOUR TELNO 33 OF 27 SEPTEMBER.

IRAQ/IRAN

1 AGREE NO OBJECTION.

2. YOU COULD CITE THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP , ARTICLE 2.

3. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY

FLASH

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

PS (5)
PS/SIR I GILMOUR (4)
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
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NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

TO DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO (2)

FLASH

GR 33
RESTRICTED
FROM ABU DHABI 271525Z SEP 80
TO FLASH DUBAI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 19 OF 27 SEPTANBER
AND TO FLASH FCO.
INFO ROUTINE DOHA AND BAHRAIN

YOUR TELNO 33 OF 27 SEPTEMBER.

IRAQ/IRAN

I AGREE NO OBJECTION.

2. YOU COULD CITE THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP , ARTICLE 2.

3. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY

XY

1717

FO 029/27

OO FCO (DESKBY 290930Z)

OO CARACAS

PP JEDDA

GPS 250

UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 290930Z
FM WASHINGTON 271655Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 4123 OF 27 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE CARACAS
PRIORITY JEDDA

MY TELNO 4119: VISIT OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

TO-DAY'S WASHINGTON POST AND NEW YORK TIMES BOTH REPORT MR HOWELL'S UNDERSTANDING, DERIVED FROM HIS TALKS IN VENEZUALA, THAT THE AGREEMENT BY SOME OPEC COUNTRIES TO CUT PRODUCTION HAD BEEN QUOTE PUT ON ICE UNQUOTE. BOTH ARTICLES ALSO REPORT A STATEMENT IN FRANCE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE VENEZUALAN CONGRESS THAT OPEC COUNTRIES WOULD INCREASE PRODUCTION TO COVER ANY SHORTFALL RESULTING FROM THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. THE TIMES ADDS THAT A VENEZUALAN OFFICIAL HERE WAS UNWILLING TO CONFIRM ANY PLAN TO INCREASE PRODUCTION.

2. THE POST REPORTS THAT QUOTE OIL SPECIALISTS UNQUOTE IN BAHRAIN HAVE PRIVATELY CONFIRMED MR HOWELL'S UNDERSTANDING AND INDICATED THAT SAUDI ARABIA INITIATED THE MOVE TO END CUTBACKS IN PRODUCTION. THIS ACCOUNT ASSERTS THAT KUWAIT AND THE UAE HAVE BACKED THE SAUDI POSITION BUT THAT INTENTIONS IN ALGERIA AND LIBYA ARE STILL UNCLEAR.

3. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE INFORM NEWS DEPARTMENT AND TELEPHONE THE ABOVE TO WEST, PS/SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY TO-DAY (HOME TELEPHONE 446 1115).

4. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY, D LE B JONES AND KELLY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND FALL ESSD DESKBY 0930 29 SEPTEMBER.

HENDERSON

courtesy POCKET.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Mr. Alexander.

Mr. Mobsley asked for these texts to be made available to you, in the light of your discussions today.

The telegrams were not sent; the blue copies are for your information.

J Patton Resident Clerk

27/9.

S3242 (21688) DD.0532043 100M 9/78 GWB LTD. GP.870

This is a copy. The original has been extracted and retained under Section 3(4)

File No. .....

Department ..... Res Clerk .....

Drafted by (Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn. .....

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Security Classification SECRET

Precedence FLASH

DESKBY ..... Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) .....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.)

(Security Class.) ..... SECRET .....

(Codeword) .....

(Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Caveat/ Privacy marking) .....

(Deskby) .....Z

TO ..... FLASH (precedence) ..... AMMAN (post) ..... Tel. No. ..... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) ..... JEDDA, KIWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI AND ABU DHABI .....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) ..... MUSCAT, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD AND DAMASCUS .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

As for Muscat tel No 268

Copies to:-

— passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

C J Wayland
2 June 2010

[TEXT]

WASHINGTON TELNO 2: IRAQ/IRAN

1. In approaching other governments in the area I would wish you to avoid making use of the specific information given to us in confidence *~~~* To do so could be particularly damaging in the context of our relations with the Iraqis and more widely in the area given Arab suspicions of our role when the Iranians occupied Tunbs.

2. You should, however, speak urgently to the local government at the highest possible level to convey my personal concern about recent reports of an Iraqi intention to widen the area of hostilities by a coup de main against Abu Musa and the Tunbs. You should

/stress

stress the incalculable consequences of any such armed action in the present circumstances which could do the gravest damage to the security and prosperity of all states in the area. Recovery of the islands by negotiation would be quite another matter.

3. You should urge governments to use their influence on all concerned to exercise the utmost restraint.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

File No. .....

Department Res Clerk

Drafted by (Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn. .....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification
SECRET
Precedence
FLASH
DESKBY ..... Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) ..... Z

POSTBY ..... Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.)

(Security Class.) SECRET

(Codeword) .....

(Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Caveat/ Privacy marking) .....

(Deskby) ..... Z

TO FLASH (precedence) MUSCAT (post) Tel. No. ..... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

.....

.....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) Flash WASHINGTON, Immediate Baghdad, Amman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Doha, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Jedda, Damascus and Paris.

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:–

Re for Muscat tel No. 208

Copies to:–

[TEXT]

WASHINGTON TELNO 2: IRAQ/IRAN

1. Please arrange most urgent delivery of the following message to the Sultan from the Prime Minister by whatsoever means you consider most appropriate:-

"I am gravely concerned by the news of possible Iraqi military action in the area of the Straits of Hormuz, making use of Omani territory and facilities. I most strongly urge you to reconsider Omani involvement in this operation the consequences of which for the security and prosperity of Oman and the whole Gulf area would be incalculable. Recovery of the islands by negotiation would be another matter."

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 27ø92øZ SEP 8ø

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 825 OF 27 SEPTEMBER 198ø

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND BONN

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW BAGHDAD AND UKDEL NATO

Mu/ox to Cheques 27.9.80
No 10 DSt.

ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TELNO 782 TO UKMIS NEW YORK (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ

1. TARIQ AZIZ, THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, SAW PRESIDENT GISCARD ON 25 SEPTEMBER. AZIZ WAS REPORTED AT A SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE TO HAVE LISTED THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS FOR IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED IRANIAN TERRITORY: ''1. RESPECT FOR IRAQ'S SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OVER HER WATERS AND TERRITORY: 2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AND NEARBY ARAB STATES: 3. NON-INTERVENTION BY IRAN IN IRAQ'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS: 4. THE ENDING OF ALL AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY IRAN.'' AZIZ REPEATED THAT IRAQ WOULD RESPECT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND IN THE PERSIAN GULF AS A WHOLE. ON 26 SEPTEMBER, THE ELYSEE SPOKESMAN WELCOMED ''THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS''. THE PAKISTAN PRESIDENT IS EXPECTED TO MEET PRESIDENT GISCARD IN PARIS ON 28 SEPTEMBER ON HIS WAY TO NEW YORK.

2. IN DISCUSSION ON 26 SEPTEMBER, THE DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR AT THE ELYSEE CLAIMED THAT AZIZ HAD NOT RAISED THE QUESTION OF ARMS SUPPLIES IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD. ACCORDING TO LEVITTE, AZIZ HAD SAID THAT THE SUBJECT HAD NOT BEEN RAISED IN MOSCOW EITHER. THE FRENCH DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS THE TRUTH OR WHETHER IT MEANT THAT AZIZ HAD ASKED FOR ARMS FROM THE RUSSIANS BUT HAD OBTAINED NOTHING. LEVITTE APPEARED TO HAVE NO IDEA HOW LONG THE IRAQIS COULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT AT THE PRESENT LEVEL WITHOUT RE-SUPPLY.

3. ON IRAQ'S OBJECTIVES, LEVITTE SAID THAT THE ELYSEE'S IMPRESSION AFTER THE TALKS YESTERDAY WAS THAT IRAQ'S IMMEDIATE AIM WAS TO CAPTURE ENOUGH TERRITORY TO BE ABLE TO BARGAIN FROM A POSITION OF STRENGH, AND THEN BY GIVING UP SOME OF THE TERRITORY TO END UP WITH WHAT SHE REGARDED AS HISTORICALLY HERS. HOWEVER, IF THE FIGHTING MOVED DECISIVELY IN IRAQ'S FAVOUR, THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD TRY TO TOPPLE KHOMEINI. THERE WAS THE FURTHER RISK THAT THEY WOULD BE TEMPTED TO OCCUPY THE GULF ISLANDS. PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD WARNED AZIZ STRONGLY AGAINST SUCH ACTION. LEVITTE SEEMED SCEPTICAL ABOUT IRAQI PROTESTATIONS THAT THEY WOULD HAND OVER THE ISLANDS TO THE UAE.

Mutaxed
27-9

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES ~~22~~ 32

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
HD/CONS D
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

Sir A Acland
Mr Adams

SECRET
FM WASHINGTON 271525Z SEP 80
TO FLASH MUSCAT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2 OF 27 SEPTEMBER
INFO FLASH FCO, MODUK, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, JEDDA
IMMEDIATE KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DAMASCUS.

TO CHARGE D'AFFAIRES FROM SECRETARY OF STATE.

YOUR TELNO 268: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. PLEASE SEE ZAWAWI SOONEST AND SAY HOW STRONGLY I DEPLORE THE SUGGESTED ACTION WHICH CAN HAVE THE GRAVEST CONSEQUENCES FOR OMAN AS WELL AS FOR THE SECURITY OF THE HORMUZ STRAITS. I AM IN TOUCH WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS ABOUT THIS AND WILL COMMUNICATE AGAIN BUT WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD USE ALL THE AUTHORITY POSSIBLE TO TRY TO DETER THE OMANIS.

HENDERSON

FLASH

NNNN

~ Master Set

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY ON SATURDAY 27 SEPTEMBER 1980 AT 2000

PM: Hello Peter.

FCS: I thought I'd just have another round up with you in the light of what's been happening here. On reflection, I think that we must be careful not to get ourselves too far in front in terms of the other people. Not with Oman but with the others. Because it is fairly obvious from information that the cooperation between them and Iraq is growing fairly close and if, as I suspect, we are not really going to find it possible to alter the decision, I think we must be careful not to have put ourselves in a position in which everybody gangs up against us. So what I've done is, I've sent that telegram as I told you to Oman and I've talked to the man on the telephone. Tunnel his name is, who is extremely sensible. Unfortunately the Ruler is about 500 miles away

PM: So he can't pop in and see him

FCS: No, but he can see the Foreign Minister they've good communication, this was about an hour ago and he was just off to see him. He didn't know what the timescale of all this was, he thought it might be tomorrow morning or it could conceivably be in about 48 hours and there was evidence that there were more things coming along.

PM: I must say I'm very very depressed about this because I think the first decision was right. And the first decision, the instinctive one, is usually right in terms of what may happen. And what depresses me is that it looks as if we were the only people prepared to give a lead. I'm certain the first decision was right, that it was right to stop it.

FCS: You were right to stop it if you could. The difficulty is it was all confidential information and to have sent a telegram round as my first reaction was and second thoughts prevailed, is of course to breach the confidentiality which of course would have conceivably and perhaps even probably made things worse.

/ PM:

PM: Yes, that I understand except I suppose it would have been possible to ask him to consult with certain people before deciding. That would not have broken the confidentiality but said look we don't think you're right but please before you continue would you consult with blah blah blah ..

FCS: Unfortunately you see I think in this particular case they're working their passage back into the Arab fold.

PM: I see, yes.

FCS: And there is no doubt that he's been giving, been getting advice on the lines that he has now accepted from Hussain.

PM: What???

FCS: Yes. There is a real ...

PM: I must tell you I'm very very shocked because I think they're going in to it far too naively.

FCS: Yes, so do I.

PM: It's dead easy to go into these things and within three days you'll wish you hadn't.

FCS: Yes, for sure. I don't think they've thought of the consequences.

PM: No neither do I.

FCS: But I think that the information, you know all of which came a little bit later, leads one to suppose that there isn't going to be very much chance of changing his mind if all the friends are urging him to do it. The Americans are not sending messages to anybody.

PM: So I understand.

/ FCS:

FCS: But I think they're probably going to get hold of Fahd. I've had a talk with the French. I had a word with Francois-Poncet.

PM: On the basis of published reports, yes.

FCS: Yes. I said there were indications, you know, all that. And his immediate reaction was, well it's going to happen anyway.

PM: Peter, I must say that when anyone says that to me I think it's a specious argument. Our job is to influence events, not to assume they're going to happen.

FCS: Well no I agree. I'm not defending the attitude but that's what he said. He then went on to say since it's going to happen anyway, I think it would be better if it were short and sharp and successful. But of course it isn't going to be.

PM: Exactly. That's exactly what it't not going to be. It's not going to be short, it's not going to be sharp and it's going to be disastrous.

FCS: Yes, well that's right, if it happens. He said he was going to ring his boss up and his boss knows a little bit more than he does because I think Reg Hibbert has told him.

PM: Oh!!

FCS: Within the sort of seal of secrecy, I think. I don't think it matters. On the UN front I was talking to Tony Parsons. Zia is at the moment in Tehran and has had quite a good reaction about mediation from the Iranians but he ..

PM: With the Iranians?

FCS: Bani-Sadr. But he gets the feeling, according to the Pakistan Ambassador at the UN, he gets it very strongly, that any association with the UN, any mediation associated with the UN is totally unacceptable. The UN is in the doghouse. Consequently,

/ according to the

according to the Pakistan Ambassador, a resolution at the UN would be the most counter-production thing that could happen, because it might really stop all this mediation going on. Well now I think it's a very moot point whether this is true or whether this is a Pakistani assessment of it being true, I don't know. But what Tony is doing, and this is right, I'm sure, is in the sidelines to say well look a resolution isn't going to help very much so let's not press it too hard. The Americans want a resolution and the Norwegians want a resolution and the Mexicans want a resolution. And of course is there is a resolution which says cease-fire we should support it. But on the whole it might be better to delay things rather than to risk what I think is the only possibility of getting a solution here, which is Islamic mediation on one side or another.

PM: Where's Zia's next stop?

FCS: He's going to Baghdad. And after that he's coming to New York. I think he's probably stopping in Paris on the way to see Giscard.

PM: On the way to New York?

FCS: Well he was going to because the French were getting very worried about the Pakistan attitude on Afghanistan and he was going to stop off and have a word with Giscard on the way. Whether he will now I don't know.

PM: Well that's for him to decide, isn't it.

FCS: Yes. Anyway he will then come and I hope that there will be a mediation. But if this other thing happens all hell will break loose I think. And I think it's very difficult to say what the reaction ...

PM: I suppose there's no hope if the Iraqis indicate certain things to him that he could stop off in Oman on his way?

FCS: He doesn't know anything about it.

/ PM: No,

PM: No, I wonder if they said certain things to him. I mean he really is mediating on the assumption that the conflict is isolated.

FCS: Yes. The Americans feel that to let him know would be unwise.

PM: It's not possible to bring certain press reports to his attention.

FCS: Well I think that's going to happen anyway. I would doubt whether, in the light of what's going on here, it will not leak.

PM: I still think the other thing that we're basically talking about is the most worrying thing I've heard. The most naive thing and the most disastrous thing. And it could lead to the fall of the person himself.

FCS: Well it could lead to anything, couldn't it. But the whole thing is pretty gruesome and I don't really believe that anybody has looked at the consequences of it because if anybody should suppose that it could be isolated in a couple of days, I think that they are misjudging the actions. Because I cannot believe that the Iranians will not retaliate.

PM: I think they're misjudging the Iranian reaction and their capacity to react which is greater than most people, I think, have calculated. Because you see their capacity, they only need to issue threats.

FCS: It's difficult to know what the capacity is you see because the Americans have turned off the tap of spare parts over a considerable period of time.

PM: Yes, but their ship capacity is quite big.

FCS: Well, it's the only one in the area really.

PM: Yes. Their ship capacity across the Straits is quite big.

/ FCS: It's the

FCS: It's the only one in the area.

PM: Yes. There's no-one else there.

FCS: Yes. But one doesn't know in what condition it is. This is presumably partly the objective of this exercise.

PM: But Peter would you take a tanker in under those circumstances?

FCS: No, not on your life.

PM: Exactly.

FCS: This is what I didn't think the French had quite hoisted in.

PM: I mean they've only got to threaten.

FCS: Tony Parsons thinks that that if this other thing happens that there would be an outrage on the part of most countries on the grounds that this was spreading the conflict beyond the bounds of what was necessary for what the Iraqis have claimed.

PM: Yes, but are they still, but does he still think that they'd keep the Arab world with them? Clearly he does and that's what worries me.

FCS: Yes. Oh I think that there's evidence that it's becoming solider rather than less solid.

PM: Yes, but this is not a calculation of the consequences, this is of teaching Khomeini a lesson which implies that they think he can be taught a lesson. I'm not certain that he can.

FCS: I think that the evidence today is beginning to make it look less likely, don't you?

PM: Yes. They're good fighters.

/ FCS: Yes and

FCS: Yes, and it looks, the military reports I thought reading the telegrams this morning, to me indicate that the Iranians are doing rather better.

PM: I know.

FCS: And the other thing, I don't know whether you've noticed, the other thing is that it looks as if the Soviet Union are rather hedging their bets.

PM: Well I didn't quite notice that.

FCS: Yes. They started off by being inclined to favour the Iraqis and they now seem to be back in the middle.

PM: Well, what frightens me is that they might not merely go back in the middle but the other way.

FCS: Well that's possible too.

PM: Because they're right near them and they could go in and help. That's the frightening thing. That the other side looks like winning remotely and they'll be absolutely in a position to help.

FCS: Well we'll just play the thing hour by hour, do what we can and I'll keep in touch with you.

PM: It's Hussain that bothers me because I thought he was the ...

FCS: I think it's not just him. Christopher told me that there was evidence that there was supportive action on the part of other people.

PM : Yes, well there has been for two or three days, hasn't there.

FCS: Yes, a bit more though.

/ PM: But that

PM: But that was at a time when they thought it was all going to over in a short time therefore they might as well weigh in on the winning side. Warlike cricket isn't like that. I think it's the wish is father to their thought at the moment rather than calculation. There's no point in sending anyone Peter is there? Too late.

FCS: Well I doubt it. I don't think there's time apart from anything else. I've told the Tunnel to go in on my authority and say that I have said this because the Americans are doing it on the Muskie net and not the Presidential one.

PM: Well Peter in that case we just have to wait. Your first reaction was still the right one.

FCS: Well it was the right one in logic.

PM: No, it was the right one in feel and judgement. Damn the logic it was the right one in feel and in judgement.

FCS: I think on the whole though we don't want to get out in front too much.

PM: I don't know, I don't know.

FCS: I think we stand ...

PM: Well what we're saying is that no-one's going to give a lead therefore we can't afford to ..

FCS: No I don't think we're really quite saying that. I think we're saying if we did do it, would it make matters worse. And I think it might conceivably make matters worse. And I think every indication, I've got some telegrams in front of me now, every indication is that all of them are now getting behind Iraq, you know, Hussain. I think the Saudis are getting behind.

PM: You know what will happen to Iraq. They'll be left out in front and alone when things don't go that way. Iraq is out in

/ front

front, she's asked certain people to follow her. Other people are and if that operation is not successful and rebounds, Iraq too will find that she's left out in front, alone.

FCS: Well that's absolutely true. But that isn't any particular skin off our nose.

PM: No it isn't.

FCS: The skin off our nose is the Gulf.

PM: Yes, all I'm saying is that the whole operation, even from the viewpoint of Iraq would have been better not conducted. All right Peter, well if we can't do anything else we'll have to do that.

FCS: Well I think we're probably right. Just sort of wait and see now. I think we've done, the French aren't going to do anything, we've done what we can with the people concerned and I think probably that's the best we can do

PM: The Tunnel will go in and say that it's the Omanis best interests we have at heart. I mean they must obviously be the best judges of their interest but ..

FCS: That's right but it's going to be very very important that in the Arab world we're seen not to let them down, so to speak. I mean we've got no interest in Iran and we've got a lot of interest in the Arab world.

PM: Yes, but you see my worry is that we are letting them down by not giving them our best judgement.

FCS: Well I think we are, we are giving them our best judgement, I promise you that. The trouble is I think he's actually promised it and can't retreat.

PM: Well I said to Clive when he was here, the fact is that he's too nice a man, he doesn't like to refuse a request from a friend.

/ FCS: He's working

FCS: He's working his passage back. That's my judgement.

PM: Yes. All right Peter.

FCS: I won't bother you again tonight unless there's a crisis. Have a good dinner. Goodbye.

PM: Goodbye Peter.

a Master Set

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY ON SATURDAY 27 SEPTEMBER 1980 AT 1630

PM: Hello, Peter

FCS: Sorry to bother you. Have you seen the flash telegram from Muscat?

PM: Yes, I have. And I'm very worried about it.

FCS: Well, I think this is very serious.

PM: I think they're going into it without having any idea of the consequences.

FCS: Right.

PM: Both for them and on the rest of the world.

FCS: The consequences for us are really gruesom beyond words. I'll tell you what I've done. I've sent off a flash telegram to Muscat telling the Charge d'Affaires to go in and try and do everything he possibly can to stop them allowing it to happen. We've sent, or are sending - I've been on to the, Acland in the Foreign Office - we're sending telegrams to all Gulf States, plus Saudi Arabia, plus Hussain, the King, pointing out, you know if the Gulf is closed. Because you know if they attack Bandara... Incidentally, the Americans, who have a slightly different interpretation, say that the object of this exercise is to take out Bandarabas and not so much the islands. And of course if they take out Bandarabas, nothing is going to go through those Straits.

PM: At all.

FCS: So we've sent these telegrams trying to point out the problems and the difficulties.

PM: Is Carter sending one too?

/ FCS:

FCS: Well, they're all away. Muskie's playing golf in Maine, I don't know what Carter's doing. But I've just talked to Warren Christopher.

PM: I really think it shouldn't only be us.

FCS: Oh they've got the skids on. I've suggested that we get hold of the French and I will get hold of Francois-Poncet who's in New York who must want the Gulf closed rather less than anyone else and see if they can do anything with the Iraqis.

PM: Iraqis, yes.

FCS: Antony Acland's getting on to the Elysee and I'll get on to Francois-Poncet here. And the last person we think might be useful is Aga Shari, whose been mounting this mediation exercise and won't want to see it collapse around his ears, and therefore might be prepared to take some action. But I would judge that it's very unlikely that we shall bump the Iraqis and Omanis off this. And I think it's going to happen.

PM: Yes, I know.

FCS: Really I do think there ought to be, we ought to be thinking about how to pick up the pieces and localise it.

PM: Yes. The whole strategy, Peter, was to isolate it. And I thought we'd succeeded.

FCS: I mean this is a lunacy. I've asked Douglas Hurd and Michael Palliser at Oxford I gather and I've suggested they all get back to London and have a talk before you see them tomorrow morning. There really is an urgency about it.

PM: Who would be most likely to bring pressure to bear on the Sultan?

/ FCS:

FCS: I think Hussain but there is evidence that Hussain has not been entirely blameless in this.

PM: But I thought that I had read telegrams or something in the paper to the effect that both the Kuawaitis and Saudi Arabia were slightly on the side of Iraq.

FCS: Well I think all the Arabs are.

PM: Yes, but that's different from enlarging the area of conflict.

FCS: Well I think it is, don't you?

PM: Yes, I think so.

FCS: Well because surely they don't want the Straits of Hormuz closed and no tankers coming in to the Gulf.

PM: Well Kuwait certainly would find it extremely difficult because of desalination.

FCS: That's right. They'll be all right for a bit but the food I think will be very difficult for them. I've read a telegram today. But in any event we've sent telegrams hoping they can do something.

PM: Well thank goodness. I was so very alarmed indeed when I read it.

FCS: Well I think this is the worst news so far.

PM: It upsets the entire strategy.

FCS: More than that at the moment we can't do. But I hope that they will be doing some thinking and you will have a chance of talking at Chequers tomorrow. I think I'll hang around here for a bit and see what's happening.

/ PM:

PM: In view of the latest development I think you should. How to stop it starting.

FCS: That's right. And then when it starts it may mean even more necessary to Iran. The last bit of the telegram which is also rather worrying is this business of the loan service personnel.

PM: Indeed yes. Because it involves us.

FCS: I think the position is that the loan service personnel are required to obey the orders of the Sultan under an agreement made in 1971 provided what they're asked to do is legal and not, I've forgotten exactly what the words are, are not contrary to, not putting Her Britannic Majesty in danger or something. But it seems at first brush that the implication is that they have to do what they are told.

PM: Yes. We've done it very badly if that is so. I mean are they actually seconded from us or are they independently employed?

FCS: No there are two sorts. There are the contract officers who are in effect mercenaries and there are the loan service personnel ..

PM: I would have thought that the loan service personnel operated only so long as it was not contrary to the fundamental interests of HMG or if in peace-time operations.

FCS: Well I don't think it's written like that. And you see it would have been difficult to write it like that because they were there originally because they were fighting a war against the PDRY. That was the problem I think. But anyway they're looking up the agreement.

PM: Yes, and they will come with advice? But even so the main thing is to stop the proposed event, isn't it?

/ FCS:

FCS: That's right. But I think it's going to be extremely difficult to do. I really do.

PM: Who else could bring pressure on Iraq?

FCS: The French are the only ones immediately to mind.

Mr. Alexander: Should the Prime Minister speak to Giscard?

FCS: Either that or I'll talk to Francois-Poncet here in New York.

PM: Quicker to talk to Francois-Poncet. But who else ...

FCS: I think on the whole I'd better do that. If I get nowhere perhaps you could go in to Giscard.

PM: Yes. Look, as I told you the Yugoslav PM is in Delhi with Mrs Gandhi. Yugoslavia gets 45% of their oil from there. They're non-aligned, Mrs Gandhi's non-aligned, is there nothing that the non-aligned movement can do in connection with Iraq?

FCS: I should think it's a bit too ponderous to get into action ...

PM: Yes, certainly the Yugoslavs are too ponderous altogether.

FCS: But we might consider, the Yugoslavs and the Indians might, the Indians do have quite a close relationship with Iraq.

PM: They're a very big country too.

FCS: I'll have a think about that, Margaret, OK?

PM: It's just that the more people who bring pressure to bear the better. All right Peter.

FCS: I'll keep in touch. What's the time with you now then?

PM: The time with us now is about a quarter to five. I'm here all the time.

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FM PARIS 27Ø92ØZ SEP 8Ø
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 825 OF 27 SEPTEMBER 198Ø
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND BONN
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW BAGHDAD AND UKDEL NATO

who to JSt.
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YOUR TELNO 782 TO UKMIS NEW YORK (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ

1. TARIQ AZIZ, THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, SAW PRESIDENT GISCARD ON 25 SEPTEMBER. AZIZ WAS REPORTED AT A SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE TO HAVE LISTED THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS FOR IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED IRANIAN TERRITORY: ''1. RESPECT FOR IRAQ'S SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OVER HER WATERS AND TERRITORY: 2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AND NEARBY ARAB STATES: 3. NON-INTERVENTION BY IRAN IN IRAQ'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS: 4. THE ENDING OF ALL AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY IRAN.'' AZIZ REPEATED THAT IRAQ WOULD RESPECT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND IN THE PERSIAN GULF AS A WHOLE. ON 26 SEPTEMBER, THE ELYSEE SPOKESMAN WELCOMED ''THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS''. THE PAKISTAN PRESIDENT IS EXPECTED TO MEET PRESIDENT GISCARD IN PARIS ON 28 SEPTEMBER ON HIS WAY TO NEW YORK.

2. IN DISCUSSION ON 26 SEPTEMBER, THE DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR AT THE ELYSEE CLAIMED THAT AZIZ HAD NOT RAISED THE QUESTION OF ARMS SUPPLIES IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD. ACCORDING TO LEVITTE, AZIZ HAD SAID THAT THE SUBJECT HAD NOT BEEN RAISED IN MOSCOW EITHER. THE FRENCH DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS THE TRUTH OR WHETHER IT MEANT THAT AZIZ HAD ASKED FOR ARMS FROM THE RUSSIANS BUT HAD OBTAINED NOTHING. LEVITTE APPEARED TO HAVE NO IDEA HOW LONG THE IRAQIS COULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT AT THE PRESENT LEVEL WITHOUT RE-SUPPLY.

3. ON IRAQ'S OBJECTIVES, LEVITTE SAID THAT THE ELYSEE'S IMPRESSION AFTER THE TALKS YESTERDAY WAS THAT IRAQ'S IMMEDIATE AIM WAS TO CAPTURE ENOUGH TERRITORY TO BE ABLE TO BARGAIN FROM A POSITION OF STRENGH, AND THEN BY GIVING UP SOME OF THE TERRITORY TO END UP WITH WHAT SHE REGARDED AS HISTORICALLY HERS. HOWEVER, IF THE FIGHTING MOVED DECISIVELY IN IRAQ'S FAVOUR, THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD TRY TO TOPPLE KHOMEINI. THERE WAS THE FURTHER RISK THAT THEY WOULD BE TEMPTED TO OCCUPY THE GULF ISLANDS. PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD WARNED AZIZ STRONGLY AGAINST SUCH ACTION. LEVITTE SEEMED SCEPTICAL ABOUT IRAQI PROTESTATIONS THAT THEY WOULD HAND OVER THE ISLANDS TO THE UAE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
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AND IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW AND UK DEL NATO BRUSSELS
PRIORITY AMMAN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, PARIS, BONN, JEDDA, DAMASCUS AND ANKARA.

JIC TEL 845 OF 22 SEPTEMBER, PARA 9: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. WE OWE YOU AN ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S AIMS IN THE PRESENT FIGHTING. I WOULD HAVE TELEGRAPHED EARLIER BUT FOR OUR PREOCCUPATION WITH GETTING MOST BRITISH COMMUNITY WIVES AND CHILDREN OUT OF THIS COUNTRY.

2. I AGREE WITH ABU DHABI (MR ROBERTS' TEL 297 TO YOU) THAT IRAQI AMBITIONS GO FURTHER THAN INDICATED IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF JICTEL UNDER REFERENCE. THIS BELIEF IS PERHAPS SUPPORTED BY THE RELEASE OF IRAQ'S ''THREE CONDITIONS'' FOR NEGOTIATION (MY TEL NO 432 AS AMENDED BY PARA 2 OF AMMAN TEL NO 354, BOTH OF 25 SEPTEMBER).

3. AN IMPORTANT NEW CONSIDERATION IS THAT THE PACE OF IRAQI IUCCESSES IN THE DISPUTED LAND AREAS IS NOW SLOWING DOWN, IN SPITE OF KING HUSSEIN'S BELIEF THAT 48 HOURS (FROM 25 SEPTEMBER) WOULD SUFFICE FOR ALL IRAQI MILITARY OBJECTIVES TO BE ACHIEVED (PARA 3 OF AMMAN TUR). AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND, SADDAM'S MILITARY PLAN MAY LOOK SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING, BUT IS NO DOUBT CONSTANTLY BEING REASSESSED IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND AND THE AVAILABILITY OF SPARES:-

FIRST PRIORITY:
——————— OCCUPATION OF ABADAN AND KORRAMSHAHR AND ADVANCE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TOWARDS REGIONAL CAPITAL, AHWAZ. SADDAM MAY NOW BE LEARNING THAT KHUZISTANI ARAB WELCOME FOR LIBERATING IRAQI TROOPS IS LESS WARM THAN HE EXPECTED: IRANIAN ARMED FORCES RESISTANCE IS CERTAINLY A SURPRISE.

SECOND PRIORITY:
——————— ADVANCE UP THE KERMANSHAH ROAD (WELL BEYOND QASR-I-SHIRIN) TO BUILD UP NEGOTIATING POSITION ON THE TWO CLAIMED STRIPS OF TERRITORY RESPECTIVELY NORTH AND SOUTH OF MANDALI (ZAIN AL-WAUS AND SAIF SAAD). IT SEEMS THAT THE IRAQIS ARE DETERMINED TO HAVE SUBSTANTIAL RECTIFICATIONS IN THEIR FAVOUR HERE AT THE END OF THE DAY.

THIRD PRIORITY:

---------- IF SAQR OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH HAS INDEED MADE A DEAL WITH SADDAM, AND IF A MEASURE OF UAE SUPPORT OR AT LEAST ACQUIESCENCE EG. IN REFUELLING IRAQI MIGS AFTER A STRIKE MISSION CAN BE OBTAINED (BOTH BIG IFS), I CAN FORESEE SOME LIMITED MOVE AGAINST THE TUNBS AND/OR ''OCCUPIED'' ABU MUSA(CF WASHINGTON TEL TO YOU 4115). THIS MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF AN AIRBONE ROCKET ATTACK ON IRANIAN INSTALLATIONS ON EG. THE TUNBS, AND WOULD BE A ONE/OFF OPERATION TO GET THE WEST (OR WHOEVER) TO PUT PRESSURE ON IRAN TO NEGOTIATE. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE IRAQIS COULD MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE LAND/SEA ATTACK AGAINST ANY OF THE ISLANDS, SINCE BOTH THEIR AMPHIBIAN FORCES AND AIR SUPPORT ARE PROBABLY INADEQUATE AND COULD NOT COUNT ON SYSTEMATIC GULF ARAB LOGISTIC SUPPORT (PARA1 (D) OF DUBAI TEL TO ABU DHABI NO 29 IS RELEVANT HERE).

4. THE ABOVE IS ALL SPECULATIVE. BUT ONE SHOULD AT ALL TIMES REMEMBER THE IMMENSE STUBBORNESS AND SELF-IMPORTANCE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN, WITH HIS INNATE TENDENCY TO ''UP THE ANTE'' IF HIS WISHES OR PRESTIGE ARE THREATENED. AS THIS FEATURE IS MORE OR LESS MATCHED BY WHAT I UNDERSTAND TO BE THE IRANIAN ATTITUDE, THE MOOD TO NEGOTIATE MAY TAKE A FEW DAYS YET TO DEVELOP, AND WILL BE INFLUENCED LARGELY BY THE RESUPPLY POSITION ON BOTH SIDES.

5. NO DOUBT YOU HAVE MANY OTHER SOURCES AT YOUR DISPOSAL WHICH THROW LIGHT ON IRAQI AMBITIONS. HERE WE SEE THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY, BUT ARE IN NO DOUBT THAT SADDAM'S PRETENSIONS AS A LEADER OF ARABISM, THOUGH NOT YET HIS FUTURE AS LEADER OF IRAQ, ARE VISIBLY AT STAKE. FURTHERMORE HE MAY BE REALISING A BIT LATE THAT THE DIFFICULTY OF FINDING AN IRANIAN LEADER PREPARED OR EMPOWERED TO NEGOTIATE (AS NABIL NAJM TOLD ME ON 23 SEPTMBER) IS A SEVERE ONE. A SKILLED MEDIATOR IS SURELY GOING TO BE REQUIRED.

EGERTON

LIMITED
MED SIR E YOUDE
NENAD SIR J GRAHAM
UND MR J C MOBERLY
ESSD MR P H MOBERLY
PUSD MR BRAITHWAITE
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 4120 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1980,
INFO UKDEL O E C D, UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, ROME,
TOKYO, BAGHDAD.

MY TELNO 4109: VISIT OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

MR HOWELL ALSO ME LANTZKE (I E A), CHRISTOPHER (STATE) AND OWEN (N S C).

2. LANTZKE'S VIEW WAS THAT LOSS OF 2 M B P D FROM IRAN AND IRAQ SHOULD BE HANDLED WITHOUT PULLING THE I E A TRIGGER. HE THOUGHT THAT COORDINATED ACTION ON STOCKS AND SOME INFORMAL ASSISTANCE TO THOSE COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED (FRANCE, JAPAN, ITALY, SPAIN AND BELGIUM, ALTHOUGH HE HAD DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER THE JAPANESE HAD A CASE AND WAS NOT YET SURE ABOUT SPAIN) WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO KEEP THE SPOT MARKET QUIET. HE WOULD ALSO BE WORKING FOR A STATEMENT FROM ALL I E A GOVERNMENTS THAT THEY WERE ENCOURAGING THEIR COMPANIES TO DRAW ON STOCKS. THE S O M WAS TO MEET ON 29/30 SEPTEMBER AND HE WOULD PRESS THEM FOR REACTIONS TO THESE IDEAS WITHIN 10 DAYS. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THE U S ADMINISTRATION SHOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT THE STRATEGIC RESERVE SHOULD BE FILLED ONLY IN THE LIGHT OF MARKET CONDITIONS. HE DID NOT WANT THE I E A TO GET INVOLVED IN PRESSING ARAMCO TO HELP CRUDE SHORT COMPANIES.

3. CHRISTOPHER SAID THERE WERE NOW SIGNS OF BUYING ACTIVITY IN THE REFINED PRODUCT SPOT MARKETS BY FRENCH AND BELGIAN COMPANIES. IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO TAKE QUICK ACTION TO ARREST SUCH DEVELOPMENTS. COOPER SUGGESTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE HANDLED BY ARRANGING STOCK TRANSFERS BETWEEN OIL COMPANIES BUT NOTED THAT THIS APPROACH COULD RUN INTO U S ANTI-TRUST DIFFICULTIES. ANOTHER REMEDY MIGHT BE TO ASK OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES, FOR INSTANCE KUWAIT, TO EXPAND PRODUCTION WHERE POSSIBLE. MR HOWELL NOTED THAT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GENERALLY ENCOURAGING O P E C COUNTRIES NOT TO CUT PRODUCTION LEVELS AND TALKING TO THEM DIRECTLY ABOUT THE USE OF THEIR SURPLUS CAPACITY.

4. MR HOWELL NOTED THAT OTHER O P E C COUNTRIES MUST HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN STOPPING THE CONFLICT. CHRISTOPHER AGREED AND SAID THAT THE PROPOSED ISLAMIC CONFERENCE INITIATIVE MIGHT HAVE A GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

5. STATE DEPARTMENT AGREED THAT THE MINIMUM POSSIBLE PUBLICITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN MAJOR POWERS ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. THE JAPANESE HAD MISINTERPRETED THE AMERICAN

PROPOSAL ABOUT CONSULTATIONS ON TANKER INSURANCE TO MEAN THAT A LARGE INTERNATIONAL MEETING WOULD BE HELD. THIS QUESTION COULD PROBABLY BEST BE HANDLED INFORMALLY AND COOPER SUGGESTED THAT AN INITIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS MIGHT TAKE PLACE NEXT WEEK IN THE MARGINS OF THE S L T MEETINGS IN PARIS.

6. AMBASSADOR OWEN ALSO REFERRED TO ACTIVITY IN THE SPOT MARKET AND SAID THAT HE HAD SUGGESTED TO DUNCAN THAT SOME AMERICAN COMPANIES SHOULD BE ASKED TO RELEASE THEIR STOCKS INTO THE MARKETPLACE. HE HAD ALSO SUGGESTED THAT DUNCAN SHOULD RING GIRAUD TO ASK HIM TO URGE MODERATION ON THE FRENCH COMPANIES. OWEN HAD ALSO ENCOURAGED LANTZKE TO PROPOSE TO THE S O M MEETING NEXT WEEK THAT COUNTRIES SHOULD REDUCE STOCK LEVELS BY AN AVERAGE OF 10 DAYS. IF POSSIBLE THIS ACTION SHOULD BE AGREED WITHIN A WEEK AFTER THE MEETING. MR HOWELL SUGGESTED THAT A STATEMENT ABOUT THIS INTENTION AFTER THE S O M MEETING MIGHT HELP TO CALM DOWN THE MARKET SITUATION. OWEN GAREED WITH THIS IDEA, AND ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PERSUADE THE FRENCH TO ACT ALONGSIDE THE I E A INITIATIVE. HE ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF SHARING CRUDE OIL SUPPLIES AMONGST COMPANIES BUT SAID THAT THISWOULD NOT BE EASY TO ARRANGE IN THE CASE OF ARAMCO. NEVERTHELESS THE ARAMCO SHARE-HOLDERS MIGHT SEE ADVANTAGE IN DAMPING DOWN THE SPOT MARKET BECAUSE OF THEIR FEARS THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD RENEW THEIR CRITICISM OF EXCESSIVE PROFITS. OWEN TOOK THE POINT THAT THE QUESTION OF U S PURCHASES FOR THE STRATEGIC RESERVE MIGHT BE RAISED IN THE S O M DISCUSSIONS.

7. PLEASE ADVANCE TO P S NUMBER 10, P S/L P S, P S/SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY AND SIR D MAITLAND DESKBY 09.00Z 27 SEPTEMBER.

HENDERSON.

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]
[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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Ch. A. Adams
MR ADAMS

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 270140Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1395 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1980
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD.
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO.

DB 270900Z

M I P T : IRAQ/IRAN

TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IS:

HAVING BEGUN CONSIDERATION OF THE ITEM ENTITLED, ''THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ,''

MINDFUL THAT ALL MEMBER STATES HAVE UNDERTAKEN THE CHARTER OBLIGATIONS TO SETTLE THEIR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND IN SUCH A MANNER THAT INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ARE NOT ENDANGERED,

MINDFUL AS WELL THAT ALL MEMBERS ARE OBLIGED TO REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OF OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE,

RECALLING THAT UNDER ARTICLE 24 OF THE CHARTER THE [illegible]

MINDFUL AS WELL THAT ALL MEMBERS ARE OBLIGED TO REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OF OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE,

RECALLING THAT UNDER ARTICLE 24 OF THE CHARTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DEVELOPING SITUATION BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ:

1. CALLS ON IRAN AND IRAQ TO REFRAIN IMMEDIATELY FROM ANY FURTHER THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AND TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS:

2. URGES THEM TO ACCEPT ANY APPROPRIATE OFFER OF MEDIATION OR ANY ASSISTANCE THAT MAY BE FORTHCOMING THAT WOULD PERMIT THE FULFILLMENT OF THEIR CHARTER OBLIGATIONS:

3. SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE OFFER OF HIS GOOD OFFICES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THIS SITUATION:

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS.

PARSONS

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 28-29

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 270135Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1394 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1980
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD,
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO.

MYTEL 1383 : SECURITY COUNCIL : IRAQ/IRAN.

1. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS MORNING'S (26 SEPTEMBER) ISLAMIC CONFERENCE MEETING AGHASHAHI (PAKISTAN), WHO PRESIDED, ISSUED A STATEMENT SAYING THAT PRESIDENT ZIA, ASSISTED BY SECRETARY GENERAL CHATTI, HAD BEEN ENTRUSTED WITH A GOODWILL MISSION TO CONTACT THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAQ AND IRAN TO ''ASCERTAIN THEIR VIEWS WITH REGARD TO A SOLUTION OF THEIR CONFLICT IN THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY''. IN THE ENSUING QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION SHAHI SAID THAT ZIA WOULD COME TO NEW YORK TO MEET THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND THAT ''BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL WHICH WAS UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED''. SHEMIRANI (THE IRANIAN ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE) ATTENDED THE MEETING, AS DID KITTANI (IRAQ). THERE HAVE HOWEVER BEEN SUBSEQUENT

IRANIAN ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE) ATTENDED THE MEETING, AS DID KITTANI (IRAQ). THERE HAVE HOWEVER BEEN SUBSEQUENT REUTER REPORTS FROM TEHRAN ACCORDING TO WHICH THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER HAS REJECTED THE PROPOSAL.

2. BEFORE THIS AFTERNOON'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THE MEXICANS AND NORWEGIANS SUBMITTED FORMAL LETTERS ASKING FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AND CIRCULATED INFORMALLY A PROPOSED DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MIFT).

3. AT THE CONSULTATIONS THE PRESIDENT (SLIM-TUNISIA) ANNOUNCED THE RECEIPT OF A TELEGRAM FROM THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WELCOMING THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE PROPOSAL. WALDHEIM SAID THAT BOTH KITTANI AND CHATTI HAD MADE CLEAR TO HIM THAT THE MISSION WAS BEING UNDERTAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 33 OF THE CHARTER AND WAS COMPLEMENTARY TO ANY ACTION THE COUNCIL MIGHT TAKE. IT WAS THEN AGREED THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED TO A FORMAL MEETING TO HEAR THOSE WHO WISHED TO SPEAK TONIGHT AND CONVENE AGAIN TOMORROW (27 SEPTEMBER) FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION PRIOR TO A FURTHER OPEN MEETING.

4. AT THE FORMAL MEETING WALDHEIM DISCUSSED THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS. ONLY MEXICO, NORWAY AND KITTANI THEN SPOKE. NO FOREIGN MINISTERS ATTENDED. MUNOZ LEDO (MEXICO) AND ALGARD (NORWAY) UNDERLINED THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION AND EMPHASISED THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COUNCIL UNDER THE CHARTER. KITTANI CONFINED HIMSELF TO QUOTING FROM A STATEMENT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ISSUED IN BAGHDAD EARLIER IN THE DAY. IRAQ WAS CONCERNED ABOUT INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: DEVOTED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF NON INTERFERENCE AND RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY: AND HAD NO WISH TO CONTINUE THE FIGHTING IF IRAN WOULD SHOW RECOGNITION OF THESE PRINCIPLES. IRAQ HAD ONLY RESORTED TO DEFENDING ITS PRINCIPLES AFTER EXHAUSTING ALL DIPLOMATIC AND LEGAL CHANNELS. HE CONCLUDED WITH AN APPEAL THAT TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED FOR HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO COME TO PRESENT IRAQ'S CASE IN FULL. HE WAS WILLING TO COME AS SOON AS IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE TIME FOR SUBSTANTIVE DELIBERATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS HAD BEEN REACHED.

5. IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE WATERED DOWN ISLAMIC CONFERENCE INITIATIVE IS OFF THE GROUND. EVEN IF IT IS, IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO DEVELOP IF IT IS TRUE THAT ZIA IS COMING TO NEW YORK FIRST. MEANWHILE THE IRAQIS AND RUSSIANS HAVE WON ANOTHER ROUND IN THE DELAYING GAME. LUSAKA (ZAMBIA), PRESUMABLY AT RUSSIAN INSTIGATION, PREVENTED NON-ALIGNED CONSENSUS ON THE NORWEGIAN/MEXICAN DRAFT THIS AFTERNOON.

CONFERENCE INITIATIVE IS OFF THE GROUND. EVEN IF IT IS, IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO DEVELOP IF IT IS TRUE THAT ZIA IS COMING TO NEW YORK FIRST. MEANWHILE THE IRAQIS AND RUSSIANS HAVE WON ANOTHER ROUND IN THE DELAYING GAME. LUSAKA (ZAMBIA), PRESUMABLY AT RUSSIAN INSTIGATION, PREVENTED NON-ALIGNED CONSENSUS ON THE NORWEGIAN/MEXICAN DRAFT THIS AFTERNCON.

6. THE SCENE IS NOW SET FOR AN ARGUMENT TOMORROW THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT ADOPT A RESOLUTON:

(A) BECAUSE SOME MEMBERS MAY INVOKE THE 24 HOUR RULE (THE DRAFT HAS NOT YET BEEN FORMALLY TABLED) AND/OR

(B) BECAUSE OF KITTANI'S APPEAL TO AWAIT THE ARRIVAL OF HIS FOREIGN MINSTER.

WE MAY THEREFORE OCCUPY OURSELVES WITH MORE SPEECHES AND NO OUTCOME.

7. SO FAR THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN AT ITS VERY WORST.

PARSONS

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 270030Z SEP 80
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1393 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1980
INFO SAVING UKMIS GENEVA.

UNGA GENERAL DEBATE: 22-26 SEPTEMBER.

1. I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED MUSKIE'S AND GROMYKO'S STATEMENTS (MY TELNOS 1318 AND 1338). MY TELNO 16 SAVING SUMMARISES REFERENCES TO SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA. THERE WAS LITTLE ELSE OF INTEREST TO REPORT DURING THIS FIRST WEEK OF THE GENERAL DEBATE. THE STATEMENTS WERE TEDIOUSLY LONG AND ATTENDANCE LOW. THE GENERAL DEBATE IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE OF A FORMALITY. THE WAR BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN PASSED UNNOTICED UNTIL YOU REFERRED TO IT ON TUESDAY AFTERNOON.

2. IN A RAMBLING SPEECH FRANCOIS-PONCET (FRANCE) CONCENTRATED ON THE FOUR TROUBLE SPOTS OF AFGHANISTAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, CAMBODIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, BUT ALSO DELIVERED A HOMILY TO THE SUPERPOWERS (SO CALLED BECAUSE ''THEY ALONE HAVE THE POWER TO THRUST THE WORLD HEADLONG INTO GENERAL CONFLAGRATION''). FRANCE WAS THE FRIEND AND ALLY OF ONE OF THEM: WITH THE OTHER SHE SOUGHT TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP RELATIONS OF CO-OPERATION. IN THE PAST FRANCE HAD NOT CONCEALED HER FEELINGS ABOUT US POLICY IN VIETNAM: TODAY SHE HAD TO SAY THAT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN WAS UNACCEPTABLE. RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENDING THE ARMS RACE RESTED ON THE SUPERPOWERS.

3. GENSCHER (FRG), IN A SPEECH WHICH HE ADMITTED TO YOU WAS LARGELY ELECTIONEERING, CONCENTRATED ON DEVELOPMENT, DETENTE, DISARMAMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS. HE INTRODUCED, AS EXPECTED, A ''NEW AND URGENT AGENDA ITEM'' ENTITLED ''INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION TO AVERT NEW REFUGEE FLOWS''. HE PROPOSED A CONVENTION TO ELIMINATE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. AND HE PROPOSED THAT THE UN DRAW UP TWO REGISTERS TO RECORD:

(A) THE AMOUNT EACH INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY SPENDS PER CAPITA ON ARMAMENTS AND ON DEVELOPMENT:

(B) THE VALUE OF WORLD-WIDE IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF ARMS.

4. HUANG HUA (CHINA) ATTACKED THE SOVIET UNION IN FIERCE BUT FAMILIAR TERMS.

5. ADDITIONAL POINTS OF INTEREST WERE:
(A) KOREA: THE GDR, RWANDA, YUGOSLAVIA, CHINA, ZAMBIA, TOGO, GUYANA AND ROMANIA CALLED FOR RESUMPTION OF THE DIALOGUE ON THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA.
(B) DHANABALAN (SINGAPORE) DELIVERED A STINGING ATTACK ON VIETNAM FOR BETRAYING THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND ON THE SOVIET UNION WHICH HAD NOW TO BE SUSPECTED OF SUPPORTING NON-ALIGNMENT ONLY IN ORDER TO WEAKEN THIRD WORLD LINKS WITH THE WEST.
(C) DIEGO GARCIA: VIETNAM AND AFGHANISTAN URGED THE US TO CUT BACK ITS MILITARY BASES IN THE GULF AND INDIAN OCEAN. AND MENTIONED DIEGO GARCIA IN PARTICULAR.
(D) TURKEY: COLOMBO (ITALY) WAS UNEXPECTEDLY CRITICAL OF THE MILITARY REGIME AND PRESSED FOR A SPEEDY RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC RULE.
(E) CZYREK (POLAND) TOOK CARE TO MAINTAIN A CORDIAL AND DEFERENTIAL TONE TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, BUT REFERRED OBLEQUELY TO THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AT HOME, MAINLY IN A SERIES OF CALLS FOR ''FULL AND INTEGRATED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE''. ''WE HAVE LEFT OUT MANY IMPORTANT AND CRUCIAL ISSUES'', HE SAID, BUT ''OUR INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE, OUR SOVEREIGN DEVELOPMENT AND OUR LASTING SECURITY ARE INSEPARABLY BOUND UP WITH THE STRENGTHENING OF SOCIALIST POLAND''.
(F) ENLARGEMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: VAN DER KLAUUW (NETHERLANDS) AND FRYDENLUND (NORWAY) MADE HELPFUL REFERENCES TO THE RISKS INHERENT IN TAMPERING WITH THE STRUCTURE OF UN BODIES.

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKMIS GENEVA

PARSONS

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FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO. 1354 OF 26 OF SEPT.
INFO IMMEDIATE DELHI, ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON,
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, KABUL.

M I P T

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER: AFGHANISTAN.

1. RAO BEGAN BY RECAPITULATING INDIA'S EFFORTS TO BRING THE PAKISTANIS AND AFGHANS TOGETHER. DURING HIS VISIT TO DELHI EARLIER IN THE YEAR, AGA SHAHI HAD ASKED THE INDIANS TO HELP. RAO HAD THEREFORE HELD EXPLORATORY MEETINGS DURING THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE IN JULY. AGA SHAHI HAD OFFERED TO TALK TO AFGHAN LEADERS UNDER THEIR PARTY, RATHER THAN GOVERNMENT, HATS: AND DOST HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD MEET AGA SHAHI IF THE LATTER CAME TO HIM AS FOREIGN MINISTER. RAO SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ON THE VERGE OF SETTING UP A MEETING IN NEW YORK, BUT THAT THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES HAD INEXPLICABLY HARDENED OVERNIGHT AT THE END OF THE SESSION. RAO THOUGHT THAT THE AFGHANS AND PAKISTANIS HAD BEEN STANDING ON CEREMONY FOR TOO LONG, AND THAT THE PROBLEM OF BRINGING ABOUT DIRECT TALKS WAS NOT INSOLUBLE.

2. RAO HAD SEEN AGA SHAHI EARLY ON 24 SEPTEMBER. THE LATTER HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOW FOCUSING HIS EFFORTS ON A UN RESOLUTION, AS FURTHER PROGRESS ON THE CONFERENCE PROPOSAL WAS IMPOSSIBLE. AGA SHAHI WANTED A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE RATHER THAN CONDEMNATORY.

3. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE HAD CONCLUDED FROM GROMYKO'S SPEECH AND HIS SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH HIM THAT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT HAVE THE LEAST INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING FROM AFGHANISTAN. HE THOUGHT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN AS A RESULT OF TALKS OF THE KIND DESCRIBED BY RAO WOULD COME TO NAUGHT, BECAUSE IT WAS CLEAR THAT BABRAK KARMAL COULD NOT SURVIVE IF THE SOVIET TROOPS WERE REMOVED. AN AGREEMENT WHICH WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED WOULD BE NO GOOD TO AGA SHAHI. ROA ARGUED THAT THE PAKISTANIS SHOULD SEEK AN AGREEMENT, IN ORDER TO CONFRONT THE RUSSIANS WITH THE PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTATION: HE REFERRED TO THE ASSURANCES GIVEN BY BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD WITHDRAW ONCE GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERFERENCE WERE GIVEN. HE ADDED THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE WOULD BE WILLING TO MODIFY THEIR RESOLUTIONS IN ANY WAY REQUESTED BY THE PAKISTANIS. LORD CARRINGTON SAW NO PROSPECT OF A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, REGARDLESS OF THEIR PREVIOUS ASSURANCES, AND SAID THAT MERELY TO SHOW THE RUSSIANS UP WOULD ACHIEVE NOTHING. RAO REPLIED THAT HE NEITHER BELIEVED NOR DISBELIEVED THE SOVIET UNION'S ASSURANCES. BUT HE THOUGHT THE CORRECT COURSE WAS TO ACT ON THEM AND SEE WHAT HAPPENED. THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND IN THE WAY. HE SAW NO OTHER WAY OUT.

CARRINGTON

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FM MOSCOW 260930Z SEP 80
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 583 OF 26TH SEPTEMBER
FOR INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK AND ROUTINE BONN, PARIS AND BAGHDAD.

IRAN / IRAQ.

1. AFTER A PERIOD IN WHICH SOVIET COVERAGE OF THE FIGHTING HAS SEEMED TO HAVE A PRO-IRAQI SHADING, TODAY'S PRAVDA'S BATTLE REPORT APPEARED TO LEAN IF ANYTHING THE OTHER WAY. IRAQI TROOPS WERE DESCRIBED AS 'CONTINUING TO ATTACK', BOTH BY MOVING SOUTH FROM QASR-I-SHIRIN AND BY DRIVING FROM ABADAN AND KHORRAMSHAHR 'INTO THE COUNTRY'S HINTERLANDS'. THE IRAQI COMMAND WAS SAID TO HAVE SET ITSELF THE TASK OF GAINING CONTROL OF THE IRANIAN OIL-REFINING CENTRE AT ABADAN. THE COVERAGE FROM BAGHDAD RELIED MORE THAN IN THE PAST ON AGENCY REPORTS, AND LESS ON THE OFFICIAL IRAQI COMMUNIQUES. THE IRANIAN FORCES WERE DESCRIBED AS CONDUCTING ''DEFENSIVE FIGHTING''. IT IS TOO EARLY TO KNOW HOW MUCH WEIGHT TO GIVE THIS APPARENT SHIFT.

CONDUCTING ''DEFENSIVE FIGHTING''. IT IS TOO EARLY TO KNOW HOW MUCH WEIGHT TO GIVE THIS APPARENT SHIFT.

2. A COMMENTARY COLUMN IN THE SAME PRAVDA, REFERRING TO THE US NAVAL FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, ONCE AGAIN PLAYED UP THE DANGER OF AN AMERICAN 'ADVENTURE'. QUOTING THE WASHINGTON POST, THE ARTICLE ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE WHITE HOUSE HAD SENT THE PENTAGON A SECRET DIRECTIVE ''TO PREPARE A VERSION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE UNSTABLE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST''. INTERFERENCE IN THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT, IT CONCLUDED, WAS INADMISSIBLE.

KEEBLE

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IRAN/IRAQ

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SECRET
FROM UKDEL NATO 261205Z SEP 83
TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 392 OF 26 SEP 1983
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW
INFO SAVING BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, ANKARA, KUWAIT, TEL AVIV

IRAQ/IRAN

1. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES HAD A PRIVATE MEETING THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS IRAQ/IRAN. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE GAVE A BRIEFING LARGELY BASED ON THE MOST RECENT JIC ASSESSMENT RELEASED TO NATO ON 25 SEPTEMBER. AS AGREED,(MY TELECON WITH MOSS) I ADDED THE ADDITIONAL POINT THAT WE HAD INFORMATION THAT BEFORE THE RECENT INTENSIFICATION OF FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN THE IRAQI MILITARY HAD INFORMED THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP THAT THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES COULD HAVE SEVERE PROBLEMS IF HOSTILITIES CONTINUED FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. THIS SUPPORTED THE HYPOTHESIS THAT IRAQ HAD SPECIFIC LIMITED TERRITORIAL AIMS WHICH IT WOULD WANT TO ACHIEVE QUICKLY.

2. GLITMAN (US) SAID THAT WESTERN OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE TO MOBILISE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ESPECIALLY IN THE UN TO BRING AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES, TO PREVENT THE DISINTEGRATION OF IRAN, AND TO PREVENT

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ESPECIALLY IN THE UN TO BRING AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES, TO PREVENT THE DISINTEGRATION OF IRAN, AND TO PREVENT SOVIET DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN, OR GAINS FROM, THE CONFLICT. HE COULD GIVE NO CLARIFICATION ON MR MUSKIE'S REPORTED STATEMENT THAT THE US WAS CONSULTING WITH ITS ALLIES ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL NAVAL FORCE WHICH WOULD BE SENT TO THE GULF IF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WERE BLOCKED. VIBE(NORWAY) SAID THAT CHINESE LEADERS HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE CONFLICT TO THE NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER DURING THE LATTER'S VISIT TO PEKING THIS WEEK. THE CHINESE HAD ADDED THAT THEY WOULD BE SPEAKING TO IRAQI QUOTE LEADERS UNQUOTE IN PEKING ON 26 SEPTEMBER. JESSEL (FRANCE) WHO OBVIOUSLY HAD IN MIND PRESS REPORTS OF FRENCH ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAQ, SAID THAT 95% OF IRAQ'S MILITARY ARMAMENT HAD BEEN SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ONLY 2% OR 3% BY FRANCE. OLCAY (TURKEY) OBSERVED THAT THE ALGIERS AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ HAD BEEN SIGNED AT THE HEIGHT OF IRAN'S, AND THE SHAH'S, STRENGTH. IRAQ'S MILITARY ACTION HAD CHANGED THE STATUS QUO EXISTING SINCE THE AGREEMENT. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI WOULD FEEL IT NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS AS POWERFUL AS THE SHAH AND WE MUST THEREFORE RECKON WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROLONGED CONFLICT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES
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FM BRITNAVAT MUSCAT 260516Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
TELEGRAM NUMBER LAA/UAJ OF 260516Z SEPTEMBER
AND TO CINCFLEET, FCO
INFO PRIORITY CTG 318.0, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI

FOR DNOT. FCO MED.
STRAITS OF HORMUZ. SITREP 260200Z.

1. TRAFFIC CONTINUES NORMAL. TWELVE IN AND SIX OUT IN SIX HOURS ENDING 252359D. NO INTERFERENCE OR HARASSMENT BY IRANIANS.

2. OMANI PATROL CRAFT NOT IN CONTACT WITH IRANIANS BUT THREE RADAR CONTACTS HELD PATROLLING EAST/WEST FIFTEEN MILES NORTH GREAT QUOIN ISLAND. EITHER IRANIANS HAVE PULLED THEIR ABU MUSA/TUNBS ISLAND PATROL BACK TO THE STRAITS OR THERE ARE MORE IRANIAN UNITS AT SEA THAN APPRECIATED. UNLIKELY THEY WOULD LEAVE ISLANDS UNPROTECTED. IRANIANS HAVE NOW BEEN OPERATING AT SEA CONTINUOUSLY FOR FIVE DAYS WITH SENSORS AND COMMUNICATIONS APPARENTLY FUNCTIONING ADEQUATELY AND ARMAMENT AVAILABLE. MECHANICAL AND ELECTRONIC RELIABILITY AND MAINTENANCE MUST BE AT MUCH HIGHER LEVEL THAN ASSESSED IN RECENT MONTHS.

3. OMANI ROYAL YACHT AL SAID DEPARTED BAHRAIN EX REFIT 24 SEP FOR MUSCAT. AT 251320D OFF FURUR ISLAND SHE WAS OVERFLOWN AND CIRCLED AT THREE THOUSAND FEET BY IRANIAN PHANTOM RECCE ASSESSED AS PROBABLY SUPPORTING IRANIAN ABU MUSA/TUNB ISLAND PATROL.

4. BOTH THE MATERIAL STATE OF IRANIAN UNITS AND THE CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF THEIR OPERATIONS ARE SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN MIGHT BE EXPECTED AT THIS STAGE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

5. DESPITE OMANI INTENTION NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY INCIDENT IN STRAITS AS REPORTED MY LAST SITREP UNITS OF OMAN AIR FORCE ARE ON ALERT TO SUPPORT OMANI PATROL BOATS IF NECESSARY.

6. THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE TO NORMAL OMAN ARMY DISPOSITION AND READINESS.

TUNNELL

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD
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IRAQ/IRAN

COPIES SENT TO
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IRAN/IRAQ

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ADVANCE COPIES 22

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
~~SIR J GRAHAM~~
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
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Sir A Acland
MR ADAMS

IMMEDIATE

GR 250
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM KUWAIT 261025Z SEPT
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 411 OF 26/9/80
INFO BAGHDAD.

IRAN/IRAQ: ROUNDUP FROM KUWAIT

IRAQI HELICOPTERS

1. DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE UNDERSTAND KUWAIT HAS WITHDRAWN OVERFLYING AND REFUELLING FACILITIES FOR IRAQI AIRCRAFT (MY TEL NO 194 PARA 6), TWO IRAQI MILITARY HELICOPTERS (SOVIET M1 OR M4) LANDED AT SOUTH BASE 1750 ON 25/9 AND AROUND FIFTY CIVILIANS ALIGHTED. THE USE OF SOUTH BASE IS UNUSUAL. THE NORMAL HELICOPTER PORT IS AT NORTH BASE.

TANK AND ARTILLERY AMMUNITION

2. PLANS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED FOR TANK AND ARTILLERY AMMUNITION TO BE MOVED FROM JAHRA NORTHWARDS. CHIEFTAIN TANKS, ALTHOUGH READY HAVE NOT YET MOVED FROM JAHRA. 1 REGT VICKERS TANKS AND 16 BDE ARMOURED CARS ARE DEPLOYED EITHER SIDE OF ROAD TO SAFWAN SOME 20 MILES SOUTH OF BORDER.

HAVE NOT YET MOVED FROM UMM QASR. 1 REGT VICKERS TANKS AND 16 BDE ARMOURED CARS ARE DEPLOYED EITHER SIDE OF ROAD TO SAFWAN SOME 20 MILES SOUTH OF BORDER.

BASRA

3. EVACUEES REPORT THAT BETWEEN 0530 AND 1200 ON 24/9 THERE WERE FEW AIR RAIDS OF FLIGHTS OF THREE OR MORE F5 OR F6 PHANTOMS. IRANIAN ATTACKS APPEARED SURPRISINGLY DISCIPLINED - DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC STRATEGIC OR MILITARY TARGETS. IRAQI TANKS WERE SEEN FIRING EAST FROM POSITIONS ON THE IRANIAN SIDE OF THE SHATT - 20 KMS AWAY. ONE IRAQI GUNBOAT OPPOSITE BASRA HOSPITAL FIRED CONTINUOUSLY EASTWARD DURING THE DAY. THERE IS A LARGE OIL STORAGE TANK FIRE IN CENTRAL BASRA. PETROCHEMICAL PLANT AND REFINERY ALSO ON FIRE. IRAQI CIVILIANS REPORTED TO BE LESS CONFIDENT IN VIEW OF CONTINUED IRANIAN AERIAL ACTIVITY BUT GROUND ADVANCES KEEPING MORALE UP.

BRITISH SUBJECTS

4. CONSULAR STAFF AT SAFWAN ON 24/9 HELPED THROUGH THREE BRITISH FAMILIES AND ABOUT 25 HONG KONG SEAMEN FROM BASRA. ON 25/9 A FURTHER EIGHT BRITISH WERE HELPED THROUGH. THE BULK OF ACTIVITY AT SAFWAN/ABDALI IS NOW WITH EASTERN EUROPEANS (POLES, CZECHS, HUNGARIANS) WHO SEEM WELL ORGANISED IN DISCIPLINED GROUPS. OUR EVACUEES SAY THAT THERE ARE VERY FEW BRITISH LEFT IN BASRAH NOW - OTHER THAN WIVES OF IRAQIS.

BALFOUR

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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

IMMEDIATE

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RESIDENT CLERK

GR 390
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM KUWAIT 261010Z SEPT
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 410 OF 26/9/80,
INFO JEDDA, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN AND DOHA.

YOUR UNNUMBERED TELEGRAM OF 251720Z TO JEDDA.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. EFFECT OF TOTAL STOPPAGE OF TRAFFIC THROUGH STRAITS OF HORMUZ WOULD NOT HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON KUWAIT'S ELECTRICITY GENERATING CAPACITY. FUEL FOR THE POWER STATIONS IS LOCALLY SUPPLIED AND SINCE THE BULK OF KUWAIT'S WATER SUPPLY COMES FROM DISTILLATION PLANTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE POWER GENERATING STATIONS THIS WOULD ALSO NOT BE AFFECTED. BUT SEE PARA 3 BELOW.

2. THE EFFECT OF THE CESSATION OF FOOD IMPORTS ON WHICH KUWAIT IS ALMOST TOTALLY DEPENDENT WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY APPARENT BUT NOT DISASTROUS. ALTERNATIVE SUPPLY ROUTES WOULD BE BY AIR BUT CHIEFLY

ALMOST TOTALLY DEPENDENT WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY APPARENT BUT NOT DISASTROUS. ALTERNATIVE SUPPLY ROUTES WOULD BE BY AIR BUT CHIEFLY ROAD USING LONG DISTANCE LORRIES OPERATING FROM JORDAN AND SYRIA. THESE COULD COME VIA IRAQ IF THE ROUTE WAS SAFE OTHERWISE THROUGH SAUDI ARABIA. THERE ARE ALREADY PRIVATE SECTOR COMPANIES WHICH OPERATE BOTH REFRIGERATED AND UNREFRIGERATED TRANSPORT SERVICES AND DOUBTLESS THESE COULD BE STEPPED UP WITH THE PROFIT MOTIVE ACTING AS AN INCENTIVE. HOWEVER, OTHER GULF STATES WOULD BE COMPETING FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPLIES BY THESE ROUTES AND THERE WOULD BE INEVITABLE SHORTAGES. NO DOUBT THERE WOULD BE DRAMATIC PRICE INCREASES.

3. CESSATION OF BUILDING MATERIAL IMPORTS AND EQUIPMENTS AND REPLACEMENT PARTS FOR ESSENTIAL PUBLIC UTILITIES COULD CAUSE MORE THAN A LITTLE INCONVENIENCE AND SLOW DOWN CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES. A REPLACEMENT PARTS SHORTAGE MIGHT CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR THE ELECTRICITY GENERATING AND WATER DISTILLATION PROGRAMMES (PARA 1 ABOVE) BUT THE COOL WEATHER SEASON IS NOW BEGINNING AND THE CONSEQUENT DECREASE IN DEMAND FOR BOTH ELECTRICITY AND WATER WOULD HELP MATTERS. REALLY URGENT EQUIPMENT COULD BE FLOWN IN OR TRANSHIPPED AT AQABA OR LATTAKIA AND THENCE BY ROAD.

4. MY CONSLUSION IS THAT AT THE BEGINNING OF A PERIOD OF TOTAL STOPPAGE THERE WOULD BE FOOD SHORTAGES BUT ONCE RELIEF MEASURES WERE ORGANISED THESE WOULD BE LARGELY OVERCOME.
PRICES WOULD RISE. WATER AND ELECTRICITY SUPPLIES SEEM ASSURED.

BALFOUR

NNNN

CYPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

LVO NR 289/26

FDW G 59/26

VOO BELGRADE DESKBY 260700Z

GRS 270
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 260700Z
FM FCO 260048Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 219 OF 26 SEPTEMBER

FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1329 OF 22 SEPTEMBER

INFO TEL AVIV, CAIRO, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, COPENHAGEN, BRUSSELS.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH DR WALDHEIM: MIPTS (NOT TO ALL):

ARAB/ISRAEL.

1. DR WALDHEIM SAID HE HAD HEARD FROM M. FRANCOIS-PONCET THAT THE NINE MIGHT BE PLAYING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE ARAB/ESRAEL QUESTION NEXT YEAR. HE THOUGHT IT VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE EUROPEANS TO TAKE ACTION, AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE CO-ORDINATED WITH THE AMERICANS.

2. LORD CARRINGTON WARNED DR WALDHEIM NOT TO EXPECT TOO MUCH FROM THE NINE. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO TAKE ANY DECISIONS BEFORE THE DECEMBER MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL. BUT THE VENICE DECLARATION HAD RAISED ARAB EXPECTATIONS: IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ARABS SHOULD NOT BE DISAPPOINTED. THE NINE WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO PRODUCE SOMETHING. LORD CARRINGTON DID NOT THINK THAT THE MODERATE ARABS EXPECTED THE NINE TO COME UP WITH A SOLUTION: THEY WERE AWARE OF EUROPE'S LIMITATIONS: BUT THEY HOPED THAT THE EUROPEANS COULD INFLUENCE THE AMERICANS.

3. DR WALDHEIM SAID HE HAD BEEN WORRIED BY REPORTS THAT THE SAUDI ARABIANS WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE EXPULSION OF ISRAEL FROM THE UNITED NATIONS. LORD CARRINGTON REPLIED THAT, DURING HIS VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA IN AUGUST, HE HAD FOUND PRINCE FAHD AND PRINCE SAUD SENSIBLE AND MODERATE IN PRIVATE.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

DD 261500Z

ADVANCE COPY

IRAN/IRAQ 31

ADVANCE COPIES 22

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PS/MR HURD
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MR J C MOBERLY
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Mr Adams TYPISTS

00 FCO DESKBY 261500Z

00 BAGHDAD DESKBY 261500Z

GR 195
RESTRICTED
FM AMMAN 261350Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER DISTRESS 024 OF 26 SEP
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD
YOUR TELNO DISTRESS 36 TO BAGHDAD.

1. YOU WILL NOW HAVE SEEN MY TELNO 37 TO BAGHDAD, COPIED IMMEDIATE TO FCO. FURTHER SITREP IS IN MY TELNO DISTRESS 22 TO YOU (PRECEDDNCE PRIORITY: WE HAVE ASKED HSP TO UPGRADE TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 150ØZ)

2. TRAVELLERS ARRIVING HERE SAY THAT THE IRAQ BORDER AUTHORITIES AT RUTBA ARE TURNING BACK MALES, INCLUDING EVEN CONSTRUCTION WORKERS, IDENTIFIED BY SPECIAL STAMPS IN THEIR PASSPORTS AS WORKERS ON IRAQI GOVERNMENT PROJECTS. WE HAVE HEARD OF AT LEAST TWENTY MEN INCLUDING THREE BRITONS, WHO HAVE BEEN REFUSED EXIT FROM IRAQ ON THIS COUNT.

3. GENERALLY MALES WITHOUT EXIT VISAS ARE BEING TURNED BACK BUT

THIS COUNT.

3. GENERALLY MALES WITHOUT EXIT VISAS ARE BEING TURNED BACK BUT REPORTED EXPERIENCES VARY AND SOME BRITISH MEN HAVE ARGUED THEIR WAY THROUGH, WITH ASSISTANCE FROM AN ARABIST MEMBER OF MY STAFF WHO WENT TO RUTBA TO MEET THE CONVOY.

4. TOTAL NUMBER OF BRITONS KNOWN TO HAVE CROSSED THE BORDER TODAY (PARA 1 AND 2 OF MY TELNO 37 TO BAGHDAD) IS ABOUT 160

5. SUBJECT TO BAGHDAD'S NEWS, YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER ARRANGING A HIGH-LEVEL MESSAGE TO THE IRAQI PRESIDENT TO FACILITATE THE DEPARTURE OF BRITISH FAMILIES FROM IRAQ.

URWICK

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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

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PS/MR HURD
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SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
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NO 10 DOWNING STREET
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ADVANCE COPY

Sir A Acland
Mr Adams

GR 200
RESTRICTED
FM BEIRUT 261033Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 76 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1980
AND TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
INFO PRIORITY F C O

CONVOYS FROM BAGHDAD: CITIZENS OF THE IRISH REPUBLIC.

1. THE IRISH EMBASSY IN BEIRUT HAVE ASKED FOR OUR HELP IN CONTACTING IRISH CITIZENS WHO MAY ARRIVE, OR HAVE ARRIVED, ON ROAD CONVOYS FROM BAGHDAD. THEY BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST ONE IRISH CITIZEN, MR. MAYNES OF THE IRISH MILK EXPORT BOARD, HAS ALREADY ARRIVED IN DAMASCUS. THEY DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY OF THEIR CITIZENS MAY BE HEADING FOR AMMAN.

2. THE IRISH EMBASSY WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU AND AMMAN COULD LET THEM KNOW THROUGH US THE NUMBER AND NAMES OF THEIR CITIZENS WHO ARRIVE IN YOUR CAPITALS AND WHAT REQUIREMENTS THEY HAVE FOR MONEY, AIR TICKETS ETC. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT SENSIBLE FOR THE REFUGEES TO COME ON TO BEIRUT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THE IRISH

WHO ARRIVE IN YOUR CAPITALS AND WHAT REQUIREMENTS THEY HAVE FOR MONEY, AIR TICKETS ETC. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT SENSIBLE FOR THE REFUGEES TO COME ON TO BEIRUT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THE IRISH EMBASSY HERE WISH TO DO WHATEVER THEY CAN TO HELP. THE IRISH EMBASSY WILL SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO AMMAN AND DAMASCUS IF NECESSARY, BUT WOULD OF COURSE LOOK AFTER ANY IRISH WHO PREFERRED NEVERTHELESS TO COME TO BEIRUT.

MOORE.

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 1130
CONFIDENTIAL
FM STOCKHOLM 260655Z SEPTEMBER 1980
TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 260830Z)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 180 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1980

IRAN/IRAQ

1. FOLLOWING IS UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM DATED 24 SEPTEMBER RECEIVED FROM SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN AND PASSED TO US IN CONFIDENCE BY MFA. BELFRAGE ADDED THAT SWEDISH HON CONSUL, KHORRAMASHAH HAD TRAVELLED FROM TEHRAN TO KHORRAMASHAH BY TRAIN WITHOUT INCIDENT ON 23 SEPTEMBER AND WAS PROPOSING TO RETURN ON 25 SEPTEMBER. THIS HE FELT, APPEARED TO SUPPORT BUNDY'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE REPORTS OF THE FIGHTING WERE EXAGGERATED

2. QUOTE

1. THE REPORTS WHICH HAVE BEEN APPEARING IN THE LOCAL PRESS IN RECENT DAYS ABOUT THE FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ ARE PROBABLY FAIRLY EXAGGERATED. THIS IS ALSO CONFIRMED IN CONVERSATION WITH THE MILITARY ATTACHE IN TEHRAN. UP UNTIL YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AT ANY RATE THE SITUATION WAS BY NO MEANS AS SERIOUS AS THE MEDIA MADE OUT. REPORTS THAT 8 MIG AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN SHOT DOWN, 10 TANKS DESTROYED AND 500 IRAQI SOLDIERS KILLED ARE NOT BELIEVED TO BE CORRECT. THE IRANIANS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CORROBORATE THESE REPORTS. THERE IS OF COURSE NO DOUBT THAT BORDER FIGHTING HAS TAKEN PLACE- CERTAINLY OF A SERIOUS NATURE. AMONG THOSE TAKING PART ARE ALSO KURDS, VARIOUS LEFT-WING GROUPS AND ANTI- GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS IN GENERAL. SMALL MILITARY UNITS HAVE CROSSED THE BORDERS OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND THERE HAVE BEEN LIMITED EXCHANGES OF FIRE. IN KHORRAMASHAH WITNESSES HAVE REPORTED THE SOUND OF FIGHTING IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. MILITARY OBSERVERS HOWEVER DOUBT WHETHER REGULAR FORCES WERE INVOLVED BEFORE THE ATTACKS MADE BY BOTH SIDES YESTERDAY. HERE , TOO, REPORTS THAT NAVAL BATTLES HAVE TAKEN PLACE ARE PROBABLY ALSO INCORRECT.

FOREIGN JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN BANNED FROM VISITING THE AREAS CONCERNED AND THE FOREIGN PRESS CAN ONLY QUOTE THE CERTAINLY EXAGGERATED REPORTS CARRIED BY THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI PRESS.

2. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO GET ANY VERY COMPLETE PICTURE OF WHAT REALLY TOOK PLACE DURING YESTERDAY'S RAID INTO IRAN. IT IS HOWEVER CERTAIN THAT A GOOD MANY AIRFIELDS WERE BOMBED. HOW MUCH DAMAGE WAS DONE AND HOW MANY WERE KILLED AND INJURED IS NOT KNOWN AT PRESENT. DURING THE ATTACK ON TEHRAN AIRPORT HOWEVER ONLY TWO PERSONS BELONGING TO AIR IRAN WERE HURT, EVEN ALTHOUGH THE PRESS REPORTED NINE DEAD AND 37 INJURED. IRAN RADIO SAYS THAT AT LEAST TEN AIRFIELDS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WERE DAMAGED. WELL INFORMED SOURCES CONFIRM THAT IN PARTICULAR THE AIRFIELDS AT KERMANSHAH BRI AND BUSHEHR SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE. AT TEHRAN AIRPORT, WHICH IS CLOSED FOR THE TIME BEING, DAMAGE WAS REALLY ONLY DONE TO ONE RUNWAY AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDING.

ONE BOEING, SOME HURCULES AIRCRAFT AND A NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS ARE ALSO BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN SET ON FIRE.

3. IN CONVERSATION WITH THE INDIAN MILITARY ATTACHE AND OTHERS TODAY IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT A NUMBER OF MIG23'S FLEW IN OVER IRANIAN TERRITORY YESTERDAY. A FURTHER RAID IS SAID TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE EARLY THIS MORNING. IT IS REPORTED BY IRANIAN SOURCES THAT THEY SUCCEEDED IN SHOOTING DOWN 16 IRAQI MIGS AND KNOCKING OUT 22 TANKS. THESE FIGURES MUST OF COURSE BE TAKEN WITH A GRAIN OF SALT. ACCORDING TO THE USUALLY WELL-INFORMED FRENCH MILITARY ATTACHE'S OFFICE, IT IS BELIEVED THAT 7 TO 8 PLANES WERE SHOT DOWN. THIS WOULD INDICATE, IF CORRECT, A FAIRLY WELL-FUNCTIONING IRANIAN AIR DEFENCE, AND MUST BE REGARDED AS DEFINITE SETBACK FOR IRAQ. THE QUESTION IT IS OF COURSE NECESSARY TO ASK IN THIS CONTEXT IS HOW THE IRAQI OVERFLIGHT SUCCEEDED IN AVOIDING DETECTION BY RADAR. THE NEAREST TAKE-OFF STRIP IN IRAQ IS SAID TO BE ABOUT 560 KM FROM IRAN. ONE EXPLANATION - THE MOST PROBABLE - IS THAT THE RADAR SYSTEM SIMPLY DOES NOT FUNCTION SATISFACTORILY, AS THIS MORNING'S OVERFLIGHT WOULD ALSO SUGGEST. ANOTHER IS OF COURSE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN QUOTE INSIDE JOB UNQUOTE - SOMETHING WHICH AS WE KNOW HAS ALSO HAPPENED BEFORE. ANOTHER QUESTION STILL OUT-STANDING IS WHY THE IRAQI AIR FORCE DID NOT ATTACK THE MANY PHANTOM AIRCRAFT AND 747 JETS LINED UP, FULLY VISIBLE, ON TEHRAN AIRPORT. SHORTLY AFTER THE IRAQI QUOTE VISIT UNQUOTE TO TEHRAN, FOUR PHANTOMS TOOK OFF FOR AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION. FOUR SHIPS ARE REPORTED TO BE IN PORT AT SHAT-EL-ARAB AT PRESENT, UNABLE TO LEAVE. 17 VESSELS ARE SUPPOSED TO HAVE OBTAINED PERMISSION YESTERDAY TO LEAVE SHAT-EL-ARAB (INCLUDING ONE SCANDINAVIAN). ACCORDING TO WHAT MILITARY OBSERVERS HAVE TOLD US TODAY, IRAN SUCCEEDED IN SINKING FOUR RUSSIAN-BUILT GUNBOATS IN BUSHEHR, WHICH IS REGARDED AS BEING A SEVERE SETBACK FOR IRAQ. IRAN IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE DECLARED QUOTE ALL SEA FRONTIERS WITH IRAQ UNQUOTE A WAR ZONE AND FORBIDDEN ALL FURTHER FREIGHTS INTO IRAQI PORTS.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, THESE ARE PROBABLY IN FACT OF THE ORDER 1:1. IRAN, WITH ITS 36 MILLION POPULATION HAS OF COURSE GREATER RESOURCES AND MORE MEN. THE ARMY USED TO CONSIST OF APPROX 450,000 MEN, OF WHOM ABOUT HALF HAVE NOW GONE. IRAQ, 13 MILLION POPULATION, ON THE OTHER HAND HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF HAVING AN ARMY WITH THE REPUTATION OF BEING VERY WELL-ORGANISED AND WELL-DISCIPLINED. IRAQ IS REPORTED TO HAVE 350 COMBAT AIRCRAFT WHEREAS IRAN HAS/HAD 450, OF WHICH 30 ARE SAID TO BE CAPABLE OF TAKING OFF AT THE PRESENT TIME. AS IS KNOWN, THE POSITION WITH REGARD TO WAR MATERIAL, SPARE PARTS, MAINTENANCE ETC IS CAUSE FOR CONCERN IN IRAN. MORALE ON THE IRANIAN SIDE MUST BE DESCRIBED AS LOW, WHEREAS THE REVERSE IS PROBABLY TRUE OF IRAQ. A LARGE NUMBER OF DESERTIONS HAVE OCCURRED AMONG IRANIAN MILITARY FORCES IN RECENT TIMES. THE DESERTIONS FROM THE APPROX 80,000- STRONG HATED REVOLUTIONARY GUARD (PASDARS) ARE INCREASING. ACCORDING TO CERTAIN MILITARY OBSERVERS, IRAQ MIGHT POSSIBLY BE ABLE TO WIN AN QUOTE ALL OUT WAR UNQUOTE IN THE SPACE OF 10 TO 15 DAYS WHEREAS A LONG-DRAWN OUT WAR WOULD MEET WITH SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, ONE WONDERS WHY IRAQ DID NOT YESTERDAY ALSO INVADE WITH GROUND FORCES AND KNOCK OUT THE PHANTOMS WHICH WERE IN TEHRAN.

5. THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT ON SHATT-EL-ARAB IS NOT LONGER VALID ACCORDING TO THE IRANIANS, WHEREAS IRAQ CONSIDERS ITSELF TO BE JUSTIFIED IN SEIZING AS MUCH AS IS NECESSARY TO SECURE THEIR OWN BORDERS. SEEN AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE GENERAL IRAQI AMBITIONS IN THE AREA, POOR PORT CONDITIONS IN IRAQ, VERY MUCH LOWER OIL RESERVES THAN IRAN ETC, WE BELIEVE IT NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT IRAQ HAS PLANS TO TRY AND TAKE POSSESSION OF THE KHUZESTAN AREA AND THUS CUT OFF IRAN'S MOST IMPORTANT NERVE. THIS WOULD GIVE THEM A WHOLE NEW DIMENSION IN THE IMPORTANT AREA THROUGH WHICH APPROX 35-40 PERCENT OF THE WORLD'S NON-COMMUNIST OIL PASSES. THE 2-3 KM WIDE SHAT-EL-ARAB HAS LONG BEEN INADEQUATE AS A SHIPPING CHANNEL FOR IRAQ. THE POPULATION OF KHUZESTAN ARE APPROX 80 PERCENT ARAB, AND LOYALTY TO IRAN MUST BE REGARDED AS UNRELIABLE. THE DISAFFECTED MINORITY GROUPS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO KHUZESTAN, NAMELY THE KURDS IN THE NORTH, LARESTAN, QASHQAI - BAHTER GROUPS IN THE SOUTH-WEST COULD ALSO GIVE THEIR SUPPORT TO AN IRAQI PENETRATION. WE DO NOT THINK IT LIKELY AT THE PRESENT TIME THAT THERE IS A RISK OF THE CONFLICT SPREADING ALSO THERE TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA.
BUNDY UNQUOTE
3. FCO PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.
MURRAY

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LORD BRIDGES
MISS BROWN
MR J C MOBERLY
MR EVANS

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RESIDENT CLERK

PS/SIR D. MAITLAND)
PS/S OF S FOR ENERGY)
PS/MINISTER OF STATE FOR ENERGY) DEPT OF ENERGY
SIR J RAMPTON)
MR D LE B JONES)
MR J R BRETHERTON CIP DIVN) THAMES HSE SOUTH
MR J WHALEY)
MR J LIVERMAN)
MR I GILLIS, PRESS OFFICE)
MR B HAMPTON)
MR MUIR)

MR J F SLATER TREASURY

MR I MEEK RM 303 DOT 1 VICTORIA ST

MR J C EDWARDS) ODA
MR R L BAXTER)

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R E S T R I C T E D
D E S K B Y 270930Z
FM WASHINGTON 262312Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4119 OF 26 SEPTEMBER
AND TO CARACAS

CARACAS TELNO 273:
VISIT OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

1. AT A BREAKFAST MEETING WITH THE PRESS TODAY MR HOWELL WAS ASKED ABOUT REPORTS THAT CERTAIN OPEC COUNTRIES HAD AGREED AT VIENNA TO CUT THEIR PRODUCTION BY 10 PERCENT. IN REPLY HE SAID THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS AGREEMENT HAD BEEN PUT ON ICE. ASKED BY THE QUESTIONER FOR THE SOUCE OF HIS UNDERSTANDING HE SAID QUOTE THAT VIEW WAS EXPRESSED TO ME IN VENEZUELA UNQUOTE.

2. THIS COMMENT HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE PRESS INTEREST AND ALSO FEATURED IN A RADIO INTERVIEW WITH THE DPC. MR HOWELL HAS STRESSED THAT THIS WAS A VENEZUELAN VIEW THAT HAD BEEN PUT TO HIM AND HAS GONE ON TO PRAISE VENEZUELAN MODERATION AND THEIR SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. HE HAS ALSO REFERRED TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY DR CALDERON BERTI IN CARACAS ON ARRIVAL FROM THE OPEC MEETING THAT ALL SIDES SHOULD ACT IN A MODERATE WAY AND WITHOUT SEEKING TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION.

3. IF THERE IS PRESS INTEREST IN LONDON OVER THE WEEKEND FURTHER BACKGROUND CAN BE OBTAINED FROM JULIAN WEST, PS TO MR HOWELL, HOME TELEPHONE 446 1115 FROM A.M. 27 SEPT.

4. ADVANCE TO DUTY OFFICER NEWS DEPT AND PS TO SIR DONALD MAITLAND DEPT OF ENERGY.

HENDERSON

NNNN

GR1100
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 270800Z
FM WASHINGTON 262142Z SEP
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4109 OF 26 SEPT 80.
INFO UK DEL OECD, UKREP BRUSSELS, OTTAWA, BONN, PARIS, ROME, TOKYO AND BAGHDAD.

VISIT OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY.

MR HOWELL CALLED ON SECRETARY DUNCAN TODAY. SAWHILL AND GOLDMAN WERE ALSO PRESENT ON THE U.S. SIDE. MR HOWELL BEGAN THE MEETING BY REFERRING TO CALDERON BERTI'S CALL FOR OPEC COUNTRIES TO EXERCISE MODERATION IN THE CURRENT SITUATION. THE VENEZUELANS HAD INDICATED THAT THE PLAN AGREED IN VIENNA FOR A NUMBER OF OPEC COUNTRIES TO CUT PRODUCTION MIGHT BE SHELVED FOR THE TIME BEING.

2 DUNCAN ASKED HOW MR HOWELL VIEWED THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. MR HOWELL SAID THAT THE SITUATION WAS CLEARLY VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE IRAN CRISIS LAST YEAR IN THAT WORLD OIL DEMAND WAS CONSIDERABLY LOWER.
STOCKS WERE HIGH. HE HAD BEEN TAKING THE LINE WITH THE PRESS THAT THE PROBLEM WAS CONTAINABLE AT THE MOMENT. DUNCAN SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THIS VIEW AND THAT THIS WAS CERTAINLY THE BEST LINE TO TAKE IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THE SITUATION MIGHT OF COURSE DETERIORATE LATER.
HE HAD FOR INSTANCE HEARD TWO REPORTS THIS MORNING THAT OIL PIPELINES FROM IRAQ TO THE MEDITERRANEAN WERE NOW OUT OF ACTION. HE ASKED WHAT STEPS MIGHT NEED TO BE TAKEN TO AVOID RENEWED PRICE ESCALATION AND MENTIONED THAT LANTZKE, WHO HAD CALLED ON HIM IMMEDIATELY BEFORE-HAND, INTENDED TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF STOCK MANAGEMENT AT THE SOM MEETING NEXT WEEK. LANTZKE RECOGNISED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE TO REACH ANY SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS AT THAT MEETING BUT WANTED TO ENCOURAGE MEMBER COUNTRIES TO INITITATE CONSULTATIONS IN THEIR CAPITALS.

3. NEITHER DUNCAN NOR MR HOWELL THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS ANY CASE FOR CALLING A SPECIAL IEA MINISTERIAL AT THIS STAGE. LANTZKE HAD INDICATED THAT HE WOULD ONLY CALL SUCH A MEETING IF THERE WERE A DRAMATIC RISE IN SPOT MARKET PRICES.
AT THE MOMENT THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF THIS HAPPENING.

4. IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO GIVE ANY PUBLICITY TO CONSULTATIONS ABOUT CONTINGENCY PLANS. DUNCAN STRESSED THAT ANY PUBLIC MENTION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENTS UNDERWRITING TANKER INSURANCE MIGHT LEAD INSURANCE COMPANIES TO DISCONTINUE COVERAGE IMMEDIATELY. THE U.S. WAS STUDYING THIS PROBLEM BUT HAD NOT YET REACHED ANY DECISIONS. SAWHILL COMMENTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION ALREADY HAD THE LEGAL POWERS TO INTERVENE ON

INSURANCE BUT STRESSED THAT MANY PRACTICAL DETAILS WOULD HAVE TO BE SORTED OUT BEFORE ANY ACTION WAS TAKEN.

5. DUNCAN RAISED THE PROBLEM OF COUNTRIES WHICH WERE ABNORMALLY RELIANT ON OIL FROM IRAQ. HE HAD SPOKEN TO GIRAUD ON 24 SEPTEMBER WHO HAD SEEMED FAIRLY RELAXED ABOUT THE FRENCH SUPPLY POSITION. BRAZIL WAS PROBABLY IN THE WORST SITUATION SINCE NEARLY 60 PERCENT OF THEIR SUPPLIES WERE AFFECTED. THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WAS ASSESSING WHAT COULD BE DONE TO HELP BRAZIL, PARTICULARLY TO AVOID THEIR ENTERING THE SPOT MARKET. MR HOWELL AND DUNCAN AGREED THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO DEAL WITH THE IMPACT OF THE SUPPLY DISRUPTION BY INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES AND OIL COMPANIES WITHOUT ACTIVATING IEA SHARING ARRANGEMENTS. THE ITALIAN ENERGY MINISTER, WHO HAD BEEN IN WASHINGTON YESTERDAY, HAD TAKEN THE SAME LINE. IT WAS NOTED THAT ACTION TO HELP BRAZIL MIGHT SET A PRECEDENT FOR CLAIMS BY OTHER AFFECTED COUNTRIES.

6. DUNCAN ASKED FOR MR HOWELL'S VIEWS ON THE OPEC LONG-TERM PRICE STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS. IN HIS VIEW THERE WAS A RISK THAT, UNLESS THE PRICE FORMULA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY PRODUCTION ASSURANCES, IT WOULD ESTABLISH ONLY A FLOOR PRICE RATHER THAN A SAFE-GUARD AGAINST FURTHER SUDDEN INCREASES.
IN ADDITION A DANGEROUS PRECENDENT MIGHT BE SET FOR OTHER COMMODITIES. MR HOWELL SAID THAT HE RECOGNISED THESE RISKS BUT THAT THE ALTERNATIVE OF LEAVING THINGS AS THEY NOW STOOD MIGHT BE EVEN WORSE. DUNCAN AGREED WITH THIS POINT BUT ADDED THAT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL, AND WOULD PROBABLY DO NO HARM, IF THE MAJOR CONSUMING COUNTRIES COULD AGREE A COLLECTIVE VIEW OF OEPC'S LONG-TERM STRATEGY PLANS. HE HAD ALREADY RAISED THIS POINT WITH THE ITALIAN MINISTER AND LANTZKE. GIRAUD HAD PUT THE SAME ARGUMENT TO HIM.
A COLLECTIVE VIEW MIGHT BEST BE REACHED BY INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS AMONGST A FEW KEY COUNTRIES, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE FRANCE, OUTSIDE THE IEA OR SUMMIT FORA. THIS MIGHT BE ARRANGED IN THE FRINGES OF AN IEA MEETING E.G. : THE GOVERNING BOARD IN OCTOBER. MR HOWELL AGREED THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE USEFUL.

7. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING GOLDMAN EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT BRITISH GAS'S DECISION TO REDUCE THE PRICE THEY WERE OFFERING FOR ALGERIAN LNG. THE U.S. WAS GRATEFUL FOR HMG'S ROLE IN BRINGING THIS ABOUT.

8. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/SECRETARY OF STATE, SIR D MAITLAND, DE LE B JONES AND KELLY IN DEPT OF ENERGY, MISS BROWN AND FALL, ESSD.

HENDERSON

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 434 OF 26/9/80
INFO TO PRIORITY KUWAIT AND AMMAN

IRAQ/IRAN: BRITISH COMMUNITY DEPENDANTS

1. PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT OF THE MFA TELEPHONED DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS THIS MORNING (26 SEPTEMBER) TO SAY THAT WIVES AND CHILDREN OF NATIONALS WISHING TO LEAVE IRAQ DO NOT (NOT) REQUIRE EXIT PERMITS.

2. THE MFA DID NOT (NOT) REFER TO HUSBANDS AND SINGLE MEN AND THE CLEAR IMPLICATION IS THAT THEY WILL NOT (NOT) BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE UNLESS THEY HAVE THE NECESSARY EXIT PERMITS. WE HAVE ALREADY HEARD THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF FOREIGN MALES NATIONALS ARE AT RUTBA, UNABLE TO CROSS THE BORDER BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE THEIR PERMITS. THE BRITISH ELEMENT OF THIS IS SMALL, AND IS BING ADVISED BY US TO RETURN TO BAGHDAD UNLESS THEY ARE ACCOMPANYING WIVES AND CHILDREN AND FEEL THEY CAN MAKE A SPECIAL CASE TO THE RUTBA AUTHORITIES.

3. THE MFA ALSO SAID THAT DEPENDANTS OF EMBASSY STAFF COULD

3. THE MFA ALSO SAID THAT DEPENDANTS OF EMBASSY STAFF COULD OBTAIN THE NECESSARY EXIT PERMIT FROM THE MFA AT ANY TIME.

THERE ARE NO (NO) DEPENDENTS ON EMBASSY OR COUNCIL STAFF WHO WISH TO LEAVE AT PRESENT.

EGERTON

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 26 September 1980

The Prime Minister has seen the suggested draft reply to President Carter's message of 24 September. She has now approved the text which was set out in FCO telegram no. 213 to Belgrade, and this has been despatched.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Julian West (Department of Energy) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 222 OF 26 SEPTEMBER

FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1352 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

1. A TRIPARTITE BREAKFAST, HOSTED BY THE FRENCH, TOOK PLACE THIS MORNING, WITH THREE A SIDE PRESENT. THE CONVERSATION WAS VERY INFORMAL, WITH FRANCOIS PONCET IN PARTICULAR THINKING ALOUD RATHER THAN EXPRESSING CONSIDERED VIEWS.

IRAN/IRAQ
2. FRANCOIS PONCET WAS SOMEWHAT MYSTIFIED BY MUSKIE'S ATTITUDE DURING A BRIEF INFORMAL DISCUSSION AMONGST THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS THE PREVIOUS EVENING. IT WAS AGREED THAT MUSKIE PROBABLY WANTED TO QUOTE THE EUROPEANS IN SUPPORT OF A CONTROLLED REACTION TO EVENTS IN THIS AREA SHOULD HE ENCOUNTER AN EXCITED MOOD AT A WHITE HOUSE MEETING THIS MORNING. THERE WAS ALSO SOME DISCUSSION OF THE POSITION IN THE GULF AND THE THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. FRANCOIS PONCET HAD CLEARLY TAKEN SERIOUSLY AN ENQUIRY BY MUSKIE THE PREVIOUS EVENING ABOUT WHAT THE FRENCH COULD DO TO HELP MILITARILY: HE THOUGHT A FRENCH AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND FORTY PLANES WERE IN THE AREA, POSSIBLE OFF DJIBUTI. ANY ATTEMPT TO CLOSE THE STRAITS COULD PRESENT A REASONABLY MANAGEABLE CHALLENGE. HE SUPPOSED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE RELUCTANT TO BE INVOLVED BECAUSE OF THE HOSTAGES. HE HAD BEEN STRUCK ONCE AGAIN BY THE PERSISTENCE OF THE ''VIETNAM SYNDROME'' IN MUSKIE'S REMARKS. THE AMERICANS WERE EMBARKING ON A HIGH-RISK PROGRAMME IN THE AREA BY ESTABLISHING BASES AND INCURRING GREAT EXPENSE. THEY WERE AFRAID THAT THESE MIGHT LEAD TO ENTANGLEMENTS, AND OF BEING LEFT ALONE TO FACE THE CONSEQUENCES. FRANCOIS PONCET HAD ALSO BEEN STRUCK BY MUSKIE'S REACTION TO GROMYKO'S SPEECH: HE SEEMED TO BE APPREHANSIVE ABOUT ESCALATION IF THE RUSSIANS ACTUALLY BELIEVED WHAT THEY SAID. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THAT MUSKIE HAD MEANT THAT GROMYKO'S SPEECH MIGHT HAVE MADE SOME IMPACT ON DETACHED OBSERVERS, WHO MIGHT THINK THAT HE HAD MADE OUT A CASE WHICH NEEDED ANSWERING.

3. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THAT THE THREAT TO THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WAS LESS MILITARY (IT WAS LESS EASY TO CLOSE THE STRAITS THAN MIGHT BE SUPPOSED) THAN PSYCHOLOGICAL. LLOYDS HAD ALREADY DECLARED THE GULF A WAR AREA, AND THE RISK WAS THAT SHIP OWVERS WOULD SIMPLY STAY CLEAR. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT ANY ACTION TO KEEP THE STRAITS OPEN WOULD NEED TO BE CAREFULLY PREPARED DIPLOMATICALLY WITH THE ARABS, WHO MIGHT SUPPORT IT IN PRIVATE, BUT NOT IN PUBLIC. AS A FIRST STEP WE NEEDED TO FIND OUT WHAT SHIPS WERE THERE: WHAT THE THREAT TO THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WAS AND HOW TO COUNTER IT: AND WHAT THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES WOULD BE.

QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS.
4. LORD CARRINGTON SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO RESPOND WHEN THE AMERICANS SHOWED INTEREST IN QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATION. NOW THAT WE HAD TO DEAL SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH AFGHANISTAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, IRAN/IRAQ AND POLAND, IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL TO KEEP IN CLOSER TOUCH THAN THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS COULD NORMALLY MANAGE. FOUR POWER CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON BASED ON THE EMBASSIES WOULD PROBABLY LEAK. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION (AND SOME SLIGHT HESITATION BY FRANCOIS PONCET) IT WAS AGREED TO PROPOSE TO THE AMERICANS THAT THIS MORE CONTINUOUS CONSULTATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN PARIS BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR THERE AND THE THREE POLITICAL DIRECTORS, WITH MILITARY ADVICE AS NECESSARY.

PAKISTAN
5. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE SLIPPAGE IN THE PALISTANI ATTITUDE WAS A CAUSE FOR REAL CONCERN. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT GISCARD WOULD SEE PRESIDENT ZIA IN PARIS TOMORROW. LORD CARRINGTON

AMERICAN AMBASSADOR THERE AND THE THREE POLITICAL DIRECTORS, WITH MILITARY ADVICE AS NECESSARY.

PAKISTAN

5. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE SLIPPAGE IN THE PALISTANI ATTITUDE WAS A CAUSE FOR REAL CONCERN. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT GISCARD WOULD SEE PRESIDENT ZIA IN PARIS TOMORROW. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT AGHA SHAHI WAS VERY BITTER ABOUT THE EUROPEANS' ''BUSINESS AS USUAL'' ATTITUDE TO THE RUSSIANS. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE PAKISTANIS WERE FACING SOVIET AND INDIAN PRESSURE. THE FACT WAS THAT, IN A CRUNCH, NO-ONE WOULD HELP THEM, AND THEY KNEW IT. THE GERMANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY COULD ONLY HELP FINANCIALLY AND NOT MILITARILY, AND THE AMERICANS HAD OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES TOO. IT WAS NOTED THAT HOPES THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD FINANCE LARGE-SCALE MILITARY SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN HAD NOT MATERIALISED. ARAB COUNTRIES WERE GIVING PRIORITY TO THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT THE NINE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO GET SOME RETURN FROM THE ARABS FOR THEIR POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN TERMS OF AFGHANISTAN: IF THEY COULD ESTABLISH THIS LINK, SO COULD WE.

6. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT IF THE PAKISTANIS RECOGNISED BABRAK KAMAL, OTHER MOSLEM COUNTRIES WOULD FOLLOW. THE PAKISTANIS WERE ALSO THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE FOR THE RESISTANCE. WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT ALTERNATIVE ROUTES. LORD CARRINGTON SAID IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS TALK WITH GROYMKO THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A SETTLEMENT. WE THEREFORE HAD TO DECIDE ON A LONG TERM POLICY. FRANCOIS PONCET AGREED: WE NEEDED ''A MATURE AND CYNICAL ATTITUDE OVER A LONG PERIOD''. WE SHOULD DECIDE JUST WHAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DO BOTH ON HELPING THE RESISTANCE AND ON PAKISTAN.

POLAND

7. GENSCHER THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT MOVE INTO POLAND IN ABOUT SIX MONTHS, AFTER MADRID WAS OUT OF THE WAY. THE ONLY WAY THE WEST COULD HELP TO STABILISE THE SITUATION, EVEN AT A LOW ECONOMIC LEVEL WHICH EXISTED BEFORE THE STRIKES BEGAN, WAS BY STRONG ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT SO FAR AS WESTERN ECONOMIC AID WAS CONCERNED THE QUESTION WAS NOT WHETHER BUT HOW MUCH. WHEN HE HAD SEEN THE FORMER POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER IN PARIS RECENTLY, WOJTASEK HAD IMPLIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD STICK TO THE LETTER OF THE GDANSK AGREEMENT, BUT WOULD FEEL FREE TO BREAK IT UNLESS THE UNIONS DID LIKEWISE. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE GDR FOREIGN MINISTER, FISCHER, HAD CLAIMED THAT THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY WOULD SOON REGAIN LOST GROUND AND POLAND WOULD ''GET BACK INSTEP''. PUJA, THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, HAD TAKEN A SIMILAR LINE. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THAT THIS REFLECTED CONCERN AMONGST THE MORE HARD-LINE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND PERSONALITIES, AND ALSO A CERTAIN DEFENSIVENESS.

U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DEVELOPMENT

8. GENSCHER THOUGHT THE US, UK AND GERMAN TACTICS HAD BEEN MISTAKEN, AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HOPED TO SECURE A CHANGE IN THE GERMAN POSITION AFTER THE ELECTIONS. WE SHOULD NOT HAVE FOUGHT THE BATTLE ON THE MANDATE, BUT DURING SUBSTANTIAL NEGOTIATIONS HE HOPED THAT THE BRITISH WOULD CHANGE THEIR POLICY TOO. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED HOW LITTLE REACTION THERE HAD BEEN TO THE US-UK-GERMAN ACTION.

MIDDLE EAST

9. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO SPELL OUT SOME FACTS OF LIFE TO MUSKIE AT THE MINISTERIAL QUADRIPARTITE MEETING THAT EVENING, BUT ACCEPTED GENSCHER'S ADVICE NOT TO FIX MUSKIE ON A HOOK.

10. FOR COMMUNICATIONS DEPT. PLEASE CONSULT PRIVATE OFFICE ON DISTRIBUTION.

CARRINGTON

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00 BELGRADE DESKBY 260500Z
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TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 782 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE FOR NO 10 DUTY CLERK (DESKBY 260500Z)
AND IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN

IRAN/IRAQ

1. FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GISCARD TO THE PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED THIS AFTERNOON:

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

AT THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO HAS SENT ME THREE MESSAGES BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE IRAQI-IRANIAN HOSTILITIES, I RECEIVED THIS MORNING MR TAREQ AZIZ, DEPUTY PM OF IRAQ.

MY INTERLOCUTOR AFFIRMED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NO TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVE BEYOND THE CONTESTED TERRITORIES AND THAT IT WAS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES TO MAINTAIN ANY MILITARY PRESENCE IN IRAN OUTSIDE THESE TERRITORIES. WE DISCUSSED THE CONDITIONS FOR OPENING NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THIS CONFLICT AS WELL AS VARIOUS POSSIBLE FORMULAE FOR NEGOTIATION. IN THIS RESPECT, I SAID THAT A SPECIAL ROLE MUST DEVOLVE TO THE ISLAMIC STATES IN THE PROCESS LEADING TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT.

I ALSO URGED ON MR TAREQ AZIZ THAT IRAQ EXPRESS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE HER POSITION ON THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS.

FINALLY, I RECALLED EMPHATICALLY THE IMPORTANCE WHICH FRANCE ATTACHES TO THE MAINTENANCE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF AND THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

THE IRAQI DEPUTY PM GAVE ME THE ASSURANCE THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THAT ZONE.

MR TAREQ AZIZ CONFIDED TO ME ALSO THAT IRAQ DID NOT AT THIS STAGE INTEND TO UNDERTAKE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GULF ISLETS (LITTLE TUMB, GREAT TUMB AND ABU MUSA) WHICH SHOULD HOWEVER REVERT TO THE UAE.

AFTER THIS CONVERSATION, MY PERSONAL EVALUATION IS THAT IRAQ'S OBJECTIVE IS TO SEIZE TERRITORIAL GAINS, AND EQUALLY POLITICAL GAINS IN THE FORM OF PUBLICLY INFLICTED DEFEATS ON THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES. MY OPINION IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF MR SADDAM HUSSEIN GIVES ITSELF ANOTHER FOUR TO FIVE DAYS TO REACH THIS OBJECTIVE.

MESSAGE ENDS.

CARRINGTON

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This is a copy. The original has been extracted and closed, 40 years.

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TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 101 OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1980

IRAQ/IRAN: THE GULF ISLANDS (ABU MUSA AND THE TUNBS)

1. IRAQ HAS CALLED FOR THE RETURN TO THE ARABS POSSESSION OF THREE PERSIAN GULF ISLANDS NEAR THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ: ABU MUSA AND THE GREATER AND LESSER TUNB. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS HAS LONG BEEN DISPUTED. FROM AT LEAST THE EARLY PART OF THE 19TH CENTURY AND UNTIL 1971 THE ISLANDS HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED BY ARABS, IN PARTICULAR BY SHARJAH (ABU MUSA) AND RAS AL KHAIMAH (THE TUNBS). DURING THE PERIOD OF THE UK'S SPECIAL TREATY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GULF STATES, THE PERSIAN CLAIM TO THE ISLANDS WAS FIRMLY REJECTED BY US ON BEHALF OF SHARJAH AND RAS AL KHAIMAH. BUT WITH THE APPROACH OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GULF (DECEMBER 1971), IRAN MADE CLEAR ITS INTENTION OF SEIZING THE ISLANDS, ARGUING IN PART THAT RECOGNITION OF HER CLAIM TO THEM WAS THE PRICE OF HER SURRENDER OF HER CLAIM TO BAHRAIN, A POSITION WE DID NOT ACCEPT. SHARJAH AGREED TO A COMPROMISE OVER ABU MUSA WHEREBY BOTH SIDES SHARED THE ISLAND WITHOUT SACRIFICING SOVEREIGNTY. BUT RAS AL KHAIMAH WAS OFFERED A LESS FAVOURABLE ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE ISLANDS' LOSS, EFFECTIVELY, IN RETURN FOR MONEY. THE RULER REFUSED. IRAN OCCUPIED THE TUNBS BY FORCE THE DAY BEFORE THE UK'S PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES EXPIRED: AS A RESULT IRAQ SEVERED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BOTH IRAN AND THE UK AND LIBYA NATIONALISED BRITISH PETROLEUM'S OPERATIONS IN LIBYA.

LINE TO TAKE

2. WE DO NOT WISH TO ADVERTISE BRITAIN'S PAST ROLE IN RELATION TO THE ISLANDS. BUT YOU MAY DRAW FULLY ON THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS (EXCEPT FOR PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 9) TO REBUT THE

/ACCUSATIONS

ACCUSATIONS THAT WILL INEVITABLY BE MADE.

SOVEREIGNTY

3. THE UK HAS NEVER CHANGED ITS POSITION ON THIS. WE SUPPORTED THE CLAIMS OF THE SHEIKDOMS. AS FAR BACK AS THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE STRETCHES, THE ISLANDS HAVE BEEN IN ARAB OCCUPATION. WE NEVER ACCEPTED THAT THE IRANIAN OCCUPATION OF THE TUNBS CHANGED THE LEGAL POSITION OVER SOVEREIGNTY. THE 1971 ARRANGEMENTS FOR ABU MUSA LEFT BOTH SIDES FREE TO MAINTAIN THEIR CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY (SEE BACKGROUND BELOW) AND WE HAVE NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT THE POSITION HAS CHANGED SINCE THEN.

BRITISH ROLE IN THE PERIOD BEFORE ISLANDS' SEIZURE

4. DURING THE CENTURY AND A HALF OF THE BRITISH PRESENCE IN THE GULF, WE MAINTAINED THE ARAB POSITION CONCERNING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS IN THE FACE OF PERSIAN CLAIMS. BUT WHEN THE DATE WAS SET FOR THE ENDING OF OUR PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES, WE TRIED TO PROMOTE AGREED SOLUTIONS TO OUTSTANDING DISPUTES, IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE STABILITY AFTER OUR DEPARTURE AND TO GIVE THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE GULF A SOUND START (AND IN PARTICULAR TO OBTAIN IRANIAN RECOGNITION OF THEM). THUS WE PERSUADED THE IRANIANS TO DROP THEIR CLAIM TO BAHRAIN, AND SECURED BAHRAIN'S ADMISSION TO THE UN (AFTER A CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED UN MISSION OF ENQUIRY) WITH IRAN'S AGREEMENT. WE URGED SHARJAH AND RAS AL KHAIMAH TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION WITH IRAN, SINCE WE COULD NO LONGER PROTECT THEM. SHARJAH DID SO, ON TERMS THAT WERE NOT UNFAVOURABLE (SEE BELOW). RAS AL KHAIMAH DID NOT, AND WE RESPECTED THE RULER'S DECISION. WE DID NOT (NOT) ASSIST THE SHAH TO SEIZE THE TUNBS. THE OVERALL BALANCE OF THE ABOVE ARRANGEMENTS (IRANIAN RECOGNITION OF BAHRAIN AND MUTUALLY AGREED ARRANGEMENTS FOR ABU MUSA, AGAINST UNAVOIDABLE LOSS OF THE TUNBS) WAS FAVOURABLE AND IN ANY CASE THE BEST OBTAINABLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF OUR WITHDRAWAL.

USE OF FORCE

5. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE USE OF FORCE TO RECOVER THE ISLANDS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED. THERE ARE OTHER WAYS OF SETTLING DISPUTES. WE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT THE ARABS HAD A STRONG CASE. THE USE OF FORCE WOULD HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE STABILITY

/OF THE GULF

OF THE GULF AND WOULD NOT NECESSARILY RESULT IN A PERMANENT SOLUTION.

REGIONAL DANGERS

6. IF IRAQ ATTEMPTED TO SEIZE THE ISLANDS BY FORCE WITH OR WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF, THERE WOULD BE A CLEAR DANGER OF THE ALREADY GRAVE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN SPREADING TO WIDER AREAS. THIS MIGHT DESTABILIZE THE WHOLE OF THE OIL PRODUCING AREA OF THE GULF. IT WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS NEITHER OF THE WEST, NOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD, NOR THE OIL PRODUCING STATES, TO SEE THIS HAPPEN.

BACKGROUND

7. IN 1887 THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT CHALLENGED THE AUTHORITY OF THE ARABS OVER THESE ISLANDS. IN THAT YEAR A PERSIAN CLAIM TO THE TUNBS WAS FIRST MADE AND WAS FIRMLY REJECTED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON BEHALF OF RAS AL KHAIMAH. IN 1904 SOME VISITING PERSIANS RAISED THE PERSIAN FLAG IN ALL THREE ISLANDS BUT THE PERSIANS REMOVED IT AFTER PRESSURE FROM LORD CURZON, THEN BRITISH VICEROY OF INDIA. THE IRANIANS HAVE ALLEGED THAT CERTAIN DOCUMENTS SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM. WE PROPOSED AN EXCHANGE OF DOCUMENTS BUT IRAN WAS NEVER WILLING TO DO THIS. IN NOVEMBER 1971, SHORTLY BEFORE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GULF (WHICH WAS DUE ON 1 DECEMBER), A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED FOR ABU MUSA. THE SHAH AND THE RULER OF SHARJAH ACCEPTED THAT ON ABU MUSA NEITHER SIDE WOULD GIVE UP ITS CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OR RECOGNISE THE OTHER'S, BUT THAT THE IRANIANS SHOULD OCCUPY PARTS OF IT AND THAT OIL INCOME DERIVING FROM IT WOULD BE SHARED EQUALLY, MINERAL AND OTHER RESOURCES WERE ALSO TO BE SHARED, AND AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED ON FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM IRAN TO SHARJAH.

FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION

8. THE RULER OF RAS AL KHAIMAH DID NOT ACCEPT THAT THE TUNBS SHOULD PASS UNDER IRANIAN SOVEREIGNTY, *~~~~*



THE SHAH MADE IT CLEAR THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE ISLANDS PROBLEM THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD IN THE LAST RESORT OCCUPY THE TUNBS WHETHER OR NOT THE RULER OF RAS AL KHAIMAH AGREED.

9. THIS ALL CAME AT THE END OF A PERIOD WHICH HAD SEEN THE DROPPING OF THE IRANIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAIN (1970) AND THE BRINGING TO FULLY RECOGNISED INDEPENDENCE OF BAHRAIN, QATAR AND THE UAE. ALTHOUGH THE IRANIAN TAKEOVER OF THE ISLANDS HAS BEEN A LINGERING CAUSE OF SOME DISAPPOINTMENT WITH BRITAIN IN THE GULF AND OUTRIGHT HOSTILITY IN IRAQ, THE POSITION WHICH WAS THEN REACHED ENSURED IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES ON THE ARAB SIDE OF THE GULF AND ENSURED HARMONIOUS RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM AND IRAN DURING THE IMPORTANT INITIAL YEARS AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH PRESENCE. AFTER THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION THE IRANIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAIN WAS REVIVED BY CERTAIN MULLAHS. THIS, AND THE IRAQI DISLIKE OF THE KHOMEINI REGIME, COUPLED WITH IRAN'S MILITARY WEAKNESS CAUSED BY INTERNAL TURMOIL APPEARS TO HAVE ENCOURAGED BAGHDAD TO TRY TO REDRESS THE OLD GRIEVANCE BY IRAQ RESTATING THE ARAB CLAIM TO ABU MUSA AND THE TUNBS.

10. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL IS BEING SENT TO CERTAIN POSTS BY BAG.

CARRINGTON

BY TELEGRAPH

BONN	BAGHDAD	DAMASCUS
BRUSSELS	BAHRAIN	ALGIERS
UKREP EC BRUSSELS	DOHA	CAIRO
UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS	DUBAI	KHARTOUM
PARIS	ABU DHABI	RABAT
ROME	MUSCAT	TRIPOLI
UKMIS NEW YORK	BEIRUT	TUNIS
WASHINGTON	JEDDA	ISLAMABAD
ADEN	KUWAIT	NEW DELHI
AMMAN	SANAA	

[IMMEDIATE]

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
OID

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
GUIDANCE

— Passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under a FOI Exemption. B A Wayland 2 June 2010

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS64
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FCO 251720Z SEPTEMBER 1980
TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA TELNO 549 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
AND TO KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, DOHA
IRAN/IRAQ

1. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR URGENT ASSEMENT, WITHOUT CONSULTING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, OF THE EFFECTS OF A TOTAL STOPPAGE OF TRAFFIC THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ ON THE LOCAL ECONOMY, E.G. THROUGH THE NON-AVAILABILITY OF GAS FOR WATER DISTILLATION, ETC AND SHORTAGES OF OTHER ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD	
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NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
IRAQ/IRAN

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

GRS 187
UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO 251000Z SEPTEMBER 80
TO PRIORITY DAMASCUS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 134 OF 25 SEPT 80
FOR INFO AMMAN, BAGHDAD, ANKARA, TEL AVIV. DI4 MOD
IRAN/IRAQ

1. TODAY'S DAILY TELEGRAPH HAS REPORT BY JOHN BULLOCK (WITH MUCH CIRCUMSTANTIAL DETAIL) THAT SYRIA HAS BROKEN ARAB RANKS AND SENT HELP TO IRAN.

2. BULLOCK CLAIMS THAT A SPECIAL ENVOY OF BANI SADR VISITED ASSAD EIGHT DAYS AGO WITH REQUESTS FOR A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR IRAN, IMMEDIATE ARMS DELIVERIES AND DIVERSIONARY MANOUVRES ON THE IRAQI BORDER. ASSAD REFUSED MOST OF THESE REQUESTS BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT SUCH MEASURES WOULD HAVE IN THE ARAB WORLD. MANOUVRES WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT A SUITABLE MOVEMENT AND DEPEND UPON THE GENERAL SITUATION. BUT, BULLOCK SAYS, SYRIA HAS SINCE AIRLIFTED ARMS TO TEHRAN SECRETLY BY NIGHT TAKING A ROUNDABOUT ROUTE ALONG THE TURKISH BORDER. ARMS LISTED INCLUDE:

150 SAM 7 LAUNCHERS WITH 600 ROCKETS:
200 RPG 7 ANTI-TANK LAUNCHERS WITH 1,000 ROCKETS:
100,000 ROUNDS OF 7.62 MM AMMUNITION, ANTI-VEHICLE MINES, DEMOLITION CHARGES AND TNT.
SEVEN SYRIAN DOCTORS AND ELEVEN ORDINANCE EXPERTS ARE ALSO SAID TO HAVE ARRIVED IN TEHRAN.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD	
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ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
IRAQ/IRAN

RESTRICTED

GRS 130
RESTRICTED
FM CAIRO 251200Z SEP 80
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 624 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
INFO BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, MODUK

IRAQ/IRAN: MY TELNO 619

1. PRESIDENT SADAT MADE HIS FIRST PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE FIGHTING ON 24 SEPTEMBER IN AN INTERVIEW WITH DUTCH TV AND URUGUAYAN JOURNALISTS, REPORTED IN TODAY'S LOCAL PRESS.

2. HE DEPLORED THE WAR, REITERATED EGYPT'S NEUTRAL STAND AND SPOKE OF THE PERSONAL ANIMOSITY BETWEEN SADDAM HUSSEIN AND KHOMEINI. TO SUPPLY ARMS TO SUCH ADOLESCENTS WAS A TRAGEDY. EGYPT HAD RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION, WHICH HE WOULD REVIEW AT THE CONFERENCE OF THE GOVERNING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY NEXT WEEK. THE SITUATION THREATENED THE STABILITY OF THE WEST AS WELL AS THE MIDDLE EAST. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE UNITED STATES AS THE WORLD'S BIGGEST POWER, AND WESTERN EUROPE WOULD ASSUME THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN THE GULF.

BARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD		ADDITIONAL DISTN.
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WED	CABINET OFFICE	

RESTRICTED

GRS 780
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY FCO 261100Z
DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK FIRST CONTACT
FM AMMAN 260725Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 354 OF 25 SEP 80
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK
ROUTINE CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA KUWAIT TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON

BAGHDAD TELNO 432 TO FCO:

IRAQ/IRAN.

1. KING HUSSEIN SENT A DELEGATION TO BAGHDAD ON 24 SEPTEMBER HEADED BY THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER AND INCLUDING THE MINISTERS OF COURT, INFORMATION AND FOR WEST BANK AFFAIRS. THEY RETURNED TO AMMAN EARLY THIS MORNING AFTER HAVING HAD TALKS WITH THE IRAQI PRESIDENT. THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, TARIQ AZIZ, CAME TO AMMAN ON 24 SEPTEMBER WITH A MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN FROM THE IRAQI PRESIDENT.

2. WHEN HE SAW THE LIBERAL PARTY DELEGATION LED BY MR STEEL THIS AFTERNOON, KING HUSSEIN DESCRIBED THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN AS HIGHLY UNFORTUNATE AND POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS FOR THE AREA. HE HOPED SOMETHING POSITIVE MIGHT NONETHELESS STILL COME OF IT, ESPECIALLY IF IT WERE TO PUT AN END TO WHAT HE TERMED IRANIAN THREATS TO THE ARABS IN THE GULF OVER A PERIOD OF MANY YEARS. GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS REPEATING ASSURANCES HE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE IRAQIS, THE KING CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST IRAN AND NO WISH TO RETAIN ANY OF THE IRANIAN TERRITORY THEY HAD RECENTLY OCCUPIED, BUT THAT THEY WOULD INSIST ON:

A. IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT EL ARAB SEMICOLON

B. THE RETURN TO THE ARABS OF THE TUNGS AND ABU MUSA SEMICOLON

C. AN END TO IRANIAN THREATS AGAINST ARAB STATES IN THE GULF REGION.

3. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT JORDAN WAS CURRENTLY EXCHANGING VIEWS WITH FRIENDLY COUNTRIES IN THE HOPE THAT IT MIGHT PROVE POSSIBLE TO MOUNT A PEACE INITIATIVE VERY SHORTLY, EITHER IN AN ISLAMIC OR NON-ALIGNED CONTEXT OR POSSIBLY AT THE UNITED NATIONS. I HAD A BRIEF PRIVATE EXCHANGE WITH THE KING AFTER THE LIBERAL PARTY DELEGATION HAD LEFT THE ROOM SEMICOLON HE TOLD ME HE THOUGHT THAT

/THE

THE IRAQIS WOULD BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE ALL THEIR MILITARY OBJECTIVES WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS OR SO AND THAT THE WAY WOULD THEN BE OPEN FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

4. ABU ODEH, THE JORDANIAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION, GAVE THE LIBERAL PARTY DELEGATION A MUCH FULLER BRIEFING AT WHICH I WAS ALSO PRESENT ONLY A FEW HOURS AFTER HE HAD RETURNED FROM IRAQ. IN REVIEWING THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS IN THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SHAH AND THE IRAQIS, ABU ODEH CLAIMED THAT THE IRANIANS HAD FAILED TO CARRY OUT THEIR OBLIGATION CLEARLY TO DELINEATE THE BORDER WITH IRAQ, FIRST DRAGGING THEIR FEET IN HIRING A FOREIGN FIRM TO CARRY OUT THE WORK INVOLVED AND THEN REFUSING TO COMPLETE THE REQUIRED MAPS. WHEN THE IRAQIS HAD PRESSED THE KHOMEINI REGIME FOR THE MAPS, THE IRANIANS HAD RESPONDED BY MOVING TROOPS INTO THE DISPUTED AREAS. WITH REGARD TO THE SHATT, THE IRAQIS HAD UNDERSTOOD DIVIDED SOVEREIGNTY TO COVER ONLY QUESTIONS OF NAVIGATION BUT THE IRANIANS HAD SOUGHT TO EXTEND THE CONCEPT TO INCLUDE, FOR EXAMPLE, NEW IRRIGATION WORKS ON THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES OVER WHICH THEY CLAIMED A RIGHT OF VETO.

5. ABU ODEH ALSO CLAIMED THAT IRAQ HAD NO TERRITORIAL DESIGNS, EVEN ON KHUZESTAN WHOSE FUTURE MUST BE DECIDED BY ITS OWN INHABITANTS, BUT THAT THE IRAQIS WERE LOOKING FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD PUT AN END TO ARAB DIFFERENCES WITH IRAN. HE THOUGHT IRAQI MILITARY COMMUNIQUES HAD ON THE WHOLE BEEN FAIRLY ACCURATE AND THAT IRANIAN BOMBING OF CIVILIAN TARGETS IN BAGHDAD HAD NOT CAUSED HEAVY CASUALTIES: IRAQI MILITARY INSTALLATIONS WERE WELL DEFENDED AGAINST AIR ATTACK. THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION HAD BEEN SHOWN TEXTS OF MESSAGES EXCHANGED BETWEEN IRANIAN MILITARY UNITS WHICH SHOWED THEM TO BE COMPLETELY DEMORALISED, AND THE IRAQIS SEEMED CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD FORCE THE IRANIANS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE IRAQIS HAD NOT ASKED FOR ANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM JORDAN: THEY ONLY WANTED POLITICAL HELP IN BRINGING ABOUT EARLY NEGOTIATIONS SEMICOLON ABU ODEH TOO DID NOT BELIEVE THE WAR WOULD CONTINUE FOR MORE THAN ANOTHER FEW DAYS. THE IRAQIS APPEARED TO BE HOPING THAT KHOMEINI'S OPPONENTS IN THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES MIGHT RALLY AGAINST HIM. IRANIAN PRISONERS TAKEN BY THE IRAQIS WERE BLAMING KHOMEINI FOR THE SET-BACKS IRAN HAD SUFFERED AND ALSO ASSERTING THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS WERE ALWAYS THE FIRST TO RUN AWAY.

/6.

6. ABU ODEH SAID HE EXPECTED THE IRAQIS TO TRY TO COMPLETE THEIR MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE SHATT BEFORE OPENING NEGOTIATIONS. THEY HAD AT THE BEGINNING BEEN WORRIED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF IRANIAN AIR AND NAVAL SUPERIORITY AND HAD THUS CONCENTRATED THEIR AIR ATTACKS ON IRANIAN AIR AND NAVAL BASES, ONLY BOMBING CIVILIAN INSTALLATIONS IN REPRISAL FOR IRANIAN ATTACKS. IF THE IRANIAN POSITION BECAME DESPERATE, ABU ODEH THOUGHT THEY WOULD SEEK TO BLOCK THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

URWICK

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTN.
IRAQ/IRAN

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
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HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

Sir A Acland

GR 800

DESKBY 0830

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 260830Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260445Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1383 OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1980
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO.

MY TELNO 1348: IRAN/IRAQ: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. THE WHOLE DAY HAS BEEN TAKEN UP WITH CONFUSED ATTEMPTS TO AGREE ON A BASIS FOR A FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. THE COUNCIL EVENTUALLY STARTED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE AT ABOUT 1030PM. AFTER INTERMINABLE STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT (SLIM OF TUNISIA), WALDHEIM AND THE MEXICAN, IT WAS AGREED, AT THE SPECIFIC REQUEST OF NORWAY AND MEXICO, THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD MEET FORMALLY TOMORROW (26 SEPTEMBER) AFTERNOON. AT THE SUGGESTION OF THE ZAMBIAN, WITH SOVIET SUPPORT, IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT WE SHOULD MEET FIRST IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TO DISCUSS THE PROCEDURE AND TO HEAR THE RESULTS OF THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (SEE PARA 3 BELOW).

THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (SEE PARA 3 BELOW).

2. THE IRAQI ENVOY, KITTANI, WORKED ALL DAY TO PREVENT ANY MEETING TAKING PLACE. WHEN I MET HIM EARLY IN THE MORNING HE TOLD ME THAT BAGHDAD WAS OPPOSED TO A MEETING ''FOR THE TIME BEING'': A MEETING NOW WOULD PREJUDICE THE CHANCES FOR HELPFUL UN MEDIATION AT A LATER STAGE: MORE TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (SEE BELOW): HE HOPED THE UK WOULD NOT BE FORWARD IN PRESSING FOR A MEETING. KITTANI WAS FULLY AND UNSCRUPULOUSLY BACKED BY TROYANOVSKY (USSR) WHO COULD BE COUNTED ON TO RAISE DIFFICULTIES WHENEVER WE SEEMED TO BE APPROACHING A POSSIBLE CONSENSUS.

3. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA LED EFFORTS TO PROMOTE MEDIATION BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. THEIR PROPOSAL IS THAT PRESIDENT ZIA, ACCOMPANIED BY SHATTI, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE, SHOULD VISIT TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS. ZIA HAS APPARENTLY AGREED TO DO THIS ON THE CONDITIONS THAT THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS (WHO ARE TO MEET HERE TOMORROW MORNING 26 SEPTEMBER) ENDORSE THE PROPOSAL AND THAT THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI AUTHORITIES INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE HIM. BANI SADR IS REPORTED TO HAVE DONE SO BUT THERE IS DOUBT ABOUT THE IRAQI POSITION: KITTANI HAS DECLINED SO FAR TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM BAGHDAD. SLIM HAS SENT IDENTICAL TELEGRAMS TO BANI SADR AND SADDAM HUSSEIN ASKING THEM TO LET HIM KNOW WHETHER THEY HAVE ACCEPTED THE MEDIATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

4. THOSE PRESSING FOR A MEETING HAVE INCLUDED:
(A) THE SECRETARY GENERAL WHO, EARLY IN THE DAY, ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BE MISLED BY TROYANOVSKY INTO THINKING THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD CHANGED THEIR POSITION AND WERE READY TO ACCEPT A MEETING. WALDHEIM WAS TORN BETWEEN THE DESIRE TO ''DO HIS DUTY'' BY THE ORGANISATION AND RELUCTANCE TO ANTAGONISE THE RUSSIANS AND THE ARABS. HE UNHELPFULLY ISSUED A FURTHER LETTER ''SUGGESTING'' AN EARLY COUNCIL MEETING JUST AT THE MOMENT WHEN THERE SEEMED TO BE A CHANCE THAT WE WOULD ALL AGREE TO LEAVE IT TO THE MUSLIMS FOR THE MOMENT:
(B) MCHENRY (US), WHO THOUGHT A MEETING ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE COUNCIL'S REPUTATION BUT WAS NOT PREPARED TO TAKE THE LEAD IN CALLING FOR ONE:
(C) ALGARD (NORWAY) WHO WAS UNDER STRICT INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS FOREIGN MINISTER:
(D) THE PRESIDENT (SLIM OF TUNISIA) WHO EMERGED AS AN INCOMPETENT, SELF-IMPORTANT AND VERBOSE CHAIRMAN. HE SUCCEEDED IN LINING UP SEVERAL OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS (ESPECIALLY MEXICO) IN FAVOUR OF A MEETING BY ARGUING THAT ONE WAS ESSENTIAL FOR

SEVERAL OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS (ESPECIALLY MEXICO) IN FAVOUR OF A MEETING BY ARGUING THAT ONE WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE COUNCIL'S STANDING AND (ERRONEOUSLY) THAT THE FIVE WESTERN MEMBERS WERE ADAMANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE ONE.

5. THE PORTUGUESE AND THE FRENCH WERE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT A MEETING. IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS, I KEPT MY HEAD DOWN BUT ARGUED FROM TIME TO TIME THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE COUNCIL TO ALLOW THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO GET ON WITH ITS MEDIATION EFFORTS THAN TO PRODUCE, AFTER LONG CONSULTATIONS, A STATEMENT WHICH WENT NO FURTHER THAN THAT OF 23 SEPTEMBER (MY TELNO 1340), WHICH WAS THE MOST THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT.

6. WHAT HAPPENS IN THE COUNCIL TOMORROW WILL, IN MY VIEW, DEPEND ON THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE GROUND. IF THE IRAQIS FEEL THAT THEY HAVE DONE ENOUGH, THE RUSSIANS MAY NOT STALL AND BLOCK A POSITIVE OUTCOME, EG A FIRMER STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, OR EVEN A RESOLUTION. IF THE IRAQIS WANT TO CONTINUE THE BATTLE, THE RUSSIANS PROBABLY WILL STALL, HOLDING THE COUNCIL UP IN ENDLESS INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. EQUALLY, THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE MAY URGE THE COUNCIL TO HOLD OFF WHILE THEY DEVELOP THEIR MEDIATION ATTEMPTS.

7. IF WE GET INTO A FORMAL MEETING, COUNCIL MEMBERS ARE LIKELY TO MAKE SHORT STATEMENTS, CAREFULLY AVOIDING TAKING SIDES AND CONCENTRATING ON THE NEED FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION, ETC. IF THIS HAPPENS, I RECOMMEND THAT WE TOO SHOULD MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT. I CAN EASILY DRAFT THIS IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH THE DAY.

PARSONS

NNNN

CYPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

LVO NR 288/26

FDW G 50/26

00 BELGRADE (DESKBY 260700Z)

GR 50

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY BELGRADE 260700Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260205Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1382 OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1980
AND TO BELGRADE (FOR P.S. TO P.M.).

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

YOUR TELNO 213: REPLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER.

LORD CARRINGTON AGREES WITH THE TERMS OF THE DRAFT REPLY.

PARSONS

NNNN

CYPHER

0407/26

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
HD/CONS D
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

Cabinet Office
FCO

GR 200
RESTRICTED
FM PEKING 250814Z SEP 80
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 621 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD MOSCOW HONG KONG ISLAMABAD

CHINESE VIEWS ON IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT

THE CHINESE MEDIA ON 24 SEPTEMBER PUBLICIZED ZHAO ZIYANG'S COMMENT TO VISITING NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER NORDLI ON THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. HE SAID BOTH WERE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO CHINA. HE HOPED THE DISPUTES COULD BE SOLVED PEACEFULLY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AND SUPERPOWER INTERFERENCE AVOIDED.

2. A XINHUA COMMENTARY OF THE SAME DATE GAVE A FACTUAL BUT ENTIRELY NEUTRAL ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS. IT ARGUED THAT SETTLING TRADITIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH CONFLICT RATHER THAN CONSULTATION COULD ONLY DAMAGE BOTH COUNTRIES' FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS. THE SOVIET UNION WAS ACCUSED OF ''FISHING IN TROUBLED WATERS'' BY SUGGESTING THAT THE CONFLICT WAS PROVOKED

INTERESTS. THE SOVIET UNION WAS ACCUSED OF ''FISHING IN TROUBLED WATERS'' BY SUGGESTING THAT THE CONFLICT WAS PROVOKED BY THE WEST. MFA HAVE TAKEN SIMILAR LINE IN INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH HEAD OF CHANCERY.

COMMENT

3. THE CHINESE ARE NO DOUBT SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSED BY THIS CONFLICT. THEY HAVE BEEN MAKING MOVES TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ (EG THE OPENING OF AN AIRLINK IN JULY, AND VICE-PREMIER JI PENGFEI'S VISIT THIS MONTH). MEANWHILE, ALTHOUGH PREPARED TO GIVE MUTED SUPPORT TO THE UNITED STATES OVER HOSTAGES, CHINA HAS IN GENERAL USED KID GLOVES IN HANDLING HER RELATIONS WITH IRAN, FLAWED BY HUA GUOFENG'S VISIT TO THE SHAH IN 1978, AND HAS TRIED TO AVOID ANTAGONISING THE PRESENT REGIME. THE CHINESE HAVE STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED ATTRIBUTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESENT CONFLICT.

CRADOCK

NNNN

RESTRICTED

GRS 240
RESTRICTED
FM BAGHDAD 251210Z SEP 80
TO FLASH AMMAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 34 OF 25/9/80
FOR INFO TO IMMEDIATE FCO

YOUR TEL NO 34: BRITISH COMMUNITY DEPENDANTS

1. MANY THANKS FOR FIELDING THE FIRST DESERT BUSLOAD AND THE SELTRUST MINI BUS CONTAINING 12 PERSONS.

2. BRITISH COMMUNITY TODAY ORGANISED FURTHER CONVOYS OF TWO BUSES, CONTAINING RESPECTIVELY 44 AND 50 WOMEN AND CHILDREN, ACCOMPANIED BY SEVEN LAND-ROVER TYPE VEHICLES CONTAINING 35 PERSONS. THESE TOTALS INCLUDE SIX MEN ON THE BUSES, NONE WITH EXIT PERMIT PROBLEMS.
ALL COULD REACH AMMAN TONIGHT.

3. BOTH BUSES ARE HIRED THROUGH TO AMMAN. NOT ALL THE SEVEN CARS HAVE CORRECT DOCUMENTATION SO SOME MAY HAVE TO BE LEFT AT RUTBA, WITH PASSENGERS TRANS-SHIPPING TO ONE OR OTHER BUS. (THE BUS CONTAINING 50 SOULS CARRIES 19 CHILDREN).

4. COSTS OF BUS HIRE HERE ARE RISING DRAMATICALLY AS THE SCRAMBLE OF DEPENDANTS TO LEAVE DEVELOPS.
BRITISH COMMUNITY PLANS TO ARRANGE FOR A FOURTH BUS TO LEAVE DURING TOMORROW (26 SEPTEMBER) . I SHALL BE INFORMING MY EC COLLEAGUES OF THIS AT A MEETING LATER TODAY AND TELLING THEM THAT THIS BUS MAY HAVE A FEW SEATS FREE FOR THEIR WOMEN AND CHILDREN (BUT NOT MALES).

5. WILL TELEGRAPH AGAIN ABOUT DEPARTURE OF FOURTH BUS.

6. MIFT CONTAINS LIST OF THOSE WHO LEFT TODAY.

EGERTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD		ADDITIONAL DISTN.
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NENAD	TRED	
NAD	ERD	
UND	ECON D	
EESD	CONS D	
ECD	CONS EM UNIT	
WED	CABINET OFFICE	

RESTRICTED

CYPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

LVO 301

FDW G 71/26

00 BELGRADE DESKBY 260700Z

GR 155
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 260700Z
FROM FCO 260122Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIAT BELGRADE (FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 227 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1359 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATESECRETARY.

SECRETARY OF STATES MEETING WITH MR MUSKIE, 25 SETEPMBER IN NEW YORK

MIPT: (NOT TO ALL).

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE UN MUST BE SEEN TO AQACT. BUT FOR THE WESTERN FIVE TO PUSH FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING COULD CAUSE THE NON-ALIGNED TO PULL BACK. IN MCHENRY'S WORDS, THERE WAS A LONG QUEUE OF PEOPLE PRESSING FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, BUT NO-ONE WAS IN FRONT. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE SITUATION WOULD BE GREATLY CLARIFIED AFTER WALDHEIM'S PRELIMINARY CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQI REPRESENTATIVE, MR KITTANI, WHO WAS ALSO DUE TO SEE THE RUSSIANS THIS MORNING. WALDHEIM WAS ALSO TRYING TO GET IN TOUCH WITH BANI SADR BY TELEPHONE, THOUGH WITHOUT SUCCESS SO FAR. THE AMERICANS FEARED THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD WANT NOTHING TO DO WITH THE UN.

2. FOR DISCUSSION ON SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS EMBARGO, SEE MIFT.

CARRINGTON

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CYPHER

0545/26

IMMEDIATE ADVANCE COPY

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
HD/CONS D
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

25 Sept by ASM - word by telephone

RESTRICTED
FM STOCKHOLM 2513412 SEPTEMBER 1980
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 178 OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1980
FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM SWEDISH EMBASSY BRITISH INTEREST SECTION TEHRAN ADDRESSED PRIORITY FCO TELNO 4 OF 24 SEPTEMBER.
IRAN-IRAQ DISPUTE.
1. WE HAVE HAD NO REPORTS OF BRITISH SUBJECTS IN IRAN SUFFERING DEATH OR INJURY.
2. WE HAVE REGISTRATION CARDS FOR THREE BRITISH SUBJECTS IN ABADAN.
(A) MR NISRAT KIRMANI. PPT 4940625 ISSUED PETERBOROUGH 9 SEPTEMBER 1978. PLUS WIFE AND TWO CHILDREN (NATIONALITY UNKNOWN).
(B) MR DAVID ANTHONY NORMAN. PPT L 010257A 25 APRIL 1975.
(C) MISS CYNTHIA MARY WILSON PPT 952798 LONDON MARCH 1972
TELEPHONE LINES TO ABADAN ARE OUT. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONTACT ABOVE TO ENQUIRE AFTER WELL-BEING.
3. ACCORDING TO RECORDS THERE ARE NOW NO BRITISH SUBJECTS IN KHORRAMSHAH.
MURRAY

NNNN

13a

LVO 286/26

FDW G 23/26

OO ATHENS

OO ANKARA

OO BELGRADE

GRS6ØØ

CYPHER

SECRET

SECRET
BURNING BUSH
ECLIPSE
FROM F C O 251855Z SEP 8Ø
TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 174 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE ANKARA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)
BELGRADE (FOR FERGUSSON/DAUNT)

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF SED WAS RECEIVED FROM UKDEL NATO TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 TO UKMIS NEW YORK OF 24 SEPTEMBER.

ATHENS TELNO 4 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: GREEK REINTEGRATION.

1. I AM SURE THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL BEAR IN MIND THAT:
(A) WHAT ROGERS TOLD ME ON 16 SEPTEMBER ABOUT HIS EFFORTS WAS GIVEN IN CONFIDENCE THAT IT WOULD BE HANDLED ON A VERY RESTRICTED BASIS AND NOT PASSED ON TO ANY OF OUR ALLIES. (HE MENTIONED ESPECIALLY THE AMERICANS, TO WHOM HE CLAIMS TO HAVE PROVIDED VERY LITTLE INFORMATION):
(B) THE FRENCH ARE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE PROBLEM OF GREEK REINTEGRATION, NOT BEING MEMBERS OF THE DPC, AND IT WOULD THEREFORE BE DIFFICULT, IN ALLIANCE TERMS, TO ASSOCIATE THEM WITH ANY ARRANGEMENTS FOR POLITICAL MONITORING OF ROGERS' ACTIVITIES.

2. THE ABOVE SAID, THE LINE TAKEN WITH THE PRIME MINISTER BY GREEK MINISTERS (ATHENS TELNO 256 TO FCO) CONVEYS A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT IMPRESSION OF THE SITUATION FROM THE ONE I HAD FROM ROGERS. I THEREFORE SPOKE TO HIM BY SECURE TELEPHONE THIS AFTERNOON AND, AS AUTHORISED IN THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, TOLD HIM IN CONFIDENCE OF THE LINE TAKEN BY RALLIS AND HIS COLLEAGUES. ROGERS AGREED WITH ME THAT THIS LINE WAS INCONSISTENT BOTH WITH WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME PREVIOUSLY AND WITH HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION NOW. THE POSITION IS THAT EVREN WAS NOT ABLE TO MEET ROGERS, AS HAD BEEN PLANNED, BECAUSE OF THE TURKISH COUP BUT, AT EVREN'S REQUEST, ROGERS SENT HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ANKARA AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS THE LATEST TEXT. AS A MATTER OF DETAIL, THERE WERE SEVEN WORDS IN THE TEXT WHICH THE TURKS WANTED THE GREEKS TO ELIMINATE AND THREE WORDS WHICH THE GREEKS WANTED THE TURKS TO ELIMINATE. THE WORDS INVOLVED ARE IMPORTANT TO EACH PARTY, BUT THIS IS THE FOCUS OF THE CURRENT DISCUSSIONS. SO FAR AS ROGERS IS CONCERNED THE PROCESS IS STILL CONTINUING AND HE DOES NOT ADMIT THAT AN IMPASSE HAD BEEN REACHED. IN FACT, EVREN HAS ASKED HIM TO MEET HIS, EVREN'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TOMORROW EVENING (25 SEPTEMBER) AT THE END OF A VISIT WHICH ROGERS IS PAYING TO EXERCISE ANVIL EXPRESS. ROGERS ASSURED ME THAT IF HE REACHED THE POINT WHERE IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS, HE WOULD REPORT PERSONALLY TO LUNS SO THAT CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN AS TO WHAT STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN. I IMPRESSED ON HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF DOING THIS BEFORE THERE WAS ANY QUESTION OF A FINAL BREACH BECOMING PUBLIC.

SECRET

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONCLUSIONS THE GREEKS HAVE EVIDENTLY DRAWN FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID TO THEIR AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA (PARAGRAPH 4 OF ATHENSTELNO 256). I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT TURKMAN MIGHT HAVE SAID THAT THE TURKS FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THE LATEST GREEK LANGUAGE AND THAT, AFTER THE CONFIDENCE EXPRESSED BY MITSOTAKIS TO H M AMBASSADOR (PARAGRAPH 2 OF ATHENS TELNO 247), THE GREEKS WOULD HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED. BUT, IN VIEW OF THEIR EVIDENT WISH TO KEEP THE DIALOGUE WITH ROGERS GOING, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT TURKS WOULD HAVE INTENDED THIS TO BE INTERPRETED AS IMPLYING ANYTHING APPROACHING AN IMPASSE. ONE CANNOT EXONERATE EITHER SIDE FROM SEEKING TO EXERT POLITICAL PRESSURE OVER THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WHENEVER THE OPPORTUNITY ARISES, AND I CANNOT HELP FEELING THAT THE GREEKS MAY HAVE SEEN SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

4. SINCE DRAFTING THE ABOVE I HAVE SEEN BELGRADE TELEGRAM NO 237 WITH THE TEXT OF RALLIS MESSAGE TO CARTER. THIS MAKES ME WONDER WHETHER GENERAL GRATSIOS HAS BEEN FULLY REFLECTING THE CURRENT VIEWS OF HIS POLITICAL MASTERS IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SACEUR'S REPRESENTATIVE. THIS MESSAGE SEEMS TO TAKE US STRAIGHT BACK TO GREEK INSISTENCE ON THE ALLEGED QUOTE HAIG/DAVOS UNQUOTE AGREEMENT.

ATHENS TELNO 4 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: GREEK REINTEGRATION.

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CARRINGTON

SECRET

NO 10 DOWNING ST 2 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 350
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BRITNAVAT MUSCAT 250928Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK NAVY
TELEGRAM NUMBER LAA/UAJ OF 250928Z SEPTEMBER
AND TO CINCFLEET, FCO
INFO PRIORITY CTG 318.0, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN,
ABU DHABI, DUBAI

FOR DNOT. FCO MED.
STRAITS OF HORMUZ. SITREP 250900Z SEP.

1. OVERALL SITUATION UNCHANGED. TRAFFIC REMAINS NORMAL. OMAN NAVY HQ AND PATROL BOATS STILL RECEIVING MANY CALLS FOR REASSURANCE FROM SHIPPING COMPANIES AND SHIPS IN TRANSIT AS RESULT OF NEWS BULLETINS FROM BBC OVERSEAS SERVICE AND OTHERS . WOULD APPRECIATE CORRECTION OF BBC INPUT IF POSSIBLE.

2. APPRECIATION IRANIAN OPERATIONS.
A. PATROL NORTH OF GREAT QUOIN ISLAND. THIS IS ASSESSED AS DUAL ROLE. SEAWARD DEFENCE BANDAR ABBAS AND NOMINAL INTERCEPTION IRAQI MERCHANT SHIPS. NOT EFFECTIVE IN LATTER ROLE AND SUSPECT IN FORMER. WHEN CHALLENGED YESTERDAY AN IRAQI MERCHANT SHIP IN OMANI WATERS ADMITTED ITS NATIONALITY BUT NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BY IRANIANS. THIS IS IN KEEPING WITH IRANIAN RELUCTANCE TO TAKE DECISIONS OR DO ANYTHING POSITIVE WHICH MIGHT LAY THEM OPEN TO CRITICISM. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE PROBABLY GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS HASTY ACTIONS BY INEXPERIENCED COMMANDING OFFICERS CANNOT BE RULED OUT.

B. ABU MUSA/TUNBS PATROL. ASSESSED AS DUAL ROLE SHIPPING INTERCEPTION AND DEFENCE ISLANDS AGAINST IRAQI AMPHIBOUS ASSAULT. IRANIANS HAVE MOVED SEPARATION ROUTES TWELVE MILES SOUTH OF ABU MUSA PRESUMABLY TO GIVE THEM CLEAR RADAR ZONE TO EASE DETECTION OF POSSIBLE HOSTILES. ALL MERCHANT SHIPS ARE BEING CALLED AND WARNED TO KEEP WELL TO THE SOUTH OF THE ISLANDS AND NOT TO PROCEED TO IRAQI PORTS. NO EVIDENCE OF ANY INTERCEPTION OF IRAQI SHIPS OR INTERFERENCE WITH MOVEMENT OF TRAFFIC WHICH REMAINS NORMAL.

3. ACTION BY OMAN NAVY. IN THE EVENT OF AN INCIDENT INVOLVING AN IRANIAN WARSHIP AND A MERCHANT SHIP OF ANY NATIONALITY IN OMANI WATERS OMANI PATROL CRAFT WOULD TAKE NO OFFENSIVE ACTION. IRANIANS WOULD BE WARNED, THE INCIDENT REPORTED AND RECORDED AND FOLLOED UP BY DIPLOMATIC PROTEST. OMAN DOES NOT WANT TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

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IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD	
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ADDITIONAL DISTN.
IRAQ/IRAN

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00 BELGRADE

00 CARACAS

00 TOKYO

CONFIDENTIAL

TRS 545
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 25 161000Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR PS/SOFS)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 773 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE (FOR PS/PM)
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, CARACAS, PARIS, BONN, TOKYO,
UKDEL OECD, UKREP BRUSSELS

IRAN/IRAQ: OIL SITUATION

1. ALTHOUGH THE SERIOUS PRESS IS TAKING A BALANCED VIEW, THERE HAVE BEEN MORE ALARMIST REPORTS ELSEWHERE ABOUT OIL SUPPLIES. THE FOLLOWING POINTS MAY HELP TO PUT THE SITUATION IN PERSPECTIVE

I) TWO BRITISH SHIPS ARE STILL BLOCKED IN THE SHATT EL ARAB, THE GULF HERON IN BASRA AND THE ALTAMEN 4 MILES OFF KHORRAMSHAHR. NO EVIDENCE OF HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST TRAFFIC IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ ALTHOUGH THE IRANIANS ARE STOPPING VESSELS PASSING NEAR THE ISLANDS TO CHECK THEIR BUSINESS. THE IRANIAN INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ROUTE TO BE FOLLOWED WEST OF THE ISLANDS COULD IN SOME AREAS LEAVE VERY LARGE CRUDE CARRIERS (VLCC'S) WITH INSUFFICIENT CLEARANCE AND SOME TANKERS ARE REPORTED TO BE RESTRICTING THEIR LOADS. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF THE IRANIAN INSTRUCTIONS. GENERAL COUNCIL OF BRITISH SHIPPING (GCBS) ARE TRYING TO CLARIFY POSITION THROUGH BP. LLOYDS' ACTION IN INCREASING THE WAR RISKS PREMIUM THROUGHOUT THE GULF IS ALSO REPORTED TO BE DETERRING SOME FOREIGN VESSELS INCLUDING TANKERS FROM ENTERING THE STRAITS. BRITISH VESSELS HAVE FEWER PROBLEMS AS THE P AND I CLUBS WAR RISKS SCHEME WHICH APPLIES ONLY TO UK REGISTERED SHIPS, CONTINUES TO PROVIDE COVER EXCEPT IN BOX ZONE EXTENDING 50 MILES SOUTH OF THE SHATT EL ARAB ESTUARY: UK SHIPPING TO KUWAIT AND OTHER PORTS ON THE SOUTHERN COAST OF THE GULF IS THEREFORE NOT AFFECTED.

II) THE IEA ARE KEEPING THE SITUATION UNDER CLOSE REVIEW BUT DO NOT INTEND TO HOLD AN EMERGENCY MEETING AT THIS STAGE. THE SECRETARIAT HAS ASKED MEMBER STATES TO URGE RESTRAINT ON COMPANIES TO AVOID A SURGE IN PRICES.

III) THE COMPANIES THEMSELVES HAVE SO FAR TAKEN A RELAXED VIEW. NEITHER BP NOR SHELL NOW HAVE VESSELS IN THE DANGER AREA, AND HAVE NO FURTHER SCHEDULED LIFTINGS FOR AT LEAST A WEEK.

IV) AT PRESENT NO WESTERN COMPANIES ARE LIFTING IRANIAN OR IRAQI OIL FROM THE GULF: THIS REPRESENTS A LOSS OF SUPPLY OF ABOUT 2 MILLION BARRELS PER DAY (MBPD).

V) SOME HARDENING IN PRODUCT PRICES ON THE SPOT MARKET BUT LEVEL OF ACTIVITY HAS REMAINED LOW.

VI) IT WOULD TAKE ABOUT A MONTH FOR SUPPLY SITUATION TO BE AFFECTED BECAUSE OF STEAMING TIME.

VII) STOCKS ARE VERY HIGH, ABOUT 100 DAYS IN MOST CONSUMING COUNTRIES.

VIII) UK'S DIRECT DEPENDENCE ON SUPPLIES FROM KUWAIT, IRAN AND IRAQ IS SMALL, MAXIMUM LOSS OF 300,000 BPD.

2. NOTHING, THEREFORE, HAS HAPPENED SO FAR WHICH CAUSES SERIOUS TROUBLE FOR OIL SUPPLIES. IF UPPER GULF SUPPLIES WERE CUT OUT FOR ONE OR TWO MONTHS, WITH THE ACCUMULALATION OF STOCKS AND SURPLUS PRODUCTION, THERE SHOULD BE NO REAL DIFFICULTIES. BUT THE LONGER THE SITUATION PERSISTED THE WIDER THE MEASURES OF DEMAND RESTRAINT WOULD HAVE TO BE. IF OTHER GULF SUPPLIES WERE AFFECTED, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF SAUDI ARABIA, (15-16 MBPD NORMALLY PASS FROM THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ) THERE WOULD BE NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON SUPPLIES BUT THE SITUATION WOULD BE VERY SERIOUS IN THE MEDIUM TERM. HOWEVER, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS COULD LEAD TO A DAMAGING DECLINE IN CONFIDENCE, LEADING TO A RAPID AND SHARP RISE IN PRICES, EVEN THOUGH THE ACTUAL SITUATION DID NOT SEEM TO WARRANT THIS.

CARRINGTON

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CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 65
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 251040Z SEPT 80
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 323 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT

YOUR TEL 431 PARA TWO : BRITISH SUBJECTS IN BASRAH AREA

1. WE AGREE. BUT YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT THE FINAL DECISION MUST BE LEFT TO INDIVIDUALS. IF THEY DECIDE THEY HAVE NO IMPORTANT REASON TO STAY AND THEY JUDGE THERE IS NO DANGER THEY SHOULD MAKE FOR KUWAIT BY ROAD.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN

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PP MOSCOW

GR 350

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SECRET
DESKBY BELGRADE 260700Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260051Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1380 OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1980
AND TO BELGRADE (FOR ALEXANDER)
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, WASHINGTON.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

M I P T MUSKIE'S TALK WITH GROMYKO

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF U S NON-PAPER HANDED TO GROMYKO
BEGINS

IN OUR VARIOUS EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST/PERSIAN GULF REGION, WE HAVE EACH RECOGNISED THE POTENTIAL DANGERS OF THE AREA TO THE PEACE OF THE WORLD, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND MISINTERPRETATIONS OF EACH OTHER'S ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS. THIS APPLIES PARTICULARLY TO THE MILITARY BUILDUP THAT HAS BEEN TAKING PLACE IN THE AREA.

LET ME REMIND YOU THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAS MADE CLEAR THAT VITAL INTERESTS OF THE U.S. ARE INVOLVED IN THE REGION OF THE PERSIAN GULF. ANY MILITARY ATTEMPT TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE PERSIAN GULF AREA, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY SOVIET MILITARY ACTION IN IRAN, COULD LEAD TO A DIRECT MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S.

IT WOULD BE A PROFOUND MISTAKE TO DISMISS OUR DECLARATION THAT OUR INTERESTS IN THIS AREA ARE VITAL TO US. FROM YOUR OWN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS, THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS AREA TO US AND OUR ALLIES SHOULD BE CLEAR AND UNMISTAKEABLE. THEREFORE, WE WANT THE SOVIET UNION TO BE FULLY AWARE OF THE INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIRECT MILITARY CONFRONTATION OF THE GREAT POWERS IN THE AREA.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WISH TO REAFFIRM THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NO INTENTION OF INVADING IRAN OR INTERVENING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN OR ANY OTHER STATE IN THE AREA. I STATE FLATLY THAT WE HAVE NO OFFENSIVE INTENTIONS ANYWHERE IN THE REGION. BY THE SAME TOKEN WE WOULD EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ADDITIONAL MILITARY MOVES INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE INDEPENDENT STATES IN THE REGION.

GIVEN THE INSTABILITIES AND VOLATILE TENSIONS OF THE AREA, IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE COMMUNICATION AS CONDITIONS MAY CHANGE, TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF MISCALCULATION OR MISINTERPRETATION OF EACH OTHER'S INTENTIONS.
ENDS

PARSONS

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DESKBY BELGRADE 260700Z
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 260050Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1379 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
AND TO BELGRADE (FOR ALEXANDER)
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
MUSKIE'S TALK WITH GROMYKO, 25 SEPTEMBER.

1. MUSKIE HAD A BRIEF PERSONAL WORD WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO. HE DESCRIBED THE TALK AS RELAXED. GROMYKO HAD MADE A DELIBERATE EFFORT TO BE FRIENDLY, AND EVEN WHEN HE HAD BEEN HARD-HITTING, THERE HAD BEEN NO ABUSE. HE HAD BEEN STARTLED TO RECEIVE A ''NON-PAPER'' FROM MUSKIE ON THE STATE OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE DANGER OF POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS, AND HAD ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS PART OF THE CONVERSATION. (TEXT IN MIFT WAS GIVEN TO LORD CARRINGTON PERSONALLY BY MUSKIE AND SHOULD BE TREATED IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE). MUSKIE EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT GROMYKO WOULD NOT LEAK. HE COMMENTED THAT GROMYKO SEEMED TO HAVE ACQUIRED SOME CONFIDENCE IN HIS OWN (MUSKIE'S) STRAIGHT-FORWARDNESS.

2. ON AFGHANISTAN, MUSKIE HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT GROMYKO'S INSISTENCE ON A FULL DISCUSSION. GROMYKO HAD RESTATED THE AFGHAN 14 MAY PROPOSALS IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE THEM SEEM MORE LIBERAL AND FORTHCOMING THAN THEY REALLY WERE. MUSKIE INTERPRETED THIS AS A SIGN THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE DETERMINED TO GET THE AFGHAN ISSUE BEHIND THEM SOMEHOW.

3. COD PLEASE CONSULT PRIVATE OFFICE ON DISTRIBUTION.

4. SEE M I F T.

PARSONS

GR 650

UNCLASSIFIED
FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 251850Z SEPT 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1365 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
AND TO C O I
INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TOKYO PEKING BAGHDAD WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM JEDDA KUWAIT ABU DHABI DAMASCUS
AMMAN MUSCAT ANKARA MOSCOW

FOLLOWING FROM HEAD OF NEWS DEPARTMENT IN NEW YORK.
1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE GAVE AN INTERVIEW TO MARTIN BELL OF BBC TV NEWS THIS MORNING. FOLLOWING IS EDITED TRANSCRIPT.
Q: LORD CARRINGTON, WHAT WAS THE REASON FOR YOUR DECISION TO STAY ON HERE?
A: I THINK ITS POSSIBLE THERE MAY BE A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING EITHER THIS AFTERNOON OR PERHAPS TOMORROW, AND IN ANY EVENT THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF DISCUSSION GOING ON BEHIND THE SCENES. I THOUGHT IT WAS RIGHT FOR ME TO STAY ON RATHER THAN GO RATHER A LONG WAY AWAY WHERE THE ACTION ISNT.
Q: HAS ANYTHING USEFUL COME OUT OF YOUR MEETINGS WITH SECRETARY OF STATE MUSKIE THIS MORNING AND WITH THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER?
A: WELL, WE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION AND WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES WERE. I THINK THAT MOST OF US FEEL THAT THERE OUGHT TO BE AMEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, EVEN THOUGH WHAT MAY COME OUT OF IT IS PERHAPS RATHER DOUBTFUL. CERTAINLY THE UNITED NATIONS REALLY MUST TRY TO DO SOMETHING TO STOP A WAR BETWEEN TWO OF ITS MEMBERS. THERE IS A SPILL OVER OF PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE WAR, NOT LEAST WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE GULF, THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. SO THERE IS QUITE A LOT TO TALK ABOUT, AND I THINK IT WAS USEFUL THAT WE MANAGED TO TALK ABOUT IT THIS MORNING.
Q: HAS THERE BEEN ANY DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS OF CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A JOINT NAVAL TASK FORCE OF SOME KIND?
A: NO. I DONT THINK THATS THE PROBLEM. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM REALLY IS NOT THAT THERE IS GOING TO BE A PHYSICAL BLOCKADE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. I THINK THE DIFFICULTY MAY ARISE - I DONT THINK ITS ARISEN YET - THAT THE AREA MAY BE CALLED A WAR AREA, OR THE IRANIANS MAY SAY ITS NOT SAFE TO GO THROUGH, AND THERE WILL BE A DISINCLINATION OF SHIPPING COMPANIES AND TANKER COMPANIES TO SEND THEIR SHIPS IN TO THE GULF, AND CONSEQUENTLY THERE WILL NOT ONLY BE A LOSS OF OIL FROM IRAQ AND IRAN, BUT ALSO FROM THE OTHER GULF STATES. THIS IS THE PROBLEM AND THIS IS WHAT WE ARE THINKING ABOUT.
Q: IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS AND CALLS FOR A CEASEFIRE, DO YOU THINK THATS GOING TO DO ANY GOOD?
A: ITS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY AT THE MOMENT. IT DEPENDS UPON THE SITUATION IT DEPENDS IF THE IRANIANS AND IRAQIS ARE READY TO HAVE A CEASEFIRE

/BUT

BUT EVEN IF NOT I AM QUITE SURE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL OUGHT TO TAKE ACTION. THERE ARE OTHER WAYS OF GOING FORWARD: THERE IS THE APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR FOR EXAMPLE, EITHER BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL: AND THEN THERE ARE THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, WHICH IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS, SINCE BOTH THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED ARE MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. ALL THIS REALLY IS HAPPENING IN NEW YORK, AND THATS WHY I THINK ITS NECESSARY TO STAY.

Q: BRITAINS ROLE BEING WHAT?

A: OUR ROLE BEING THAT WE ARE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THAT WE ARE - LIKE THE WHOLE OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND THE WORLD GENERALLY - INVOLVED IN WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES MAY BE IF THIS WAR IS NOT STOPPED. WE SHALL DO OUR BEST TO HELP BRING AN END TO THE WAR AND TO GET A MEDIATION GOING.

BELL: THANK YOU LORD CARRINGTON.

PARSONS

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD		ADDITIONAL DISTN.
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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 251820 Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1364 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS BONN JEDDA ISLAMABAD
BAGHDAD AMMAN DAMASCUS MOSCOW KUWAIT

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER

IRAN/IRAQ

1. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT IRAN HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO REVIEW THE HOSTAGES QUESTION ON 28 SEPTEMBER AND TO ACCEPT A CONTACT FROM THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. BUT SHE HAD NOT RESPONDED TO THE IRAQI DEMAND THAT SHE SURRENDER THE DISPUTED TERRITORIES AND THE ISLANDS. ASKED ABOUT IRAQ'S OBJECTIVES, SAUD SAID THAT THESE INCLUDED THE OVERTHROW OF KHOMEINI AND BANI SADR. THE IRAQIS PROBABLY HAD NOT THOUGHT WHOM TO INSTAL INSTEAD, BUT THEY MIGHT BELIEVE THAT ANY CHANGE WOULD BE FOR THE BETTER. ELEMENTS OF THE IRANIAN OPPOSITION WERE IN TOUCH WITH BAGHDAD.

2. SAUD ASKED ABOUT THE SOVIET ATTITUDE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT GROMYKO ON 23 SEPTEMBER HAD SEEMED UNCERTAIN WHERE THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE LAY. BUT THEY WOULD NOT WANT THEIR CREDIBILITY AS ARMS SUPPLIERS THREATENED: THEY MIGHT THEREFORE WANT TO STOP THE FIGHTING BUT WITH A SLIGHT BIAS TOWARDS IRAQ.

3. SAUD ASKED HOW IRAN COULD IMPLEMENT HER THREAT TO STOP SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE DANGER LAY NOT SO MUCH IN THIS POSSIBILITY AS IN THE RISK THAT TANKERS WOULD SIMPLY STAY AWAY FROM PORTS IN IRAQ AND IRAN. WE COULD NOT STOP THIS HAPPENING, BUT WE COULD TRY TO HELP THEM CONTINUE TO CALL AT OTHER PORTS IN THE GULF. IDEAS DISCUSSED WITH THE AMERICANS HAD INCLUDED THAT OF GOVERNMENTAL WAR RISK INSURANCE. THIS SEEMED A BETTER PROSPECT THAN THE CONVOY SCHEME. SAUD THOUGHT THAT THE LATTER WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.

4. SAUD SAID THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD WELCOME MORE INFORMATION BOTH ABOUT THE MILITARY THREAT AND ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF TANKER OWNERS, INSURANCE COMPANIES ETC. HE ASKED THAT THIS BE PROVIDED IN JEDDA. LORD CARRINGTON AGREED. (HE IS MOST ANXIOUS THAT THIS SHOULD BE SET IN TRAIN FORTHWITH.)

5. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE UN SO FAR HAD BEEN EXTRAORDINARILY FEEBLE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND A MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO PROPOSE A MEETING. EACH HAD HIS REASONS

/FOR

FOR DECLINING: IN THE BRITISH CASE IT WAS A DESIRE NOT TO POLARISE THE CRISIS INTO AN EAST/WEST PROBLEM. WAS PRINCE SAUD OPOSED TO A MEETING? SAUD SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY, HE SAW NO ALTERNATIVE. THE RISKS OF THE SITUATION WERE OBVIOUS. THE IRAQIS WOULD NOT BE AVERSE TO A RESOLUTION SO LONG AS IT DID NOT INCLUDE A CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL TO THE ORIGINAL FRONTIER. THE BEST MEDIATOR MIGHT BE THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. THERE WAS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THIS AND LORD CARRINGTON'S SUGGESTION THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD AT LEAST MEET AND SIMPLY CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE.

PAKISTAN

6. LORD CARRINGTON EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT AGHA SHAHI'S ATTITUDE AND HIS POSITION OF INCREASING LONELINESS. PRINCE SAUD AGREED. PAKISTAN WAS UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE AND DID NOT FEEL SECURE EXTERNALLY OR INTERNALLY. THE SUGGESTION OF A CONFERENCE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO QUIETEN THINGS DOWN, BUT IT WAS DANGEROUS AND USELESS. HOWEVER AGHA SHAHI HAD PROMISED TO TAKE NO FURTHER STEPS UNTIL PRESIDENT ZIA HAD ARRIVED AND DISCUSSED MATTERS WITH THE SAUDIS. SAUD AGREED THAT WE SHOULD STAY IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH ABOUT HOW TO PREVENT THE PAKISTANI ATTITUDE SLIPPING FURTHER AND NOT ALLOW THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM TO BE ECLIPSED.

PARSONS

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD		ADDITIONAL DISTN.
MED	MAED	IRAQ/IRAN
NENAD	TRED	
NAD	ERD	
UND	ECON D	
EESD	CONS D	
ECD	CONS EM UNIT	
WED	CABINET OFFICE	

IRAN/IRAQ

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPIES 19 22

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
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HD/DEF D
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NEWS D
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM ABU DHABI 250740Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 298 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE DUBAI MODUK BAGHDAD UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON
PRIORITY BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA KUWAIT TRIPOLI AND MUSCAT
SAVING TO BONN PARIS UKREP BRUSSELS AND MOSCOW.

IMMEDIATE

DUBAI TELEGRAM NO 29 OF 24 SEPTEMBER AND MY TELEGRAM NO 297 OF 24 SEPTEMBER (NOT TO ALL):

IRAN/IRAQ

1. I SAW THE UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THIS MORNING. HIS MAIN THEME WAS THAT THE UAE WANTED TO STAY OUT. HE HAD NO PARTICULAR NEWS TO IMPART ABOUT THE SITUATION.

2. JARWAN WAS WELL AWARE THAT THE RECOVERY DDOF THE ISLANDS WAS A DECLARED AND OFFICIAL AIM OF THE IRAQIS.
(THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR SAID THE SAME TO ME LAST NIGHT).
I ASKED HIM OUT-RIGHT WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE RULER OF RAS

(THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR SAID THE SAME TO ME LAST NIGHT).
I ASKED HIM OUT-RIGHT WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE RULER OF RAS AL KHAIMAH HAD ENTERED INTO SOME DEAL WITH THE IRAQIS WHILE HE WAS IN BAGHDAD. HE SAID THAT SAROUR (WHO SOMETIMES ACTS AS A SUPER-NUMERARY FOREIGN SECRETARY THESE DAYS) HAD TAXED SAQR WITH THIS YESTERDAY AND THAT SAQR HAD DENIED IT STRENUOUSLY, AS ~~HE~~ JARWAN SAID, HOWEVER, ''WITH SAQR YOU NEVER KNOW''.

3. HE THEN SHOWED ME A NOTE FROM THE LIBYAN EMBASSY WHICH CALLED ON QADDAFIS BEHALF FOR THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO HOLD AN EMERGENCY SESSION IN TRIPOLI TO PRESERVE PEACE AND PREVENT A WAR BETWEEN ISLAMIC BRETHREN. HE THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO GO TO SUCH A MEETING.

4. I TOLD JARWAN THAT IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN TOUCH. I WAS AT HIS DISPOSAL AT ANY HOUR. HE THANKED ME AND SAID THAT THE SAME APPLIED TO HIM.

5. ALL IN ALL, I AM SATISFIED THAT THE UAE ''AUTHORITIES'' ARE DETERMINED TO STAY OUT IF THEY CAN: BUT THEY ARE NO MORE SURE ABOUT WHAT SAQR MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE DONE THAN WE CAN BE

6. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BONN PARIS UKREP BRUSSELS AND MOSCOW

ROBERTS
BT

NNNN

GRS 380

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 251715Z SEPT 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1361 OF 25 SEPTEMBER.
INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG, TOKYO, PEKING, BAGHDAD, AND PRIORITY STOCKHOLM.

FOLLOWING FROM HEAD OF NEWS DEPARTMENT IN NEW YORK.

IRAN/IRAQ: SECRETARY OF STATES MOVEMENTS.

1. I HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT THIS MORNING ON THE RECORD: QUOTE IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION ON THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS, LORD CARRINGTON HAS DECIDED TO POSTPONE FOR THE MOMENT HIS DEPARTURE FOR HONG KONG. UNQUOTE.

2. UNATTRIBUTABLY, IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, I AM TAKING THE FOLLOWING LINE.

(A) HE HAS NOT AT THIS TAGE CANCELLED HIS VISIT TO HONG KONG. HE WILL KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER REVIEW. THERE IS NO QUESTIONS OF CHANGING THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS VISITS TO TOKYO (29 SEPTEMBER) AND PEKING (2 OCTOBER). HE WOULD BE VERY SORRY TO MISS HONG KONG THIS TIME, IF IT CAME TO THAT, BUT HE HAS OF COURSE BEEN THERE BEFORE AS FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THERE IS NO CURRENT CRUCIAL MATTER TO DISCUSS. IN VIEW OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE THINKS IT RIGHT TO STAY HERE FOR THE MOMENT.

Q: WHAT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UN?
A: THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAY MEET URGENTLY. THE SITUATION SHOULD BE CLEARER IN A FEW HOURS.

Q: WILL THE UK CALL THE COUNCIL?
A: I WOULD NOT EXPECT US TO DO SO ALONE, BUT WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT A NUMBER OF STATES MIGHT DO SO.

Q: WHAT WILL THE COUNCIL DO?
A: WE SHALL BE WORKING FOR A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS.

Q: PROSPECTS FOR MEDIATION? (WHICH LORD CARRINGTON HAS MENTIONED PUBLICLY).
A: THERE ARE MANY WAYS IN WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAY BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. MEDIATION IS ONE. THERE IS ALSO THE PROVISION FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERALS GOOD OFFICES.

/a.

RESTRICTED

Q: IS THERE EVIDENCE THAT THE PARTIES ARE READY FOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION?

A: A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ, MR KITTANI, ARRIVED IN NEW YORK LAST NIGHT. THE IRAQIS HAVE WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL INDICATING THEIR READINESS TO EXPLAIN THEIR VIEWS. I HAVE NO READING TODAY ON THE VIEWS OF IRAN.

FOR HONG KONG.

3. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE POSITION TO THE JOURNALISTS AS THEY ARRIVE. WE SHALL KEEP YOU CLOSELY POSTED ON OUR MOVEMENTS AS SOON AS DECISIONS ARE TAKEN. YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 6, PARA 4. YES. I WILL BE GLAD TO MEET THE UK PRESS WHEN WE ARRIVE, IF WE ARRIVE (AND IF THE HOUR IS NOT TOO BARBARIC).

PARSONS

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD		ADDITIONAL DISTN.
MED	MAED	IRAQ/IRAN
NENAD HRCD	TRED	
NAD	ERD PCD	
UND	ECON D	
EESD	CONS D	
ECD	CONS EM UNIT	
WED	CABINET OFFICE	

SECRET

SECRET

11

DESKBY BELGRADE 260500Z

FM FCO 251910Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE (FOR PS NO 10 DUTY CLERK)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 212 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
AND TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR AND SIR R. ARMSTRONG).

IRAQ/IRAN

1. MY IFT CONTAINS A DRAFT REPLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER. (TEXT IN FCO TELS NO'S 205 TO BELGRADE AND 766 TO UKMIS NEW YORK).

SO FAR AS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH, SIMILAR MESSAGE WENT TO PRESIDENT GISCARD, AND PARALLEL COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE FRG, ITALY AND JAPAN ON THE SUBJECT OF INSURANCE, ETC. HOWEVER IN THE COURSE OF A CALL TODAY ON THE LORD PRIVY SEAL, THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER MADE CLEAR THAT MUSKIE HAD PUT THESE PROPOSALS ALSO TO THE AUSTRALIANS WHEN HE MET MR PEACOCK IN NEW YORK YESTERDAY, AND IT MAY WELL BE THAT OTHERS HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY CONTACTED.).

2. AS BACKGROUND TO THE DRAFT REPLY, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WISH TO KNOW THAT THE MOD RECEIVED YESTERDAY AN ENQUIRY WHETHER WE WERE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN NAVAL STAFF TALKS ON A CONFIDENTIAL AND CONTINGENCY BASIS WITH THEMSELVES AND PROBABLY THE FRENCH. MINISTERS HERE APPROVED THIS AND THE PENTAGON WERE INFORMED EARLIER TODAY.

3. THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 2 OF THE DRAFT RELATES TO A RESTRICTED DISCUSSION AT THE QUADRIPARTITE DINNER, AN ACCOUNT OF WHICH WILL FOLLOW SEPARATELY.

4. CURRENT NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS.
A TASK GROUP OF 5 SHIPS WILL BE IN HONG KONG AS FROM 26 SEPTEMBER AND PUBLICITY WILL BE MINIMISED IF ANY DIVERSIONS ARE MADE BEFORE THEY ENTER HARBOUR. THIS REQUIRES AN IMMEDIATE DECISION.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL HAS THEREFORE AGREED WITH THE DEFENCE SECRETARY THAT ONE DESTROYER (HMS CONVENTRY) WITH A ROYAL FLEET AUXILIARY SHOULD MOVE IMMEDIATELY TOWARDS THE GULF. THEY CANNOT HOWEVER ARRIVE IN THE AREA BEFORE 7 OCTOBER. THE REMAINDER OF THE TASK GROUP WILL VISIT HONG KONG AS PLANNED. A SECOND FORCE OF 3 SHIPS IS PAYING AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO LISBON BEFORE ENTERING THE MEDITERRANEAN ON 30 SEPTEMBER TO TAKE PART IN A NATO EXERCISE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. THESE DISPOSITIONS CAN BE CHANGED IF THE SITUATION WARRANTS.

/5.

5. WE THINK THAT IF MAJOR NAVAL REDEPLOYMENTS ARE SEEN TO BE MADE AT THIS STAGE THERE COULD BE A GOOD DEAL OF SPECULATION AND THE RISK OF A DANGEROUS REACTION FROM THE IRANIANS. THE REDEPLOYMENT FROM HONG KONG IS THE LEAST NOTICEABLE AND ALSO MEETS THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION.

6. IN GENERAL, WHILE IT IS CLEARLY PRUDENT TO BE DRAWING UP CONTINGENCY PLANS AS PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT CARTER, AND TO BE MAKING DISPOSITIONS WHICH WILL PUT US IN A POSITION TO PUT THEM INTO EFFECT, WE DO HAVE SOME LEEWAY, THANKS TO OUR BUOYANT OIL STOCKS AMOUNTING TO 100 DAYS, WITH MORE IN TANKERS AT SEA. THUS IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE EFFECTS OF CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WILL BE FELT MORE QUICKLY BY SOME OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INDEED BY THE OTHER LITTORAL STATES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, SUCH AS KUWAIT AND THE EMIRATES. THE ECONOMIES OF THESE INCLUDING WATER DISTILLATION, ARE LARGELY DEPENDENT ON THE PRODUCTION OF ASSOCIATED GAS, SO THAT A CESSATION OF LIFTINGS WOULD, ONCE STORAGE TANKS ARE FULL, LEAD QUICKLY TO INCONVENIENCE AND POSSIBLY BREAKDOWN. AT THAT STAGE IT SEEMS TO US THAT, WHILE WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO COUNT ON A POSITIVE INVITATION TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF SHIPS IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, WE WOULD BE LIKELY TO RECIEVE TACIT SUPPORT WHICH WOULD GREATLY REDUCE THE RISKS INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION.

7. IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS ANY COMMENTS THEY SHOULD REACH BELGRADE BY 260500Z IN ORDER THAT THEY CAN BE CONVEYED BY THE NO 10 DUTY CLERK TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN DUBROVNIK.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED
HD/FCO
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D.
HD/PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J. GRAHAM
MR J. TOBERCY
MR BULLARD
MR P. TOBERCY
MR BLAITHWAITE

COPY TO
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

GRS 480 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW 251435Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 584 OF 25TH SEPTEMBER

FOR INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, HONG KONG (FOR PRIVATE SEC)

INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS AND BAGHDAD.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. THE RUSSIANS ARE STILL BEING CAUTIOUS IN PUBLIC, ALTHOUGH THEIR REPORTING SUGGESTS A TENDENCY TO FAVOUR IRAQ. THEY PAY LIP SERVICE TO THE NEED FOR A SETTLEMENT, BUT I WOULD NOT SAY, ON THE EVIDENCE SO FAR AVAILABLE, THAT THEY ARE PRESSING FOR ONE (PARA 7 OF YOUR TEL 500). THEY MAY WELL SUSTAIN THIS POSITION FOR SOME TIME UNLESS WESTERN ACTION IS TAKEN TO KEEP OPEN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ.

2. APART FROM THE MEDIA, THE ONLY DIRECT INDICATIONS OF SOVIET POLICY WHICH WE HAVE ARE:

(A) TWO MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY CALLED ON STANISLAV KOVRYGIN, A COUNSELLOR IN THE MFA'S MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT, ON 24 SEPTEMBER. KOVRYGIN EMPHASISED THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT CONFLICT ON HER BORDERS. THEY WISHED TO BE EVEN HANDED: AS FAR AS IRAQ WAS CONCERNED THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPLY ARMS AS FORESEEN IN THE TREATY, BUT THIS WOULD NOT BE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CAUSE ANY SPECIAL HARM TO ANY THIRD PARTY. IT WAS UP TO IRAN TO RECOGNISE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT TAKING ANY NEW INITIATIVES AGAINST IRANIAN INTERESTS. HE DID NOT BELEIVE THAT IRAQ WOULD GO SO FAR AS TO SEIZE KHUZESTAN. HOWEVER, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION WANTED A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM, THEY DID NOT BELEIVE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WAS THE APPROPRIATE FORUM: THIS WAS A BILATERAL ISSUE.

(B) THE AMERICANS ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE RECENT PRESS ARTICLES BLAMING THE WEST FOR EXPLOITING THE CONFLICT (OUR TELNO 580 REFERS), AND WERE TOLD THAT THEY SHOULD NOT ATTACH TOO MUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO WHAT INDIVIDUAL JOURNALISTS WROTE. KOVRYGIN SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION AGREED WITH PRESIDENT CARTER ON THE NEED FOR NON-INTERFERENCE, BUT THE ''OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS'' FOR US INVOLVEMENT EXISTED (PRESUMABLY A REFERENCE TO US NAVAL FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN). TODAY'S PRAVDA QUOTED A ''HUMANITE'' REPORT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE US WAS PREPARING TO INTERVENE.

(C) THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR TOLD MY INDIAN COLLEAGUE THAT AZIZ HAD COME TO MOSCOW TO INVOKE THE TREATY, AND HAD BEEN SATISFIED. HOWEVER THERE ARE WIDESPREAD REPORTS THAT PART OF AZIZ'S MISSION WAS TO ASK FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPLIES, AND THAT HE WAS REFUSED. KOVRYGIN'S COMMENT SUGGESTS AT LEAST A DEGREE OF CAUTION.

(D) QUESTIONED BY A MEMBER OF THE FRG EMBASSY AN MFA OFFICIAL INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT YET SEEKING A MEDIATORY ROLE.

(E.) MOKHARI,

CONFIDENTIAL

(E) MOKHRI, IRANIAN AMBASSADOR, TOLD MINISTER YESTERDAY THAT HIS DEMANDS THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD CONDEMN IRAQI AGGRESSION AND STOP SUPPLYING ARMS TO IRAQ HAD BEEN REJECTED. CONTINUED ARMS SUPPLY WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE RUSSIANS BY REFERENCE TO THE SOVIET-IRAQI FRIENDSHIP TREATY, BUT MOKHRI'S IMPRESSION (BASED ON UNSPECIFIED EVIDENCE) WAS THAT THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES HAD RECENTLY SLOWED DOWN. MOKHRI EMPHATICALLY REJECTED ANY IDEA OF MEDIATION BY SOVIET UNION, BUT WAS UNINFORMED ABOUT ANY OTHER MEDIATION INITIATIVES. HE NOW SEEMS TO HAVE NO REGULAR COMMUNICATION WITH TEHRAN AND RELIES ON THE BBC NEWS OF WHAT IS HAPPENING.

KEEBLE

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD		ADDITIONAL DISTN.
MED	MAED	IRAQ/IRAN
NENAD	TRED	
NAD	ERD	
UND	ECON D	
EESD	CONS D	
ECD	CONS EM UNIT	
WED	CABINET OFFICE	

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

IMMEDIATE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
HD/CONS D
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MUSCAT 250535Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 267 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
AND TO DOHA, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, JEDDA
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, ATHENS, BAGHDAD, DUBAI, ROUTINE
WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN

YOUR TELNO 194 TO ABU DHABI: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. THE ASSESSMENT IN YOUR TEL NO 76 TO DOHA HAS TO SOME EXTENT BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS (E.G. PARAGRAPH 4 ABOUT ATTACKS ON OIL INSTALLATIONS). NEVERTHELESS I HAVE NO REASON TO QUESTION THE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT IRAQI MOTIVES. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH THE OMANIS CONSIDER THE MAIN MOTIVE TO BE TERRITORIAL GAIN. IT MAY BE RELEVANT THAT AN IRAQI EMISSARY WAS HERE LAST WEEK TO DELIVER A MESSAGE FROM SADDAM HUSSAIN TO THE SULTAN. WE DO NOT KNOW THE CONTENT OF THE MESSAGE, BUT I SUPPOSE IT COULD HAVE BEEN AIMED AT REINFORCING RECENT IRAQI ATTEMPTS AT RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE GULF STATES (AND PERHAPS EVEN TO WARN THE OMANIS THAT IRAQI PATIENCE WITH IRAN WAS RUNNING OUT).

OMANIS THAT IRAQI PATIENCE WITH IRAN WAS RUNNING OUT).

2. THE OMANIS THEMSELVES SEEM DETERMINED TO TAKE A SENSIBLE LINE, ADOPTING A LOW PROFILE AND AVOIDING TAKING SIDES. THIS IS BORNE OUT BY THE TENOR OF LOCAL NEWS BROADCASTS WHICH ARE BEING CONFINED TO FACTUAL BULLETINS.

3. THE MAJOR CONCERN HERE IS NATURALLY ENOUGH THAT THE IRANIANS SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH SHIPPING IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM THE NAVAL ATTACHE'S TELEGRAM LAA/UAJ 240422Z THE IRANIAN NAVAL UNITS IN THE AREA ARE NOW BEHAVING CORRECTLY. ANY ATTEMPT BY THEM TO DENY FREEDOM OF PASSAGE WOULD PUT THE OMANIS, WHO SEE THEMSELVES AS THE GUARANTORS OF ACCESS TO THE GULF, IN AN EMBARRASSING POSITION. HOWEVER I BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD REGARD DISCRETION AS THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR AND DO THEIR BEST TO AVOID ANY INFLAMMATORY ACTION.

4. THE OMANI VIEW IS THUS ONE OF "A PLAGUE ON BOTH THEIR HOUSES" AND A FERVENT DESIRE NOT TO BE DRAWN IN. AS THEY CONTINUE TO STRESS, OMAN IS THE ONLY STATE IN THE AREA WHICH CANNOT BE BLOCKADED AT THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. IT WOULD, THEY THINK, BE IRONIC IF, AFTER THEIR ABORTIVE EFFORT LAST YEAR TO WHIP UP SUPPORT TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF THE WATERWAY, THEY SHOULD SO SOON BE PROVEN RIGHT.

TUNNELL

NNNN

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REOPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1357 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WARSAW PRIORITY MOSCOW WASHINGTON BUCHAREST PARIS SOFIA PRAGUE BONN BUDAPEST UKDEL NATO EAST BERLIN INFO SAVING BELGRADE

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER IN NEW YORK: 24 SEPTEMBER

1. CZYREK SAID THAT THE DANGER OF AN INTERNAL CONFRONTATION IN POLAND SEEMED TO HAVE PASSED. THE TROUBLES STILL OCCURRING WERE ONLY SPLINTER ACTIVITIES OR PUBLICITY-SEEKING, THE DIFFICULTIES HAD BEEN SOLVED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF POLAND'S POLITICAL SYSTEM AND A SOCIAL CONSENSUS ESTABLISHED. ALL SIDES, INCLUDING THE CHURCH, HAD SHOWN GREAT MATURITY AND RESPONSIBILITY. POLAND HAD EMERGED WITH THE SENSE OF NATIONAL UNITY STRENGTHENED, DESPITE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AS TO WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND WHY.
2. QBUT SHE NOW FACED LONG-TERM PROBLEMS OF GREAT DIFFICULTY. THE GOVERNMENT WISHED TO FULFIL ALL THEIR COMMITMENTS TO THE WORKERS, NOT ONLY IN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FIELDS BUT ALSO IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE TOWARDS THE TRADE UNIONS. THERE WAS A NEED FOR CONFIDENCE AND FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. SPECIFIC REFORMS WOULD BE REQUIRED IN POLAND'S ECONOMY, WHOSE FUNDAMENTAL SOUNDNESS HAD BEEN SPOILED MAINLY BY SUBJECTIVE MISTAKES, EG OVER5 INVESTMENT IN HEAVY INDUSTRY. THE INVESTMENT RATIO MUST BE LOWERED AND EMPHASIS ON CONSUMER GOODS AND AGRICULTURE INCREASED.
3. POLAND COUNTED ON HELP FROM SOCIALIST STATES, BUT ALSO ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF HERE WESTERN PARTNERS, ESPECIALLY THE BIGGER TRADITIONAL PARTNERS INCLUDING THE UK. THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS THAT THREE-QUARTERS OF ALL POLAND'S FOREIGN DEBT WAS DUE TO BE REPAID IN THE THREE YEARS 1981-83. IN THE NEW AND WORSE ECONOMIC SITUATION POLAND WOULD NEED EITHER TO BORROW MORE IN ORDER TO REPAY THE AMOUNTS DUE, OR, WHERE THIS WOULD BE MORE SUITABLE FOR HER PARTNERS, TO REQUEST A PROLONGATION OF THESE REPAYMENTS FOR TWO YEARS BEYOND 1983, OR BOTH.
4. POLAND DID NOT WANT A MORATORIUM. SHE WOULD LIKE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM BY BILATERAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AGREEMENTS. SHE WOULD NOT ASK FOR ANY PROLONGATION OF REPAYMENTS OF PRIVATE LOANS, BUT SHE WOULD SEEK THIS FOR CREDITS GUARANTEED BY GOVERNMENTS. CZYREK DID NOT WISH TO MENTION ANY FIGURES: HE WAS SIMPLY ASKING THE BRITISH AND OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR UNDERSTANDING. HE COULD ASSURE THEM THAT POLAND WOULD REMAIN A STABLE PARTNER AND REPAY ALL HER DEBTS IN GOOD TIME WITHOUT NARROWING HER PRESENT TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. CZYREK TRUSTED THAT TAKING THESE STEPS WOULD NOT JEOPARDISE POLAND'S POSITION ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS. SHE WANTED A SOLUTION FAVOURABLE TO HER AND TO HER PARTNERS.
5. POLAND'S POLICIES ABROAD WOULD NOT CHANGE. EVEN MORE THAN PREVIOUSLY SHE NEEDED PEACE, DETENTE AND COOPERATION. POLISH-BRITISH RELATIONS WERE GOOD AND STABLE. CZYREK LOOKED FORWARD TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT IN LATE OCTOBER.
6. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE POLES WOULD FIND CONSIDERABLE UNDERSTANDING FROM THE BRITISH AND OTHER WESTERN FRIENDS OF THE PROBLEMS THEY FACED. WE WOULD LOOK SYMPATHETICALLY AT WHAT COULD BE DONE. HE PARTICULARLY LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO POLAND. WE HAD FOLLOWED EVENTS CLOSELY, BUT HAD SOME DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING THE REASONS FOR THE EVENTS OF POLAND, AND THE SOLUTIONS REACHED. IN HIS EXPERIENCE, WHEN SOMEBODY GOT SOME CAKE THEY WANTED ANOTHER SLICE. WOULD UHE SETTLEMENT BE A FINAL SOLUTION? OR WOULD ITS IMPLEMENTATION BE MADE DIFFICULT BY THE EFFECTS OF THE STRIKES.
7. CZYREK SAID THAT THE NEW ROLE OF THE TRADE UNIONS WOULD BE LINKED TO A BILL WHICH WAS UNDER PREPARATION TO REGULATE SELF-MANAGEMENT IN FACTORIES. THE MANAGEMENT TOO MUST HAVE A ROLE, AND TRADE UNIONS MUST ACCEPT A BALANCE BETWEEN RIGHTS AND DUTIES. THE GDANSK AGREEMENTS GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NEW TRADE UNIONS WERE MAKING ALL THE DEMANDS AND OTHERS HAD TO DO THE GIVING. NO SOCIETY COULD SURVIVE THAT WAY. THE WORKERS MUST HAVE THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION, BUT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE WORKING CLASS MUST ALSO BE DEFENDED. TRADE UNIONS MUST ACCEPT OBLIGATIONS, IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. A COMMISSION, ON WHICH THE NEW TRADE UNIONISTS WERE REPRESENTED, WAS PREPARING THE BILL.
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10. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A LITTLE OF THE HISTORY OF POLATD AS WELL AS OF ITS MODERN ACHIEVEMENTS DURING HIS STAY.

FCO PASS SAVING BELGRADE

CARRINGTON

SECRET

OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR UNDERSTANDING. HE COULD ASSURE THEM THAT POLAND WOULD REMAIN A STABLE PARTNER AND REPAY ALL HER DEBTS IN GOOD TIME WITHOUT NARROWING HER PRESENT TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. CZYREK TRUSTED THAT TAKING THESE STEPS WOULD NOT JEOPARDISE POLAND'S POSITION ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS. SHE WANTED A SOLUTION FAVOURABLE TO HER AND TO HER PARTNERS.

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FCO PASS SAVING BELGRADE

CARRINGTON

SYPHER
05/20/26

NNNN

IRAN/IRAQ

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPIES 22

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
HD/CONS D
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

RESTRICTED
FM AMMAN 250805Z SEP 80
TO FLASH BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 034 OF 25 SEP
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO
YOUR TELNO 32: BRITISH COMMUNITY DEPENDANTS

1. FIRST GROUP OF ABOUT 45 PEOPLE IN DESERT BUS CHARTERED BY BRITISH CLUB HAS GOT THROUGH SAFELY AND MOST ARE NOW AT AMMAN AIRPORT MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR ONWARD JOURNEY TO LONDON (WE HAVE NO NEWS OF SECOND GROUP OF 12 REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 OF YOUR TUR). WE HAVE JUST SPOKEN TO A MR ELGEY OF THE FIRM HOUCHIN WHO WAS A MEMBER OF THE GROUP, WHICH INCLUDED A BRITISH AIRWAYS CREW AND SOME GERMAN AND IRISH CITIZENS. ONLY A FEW HAD EXIT VISAS AND THEY WERE HELD UP FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES AT RUTBA BEFORE BEING ALLOWED TO PROCEED. ELGEY'S VIEW BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THIS GROUP WAS THAT OTHER PARTIES WITHOUT EXIT VISAS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO CROSS EVEN IF ONLY AFTER SOME ARGUMENT.

2. A FEW OTHER BRITISH SUBJECTS WHO HELD EXIT VISAS AND WERE TRAVELLING IN TAXIS HAVE TRANSITED H4 EN ROUTE FOR AMMAN. ONE OF THESE (FREELAND OF WHITE HORSE DISTILLERS), WHO HAD BEEN IN BAGHDAD ON A SHORT VISIT FROM THE UK, LEFT BAGHDAD YESTERDAY MORNING IN A TAXI AND GOT THROUGH WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. WE HAVE LEARNT THAT A GROUP OF 12 AUSTRALIANS CROSSED THE FRONTIER AND ARE EXPECTED [illegible] ABOUT TWO HOURS. ALTHOUGH ONE OF THEIR TAXIS OVERTURNED

A GROUP OF 12 AUSTRALIANS CROSSED THE FRONTIER AND ARE EXPECTED IN AMMAN IN ABOUT TWO HOURS, ALTHOUGH ONE OF THEIR TAXIS OVERTURNED AND 3 ARE IN HOSPITAL IN RUTBA. WE ARE ALSO TOLD BY THE US EMBASSY HERE THAT 20 AMERICANS INCLUDING SOME EMBASSY DEPENDANTS WERE TURNED BACK AT THE FRONTIER YESTERDAY AS THEY HAD NO EXIT VISAS: THEY RETURNED TO BAGHDAD AND WERE REFUSED EXIT VISAS BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES IN BAGHDAD. A GROUP OF FRENCH CIVILIANS WORKING AS ADVISERS TO THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES ALSO REACHED AMMAN YESTERDAY FROM BAGHDAD TRAVELLING BY BUS: THEY WERE WITHOUT EXIT VISAS AND GOT THROUGH THE IRAQI FRONTIER ON THE STRENGTH OF IDENTITY CARDS ISSUED BY THE IRAQI MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

3. MINTO (CONSUL) WHO IS NOW AT H4 WITH CONSULS OF A NUMBER OF OTHER WESTERN EMBASSIES ADVISES THAT TRANSPORT FROM RUTBA ONWARDS COULD PROVE A MAJOR DIFFICULTY. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, THEREFORE, THE BEST COURSE WOULD SEEM TO BE TO CONTINUE TO RENT BUSES OR TAXIS IN BAGHDAD WHICH ARE ABLE TO MAKE THE JOURNEY THROUGH TO AMMAN. IF TRANSPORT IS REQUIRED FROM RUTBA, WE SHALL NEED TO HAVE SOME IDEA OF TIMING AND NUMBERS, AS WE SHALL ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE TO SEEK HELP FROM THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES OR POLICE TO GET THEM TO AMMAN.

4. FCO ONLY. WITH REFERENCE TO MY TELECON WITH CONSULAR DEPARTMENT LAST NIGHT, WE HAVE OF COURSE WELL IN MIND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN OFFICIALLY ASSISTED EVACUATION AND THE CUSTOMARY HELP EXTENDED TO BRITISH SUBJECTS IN NEED. HOWEVER I HOPE IT IS ALSO REALISED THAT THE JOURNEY FROM BAGHDAD TO AMMAN IS TAKING 15-17 HOURS IN PRESENT CONDITIONS AND IS MAINLY ACROSS DESERT, WITH LITTLE HELP AVAILABLE ON THE ROUTE, AND THAT THE IRAQI FRONTIER POST AT RUTBA AND THE JORDANIAN POST AT H4 ARE SOME 50KMS APART. WE ARE THEREFORE BOUND TO HAVE TO SEEK HELP FROM THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES, WHO ARE DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO HELP US ON ORDERS FROM KING HUSSEIN. IF THERE IS A GENERAL EXODUS OF THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY FROM BAGHDAD, FACILITIES HERE ARE LIKELY TO BE UNDER CONSIDERABLE STRAIN AND THE FINE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN OFFICIAL EVACUATION AND NORMAL HELP TO BRITISH SUBJECTS IN DISTRESS MAY BECOME MORE DIFFICULT TO DRAW. YOU WILL ALSO WISH TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE BRITISH PRESS IS HERE IN NUMBERS, AS WELL AS A BRITISH LIBERAL PARTY DELEGATION LED BY MR STEEL, AND THAT FAILURE TO RENDER PROPOER ASSISTANCE TO BRITISH SUBJECTS WILL WIN US IMMEDIATE ADVERSE PUBLICITY.

URWICK

NNNN

SECRET 10a

LVO 282/26

FDW F 012/25

00 SINGAPORE

PP BELGRADE

CYPHER

GRS 425
SECRET
DESKBY 260200Z
FM FCO 251835Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 839 OF 25 SEP 80
INFO IMMEDIATE SINGAPORE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR PS)
PRIORITY BONN PARIS BELGRADE (FOR PS/PM)

PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR
IRAQ/IRAN: NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS
1. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT MINISTERS HAVE DECIDED AS A PRELIMINARY PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE TO DETACH HMS COVENTRY AND RFA OLWEN FROM THE TASK GROUP DUE TO ARRIVE IN HONG KONG ON 26 SEPTEMBER. HMS COVENTRY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED TOWARDS SINGAPORE IMMEDIATELY.
STRICTLY FOR YOU OWN INFORMATION THIS DEPLOYMENT IS CONNECTED WITH CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE GULF.
2. WE WISH TO DO ALL WE CAN TO AVOID PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF THIS REDEPLOYMENT, ALTHOUGH WE REALISE OF COURSE THAT THE ABSENCE OF HMS COVENTRY IS BOUND TO BE NOTICED IN HONG KONG. IF YOU ARE QUESTIONED ABOUT THIS YOU SHOULD
DRAW ON THE CONTINGENSY PRESS LINE IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH. MOD ARE SENDING SIMILAR INSTRUCTIONS TO CBF HONG KONG.
3. Q.1 WHAT IS HMS COVENTRY DOING IN THE FAR EAST?
A.1 SHE IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF SHIPS COMPRISING THE TASK FORCE CURRENTLY DEPLOYED IN THE AREA.
Q.2 IS IT TRUE THAT HMS COVENTRY'S VISIT TO HONG KONG HAS BEEN CANCELLED?
A.2 YES.
SECRET
Q.3 WHERE IS HMS COVENTRY GOING?
A.3 HMS COVENTRY IS PROCEEDING TOWARDS SINGAPORE.
Q.4 IS HMS COVENTRY ALONE?
A.4 SHE IS IN COMPANY WITH THE ROYAL FLEET AUXILIARY TANKER OLWEN.
Q.5 WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER SHIPS IN THE TASK FORCE?
A.5 THEY ARE CONTINUING WITH THEIR PLANNED PROGRAMME.
Q.6 WHY HAS HMS COVENTRY'S VIST TO HONG KONG BEEN CANCELLED?
A.6 WE OFTEN CHANGE PLANS, OUR AIM IS TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE. (IF PRESSED: WE DO NOT DISCUSS OPERATIONAL DETAILS).
Q.7 IS HMS COVENTRY BEING SENT TO THE GULF?
A.7 IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN PLANNED THAT SHE SHOULD RETURN HOME TO THE UK VIA THE GULF. (IF PRESSED ON WHETHER THE SHIP IS GOING STRAIGHT TO THE GULF). SHE IS CURRENTYLY PROCEEDING TOWARDS SINGAPORE. (IF FURTHER PRESSED) WHERE SHE GOES AFTER SINGAPORE REMAINS TO BE SEEN. (AS I HAVE SAID) OUR AIM IS TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE.
Q.8 IS HMS COVENTRY'S DIVERSION CONNECTED WITH THE GULF CRISIS?
A.8 IT IS NOT OUR PRACTICE TO DISCUSS OPERATIONAL DETAILS.
Q.9 ARE THER ANY PLANS TO LINK UP WITH OTHER NAVIES?
A.9 WE ARE ALWAYS IN TOUCH WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES.
Q.10 WHAT ARE OTHER NAVIES DOING?
A.10 I HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THIS.

CARRINGTON

SECRET

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UDM OCØ(8.

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CYPHER GUARDED

LVO NR 275/25
FDW G Ø72/25

00 TOKYO (DESKBY 26ØØØ1Z)

00 PEKING

00 BELGRADE

GRS 13ØA

RESTRICTED
DESKBY HONG KONG (251930Z)
DESKBY TOKYO (26ØØØ1Z)
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 2516ØØZ SEPT 8Ø
TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 11 OF 25 SEPTEMBER.
INFO IMMEDIATE TOKYO, FCO, PEKING, BELGRADE (FOR PS TO PM).

FROM SECRETARY OF STATE.

MY VISIT.

1. I REGRET THAT BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ I CANNOT LEAVE NEW YORK TODAY AS PLANNED. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL MEET. IF IT DOES SO I WILL WISH TO BE PRESENT. I MUST IN ANY CASE KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH MUSKIE AND OTHERS, AND CANNOT BE IN THE AIR AND OUT OF CONTACT WITH LONDON WHILE MATTERS ARE SO UNCERTAIN.

2. I MAY BE ABLE TO LEAVE NEW YORK IN THE COURSE OF 26 SEPTEMBER, THOUGH I SHALL NOT BE TAKING A FINAL DECISION ON THIS YET. HOWEVER, IT WILL BY THEN BE TOO LATE TO REACH HONG KONG IN TIME TO CARRY OUT A SENSIBLE PROGRAMME. WITH SINCERE APOLOGIES TO YOU, YOUR WIFE AND YOUR STAFF, I MUST THEREFORE CANCEL THE VISIT TO HONG KONG. I AM SORRY THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE BEEN PUT TO SO MUCH UNNECESSARY TROUBLE: AND ALSO THAT WE SHALL BE MISSING A VISIT TO WHICH WE WERE LOOKING FORWARD. PLEASE ALSO CONVEY MY REGRETS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. BUT I KNOW THAT YOU AND THEY WILL UNDERSTAND WHY WE HAVE TO TAKE THIS DECISION.

3. WE SHALL BE IN TOUCH TOMORROW WITH TOKYO ABOUT OUR FURTHER MOVEMENTS. I HOPE TO BE ABLE TO GO AHEAD WITH MY VISITS TO JAPAN AND CHINA, BUT THIS MUST OF COURSE DEPEND ON THE WAY THINGS GO IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

PARSONS

NNNN

1830/25

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 September 1980

BF 30/9/80.

I enclose the text of a message from President Giscard d'Estaing to the Prime Minister reporting a meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for a translation to be telegraphed to Belgrade for the Prime Minister's party and to be circulated to those who will be attending the Prime Minister's meeting at Chequers on Sunday on the Iran/Iraq conflict.

If appropriate, it would be helpful for us to have a draft reply in time for the Prime Minister to consider it over the weekend.

MAP

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

GPS 450A

SECRET

SECRET
DESKBY BELGRADE 260500Z

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T187/80

FM FCO 251910Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE (FOR PS TO PM)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 213 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
AND TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR PS)
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MY IPT

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT REPLY.

1. I WAS GLAD TO RECEIVE YOUR LETTER OF 24 SEPTEMBER, ADDRESSING QUESTION THAT HAS INDEED BEEN ON MY MIND THESE PAST FEW DAYS. I ENTIRELY AGREE THAT OUR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE IS THAT THE FIGHTING SHOULD STOP, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO ANYTHING WE CAN TO HELP.

2. I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, AND THE FRENCH AND GERMANS AS WELL, TO CONSULT CONFIDENTIALLY ON THE BROAD POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS MATTER, AND THAT THE BEST FORUM FOR THIS IS THE QUADRIPARTITE ONE, AT LEAST AS A FIRST STEP. YOU WILL PROBABLY HAVE HAD AN ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSION OF QUADRIPARTITE MACHINERY THAT TOOK PLACE AMONG THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS AT DINNER ON 24 SEPTEMBER.

3. I SHARE YOUR PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF SHIPPING IN THE GULF AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS DISRUPTION. WE DO NOT AT THIS MOMENT HAVE ROYAL NAVY SHIPS NEAR THE GULF AND THE EARLIEST DATE BY WHICH ANY COULD REACH THE AREA IS 7 OCTOBER. I HAVE INSTRUCTED THAT TWO SHIPS BE DETACHED IMMEDIATELY FROM A TASK FORCE WHICH IS NOW IN HONG KONG, AND MOVE TO THE AREA. THIS IS THE MAXIMUM THAT WE CAN DEPLOY AT ONCE WITHOUT ATTRACTING PUBLICITY, WHICH WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO AVOID AT THIS STAGE. WE ALSO HAVE SHIPS IN A TASK FORCE WHICH WILL REACH THE MEDITERRANEAN ON 30 SEPTEMBER. THEY ARE DESTINED FOR AN EXERCISE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN BUT COULD BE DIVERTED TO THE GULF IF NECESSARY. THESE AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS CAN BE DISCUSSED IN THE NAVAL STAFF TALKS ABOUT WHICH YOUR DEFENCE PEOPLE ARE ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH OURS. IN MY VIEW IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE FRENCH, WHO ALREADY HAVE A SIGNIFICANT NAVAL FORCE IN THE AREA, TO JOIN THESE TALKS FROM THE OUTSET.

4. I AGREE ALSO WITH YOU THAT THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO REASSURE SHIPPERS AND INSURERS, AND TO LIMIT THE IMPACT OF THE IRAN/IRAQ HOSTILITIES ON THE PRICE OF OIL AND INSURANCE RATES. IT WOULD INDEED BE USEFUL FOR OUR OFFICIALS - AND THOSE OF OTHER NATIONS PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED - TO MEET TO TAKE STOCK OF THE PROBLEMS FOR SHIPPING AND TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS, ALTHOUGH WE SHALL HAVE

TO BEAR

TO BEAR IN MIND THAT SHIPPING INSURANCE RATES ARE THE RESULT OF MARKET DECISIONS OVER WHICH OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE LITTLE DIRECT INFLUENCE. MY OFFICIALS COULD ATTEND A MEETING IN WASHINGTON IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

5. I SHARE YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ IS DANGEROUS FOR US ALL, WITH MANY POTENTIAL RISKS BOTH FOR OTHER STATES IN THE AREA AND FOR OIL CONSUMING COUNTRIES. NEVERTHELESS, AS YOU HAVE SAID IN YOUR STATEMENT OF 24 SEPTEMBER, BY GOOD FORTUNE AND GOOD MANAGEMENT WE HAVE AMPLE STOCKS OF OIL AND THIS DOES GIVE US SOME ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE. I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT IN ANYTHING WE DO WE CARRY WITH US THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REGION, SO FAR AS IS POSSIBLE. WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING SOME FORM OF U.N COVER FOR ANY ACTION THAT WE MAY UNDERTAKE.

6. FINALLY, LIKE YOU, I AM VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO AVOID SETTING AT RISK THE LIVES OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES, AND INDEED OF OUR OWN CITIZENS IN IRAN, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN DETENTION. THIS MUST BE CONTINUALLY IN OUR MINDS AS OUR CONSULTATIONS GO FORWARD.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED
HD/ MED
HDI MAED
HDI DEF.D
HDI PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS|LPS
PS|MR HURD
PS|PUS
SIR J. GRAMHAM
MR J.C.MOBERLY
MR BULLARD
MR P.H.MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

ZZ 251616Z
LONDRES DE PARIS
SECRET GOUVERNEMENTAL NR 101
BT
DE M. VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
PALAIS DE L'ELYSEE
PARIS
A MADAME MARGARET THATCHER
PREMIER MINISTRE DU ROYAUME UNI
10 DOWNING STREET LONDRES

T 186/80

PARIS, LE 25 SEPTEMBRE 1980

MON CHER PREMIER MINISTRE,

A LA DEMANDE DU PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN QUI M'AVAIT ADRESSE TROIS MESSAGES PAR LA VOIE DIPLOMATIQUE DEPUIS LE DEBUT DES HOSTILITES IRAKO-IRANIENNES, J'AI RECU CE MATIN M. TAREK AZIZ, VICE PREMIER MINISTRE D'IRAK.

MON INTERLOCUTEUR A AFFIRME QUE SON GOUVERNEMENT N'AVAIT AUCUN OBJECTIF D'ORDRE TERRITORIAL EN DEHORS DES TERRITOIRES CONTESTES, ET QUE L'INTENTION DES AUTORITES IRAKIENNES ETAIT DE NE MAINTENIR AUCUNE PRESENCE MILITAIRE EN IRAN HORS DE CES TERRITOIRES. NOUS AVONS EVOQUE LES CONDITIONS D'OUVERTURE DE NEGOCIATIONS CONDUISANT A UN REGLEMENT POLITIQUE DE CE CONFLIT AINSI QUE DIVERSES FORMULES EVENTUELLES DE NEGOCIATION. J'AI DIT A CET EGARD QU'UN ROLE PARTICULIER DEVAIT ETRE DEVOLU AUX ETATS ISLAMIQUES DANS LE PROCESSUS CONDUISANT A UN REGLEMENT POLITIQUE DU CONFLIT.

J'AI EGALEMENT INSISTE AUPRES DE M. TAREK AZIZ POUR QUE L'IRAK EXPRIME LE PLUS RAPIDEMENT POSSIBLE SA POSITION SUR L'OUVERTURE DE NEGOCIATIONS.

ENFIN, J'AI RAPPELE AVEC FORCE L'IMPORTANCE ATTACHEE PAR LA FRANCE A LA PRESERVATION DE LA LIBERTE DE NAVIGATION DANS LE GOLFE ET LE DETROIT D'ORMUZ.

.../...

SECRET GOUVERNEMENTAL NN 101

T 186/80

BT
DE M. VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
PALAIS DE L'ELYSEE

PARIS
A MADAME MARGARET THATCHER
PREMIER MINISTRE DU ROYAUME UNI
10 DOWNING STREET LONDRES

PARIS, LE 25 SEPTEMBRE 1980

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.../...

LE VICE PREMIER MINISTRE D'IRAK M'A DONNE L'ASSURANCE QUE LE GOUVERNEMENT IRAKIEN NE PORTERAIT PAS ATTEINTE A LA LIBERTE DE NAVIGATION DANS CETTE ZONE.

M. TAREK AZIZ M'A EGALEMENT CONFIE QUE L'IRAK N'AVAIT PAS A CE STADE L'INTENTION D'ENTREPRENDRE DES OPERATIONS MILITAIRES EN DIRECTION DES ILOTS DU GOLFE (PETITE TOMB, GRANDE TOMB ET ABBU MOUSSA), QUI DEVRAIENT CEPENDANT REVENIR AUX EMIRATS ARABES UNIS.

A LA SUITE DE CET ENTRETIEN, MON EVALUATION PERSONNELLE EST QUE L'OBJECTIF DE L'IRAK EST DE SAISIR DES GAGES TERRITORIAUX, ET EGALEMENT DES GAGES POLITIQUES SOUS LA FORME DE DEFAITES PUBLIQUEMENT INFLIGEES AUX FORCES ARMEES IRANIENNES. MON SENTIMENT EST QUE LE GOUVERNEMENT DE M. SADDEM HUSSEIN SE DONNE ENCORE DE QUATRE A CINQ JOURS POUR ATTEINDRE CET OBJECTIF.

JE VOUS PRIE DE CROIRE, MON CHER PREMIER MINISTRE, EN MES SENTIMENTS LES MEILLEURS.

VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T186/80

OO BELGRADE DESKBY 260500Z
GRS 342
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 251900Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 782 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE FOR NO 10 DUTY CLERK (DESKBY 260500Z)
AND IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN

IRAN/IRAQ

1. FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GISCARD TO THE PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED THIS AFTERNOON:

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

AT THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO HAS SENT ME THREE MESSAGES BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE IRAQI-IRANIAN HOSTILITIES, I RECEIVED THIS MORNING MR TAREQ AZIZ, DEPUTY PM OF IRAQ.

MY INTERLOCUTOR AFFIRMED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NO TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVE BEYOND THE CONTESTED TERRITORIES AND THAT IT WAS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES TO MAINTAIN ANY MILITARY PRESENCE IN IRAN OUTSIDE THESE TERRITORIES. WE DISCUSSED THE CONDITIONS FOR OPENING NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THIS CONFLICT AS WELL AS VARIOUS POSSIBLE FORMULAE FOR NEGOTIATION. IN THIS RESPECT, I SAID THAT A SPECIAL ROLE MUST DEVOLVE TO THE ISLAMIC STATES IN THE PROCESS LEADING TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT.

I ALSO URGED ON MR TAREQ AZIZ THAT IRAQ EXPRESS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE HER POSITION ON THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS.

FINALLY, I RECALLED EMPHATICALLY THE IMPORTANCE WHICH FRANCE ATTACHES TO THE MAINTENANCE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF AND THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

THE IRAQI DEPUTY PM GAVE ME THE ASSURANCE THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THAT ZONE.

MR TAREQ AZIZ CONFIDED TO ME ALSO THAT IRAQ DID NOT AT THIS STAGE INTEND TO UNDERTAKE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GULF

/ISLETS

ISLETS (LITTLE TUMB, GREAT TUMB AND ABU MUSA) WHICH SHOULD HOWEVER REVERT TO THE UAE.

AFTER THIS CONVERSATION, MY PERSONAL EVALUATION IS THAT IRAQ'S OBJECTIVE IS TO SEIZE TERRITORIAL GAINS, AND EQUALLY POLITICAL GAINS IN THE FORM OF PUBLICLY INFLICTED DEFEATS ON THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES. MY OPINION IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF MR SADDAM HUSSEIN GIVES ITSELF ANOTHER FOUR TO FIVE DAYS TO REACH THIS OBJECTIVE.

MESSAGE ENDS.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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SIR J GRAHAM
MR J MOBERLY
MR P MOBERLY
MR BULLARD

COPIES TO

MR S HAMPSON	DOT
MR J WEST	DEPT/ENERGY
MR D WHITE	CABINET OFFICE

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FM BAGHDAD 251020Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 433 OF 25/9/80

FOR INFO TO PRIORITY KUWAIT JEDDA AMMAN DAMASCUS ANKARA MOSCOW WASHINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN SITREP: MY TEL NO 427

1. BY THE EVENING OF 24 SEPTEMBER, IRAQ CLAIMED TO HAVE ADVANCED ON ALL FRONTS, CAPTURING MEHRAN AND SHOOTING DOWN THIRTY THREE IRANIAN AIRCRAFT. IRAN MOUNTED AIR ATTACKS ON MOSUL, KIRKUK, BAGHDAD , KUT AND BASRA THIS MORNING (25 SEPTEMBER). THE GENERAL COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES ISSUED TWELVE STATEMENTS NUMBERED 11-22 FOR THE PERIOD 24 SEPTEMBER.

SUMMARY AS FOLLOWS:

STATEMNENT 11

IRANIAN LOSSES FOR 23 SEPTEMBER GIVEN AS: THREE OFFICERS AND EIGHTEEN MEN KILLED, TWENTY TANKS AND EIGHT ARMOURED CARS DESTROYED TWO TANKS AND TWO APCS CAPTURED.

STATEMENT 12

IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED ON 24 SEPTEMBER AS FOLLOWS:

0630 HOURS SHUAIBA OIL REFINERY (BASRA) AND THE DEEP WATER OIL TERMINAL. ONE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN

0635 MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN ERBIL.

STATEMENT 13

THE IRAQI AIRCRAFT ATTACKED IRANIAN AIRFIELDS AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS:

0510 AND 0640 HOURS TABRIZ

0525 AHWAZ AIRFIELD

0530 SANANDAJ AIRFIELD

0540 KERMANSHAH

0540 SHAHROKHI

0543 AND 0725 DEZFUL

0600 SHAHABAD (4 PHANTOMS SAID TO HAVE BEEN DESTROYED ON THE GROUND).

STATEMENT 14

DEEP WATER OIL TERMINAL IN BASRA ATTACKED BY IRANIAN GUNBOATS.

FIVE IRANIAN VESSELS SUNK. THE ATTACK CONTINUING.

STATEMENT 15

NORTH SECTOR: QASR-I-SHIRIN AREA CLEARED OF ENEMY FORCES. SANJAN NORTH OF MEHRAN AND ZAID AREA TO THE SOUTH CAPTURED. MEHRAN BESIEGED.

CENTRAL SECTOR: IRAQI FORCES CONTINUING TO ADVANCE

SOUTHERN SECTOR: IRAQI GRIP INCREASING.

STATEMENT 16

0700 HOURS : ARTILLERY EXCHANGES ACROSS THE SHATT AL ARAB. AN IRANIAN NAVAL REPAIR YARD AND THREE IRANIAN PATROL BOATS HIT.

TWO PHANTOMS SHOT DOWN IN THE BADRA AREA.

STATEMENT 17

THE IRANIANS REPORTED TO BE RETREATING IN PANIC LEAVING BEHIND THEIR EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION INCLUDING TANKS.

IRAQ CALLS ON IRANIAN FORCES TO SURRENDER.

STATEMENT 18

STATMENT 18 CLAIMS THAT IRAQ FORCES ARE SCORING HOURLY VICTORIES BUT GIVES NO FURTHER DETAILS.

STATEMENT 19

IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED OIL INSTALLATIONS AND THE MILITARY AIRFIELD IN KIRKUK AT 1105 HOURS AND 1110. TEN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN. IRAQI CASUALTIES GIVEN AS THIRTEEN WOUNDED. ONE IRAQI TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT DESTROYED.

STATEMENT 20

IRANIAN NAVAL LOSSES FOR 24 SEPTEMBER: TWO FRIGATES AND SEVEN GUNBOATS.

STATEMENT 21

IRANIAN AIR LOSSES PUT AT THIRTY THREE AIRCRAFT, NINETEEN OVER KIRKUK AND MOSUL, TWO SHOT DOWN BY BORDER FORCES, TWELVE IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR

3. THERE HAS BEEN NO (NO) MENTION OF THE REPORTED ATTACK ON KHARG ISLAND.

4. THIS MORNING, 25 SEPTEMBER , IRAQI RADIO REPORTED IRANIAN AIR ATTACKS ON MOSUL, KIRKUK, BAGHDAD, KUT AND BASRA. THE ATTACK ON BAGHDAD (WHICH WE WITNESSED) CAME IN TWO WAVES: THE FIRST AT 0630 HOURS APPEARS TOHAVE BEEN AGAINST RASHID AIR BASE AND THE DAWRA OIL REFINERY (NO SIGN OF ANY MAJOR FIRE AT DAWRA). THE SECOND , AT 0650 HIT THE OLD BAGHDAD AIRPORT OF MUTHANNA SEVERAL PHANTOMS WERE SHOT DOWN. WE HAVE HAD NO (NO) REPORTS OF INJURIES TO BRITISH CITIZENS. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL PHONE CALL FROM THE UK MEDIA , WHICH I HAVE REFERRED TO MED AND NEWS DEPT.

5. THE TONE OF IRAQI REPORTS IN INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT. FILM OF A GROUP OF PILOTS WHO HAD BOMBED KERMANSHAH THAT MORNING BEING INTERVIEWED ON AN AIR STRIP '' SOMEWHERE IN IRAQ '' WAS SHOWN ON TELEVISION LAST NIGHT. THERE WAS ALSO FILM OF A GROUND -TO - GROUND MISSILE BATTERY IN ACTION AND OF SOME CRASHED AIRCRAFT, BUT NONE OF THE ACTUAL FIGHTING.

EGERTON

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SEP 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 432 OF 25/9/80
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIW NEW YORK
PRIORITY JEDDAN KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, MUSCAT, PARIS, DAMASCUS AND AMMAN

MY TEL NO 427(NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN: REPORTED IRAQI CONDITIONS.

1. TODAY'S PRESS (25 SEPTEMBER) HAS NOT (NOT) PUBLISHED IRAQ'S CONDITIONS FOR ENDING THE HOSTILITIES WITH IRAN WHICH WERE REPORTED ON YESTERDAY'S BBC WORLD SERVICE. NOR DO THEY APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN BROADCAST ON TELEVISION OR RADIO HERE. THERE IS A BRIEF MENTION OF A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD HERE BY ADNAN KHAIRALLAH, THE DEFENCE MINISTER, YESTERDAY EVENING BUT NO TEXT IS GIVEN.

2. THE PRESS DOES, HOWEVER, REPORT SADDAM HUSSAIN'S MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD WITH YASSIR ARAFAT AND WITH THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER. TARI1 AZIZ, THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, IS REPORTED AS HAVING ARRIVED IN PARIS AFTER HIS TRIP TO MOSCOW. THERE HAS SO FAR BEEN NO (NO) ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE IMPENDING ARRIVAL OF THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER.

03. THE CONDITIONS AS WE REMEMBER THEM FROM RAPID HEARINGS ON THE RADIO ARE:-

(I) SOME ''JUST'' TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS BY IRAN:

(II) REVERSION TO THE PRE-1975 POSITION ON THE SHATT AL-ARAB.

(III) RETURN TO ARAB OWNERSHIP OF THE TUNBS AND THE WHOLE OF ABU MUSA.

4. THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT (NOT) SO FAR BEEN CARRIED ON THE STRICTLY CONTROLLED MEDIA WITHIN IRAQ SUGGEST THAT THEY ARE A BALLON D'ESSAI AUTHORISED FOR RELEASE BY AN IRAQI OFFICIAL ABROAD. E.G. AT THE UN.

5. GRATEFUL TO KNOW IF ANY ADDRESSEE CAN SOURCE OR DUCMENT THESE ''CONDITIONS.''

EGERTON

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FM BAGHDAD 250700Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 429 OF 25/9/80

FOR MIERS, M.E.D.

VISITORS AND MISSIONS TO BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL FAIR.
1. BAGHDAD WAS SUBJECTED TO ANOTHER AIR-RAID TODAY, 25 SEPTEMBER, AND BOMBS WERE DROPPED ON THE CITY'S PERIPHERY, POSSIBLY INCLUDING THE AIRPORT.

2. THE AIRPORT REMAINS SHUT, AND WILL I THINK ONLY BE REOPENED WHEN THE IRAQIS JUDGE THAT THEY HAVE MADE SUFFICIENT TERRITORIAL GAINS FOR A CEASEFIRE TO BECOME ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. PER CONTRA, IT MUST BE AN IRANIAN AIM (SO LONG AS THEY HAVE ENOUGH PILOTS) TO INTERDICT BAGHDAD AIRPORT AND CAUSE DAMAGE TO INSTALLATIOB AT KEY POINTS ALL OVER IRAQ. THUS THE IRAQI LINE THAT THE FAIR REMAINS ON FROM 1 - 15 OCTOBER, AND THAT BUSINESS WILL BE CONDUCTED AS USUAL WITH THOSE VISITORS WHO SHOW UP, SHOWS SANG FROID BUT IS NOT YET PRACTICAL.

3. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND I RECOMMEND, THAT IF THE AIRPORT REOPENS BY SUNDAY , 28 SEPTEMBER, MR JENKIN AND PARTY SHOULD ARRIVE AS PLANNED ON THE EVENING OF MONDAY, 29 SEPTEMBER. I WILL TELEGRAPH A FINAL RECOMMENDATION ON THIS VISIT DURING SATURDAY, 27 SEPTEMBER.

4. AS REGARDS THE COMET MISSION, I WOULD WELCOME THIS TOO, TO ARRIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE AIRPORT REOPENS. IT MAY BE THAT THE MISSION WILL NOT (NOT) BE ABLE TO GET HERE UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK, BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD WELCOME LORD SELSDON, MR ROAD AND AS MANY OTHERS OF THE MISSION WHO CAN MANAGE TO RESCHEDULE THEIR OWN PROGRAMMES BY A FEW DAYS.

5. AS REGARDS BRITISH EXHIBITORS AT THE FAIR, THE POSITION IS COMPLICATED BY THE DECISION OF OUR (GERMAN) STAND CONTRACTOR TO WITHDRAW HIS STAFF BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION. IN SPITE OF OUR EARNEST ENTREATIES (SEE MY ESBOT 279), BRITISH ERECTION SUPERVISORS ARE ALSO LEAVING BAGHDAD TODAY, BY ROAD. KEARNEY OF FPB ADVISES THAT WITH NO CONTRACTORS OR SUPERVISORY STAFF, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO UNPACK MANY OF THE HEAVY MECHANICAL EXHIBITS OR COMPLETE OUR STANDS. NO IRAQI SKILLED LABOUR TO HANDLE THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE EITHER. THUS THE BRITISH PAVILION WILL NOT (NOT) BE READY FOR THE OFFICIAL OPENING IF HELD ON 1 OCTOBER.

6. I RECOMMEND THAT YOU DISCUSS THIS ASPECT WITH CRE5 AND FPB REMINDING THEM THAT MANY OF OUR MAJOR COMPETITORS WILL STILL MOUNT MATERIAL STANDS, PERHAPS ON A REDUCED SCALE. CREDIT WILL GO TO THOSE WHO KEEP THEIR NERVE AND HANG ON, TO MAKE SOME SORT OF A NATIONAL SHOWING. I THINK UK PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES WHETHER OR NOT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR ENTRY VISAS AS AND WHEN AIRPORT REOPENS TO VISIT AND DO WHAT BUSINESS THEY CAN, WITH OR WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THEIR STANDS.

7. I WILL TELEGRAPH AGAIN ON 27 SEPTEMBER. MR KEARNEY OF FPB IS STAYING HERE MEANTIME.

EGERTON

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 September 1980

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Carter. I understand that the text has already been seen in the Foreign Office, as it has been passed to Belgrade through your channels.

The Prime Minister's initial reaction to this message is that both the proposals are reasonable, and we should respond as postively and as quickly as possible. I imagine that there should certainly be no difficulty over the procedural proposal, and I should be grateful if you could let us have a draft reply for the Prime Minister to consider by close of play today.

The Prime Minister also wishes to discuss the implications of the Iraq/Iran conflict in a meeting at Chequers at 11 a.m. on ~~Saturday~~ Sunday morning. I hope that it will be possible for the Lord Privy Seal to attend. I should also be grateful if other recipients of this letter will indicate which Minister or senior official would be available to attend if required.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Julian West (Department of Energy) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATT

(Tube)

Paul Lever Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 184/80

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OO WTE24
DE WTE £7099 2690251
O 250400Z SEP 80
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO THE CABINET OFFICE
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S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH07099

SEPTEMBER 24, 1980

FOR: PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

FROM: PRESIDENT CARTER

I KNOW YOU ARE AS PREOCCUPIED AS I AM ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTINUING CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. SECRETARY MUSKIE AND LORD CARRINGTON ARE INVOLVED IN CLOSE CONSULTATIONS AT THE UN. OUR OVERRIDING CONCERN, OF COURSE, IS TO SEE THE CONFLICT BROUGHT TO A PROMPT END SO THAT ISSUES BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN CAN BE NEGOTIATED. HOWEVER, I WANTED TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH YOU ON ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS FOR WHICH I BELIEVE PRECAUTIONARY STEPS BY OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS APPEAR NECESSARY.

I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY OF SHIPPING IN THE PERSIAN GULF TO AND FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND THE OTHER GULF STATES. THE IRANIAN INTERROGATION OF VESSELS ENTERING THE GULF AND THE SHARP CONSTRAINTS AND INCREASED PRICES FOR INSURANCE THREATEN TO REDUCE DRASTICALLY OIL SHIPMENTS FROM THE PERSIAN GULF STATES. WHILE THE WORLD CAN, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, ADJUST TO THE STOPPAGE OF IRAQI AND IRANIAN OIL SHIPMENTS FOR A TIME, THE EXTENDED HALT IN ALL OIL EXPORTS FROM THE GULF COULD BE AN ECONOMIC CATASTROPHE.

AS A FIRST STEP IN PREPARING TO DEAL WITH THIS POTENTIAL THREAT, I WOULD URGE THAT YOU MOVE ANY NAVAL FORCES YOU MAY HAVE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA CLOSER TO THE GULF. SUCH A PRESENCE ITSELF WOULD BE A REASSURING FACTOR. ADDITIONALLY, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS -- WITH OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS-- COMMENCE URGENT CONTINGENCY CONSULTATIONS ON HOW BEST TO ASSURE NAVAL PROTECTION FOR OIL TANKERS ENTERING AND DEPARTING THE PERSIAN GULF FOR PORTS OTHER THAN THOSE OF IRAQ AND IRAN.

SECONDLY, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS THAT MANY NATIONS AND SHIPPING COMPANIES ARE RESTRAINING THEIR TANKERS FROM OPERATING IN THE PERSIAN GULF, BOTH BECAUSE OF THE RISK AND THE PROBLEM OF INSURANCE. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT OUR APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS BE IN CONTACT, TOGETHER WITH THOSE OF FRANCE, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, ITALY AND JAPAN, TO ASSESS THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS PROBLEM AND CONSIDER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS. IF NECESSARY, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HOST AN APPROPRIATE MEETING IMMEDIATELY.

I HOPE THAT HOSTILITIES CAN BE BROUGHT TO AN END SOON, BUT I

END OF PAGE 01

AND LORD CARRINGTON ARE INVOLVED IN CLOSE CONSULTATIONS AT THE UN. OUR OVERRIDING CONCERN, OF COURSE, IS TO SEE THE CONFLICT BROUGHT TO A PROMPT END SO THAT ISSUES BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN CAN BE NEGOTIATED. HOWEVER, I WANTED TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH YOU ON ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS FOR WHICH I BELIEVE PRECAUTIONARY STEPS BY OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS APPEAR NECESSARY.

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I HOPE THAT HOSTILITIES CAN BE BROUGHT TO AN END SOON, BUT I

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SUSPECT THAT, EVEN IF THEY ARE, WE WILL BE FACED WITH DEEP CONCERNS ABOUT A CONTINUING THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS THAT COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF CURTAILING OIL EXPORTS IN THAT REGION.

I LOOK FORWARD TO AN EARLY RESPONSE.

SINCERELY,

JIMMY CARTER

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£7Ø99

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THATS FINE TKU

QSL 25/Ø416Z JJ

THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN PASSED TO BELGRADE FOR PRIME MINISTER

6a

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SECRET GIS 2Fo

FROM D.A. ABU DHABI 240624Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO AND DUBAI
PRIORITY MUSCAT, DOHA , BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD
AND JEDDA.

FOR DI4 FROM DA. IRAN/IRAQ.

REF YOUR U2H OF 221420Z SEP AND OUR TEL 295 OF 23 SEP.

1. UAE ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO A STATE OF READINESS. ALL PERSONNEL IN UNITS ARE CONFINED TO CAMP AND MOST UNITS ARE READY TO MOVE AT SHORT NOTICE. OPS CENTRES ARE MANNED. TYPICALLY, NO ONE HAS RECEIVED ANY BRIEFING NOR ANY INDICATION TO WHERE THEY ARE LIKELY TO DEPLOY. HOWEVER THESE PREPARATORY MOVES HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED WITH MORE PROFESSIONALISM THAN IN PREVIOUS INCIDENTS OF THIS SORT.

2. IN THE AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENCE BRIGADE, WHICH COULD BE THE FIRST TO BECOME INVOLVED, LIVE MUNITIONS HAVE BEEN DRAWN. MIRAGE PILOTS, WHILST NOT ACTUALLY SITTING IN AIRCRAFT, ARE IN CREW ROOMS. THE RAPIER BATTERY HAS TWO TROOPS EACH OF FOUR DETACHMENTS WITH SIXTY FIVE LIVE MISSILES. THERE IS A 50% BLINDFIRE CAPABILITY. THE BATTERY HAS JUST BEEN ORDERED TO DEPLOY AS FOLLOWS:

A. TWO DETACHMENTS TO THE BEACH PALACE (BB 3708).
B. THREE DETACHMENTS TO UMM AN NAR REFINERY (BB 4504).
C. FIVE DETACHMENTS IN RESERVE AT AIRFIELD CAMP.

THE CROTALE BATTERY HAS TWENTY EIGHT MISSILES. HOWEVER, NEITHER GUNS NOR MISSILES HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO DAS ISLAND AS YET.

3. THE NAVY HAS ITS CUSTOMARY ONE CRAFT IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF DAS WITH THE REAMAINDER AT SHORT NOTICE IN ABU DHABI. THE FIRST TWO GERMAN STRIKE CRAFT ARRIVED TWO DAYS AGO. THESE COULD DRAMATICALLY INCREASE NAVY'S CAPABILITY BUT THEY COULD HARDLY BE COMMISSIONED FOR A WHILE YET. I WILL BE CHECKING ON THIS TOMORROW.

ROBERTS

IRAN/IRAQ

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GRS 290
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FM MOSCOW 240830Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 580 OF 24TH SEPTEMBER
FOR INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK AND ROUTINE BONN, PARIS AND BAGHDAD.

OUR TEL NO 578: IRAN/IRAQ: SOVIET COMMENT.

1. IZVESTIA OF 23 SEPTEMBER AND PRAVDA OF 24 SEPTEMBER BROKE THE LONG SILENCE WITH SEPARATE ARTICLES CLAIMING THAT THE CONTINUING CONFLICT ONLY SERVED IMPERIALISM'S INTERESTS, AND ACCUSING THE WEST OF TRYING TO INFLATE AND EXPLOIT THE SITUATION. IZVESTIA ALSO CLAIMED THAT US INTEREST IN THE DISPUTE WAS THE RESULT OF HOPES THAT IT WOULD WEAKEN OPPOSITION TO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. BOTH ARTICLES NOTED THE CONTRIBUTION MADE IN THE PAST BY THE TWO COUNTRIES TO THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE. THEY CLAIMED THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS CAUSING SERIOUS CONCERN TO THE COUNTRIES' FRIENDS, AND PRESSED FOR A RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM THROUGH PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS. IZVESTIA ADDITIONALLY NOTED THAT NO-ONE HAD THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

2. THE TWO ARTICLES DID NOT DEAL WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISPUTE, BUT IZVESTIA DID QUOTE THE IRAQI JUSTIFICATION THAT IRAN HAD NOT FULFILLED ITS SIDE OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT. A SEPARATE REPORT IN PRAVDA QUOTED AN IRAQI REPRESENTATIVE OUTLINING IRAQ'S CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING THE RETURN TO IRAQ OF THE THREE PERSIAN GULF ISLANDS ''SEIZED BY IRAN'', AND RESPECT FOR IRAQ'S RIGHTS TO THE WHOLE SHATT-EL-ARAB.

3. IRANIAN AMBASSADOR MOKRI CALLED YESTERDAY ON A DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE PRAESIDIUM (USMANKHODZHAYEV) AND FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MALTSEV (WHO EARLIER SAW AZIZ - OUR TUR REFERS), AND AFTERWARDS HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE. HE SAID HE HAD MADE TWO REQUESTS, FIRSTLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD CONDEMN IRAQI 'AGRESSION' AGAINST IRAN, AND SECONDLY THAT ARMS DELIVERIES TO IRAQ SHOULD CEASE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REMAIN NEUTRAL, BUT THAT THEY WERE BOUND TO SUPPLY ARMS TO IRAQ BY THEIR FRIENDSHIP TREATY.

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No 10 DOWNING STREET

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FM DUBAI 240515Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 113 OF 24 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA KUWAIT MUSCAT
BAGHDAD UKMIS NEW YORK

IRAN/IRAQ

1. SHIPPING AGENTS HERE CONFIRM THAT TRAFFIC THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ IS STILL NORMAL, THOUGH ALL SHIPS ARE OBEYING IRANIAN NAVY INSTRUCTIONS TO KEEP WELL SOUTH OF MEDIAN LINE. ONE NORWEGIAN TANKER CARRYING IRAQI OIL WAS CHALLENGED THREE TIMES BY IRANIAN WARSHIPS BUT ALLOWED TO PROCEED.

2. WE KNOW OF ONLY TWO SHIPS SO FAR WHICH HAVE CANCELLED PLANS TO ENTER THE GULF. A U S CONTAINER SHIP HAS OFF-LOADED CARGO FOR DUBAI AND ABU DHABI AT KHOR FAKHAN, AND AN EMPTY NORWEGIAN TANKER HAS HALTED THERE FOR ORDERS. GRAY MACKENZIE'S GRAYSWIFT LAUNCH SERVICE FROM RAS AL-KHAIMAH IS STILL OPERATING, WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO KEEP WELL INSIDE ARAB WATERS.

HASKELL

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MR T.C. MOBELLY
MR FERGUSSON

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FM AMMAN 241130Z SEP 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 351 OF 24 SEP
INFO BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON, CG JERUSALEM, FCO MED AND RESEARCH DEPT AND MODUK (DI4)
MY TELELETTER OF 17 SEPTEMBER TO MILES IN NENAD (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ/JORDAN

1. FURTHER STATEMENTS OF JORDANIAN SUPPORT FOR IRAQ HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS ON 23 AND 24 SEPTEMBER, WHICH REPORTED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD TELEPHONED THE IRAQI PRESIDENT ON 22 SEPTEMBER TO ASSURE HIM OF JORDANIAN BACKING FOR IRAQ IN THE FACE OF ''IRANIAN AGRESSION AGAINST IRAQI TERRITORY.'' THE KING IS ALSO REPORTED HAVE HAD LENGTHY TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT ASAD OF SYRIA AND CROWN PRINCE FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA ON THE IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE.

2. AT A SPECIALLY SUMMONED CABINET MEETING ON 23 SEPTEMBER, ALSO ATTENDED BY CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES AND OTHERS, KING HUSSEIN IS REPORTED AS HAVING CALLED ON ALL ARAB STATES TO ADOPT A UNIFIED STAND IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ'S DEFENCE OF ITS TERRITORY IN FACE OF ''IRAN'S AGGRESSION ON IRAQI TERRITORY AND ITS CONSTANT THREATS TO THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF WHICH CONSTITUTE A DRAIN ON ARAB EFFORTS AND CAPABILITIES CONFRONTING ISRAEL.''

3. JORDAN'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQ IS ECHOED IN THE EDITORIAL COLUMNS OF THE JORDANIAN PRESS, WHICH CRITICISE WHAT THEY DESCRIBE AS IRAN'S AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS AGAINST IRAQ AND THE WHOLE ARAB NATION AND IRAN'S ''DEEP HATRED'' OF THE ARABS.

4. THE JORDANIAN PRESS OF 24 SEPTEMBER ALSO CARRIES PROMINENTLY A JORDANIAN OFFICIAL DENIAL OF A REPORT ON RADIO ISRAEL TO THE EFFECT THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD INFORMED THE ISRAELIS OF THE PRESENCE OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT AT JORDANIAN AIR BASES (TEL AVIV TELNO 450 REFERS). THE STATEMENT DID NOT COMMENT ON THE ALLEGED PRESENCE OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT IN JORDAN, BUT ASSERTED THAT JORDAN WAS FREE TO ACT IN ANY WAY IT PLEASED ON ITS OWN SOIL AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT INTERFERENCE FROM ANY OTHER PARTY IN ITS OWN AFFAIRS AND SOVEREIGNTY. SEE ALSO MY DA'S TELEGRAM SIC ACA/U2G OF 231120Z (NOT TO ALL).

5. IN SPEAKING TO THE VISITING RCDS GROUP ON THE EVENING OF 22 SEPTEMBER, KING HUSSEIN EMPHASISED THE DANGER FOR THE AREA OF THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT AND SAID THAT JORDAN WOULD ''OBVIOUSLY LEND HER FULL SUPPORT TO IRAQ'' WHICH IN RECENT YEARS HAD BECOME A SOURCE OF STABILITY IN THE AREA AND THAT, BUT FOR THE POSITIVE ROLE PLYAED BY IRAQ IN RESISTING EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD, THE SITUATION IN THE AREA WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE BEEN MUCH WORSE THAT IT NOW WAS.

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Repetition to .... BERLIN
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.

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FM FCO 241635Z SEPTEMBER 1980
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 317 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

FROM MAED
OUR TELNO 314 : IRAQ/IRAN
1. GCBS HAVE HEARD RUMOUR THAT BRITISH VESSEL GULF HERON AT BASRA HAS BEEN DAMAGED BY A BOMB. GRATEFUL ANY NEWS.

CARRINGTON

IRAN STANDARD

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FM DOHA 240849Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 135 OF 24 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE NEW YORK (FOR S OF S) INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN AND JEDDA.
SAVING PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO: 194 TO ABU DHABI: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. QATARIS HAVE AS YET GIVEN THE SITUATION LITTLE INFORMED CONSIDERATION. THE AMIR IS STILL IN PARIS: THE DEPUTY C-IN-C AND HIS ASSISTANT ARE IN LONDON. OTHER MINISTERS ARE ALSO ABSCENT.

2. ACTING RULER, SHAIKH HAMAD, WITH WHOM I DISCUSSED MATTERS ON 20 SEPTEMBER, DISMISSED THE MESSAGE HE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE IRAQI PRESIDENT AS A PROPAGANDA EXERCISE. BUT HIS OFFICE LATER EVINCED ANXIETY ABOUT POSSIBLE RESTRICTION OF SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

3. AMIR'S CHEF DE CABINET WAS PERPLEXED, WHEN HE LUNCHED WITH ME ON 22 SEPTEMBER, ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR QATAR'S SECURITY OF ANY SPREAD OF FIGHTING. HE ADMITTED TO A GENERAL SENSE OF UNEASE ABOUT IT, RATHER THAN ANY ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE DANGERS IT MIGHT BRING HERE. QATARIS KEPT THE INTERNAL SITUATION QUIET THROUGH PREVIOUS IRANIAN UPHEAVALS. THE IRANIAN COMMUNITY, HOWEVER, NUMBERS SOME 40-60,000 AND COULD YET CAUSE TROUBLE. I SHARE CHEF DE CABINET'S FEELINGS: THERE IS AS YET NO IDENTIFIABLE PROBLEM FOR QATAR GOVERNMENT EXEPT THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERFERENCE WITH SHIPPING IN THE GULF.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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FM CENTROFORM LONDON 241343Z

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RETRACT 33224SEPT

FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT FROM TODAY'S FCO SPOKESMAN 24-9-8Ø

IRAN/IRAQ:

SPOKESMAN DREW ATTENTION TO THE TERMS OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NINE IN NEW YORK ON 23 SEPTEMBER.

ASKED ABOUT THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN IRAQ, SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAD MET REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMUNITY THIS MORNING. THE EMBASSY WAS NOT AT PRESENT ADVISING THE COMMUNITY TO LEAVE. SOME MEMBERS HAD DECIDED HOWEVER TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR DEPENDENTS TO GO BY ROAD TO AMMAN. THE EMBASSY IS CO-OPERATING FULLY. A CONVOY WOULD BE LEAVING IN THE COURSE OF THE MORNING, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT LULL. MANY BRITISH SUBJECTS IN THE BASRAH AREA HAD LEFTQBY ROAD FOR KUWAIT. A TOTAL OF ABOUT 1ØØ PERSONS WOULD BE LEAVING BAGHDAD TODAY. THE EMBASSY HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE IRAQI MFA ABOUT THE GROUP'S DEPARTURE. A CONSULAR OFFICIAL FROM THE EMBASSY WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING THE GROUPS TO RUTBA. THE EMBASSY IN AMMAN WAS ARRANGING FOR A CONSULAR OFFICIAL TO MEET THE GROUP AT THE JORDANIAN FRONTIER.

ENDS FCO SPOKESMAN

CENTROFORM LONDON

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1510/24

NUFU EU

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DIBY. 240930Z.

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED W.3G
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NO.10 DOWNING STREET
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.. WASHINGTON

GRS 725
RESTRICTED
FM BAGHDAD 240830Z SEP 80
TO FLASH AMMAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 24/9/80
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, UKMIS NEW YORK,
PRIORITY KUWAIT, JEDDA, DAMASCUS AND WASHINGTON

FOR AMBASSADOR.
MY TEL NO 424: DEPARTURE OF DEPENDENTB OF BRITISH BUSINESS COMMUNITY

1. AT A MEETING AT 0600Z IN THE NEW BRITISH CLUB HERE TODAY, IT WAS DECIDED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT LULL IN FIGHTER ACTIVITY OVER BAGHDAD TO GET ABOUT ONE HUNDRED DEPENDENTS ON THE ROAD, IN THEIR OWN CARS AND ESCORTED BY SOME HUSBANDS, STARTING AT 0930Z TODAY, 24 SEPTMBER. TOTAL WILL BE APPROX 100 PERSONS. ROUTE WILL BE RUTBA-H4-AMMAN. A SMALL LOCAL BUS LEAVING AT 1100Z WILL TAKE ANY OVERFLOW.

ROUTE WILL BE RUTBA-H4-AMMAN. A SMALL LOCAL BUS LEAVING AT 1100Z WILL TAKE ANY OVERFLOW.

2. I HAVE EXPLAINED THE REASONS FOR THIS EXODUS TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF PROTOCOL AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND ASKED FOR EXEMPTION FOR ALL THESE TRAVELLERS FROM EXIT PERMIT REQUIREMENTS, ON THE ANALOGY OF THE SAFWAN CROSSING YESTERDAY. NAJM WAS HELPFUL AND PROMISED TO PHONE THE BORDER POLICE AT RUTBA. I ALSO MENTIONED THAT SIR J.GRAHAM HAD REQUESTED VERY SPEEDING GRANTING OF EXIT PERMITS TO BRITISH SUBJECTS WANTING TO LEAVE WHEN HE SAW AMBASSADOR SHAWI ON 23 SEPT (FCO TEL TO ME NO 316).

3. AS IT HAS NOT (NOT) BEEN POSSIBLE TO COPLETE EXIT DOCUMENTATION FOR MANY OF THE PRIVATE CARS OF TODAY'S EVACUEES , SOME MAY HAVE TO BE LEFT BEHIND AT RUTBA. GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF YOU WOULD ARRANGE MOST URGENTLY FOR A 40 SEATER DESERT BUS (WITH JORDANIAN OR OTHER ARAB DRIVER) TO PROCEED TODAY, 24 SEPTEMBER , TO RUTBA TO AWAIT THE CONVOY. BRITISH CLUB REPRESENTATIVE HAS GIVEN CONSUL HERE UNDERTAKINGS TO REPAY FULL COSTS OF BUS HIRE AND DRIVER'S SUBSISTENCE WHEN KNOWN.

4. IF YOU COULD ARRANGE FOR A MEMBER OF YOUR CONSULAR STAFF TO MEET THE PARTY AT H4, EITHER LATE TONIGHT OR MORE LIKELY EARLY ON THURSDAY, 25 SEPTEMBER, THAT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL.

5. A SECOND, LARGER EXODUS OF BUSINESSMEN'S WIVES AND CHILDREN AND SOME HUSBANDS FROM OUTLYING AREAS (EG NORTH IRAQ) IS PLANNED FOR EARLY 25 SEPTEMBER IF THE GROUP, TOTALLING SOME THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY, CAN BE ASSEMBLED BY THEN. A TOTAL OF SEVEN IRAQI BUSES ARE BEING HIRED TODAY. THESE MAY NOT (NOT) BE PERMITTED BY THE AUTHORITIES TO PROCEED BEYOND RUTBA FOR MILITARY REASONS, SO I MAY HAVE TO ASK YOU TO SEND AN EQUAL NUMBER OF BUSES, ON REPAYMENT, OVER TO RUBA DURING 25 SEPTMBER, IF THE FIRST BUS (PARA 3 ABOVE) GETS THROUGH SAFELY.

6. I AM STILL NOT (NOT) ADVISING BRITISH SUBJECTS WITH BUSINESS HERE TO LEAVE IRAQ OR ADIVISING EVACUATION. BUT IF DEPENDENTS WANT TO GO, AS THEY CLEARLY DO VERY STRONGLY, I AM HELPING THEM TO GET OUT WITH THE MINIMUM OF DISCOMFORT. WE HAVE WARNED THAT THE CONVOY MAY BE SERIOUSLY DELAYED AT ROADBLOCKS, EG AT HABBANIYA.

7. I AM ASKING FOREIGN MINISTRY TO ALLOW, EXCEPTIONALLY

, A CONSULAR OFFICE

A CONVULAR OFFICER TO ACCOMPANY THE FIRST PARY TO RUTBA TO FACILITATE

6. I AM STILL NOT (NOT) ADVISING BRITISH SUBJECTS WITH BUSINESS HERE TO LEAVE IRAQ OR ADIVISING EVACUATION. BUT IF DEPENDENTS WANT TO GO, AS THEY CLEARLY DO VERY STRONGLY, I AM HELPING THEM TO GET OUT WITH THE MINIMUM OF DISCOMFORT. WE HAVE WARNED THAT THE CONVOY MAY BE SERIOUSLY DELAYED AT ROADBLOCKS, EG AT HABBANIYA.

7. I AM ASKING FOREIGN-MINISTRY TO ALLOW, EXCEPTIONALLY

, A CONSULAR OFFICE

A CONVULAR OFFICER TO ACCOMPANY THE FIRST PARY TO RUTBA TO FACILITATE THEIR DEPARTURE, AND TO STAY THERE UNTIL THE SECOND PARTY HAS STAGED THROUGH ON 25 SEPTMBER.

8. I AM NOT (NOT) CONFIDENT THAT IT IS WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S POWER TO GRANT SUCH AN EXEMPTION FROM THE TRAVEL REGULATIONS AT A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY, BUT SEE NO (NO) HARM IN ASKING. I WILL REPORT FURTHER BY BRIEF FLASH TELS TO YOU AND FCO WHEN FIRST PARTY HAVE LEFT. NO OBJECTION TO NEWS DEPT DRAWING ON PARAS 1 TO 4 INCLUSIVE AND PARAS 6 AND 7 ABOVE, IN TODAY'S BRIEFINGS.

9. I AM HAVING ANOTHER MEETING WITH BRITISH COMMUNITY LEADER LATER TODAY TO DISCUSS THE SECOND EXODUS (SEE 5 ABOVE) AND ALSO WITH MEMBER OF EMBASSY AND BRITISH COUNCIL STAFF. SOME OF WHOM HAVE YOUNG CHILDREN HERE. IT MAY BE THAT THEY WISH TO JOIN A A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT CONVOY.

EGERTON

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FM F.C.O. 241420Z SEP 8Ø
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2Ø2 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

FOR ALEXANDER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE WAS RECEIVED FROM DUBAI TELEGRAM NUMBER 29 OF 24 SEPTEMBER TO
ABU DHABI
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA KUWAIT
INFO ROUTINE BONN PARIS

FCO TELNO 194 TO YOU AND YOUR TELNO 297: IRAN/IRAQ.
1. I SAW MOHAMMED BIN RASHID, FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE, AT 13ØØ LOCAL TIME. HE HAD NO INSIDE INFORMATION ON THE MILITARY SITUATION, BUT ON THE BASIS OF CURRENT PRESS AND RADIO REPORTS, AND PAST CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQIS, HIS ASSESSMENT WAS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE IRAQIS HAD BEGUN HOSTILITIES WITH ONLY LIMITED TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVES IN MIND. HOWEVER, THE QUALITY OF IRANIAN RESISTANCE HAD BEEN POORER THAN EXPECTED, AND THIS HAD ENCOURAGED THEM TO RAISE THEIR SIGHTS.
(B) NEVERTHELESS, THE IRAQIS WERE REALISTIC ENOUGH TO KNOW THAT THEY COULD NOT PERMANENTLY SUBDUE LARGE AREAS OF HOSTILE TERRITORY. MOREOVER, RESUPPLY PROBLEMS WOULD FAIRLY SOON PRESENT THEMSELVES. THE FIGHTING COULD BE EXPECTED TO DIE DOWN OF ITS OWN ACCORD IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.
(C) HOWEVER, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE IRANIANS SHOULD BE SEEN CLEARLY TO HAVE HAD THE WORST OF IT. ANY SUGGESTION THAT THEY HAD ENDED ON EQUAL OR SUPERIOR TERMS IN ANY ASPECT OF THE FIGHTING COULD ENCOURAGE THEM TO DO SOMETHING REALLY IRRESPONSIBLE IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.
(D) THE IRAQIS HAD MADE NO REPEAT NO APPROACH TO THE U A E FOR SEA OR AIR BASE FACILITIES TO SUPPORT ANY MOVE ON THE GULF ISLANDS. SHAIKH SAQR OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH WAS QUITE CAPABLE OF OFFERING THEM SOME KIND OF DEAL, BUT SHAIKHS ZAID AND RASHID WERE IN A POSITION TO THWART HIM AND WOULD DO SO.
(E) SOVIET INTERVENTION WAS A REMOTE BUT STILL SERIOUS THREAT. THE RUSSIANS WERE AT PRESENT TRYING TO AVOID TAKING SIDES BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. BUT IF THEY DECIDED TO GRAB A CHUNK OF IRANIAN TERRITORY, THEY WOULD NOT BE CONTENT WITH A SMALL BORDER ZONE BUT WOULD AIM TO OCCUPY UP TO HALF OF IRAN.

2. SHIPPING IS STILL PASSING NORMALLY THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, THOUGH INWARD TRAFFIC IS THIN. THERE IS A RUMOUR, ALLEGEDLY ORIGINATING FROM A DANISH SHIPPING AGENT IN ABU DHABI, THAT CONTACT HAS BEN LOST WITH AN ITALIAN SHIP IN MID-GULF, BUT THIS MAY WELL BE ONLY A ROUTINE EQUIPMENT FAILURE. GUARDS ON MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND ELSEWHERE

SECRET

BE ONLY A ROUTINE EQUIPMENT FAILURE. GUARDS ON MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND ELSEWHERE IN DUBAI HAVE BEEN INCREASED AND ARE WEARING BATTLE EQUIPMENT, BUT OTHERWISE SITUATION IS NORMAL AND BRITISH AND U S COMMUNITIES ARE RELAXED.

3. SHAIKH MOHAMMED IS KEEN TO REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT AND EXCHANGE INFORMATION WITH ME. GRATEFUL IF WE COULD BE INCLUDED, WITH HIGH PRIORITY, IN REPETITION OF ALL RELEVANT TELEGRAMS.

CARRINGTON

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IRAN/IRAQ

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MR BRAITHWAITE
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OO BAGHDAD

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DESKBY 241700Z

FROM KUWAIT 241500Z SEPT
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO DISTRESS 32 OF 24/9/80.
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.

YOUR TEL NO DISTRESS 19: EVACUEES FROM IRAQ.

1. AT 0230 THIS MORNING WHEN VICE-CONSUL ROSE LEFT THE BORDER ABOUT 420 BRITISH NATIONALS HAD CROSSED INTO KUWAIT. THERE WERE NONE LEFT ON THE IRAQI SIDE.

2. WE HAVE NOT HEARD SINCE OF ANY BRITISH WAITING THERE. WE HAVE PLANNED TO MAKE A PHYSICAL LATER TODAY.

2. WE HAVE NOT HEARD SINCE OF ANY BRITISH WAITING THERE. WE HAVE PLANNED TO MAKE A PHYSICAL LATER TODAY.

3. NEARLY ALL THE 220 ALREADY THROUGH WERE FROM THE BOMBED CONSTRUCTION SITE AT KHOR AL ZUBAIR. VERY FEW WERE FROM BASRAH TOWN. THEY DID NOT HAVE INFORMATION ABOUT NUMBERS STILL IN BASRAH, BUT WE WILL INVESTIGATE THIS FURTHER. (WE HAVE HAD ONE TELEPHONE CENQUIRY FROM UK ABOUT PERSONS SAID TO BE IN BASRAH BUT NOT IN OUR LISTS.)

4. WE THINK IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE FOR CONSULAR OFFICER TO VISIT BASRAH, INCLUDING HOSPITALS (OUR TEL NO 404 OF 23/9 REFERS).

5. AMERICAN EMBASSY HAVE HEARD FROM THREE AMERICANS STILL AT THE BOMBED SITE THAT THE BODIES OF THE PERSONS KILLED WERE UNIDENTIFIABLE AND WERE BURIED. THE REMAINING AMERICANS ARE EXPECTED TO EVACUATE TO KUWAIT SHORTLY.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250435Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1353 OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1980
INFO PRIORITY DELHI, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN.
INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, MOSCOW, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, JEDDA
ANKARA.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, 24 SEPTEMBER, NEW YORK.

IRAN/IRAQ

1. LORD CARRINGTON ASKED RAO HOW THE INDIANS, WHO ENJOYED CLOSE RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, INTERPRETED THE LATTER'S RECENT ACTIONS.

2. RAO SAID IT WAS NOT ALWAYS EASY TO UNDERSTAND ONE'S FRIENDS. THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE FOR THE ESCALATION OF THE LONG-RUNNING DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, AND IRAQ'S ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES, WERE NOT CLEAR TO THE INDIANS. HOWEVER, THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN CONVINCED THAT KHOMEINI WAS FOMENTING TROUBLE IN THEIR COUNTRY, HENCE THEIR DESIRE TO RETALIATE. RAO THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE CONTINUING CONFUSION AND NEAR-ANARCHY IN IRAN, BUT DID NOT EXPECT THE COUNTRY TO DISINTEGRATE. NOR DID HE EXPECT THE TUDEH PARTY TO TAKE CONTROL, THOUGH HE DID NOT EXCLUDE ITS POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN A COALITION.

3. RAO WAS INCLINED TO AGREE WITH LORD CARRINGTON THAT UN MEMBERS WERE TAKING TOO RELAXED A VIEW (HE ASCRIBED THIS TO A GENERAL FEELING OF ''SERVE THEM RIGHT''). MISHRA SUGGESTED THAT THE 5 PERMANENT MEMBERS SHOULD GET TOGETHER, AS PROLONGATION OF THE DISPUTE WAS IN NONE OF THEIR INTERESTS.

4. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE INDIANS ACTING AS INTERMEDIARIES WAS NOT RAISED ON EITHER SIDE.

5. SEE MIFT FOR DISCUSSION ON AFGHANISTAN.

PARSONS

IRAN/IRAQ

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MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
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ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

Prime Minister

MAP

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 250015Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1350 OF 24 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON PARIS BONN
INFO PRIORITY TO BAGHDAD
INFO AMMAN DAMASCUS KUWAIT MUSCAT JEDDAH ANKARA MOSCOW

FOLLOWING FROM HEAD OF NEWS DEPARTMENT

STRAIT OF HORMUZ

1. I UNDERSTAND THAT AFTER TODAYS NSC, MR MUSKIE WAS ASKED BY REPORTERS: ''WHAT ABOUT THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, MR SECRETARY? IS THERE A BIG FOUR PLAN TO KEEP THEM OPEN?''. HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE ANSWERED ''THERE ARE CONSULTATIONS GOING ON''. UPI HAVE REPORTED THAT THE US IS CONSULTING WITH ITS ALLIES ON CONTINGENCY PLANS TO KEEP THE STRAIT OPEN. FRANCOIS PONCET IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID AFTER LUNCH WITH MUSKIE THAT THE FOUR HAD AGREED THAT THE CONTINUED FLOW OF OIL WAS OF VITAL INTEREST.

2. IN RESPONSE TO INSISTENT QUESTIONS ON THE SUBJECT, WE ARE TAKING THE FOLLOWING LINE.
(A) AS THE NINE SAID IN THEIR STATEMENT LAST NIGHT, IT IS IMPERATIVE NOT TO INFRINGE THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF.
(B) THE IMMEDIATE THREAT TO NAVIGATION IS NOT THE PHYSICAL INTERDICTION OF TRAFFIC BUT THE DETERRANT AFFECT OF THE CONFLICT ITSELF AND THE REACTION OF UNDERWRITERS TO IT. THEREFORE THE URGENT NEED IS TO END THE WAR.
(C) THERE IS NO QUESTION OF A MILITARY PLAN. THERE IS A SERIES OF URGENT CONSULTATIONS ON HOW TO STOP THE WAR.
PARSONS

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

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PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
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~~SIR J GRAHAM~~
MR J C MOBERLY
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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 242250Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1348 OF 24 SEPTEMBER
INFO WASHINGTON PARIS BONN MOSCOW BAGHDAD NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD
UKDEL NATO AMMAN

MY TELNOS 1339 AND 1340 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ

1. THERE WAS NO FURTHER ACTIVITY BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY (24 SEPTEMBER). THERE IS WIDE AGREEMENT WITH THE VIEW YOU EXPRESSED IN YOUR MEETING WITH WALDHEIM AND AT YOUR PRESS CONFERENCE HERE (MY TELNOS 1325, 1332 AND 1333) THAT THE COUNCIL OUGHT TO BE DOING SOMETHING TO TRY TO PREVENT THE CONFLICT DEVELOPING. BUT WITH THE ARABS DIVIDED ON WHAT, IF ANYTHING, SHOULD BE DONE HERE (WALDHEIM TOLD ME TODAY THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM KING HUSSEIN A LETTER WHICH SUPPORTED THE IRAQIS 100 PERCENT) AND WITH THE LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET OPPOSITION, NO ONE IS PREPARED TO TAKE THE LEAD IN ASKING FOR A FORMAL MEETING OF [illegible] THOSE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS SUCH AS BANGLADESH AND

NO ONE IS PREPARED TO TAKE THE LEAD IN ASKING FOR A FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. THOSE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS SUCH AS BANGLADESH AND TUNISIA WHO FEEL MOST STRONGLY THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE WANT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO USE HIS POWERS UNDER ARTICLE 99 OF THE CHARTER TO BRING THE MATTER TO THE COUNCIL'S ATTENTION. BUT WALDHEIM FEELS, APPARENTLY WITH SOME BITTERNESS, THAT HE IS ALREADY IN AN EXPOSED POSITION AND HE TOLD ME TODAY THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO STICK HIS NECK OUT FURTHER. ALL HE HAS DONE TODAY IS TO FORWARD TO BANI SADR AND SADDAM HUSSEIN THE TEXT OF LAST NIGHT'S STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, THOUGH HE HOPES TO SPEAK TO BANI SADR BY TELEPHONE LATE TONIGHT.

3. THIS IS A SORRY SITUATION, WHICH CONFIRMS YET AGAIN THAT THE COUNCIL FINDS GREAT DIFFICULTY IN ACTING EFFECTIVELY ON A CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. THE INHIBITIONS ARE OF COURSE PARTICULARLY STRONG WHEN BOTH COMBATANTS ARE MAJOR OIL PRODUCERS.

3. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED WE HAVE LEARNT THAT AN IRAQI ENVOY (ISMET KITTANI) IS DUE HERE OVERNIGHT AND WILL SEE THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TOMORROW MORNING (25 SEPTEMBER) -C.F. BAGHDAD TELNO 428.

PARSONS

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FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 242146Z SEPT 80

Prime Minister

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1346 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

To see all

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV BEIRUT DAMASCUS AMMAN CAIRO

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD WASHINGTON PARIS BONN JEDDA KUWAIT

INFO SAVING MUSCAT ABU DHABI QATAR BAHRAIN KHARTOUM TRIPOLI TUNIS RABAT.

MAP 26/9

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY: SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER: 24 SEPTEMBER IN NEW YORK.

IRAN/IRAQ

1. SHAMIR USED THIS TO ILLUSTRATE HIS ARGUMENT THAT THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM WAS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE TROUBLED SITUATION IN THE AREA. LORD CARRINGTON SAID HIS INTERPRETATION WAS THAT THE IRAQIS HAD DECIDED THAT THE PRESENT TIME OF IRANIAN WEAKNESS WAS THE MOMENT TO PURSUE THEIR LONG STANDING DEMANDS. WHETHER THEY ALSO WANTED TO BRING DOWN KHOMEINI AND BANI SADR WAS A MATTER FOR SPECULATION. IF SO, THEY MIGHT NOT HAVE THOUGHT THROUGH THE CONSEQUENCES. A FRAGMENTED IRAN MIGHT NOT EVEN SUIT THE RUSSIANS: THEY WOULD PREFER TO TAKE OVER THE COUNTRY INTACT. SHAMIR EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT SADDAM HUSSAIN, WHOM HE SAW AS ASPIRING TO THE MANTLE OF NASSER.

ARAB/ISRAEL

2. SHAMIR SAW THE IRAN/IRAQ CRISIS AS IMPROVING THE PROSPECTS OF PROGRESS ON THIS, BECAUSE THE PROBLEM WOULD BE LESS IN THE LIME-LIGHT AND SADAT LESS OBLIGED TO LOOK OVER HIS SHOULDER AT THE REST OF THE ARABS, THE NON-ALIGNED, ETC. SHAMIR EXPLAINED HIS HOPES FOR THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS IN THE COMING MONTHS. NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE RESUMED, PROBABLY IN OCTOBER. THERE WAS THE IDEA OF A SUMMIT AFTER THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS, AND TALK OF A SUMMIT USUALLY LED TO IT BEING HELD. THERE WERE SOME POSSIBILITIES OF REACHING A CERTAIN AGREEMENT ON AUTONOMY. AFTER THAT THE ATTITUDES OF THE LOCAL POPULATION WOULD BECOME CLEAR, AND ISRAEL HOPED THAT NEW ELEMENTS WOULD EMERGE WHEN, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THERE WAS THE CHANCE OF ELECTED PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATING IN NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE AREA.

3. SHAMIR ASKED WHAT THE NINE WOULD DO WHEN THE THORN MISSION WAS CONCLUDED. HE HOPED THERE WOULD NOT BE SOME NEW DECISION DAMAGING TO THE ISRAEL/EGYPT NEGOTIATIONS. LORD CARRINGTON HOPED THAT ANY DECISION BY THE NINE WOULD BENEFIT THE SITUATION AS A WHOLE.

4. ON JERUSALEM, SHAMIR RECALLED THAT THIS HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY SET ASIDE AT THE TIME OF CAMP DAVID ITSELF. IT WAS STILL USELESS TO THINK OF DISCUSSING IT.

5. LORD CARRINGTON SAW THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM AS INTER-CONNECTED WITH OTHERS. MANY ISLAMIC COUNTRIES WERE UNWILLING TO PUT THEIR EFFORTS BEHIND GETTING THE SOVIET UNION OUT OF AFGHANISTAN SO LONG AS THERE WAS NO PROGRESS ON ARAB/ISRAEL, WHICH TO THEM WAS MORE IMPORTANT.

6. SHAMIR SAID HE WAS AWARE OF THIS LINE OF THOUGHT, BUT THE ISRAELI VIEW WAS THAT PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SETTLED ONE BY ONE. THE ZONE OF STABILITY CREATED BY THE ISRAEL/EGYPT PEACE TREATY WOULD BE ENLARGED IF THERE WERE AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT. AFTER THAT THERE WOULD BE THE CHANCE OF BRINGING IN JORDAN. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT WOULD BE RECOGNISED BY ANY ARAB COUNTRY. SHAMIR SAID THAT EGYPT, AND SADAT PERSONALLY, HAD AT ONE TIME BEEN BITTERLY HOSTILE TO ISRAEL. THEY HAD CHANGED, AND ONE DAY ALL ARABS MIGHT CHANGE.

7. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT ANYTHING WAS POSSIBLE ONE DAY, BUT MEANWHILE THE WORLD FACED A PERIOD OF VERY GREAT DANGER. THE ARAB STATES WERE BEING DRIVEN TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. SHAMIR DOUBTED IF THIS WAS HAPPENING, OR AT LEAST NOT BECAUSE OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. HE SAW NO OTHER WAY FORWARD THAN CAMP DAVID, DIFFICULT AND SLOW THOUGH THIS MIGHT BE. HE CONCEDED THAT IT WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT THE PALESTINIANS WOULD WANT TO TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS: SO LONG AS THERE WAS NO AUTONOMY AGREEMENT, ISRAEL COULD NOT BEGIN TO IDENTIFY PALESTINIANS TO WORK WITH. BUT WITH AN AGREEMENT THEY COULD SEE WHERE THEIR INTERESTS LAY AND WOULD COME FORWARD.

8. LORD CARRINGTON SUPPOSED THAT THE REFERENCES TO THE PLO HAD BEEN THE CAUSE OF ISRAEL'S PARTICULAR OBJECTION TO THE VENICE DECLARATION BY THE NINE AND OF SHAMIR'S DISOBLIGING REMARKS ABOUT HIM PERSONALLY. DID ISRAEL REALLY BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS POSSIBLE WITHOUT TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE PLO? SHAMIR REPLIED THAT PROGRESS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE WITH THE PLO. THEIR RAISON D'ETRE WAS REJECTION OF PEACE WITH ISRAEL. THEIR METHODS MIGHT BE THE SAME AS MUGABE'S, BUT THEIR AIM WAS DIFFERENT IN KIND. THEY WANTED A FREE ARAB PALESTINE AND THE ABOLITION OF THE JEWISH STATE. A RETURN TO THE 1967 FRONTIERS WAS ONLY THE FIRST STAGE FOR THEM. THEY HAD MADE THEIR BELIEFS CLEAR IN DAMASCUS IN MAY.

9. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT SUCH A POLICY WAS, OF COURSE, TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO BRITAIN AND THE NINE. THE PLO MUST RECOGNISE ISRAEL, AND ABANDON THE COVENANT. BUT SO LONG AS ISRAEL HAD NOT EVEN ATTEMPTED TO TALK TO THE PLO, SHE COULD NOT PROVE THAT HER VIEW OF THE PLO WAS THE RIGHT ONE. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO IMAGINE A LASTING SETTLEMENT WITHOUT BRINGING IN THE PLO. SHAMIR REPEATED THAT HIS VIEW WAS THE EXACT OPPOSITE, AND IT WAS SHARED BY HIS GOVERNMENT AND HIS PARTY.

LEBANON

10. SHAMIR SAID THAT AS A COUNTRY LEBANON DID NOT EXIST. THE GOVERNMENT WAS A FICTION AND ITS TERRITORY WAS OCCUPIED BY SYRIANS, THE PLO AND VARIOUS ARMED GROUPS. ISRAEL HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS OR AMBITIONS.

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11. LORD CARRINGTON ASKED WHETHER ISRAEL WOULD CARRY OUT MORE STRIKES AGAINST LEBANON. SHAMIR SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE STRIKES BUT THEY WOULD BE AGAINST THE PLO. GREAT TROUBLE WAS TAKEN NOT TO HARM CIVILIANS. THE STRIKES WERE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE PLO RAIDING ISRAELI VILLAGES. IT WAS BETTER TO HANDLE MATTERS IN THIS WAY THAN WAIT FOR A SPECTACULAR PLO ATTACK, TO WHICH ISRAEL WOULD BE BOUND TO RETALIATE.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO MUSCAT ABU DHABI QATAR BAHRAIN KHARTOUM TRIPOLI TUNIS RABAT

PARSONS

(Repetition to. BEIRUT referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts.)

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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Prime Minister

MAP 26/IX

UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 240600Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1342 OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1980
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, BONN, KUWAIT, JEDDA, ABU DHABI, AMMAN DAMASCUS.
INFO SAVING ROME, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, UKREP BRUSSELS, DUBLIN, ATHENS, MADRID, LISBON.

IRAQ/IRAN

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NINE MEETING IN NEW YORK LATE ON 23 SEPTEMBER:-
BEGINS
1. THE NINE STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY EXPRESS THEIR DEEP CONCERN AT THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN.
2. THEY NOTE THE BILATERAL NATURE OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT AND STRESS THE NEED TO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT GIVE IT A BROADER DIMENSION. IN THIS CONNECTIONS, THEY LOOK TO OTHER STATES, PARTICULARLY THE GREAT POWERS, TO MAINTAIN THE RESTRAINT WHICH THEY HAVE SHOWN.
3. THEY SUPPORT THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND, IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONSULTATIONS PUT IN HAND BY MR WALDHEIM, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DECLARE THEMSELVES READY TO SUPPORT ANY INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE LIKELY TO PROMOTE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE.
4. THEY RECALL THE CAPITAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF, WHICH IT IS IMPERATIVE NOT TO INFRINGE.
5. THEY DECIDE TO CONTINUE TO FOLLOW CLOSELY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION AND THEY HOLD THEMSELVES READY TO SUPPORT THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION.
ENDS
F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ROME, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, UKREP BRUSSELS, DUBLIN, ATHENS, MADRID, LISBON.

PARSONS

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

IRAN/IRAQ

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 240515Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1341 OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1980
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, BAGHDAD.
INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, MADRID, UKDEL NATO.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH GROMYKO, 23 SEPTEMBER.

IRAQ/IRAN

1. LORD CARRINGTON SOUNDED OUT GROMYKO'S ATTITUDE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF MINISTERIAL PARTICIPATION IN SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS, AND TO A SECURITY COUNCIL CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE. GROMYKO WAS RELUCTANT ON BOTH COUNTS. THE SITUATIC WAS UNCLEAR, AND THERE WAS A LACK OF INFORMATION. EVERYONE MIGHT BE WISER TOMORROW. HE WAS NOT SURE THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING WOULD BE WISE EVEN THEN. MOREOVER, FIGHTING MIGHT HAVE STOPPED BY THEN. SADDAM HUSSAIN HAD SAID THAT IRAQ HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST IRAN: IT WAS STRANGE THAT THE FIGHTING SHOULD CONTINUE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. HE SUSPECTED THAT THE 1975 AGREEMENT ON SHATT AL ARAB HAD BEEN TOO HASTILY CONCLUDED, AND WAS NOT A RELIABLE AGREEMENT.

2. GROMYKO'S GENERAL ATTITUDE ON THIS SUBJECT WAS EVASIVE AND NON-COMMITTAL, THOUGH THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALSO THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE AN ELEMENT OF GENUINE UNCERTAINTY IN HIS MIND ABOUT WHAT WAS GOING ON ON THE GROUND, AND ABOUT HOW THE RUSSIANS SHOULD RESPOND.

AFGHANISTAN

3. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE DID NOT PROPOSE GOING OVER THE GROUND ON AFGHANISTAN ONCE AGAIN, HAVING HEARD GROMYKO'S SPEECH. BUT HE WAS AFRAID THAT THE WHOLE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EASTERN AREA WAS BECOMING DANGEROUS. GROMYKO RE-STATED THE SOVIET POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN IN CRISP TERMS. THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE TO PAST PROPOSALS. THERE COULD BE NO POLITICAL SOLUTION WITHOUT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AND IRAN. EVEN WITHOUT A SOLUTION AFGHANISTAN WOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE, AND ENCROACHMENTS FROM OUTSIDE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE REPULSED. SOVIET TROOPS WOULD REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO REAL FORCE FOR THEM TO MATCH THEIR STRENGTH AGAINST. THESE TROOPS WERE A STABILISING FACTOR, WHO WOULD LEAVE ONLY WHEN THERE WAS A COMPLETE END TO OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

4.

4. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT AGA SHAHI WAS DISAPPOINTED AT THE SOVIET REJECTION OF HIS SUGGESTION FOR A CONFERENCE, EVEN THOUGH SOME PEOPLE THOUGHT THAT A CONFERENCE MIGHT BE BENEFICIAL TO PEOPLE THEY WERE NOT ANXIOUS TO RECOGNISE. GROMYKO SAID THAT THERE WAS NOTHING FOR A CONFERENCE TO DO, LEAST OF ALL DISCUSS A POSSIBLE CHANGE OF REGIME. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS AN END TO INTERFERENCE. AFGHANISTAN WAS ALREADY NON-ALIGNED. IN THE PAST BRITAIN HAD PLAYED A ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD, BUT SHE WAS NOW FOLLOWING IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF THOSE WHO SENT ARMS TO AFGHANISTAN, INSTEAD OF APPEALING FOR REALISM. THE AFGHANS HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, BUT NOBODY WOULD TALK TO THEM ABOUT THE NEED TO LIVE IN PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP. IF THE PAKISTANIS HAD TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, THEY MUST BE WRONG IN THE HEAD.

5. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO SEE A GOVERNMENT HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN. NOR DID WE WISH FOR DISTURBANCES ON SOVIET BORDERS. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND BRITISH VIEW WAS NOT ALL THAT GREAT: WE WISHED FOR A NEUTRAL NON-ALIGNED GOVERNMENT WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE, WHICH INCLUDED HELP GIVEN TO THE RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN, FROM WHEREVER IT CAME, AND SOVIET FORCES. GROMYKO MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRESENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET TROOPS FRIGHTENED THE PAKISTANIS AND IRANIANS. LAST TIME THEY HAD MET LORD CARRINGTON HAD BEEN GLAD TO HEAR GROMYKO'S ASSURANCES THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO DESIGNS ON OIL IN THE GULF, AND WOULD LIKE TO HEAR CONFIRMATION OF THIS. GROMYKO SAID THAT HE WAS READY TO REPEAT THESE ASSURANCES A HUNDRED TIMES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS TILTING AT WINDMILLS: HE COULD NOT POSSIBLY BELIEVE THAT SOVIET FORCES WOULD REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN REACHED WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN. EITHER WE WERE UNDER A MISAPPREHENSION OR WE WERE MERELY FOLLOWING OUR AMERICAN ALLIES, WHICH WAS WORSE. OBSOLETE CONCEPTS ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES CLEARLY PREVAILED IN LONDON. HOW WAS IT POSSIBLE TO THINK THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT AFTER ALL GO FOR THE OIL AND THE PERSIAN GULF, DESPITE THEIR ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY?

6. LORD CARRINGTON HOPED THAT THE RUSSIANS COULD UNDERSTAND THAT GENUINE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION SOMETIMES AROSE, AND REFERRED TO GROMYKO'S DISMISSIVE ATTITUDE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT WHEN THEY HAD MET IN NEW YORK LAST YEAR. THERE WERE A MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THE BORDER WAS DIFFICULT TO POLICE. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS RECIPROCITY, AND THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TRUST. THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM WAS ONE OF TIMING. IT SHOULD NOT BE BEYOND THE WIT OF MAN TO OVERCOME THIS.

7. FINALLY LORD CARRINGTON ASKED GROMYKO TO STOP JAMMING THE BBC. GROMYKO TRIED TO TURN THIS ASIDE WITH A LABOURED JOKE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE PERSISTED, POINTING OUT THAT JAMMING WAS IN RECONCILABLE WITH THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS. GROMYKO ARGUED THAT THE FINAL ACT AT HELSINKI DID NOT PERMIT INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE HOPED THAT EVERYONE WOULD KEEP THEIR COOL IN MADRID. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT DEMAGOGY OR PROPAGANDA, AND WOULD REBUFF ANYONE WHO TOOK THIS ATTITUDE. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT A REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT IN MADRID WOULD BE ESSENTIAL. IT WAS NOT A GOOD BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN STATES TO IGNORE THINGS THAT HAD HAPPENED, AND TO PAPER OVER CRACKS.

PARSONS

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Prime Minister

MAP 26/X

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FM HAVANA 241440Z SEPT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 367 OF 24 SEPTEMBER
AND PRIORITY INFO TO BAGHDAD
AND INFO SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

CUBA/MIDDLE EAST

1.. FOREIGN MINISTER MALMIERCA DEPARTED ON 23 SEPTEMBER FOR IRQ ACP AND IRAN WITH MESSAGES FOR BOTH HEADS OF STATE FROM CASTRO AS PRESIDENT OF NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT.

2.. OFFICIAL NEWSPAPER PROMINENTLY REPORTS THAT CASTRO GAVE MALMIERCA LAST MINUTE INSTRUCTIONS AT AIRPORT, AND THAT THE CUBAN MOVE IS DESIGNED TO STOP THE FIGHTING BETWEEN TWO NON ALIGNED COUNTRIES.

3.. FCO PLEASE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

CCN..... PARA 1 LNE 2....IRAQ AND IRAN ETC

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SECRET
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TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 201 OF 24 SEPT
FOLLOWING TLEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE
WAS RECEIVED FROM KUWAIT TELEGRAM NO 409 OF 24 SEPT.

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
AND TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD AND JIC LONDON,
INFO MUSCAT, DOHA, BAHRAIN, JEDDA, ABU DHABI, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

YOUR TEL 194 OF 23 SEPT TO ABU DHABI

IRAN/IRAQ

HAVING EXPLAINED TO THE MFA THAT I HAD BEEN ASKED FOR THE VIEWS OF SHAIKH SABAH AL AHMAD IN ORDER TO REPORT THEM TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE I WAS GIVEN AN EARLY APPOINTMENT WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT 1100 HOURS. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HEAD OF CHANCERY.

2. THE MINISTER OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE WOULD SPEAK FRANKLY FOR HIS FRIEND LORD CARRINGTON.

3. HE SAID THAT THE KUWAIT GOVT'S INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACTUAL HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE SEVERELY LIMITED AND HE RELIED MAINLY ON NEWSPAPER AND RADIO REPORTS. IT OCCURS TO ME THAT HIS OFFICE WOULD WELCOME THE OCCASIONAL REPORT FROM US ON THE LINES OF EDITED JICTELS AND I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THIS COULD BE CONSIDERED.

4. SHAIKH SABAH SAID THAT NATURALLY KUWAIT AS THE SMALL AND NEAREST NEIGHBOUR TO BOTH STATES WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FIGHTING AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT ENDED. THIS WAS TRUE FOR THE OTHER GULF STATES AND THEY WOULD WELCOME MEDIATION, BUT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ARAB COUNTRIES BECOMING MEDIATORS BECAUSE IT WAS OBVIOUS THEY MUST SIDE WITH THEIR ARAB BROTHER, IRAQ. HOWEVER, IRAN WAS A GULF STATE AS WAS IRAQ AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES. THEY DID NOT WANT TO BECOME ENEMIES OF IRAN AND FOR THIS REASON KUWAIT WOULD NOT GIVE UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY TO ITS ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ. HE DID NOT THINK THE HOSTILITIES WERE ENTIRELY OUT OF CONTROL. BOTH SIDES WERE AWARE OF THE LIMITS TO THEIR MILITARY CAPACITY AND DID NOT HAVE ALL-OUT WAR IN MIND.

5. HE THOUGHT THAT MEDIATION WHICH COULD INVOLVE THE ARAB STATES COULD BEST COME UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THE ISLAMIC LEAGUE AND HE SAID AN INITIATIVE OF THE SORT HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE LEAGUE SECRETARY TO HAVE THE SUBJECT BROUGHT UP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED TO LEARN OF THE RUSSIAN AND GERMAN ATTITUDE THAT BECAUSE THE PROPOSAL HAD NOT BEEN INITIATED BY EITHER IRAN OR IRAQ THERE WAS NO NEED TO TREAT THE SUBJECT AS OFFICIAL. THINKING ALOUD HE WONDERED WHY THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD NOT HAVE [illegible] THE SUBJECT.

6. THE LOCAL PRESS CARRIES REPORTS TODAY THAT THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE WARNED THE GULF STATES NOT TO ALLOW IRAQ TO USE THEIR PORT AND AIRPORT FACILITIES AND HAD THREATENED "SEVERE RETALIATION" AGAINST ANY STATE WHICH DOES SO. I ASKED IF THIS WAS TRUE. THE MINISTER SAID THAT A MESSAGE HAD BEEN RECEIVED BUT IT HAD BEEN MORE A REQUEST THAT A THREAT. IN ANY CASE, KUWAIT DID NOT HEED THREATS OF RETALIATION. KUWAIT HAD CERTAIN CONTRACTS CONCERNING PORT FACILITIES WITH IRAQ. THESE HAD TO BE CARRIED OUT. IF ANY THREATS RESULTED FROM THIS HIS GOVERNEMT WOULD ASK IF IT WAS INTENDED TO MAKE WAS AGAINST KUWAIT. THE MINISTER MADE NO MENTION OF THE REPORT CONTAINED IN OUR TELNO 405 OF 23 SEPTEMBER (NOT TO ALL) THAT IRAN HAD BEEN REFUSED AND IRAQ HAD BEEN GRANTED FACILITIES FOR FIGHTER AIR SPACE AND REFUELLING. THE OIC BRITISH MILITARY LIAISON TEAM WHO WAS THE ORIGINAL SOURCE NOW TELLS ME THIS HAS BEEN RESCINDED.

7. SPEAKING ABOUT HORMUS, THE MINISTER ASKED HOW THE IRANIANS COULD CLOSE THE STRAITS. I TOLD HIM HOW AND HE THEN REFERRED TO THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN NAVAL VESSELS OUTSIDE THE GULF AND SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT THIS WOULD DETER ANY SUCH ACTION BY THE IRANIANS WHO HE THOUGHT HAD NO INTENTION OF PREVENTING THE OIL OF THE ARAB STATES PASSING THROUGH THE GULF. THIS LAST OPINION IS SUPPORTED BY LOCAL REPORTS THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE ONLY MADE THREATS AGAINST SHIPPING IN THE GULF WHICH IS CARRYING SUPPLIES FOR IRAQ. THE MINISTER MADE IT CLEAR THIS WAS THE SORT OF THREAT WHICH KUWAIT WOULD NOT HEED.

8. I ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THAT EITHER IRAQ OR IRAN WERE READY FOR COMPROMISE . THE MINISTER SAID THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF THIS.

9. WE THEN TURNED TO THE RUSSIAN AMBITIONS AND I DREW ON PARA 7 OF JICTEL 845. HE DISCOUNTED ANY IDEA THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD WANT TO INTERVENE DIRECTLY. WHY SHOULD THEY? ALL THEY WISHED FOR WAS HAPPENING IN IRAN WHILE THEY WAITED ACROSS THE FRONTIER. IF INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION DETERIORATED IN THE COUNTRY IT WOULD HELP THE TUDEH TO POWER. KHOMEINI HAD KILLED OFF ALL THE TOP AND CAPABLE PEOPLE IN THE ARMED FORCES.

10. THIS AND THE MENTION OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES BROUGHT THE MINISTER TO ONE OF HIS FAVOURITE THEMES, NAMELY, THAT THE TWO GREAT POWERS WERE DIRECTORS OF A FILM IN WHICH ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE GULF REGION WERE PLAYERS. ON THE MINISTER'S ANALOGY I THINK HE MEANS PUPPETS ACTIVATED BY TWO PUPPET MASTERS. WE THEN GOT ON TO THE SUBJECT OF THE THREAT TO KUWAIT AS NEAREST NEIGHBOUR TO THE TWO BIG LOCAL POWERS AT WAR. I ASKED HOW KUWAIT COULD PRESERVE ITS INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY IF EITHER SHOULD VIOLATE ITS SOVEREIGNTY. THE MINISTER SAID THERE WAS NOTHING KUWAIT COULD DO BUT HOPE THAT IT WOULD NOT HAPPEN. THIS WAS WHY THE GIVT WANTED MEDIATION TO TAKE PLACE AND THE FIGHTING TO STOP. IT WAS ALSO WHY KUWAIT'S POLICY WOULD BE TO TRY AND APPEAR AS NEUTRAL AS POSSIBLE GIVEN THAT SHE WAS AN ARAB STATE LIKE IRAQ, AND IRAN WAS NOT.

11. OF COURSE, KUWAIT HAS MADE MILITARY DISPOSITIONS ON ITS FRONTIERS, GARRISONED ITS OFF-SHORE ISLANDS AND INCREASED AIR SURVEILLANCE. (MY TEL NO 405 NOT TO ALL). BUT THE MINISTER IS CORRECT IN THE IMPLICATION THAT THESE ARE COSMETIC MEASURES. KUWAIT COULD NOT BY ITSELF CONTAIN DETERMINED AGGRESSION BY EITHER IRAQ OR IRAN. THAT IS WHY ITS POLICY IS THAT OF TRYING TO BE ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN. AND THIS ACCURATELY REFLECTS MY SUMMING UP OF KUWAIT'S SITUATION AND POLICY AT THE PRESENT TIME.

12. IN CONCLUSION I THANKED THE MINISTER FOR THE FULL SUPPORT WE HAD RECEIVED FROM HIS MINISTRY IN CLEARING THE C.250 BRITISH REFUGEES FROM IRAQ THROUGH BORDER FORMALITIES YESTERDAY (23 SEPT), ALTHOUGH IN FACT THE SPIRIT OF THEIR INSTRUCTIONS WAS NOT APPARENT AT THE BORDER WHERE IT MATTERED. I ASKED IF HE STILL INTENDED TO GO TO NEW YORK. HE SAID HE HOPED SO BUT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE UP HIS MIND FOR AT LEAST 2 DAYS. IF HE DID SO, HE HOPED HE COULD MEET LORD CARRINGTON AND HE GAVE HIS SECRETARY INSTRUCTIONS TO LET ME HAVE DETAILS OF HIS DATES AND TIMINGS.

CCN PARA 6 LINE 10 MAKE WAR REPEAT WAR NOT WAS

CARRINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 242222Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4093 OF 24 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, ALGIERS AND BAGHDAD

M I P T
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THE FIGHTING SHOULD BE PROMPTLY TERMINATED. ANY GRIEVANCES BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ SHOULD BE SETTLED AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND NOT ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

WE STRONGLY SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, BOTH THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALSO BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO BRING THIS FIGHTING TO A PROMPT END AND TO OBTAIN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

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I KNOW THAT THE CONFLICT HAS CAUSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN THAT WORLD OIL SUPPLIES MIGHT BE SEVERELY REDUCED, THEREFORE DRIVING UP OIL PRICES AND ENDANGERING THE CONOMIC SECURITY OF THE CONSUMING NATIONS. THIS CONCERN IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE PRESENT SITUATION. IT IS TRUE THAT OIL COMPANIES AND SHIPMENTS DIRECTLY TO IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE BEEN INTERRUPTED OR SUSPENDED DURING THE OUTBREAK OF THE HOSTILITIES. BUT EVEN IF THIS SUSPENSION OF IRAN AND IRAQI SHIPMENTS SHOULD PERSIST FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME, THE CONSUMING NATIONS CAN COMPENSATE FOR THIS SHORTFALL.

OIL INVENTORIES IN THE WORLD'S MAJOR OIL-CONSUMING NATIONS ARE NOW AT AN ALL TIME HIGH. THE WORLD'S MARGIN OF OIL SUPPLY SECURITY IS MUCH GREATER TODAY, THAN IN THE WINTER OF 1978 AND '79, WHEN THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION REDUCED OIL SUPPLIES AT A TIME WHEN RESERVE OIL SUPPLIES WERE ERY LOW.

OUR GREATER SECURITY TODAY IS DUE IN PART TO ENERGY CONSERVATION AND ALSO TO THE SUBSTITUTION OF OTHER FUELS FOR OIL, BOTH IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN OTHER CONSUMING NATIONS.

THIS HAS FACILITATED THE BUILDING UP OF RESERVE STOCKS TO MUCH MORE SATISFACTORY LEVELS THAN DID OCCUR IN 1979. HENCE, THERE IS NO REASON FOR REPETITION OF THE SHORTAGES OR THE PRICE ESCALATION THAT RESULTED IN 1979. OF COURSE, A TOTAL SUSPENSION OF OIL EXPORTS FROM THE OTHER NATIONS WHO SHIP THROUGH THE PERSIAN GULF REGION WOULD CREATE A SDRIOUS THREAT TO THE WORLD'S OIL SUPPLIES AND CONSEQUENTLY A THREAT TO THE ECONOMIC HEALTH OF ALL NATIONS.

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ENDS.

2. PLEASE PASS ADVANCE COPY TO D G B JONES, DEPT OF ENERGY.

HENDERSON

11/30/79

NNNN

X-20

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
~~SIR E YOUDE~~
~~SIR I GRAHAM~~
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
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HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
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RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

Prime Minister

IMMEDIATE

MAP

ADVANCE COPY

GR280
CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 242040Z
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4092 OF 24 SEPT 80.
INFO IMMEDIATE UK MIS NEW YORK
INFO ROUTINE BONN, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, PARIS AND ALGIERS.

MY TELEGRAM NO 4080 (NOT TO ALL)

IRAQ/IRAN.

1. THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL IN WASHINGTON THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT. IT WAS EVIDENTLY DECIDED THAT MUSKIE WOULD HANDLE THE IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-UP IN NEW YORK AND LITTLE INFORMATION IS YET AVAILABLE HERE. THE MAIN DECISIONS OF WHICH WE HAVE HEARD ARE:

(A) THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO REAFFIRM U.S. NEUTRALITY AND NON-INVOLVEMENT AND TO TRY TO CALM THE WORLD OIL MARKET (TEXT IN M.I.F.T.),

(B) THAT MUSKIE WOULD CONCERT WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS ON FURTHER

(B) THAT MUSKIE WOULD CONCERT WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS ON FURTHER ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TRY TO SECURE A CEASE-FIRE;

(C) THE U.S. WOULD CONSULT BRITAIN AND FRANCE, AS THE ONLY OTHER WESTERN POWERS WITH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA, ABOUT CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE CLOSURE OF THE HORMUZ STRAITS.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THEY HAVE NOT SPOKEN TO THE RUSSIANS IN WASHINGTON ON THE LINES ENVISAGED YESTERDAY (PARA 3 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE), BUT THAT IF MUSKIE HAS NOT YET TALKED TO GROMYKO IN NEW YORK HE WILL TAKE THE SUBJECT UP WITH HIM AT THE MEETING ALREADY ARRANGED FOR TOMORROW.

3. ACCORDING TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT ALGERIA IS EMERGING AS THE FAVOURED CANDIDATE FOR A MEDIATORY ROLE.

HENDERSON

NNNN

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22 21

PS
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PS/MR HURD
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~~SIR E YOUDE~~
~~SIR J GRAHAM~~
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
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CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
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PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

COPIES TO
MR D.G.B.JONES D/ENERGY.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 242222Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4093 OF 24 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, ALGIERS AND BAGHDAD

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ENDS.

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HENDERSON

NNNN

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

IMMEDIATE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
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RESIDENT CLERK

Prime Minister

MP 26/IX

GR 450
UNCLASSIFIED
FM BAGHDAD 241255Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 428 OF 24/9/,0
AND IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

IRAQ/IRAN

1. DICKSON WAS CALLED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF CHINA AND BANGLADESH AMBASSADOR WERE ALSO PRESENT. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WITH WHOM THE MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED, AND THE UNDER SECRETARY, AL QAIS, HEAD OF THE LEGAL DEPARTMENT, SAID THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ WISHED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS RELATING TO THE CALL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TO CONSIDER EVENTS BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

2. IRAQ ACCEPTED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD THE POWER UNDER ARTICLE 99 TO CONVENE SUCH A MEETING. BUT IRAQ WISHED TO MAKE ITS POSITION CLEAR AND STRESSED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(1) AS ALREADY COMMUNICATED TO GOVERNMENTS THROUGH THEIR MISSIONS IN BAGHDAD, IRAQ HAD TERMINATED THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT ON 17 SEPTEMBER. THIS WAS DONE UNDER PARA 4 OF THE

MISSIONS IN BAGHDAD, IRAQ HAD TERMINATED THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT ON 17 SEPTEMBER. THIS WAS DONE UNDER PARA 4 OF THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE IRAN ITSELF CONSIDERED THE AGREEMENT INVALID. THE DETAILED EVIDENCE OF THIS HAD BEEN SENT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN A LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER WITH A REQUEST THAT THE LETTER SHOULD BE CIRCULATED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

(2) OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS IRAQ HAD EXHAUSTED ALL PEACEFUL MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL TO GET IRAN TO HONOUR THE 1975 AGREEMENT. BECAUSE IRAN HAD NOT RESPONDED IRAQ HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. IRAQ HAD NO EXPANISIONIST TERRITORIAL DESIGNS AGAINST IRAN.

(3) IRAQ HAS CLEARLY STATED THAT IT IS NOT (NOT) INTERESTED IN ESCALATING THE CONFLICT. UNFORTUNATELY IRAN HAD DONE SO AND ITS INDISCRIMINATE ACTION AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF IRAQ, THE REGION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY LEFT IRAQ WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENCE.

(4) IRAQ HAS NOTHING TO HIDE AND IS FULLY PREPARED TO PRESENT ITS POINT OF VIEW BEFORE THE COUNCIL AS SPECIFICALLY STATED IN THE LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. IRAQ HAS TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT IT CONSIDERS IT WOULD BE HIGHLY IRREGULAR AND UNFORTUNATE IF THE COUNCIL WERE TO ARRIVE AT ANY CONCLUSIONS BEFORE IRAQ WERE GIVEN ITS RIGHTFUL HEARING.

2. AL QAIS IN ASKING US TO PUT THESE FOUR POINTS TO OUR GOVERNMENTS REPEATED POINT 4 WITH GREAT EMPHASIS.

EGERTON

NNNN

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
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HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

ADVANCE COPY

GR 950
RESTRICTED
FM BAGHDAD 240922Z SEP 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 427 OF 24/9/80
ND PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, JEDDA, ANKARA, WASHINGTON, AND MOSCOW

IRAQ/IRAN SITREP: MY TEL NO 423.

1. BY THE EVENING OF 23 SEPTEMBER IRAQ CLAIME TO HAVE SURROUNDED MOHAMMERAH (~~KK~~KHORRAMSHAHR), DESTROYED OIL ISTALLATIONS AT ABADAN, CAPTURED QASR-I-SHIRIN AND TO HAVE REACHED MEHRAN. FOLLOWING A NUMBER OF AIR ATTACKS ON BAGHDAD, BASRA AND OTHER IRAQI CITIES, DURING 23 SEPT, IRAQ CLAIMS TO HAVE SHOT DOWN SIXTY SEVEN IRANIAN AIRCRAFT AND HAS AGAIN ACCUSED THE IRANIANS OF HITTING CIVILIAN TARGETS.

2. THE GENERAL COMMAND OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES ISSUED EIGHT STATEMENTS DURING 23 SEPTEMBER NUMBERED 3 TO 10 IN THE CURRENT SERIES. SUMMARY AS FOLLOWS:

STATEMENT 3

IN RESPONSE TO IRAN'S CLOSING OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUS, AT [illegible] HOURS ON 23 SEPTEMBER IRAQI FORCES ADVANCED ON DESIGNATED

IN RESPONSE TO IRAN'S CLOSING OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUS, AT 0300 HOURS ON 23 SEPTEMBER IRAQI FORCES ADVANCED ON DESIGNATED TARGETS AND TOOK CONTROL OF VITAL POSITIONS INSIDE IRAN. THE POSITIONS WOULD BE RELINQUISHED ONLY IF IRAN RECOGNISED IRAQ'S SOVERIEGNTY OVER ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY.

STATEMENT4.

ON THE MORNING OF 23 SEPTEMBER IRANIAN AIRCRAFT STRUCK AT SIX IRAQI AIR FIELDS AND BOMBED CIVILIAN AREAS IN BAGHDAD, NINEVEH, BASRA AND NASIRIYA, KILLING AND WOUNDING A NUMBER OF CIVILIANS INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN. THERE WERE 20 DEAD AND 50 WOUNDED AT THE PETRO-CHEMICAL COMPLEX (KHOR AL ZUBAIR) NEAR BASRA. IRAQI FIGHTERS AND GROUND DEFENCE FORCES ALLEGEDLY SHOT DOWN 7 IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ~~XXXXXX~~ IN MOSUL, 5 INBASRA, 4 IN BAGHDAD, 2 IN HABBANIYA,
2 AT KUT, 2 AT NASIRIYA.

AT 0630 IRAQI AIRCRAFT RAIDED DEZFUL AND SHAHROKH AIR BASES AND AHWAZ MILITARY AIR FIELD. HEAVY LOSSES WERE INFLICTED. ONE IRAQI AIRCRAFT WAS LOST.

STATEMENT 5

IRAQI CASULATIES DURING THE DAWN AIR ATTACKS WERE GIVEN AS :- BAGHDAD 18 DEAD, 42 WOUNDED IN 4 RESIDENTIAL AREAS. MOSUL, 24 WOUNDED: BASRA, 29 KILLED AND 50 WOUNDED.

STATEMENT 6.

STATEMENT 6 REPEATED IRAQ'S WARNING THAT IF IRAN CONTINUED TO ATTACK IRAQI CIVILIAN AND MILITARY TARGETS IRAQ WOULD RETALIATE IN KIND.

STATEMENT 7

THE IRAQI AIRFORCE ATTACKED IRANIAN MILITARY BASES AS FOLLOWS:-

0625 HOURS HAMADAN

0630 ,, DEZFUL

1055 ,, BOSHAHR

1115 ,, TABRIZ

1115 ,, TABRIZ

3 IRAQI LOST AT 1145 HOURS, TWO PHANTOMS AND TWO OTHER AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN AT UMM QASR. AT 1330 HOURS FIVE IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED KIRKUK AND ALL WERE SHOT DOWN. A FURTHER IRANIAN AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN.

STATEMENT 8

IRAQI FORCES IN CONTROL OF SUMAR AND QASR -I - SHIRIN HAVING ISOLATED MOHAMMERAH AND ABADAN, PUTTING IRANIAN FORCES TO FLIGHT.

STATEMENT 9

ON THE AFTERNOON OF 23 SEPTEMBER IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED IRAQI CITIES AS FOLLOWS:-

1645 HOURS 3 RAIDS AT RASHID AIR BASE AND BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT: 9 OUT OF 20 IRANIAN PHANTOMS SHOT DOWN.

1850 HOURS BAGHDAD CITY: 5 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN. BASRA AIRPORT AND VITAL INSTALLATIONS IN BASRA ATTACKED: 6 F AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN.

1530 HOURS OIL INSTALLATION IN FAO ATTACKED , 2 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN

1700 HOURS ATTACK AT AL NAJHIBIYA DISTRICT OF BASRA. ONE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN

1230 HOURS ATTACK AT KIRKUK AIR FIELD AND VITAL INSTALLATIONS 6 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN.

1700 HOURS ATTACK AT KIRKUK MILITARY INSTALLATIONS: ONE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN

1730 HOURS ATTACK AT KIRKUK MILITARY INSFSLLATIONS: 3 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN.

2 MORE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN, ONE FOLLOWING AN ATTACK AT ERBIL AIR FIELD AND ONE IN DOKAN.
IRAQI AIRCRAFT ATTACKED AND DESTROYED OIL INSTALLATIONS IN ABADAN AND 5 IRANIAN SHIC[illegible]

FIELD AND ONE IN DOKAN.
IRAQI AIRCRAFT ATTACKED AND DESTROYED OIL INSTALLATIONS IN ABADAN AND 5 IRANIAN SHICI.

STATEMENT 10

POSITIONS REACHED BY IRAQI AIRFORCES IN IRAN ON 23 SEPTEMBER:

NORTHERN SECTOR IRAQI FORCES IN CONTROL OF SUMAR, SARBIL, THAHAB AND QASWWAUB-SHIRIN.

CENTRAL SECTOR IRAQI FORCES REACHED MEHRAN

SOUTHERN SECTOR IRAQI FORCES SURROUNDING MOHAMMERAH AND THE ROAD FROM MOHAMMERAH TO AHWAZ CUT. IRAQI FORCES HAVE PENETRATED 15 KMS.

IRAQI LOSSES GIVEN PROVISIONALLY AS 4 AIRCRAFT LOST, ONE OFFICER AND 4 OTHER RANKS KILLED AND 11 WOUNDED.

3. IRAQ RADIO ANNOUNCED THIS MORNING (24 SEPTEMBER) THAT IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ATTACKED BASRA EARLY TODAY AND HIT THE OIL REFINERY AND THE DEEP WATER PORT. A BUSINESSMAN IN BASRA WHO TELEPHONED US AT 1030 HOURS SPOKE OF TWO AIR RAIDS AND A LARGE FIRE AT THE REFINERY, WITH A TICK PALL OF SMOKE COVERING PART OF THE CITY. IRAQI RADIO ALSO REPORTS AN ATTACK ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AT ERBIL. IRAQI AIRCRAFT HAVE ATTACKED IRIANIAN BASES INCLUDING TABRIZ, AHWAS, KERMANSHAH AND SANADAJ, WITH FOUR PHANTOMS SAID TO HAVE BEEN DESTROYED ON THE GROUND. THERE ARE NO (NO) FURTHER REPORTS OF THE FIGHTING ROUND KORRAMSHAHR.

4. THE FIGURE OF SIXTY-SEVEN IRANIAN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IS ALMOST CERTAINLY AN EXAGGERATION, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE A NUMBER OF EYE WITNESS ACCOUNTS. I MYSELF SAW SIX IRANIAN JETS SHOT DOWN, FOUR BY SAM MISSILES (PROBABLY SAM 7S), AND TWO BY ORDINARY ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE. THIS MORNING'S RAIDS PROVE THAT IRANIAN LOSSES, HOWEVER SERVERE, HAVE NOT DISSUADED THEM FROM MOUNTING FRESH ATTACKS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO (NO) RAIDS ON BAGHDAD SINCE EARLY YESTERDAY EVENING.

5. THE ASSISTANT DA, WHO CALLED ON THE MILITARY ILTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT THIS MORNING, SAW TWO BUS LOADS OF BLINDFOLDED IRANIAN PRISONERS BEING DRIVEN IN. HE WAS TOLD THAT 128 MEN AND 4 OFFICERS HAD BEEN CAPTURED. THE MOOD OF THE IRAQIS SEEMS BUOYANT

DEPARTMENT THIS MORNING, SAW TWO BUS LOADS OF BLINDFOLDED IRANIAN PRISONERS BEING DRIVEN IN. HE WAS TOLD THAT 128 MEN AND 4 OFFICERS HAD BEEN CAPTURED. THE MOOD OF THE IRAQIS SEEMS BUOYANT, AT LEAST IN BAGHDAD, WHERE THOUSANDS WATCHED IRANIAN AIRCRAFT BEING BLOWN OUT OF THE SKY ON 23 SEPTEMBER WITH THE ENTHUSIASM OF A FOOTBALL CROWD.

EGERTON

1312

NNNN

GR 480
RESTRICTED
FM AMMAN 241145Z SEP 80
TO FLASH BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 033 OF 24 SEP
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, PRIORITY DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, UKMIS NEWYORK AND WASHINGTON
BAGHDAD TELNO 31: DEPARTURE OF DEPENDANTS OF BRITISH BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN IRAQ.

1. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE PALACE AND THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES WHO HAVE PROMISED EVERY ASSISTANCE IN COPING WITH THE FIRST AND SUBSEQUENT PARTIES. AS SOON AS WE HEAR THAT THE FIRST GROUP HAVE LEFT BAGHDAD, MY CONSUL OLIVER MINTO WILL LEAVE FOR H4. HE WILL GO ON TO RUTBA IF IRAQI EMBASSY AGREE TO ISSUE A VISA (WE ARE STILL TRYING TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM). ON ORDERS FROM THE KING, THE JORDANIAN POLICE ARE OFFERING US EVERY HELP INCLUDING DOD AND FIRST AID AT H4 AND TO SEND TRANSPORT FROM H4 TO RUTBA IF NECESSARY. WE SHALL HAVE RECEPTION PARTY READY AT THE EMBASSY TO LOOK AFTER THE GROUP WHEN THEY REACH AMMAN AND HAVE TENTATIVELY BOOKED SUFFICIENT HOTEL BEDROOMS TO COVER THEIR NEEDS FOR TONIGHT. THE BRITISH AIRWAYS REGULAR DIRECT FLIGHT TO LONDON LEAVES AMMAN ON THURSDAY AT 0940 BUT COULD BE DELAYED IF NECESSARY. THERE ARE 140 SEATS AVAILABLE ON IT AT THE MOMENT. BRITISH AIRWAYS REPRESENTATIVE IS ALSO ASKING HIS HEAD OFFICE WHETHER BA COULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL CHARTER FLIGHTS TO FLY OUT SUBSEQUENT GROUPS.

2. THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY I FORESEE IS IF LARGE NUMBERS OF THE EVACUEES WISH TO STAY IN AMMAN RATHER THAN GOING ON TO BRITAIN AS HOTEL ACCOMMODATION IS UNLIKELY TO BE SUFFICIENT. THE SUBSEQUENT INFLUX ANTICIPATED IN YOUR PARA 5, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD CONVINCE AS MANY AS POSSIBLE TO GO DIRECTLY TO BRITAIN, THUS VACATING SPACE IN HOTELS FOR SUBSEQUENT GROUPS. THERE WILL OF COURSE BE A GREAT DEAL OF COMPETITION FOR AVAILABLE ROOMS: I HAVE ALREADY HEARD FROM MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE THAT A GROUP OF 100 ITALIANS IS LEAVING BAGHDAD TODAY FOR AMMAN AND NO DOUBT OTHER FOREIGN COMMUNITIES WILL FOLLOW. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, MY EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES WHOM I SAW THIS MORNING SEE ADVANTAGE IN SENDING FUTURE CONVOYS ON A COMMUNITY BASIS, SO THAT WE CAN THEN POOL RESOURCES HERE TO COPE WITH THE INFLUX.

3. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, ANY INFORMATION YOU CAN LET US HAVE IN ADVANCE CONCERNING CONVOYS, IE NAMES OF TRAVELLERS, WHETHER THEY HAVE FRIENDS OR COLLEAGUES IN AMMAN WHO MIGHT ACCOMMODATE THEM, HOW MANY CAN AGREE TO PROCEED TO LONDON BY FIRST AVAILABLE MEANS, THIS WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IN SORTING THEM OUT WHEN THEY ARRIVE HERE.

4. FCO ONLY: TELEPHONE AND DWS WILL BE MANNED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT AND WE ARE LIKELY TO HAVE MANY MESSAGES FOR RELATIVES OF PEOPLE WHO AGREE TO TRAVEL ON TO LONDON TOMORROW MORNING: NO DOUBT YOU WILL HAVE STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS IN CONSULAR DEPARTMENT TO COPE WITH THIS.

5. INTIL FIRST CONVOY IS SAFELY THROUGH, I THINK THE LESS SAID PUBLICLY ABOUT THE ARRANGEMENTS WE ARE MAKING THE BETTER. BUT THERE WOULD OF COURSE BE NO OBJECTION TO STATING THAT THE EMBASSY ARE MAKING PREPARATION TO RECEIVE EVACUEES WITH THE FULL COOPERATION AND HELP OF THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES.

URWICK

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD	COD
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UND	CONS D
EESD	CONS EM UNIT
ECD	CABINET OFFICE
WED	
MAED	

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

ADVANCE COPY

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
HD/CONS D
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ES & SD
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HD/DEF D
PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

GR 180
RESTRICTED
FM BAGHDAD 241443Z SEP 80
TO FLASH AMMAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 32 OF 24/9/80
AND IMMEDIATE FCO AND UK MIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT, JEDDA, DAMASCUS AND WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 31 TO AMMAN: BRITISH COMMUNITY DEPENDENTS.
1. BRITISH CLUB MANAGED TO CHARTER ONE DESERT BUS AND THIS LEFT BAGHDAD FOR RUTBA AT 1300Z, WITH 42 PERSONS ON BOARD (INCLUDING ONE BABY). TWELVE OTHER MOSTLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN LEFT IN TWO MINIBUSES SEPARATELY AT 1215Z.

2. BALANCE OF ORIGINAL ONE HUNDRED HAVE BEEN VACILLATING BUT NOW SAY THEY PLAN TO TRAVEL IN DESERT BUSES TOMORROW, 25 SEPTEMBER. OTHERS MAY THEN JOIN THEM. IN ANY CASE AMMAN SHOULD PLEASE NOT (NOT) DESPATCH FURTHER BUSES TO RECEIVE SECOND CONVOY UNTIL WE CAN JUDGE UPSHOT OF FIRST BATCH'S SUCCESS IN SERMOUNTING EXIT FORMALITIES AT RUTBA CONTROL POST, AND MILITARY POSTS BEFORE RUTBA.

3. POSITION WILL BE REVIEWED AT THIRD MEETING WITH BRITISH COMMUNITY LEADERS AT 0900Z 25 SEPTEMBER. EMBASSY AND COUNCIL STAFF WITH YOUNG CHILDREN CONTENT TO AWAIT OUTCOME OF FIRST BUS JOURNEY.

4. AMMAN TEL 33 JUST RECEIVED. ON HOTELS THE REDUCED NUMBER IN FIRST BATCH SHOULD HELP A LITTLE. THE TWELVE PERSONS IN THE SELTRUST MINIBUSES WISH TO TRAVEL TO THE UK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SO ALSO DO CAPT. WHITE AND B.A. TECHNICAL CREW WHO ARE ON THE MAIN BUS, PLUS TWO MILLROYS AND TWO RAYMENTS, TOTAL TWENTY-ONE.

EGERTON

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LVO 246
FDW G 088/24

CYPHER

00 BELGRADE

GR 270

SECRET

SECRET
FM F.C.O. 241400Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 198 OF 24 SEPTEMBER.

FOR ALEXANDER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE WAS RECEIVED FROM ABU DHABI TELEGRAM NUMBER 297 OF 24 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE DUBAI, MODUK, WASHINGTON AND BAGHDAD
ROUTINE DOHA, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, JEDDA AND MUSCAT
INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS AND MOSCOW AND
UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 194 OF 23 SEPTEMBER: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I AGREE GENERALLY WITH JIC ASSESSMENT IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO 76 OF 23 SEPTEMBER TO DOHA. SUBJECT TO BAGHDAD'S VIEWS, HOWEVER, I FEAR THAT IRAQI AMBITIONS MAY GO A LITTLE FURTHER THAN INDICATED IN THE LAST SENTENCE. IN PARTICULAR, I WONDER WHETHER THE RULER OF RAS AL KHAIMAH MAY NOT HAVE ENTERED INTO SOME KIND OF DEAL WITH THE IRAQIS. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HERE DRAWING ON INDEPENDENT SOURCES BELIVES THIS MAY BE THE CASE.

2. IN THE ABSENCE OF RASHID ABDULLAH I AM SEEING THE UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT 1000 LOCAL TIME TOMORROW. ON MY INSTRUCTIONS HM CONSUL GENERAL IN DUBAI IS SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT WITH MOHAMMED BIN RASHID OR RASHID HIMSELF, WHICHEVER IS THE QUICKER.

3. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO URGE THE UAE TO SUPPORT A CEASE-FIRE IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND AT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. HE IS TO STRESS UNITED STATES CONCERN:

(A) TO ENSURE OIL SUPPLIES:
(B) TO PRESERVE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAN:
(C) TO PREVENT SOVIET INTERVENTION.

SECRET

HE WISHED US TO KNOW OF THIS ACTION.

CARRINGTON

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 241315Z SEP 8Ø
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 193 OF 24 SEP
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NO REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT.
WAS RECIEVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1342 OF 24 SEP

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW BONN KUWAIT
JEDDA ABU DHABI AMMAN DAMASCUS
INFO SAVING ROME LUXEMBOURG THE HAGUE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN
UKREP BRUSSELS DUBLIN ATHENS MADRID LISBON

IRAQ/IRAN

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE FOREIGN MINSTERS OF
THE NINE MEETING IN NEW YORK LATE ON 23 SEPTEMBER:-
BEGINS
1. THE NINE STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY EXPRESS THEIR DEEP
CONCERN AT THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN.
2. THEY NOTE THE BILATERAL NATURE OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT AND
STRESS THE NEED TO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT GIVE IT A BROADER
CDIMENSION. IN THIS CONNCETIONS THEY LOOK TO OTHER STATES,
PARTICULARLY THE GREAT POWERS. TO MAINTAIN THE RESTRAINT WHICH
THEY HAVE SHOWN.
3. THEY SUPPORT THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC
CONFERENCE FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND, IN CONNECTION
WITH THE CONSULTATTIONS PUT IN HAND BY MR WALDHEIM, SECRETARY-
GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DECLARE THEMSELVES READY TO S
SUPPORT ANY INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE LIKELY TO PROMOTE A
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE.
4. THEY RECALL THE CAPITAL IMPORTANCE OFOR THE GULF, WHICH IT IS
IMPERATIVE NOT TO INFRINGE.
5. THEY DECIDE TO CONTINUE TO FOLLOW CLOSELY DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE SITUATION AND THEY HOLD THEMSELVES READY TO SUPPORT THE
SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION.
ENDS
F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ROME LUXEMBOURG THE HAGUE BRUSSELS
COPENHAGEN UKREP BRUSSELS DUBLIN ATHENS MADRID LISBON.

CARRINGTON

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM F C O 241207Z SEPTEMBER 8Ø
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE (FOR ALEXANDER PS/PM)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 191 OF 24 SEPTEMBER.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF P. OFF. WAS RECEIVED FROM MOSCOW TELNO 578 OF 23/9.

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND ROUTINE BONN, PARIS AND BAGHDAD.

YOUR TEL TO WASHINGTON NO 1534: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AZIZ ARRAVED IN MOSCOW ON 21 SEPTEMBER. HE HAD A MEETING YESTERDAY WITH PONOMAREV AND WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MALTSEV. THE SOVIET PRESS ANNOUNCED THE FACT BUT GAVE NO DETAILS. HE LEFT AGAIN ON 22 SEPTEMBER.

2. THE SOVIET PRESS CONTINUES TO PRINT THE VIEWS OF THE OPPOSING SIDES AT ROUGHLY EQUAL LENGTH WITHOUT COMMENT. HOWEVER, SOME SLIGHT PRO-IRAQI SHADING MAY BE SEEN IN THE SELECTION OF RECENT REPORTS FROM BAGHDAD WHICH PRESENT THE IRAQI ACTION AS LARGELY DEFENSIVE. IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH A MEMBER OF CHANCERY, A SOVIET MFA OFFICIAL SIMILARLY APPEARED TO BE LEANING SLIGHTLY TOWARDS THE IRAQI POSITION, POINTING OUT THAT THE IRANIANS HAD BYGCHEIR OWN ADMISSION FAILED TO FULFIL THEIR AID OF THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT AND DESCRIBING THE IRANIAN SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD CEASE ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAQ AS ''ILLOGICAL'' IN VIEW OF THE BILATERAL FRIENDSHIP TREATY.

3. I AGREE GENERALLY WITH THE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION IN PARA 3 OF TUR. THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IS CLEARLY ONE WHICH NEEDS TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. THE EXAMPLE OF AFGHANISTAN SUGGESTS THAT THEY WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THIS AS A POSSIBLE OPTION IF THEY BELIEVED IT WOULD SERVE THEIR POLITICAL AND SECURITY INTERESTS, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THEY COULD REACH SUCH A CONCLUSION. THEIR MAIN LONG-TERM CONCERN IS PROBABLY TO SEE THE WEAKENING ON F KHOMEINI, AND A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN IRAN'S INTERNAL POSITION, WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS WOULD FURTHER WEAKEN IRANIAN OPPOSSITION TO THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND IN DUE COURSE OPEN THE WAY TO A TAKE OVER BY THE PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS IN IRAN ITSELF. THEY ARE THEREFORE LIKELY TO CONCLUDE THAT THEIR INTERESTS WILL BE BETTER SERVED BY AVOIDING INVOLVEMENT AND ALLOWING THE IRAQIS TO TEACH THE IRANIANS A LESSON RATHER THAN BY ANY OCCUPATION OF IRANIAN TERRITORY BY THEMSELVES. THEY MIGHT AT SOME POINT - BUT NOT YET - BE TEMPTED TO OFFER MEDIATION AS A MEANS OF EXTENDING THEIR OWN INFLUENCE. FOLLOWING AZIZ'S VISIT, THEY MAY HAVE GOT A REASONABLY CLEAR PICTURE OF IRAQI INTENTIONS AND HAVE INDICATED THE LIMITS OF THEIR ACQUIESCENCE.

CARRINGTON

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 240943Z SEP 8Ø
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 189 OF 24 SEPTEMBER
(FOR ALEXANDER, PM'S PARTY)
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPARTMENT
WAS RECEIVED FROM BAGHDAD TELNO 424 OF 23 SEPTEMBER

IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK KUWAIT AND AMMAN
INFO PRIORITY JEDDA DAMASCUS ANKARA BAHRAIN AND WASHINGTON
MY TELNO 419: IRAQ/IRAN. MIERS DICKSON TELECON.
1. CALLED MEETING OF AS MANY HEADS OF BRITISH FIRMS OPERATING IN BAGHDAD AS WE COULD CONTACT AT 1Ø15Z TODAY 23 SEPTEMBER.
2. WE SAID WE WERE NOT (NOT) AT PRESENT ADVISING BRITISH SUBJECTS TO LEAVE IRAQ BUT THAT WE WERE ADVISING THOSE WHO DID NOT HAVE ESSENTIAL BUSINESS TO POSTPONE THEIR TRAVEL PLANS (PARA 4 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE).
3. AIRPORTS REMAIN CLOSED AND B.A. HAVE EITHER CANCELLED THEIR FLIGHTS FOR BAGHDAD OR WILL TERMINATE THEM IN AMMAN OR DAMASCUS UP TO AND INCLUDING FRIDAY 26 SEPTEMBER.
4. MOST REPRESENTATIVES AGREE THAT THEY WANTED DEPENDANTS TO LEAVE BY ROAD VIA RUTBA TO AMMAN. THEY ARE TO HAVE A MEETING AT Ø6ØØZ ON 24 SEPTEMBER AT WHICH H.M. CONSUL WILL BE PRESENT SO AS TO DISCUSS DETAILS. A FURTHER MEETING WITH H.M. AMBASSADOR IS ARRANGED FOR Ø9ØØZ TO DISCUSS THEIR CONCLUSIONS.
5. EXIT PERMITS ARE LIKELY TO BE A PROBLEM AND WE SHALL TAKE THIS UP AGAIN WITH MFA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

CARRINGTON

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OO BELGRADE

GR 370

SECRET
FM F C O 240944Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 188 OF 24 SEPTEMBER.

FOR ALEXANDER, PM'S PARTY.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE WAS RECEIVED FROM BONN TELEGRAM NUMBER 699 OF 23 SEPTEMBER 80
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW
INFO SAVING BAGHDAD

YOUR TELNO 1534 TO WASHINGTON: IRAQ/IRAN
1. AT LUNCH TODAY, VAN WELL GAVE ME AND MY AMERICAN, CANADIAN AND NETHERLANDS COLLEAGUES THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ASSESSMENT OF EVENTS IN IRAQ AND IRAN.
2. IN VAN WELL'S VIEW, THE IRAQI MOTIVATION IN ATTACKING IRAN WAS TWO-FOLD: FIRST, TO SEIZE A FAVOURABLE OPPORTUNITY TO REVERSE THE BORDER AGREEMENT OF 1975, WHICH, IN THE IRAQI VIEW HAD BEEN IMPOSED UNDER DURESS. NOW THAT THE KURDS WERE UNDER CONTROL AND THE IRANIAN ARMY IN DISARRAY, THE OPPORTUNITY WAS TOO GOOD TO BE MISSED. SECONDLY, THE IRAQIS WISHED TO DESTROY IRANIAN CONTROL OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, ON WHICH THE IRAQIS WERE FAR MORE DEPENDENT THAN THE IRANIANS FOR THE PASSAGE OF OIL. VAN WELL TENDED TO DISCOUNT THE PROCLAIMED IRAQI INTENTION OF QUOTE SHATTERING THE KHOMEINI REGIME UNQUOTE. THIS WAS TYPICAL ARAB HYPERBOLE. KHOMEINI HAD BEEN THREATENING THE IRAQI REGIME WITH SIMILAR DIRE PROSWECTS FOR MONTHS AND IT WAS NATURAL THAT THE IRAQIS SHOULD NOW EXPRESS SIMILAR AIMS. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE FIRST TWO MOTIVES WERE ENOUGH IN THEMSELVES AND HE THOUGHT, ON BALANCE, THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT WELL BE SUCCESSFUL IN ACHIEVING THEM. WHETHER OR NOT THE COLLAPSE OF THE IRANIAN REGIME FOLLOWED SUCCESS ON THE OTHER TWO FRONTS WAS ANOTHER MATTER. BUT IT WAS A LIKELY CONSEQUENCE, NOT A WAR AIM.
3. AS FAR AS THE RUSSIANS WERE CONCERNED, VAN WELL SAID THAT THE GERMAN VIEW WAS THAT WHEN MUSKIE MET GROMYKO ON 25 SEPTEMBER THEY SHOULD QUOTE EXCHANGE ASSURANCES OF NON-INTERVENTION UNQUOTE. THE FEDERAL GERMANS BELIEVED THAT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT WITH TO INTERVENE. THEY THOUGHT IT MORE LIKELY THAT THEY WISHED TO RESERVE FOR THEMSELVES THE POSSIBILITY OF MEDIATION IN THE DISPUTE. THE GERMANS HAD NOTED THAT THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, AZIZ, HAD BEEN SENT TO MOSCOW AT THE WEEKEND, DOUBTLESS TO EXPLAIN TO THE RUSSIANS WHAT THE IRAQIS WERE UP TO AND TO ASK FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THEIR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, BUT THE GERMANS HAD ALSO NOTICED THAT AZIZ HAD BEEN RECEIVED AT A COMPARATIVELY LOW LEVEL AND WAS ALREADY BACK IN BAGHDAD. CLEARLY THE RUSSIANS WERE HOLDING BACK AND WISHED TO AVOID BEING DRAWN TOO MUCH TO ONE SIDE.

CARRINGTON

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GR 650

CONFIDENTIAL
FM JEDDA 241117Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 696 OF 24 SEPTEMBER
AND IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, ATHENS, BELGRADE
INFO PRIORITY MUSCAT, DOHA, ABU DHABI, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DUBAI, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BOON.

YOUR TELNO 194 TO ABU DHABI: IRAQN/IRAQ

1. I TALKED TODAY WITH THE HEAD OF THE ARAB DEPARTMENT IN THE MFA. AMBASSADOR SHURA IS INTELLIGENT, EXPERIENCED AND SUFFICIENTLY SELF-CONFIDENT TO SPEAK FAIRLY FRANKLY.

2. HE SAID THE SITUATION WAS AN EXCEPTIONALLY DIFFICULT ONE FOR SAUDI ARABIA. THEY HAD INTERESTS ON BOTH SIDES. IRAQ WAS A CLOSE NEIGHBOUR AND FELLOW MEMBER OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND AT THE MOMENT RELATIONS WERE GOOD. ON THE OTHER HAND IRAN WAS ALSO A NEIGHBOUR, AN ISLAMIC STATE AND A COUNTRY OF IMPORTANCE AND STANDING WITH WHOM IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD GET ON WELL. RECENTLY RELATIONS WITH IRAN HAD NOT BEEN GOOD BUT SAUDI ARABIA HAD RESISTED PROVOCATION AND HAD WORKED HARD TO IMPROVE MATTERS.

3. SHURA SAID I WOULD HAVE NOTICED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD ISSUED NO STATEMENT SO FAR. THEY WERE NOT SURE OF THE FACTS, THOUGH IT LOOKED TO HIM, SPEAKING ENTIRELY PERSONALLY, AS IF IRAQ HAD STARTED THE TROUBLE. THE SAUDIS' FIRST FEELING WAS THE OBVIOUS ONE OF SORRO THAT TWO MUSLEM STATES SHOULD BE QUARELLING. BUT THEY THOUGHT THAT IN ANNOUNCING THE CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ IRAN HAD GONE TOO FAR. THE MFA HAD PREPARED A DRAFT STATEMENT FOR SUBMISSION TO PRINCE FAHD. SHURA READ IT TO ME, EMPHASISING THAT FAHD MIGHT WELL CHANGE IT OR EVEN NOT AGREE TO ISSUE IT. IT CONDEMNED THE IRANIAN ANNOUNCEMENT, SAYING THAT IT WENT CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, TO THE RIGHTS OF OTHER GULF STATES AND TO THE CLAIMS OF FRIENDSHIP AND GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS. IT WENT ON TO CALL ON BOTH SIDES TO FOLLOW THE PATH OF WISDOM AND RESORT TO PEACEFUL MEANS TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTE. I ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY MOVE AFOOT TOWARDS MEDIATION BY THE ARAB LEAGUE OR THE LEAGUE OF ISLAMIC STATES. SHURA SAID THE QUESTION HAD BEEN RAISED BY ALGERIA BUT HAD NOT BEEN FOLLOWED THROUGH. IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE ARABS TO CALL FOR MEDIATION, GIVEN THEIR OBLIGATION TO HELP A FELLOW ARAB STATE IN DIFFICULTY AND GIVEN (THIS WAS SAID RATHER CYNICALLY) THAT IRAQ SEEMED TO HAVE THE UPPER HAND AT THE MOMENT. PERHAPS A NON-ARAB MUSLIM STATE IN THE AREA OUGHT TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE - POSSIBLY PAKISTAN. BUT THE TIME WAS PROABLY NOT RIPE YET. IN ANY CASE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ALL ISLAMIC STATES WERE NOW IN NEW YORK AND WOULD PRESUMABLY BE DISCUSSING THE MATTER URGENTLY.

A

4. AS FOR IRAQI MOTIVES, SHURA THOUGHT THEY WERE MIXED. CERTAINLY SADDAM HUSSAIN HAD BEEN PROVOKED BY IRANIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE KURDS AND THE SHIA. HE ALSO WANTED TO GET RID OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT WHICH HE HAD DESCRIBED AS SHAMING. HE PROBABLY HOPED TO WIN DOMESTIC SUPPORT, WHICH THE BA'ATH CERTAINLY NEEDED, BY MEANS OF A VICTORY. AND HE PROBABLY HOPED TO WIN PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE AS A NEW MILITARY POWER IN THE REGION, THOUGH HIS GAINS IN THIS DIRECTION IN THE EYES OF THE ARABS WOULD BE COUNTER-BALANCED BY THE FEELINGS OF RESENMENT THAT WERE LIKELY TO BE RAISED AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED. ALTOGHETHER, WHEN HE HAD SEEN IRAN'S MILITARY WEAKNESS, AND HER INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND HER BAD IMAGE IN THE EYES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BECAUSE OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES, HE HAD FOUND THE TEMPTATION TOO HARD TO RESIST.

5. ON THE COURSE OF THE FIGHTING AND THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS, SHURA HAD NO INFORMATION. THEY WERE OUT OF TOUCH WITH THEIR EMBASSY IN TEHRAN, BECAUSE (HE THOUGHT) OF IRANIAN ACTION. AND THOUGH THEY HAD ASKED OTHER GULF STATES FOR INFORMATION NONE HAD BEEN FORTHCOMING. HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING THAT WE COULD PASS ON. I SAID THAT IT WAS OF COURSE DIFFICULT FOR ANY FOREIGN OBSERVERS TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION OF THIS SORT, GIVEN THE SECURITY RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY BOTH SIDES. BUT IF THERE EVER IS ANYTHING WHICH I CAN PASS ON I THINK IT WOULD HELP OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SAUDIS IF YOU COULD AUTHORISE ME TO DO SO.

6. IN CONCLUSION SHURA REITERATED THE DIFFICULTY WHICH FACED SAUDI ARABIA. EVEN THOUGH THEIR RELATIONS WITH IRAN HAD NOT BEEN GOOD FOR SOME TIME, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO TAKE SIDES AGAINST HER. I ENQUIRED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE IRAQIS REQUESTED SAUDI SUPPORT (TO-DAY'S LOCAL PRESS SAYS THAT AN IRAQI EMISSARY HAS BEEN HERE). SHURA EVADED THE QUESTION BY SAYING THAT IRAQ HAD NO NEED OF SAUDI SUPPORT. HE HAD NOTHING TO SAY ABOUT OIL EXCEPT THAT OF COURSE SAUDI INTERESTS REQUIRED SAFE PASSAGE FOR TANKERS THROUGH AND OUT OF THE GULF.

CRAIG

CCN PREAMBLE .. IRAN/IRAQ.

1405/24

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SECRET

CYPHER

OO BELGRADE

GRS 234

SECRET
FM FCO 241645Z SEPTEMBER 80
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 763 OF 24 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE (FOR ALEXANDER)

FOR PS
1. AS REQUESTED FOLLOWING IS NAVAL DISPOSITION IN THE GULF:

IRAN:
3 DESTROYERS
8 FRIGATES
9 MISSILE PATROL CRAFT
7 LARGE AND 20 SMALL PATROL CRAFT
12 LARGE AND 8 SMALL HOVERCRAFT
2 LANDING SHIPS
2 LOGISTIC SUPPORT SHIPS

IRAQ:
12 OSA MISSILE CRAFT
12 MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
2 FLEET MINESWEEPERS
3 INSHORE MINESWEEPERS
4 LANDING CRAFT
2 LARGE PATROL CRAFT
8 SMALL PATROL CRAFT

KUWAIT:
NIL

UAE:
6 MEDIUM AND 3 SMALL PATROL CRAFT
2 LARGE MISSILE PATROL CRAFT (NOT OPERATIONAL)

QATAR:
6 MEDIUM PATROL CRAFT

OMAN:
6 MISSILE PATROL CRAFT
1 LOGISTIC LANDING CRAFT
6 SMALL LANDING CRAFT
1 ARMED YACHT
1 FREIGHTER

BAHRAIN:
20 COASTAL GUARD PATROL CRAFT

SOVIET UNION:
1 FRIGATE (NEAR STRAITS OF HORMUZ)
1 DESTROYER
1 MINESWEEPER
1 INTELLIGENCE GATHERER
1 NUCLEAR SUBMARINE (SSN) (ALL IN NORTH ARABIAN SEA)

SECRET

USA:
1 COMMAND SHIP
1 DESTROYER
2 FRIGATES
} ALL AT BAHRAIN
AIRCRAFT CARRIER
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP (IN NORTH ARABIAN SEA)

2. IRAN IS MAINTAINING HORMUZ PATROL WITH 1-3 FRIGATES, AND NORTH GULF PATROL WITH FRIGATE, MINESWEEPER AND PATROL CRAFT.
3. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF SINKINGS BY IRAQ AND IRAN. THESE PROBABALY REFER TO PATROL CRAFT IN THE SHATT AL ARAB.

CARRINGTON

LVO 234/24

FDW G Ø58/24

OO BELGRADE

GR 245

CYPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM F.C.O. 241426Z SEP 8Ø
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 757 OF 24 SEPTEMBER
AND TO BELGRADE.

UKMIS NEW YORK FOR P.S./S OF S.
BELGRADE FOR ALEXANDER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE WAS RECEIVED FROM UKDEL OECD TELEGRAM NUMBER 57 OF 24 SEPTEMBER.

OIL MARKET SITUATION

1. IEA SECRETARIAT BRIEFED DELEGATIONS LAST NIGHT ON EFFECT OF IRAN/IRAQ HOSTILITIES ON THE OIL MARKET. THE QUOTE SPOT UNQUOTE CRUDE MARKET REMAINED QUIET. QUOTATIONS FOR PRODUCTS IN ROTTERDAM HAD MOVED UP SLIGHTLY IN THE PREVIOUS 24 HOURS THUS REVERSING THE DOWNWARD TREND. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SALES HAVING BEEN AGREED AT THESE PRICES.

2. TANKERS IN THE GULF APPEARED TO BE LOADING NORMALLY IN KUWAIT AND OTHER TERMINALS NOT IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF THE FIGHTING. ACCORDING TO EXXON TANKER MOVEMENTS THROUGH THE STRAIGHTS OF HORMUZ HAD BEEN NORMAL AT LEAST UP TO NOON TUESDAY.

3. AFTER CONTACTING ERSBOEL SECRETAIRIAT SAW NO NEED TO CONVENE GOVERNING BOARD MEETING AT THE MOMENT. THEY WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE SEQ CHAIRMAN MF THE SITUATION CONTINUES WITH A VIEW TO A POSSIBLE SEQ/SOM JOINT MEETING.

4. THE MAIN MESSAGE TO GOVERNMENUS WAS TOSAVOID PANIC BUYING ON THE SPOT MARKET AS HAD HAPPENED AFTER THE 1979 IRAN CRISIS. STOCKS REMAIN AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH AND THERE IS STILL A CONSIDERABLE SURPLUS OF NON-DISRUPTED PRODUCTION OVER CONSUMPTION.

5. A FURTHER MEETING WILL BE HELD ON FRIDAY AT 12 NOON.

CARRINGTON

1655/24

NNNN

GRS
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 241030Z SEPT 80
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 754 OF 24 SEPTEMBER
INFO PRIORITY JEDDA, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

IRAN/IRAQ: SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER EN ROUTE TO UN

1. MR HURD CALLED LAST NIGHT ON PRINCE SAUD AT HIS HOTEL. HE SEEMED GENUINELY APPALLED AT THE INDISCRIMINATE FIGHTING AND THE HEAVY LOSS OF LIFE, OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LAND IN DISPUTE. FIGHTING HAD ESCALATED WILDLY EVEN THOUGH IRAQ'S DECLARED MILITARY OBJECTIVES HAD BEEN SECURED ON THE FIRST DAY. HE WAS ALSO STRUCK BY THE APPARENT NONCHALANCE OF THOSE LOOKING ON, BUT AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING INVOLVEMENT BY SUPERPOWERS. THE SAUDIS WERE IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH BAGHDAD BUT SAUD NO LONGER SEEMED TO EXPECT TO HAVE MUCH INFLUENCE ON EITHER SIDE.

2. HE ACCEPTED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE ACTION, BUT EXPECTED ISLAMIC STATES ALSO TO BE MEETING IN NEW YORK (DR CHATTI IS THERE). HE THOUGHT THERE NEED BE NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN PEACE-MAKING ACTION BY BOTH ORGANISATIONS IN PARALLEL. THE KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER TELEPHONED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE TALK. THEY DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN GENERAL TERMS, BUT SAUD SAID SHAIKH SABAH ALSO MENTIONED IRAN'S LATEST APPEAL FOR MUSLIM SUPPORT.

3. MR HURD RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE ISLANDS. PRINCE SAUD AGREED THAT ANY FIGHTING THERE WOULD THREATEN THE SHIPPING ROUTES, BUT DID NOT RULE OUT THE TEMPTATION FOR THE IRAQIS TO SEIZE THE ISLANDS AS TOKENS OF VICTORY. AN EFFECTIVE BLOCKADE OF THE STRAITS WAS UNLIKELY: BUT ANY FIGHTING WOULD FRIGHTEN OFF THE TANKERS. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO CLOSING THEIR TERRITORIAL WATERS THE IRANIANS HAD HANDED NOTES TO GULF

AMBASSADORS (EXCEPT SAUDI ARABIA) WARNING THEM NOT TO OFFER THE IRAQIS ANY HELP OR FACILITIES.

4. SAUD FLIES ON TO NEW YORK TODAY AND WILL BE AT THE WALDORF UNTIL 5 OCTOBER. HE WOULD CLEARLY WELCOME A CONTACT WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HE SEEMED ANXIOUS, AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS FEELING HIS WAY.

CARRINGTON

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SIR J GRAHAM
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ADDITIONAL DISTN
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
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ADVANCE COPY

GR 200
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BAGHDAD 231405Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 424 OF 23/9/80
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK , KUWAIT AND AMMAN
INFO PRIORITY JEDDA, DAMASCUS, ANKARA, BAHRAIN AND WASHINGTON

MY TEL 419: IRAQ/IRAN. MIERS DICKSON TELECON.

1. CALLED MEETING OF AS MANY HEADS OF BRITISH FIRMS OPERATING IN BAGHDAD AS WE COULD CONTACT AT 1015Z TODAY 23 SEPT.

2. WE SAID WE WERE NOT (NOT) AT PRESENT ADVISING BRITISH SUBJECTS TO LEAVE IRAQ BUT THAT WE WERE ADVISING THOSE WHO DID NOT HAVE ESSENTIAL BUSINESS TO POSTPONE THEIR TRAVEL PLANS (PARA4 OF MY TUR) .

3. AIRPORTS REMAIN CLOSED AND B.A. HAVE EITHER CANCELLED THEIR FLIGHTS FOR BAGHDAD OR WILL TERMINATE THEM IN AMMAN OR DAMASCUS

3. AIRPORTS REMAIN CLOSED AND B.A. HAVE EITHER CANCELLED THEIR FLIGHTS FOR BAGHDAD OR WILL TERMINATE THEM IN AMMAN OR DAMASCUS UP TO AND INCLUDING FRIDAY 26 SEP.

4. MOST REPRESENTATIVES AGREE THAT THEY WANTED DEPENDANTS TO LEAVE BY ROAD VIA RUTBA TO AMMAN. THEY ARE TO HAVE A MEETING AT 0600Z ON 24 SEPT AT WHICH H.M.CONSUL WILL BE PRESENT SO AS TO DISCUSS DETAILS. A FURTHER MEETING WITH H.M.AMBASSADOR IS ARRANGED FOR 0900Z TO DISCUSS THEIR CONCLUSIONS.

5. EXIT PERMITS ARE LIKELY TO BE A PROBLEM AND WE SHALL TAKE THIS UP AGAIN WITH MFA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

EGERTON

NNNN

GR 550
UNCLASSIFIED
FM BAGHDAD 231038Z SEP 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 423 OF 23/9/80
AND PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN DAMASCUS, ANKARA, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN: MY TELS NO 416 AND 421.

1. ACCORDING TO A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE GENERAL COMMAND OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES, THE IRAQI AIRFORCE RAIDED TEN IRANIAN AIR BASES AT 1200 HOURS ON 22 SEPPTEMBER. THE BASES ARE LISTED AS: MAHARABAD (TEHRAN), SHIRAZ, BOSHAHAR, DIZFUL, SHAROKHI IN HAMADAN, KHATIMI IN ISFAHAN, TABRIZ MILITARY AIRPORT, OMIDLI IN AGHA JARI, KERMANSHAH MILITARY AIRPORT AND AHWAZ AIRPORT.

2. THE IRAQIS CLAIM TO HAVE INFLICTED HEAVY DAMAGE. THEIR OWN LOSSES ARE GIVEN AS: ONE BOMBER CRASHED IN IRANIAN TERRITORY AS A RESULT OF A TECHNICAL FAULT: CREW REPORTED TO HAVE BAILED OUT: ONE FIGHTER HIT BY ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE, PILOT BAILED OUT OVER IRAQI TERRITORY.

3. A SECOND GENERAL COMMAND STATEMENT REPORTS FURTHER IRAQI RAIDS BETWEEN 1500 AND 1800 HOURS ON 22 SEPTEMBER AGAINST IRANIAN BASES AT BOSHAHAR, SHAROKHI, WAHDITI IN DIZFUL, KERMANSHAH MILITARY AIRPORT, OMIDLI MILITARY BASE, AHWAZ MILITARY AIRPORT AND RADAR STATIONS IN THE DEHLARAN AND NAFT SHAH AREAS. THE IRAQI AIRCRAFT ARE REPORTED TO HAVE RETURNED TO BASE WITHOUT LOSS. THE STATEMENT GOES ON TO CLAIM THAT IRAQIS SHOT DOWN SIX PHANTOMS INSIDE IRAQI AIRSPACE ON 22 SEPTEMBER: THREE AT BASRA, ONE IN THE WASIT SECTOR, ONE AT UMM QASR AND ONE AT AL SHAIBA. THREE IRANIAN PILOTS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN CAPTURED.

4. A MOD STATEMENT DESCRIBES MORE ARTILLERY EXCHANGES ACROSS THE SHATT AL ARAB AND CLAIMS THAT FOUR MERCHANT VESSELS WERE ATTACKED BY IRANIAN FORCES. A CREW MEMBER OF THE JAPANESE "CAMILA" IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN WOUNDED.

5. SELECTED GROUPS OF IRAQI RESERVISTS ARE BEING CALLED UP. THERE WAS A PARTIAL BLACK OUT IN BAGHDAD ON THE NIGHT OF 22/23 SEPTEMBER.

/6. THE

6. THE FOREIGN MINISTER, DR SAADOUN HAMMADI, HAS SENT MESSAGES TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL AND TO PRESIDENT CASTRO AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT SETTING IRAQ'S VERSION OF THE DISPUTE WITH IRAN.

7. A WELL INFORMED BUSINESSMAN WHO RETURNED FROM BASRA ON 21 SEPT TOLD US THAT THE 300 BED PORT HOSPITAL HAS BEEN CLEARED OF ALL CIVILIAN PATIENTS. IT IS PRETTY BUSY DEALING WITH IRAQI MILITARY CASUALTIES, WHICH ARE DESCRIBED AS ''HEAVY''. AT UMM QASR HE SAW TWO RUSSIAN UNLOADING AMMUNITION AND TANKS. MUCH HARDWARE WAS MOVED FROM THE ARSENAL AT UMM QASR TO BASRA, THEN ACROSS THE SHATT. HE CLAIMS TO HAVE SEEN TRUCK-MOUNTED MOBILE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES AT UM QASR. STATIC ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE SITES THERE HAVE BEEN UNCOVERED AND ACTIVATED.

EGERTON

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

[NOT ADVANCED]

GR 270
UNCLASSIFIED
FM BAGHDAD 230908Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 421 OF 23/9/80
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, ANKARA , WASHINGTON , MOSCOW AND UKDEL NATO.

IRAQ/IRAN

1. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL ISSUED A STATEMENT ON 22 SEPTEMBER INSTRUCTING THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES TO ''DIRECT DETERRENT STRIKES AGAINST IRANIAN MILITARY TARGETS IN ORDER TO FOIL THE RACIST PERSIAN REGIME'S DESIGNS ON IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY, BOTH LAND AND WATER''.

2. THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE ''IN RESPONSE TO THE IRANIANS' RECKLESS MILITARY OPERATIONS, THEIR ATTEMPTS TO INTERRUPT NAVIGATION IN THE SHATT AL ARAB BY FIRING ON MERCHANT SHIPS, THEIR EXTENSIVE AIR ATTACKS ON THE IRAQI ARMY, THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT OF A GENERAL CALL-UP, AND THE CLOSURE OF IRANIAN AIR SPACE - ALL OF WHICH INDICATES THAT THE IRANIANS INTEND TO BROADEN THE SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT UNTIL IT REACHES A STATE OF WAR''. IRAQ WOULD AVOID STRIKING AT CIVILIAN TARGETS, PROVIDED THE IRANIANS CEASE ATTACKING CIVILIAN TARGETS IN IRAQ.

3. THE COMMUNIQUE GOES TO TO SAY THAT THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WOULD ''WITHDRAW FROM ANY IRANIAN TERRITORIES IN WHICH DEFENSIVE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS MAKE AN IRAQI PRESENCE ESSENTIAL, AS SOON AS IRAN RECOGNISES IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS TERRITORY AND RESPECTS ITS VITAL INTERESTS''.

4. SEVERAL OBSERVERS HERE POINT TO THIS LAST SENTENCE AS A CLUE TO IRAQ'S REAL INTENTIONS, IE., AN OFFER TO WITHDRAW FROM CERTAIN NEWLY ACQUIRED BORDER AREAS IN RETURN FOR IRANIAN RECOGNITION EVEN IF TACIT, OF IRAQ'S CLAIMS TO THE SHATT. LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 9 OF YR TEL NO 169 TO UKDEL NATO (NOT TO ALL) SEEMS EXACTLY RIGHT.

EGERTON

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

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COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

PP JEDDA

PP ANKARA

PP HSP1

GR 375
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BAGHDAD 23Ø752Z SEP 8Ø
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 42Ø OF 23/9/8Ø
INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, ATHENS, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, JEDDA, ANKARA AND HSP1

MIPTS (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN

1. WHEN I PAID MY FIRST COURTESY CALL ON NABIL NAJM, THE CHIEF PROTOCOL AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING, HE ASKED WHAT I THOUGHT OF THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. YESTERDAY, 22 SEPTEMBER, THE IRANIANS HAD BOMBED BASRAH AIRPORT AND KUT TOWN. THIS MORNING, THEY HAD MADE A SUDDEN AIR ATTACK ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF BAGHDAD. IRAQ HAD TRIED FOR OVER A YEAR TO FIND SOMEONE TO NEGOTIATE WITH IN IRAN ABOUT THE BORDER TERRITORIES WHICH THE IRANIANS HAD AGREED TO HAND OVER IN 1975, BUT HAD FAILED TO SURRENDER. PRESIDENT SADDAM'S PATIENCE HAD EVENTUALLY RUN OUT, AND IRAQ FORCES HAD TAKEN BACK PART OF THEIR LAND AND RE-ESTABLISHED SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT. IRAQ WAS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT IF SHE COULD FIND SOMEONE OF ENOUGH STATUS IN IRAN TO DEAL WITH. OTHERWISE, THE SKIRMISHES WOULD CONTINUE. IRAQ WAS NOW LOOKING TO MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DECLARE WHERE THEY STOOD ON THE DISPUTE.

2. I ASKED IF IRAQ WAS LOOKING FOR A MEDIATOR YET, OR THINKING OF TAKING THE MATTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. NAJM SAID NO. I SAID THAT I WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, THE FACTS BEING STILL UNCLEAR. BUT IN GENERAL WE VIEWED WITH DISMAY ANY SITUATION TENDING TO ESTABILISE TRADE AND TRAFFIC IN THE GULF, PARTICULARLY SO SOON AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. IRAQ, HAVING MADE A SHOW OF STRENGTH, SHOULD NOW SHOW STATESMANSHIP AND MAKE A FIRM OFFER OF NEGOTIATION BEFORE FURTHER HOSTILITIES TOOK PLACE.

3. NAJM THEN SAID THAT SAADUN HAMMADI MIGHT HAVE TO POSTPONE HIS DEPARTURE TO NEW YORK, PLANNED FOR 28 SEPTEMBER. IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE THREE NEW AMBASSADORS HERE (AUSTRIA, AFGHANISTAN AND UK) WOULD BE ABLE TO PRESENT THEIR CREDENTIALS AS QUICKLY AS WAS NORMAL.

4. I SAID I WOULD BE ADVISING A LARGE NUMBER OF IMPORTANT BRITISH VISITORS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, INCLUDING THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, WHETHEWVTA NOT TO PROCEED WITH PLANS TO VISIT BAGHDAD FOR THIS YEAR'S INTERNATIONAL FAIR. OBVIOUSLY NOBODY WOULD COME IF THE MAJOR IRAQI AIRPORTS REMAINED SUBJECT TO INSTANT CLOSURE WITHOUT WARNING. THIS WAS YET ANOTHER REASON WHY THE IRAQIS SHOULD GET THE SITUATION BACK TO SOME SORT OF NORMALITY. NAJM LOOKED MOROSE BUT AGREED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH.

EGERTON

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LG 745

LKS 219/23

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PP ATHENS

PP KUWAIT

PP JEDDA

PP AMMAN

PP DAMASCUS

PP ANKARA

PP WASHINGTON

PP MOSCOW

PP HSP 1

GRS 25ø
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BAGHDAD 23ø745Z SEPT 8ø
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 419 OF 23/9/8ø
FOR INFO TO PRIORITY ATHENS KUWAIT JEDDA AMMAN DAMASCUS ANKARA
WASHINGTON , MOSCOW AND HSP 1

IRAQ/IRAN: MY IPT AND YOUR TELS 314 AND 315:

1. TEL 314, PARA 1 - LAST SENTENCE AGREED.

2. TEL 315, PARA 2 - BAGHDAD AND BASRA AIRPORTS REMAIN CLOSED SO TRAVEL TO AND FROM IRAQ BY AIR IS IMPOSSIBLE AND TRAVELLERS SHOULD BE SO ADVISED.

3. AT EC HEADS OF MISSION MEETING ON 22 SEPTEMBER IT WAS REPORTED THAT COMMUNITY NATIONALS IN SOUTH IRAQ WERE CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION ON THE SHATT, BUT WERE NOT (NOT) IN ANY IMMEDIATE DANGER AND STAYING PUT. IF FORCED TO LEAVE MANY WILL DO SO BY ROAD VIA KUWAIT PROVIDED (REPEAT PROVIDED) IRAQI EXIT PERMITS CAN BE OBTAINED. THIS HAS BEEN RELATIVELY EASY FOR THOSE WHOSE RESIDENT DEPARTMENT FILES ARE IN BASRA, BUT LESS SO FOR THOSE WHO ENTERED VIA BAGHDAD AND PROCEEDED SOUTH.
WE AGREED YESTERDAY THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT(REPEAT NOT) SERIOUS ENOUGH TO APPROACH THE IRAQIS WITH JOINT OR SEVERAL REQUESTS FOR EXIT PERMIT VISAS. I SHALL HOWEVER BE REVIEWING THIS POINT WITH EC COLLEAGUES WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

4. ENTRY TO IRAQ IS STILL POSSIBLE FROM KUWAIT AND BRITISH TRAVELLERS ON ESSENTIAL BUSINESS IN SOUTH IRAQ SHOULD BE ADVISED TO TAKE THE LAND ROUTE.
IF THEIR JOURNEY IS NOT(NOT) ESSENTIAL THEY SHOULD WAIT A DAY OR TWO .
THE LAND ROUTE FROM JORDAN IS ALSO OPEN, AND THE SAME ADVICE SHOULD BE GIVEN.

EGERTON

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LKS 218/23

OO FCO DESKBY 23ø915Z

PP KUWAIT

PP JEDDA

PP AMMAN

PP DAMASCUS

PP ANKARA

PP WASHINGTON

PP MOSCOW

PP ATHENS

PP HSP1

GR 15ø
RESTRICTED
FM BAGHDAD 23ø74øZ SEP 8ø
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 418 OF 23/9/8ø
INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT , JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON
MOSCOW AND HSP1

DESKBY 23ø915Z

IRAQ/IRAN
1. BAGHDAD AWOKE TODAY (23 SEPTEMBER) TO AN AIR RAID WARNING AND ELECTRICITY POWER CUT. AN ATTACK THEN TOOK PLACE BY A SMALL NUMBER OF JETS. CLOUDS OS SMOKE WERE SEEN AT SEVERAL POINTS AROUND BAGHDAD, AND WE HAVE REPORTS THAT BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND RASHID CAMP ON THE SOUTH EAST OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY WERE HIT. ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND MACHINE GUN FIRE STARTED IMMEDIATELY, AND ONE AIRCRAFT IS REPORTED TO HAVE CRASHED NEAR THE DAWRA OIL REFINERY. AN IRAQI STATEMENT IS EXPECTED LATER TODAY.

2. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF PHONE AND PERSONAL CALLS, THERE ARE NO (NO) REPORTS OF CASUALTIES AMONG THE BRITISH COMMUNITY. THE RAIDS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN SMALL SCALE, BUT THE GENERAL REACTION AMONGST IRAQIS IS ASTONISHMENT THAT THEY TOOK PLACE AT ALL.

3. SEE MY TWO I.F.T'S

EGERTON

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GVVVVVVVV

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 240350Z SEP
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1340 OF 23 SEPTEMBER 1980
INFO PRIORITY ATHENS (FOR PRIME MINISTER)
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO.

M I P T : IRAQ/IRAN

1. FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: BEGINS

MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE TODAY EXCHANGED VIEWS IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE EXTREMELY SERIOUS SITUATION PREVAILING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. THEY HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE SHARP DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS AND OF THE ESCALATION IN ARMED ACTIVITY LEADING TO LOSS OF LIFE AND HEAVY MATERIAL DAMAGE.

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THIS CONFLICT CAN PROVE INCREASINGLY SERIOUS AND COULD POSE A GRAVE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WELCOME AND FULLY SUPPORT

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, BOMBAY, NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO.

M I P T : IRAQ/IRAN

1. FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: BEGINS

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THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WELCOME AND FULLY SUPPORT THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ADDRESSED TO BOTH PARTIES ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1980, AS WELL AS THE OFFER THAT HE HAS MADE OF HIS GOOD OFFICES TO RESOLVE THE PRESENT CONFLICT.

THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAVE ASKED ME TO APPEAL, ON THEIR BEHALF, TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAN AND IRAQ, AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS A SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT, TO DESIST FROM ARMED ACTIVITY AND ALL ACTS THAT MAY WORSEN THE PRESENT DANGEROUS SITUATION AND TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS.
ENDS

PARSONS

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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 240345Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1339 OF 23 SEPTEMBER 1980
INFO PRIORITY ATHENS (FOR PRIME MINISTER),
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, NEW DELHI,
ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO 750: IRAQ/IRAN

1. THIS MORNING (23 SEPTEMBER) THE SECRETARY GENERAL ASKED THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (TUNISIA) TO ARRANGE URGENTLY FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL. THESE TOOK PLACE THIS EVENING, AFTER DELAYS CAUSED BY MEETINGS OF THE ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND BY AN ABORTIVE SUGGESTION BY MUSKIE, WITH SOME SUPPORT FROM THE SECRETARIAT, THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD TAKE PART IN THE CONSULTATIONS.

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT IN SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK OF IRAQ AND IRAN HE HAD OFFERED HIS GOOD OFFICES AND ASKED THEM TO REPORT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS HIS APPEAL FOR RESTRAINT AND A CEASEFIRE. TODAY HE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER SETTING OUT THE HISTORY

HIS GOOD OFFICES AND ASKED THEM TO REPORT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS HIS APPEAL FOR RESTRAINT AND A CEASEFIRE. TODAY HE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER SETTING OUT THE HISTORY OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT ON THE SHATT AL-ARAB, DESCRIBING IRAN'S BREACHES OF THE AGREEMENT, BY SUBVERSION AND TERRITORIAL ENCROACHEMENT, AND JUSTIFYING IRAQ'S DENUNCIATION OF THE AGREEMENT: IRAQ WAS ACTING IN SELF-DEFENCE AND HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST IRAN. WALDHEIM SAID THAT HE HAD SO FAR HAD NO RESPONSE FROM TEHRAN WITH WHICH ALL COMMUNICATIONS SEEMED TO BE INTERRUPTED, BUT THE IRANIAN CHARGE HERE HAD TOLD HIM THAT THIS WAS A REAL WAR AND THAT IRAN WAS THE VICTIM OF AGGRESION.

3. THE TUNISIAN REPORTED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE HAD OFFERED HIS GOOD OFFICES TO THE TWO PARTIES. HE THEN ASKED FOR VIEWS ON WHAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD DO. MY NORWEGIAN COLLEAGUE PROPOSED THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT APPEALING FOR A CEASEFIRE AND ENDORSING THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARIES GENERAL OF THE UN AND THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. WITH 104 FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK, IT WOULD BE RIDICULOUS IF THE COUNCIL SAT IDLE. WAR HAD BROKEN OUT. THE PRIORITY WAS TO STOP THE FIGHTING. I SUPPORTED NORWAY. MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE, HOWEVER, ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER FOR THE COUNCIL, WHEN MEETING INFORMALLY, TO AUTHORISE THE PRESIDENT TO ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT AND THAT ON THE SUBSTANCE THE COUNCIL SHOULD HEAR THE PARTIES AND OBTAIN MORE INFORMATION BEFORE EXPRESSING A VIEW.

4. THERE ENSUED A LONG WRANGLE ON THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION. NORWAY WAS SUPPORTED BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES EXCEPT FRANCE, WHICH SAT ON THE FENCE (AS DID CHINA), AND BY MOST OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS: SOME OF THE LATTER SUPPORTED THE RUSSIANS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT MIGHT BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE FOR THE COUNCIL TO TAKE A POSITION UNTIL IT KNEW MORE ABOUT THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE CASE.

5. THE PRESIDENT, WHO DID NOT DISGUISE HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE REPUTATION OF THE COUNCIL THAT IT DO SOMETHING TONIGHT, EVENTUALLY DECIDED THAT THE MAJORITY FAVOURED A STATEMENT AND HE TABLED A DRAFT. IN FURTHER ARGUMENT, TROYANOVSKY (USSR) INSISTED THAT THE STATEMENT SHOULD NOT CALL EXPLICITLY FOR A CEASEFIRE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS MIGHT BE PARTIAL, AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO REFERENCE TO THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. AFTER AN ADJOURNMENT TO ENABLE HIM TO OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS, THE STATEMENT IN MIFT WAS FINALLY AGREED. THE PRESIDENT WILL ISSUE IT TO THE PRESS TONIGHT (23 SEPTEMBER).

GRS 1200

UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 231610Z SEPT 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1332 OF 23 SEPTEMBER.
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON BAGHDAD STOCKHOLM,
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW KUWAIT JEDDA AMMAN DAMASCUS ANKARA KABUL PRETORIA SALISBURY,
INFO ROUTINE ROME LUXEMBOURG THE HAGUE PARIS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN UKREP BRUSSELS AND DUBLIN.

FROM HEAD OF NEWS DEPARTMENT IN NEW YORK.

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THIS MORNING GAVE RADIO INTERVIEWS TO BBC AND IRN. FOLLOWING IS EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF HIS INTERVIEW WITH ANDREW MANDERSTAN OF IRN.

BEGINS

IRAN/IRAQ.

Q: JUST HOW SERIOUS IS THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN?
A: I THINK IT COULD GET VERY SERIOUS INDEED. THE SITUATION THERE HAS BECOME A GOOD DEAL WORSE THAN JUST BORDER INCIDENTS WHEN YOU HAVE THE BOMBING OF CAPITALS. AND THEREFORE I DO THINK ITS SERIOUS: ITS SERIOUS IN TERMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST GENERALLY - IT COULD SET A MATCH ALIGHT TO THE MIDDLE EAST - AND OF COURSE IT COULD BE SERIOUS FROM THE WESTS POINT OF VIEW ON OIL SUPPLIES.

Q: WHAT CAN THE UN DO TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
A: THERE ARE VARIOUS WAYS IN WHICH THE UN CAN TRY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS, THOUGH ITS NOT ALWAYS VERY SUCCESSFUL. BUT OF ONE THING I AM QUITE SURE: THE UN, SITTING HERE IN SESSION AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WITH 150 FOREIGN MINISTERS HERE, CANT SIT AROUND AND PRETEND THAT NOTHING IS HAPPENING, OTHERWISE IT MAKES A FARCE OF THE UN. THIS IS UP TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL: I HAD A TALK WITH HIM YESTERDAY AND HE IS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THIS. WHAT ONE WOULD HOPE IS THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT EITHER BY MEDIATION OR IN SOME OTHER FORM. IT MAY VERY WELL BE THAT THE INTERESTS OF MOST OF US HERE IN THE UNITED NATIONS ARE IN A SETTLEMENT, AND THEREFORE IT MAY BE LESS DIFFICULT TO GET SOMETHING GOING THAT IT MIGHT BE IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES.

Q: COULD THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TAKE THE MATTER UP?
A: OH YES. CERTAINLY IT COULD. USUALLY THE PARTY THATS ATTACKED BRINGS THE MATTER TO THE UNITED NATIONS THEMSELVES. BUT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE IRAN IS HARDLY IN A POSITION TO BRING THE MATTER TO THE UN HAVING FLOUTED THE UN OVER THE HOSTAGE QUESTION. THEREFORE I THINK THERE WILL HAVE TO BE SOME OTHER PROCEDURAL DEVICE, WHEREBY IT CAN BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE OBVIOUS WAY OF DOING IT IS THE SECRETARY GENERAL HIMSELF TO SAY THIS IS A THREAT TO PEACE. IT QUITE CLEARLY IS A THREAT TO PEACE BECAUSE ITS A WAR.

Q: COULD

Q: COULD THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ BE BLOCKADED?
A: THEY COULD BE: BUT I THINK IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND I RATHER DOUBT WHETHER THAT WOULD BE ONE OF THE THINGS THAT WOULD BE DONE.

Q: THERE HAVE BEEN SUGGESTIONS THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT EXPLOIT THE SITUATION OF UNREST IN IRAN AND INDEED THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE BEHIND THE UNREST.
A: I THINK YOU HAVE TO ASSESS WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT TO SEE A BREAK UP OF IRAN AND THE FALL OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION. I DONT SUPPOSE THEY PARTICULARLY LIKE THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION BECAUSE BANI SADR AND KHOMEINI MADE PLAIN THEIR OBJECTIONS TO SOVIET POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN. BUT THE SOVIET UNION LOOKS A BIT FURTHER FORWARD THAN THAT AND I DOUBT WHETHER IT WOULD BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO SEE THIS CONFLICT SPREAD VERY MUCH.

Q: IS THERE ANYTHING BRITAIN COULD DO TO HELP THE SITUATION AT THIS TIME?
A: IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR ALLIES I THINK WE CAN USE OUR INFLUENCE TO SEE SOME KIND OF MEDIATION AND IF SOME KIND OF SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE. ON OUR OWN I THINK NOT VERY MUCH. WE HAVE WITHDRAWN OUR AMBASSADOR FROM TEHRAN FOR REASONS WHICH YOU KNOW, AND I DONT THINK THAT OUR INFLUENCE IN IRAQ IS GREAT ENOUGH TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE ON OUR OWN WITHOUT OUR ALLIES.

THE MIDDLE EAST.

Q: IN YOUR SPEECH YOU MENTION THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE IS AN IMPRESSION HERE IN THE USA THAT THERE ARE NOW, OR THE POSSIBILITY OF, TWO CONFLICTING PEACE PLANS: ONE EUROPEAN AND THE OTHER THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD, THE AMERICAN BACKED PROPOSAL. IS THERE A REAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO?
A: THERE MUST NOT BE A REAL CONFLICT. THERE IS NO SOLUTION POSSIBLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITHOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. WHAT EUROPE IS SEEKING TO DO IS TO BE HELPFUL AND NOT TO CUT ACROSS WHAT THE US IS TRYING TO DO. MR THORN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE NINE FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, HAS BEEN GOING ROUND ON A FACT FINDING MISSION. I HOPE THAT HE WILL COME BACK WITH A CLEARER IDEA OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE - HE HASNT QUITE FINISHED YET. WE MUST THEN SIT DOWN AND WORK OUT WHAT WE THINK WILL BE ACCEPTABLE AND WHAT POSSIBILITIES THERE ARE. I DONT BELIEVE THERE IS ANY LIKELIHOOD OF A PLAN BEING PRODUCED BY EUROPE WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY UNACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE PARTIES. WHATS THE POINT OF THAT? WHAT WE HAVE GOT TO DO IS TO TRY AND BE HELPFUL AND INFLUENCE BOTH SIDES TO COME TO A SETTLEMENT.

AFGHANISTAN.

Q: THE UN SESSION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN. ARE THERE ANY PROSPECTS OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION, ANY INKLINGS THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY BE LEAVING?
A: NO I DONT THINK SO. I THINK THAT IF ANYTHING THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE PREPARING TO STAY. AND THAT I THINK IS VERY SERIOUS BECAUSE WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR IN THE NATO ALLIANCE AND ELSEWHERE THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN IS ACCEPTABLE, NOR INDEED IS IT IRREVERSIBLE. I AM STILL QUITE SURE

/THAT

THAT THE PLAN WE PUT FORWARD FOR A NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT AFGHANISTAN WITH GUARANTEES BY BOTH SIDES OF NON-INTERFERENCE, IS THE BEST WAY OF PROCEEDING. FOR ALL I KNOW, SUCH AN AFGHANISTAN MIGHT HAVE A GOVERNMENT FRIENDLY TO THE SOVIET UNION - I DONT THINK THAT MATTERS AS LONG AS THE AFGHANS WANT THAT GOVERNMENT. THE DIFFICULTY IS TO SEE HOW YOU GET TO THAT POINT. ITS BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS COME OUT OPENLY AGAINST HAVING A CONFERENCE ON THE SUBJECT. IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE WEEKS HERE THE PAKISTANIS AND THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, WHO ARE OBVIOUSLY MOST CONCERNED WITH THIS, WILL BE HAVING DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WHAT TO DO NEXT, AND WE SHALL BE INVOLVED IN THAT.

SOUTH AFRICA.

Q: BRITAIN HAS BEEN CRITICISED BY SOME OF THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES ABOUT HER RELUCTANCE TO INITIATE ANY CONDEMNATIONS OF APARTHEID, OR ACTIONS ON APARTHEID. DO YOU FIND THAT BRITAIN IS IN A SENSITIVE POSITION AT THIS TIME?
A: NO NOT A BIT. WE CONDEMN APARTHEID AND I HAVE CONDEMNED IT IN MY SPEECH. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF US SUPPORTING APARTHEID. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT GETTING A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA AND GETTING A CHANGE OF POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA. ITS A QUESTION OF JUDGEMENT ABOUT HOW BEST YOU SEE THAT BEING ACHIEVED. WE DONT TAKE THE VIEW THAT TO OSTRACISE, ISOLATE SOUTH AFRICA - ANY MORE THAN TO ISOLATE ANY COUNTRY WITH WHICH YOU DISAGREE - IS THE RIGHT WAY TO CHANGE ITS MIND. IF YOU PUSH THEM INTO A CORNER THEY BECOME MORE OBDURATE. WHAT WE WANT TO DO IS ENCOURAGE THOSE IN SOUTH AFRICA WHO DONT AGREE WITH THE PRESENT APARTHEID POLICY TO CHANGE IT. I DONT BELIEVE THAT THE KIND OF ACTIONS WHICH ARE GOING TO DRIVE THE SOUTH AFRICANS INTO A CORNER ARE LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THAT.

ZIMBABWE.

Q: ON ZIMBABWE THE AMERICANS HAVENT REALLY PRODUCED AS MUCH AID AS HAD BEEN EXPECTED, ECONOMIC AID. IS THERE GOING TO BE A BRITISH ATTEMPT TO CREATE A SPECIAL AID FUND WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS OR THROUGH SOME OTHER MEDIA?
A: THERE IS A DONORS CONFERENCE GOING TO TAKE PLACE IN ZIMBABWE IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. I THINK IT HAS BEEN RATHER DISAPPOINTING WHAT HAS BEEN GIVEN. WE HAVE DONE OUR BEST. WE HAVE GIVEN 180 MILLION DOLLARS OVER THREE YEARS, AND HAVE CANCELLED OVER 50 MILLION DOLLARS OF DEBTS. SO I DONT THINK WE HAVE DONE TOO BADLY. I WISH WE COULD HAVE DONE MORE, BUT OUR SITUATION DOESNT ALLOW IT. BUT I DO THINK THAT OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE NOT REALLY HELPED AS MUCH AS THEY SHOULD. THE TROUBLE IS THAT WHEN IT LOOKED AS THOUGH EVERYTHING WAS GOING WRONG AND IT WAS A DANGER TO PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA EVERYBODY WAS PREPARED TO PUT THEIR HAND ON THEIR HEART AND SAY IF IT ALL GOES WELL WE WILL HELP YOU. NOW THAT THINGS HAVE TURNED OUT NOT TOO BADLY THEY FORGET ABOUT IT AND SAY OH ITS ALL RIGHT DONT LETS BOTHER. I DID MAKE THESE OBSERVATIONS THIS MORNING AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND I HOPE PERHAPS, IF ANYBODY WAS LISTENING, IT MIGHT HAVE SOME EFFECT IN PERHAPS MAKING ONE OR TWO COUNTRIES MORE GENEROUS THAN THEY HAVE BEEN.
ENDS
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LLG NR 76ø/23

FDW G ø79/23

OO ATHENS

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 231ø55Z SEP 8ø
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 728 OF 23 SEPTEMBER

FOR PS TO PM:

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPARTMENT
WAS RECEIVED FROM ABU DHABI TELNO 295 OF 23 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE DUBAI MODUK
PRIORITY MUSCAT DOHA BAHRAIN KUWAIT BAGHDAD JEDDA
INFO SAVING WAHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS UKREP BRUSSLES
MOSCOW

DUBAI TELEGRAM NO 11ø OF 21 SEPTEMBER AND BAGHDAD TELEGRAM
NO 413 OF 21 SEPTEMBER (NOT TO ALL)

IRAN-IRAQ.

1. IT IS NOT FOR ME TO JUDGE HOW FAR IRAN AND IRAQ WILL GO.
WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, CONSIDER NOW WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN HERE IF THE
WORST SHOULD COME TO THE WORST.

2. SO FAR THE PRESS HAS NOT DONE MUCH MORE THAN REPORT EVENTS
PROMINENTLY, EXCEPT THAT IN A LEADER TODAYS SEMI-OFFICIAL ''ITTIHAD''
POINTS TO THE DANGER OF INTERVENTION BY THE GREAT POWERS. THE
UAE'S RELUCTANCE TO RECEIVE A BRITISH NAVAL VISIT, I THINK,
REFLECTS INSTINCTIVE PANIC AND A HOPE THAT THE PROBLEM WILL GO
AWAY (MY TELEGRAM NO 293 OF 23 SEPTEMBER , NOT TO ALL). IT IS
NOT THOUGHT OUT. HAVING ONLY RETURNED FROM LOCAL LEAVE LATE
ON 21 SEPTEMBER I HAVE NOT YET HEARD ANY INFORMED REACTION:
NOR WOULD IT BE HELPFUL TO GRIN LIKE A DOG AND RUN ABOUT THE
CITY.

3. AS LONG AS A DISPUTE OR EVEN A BATTLE WAS CONFINED TO THE MAINLAND OR THE SHATT AL ARAB, I SHOULD EXPECT THE UAE TO TRY HARD TO KEEP OUT. THEY WOULD HAVE TO SUPPORT IRAQ WITH WORDS IN LINE WITH OTHER GULF STATES, BUT WOULD HOPE TO GO NO FURTHER.

4. IF IT CAME TO THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA, HOWEVER IT WOULD BE DIFFERENT. IF THE IRAQIS ''LIVERATED'' THE ISLANDS THE UAE WOULD NOT ONLY HAVE TO ACQUIESCE BUT WOULD PROBABLY ALSO FEEL OBLIGED TO REESTABLISH A PRESENCE ON THEM. WHILE DUBAI WOULD HATE SUCH A COURSE BECAUSE OF HER TRADE WITH IRAN, AND RAS AL KHAIMAH WOULD REJOICE OUT OF JAWASIM IRREDENTISM, THE FEDERAL CONSENSUS WOULD SUPPORT IRAQ, ALTHOUGH DUBAI'S OPPOSITION MIGHT STRAIN ITS VERY EXISTENCE.

5. IN THIS EVENT THERE COULD BE IRANIAN RETALIATION AGAINST TARGETS SUCH AS THE OFFSHORE OIL INSTALLATIONS WHICH THE UAE IS UNABLE TO DEFEND. THIS COULD ENTAIL SOME RISK TO BRITISH LIFE AND PROPERTY.

6. THE CURRENT CONFLICT MAY BE SEEN IN BAGHDAD AS IRAQ'S GOLDEN CHANCE TO ASSERT HER LEADERSHIP OF THE ARABS OF THE GULF, WHICH HAS SEEMED FROM HERE TO BE MORE AND MORE HER AIM. PRESUMABLY THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TO BE CAUTIOUS. FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION, TO WHICH THE LOCAL PRESS SAYS AN IRAQI ENVOY TARIQ AZIZ WAS DESPATCHED ON 21 SEPTEMBER, CAN NO DOUBT BE RELIED UPON TO EXPLOIT THE DISPUTE IN DIVERSE WAYS TO THEIR NARROW ADVANTAGE.

7. IF WE OURSELVES WERE NOT FOUND ON THE SIDE OF THE UAE IN THE MATTER OF THE ISLANDS, LAW AND LOGIC WOULD BE OF NO ACCOUNT. FOR A LONG TIME IT WOULD BE HARD IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO PROMOTE ANY SCHEME OF DEFENCE OR SECURITY TO WHICH WE WERE PARTY OR TO BE REGARDED AS DDCREDIBLE PARTNER IN ANYTHING. THE EMIRATES HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN JANUARY 1968, EVEN IF WE HAVE.

8. I HOPE THIS IS ALL A FALSE ALARM. BUT IF NOT THE SOONER WE MAKE OUR MINDS UP THE BETTER. IT IS HARD TO MAKE A RECOMMEND-ATION BEYOND THE NEGATIVE ONE IN PARAGRAPH 7 ABOVE WITHOUT MORE LCOWLEDGE THAN I HAVE OF IRAQI AND IRANIAN INTENTIONS AND OF THE REACTIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN AND AROUND THE GULF. A SWIFT AND CONCERTED WESTERN RESPONSE WOULD BE IDEAL.

9. SOLVED OR NOT, THE DISPUTE IS A SUBJECT ON WHICH MR JENKIN WILL NEED TO BE BRIEFED FOR HIS IMPENDING VISIT.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

REF MY FDW G ø78/23 00 DAR ES SALAAM CAN U CANCEL PSE SHUD HAVE GONE VIA TELEX WILL MAKE NUMBER UP WITH NEXT ONE TKS VM

GR 650 CONFIDENTIAL
COMFIDENTIAL
FROM ABU DHABI 230650Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 295 OF 23 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE DUBAI, MODUK
PRIORITY MUSCAT, DOHA, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD AND JEDDA.
SAVING INFO. WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, UKREP BRUSSELS AND MOSCOW.

DUBAI TELEGRAM NO 110 OF 21 SEPTEMBER AND BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 413 OF 21 SEPTEMBER (NOT TO ALL)

IRAN-IRAQ.

1. IT IS NOT FOR ME TO JUDGE HOW FAR IRAN AND IRAQ WILL GO. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, CONSIDER NOW WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN HERE IF THE WORST SHOULD COME TO THE WORST.

2. SO FAR THE PRESS HAS NOT DONE MUCH MORE THAN REPORT EVENTS PROMINENTLY, EXCEPT THAT IN A LEADER TODAYS SEMI-OFFICIAL ''ITTIHAD'' POINTS TO THE DANGER OF INTERVENTION BY THE GREAT POWERS. THE UAE'S RELUCTANCE TO RECEIVE A BRITISH NAVAL VISIT, I THINK, REFLECTS INSTINCTIVE PANIC AND A HOPE THAT THE PROBLEM WILL GO AWAY (MY TELEGRAM NO 293 OF 23 SEPTEMBER , NOT TO ALL). IT IS NOT THOUGHT OUT. HAVING ONLY RETURNED FROM LOCAL LEAVE LATE ON 21 SEPTEMBER I HAVE NOT YET HEARD ANY INFORMED REACTION: NOR WOULD IT BE HELPFUL TO GRIN LIKE A DOG AND RUN ABOUT THE CITY.

3. AS LONG AS A DISPUTE OR EVEN A BATTLE WAS CONFINED TO THE MAINLAND OR THE SHATT AL ARAB, I SHOULD EXPECT THE UAE TO TRY HARD TO KEEP OUT. THEY WOULD HAVE TO SUPPORT IRAQ WITH WORDS IN LINE WITH OTHER GULF STATES, BUT WOULD HOPE TO GO NO FURTHER.

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6. THE CURRENT CONFLICT MAY BE SEEN IN BAGHDAD AS IRAQ'S GOLDEN CHANCE TO ASSERT HER LEADERSHIP OF THE ARABS OF THE GULF, WHICH HAS SEEMED FROM HERE TO BE MORE AND MORE HER AIM. PRESUMABLY THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TO BE CAUTIOUS. FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION, TO WHICH THE LOCAL PRESS SAYS AN IRAQI ENVOY TARIQ AZIZ WAS DESPATCHED ON 21 SEPTEMBER, CAN NO DOUBT BE RELIED UPON TO EXPLOIT THE DISPUTE IN DIVERSE WAYS TO THEIR NARROW ADVANTAGE.

7. IF WE OURSELVES WERE NOT FOUND ON THE SIDE OF THE UAE IN THE MATTER OF THE ISLANDS, LAW AND LOGIC WOULD BE OF NO ACCOUNT. FOR A LONG TIME IT WOULD BE HARD IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO PROMOTE ANY SCHEME OF DEFENCE OR SECURITY TO WHICH WE WERE PARTY OR TO BE REGARDED AS A CREDIBLE PARTNER IN ANYTHING. THE EMIRATES HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN JANUARY 1968, EVEN IF WE HAVE.

8. I HOPE THIS IS ALL A FALSE ALARM. BUT IF NOT THE SOONER WE MAKE OUR MINDS UP THE BETTER. IT IS HARD TO MAKE A RECOMMENDATION BEYOND THE NEGATIVE ONE IN PARAGRAPH 7 ABOVE WITHOUT MORE KNOWLEDGE THAN I HAVE OF IRAQI AND IRANIAN INTENTIONS AND OF THE REACTIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN AND AROUND THE GULF. A SWIFT AND CONCERTED WESTERN RESPONSE WOULD BE IDEAL.

9. SOLVED OR NOT, THE DISPUTE IS A SUBJECT ON WHICH MR JENKIN WILL NEED TO BE BRIEFED FOR HIS IMPENDING VISIT.

10 PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS NEEDS BE.

FCO REGISTRY PLEASE PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS UKREP BRUSSELS AND MOSCOW.

ROBERTS

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

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OO ABU DHABI

OO MUSCAT

OO DOHA

OO BAHRAIN

OO KUWAIT

OO JEDDA

OO ATHENS

OO BAGHDAD

OO DUBAI

GR 12ø
SECRET
FM FCO 23123øZ SEP 8ø
TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 194 OF 23 SEPTEMBER
AND TO MUSCAT DOHA BAHRAIN KUWAIT JEDDA
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK ATHENS BAGHDAD DUBAI ROUTINE
WASHINGTON PARIS BONN

ABU DHABI TELNO 295 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ

1. YOU WILL BE RECEIVING TELEGRAPHICALLY THROUGH SEPARATE CHANNELS A OIG ASSESSMENT AGREED ON 22 SEPTEMBER.

2. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS ON THE CONCLUSIONS OF THIS ASSESSMENT, AND PARTICULARLY THOSE PASSAGES CONCERNING IRAQI MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS. PLEASE DISCUSS THE SITUATION (BUT NOT THE ASSESSMENT ITSELF) AS NECESSARY WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS AND REPORT THEIR ATTITUDE.

3. FOR KUWAIT. YOUR TELNO 393. SABAH AL AHMAD HAS LEFT LONDON FOR KUWAIT. GRATEFUL YOU CONTACT HIM ON HIS RETURN FOR HIS VIEWS.

4. PLEASE REPEAT YOUR REPLIES TO UKMIS NEW YORK FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

CARRINGTON

MNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

MAD

GRS 360
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW 231515Z SEP 80
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 578 OF 23RD SEPTEMBER
FOR INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND
ROUTINE BONN, PARIS AND BAGHDAD.

MG

YOUR TEL TO WASHINGTON NO 1534: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AZIZ ARRIVED IN MOSCOW ON 21 SEPTEMBER. HE HAD A MEETING YESTERDAY WITH PONOMAREV AND WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MALTSEV. THE SOVIET PRESS ANNOUNCED THE FACT BUT GAVE NO DETAILS. HE LEFT AGAIN ON 22 SEPTEMBER.

2. THE SOVIET PRESS CONTINUES TO PRINT THE VIEWS OF THE OPPOSING SIDES AT ROUGHLY EQUAL LENGTH WITHOUT COMMENT. HOWEVER, SOME SLIGHT PRO-IRAQI SHADING MAY BE SEEN IN THE SELECTION OF RECENT REPORTS FROM BAGHDAD WHICH PRESENT THE IRAQI ACTION AS LARGELY DEFENSIVE. IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH A MEMBER OF CHANCERY, A SOVIET MFA OFFICIAL SIMILARLY APPEARED TO BE LEANING SLIGHTLY TOWARDS THE IRAQI POSITION, POINTING OUT THAT THE IRANIANS HAD BY THEIR OWN ADMISSION FAILED TO FULFIL THEIR AID OF THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT AND DESCRIBING THE IRANIAN SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD CEASE ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAQ AS ''ILLOGICAL'' IN VIEW OF THE BILATERAL FRIENDSHIP TREATY.

3. I AGREE GENERALLY WITH THE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION IN PARA 3 OF TUR. THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IS CLEARLY ONE WHICH NEEDS TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. THE EXAMPLE OF AFGHANISTAN SUGGESTS THAT THEY WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THIS AS A POSSIBLE OPTION IF THEY BELEIVED IT WOULD SERVE THEIR POLITICAL AND SECURITY INTERESTS, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THEY COULD REACH SUCH A CONCLUSION. THEIR MAIN LONG-TERM CONCERN IS PROBABLY TO SEE THE WEAKENING

/ON

CONFIDENTIAL

ON F KHOMEINI, AND A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN IRAN'S INTERNAL POSITION, WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS WOULD FURTHER WEAKEN IRANIAN OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND IN DUE COURSE OPEN THE WAY TO A TAKE OVER BY THE PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS IN IRAN ITSELF. THEY ARE THEREFORE LIKELY TO CONCLUDE THAT THEIR INTERESTS WILL BE BETTER SERVED BY AVOIDING INVOLVEMENT AND ALLOWING THE IRAQUIS TO TEACH THE IRANIANS A LESSON RATHER THATN BY ANY OCCUPATION OF IRANIAN TERRITORY BY THEMSELVES. THEY MIGHT AT SOME POINT - BUT NOT YET - BE TEMPTED TO OFFER MEDIATION AS A MEANS OF EXTENDING THEIR OWN INFLUENCE. FOLLOWING AZIZ'S VISIT, THEY MAY HAVE GOT A REASONABLY CLEAR PICTURE OF IRAQI INTENTIONS AND HAVE INDICATED THE LIMITS OF THEIR ACQUIESCENCE.

KEEBLE

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD

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EESD	CONS EM UNIT
ECD	CABINET OFFICE
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GROUPS 350

FM CENTROFORM LONDON 231003Z

UNCLASSIFIED

RETRACT 23323 SEP

ITEM: LORD CARRINGTON DISCUSSES IRAN/IRAQ WITH MR WALDHEIM

BY ROBIN GORDON-WALKER LPS DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT, NEW YORK TUESDAY SEPTEMBER 23 (TWENTYTHREE) (LPS):

BRITAIN'S FOREIGN SECRETARY, LORD CARRINGTON, DISCUSSED THE FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN DURING A MEETING HERE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, MR KURT WALDHEIM. LORD CARRINGTON ARRIVED IN NEW YORK YESTERDAY AND WILL BE ADDRESSING THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY TODAY.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE IRAN/IRAQ SITUATION. LORD CARRINGTON BELIEVES THAT THE UN MUST RESPOND TO THIS POTENTIALLY VERY SERIOUS SITUATION AND IN HIS MEETING WITH MR WALDHEIM THE QUESTION OF HOW IT COULD BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS DISCUSSED.

LORD CARRINGTON ALSO HAD A MEETING WITH THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER MR AGHA SHAHI. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED THE UN RESPONSE TO THE IRAN/IRAQ SITUATION. PAKISTAN IS AN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE ISLAMIC GROUP AT THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH INCLUDES THE COMBATANT COUNTRIES.

THE CONTINUED SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN WAS ALSO DISCUSSED AT LORD CARRINGTON'S MEETINGS WITH MR WALDHEIM AND MR AGHA SHAHI, PARTICULARLY HOW THE ISSUE SHOULD BE HANDLED AT THE CURRENT SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. SINCE THE SOVIET INVASION LAST DECEMBER THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS URGING WITHDRAWAL AND THE RESTORATION OF AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY BELIEVES THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MUST SUSTAIN DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN AT THE CURRENT SESSION.

A NUMBER OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES CAME UP DURING LORD CARRINGTON'S MEETING WITH MR WALDHEIM - INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST, CAMBODIA AND NAMIBIA. THEY SPOKE ABOUT DR WALDHEIM'S LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 19 TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT PROPOSING THAT A TEAM OF SENIOR UN OFFICIALS GO TO SOUTH AFRICA TO DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PLAN FOR NAMIBIA'S FUTURE. THE PROPOSED DATE FOR THE TEAM'S VISIT IS SEPTEMBER 29 TO OCTOBER 4.

LORD CARRINGTON IS IN NEW YORK PRINCIPALLY FOR HIS ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TODAY. HE IS ALSO SEEING A NUMBER OF OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS AND WILL HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES ABOUT THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE NINE'S INITIATIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. (LPS)

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CENTROFORM LDN

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FDW G 1ø4/23

ATHENS DESKBY 2315øøZ

RR MOSCOW

RR BAGHDAD

GRS 415
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK AND ATHENS 2315øøZ
FM FCO 231245Z SEPTEMBER 8ø
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 73ø OF 23 SEPTEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (FOR PRIME MINISTER)
INFO TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO.

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE
IRAQ/IRAN

1. WE HELD A MEETING THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FIGHTING. WE AGREED A LINE FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT WHICH IS BEING TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY. THE ADVICE TO BRITISH SUBJECTS AND SHIPPING/AVIATION INTERESTS IS ALSO BEING TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY.
2. WE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UK AND THE WEST AS A WHOLE IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD MEET SOON TO URGE AN END TO THE FIGHTING. BUT IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT NEITHER SIDE WILL WANT TO TAKE THE QUESTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNLESS AND UNTIL IT FINDS ITSELF CLEARLY ON THE LOSING SIDE. MEANWHILE CONTINUATION OF THE CONFLICT COULD HAVE GRAVE EFFECTS, PARTICULARLY IF THE INTERRUPTION OF CRUDE SHIPMENTS FROM THE GULF HARMS KUWAIT, WHOSE ECONOMY IS DEPENDENT ON GAS ASSOCIATED WITH CRUDE PRODUCTION, OR IF THE IRAQIS TRY TO EJECT THE IRANIANS FROM ABU MUSA AND THE TUNBS, WITH RESULTING FIGHTING IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.
3. WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE EFFORT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAY DEPEND ON THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE. OUR INITIAL VIEW IS THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL BE VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT SEEKING TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION FOR SELFISH ENDS BUT YOU WILL WISH TO SOUND OUT GROMYKO ON THIS. AS IRAQ'S PRINCIPAL SUPPLIER OF WEAPONS, THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO EXERT INFLUENCE ON HER.
4. FOR YOUR DISCUSSION WITH RAO, IT MIGHT BE WORTH FLOATING THE IDEA OF AN INDIAN INITIATIVE TO MEDIATE. THE INDIANS ENJOY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE IRAQIS AND HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN KEEPING IN WITH THE IRANIANS AS POTENTIAL OIL SUPPLIERS.
5. THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR TOLD MR HURD THIS MORNING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE SENDING A SENIOR OFFICIAL TO SAUDI ARABIA IN AN ATTEMPT TO LAUNCH AN EFFORT AT MEDIATION BY THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL. THIS MIGHT BE A BETTER BET.
6. DESPITE OUR STRONG INTEREST IN AN EARLY SETTLEMENT, WE SEE DANGER IN ANY MOVE BY THE UK ALONE TO PROMOTE A SOLUTION OR EVEN A SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE AT THIS STAGE. THE IRAQIS WOULD CLEARLY RESENT SUCH A MOVE AND MIGHT ACCUSE US OF SEEKING TO REVERSE OUR FORMER ROLE IN THE GULF AND RAKE UP OLD CHARGES THAT WE ALLOWED THE IRANIANS TO TAKE THE ISLANDS. IT WOULD BE BEST IF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WERE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CALLING FOR THE COUNCIL.

CARRINGTON

ADVANCE COPY

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
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NO 10 DOWNING STREET
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Prime Minister

MAP 26/X

GR 240
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM KUWAIT 231300Z SEPT
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 405 OF 23/9/80,
INFO BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN AND JEDDA.

IRAN/IRAQ: KUWAIT MILITARY REACTION

1. THE KUWAITIS HAVE PLACED THEIR ARMED FORCES ON A STATE OF GENERAL READINESS AND MADE A NUMBER OF PRECAUTIONARY DEPLOYMENTS (SEE PARA 2). MINISTER OF DEFENCE SHEIKH SALEM HAS SAID PRIVATELY THAT RELATIONS WITH IRAQ ARE GOOD AND THAT HE WOULD EXPECT IRAQ TO AVOID INVOLVING KUWAIT IN THE WAR. KUWAIT HAS AGREED TO AN IRAQI, BUT NOT AN IRANIAN, REQUEST FOR FIGHTER AIR SPACE AND, IF NECESSARY, REFUELLING FACILITIES.

2. DETAILED DEPLOYMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS

(I) TANKS: 35 BDE HAS 146 CHIEFTAIN TANKS ON FULL STANDBY. THESE ARE BEING MOVED TO POSTION 10-20 MLS SOUTH OF THE NORTHERN BORDER (WITH IRAQ) AT THE RATE OF ONE REGIMENT PER DAY, UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS.

(II) INFANTRY: AT LEAST ONE INFANTRY BATTALION (AND POSSIBLY TTWO) WAS MOVED TO FAILAKA ON 22 SEPT UNDER COMMAND OF COL SALEM TURKI.

(II) INFANTRY: AT LEAST ONE INFANTRY BATTALION (AND POSSIBLY TWO) WAS MOVED TO FAILAKA ON 22 SEPT UNDER COMMAND OF COL SALEM TURKI. KUWAIT'S INTENTION HERE WOULD BE TO PREVENT AN IRANIAN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT. THERE ARE TROOPS AND POLICE ON BUBIYAN (IN UNKNOWN BUT PROBABLY SMALL NUMBERS) ARMED WITH HEAVY MACHINE GUNS AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS (THE LATTER AS A DEFENCE AGAINST LANDING OR HOVER CRAFT)

(III) AIR FORCE: REGULAR BORDER PATROLS AND SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTER STAND BY HAVE BEEN STEPPED UP.

3. POLICE DEALT QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY WITH A SMALL DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE THE IRAQI EMBASSY THIS MORNING. NO FURTHER INFORMATION YET AVAILABLE.

BALFOUR

NNNN

LLG 766/23

FDW G 095/23

OO ATHENS

GRS 270
UNCLASSIFIED
FM F C O 231325Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 167 OF 23 SEPTEMBER

FOR ALEXANDER
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT
WAS RECEIVED FROM BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 421 OF 23 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT JEDDA AMMAN DAMASCUS ANKARA WASHINGTON
MOSCOW UKDEL NATO

IRAQ/IRAN
1. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL ISSUED A STATEMENT ON 22 SEPTEMBER INSTRUCTING THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES TO ''DIRECT DETERRENT STRIKES AGAINST IRANIAN MILITARY TARGETS IN ORDER TO FOIL THE RACIST PERSIAN REGIME'S DESIGNS ON IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY, BOTH LAND AND WATER''.

2. THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE ''IN RESPONSE TO THE IRANIANS' RECKLESS MILITARY OPERATIONS, THEIR ATTEMPTS TO INTERRUPT NAVIGATION IN THE SHATT AL ARAB BY FIRING ON MERCHANT SHIPS, THEIR EXTENSIVE AIR ATTACKS ON THE IRAQI ARMY, THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT OF A GENERAL CALL-UP, AND THE CLOSURE OF IRANIAN AIR SPACE - ALL OF WHICH INDICATES THAT THE IRANIANS INTEND TO BROADEN THE SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT UNTIL IT REACHES A STATE OF WAR''. IRAQ WOULD AVOID STRIKING AT CIVILIAN TARGETS, PROVIDED THE IRANIANS CEASE ATTACKING CIVILIAN TARGETS IN IRAQ.

3. THE COMMUNIQUE GOES ON TO SAY THAT THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WOULD ''WITHDRAW FROM ANY IRANIAN TERRITORIES IN WHICH DEFENSIVE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS MAKE AN IRAQI PRESENCE ESSENTIAL, AS SOON AS IRAN RECOGNISES IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS TERRITORY AND RESPECTS ITS VITAL INTERESTS''.

4. SEVERAL OBSERVERS HERE POINT TO THIS LAST SENTENCE AS A CLUE TO IRAQ'S REAL INTENTIONS, IE., AN OFFER TO WITHDRAW FROM CERTAIN NEWLY ACQUIRED BORDER AREAS IN RETURN FOR IRANIAN RECOGNITION, EVEN IF TACIT, OF IRAQ'S CLAIMS TO THE SHATT. LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 9 OF YOUR TEL NO 169 TO UKDEL NATO (NOT TO ALL) SEEMS EXACTLY RIGHT.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

LLG NR 765/23

TO OO ATHENS
OO BAGHDAD
RR ABUDHABI
RR ADDISABABA
RR AMMAN
RR ANKARA
RR BAHRAIN
RR BEIRUT
RR BELGRADE
RR CAIRO
RR DAMASCUS
RR DOHA
RR DUBAI
RR ISLAMABAD
RR JEDDA
RR JERUSALEM
RR KHARTOUM
RR KUWAIT
RR MUSCAT
RR ROME
RR TELAVIV

GROUPS 37Ø
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FCO PRESS CONFERENCE (EXTRACT)

IRAQ/IRAN FIGHTING

SPOKESMAN SAID THAT FCO HAD JUST RECEIVED A REPORT FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD THAT TWO BRITONS HAD BEEN KILLED AND ANOTHER INJURED DURING AN IRANIAN BOMB ATTACK ON THE ZUBAIR PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX NEAR BASRA EARLY TODAY. ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN IRAQ, SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THERE WERE ABOUT 1,ØØØ BRITISH CITIZENS IN BAGHDAD AND SOME 5ØØ ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. THESE NUMBERS WERE NECESSARILY APPROXIMATE, AS A LOT OF PEOPLE HAD NOT (NOT) REGISTERED WITH THE EMBASSY ALTHOUGH THEY WERE NOW COMING TO DO SO. THE EMBASSY WAS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE COMMUNITY WHICH WAS BEING ADVISED TO CARRY ON AS NORMAL BUT TO BE CAREFUL TO OBEY INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES ABOUT STAYING IN DOORS DURING AIR RAIDS ETC. ASKED ABOUT BRITISH SHIPPING, SPOKESMAN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE DEPT OF TRADE, THROUGH THE BRITISH COUNCIL OF SHIPPING, HAD ADVISED BRITISH VESSELS TO STAY AWAY FROM THE AREA AND THOSE IN BASRA TO STAY PUT. BRITISH SHIPPING WAS ALSO BEING ADVISED TO KEEP OUT OF IRANIAN WATERS WHICH WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN DECLARED A WAR ZONE BY THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES. ASKED WHETHER BRITAIN WOULD RAISE THE MATTER AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SPOKESMAN SAID HE THOUGHT THE CONFLICT WOULD BE A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION AMONG DELEGATES BUT WHETHER THE MATTER WAS FORMALLY BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UN REQUIRED FURTHER CONSIDERATION. LORD CARRINGTON WAS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND HAD SEEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL, DR WALDHEIM YESTERDAY. FCO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS IN TOUCH WITH BOTH PARTIES THROUGH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK. ASKED WHETHER HE HAD ANY INFORMATION THAT THE US HOSTAGES IN IRAN HAD BEEN RELEASED, SPOKESMAN SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN THE REPORTS TO THAT EFFECT BUT HAD NO (NO) INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR ACCURACY.

CENTROFORM LONDON

FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1331 OF 22 SEPTEMBER

AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, KABUL, ISLAMABAD, PARIS, BONN, PEKING, JEDDA, NEW DELHI, TOKYO

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH AGA SHAHI: M I P T

AFGHANISTAN.

1. AGA SHAHI SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS SEEMED OPPOSED TO HIS IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, WHICH THEY HAD DESCRIBED AS VAGUE, A DIPLOMATIC TRICK AND NOT THE WAY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. THEY WERE INSISTING ON THEIR MAY 14 PROPOSALS. DESCRIBING THE ORIGIN OF THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW (ISLAMABAD TELNO 1295), AGA SHAHI SAID HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN A HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE, PROVIDED THE RUSSIANS WERE OPEN-MINDED. BUT THE PAKISTANIS RESENTED THE SOVIET LEAK OF THEIR CONFERENCE PROPOSALS. HE HAD DECLINED AN INVITATION TO GO TO MOSCOW HIMSELD, BUT HAD AGREED TO AN ALTERNATIVE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO SEND A DELEGATION, OSTENSIBLY TO DISCUSS GENERAL ASSEMBLY BUSINESS. IT WAS DURING THIS VISIT THAT FIRYUBIN HAD REJECTED A CONFERENCE AS AN OPPORTUNITY BY THE CHINESE AND THE AMERICANS TO FISH IN TOUBLED WATERS.

2. AGA SHAHI SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS SEEMED EQUALLY OPPOSED TO A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OR TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OR TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THEY MIGHT, HOWEVER, REACT DIFFERENTLY TO A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL NOT MANDATED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HIS FUNCTION WOULD BE TO VISIT THE AREA AND SEE WHETHER THERE WAS ANY COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE MAY 14 PROPOSALS AND THOSE FOR A NON-ALIGNED, INDEPENDENT AFGHANISTAN AS CALLED FOR IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 1980.

3. THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO BY TOYING WITH THE IDEA OF TWO U.N RESOLUTIONS. THE FIRST WOULD BE ''PROPAGANDISTIC'', CONCENTRATING ON WITHDRAWAL, AND THE SECOND WOULD SPELL OUT THE PRINCIPLES OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE DANGER WAS THAT THEY MIGHT USE THE SECOND RESOLUTION, WHICH MIGHT SECURE A LARGER MAJORITY, TO NEUTRALISE THE FIRST, AND EQUATE SOVIET INTERVENTION WITH ALLEGED OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. THE PAKISTANIS WERE THEREFORE THINKING OF A SINGLE RESOLUTION. THIS WOULD RECALL THE RESOLUTION OF 14 JANUARY AND REITERATE THE NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS, BUT GO ON TO LIST THE PRINCIPLES FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, EG RESPECT FOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE NON-ALIGNED STATUS OF AFGHANISTAN: RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN POLITICAL SYSTEM, FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTEREFERENCE: THE NEED TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD PERMIT REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES: THE NEED TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERFERENCE: AND MUTUAL RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY (AGA SHAHI THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT BY MEANS OF THIS LAST FORMULA THE RUSSIANS MIGHT IN EFFECT ACCEPT THE DURAND LINE). THE RESOLUTION WOULD END BY CALLING ON ALL PARTIES AND INTERESTED MEMBER STATES TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION CONSISTENT WITH THESE PRINCIPLES.

4. AGA SHAHI'S INTENTION WAS TO DISCUSS THESE IDEAS FIRST WITH SELECTED ISLAMIC COUNTRIES AND ALSO WITH ONE OR TWO KEY NON-ALIGNED, EG YUGOSLAVIA, AND THEN AT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ON 6 OCTOBER. IN THE LIGHT OF THE SUPPORT OBTAINED, THE RESOLUTION COULD BE LAUNCHED AND THE DEBATE ON THIS ITEM CONDUCTED IN LATE OCTOBER/EARLY NOVEMBER, BUT IN ANY CASE BEFORE 15 NOVEMBER WHEN ARAB INTEREST WOULD SWITCH TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM.

5. AGA SHAHI SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD AGAIN TRIED TO ENGINEER A MEETING BETWEEN HIM AND THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER. AGA SHAHI HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WOULD ONLY MEET DOST IN HIS CAPACITY AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, AND IN THE PRESENCE OF CHATTY (THE SECRETARY-GENERAL) DOST HIMSELF WOULD ONLY HAVE THE STATUS OF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

6. MEANWHILE, THE ROMANIANS WERE STILL TRYING TO PROMOTE A CONFERENCE CONCENTRATING ON IRAN, PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN. THIS AGA SHAHI RULED OUT. HOWEVER, 8 OR 9 COUNTRIES COULD PROVIDE A NUCLEUS FOR A CONFERENCE. THE PAKISTANIS WANTED ALL THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH THE RUSSIANS REJECTED AS INTERNATIONALISING A PROBLEM WHICH THEY WISHED TO KEEP LOCAL. THE NON-ALIGNED REPRESENTATIVES MIGHT INCLUDE

FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION CONSISTENT WITH THESE PRINCIPLES.

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7. AGA SHAHI COMPLAINED THAT EUROPE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE UK, HAD SHOWN NO DISPOSITION TO SUPPORT PAKISTAN. GISCARD'S VISIT TO POLAND HAD BEEN PRECIPITOUS, FOLLOWED BY THAT OF SCHMIDT TO MOSCOW. SCHMIDT HAD CLEARLY OPTED OUT OF THE PROBLEM. WESTERN EUROPE HAD NOT REFUSED TO EXTEND FURTHER CREDIT TO THE SOVIET UNION, ALTHOUGH JAPAN HAD, AND SEEMED RELUCTANT TO JEOPARDISE DETENTE, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF ELECTIONS. THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS ANOTHER NEGATIVE FACTOR, AS WAS THE DEFECTION OF IRAN FROM THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE STANDING COMMITTEE. FINALLY THERE WERE SIGNS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE INSTIGATING INDIA TO PUT MILITARY PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN. MRS GANDHI HAD SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THE NORTH-EAST AND CLAIMED THAT FOREIGN ELEMENTS WERE AT WORK THERE. AGA SHAHI HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE INDIANS IN REPLY TO A MESSAGE FROM RAO (WHICH W
S HALF APPEAL AND HALF THREAT) THAT THE PAKISTANIS KNEW OF NO CONSPIRACY TO DESTABILISE MRS GANDHI'S GOVERNMENT, AND WOULD JOIN NO SUCH CONSPIRACY. THERE HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN DOMESTIC PRESSURE IN PAKISTAN TO TAKE A STAND ON DISTURBANCES IN INDIA IN AREAS WHERE MANY PAKISTANIS HAD RELATIVES. UNFORTUNATELY THE PAKISTANI PRESS HAD BEEN RATHER EXCESSIVE ON THIS THEME, AND CRITICAL OF MRS GANDHI PERSONALLY.

CARRINGTON

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06/04/16

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Prime Minister

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 230500Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1330 OF 22 SEPTEMBER 1980
AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, KABUL, ISLAMABAD, BAGHDAD, PARIS, BONN, PEKING, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, CAIRO.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH AGA SHAHI (Pakistan)

IRAN/IRAQ HOSTILITIES

1. AGA SHAHI THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQIS WERE WORRIED BY THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND HAD TAKEN THE OFFENSIVE TO TOPPLE KHOMEINI. THE IRAQIS SAW THIS AS A GOOD MOMENT BECAUSE OF THE WEAKNESS OF IRANIAN FORCES. LORD CARRINGTON POINTED OUT THE DANGER OF FRAGMENTATION IN IRAN FOLLOWED BY A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. AGA SHAHI AGREED, BUT THOUGHT THAT MORE PRIMITIVE, SHORT-SIGHTED PASSIONS WERE PREVAILING IN BAGHDAD. IRANIAN THREATS OF EXPORTING REVOLUTION HAD ANGERED MANY ARABS. THE SAUDIS AND IRAQIS WERE CONCERTING THEIR OPPOSITION TO KHOMEINI, EG OVER OIL PRICES, TO INCREASE ECONOMIC PRESSURES. A STRIKE AGAINST IRANIAN OIL FIELDS WOULD BE CRIPPLING.

2. LORD CARRINGTON STRESSED THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR THE UN TO DO NOTHING. BRITAIN DID NOT WISH TO TAKE SIDES, BUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE A STAND. AGA SHAHI AGREED BUT POINTED OUT THAT THE IRANIANS HAD ALIENATED EVERYONE, INCLUDING THE UN AND THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE PLO OR THE NON-ALIGNED COULD MEDIATE. ALTERNATIVELY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAS ENPOWERED UNDER ARTICLE 99 TO CONVENE THE SECURITY COUNCIL IF HE JUDGED THAT A THREAT TO THE PEACE EXISTED. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT EAST AND WEST MIGHT UNITE TO PREVENT AN IRAN/IRAQ WAR, INCLUDING THE RUSSIANS. AGA SHAHI SEEMED DOUBTFUL ABOUT THIS, THOUGH HE THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD PREFER TO TAKE OVER IRAN INTACT RATHER THAN ALLOW IT TO BE FRAGMENTED.

3. SEE MIPT FOR DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN (NOT TO ALL).

PARSONS

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4066 OF 22 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD
INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, ANKARA AND MOSCOW.

IRAQ/IRAN.

1. SECRETARY OF DEFENCE BROWN WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE IRAN/IRAQ FIGHTING IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW ON 21 SEPTEMBER TOOK THE LINE THAT THE FIGHTING HAD GONE BEYOND SKIRMISHING BUT WAS NOT A MAJOR WAR. QUOTE I THINK IT IS VERY DANGEROUS TO BOTH OF THOSE COUNTRIES, IT IS VERY DANGEROUS TO ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, AND IT IS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE PEACE OF THE WORLD UNQUOTE.

2. STATE DEPARTMENT ADMIT THAT THEY HAVE COME TO NO FIRM CONCLUSION ABOUT WHERE THE FIGHTING MIGHT BE LEADING BUT BELIEVE THAT IT HAS ESCALATED IN THE LAST 24 HOURS.
THEY HAVE ISSUED NOTAM WARNINGS TO SHIPPING: AND ARE ADVISING US CITIZENS NOT TO TRAVEL TO IRAQ UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 230330Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1325 OF 22 SEPTEMBER 1980
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW,
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, ISLAMABAD.

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE AND UN SECRETARY-GENERAL: IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT.

1. THE MAIN POINTS TO ARISE ON THIS SUBJECT DURING LORD CARRINGTON'S MEETING WITH DR WALDHEIM WERE AS FOLLOWS (FULL RECORD BY BAG).

2. LORD CARRINGTON ARGUED THAT THE UN HAD TO TAKE SOME ACTION. WALDHEIM THOUGHT THE IRANIANS WOULD NOT WISH TO BRING THE DISPUTE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE WAS RELUCTANT TO DO SO HIMSELF UNDER ARTICLE 99. AS A FIRST STEP HE PROPOSED TO SEND PRIVATE MESSAGES TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS THROUGH THEIR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES. HE ACCEPTED THAT HE MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY HAVE TO TAKE THE QUESTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE SCOPE FOR EAST/WEST COLLABORATION TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT. RECENT IRANIAN ACTIONS HAD INFURIATED THE IRAQIS, WHO HAD PROBABLY NOT THOUGHT THROUGH THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISINTEGRATION OF IRAN. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THAT THE NON-ALIGNED WOULD BE DIVIDED ON THE ISSUE AND THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT SEE THE DISINTEGRATION OF IRAN AS BEING TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. MOVES TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT WERE THEREFORE LIKELY TO ATTRACT WIDE SUPPORT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. SEE MY FOUR IFTS FOR OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED.

PARSONS

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 230020Z SEP 80
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1321 OF 22 SEPTEEMBER
INFO BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON

IRAN/IRAQ

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ISSUED A STATEMENT TODAY (22 SEPTEMBER) IN WHICH HE NOTED WITH GROWING CONCERN THE ESCALATING CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, EXPRESSED THE FEAR THAT IT COULD HAVE SERIOUS AND UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES, AND APPEALED TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT, TO DESIST FROM FURTHER ARMED ACTION AND TO DO ALL THEY COULD TO NEGOTIATE A SOLUTION.

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THIS TELEGRAM
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FM F C O 222314Z SEP 8Ø
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 719 OF 22 SEPTEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS (FOR PS TO THE PRIME MINISTER)

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF RESIDENT CLERK WAS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON AS TELEGRAM NO 4Ø66 OF 22 SEPTEMBER 8Ø.
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD
INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, ANKARA AND MOSCOW.

IRAQ/IRAN

1. SECRETARY OF DEFENCE BROWN WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE IRAN/IRAQ FIGHTING IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW ON 21 SEPTEMBER TOOK THE LINE THAT THE FIGHTING HAD GONE BEYOND SKIRMISHING BUT WAS NOT A MAJOR WAR. QUOTE I THINK IT IS VERY DANGEROUS TO BOTH OF THOSE COUNTRIES, IT IS VERY DANEGEROUS TO ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, AND IT IS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE PEACE OF THE WORLD UNQUOTE.

2. STATE DEPARTMENT ADMIT THAT THEY HAVE COME TO NO FIRM CONCLUSION ABOUT WHERE THE FIGHTING MIGHT BE LEADING BUT BELIEVE THAT IT HAS ESCALATED IN THE LAST 24 HOURS.
THEY HAVE ISSUED NOTAM WARNINGS TO SHIPPING: AND ARE ADVISING US CITIZENS NOT TO TRAVEL TO IRAQ UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

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FM BAGHDAD 211017Z SEP 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 415 OF 21/9/80

INFO KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW

IRAQ/IRAN SITREP: OUR TEL NO 407.

1. FIGHTING CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 17-20 SEPTEMBER AND ARTILLERY EXCHANGES NOW APPEAR TO BE TAKING PLACE ALONG PARTS OF THE BORDER FROM THE SHATT AL ARAB AS FAR NORTH AS KHANAQIN.

2. ACCORDING TO IRAQI MOD STATEMENTS, AT 1800 HOURS ON 17 SEPTEMBER, THE IRAQI OIL TANKER ''KHALIDA'' WAS FIRED ON BY THE IRANIANS FROM MOHAMMERAH (KHORRAMSHAHR) . THE ISLAND OF UM AL RASAS IN BASRA GOVERNORATE WAS ALLEGEDLY SHELLED ON BOTH 17 AND 20 SEPTEMBER. IRAQ CLAIMS TO HAVE SHOT DOWN TWO IRANIAN FSA PHANTOMS ON THE MANDALI AND MISAN SECTORS OF THE BORDER ON 18 SEPTEMBER. THEY ALSO CLAIM A SECOND PHANTOM (CF. OUR TUR) ON 17 SEPTEMBER, MAKING A TOTAL OF FOUR IN THE 48 HOUR PERIOD. AT 0500 HOURS ON 19 SEPTEMBER IRAQI FORCES CLAIM TO HAVE CAPTURED KIHFAT AL MAUT BORDER POST IN THE MANDALI SECTOR. AT 1330 HOURS ON 20 SEPTEMBER IRANIAN PATROL BOATS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE ATTACKED IRAQI PATROL BOATS IN THE SHATT AL ARAB. THE IRAQIS CLAIM TWO IRANIAN BOATS DESTROYED WITH ONE IRAQI BOAT LISTING AND ON FIRE. AT 1800 HOURS ON 20 SEPTEMBER, IRANIAN ARTILLERY IS SAID TO HAVE SHELLED IRAQI ECONOMIC INSTALLATIONS IN THE SHATT AL ARAB AREA. IRAQ HAS WARNED THAT IT WILL RETALIKBE AGAINST IRANIAN INSTALLATIONS.

3. THE CLASHES ON THE SHATT AL ARAB AND THE SHELLING OF THE ECONOMIC INSTALLATIONS MARK A FURTHER ESCALATION OF THIS DISPUTE. THE RESULTANT PUBLICITY, PARTICULARLY OVER THE SHATT AL ARAB, WILL MAKE IT HARDER FOR EITHER SIDE TO BACK DOWN. IT MAY BE THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE SOMEWHAT UNDERESTIMATED THE STRENGTH-HOWEVER BELATED- OF THE IRANIAN RESPONSE.

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EGERTON [THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 414 OF 21/9/80
AND IMMEDIATE DOT CRE5
INFO ANKARA, MOSCOW, PARIS, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, AMMAN AND DAMASCUS.

DESKBY 211100Z

MIPT: IRAQ/IRAN-CLOSURE OF IRANIAN AIR SPACE.
1. WHEN AT THE MFA THIS MORNING HEADS OF MISSION WERE TOLD THAT, ACCORDING TO THE LATEST INFORMATION RECEIVED, IRAN HAD TODAY, 21 SEPTEMBER , CLOSED THE MAJOR PART OF ITS AIR SPACE TO AIR TRAFFIC. THIS, SAID THE SPOKESMAN, INDICATED TO IRAQ THAT THE IRANIANS WERE QUOTE WAGING WAR UNQUOTE.

2. COMMENT: B A MANAGER TELLS US THAT THIS DOE NOT (NOT) AFFECT ANY OF THEIR AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY SCHEDULED TO LAND AT BAGHDAD.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 413 OF 21/9/80
AND IMMEDIATE KUWAIT, PRIORITY MUSCAT AND BAHRAIN
INFO ANKARA, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, AMMAN, MOSCOW, PARIS, WASHINGTON, ABU DHABI, DUBAI AND DOHA

DESKBY 211100Z

OUR TEL NO 402 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN-SHATT AL ARAB
1. AT HEADS OF MISSION MEETING AT MFA ON 21 SEPTEMBER, WHICH DICKSON ATTENDED, HEAD OF LEGAL DEPARTMENT SAID THAT WITH EFFECT FROM 17 SEPTEMBER, WHEN IRAQ ABROGATED THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT WITH IRAN, THE SHATT AL ARAB IS TO BE CONSIDERED A NATIONAL RIVER AND THAT IRAQ WOULD EXERCISE FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER IT. WE WERE ASKED TO PASS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION URGENTLY TO OUR GOVERNMENTS. BEGINS:

ALL VESSELS USING THE SHALL AL ARAB WILL BE OBLIGED TO OBSERVE THE FOLLOWING RULES:

(1) THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF NAVIGATION IN THE SHALL AL ARAB ISSUED BY THE STATE ORGANISATION FOR IRAQI PORTS.

(2) TO FLY THE IRAQI FLAG WHEN NAVIGATING THE SHATT AL ARAB REGARDLESS OF THE PORT OF DESTINATION.

(3) TO PAY ALL DUES AND CHARGES PERTAINING TO NAVIGATION OF THE SHATT AL ARAB TO THE STATE ORGANISATION FOR IRAQI PORTS:

(4) TO USE IRAQI PILOTS ONLY FOR PILOTAGE, AND TO ADHERE TO PILOT'S ORDERS ISSUED BY THE STATE ORGANISATION FOR IRAQI PORTS.

THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ EMPHASISES THAT IT WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO ENSURE THE APPLICATION OF THESE RULES FROM 17 SEPTEMBER (SIC). THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ WILL NOT TOLERATE ANY VIOLATION OF IRAQ'S COMPLETE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT AL ARAB BY ANY VESSELS OF WHATEVER NATIONALITY, AND WILL NOT HESITATE TO TAKE SUITABLE MEASURES INCLUDING MILITARY FORCE AGAINST VESSLES VIOLATING IT.

ENDS.

2. WE HAVE BEEN PROMISED THE ABOVE IN WRITING WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

3. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE ALERT CRE5 IN DOT. SEE MY I.F.T.
EGERTON

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 409 OF 20/9/80
AND PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS
INFO PARIS

IRAQ/IRAN

1. THE DUTCH CHARGE D#'AFFAIRES (FOR THE PRESIDENCY) CALLED A MEETING ON FRIDAY 19 SEPTEMBER TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION AND TO DECIDE WHAT, IF ANY, SPECIFIC ADVICE WE SHOULD BE GIVING TO OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.
PRESENT WERE:
AMBASSADORS: FRANCE, BELGIUM AND DENMARK
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES: NETHERLANDS, ITALY, GREECE FRG AND UK.

2. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN CALLED SEPARATELY TO SEE SADDAM HASSAIN WHILE THE REST OF US HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE SUMMONING OF HEJDS OF MISSION BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER (MY TEL NO 404). THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS TOLD THAT IT WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF IRAQ AND FRANCE'S CLOSE RELATIONS THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE PRESIDENT TO CONVEY A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAIN ABOUT THE ABROGATION OF THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT.

3. IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT WE HAD TOO LITTLE INFORMATION, BOTH HISTORICAL AND CURRENT, ON WHICH TO BASE ANY REALISTIC PREDKTION. THERE WAS A FEELING THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO HUMILIATE KHOMEINI AND THE MULLAHS WAS AN ELEMENT IN IRAQI THINING. IT WAS AHTT AN ATTEMPT, IT WAS THOUGH, BY SADDAM HUSSAIN WHO AS VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE RCC WAS CRITICISED HERE WHEN HE SIGNED THE AGREEMENT, TO RECOVER CONCESSIONS WHICH HAD BEEN FORCED ON HIM NOW THAT IT WAS THE IRANIANS WHO WERE VULNERABLE.
HIS SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WAS DEFENSIVE ABOUT HIS PART IN NEGOTIATING THE AGREEMENT. WITH BOTH THE BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL FAR AND THE OPEC SUMMIT ON THE HORIZON THE EXACT TIMING OF IRAQ'S ACTIONS PUZZLED US. IT WAS ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN SLIGHTLY SURPRISED BY THE DEGREE OF IRANIAN RESISTANCE AND COUNTER-ATTACKS.

4. IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO WARN OUR CITIZENS IN THE BASRA AREA TO THINK OF LEAVING, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE REPORTS THAT RESIDENTS OF BASRA CITY CAN HEAR SOUNDS OF GUNFIRE. TWO NEARBY OFF-SHORE OIL RIGS, ON WHICH THERE WERE A SMALL NUMBER OF FRENCH AND ITALIAN WORKERS, HAVE BEEN CLOSED AND EVACUATED BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

5. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ON WHETHER WE SHOULD WARN OUR SHIPPING. THE BELGIAN AMBASSODOR , WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN SHIPPING AFFAIRS ELSEWHERE, SAID THAT BEFORE 196//// 1975 BELGIAN SHIPS HAD BEEN SPECIALLY EQUIPPED TO FLY BOTH THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI FLAGS SIMULTANEOUSLY AND AT THE SAME HEIGHT.
DICKSON [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

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TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 4064 OF 20 SEPTEMBER
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK CABINET OFFICE (FOR JIS)

US/IRAN

1. THE LEAD STORY IN THE WASHINGTON POST OF 19 SEPTEMBER, HEADLINES QUOTE TOP SECRET IRAN PAPERS OUTLINE ROLE OF U S THERE UNQUOTE, CLAIMS THAT A SMALL STATE DEPARTMENT GROUP, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF TONY LAKE (HEAD OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF) HAS BEEN WORKING SINCE DECEMBER 1979 TO PUT TOGETHER A QUOTE MASSIVE TOP SECRET REPORT THAT DESCRIBES 4 DECADES OF US INVOLVEMENT IN IRAN UNQUOTE. THE WASHINGTON POST ASSERTS THAT THE REPORT CONSISTS OF A 500 PAGE OVERVIEW AND ABOUT 60,000 PAGES OF GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS. ONLY 2 COPIES ARE REPORTED TO EXIST, ONE BEING HELD BY BRZEZINSKI AND THE OTHER QUOTE LOCKED IN A PLACE WHERE ONLY 2 STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE ACCESS TO IT, APPARENTLY TO PREVENT LEAKS, OR ACCORDING TO SOME SOURCES, TO KEEP BRZEZINSKI FROM MAKING CHANGES OR DESTROYING MATERIAL. UNQUOTE THE POST ARTICLE POINTS TO SEVERAL DIFFERENT SOURCES FOR ITS STORY, SOME OF WHICH CLAIM THAT THE PAPER CONTAINS NO BOMBSHELLS AND IN NO WAY CONSTITUTES AN APOLOGY OR ADMISSION OF US GUILT, OTHERS THAT EVERY PRESIDENT FROM ROOSEVELT TO CARTER, AS WELL AS PEOPLE LIKE VANCE, BROWN, BRZEZINSKI AND KISSINGER, WILL ALL COME OUT OF IT BADLY. (FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE BY BAG.)

2. COMMENTING ON THIS REPORT LAST NIGHT, STATE DEPT SPOKESMAN SAID QUOTE THIS IS NOT THE PENTAGON PAPERS .... THERE IS NO 'STUDY' AS SUCH, ONLY A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS AND FACTUAL SUMMARIES ON PAST US RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THIS COMPILATION DID NOT FOCUS ON 'US MISDEEDS', AND NO CONCLUSIONS OR JUDGEMENTS WERE DERIVED. ESSENTIALLY, IT IS AN INVENTORY AND NOTHING MORE. UNQUOTE

3. SICK (NSC) HAS DESCRIBED THE WASHINGTON POST STORY TO US AS SOMEWHAT SENSATIONAL AND APPARENTLY BASED ON SECONDARY AND TERTIARY SOURCES. IT WAS TRUE THAT A COMPILATION OF PAST GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS ON IRAN HAD BEEN MADE, TOGETHER WITH SOME EDITORIAL WORK CONDENSING THE ESSENTIAL FACTS INTO A COVERING PAPER. THE RESULTING DOCUMENT WAS NOTHING LIKE SO FAT AS THE WASHINGTON POST ALLEGED. ITS PURPOSE WAS TO ENABLE THE ADMINISTRATION TO RESPOND WITH QUICK ANSWERS ABOUT THE PAST HISTORY OF US/IRAN RELATIONS IF THAT SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY AT ANY STAGE AS PART OF A SCENARIO FOR THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. THE DOCUMENT WAS NOT WRITTEN WITH A VIEW TO AN APOLOGY OR AN ADMISSION OF GUILT BUT RATHER AS A CONVENIENT ASSEMBLY OF THE FACTS. THERE WERE NO DAMAGING REFERENCES IN IT TO ANY BRITISH ROLE OVER THE PERIOD CONCERNED. IT WAS NOT THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTENTION TO MAKE THE DOCUMENT PUBLIC, ALTHOUGH THE FACT OF ITS EXISTENCE COULD OBVIOUSLY

BE EXPECTED TO LEAD TO PRESSURE FROM CONGRESS TO HAVE A SIGHT OF IT (INDEED THE SECRECY ABOUT ITS EXISTENCE HITHERTO HAD BEEN PARTLY TO HEAD OFF SUCH CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE SO THAT IT COULD BE KEPT IN RESERVE FOR THE MOMENT AT WHICH IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HOSTAGES RELEASE).

4. ONE OF THE SENIOR PEOPLE IN STATE WHO WORKED ON THE PROJECT (STODDARD- DESCRIBED IN THE POST AS THE OPERATIONAL HEAD OF THE STUDY), HAS DESCRIBED IT TO US AS A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS ON QUOTE NEURALGIC UNQUOTE SUBJECTS ON WHICH THE US WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO ENQUIRY, SUCH AS THE SHAH'S ASSETS AND US DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (INCLUDING DISTORTED PRIORITIES). AS WELL AS THE SUMMARIES (PARA. 2 ABOVE) THERE ARE, ACCORDING TO STODDARD, TWO SHORT (20-PLUS PAGES) QUOTE OVERVIEW PAPERS UNQUOTE, BUT NO HISTORY AS SUCH. A POST ALLEGATION, THAT WHAT HAS BEEN WRITTEN IS STILL IN DRAFT FORM TO AVOID BEING SUBJECT TO RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, IS EVIDENTLY ACCURATE (AND MAY WELL CAUSE A LEGAL DISPUTE).

5. ALSO ACCORDING TO STODDARD, THE ONLY REFERENCES TO HMG IN THE PAPERS ARE A COUPLE OF SENTENCES ABOUT COOPERATION WITH THE BRITISH IN THE EARLY PHASES OF THE DOWNFALL OF MOSSADEQ. WE WILL RAISE THESE WITH THOSE CONCERNED. THEY APPEAR IN A HIGHLY CLASSIFIED CONTRIBUTION BY THE CIA (THE POST REPORT REFERS TO SUCH A CONTRIBUTION), AND, MORE BRIEFLY, IN ONE OVERVIEW PAPER. IT IS CLASSIFIED SECRET NOFORN (I.E. NO RELEASE TO ANY FOREIGN NATIONAL), BUT IT COULD, IN STODDARD'S PERSONAL VIEW (PLEASE PROTECT) BE DOWNGRADED AND THE MATERIAL BE RELEASED IF A FEW PARAGRAPHS WERE EXCISED. THIS PAPER, IT SEEMS TO US, COULD WELL HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY WRITTEN WITH AN EYE TO EARLY RELEASE IN THE HOSTAGE CONTEXT.

HENDERSON

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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Iraq.

EXTRACT FROM SUMMARY RECORD OF GISCARD'S LUNCH 19-9-80.

Community must now follow up the initiative by giving more precision and detail to the ideas and concepts in the Venice declaration, with a view to making further progress at the December meeting of the European Council.

The Lord Privy Seal agreed generally with Monsieur Francois-Poncet's analysis and in particular upon the need for building on, and giving greater detail and precision to, the European Council's initiative; but he emphasised the importance of ensuring that any proposals made by the European Community were at least not unacceptable to the United States, whose support was indispensable to progress towards peace in the region.

In discussion it was agreed that one of the matters which would require further discussion in the European Community was the future of the West Bank. The Prime Minister favoured federation of the West Bank in the State of Jordan: there was reason to believe that this could be acceptable to King Hussein. In her judgment the future of Jerusalem was likely to be the most intractable problem, given the views of the Saudi Government. The President of the Republic agreed that inclusion of the West Bank in a federal state of Jordan would be an acceptable solution if it were the choice of the PLO, but it could not be imposed on the PLO. He believed that it would not be possible to withhold recognition from the PLO after 1981. The Prime Minister said that recognition of the PLO must be dependent upon the PLO and the Arab states recognising the right of the state of Israel to exist. The President of the Republic agreed, and said that Arab leaders were in practice ready to accept and recognise the existence of the State of Israel. It was difficult, however, for the PLO and the Arab states to concede Israel's right to exist until the PLO was recognised: some way would have to be found of making the two steps simultaneous.

Iraq-Iran

The Prime Minister said that it was known that France was closer than other Western powers to Iraq: what view did France take of recent developments in relations between Iraq and Iran? Monsieur Francois-Poncet said that until recently he would have said that

/they

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would be likely to
they/prosecute their claims upon territory held by Iran with words rather than with organised military force: in the light of recent reports that view might need to be re-evaluated. The Prime Minister asked whether there was a danger that the Iraqis might use the nuclear reactor and the weapons-grade uranium supplied to them by France to make nuclear weapons. The President of the Republic and Monsieur Giraud argued at considerable length that the French Government had considered this possibility in great detail and were satisfied that there was no such danger. It was because they were not satisfied that the same could be said about the Pakistanis and the South Koreans that they had cancelled their nuclear contracts with those countries. The fact that the uranium supplied for the Iraqi reactor was weapons-grade uranium was not itself significant: it was a research reactor, and all the thirty or so research reactors in the world used weapons-grade uranium. The amount supplied would be sufficient to make only one or two weapons, and the Iraqis had agreed to its being supplied in instalments in such a way as made it technically impossible to use it for the manufacture of weapons. The Iraqis had accepted perfectly readily all the requirements of international inspection. If their aim was to be able to make a nuclear weapon, they had chosen an unlikely and technically cumbersome way of going about it. If it was argued that Iraq's resources of oil made it unnecessary for her to develop nuclear power for the supply of energy, the Iraqis said that that oil would not last forever, and now was the time for them to begin development of a nuclear power capacity so as to be able to prolong the availability of oil and to replace it as a source of energy when it ran out.

Aid Policy and North-South Relations

Turning to questions of aid policy and North-South relations, there was general agreement that the resources which the industrialised countries had available to help the Third World were considerably restricted by the effects of the increase in oil prices. In international discussion of aid policies, it would be important to emphasise a number of points:

(a) For several reasons the emphasis should be switched from multi-lateral aid more towards bilateral aid. Multi-lateral aid was in danger of becoming little more than a

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TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 210 OF 18 SEPTEMBER

FOR ALEXANDER
FOLLOWING TRELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE WAS RECEIVED FROM BAGHDAD AS TELEGRAM NUMBER 428 OF 24 SEPTYEMBER.

AND IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

IRAQ/IRAN

1. DICKSON WAS CALLED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF CHINA AND BANGLADESH AMBASSADOR WERE ALSO PRESENT. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WITH WHOM THE MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED, AND THE UNDER SECRETARY, AL QAIS, HEAD OF THE LEGAL DEPARTMENT, SAID THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ WISHED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS RELATING TO THE CALL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TO CONSIDER EVENTS BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

2. IRAQ ACCEPTED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD THE POWER UNDER ARTICLE 99 TO CONVENE SUCH A MEETING. BUT IRAQ WISHED TO MAKE ITS POSITION CLEAR AND STRESSED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(1) AS ALREADY COMMUNICATED TO GOVERNMENTS THROUGH THEIR MISSIONS IN BAGHDAD, IRAQ HAD TERMINATED THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT ON 17 SEPTEMBER. THIS WAS DONE UNDER PARA 4 OF THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE IRAN ITSELF CONSIDERED THE AGREEMENT INVALID. THE DETAILED EVIDENCE OF THIS HAD BEEN SENT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN A LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER WITH A REQUEST THAT THE LETTER SHOULD BE CIRCULATED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

(2) OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS IRAQ HAD EXHAUSTED ALL PEACEFUL MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL TO GET IRAN TO HONOUR THE 1975 AGREEMENT. BECAUSE IRAN HAD NOT RESPONDED IRAQ HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. IRAQ HAD NO EXPANISIONIST TERRITORIAL DESIGNS AGAINST IRAN.

(3) IRAQ HAS CLEARLY STATED THAT IT IS NOT (NOT) INTERESTED IN ESCALATING THE CONFLICT. UNFORTUNATELY IRAN HAD DONE SO AND ITS INDISCRIMINATE ACTION AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF IRAQ, THE REGION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY LEFT IRAQ WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENCE.

(4) IRAQ HAS NOTHING TO HIDE AND IS FULLY PREPARED TO PRESENT ITS POINT OF VIEW BEFORE THE COUNCIL AS SPECIFICALLY STATED IN THE LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. IRAQ HAS TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT IT CONSIDERS IT WOULD BE HIGHLY IRREGULAR AND UNFORTUNATE IF THE COUNCIL WERE TO ARRIVE AT ANY CONCLUSIONS BEFORE IRAQ WERE GIVEN ITS RIGHTFUL HEARING.

2. AL QAIS IN ASKING US TO PUT THESE FOUR POINTS TO OUR GOVERNMENTS REPEATED POINT 4 WITH GREAT EMPHASIS.

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FM BAGHDAD 151003Z SEP 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 391 OF 15/9/80
INFO KUWAIT, JEDDA, DAMASCUS, ANKARA AND WASHINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN: OUR TEL NO 389

1. FIGHTING CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 13 AND 14 SEPTEMBER. THE IRAQI MOD ISSUED TWO STATEMENTS ON 14 SEPTEMBER REPORTING IRANIAN ARTILLERY ATTACKS ON THE BORDER POSTS OF SHALHA AND BAWARIN (NOT LOCATED) IN THE BASRA SECTOR. IN ADDITION AT 0530 ON 14 SEPT IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ARE REPORTED TO HAVE ATTACKED IRAQI POSITIONS IN THE SAIF SA'AD AREA BUT TO HAVE BEEN DRIVEN OFF BY IRAQI ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE. AT 1220 ON 14 SEPTEMBER IRAQI AIRCRAFT ARE SAID TO HAVE ATTACKED A CONCENTRATION OF TANKS AND ARMOURED TROOP CARRIERS NEAR SARBAIL(?) AND INFLICTED HEAVY LOSSES. AT 1330 IRAQI FORCES LAUNCHED AN ATTACK ON SUMAR. IRAQ ADMITS TO LOSING ONE AIRCRAFT DURING THE TWO DAYS OF FIGHTING. A CORRESPONDENT FOR THAWRA NEWSPAPER ALSO REPORTS ARTILLERY FIRE AND AN ATTACK BY AN IRANIAN PHANTOM IN THE MANDALI SECTOR OF THE BORDER.

2. AN EMISSARY OF YASSIR ARAFAT, HANI AL HASSAN, ARRIVED ON 14 SEPTEMBER WITH A WRITTEN MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN. THE MESSAGE IS REPORTED TO DEAL WITH THE LATEST ARAB AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, IN PARTICULAR SOUTHERN LEBANON, BUT THERE IS SPECULATION HERE THAT ARAFAT IS OFFERING HIMSELF AS MEDIATOR BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN.

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 351 OF 19/8/80
INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, JEDDA, KUWAIT
AND STOCKHOLM (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)
SAVING TO TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON

MIPT: IRAQ/SYRIA

1. THE SYRIAN EMBASSY WAS SURROUNDED BY IRAQI SECURITY FORCES ON 18 AUGUST MORNING AT ABOUT THE TIME (10.00AM) THAT ALWAN, THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER, SUMMONED THE HEADS OF ARAB MISSIONS, WHO ARE NEARLY ALL CHARGES D'AFFAIRES. THE HEADS OF MISSION REACHED THE EMBASSY AN HOUR LATER.

2. IRAQI TV NEWS HAD A THIRTY MINUTE FILM COVERAGE SHOWING ALWAN'S MEETING AND THE SYRIAN EMBASSY. FROM THIS IT APPEARED THAT JOURNALISTS ATTENDED THE MEETING AND THAT THE EMBASSY HAD BEEN RANSACKED BEFORE THE RE-ENACTMENT OF THE SEARCH THAT WAS STAGED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE CAMERAS.

3. THE MATERIAL SAID TO HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED COMPRISED 60 BLOCKS, 50 STICKS AND 14 KILOGRAMS OF EXPLOSIVE: EIGHT PISTOLS WITH FIVE SILENCERS: 42 SMALL CONTAINERS OF POISON: TWO GRENADES: FUSES, AMMUNITION AND TIMING DEVICES. THE ENTIRE HAUL WAS LAID OUT ON A COFFEE TABLE AND IN TWO BRIEF-CASES AT THE DOORWAY OF THE EMBASSY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE ARAB HEADS OF MISSION, WHO DID NOT ENTER THE BUILDING.

4. THE IRAQIS HAVE NOT SAID HOW THE PRESENCE OF THE MATERIAL WAS DISCOVERED AND THEY HAVE NOT EXPLAINED THEIR VIOLATION OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION: THERE HAS BEEN NO SUGGESTION THAT THE EMBASSY WAS ACTUALLY ENTERED AT SYRIAN INVITATION.

5. THE SECURITY FORCES WERE SEEN REMOVING SEVERAL PEOPLE IN HANDCUFFS FROM THE EMBASSY. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THESE WERE SYRIANS OR LOCAL STAFF. A FRIGHTENED GROUP, APPARENTLY OF VISITORS TO THE EMBASSY CAUGHT BY THE RAID, WAS INTERROGATED ON TV. EACH PERSON GAVE HASTY ASSURANCES THAT THEY HAD BEEN SHOCKED AT SEEING THE EXPLOSIVES AND WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE CONSIDERATE BEHAVIOUS OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON
STIRLING

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 350 OF 19/8/80
INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, AMMAN BEIRUT, CAIRO, JEDDA, KUWAIT AND STOCKHOLM (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)
SAVING TO TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON

Prime Minister
MAD 21/8.
Details on the further tel attached.
MF.

IRAQ/SYRIA.

1. THE IRAQI MFA ANNOUNCED ON 18 AUGUST THAT THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES HAD LEARNED THAT THERE WERE HUGE QUANTITIES OF EXPLOSIVES ARMS AND POISONOUS AND OTHER MATERIAL IN THE SYRIAN EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD. THESE WERE EVIDENTLY INTENDED FOR ACTS OF MURDER AND SUBVERSION. IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE COUNTRY FROM THESE EVILS AND IN THE INTEREST OF ARAB SOLIDARITY, THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SUMMONED THE HEADS OF ARAB MISSIONS INCLUDING THE SYRIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND HAD INFORMED THEM OF THE DISCOVERY. THE HEADS OF MISSION HAD BEEN INVITED TO WITNESS THE REMOVAL OF THE MATERIALS FROM THE EMBASSY. THIS HAD BEEN DONE PEACEFULLY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE SYRIAN CHARGE.

2. THE STATEMENT ADDED THAT IRAQ REGRETTED THIS SHAMEFUL BEHAVIOUR BY THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES IN PREPARING TO MASSACRE MILLIONS OF IRAQIS, AS WAS SHOWN BY THE GREAT QUANTITIES OF POISON. THE BEHAVIOUR WAS ALSO INTENDED TO DAMAGE ARAB SOLIDARITY BY SERVING IMPERIALIST-ZIONIST PLOTS AND THE CAMP DAVID CONSPIRACY. IT GAVE EVIDENCE OF THE NATURE OF THE SYRIAN REGIME, WHICH DENIED HONOUR, BETRAYED ARAB MORALS AND FOLLOWED THE PATH OF EVIL. THE SYRIAN CHARGE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT HE AND ALL MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF MUST LEAVE IRAQ WITHIN 48 HOURS AND IT WAS UP TO THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT TO REPLACE THEM WITH OTHER DIPLOMATS.

3. SEE MIFT.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON

STIRLING

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SUBJECT.

RESTRICTED SERIAL No. T 131/80.

GRS 100
RESTRICTED
DESKBY 220700Z
FM FCO 211400Z
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 208 OF 21 JUNE
EMBASSY ATTACK.
1. PROVIDED YOU SEE NO OBJECTION, PLEASE ARRANGE FOR THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BE FORWARDED TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.
BEGINS.
I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE WAY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES DEALT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE BRITISH EMBASSY ON 19 JUNE. PLEASE PASS ON MY THANKS AND CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED WHOSE SWIFT AND COURAGEOUS ACTION RESOLVED THE INCIDENT WITHOUT HARM TO OUR EMBASSY STAFF.
ENDS.

CARRINGTON

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FCO Resident Clerk informed 21/6 G. Baldwin Clerk. Duty Clerk. (1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

20 June 1980

After Cook?

Dear Michael,

Attack on our Embassy in Baghdad

The Prime Minister may wish to see the attached telegram from Baghdad giving an account of yesterday's attack on the Embassy.

In the light of a recent report of which the Prime Minister is aware, Lord Carrington thinks it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could send a message to President Saddam Hussein thanking him for the action which the ~~Iraqi authorities~~ took to deal with the situation. The underlying point of such a message would be to remind the Iraqi authorities of the responsibility they have for the protection of British diplomats. It might also serve incidentally to improve the climate of our general, particularly our commercial, relations. I attach a draft telegram containing a suggested text.

Yours ever,

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

RE

GR 540
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BAGHDAD 191235Z JUN 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 261 OF 19/6/80

TOP COPY

MIPT: ATTACK ON EMBASSY

1. THE ATTACK BEGAN AT 1015 LOCAL TIME TODAY WHEN THREE OR FOUR YOUTHS FAILED TO STOP WHEN CHALLENGED BY THE POLICE AT THE MAIN GATE AND RAN UP THE DRIVE. THEY OPENED FIRE WITH PISTOLS AT LONG RANGE AT OUR ARCHIVISIT WHO WAS ENTERING THE CHANCERY BUILDING. HE SOUNDED THE RIOT ALARM AND THE CONSUL WAS ABOUT TO CLOSE THE MAIN DOORS AS THE FIRST GRENADE EXPLODED, DOING MINOR DAMAGE TO THE ENTRANCE AND HALLWAY. THE DOORS WERE FULLY CLOSED AND WINDOW SHUTTERS SECURED BEFORE THE SUBSEQUENT GRENADES, THREE OR FOUR IN ALL, WERE THROWN.

2. MOST OF THE STAFF TOOK REFUGE IN REGISTRY AND THE CHANCERY WAS EFFECTIVELY BATTENED DOWN IN LITTLE MORE THAN A MINUTE. THE CONSULAR AND ADMINISTRATION STAFF HAD BARRICADED THEMSELVES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE BUILDINGS. THE ATTACKERS CIRCLED THE CHANCERY BUILDING FIRING AND THROWING THE GRENADES APPARENTLY AT RANDOM. ONE OF THEM SAW ME THROUGH A WINDOW AS I RETURNED BRIEFLY TO CHECK MY OFFICE AND FIRED TWO SHOTS, NEITHER DID MUCH DAMAGE.

3. I TELEPHONED TO THE MFA AT ABOUT 10.20 BUT REPEATED CALLS FAILED TO REACH A RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL UNTIL ABOUT 1035 WHEN I SPOKE TO THE DG OF PROTOCOL, ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE POLICE GUARD (THE POLICE HAD IN FACT ALREADY SUMMONED THESE) AND GAVE PERMISSION FOR THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES TO ENTER THE PREMISES. FIRING, SOME OF IT DIRECTED AT THE CHANCERY, CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THIS TIME AND INTENSIFIED WHEN THE MAIN SECURITY REINFORCEMENTS TOOK OVER SHORTLY BEFORE 1045. BY ABOUT 1105 THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES HAD CORNERED AND KILLED THREE OF THE ATTACKERS AND A FOURTH HAD SURRENDERED. THE DG OF PROTOCOL LATER TOLD ME THAT THE AUTHORITIES WERE NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THIS MAN HAD IN FACT TAKEN PART IN THE ATTACK. THE VISITOR'S DRIVER (PARA 2 OF MY TEL NO 258) HAD NOT BEEN HURT, BUT HAS BEEN TAKEN FOR QUESTIONING. THE ALL-CLEAR WAS GIVEN AT ABOUT 1115. A SUBSTANTIAL ARMED GUARD IS STILL IN THE GROUNDS.

4. THE ATTACKERS WERE SCRUFFY YOUTHS DRESSED IN SHIRTS AND SLACKS, INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM MOST LOCAL YOUTHS. AS THEY WENT STRAIGHT INTO THE ATTACK AND WERE PROMPTLY ENGAGED BY THE POLICE, ONE OF WHOM WAS WOUNDED, THERE WAS NO OPPORTUNITY TO IDENTIFY THEM. NOR DID THEY SPEAK AT ANY STAGE, AND I WAS UNABLE TO SATISFY THE SUBSEQUENT CURIOSITY OF THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DG OF PROTOCOL WHO WERE ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHAT DEMANDS THEY HAD MADE AND IN WHAT LANGUAGE. (THE OBVIOUS BUT SO FAR UNCONFIRMED SUPPOSITION IS THAT

THEY WERE IREANIAN ARABS FROM KHUZESTAN.) THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY HAS ISSUED A BRIEF STATEMENT AECUT THE ATTACK. I HAVE NOT SEEN THE TEXT BUT I GATHER THAT IT REFERS TO HOSTILE ELEMENTS ATTEMPTING TO DISTURB THE ELECTIONS.

5. WE HAD NO CASUALTIES OR EVEN MINOR INJURIES AND THE GRENADE DAMAGE IS SURPRISINGLY SMALL. I MOST WARMLY COMMEND THE COURAGE OF ALL MY STAFF, WHO REMAINED ENTIRELY COMPOSED THROUGHOUT THE UNPLEASANTLY NOISY ASSAULT. THE LOCALLY ENGAGED TELEPHONIST, HUSSEIN, DESERVES ESPECIAL PRAISE FOR REMAINING AT HIS POST WITHIN A FEW FEET OF THE WORST EXPLOSIONS AND GUNFIRE.

STIRLING

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File No. .....

Department MIDDLE EAST

Drafted by (Block Capitals) D E TATHAM

Tel. Extn. 3671

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification
RESTRICTED
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY .....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched (Date) .....

(Time) .....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

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TO ..... IMMEDIATE (precedence) BAGHDAD (post) Tel. No. ..... of .....

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Distribution:-

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Copies to:-

[TEXT]

EMBASSY ATTACK

1. Provided you see no objection, please arrange for the ~~CO~~ following message to be forwarded to President Saddam Hussein from the Prime Minister.

Begins

I am most grateful for the prompt and effective way the Iraqi authorities dealt with the attack on the British Embassy on 19 June. Please pass on my thanks and congratulations to all those involved whose swift and courageous action resolved the incident without harm to our Embassy staff.

Ends

MT.

20 JUIN 1980

IMMED

ADVANCE COPY

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR D. MAITLAND
MR R.J.L. MOBERLY
MISS BROWN
MR ADAMS

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HD NENAD
HD PUSD (4)
HD POD
HD PSD
HD SECD
HD. CONSD
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HD. NEWSD
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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ASSESSMENTS STAFF } Cabinet Office

P.S. No 10 ~~Downing St.~~

IMMEDIATE

(Dogtle)

Read in full

PP HSP1

GR 540
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BAGHDAD 191235Z JUN 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 261 OF 19/6/80

IMMEDIATE

MIPT: ATTACK ON EMBASSY

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Iraq

GRS 370

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FM BAGHDAD 161015Z APRIL 1980
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 156 OF 16 ~~MARCH~~ APRIL 1980
INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN,
INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT AND JEDDA.
SAVING TO BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI AND WASHINGTON.

IRAQ/IRAN

1. IN A RAMBLING SPEECH AT THE MOSUL SPRING FESTIVAL ON 15 MARCH, SADDAM HUSSAIN CONTINUED THE IRAQI ATTACKS ON IRAN, REFERRING TO ''THAT SHAH IN A TURBAN....ROTTEN KHOMEINI'' AND DERIDING IRANIAN EFFORTS TO ROUSE DISSENT IN IRAQ AND THEIR CLAIMS TO SUPPORT THE PALESTINIANS, HE SAID THAT AT THE 1979 NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN HAVANA, THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ASKED HOW PROPER RELATIONS COULD BE ESTABLISHED: HE HAD REPLIED THAT THE GULF ISLANDS MUST BE RESTORED TO THEIR OWNERS, THAT THE PART OF THE SHATT AL ARAB UNRIGHTEOUSLY TAKEN IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER THE 1975 TREATY MUST BE RETURNED TO IRAQ AND THAT THE ARABS OF ARABISTAN MUST BE DECENTLY TREATED. SADDAM SAID THAT THE IRANIANS HAD RESPONDED BY THROWING GRENADES AT CHILDREN. HE WONDERED WHY THE IRANIANS WERE SO SOLICITOUS ABOUT 'DESCENDANTS OF THE PROPHET' IN IRAQ WHILE THEY WERE MARTYRING THE SHIA ARABS OF ARABISTAN. SADDAM WISHED THAT THE IRANIAN PEOPLE WOULD REPLACE KHOMEINI AND BANI SADR WITH SOMEONW CAPABLE OF ESTABLISHING SOUND RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS. HE DECLARED THAT ARAB SWORDS COULD REACH THE FARTHEST POINT OF THE EARTH, INCLUDING THE LAND OF BANI SADR,. IRAQ WAS NOT FRIGHTENED BY THE SUPERPOWERS' MACHINATIONS AND IRAQIS WOULD DIE IN DEFENCE OF THE ARAB HOMELAND AS THEY HAD DIED IN DEFENCE OF DAMASCUS, JORDAN, LEBANON AND SINAI.

2. THERE HAS BEEN NO MENTION HERE OF BAQR SADR (MY TELELETTER Ø28/324/1 OF 13 APRIL) ACCORDING TO AN UNCONFIRMED LOCAL STORY, ABOUT NINETY SHIA WERE EXECUTED IN BAGHDAD LAST WEEK. THEY WERE SAID TO HAVE INCLUDED AN UNNAMED IMAM. WE HAVE NO (NO) EVIDENCE THAT THIS WAS BAQR SADR.

3. WE GATHER THAT THE BEIRUT PRESS HAVE DESCRIBED BAQR SADR AS A LEADER OF THE DAWA PARTY (DICKSON'S TELELETTER Ø14/2 OF 10 APRIL) ON 13 APRIL, THE IRAQI RCC DECLARED AN AMNESTY FOR DAWA PARTY MEMBER WHO SURRENDERED WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

4. F.C.O. PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI AND WASHINGTON.

STIRLING

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FM TEHRAN 110530Z APR 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 371 OF 10 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON.

INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 370: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. THE INCIDENTS ON THE IRANIAN BORDER WITH IRAQ DURING THE LAST FEW WEEKS HAVE BEEN FULLY REPORTED IN THE PRESS, AS HAVE THE CLOSURE OF CONSULATES IN THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE WITHDRAWAL (AS PRESENTED IN IRAN) OF THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD AND THE SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF HIS ENTIRE STAFF, MATCHED BY THE WITHDRAWAL FROM TEHRAN OF THE IRAQI EMBASSY. CLEARLY THERE HAS BEEN A SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND THE QUESTION ARISES WHO IS TO BLAME AND WHERE IT WILL LEAD.

2. IT IS DIFFICULT TO APPORTION BLAME. WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO CHECK IN OUR PAPERS OF LAST YEAR, I THINK THAT THE FIRST MOVES CAME LAST SPRING FROM IRAN, IN THE SHAPE OF CALLS TO THE IRAQI SHI'I TO RALLY TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. THIS PRODUCED THE RIOTS IN THAWRA TOWNSHIP IN BAGHDAD AND THE HOUSE ARREST OF AYATOLLAH BAHR SADR. IN RETALIATION, THE IRAQIS BEGAN TO ENCOURAGE SUBVERSION IN KURDESTAN AND KHUZESTAN AND TO TURN BAGHDAD RADIO, IN FARSI, AGAINST THE IRANIAN REGIME. DURING THE LAST MONTHS OF HIS MINISTRY YAZDI TRIED TO COOL RELATIONS DOWN AND TO PERSUADE SADDAM HUSSAIN TO CALL OFF THESE CAMPAIGNS BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS. RECENTLY IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SEEM TO HAVE DECIDED TO REACT MORE FORCEFULLY AND TO STEP UP THEIR ATTEMPTS TO INSTIGATE THE SHI'I IN SOUTHERN IRAQ WHILE ALSO ENCOURAGING IRAQI KURDS IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST BAGHDAD. DUA'I THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ, WHOSE EARLIER CAREER WAS AS ANTI-SHAH PROPAGANDIST ON RADIO BAGHDAD, WAS OUTSPOKEN IN HIS CRITICISMS, ALMOST CERTAINLY WITH KHOMEINI'S BLESSING AND EARNED HIS EXPULSION. QOTBZADEH, BANI SADR AND KHOMEINI HIMSELF NO LONGER TROUBLE TO PLAY DOWN THEIR IDEAS OF EXPORTING THEIR REVOLUTION, QUITE THE REVERSE, AND IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, FOLLOWING THE RENEWED IRAQI CLAIM, ON BEHALF OF THE ARABLS, TO THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA, HAVE BEEN VITRIOLIC IN THEIR ABUSE OF THE IRAQI BAATH AND OF SADDAM HUSSAIN. A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO A PLO SPOKESMAN IN THE RECENT SEMINAR IN BAGHDAD CLAIMING THESE ISLANDS HAS PROVOKED A DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAN AND THE PLO, THE LATTER MAKING CLEAR THAT WHILE THE STATEMENT WAS UNAUTHORISED AND UNTIMELY, IT CORRECTLY REPRESENTED THE PLO VIEW.

3. FOR ALL THE SOUND AND FURY, I AM DOUBTFUL IF THE PRESENT TENSION WILL LEAD TO OUTRIGHT WAR. WITH ITS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, THE DEMORALISATION OF ITS FORCES AND ITS TROUBLES WITH ITS MINORITIES, IRAN IS IN NO STATE TO ENGAGE IN HOSTILITIES. H M AMBASSADOR, BAGHDAD WILL HAVE VIEWS ON SADDAM HUSSAIN'S MOTIVES. AS SEEN FROM HERE, HE IS UNLIKELY TO RISK HIS ARMY, COMPRISED IN LARGE PART OF SHI'I WHOSE LOYALTY TO THE BA'ATH THE IRANIAN PRESS IS ALREADY QUESTIONING, IN THE DIFFICULT BORDER COUNTRY, UNLESS AND UNTIL THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES AND IRAN ITSELF SHOW A CONSIDERABLY GREATER DEGREE OF DISINTEGRATION. I ALSO DOUBT IF THERE IS A REAL RISK OF AN IRAQI ATTACK ON THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA. MOREOVER THE RISK THAT OVERT ATTACK BY IRAQ MIGHT BE USED BY THE SOVIET UNION AS A PRETEXT FOR INTERVENTION IN IRAN MUST BE A RESTRAINT, ALTHOUGH, SHOULD IRAN SHOW REAL SIGNS OF COMING APART UNDER MINORITY PRESSURES, SADDAM MIGHT EVEN SO BE TEMPTED TO SECURE KHUZISTAN.

4. INSTEAD I FORESEE A CONTINUANCE OF BORDER INCIDENTS, SOME OF THEM QUITE SERIOUS, AND A STEPPING UP OF CROSS-BORDER SABOTAGE IN KHUZESTAN ON THE PART OF IRAQ AND OF SUBVERSION AND TERRORISM ON THE PART OF IRAN. THE WAR OF WORDS WILL CONTINUE AND BOTH SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO USE THE KURDS FOR THEIR OWN ENDS. THIS COULD GO ON INDECISIVELY FOR A LONG TIME.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

GRAHAM

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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PRIME MINISTER

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FM BAGHDAD. 081002Z APR
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 142 OF 8 APRIL 1980.,
INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.
SAVING TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, JEDDA, AND WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 136: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. WE HAVE HAD RELIABLE REPORTS THAT IRAQIS OF IRANIAN ORIGIN ARE BEING ROUNDED UP IN BAGHDAD IN LARGE NUMBERS AND ARE BEING REMOVED IN LORRIES, PRESUMABLY TO THE IRANIAN BORDER.

2. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THESE DEPORTATIONS ARE PROCEEDING THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY FROM KERBELA AND NAJAF. ONE DEPORTED FAMILY'S ONLY CONNECTION WITH IRAN WAS THEIR GRAND-FATHER, WHO SETTLED HERE MORE THAN 80 YEARS AGO. THIS IS APPARENTLY NOT (NOT) AN ISOLATED INSTANCE AND MANY THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE MAY BE AFFECTED.

3. THERE HAS STILL BEEN NO PUBLIC REFERENCE HERE TO THESE EXPULSIONS, BUT THE PRESS OF 8 APRIL REPORTED THAT 120 MEMBERS OF THE IRAQI COMMUNITY IN TEHRAN HAD BEEN DEPORTED AND HAD ACCUSED THE IRANIANS OF TREATING THEM INHUMANLY.

4. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, JEDDA, AND WASHINGTON.

S T I R L I N G

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[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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PRIME MINISTER
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FM BAGHDAD. 081000Z APR
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 140 OF 8 APRIL 1980.,
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT AND TEHRAN.
SAVING TO WASHINGTON

IRAQ/INTERNAL:

1. ACCORDING TO LOCAL STORIES, THERE HAVE BEEN AT LEAST TWO FURTHER EXPLOSIONS IN BAGHDAD, INCLUDING ONE AT A CINEMA, AND A BOMB INCIDENT IN BASRA. WE HAVE ALSO HAD A CIRCUMSTANTIAL REPORT OF THE ASSASSINATION OF ABDUL KARIM SHAIKHLY, THE DISGRACED FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER AND AMBASSADOR (SEE LPR).

2. TOGETHER WITH THE APPARENT MASS EXPULSIONS OF IRAQIS OF IRANIAN ORIGIN (MY TEL NO 142), THESE CONTINUING INCIDENTS ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE TENSION. BAGHDAD, HOWEVER, REMAINS CALM AND THERE IS NO (NO) PRESENT NEED TO DISCOURAGE VISITORS.

3. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON.

S T I R L I N G

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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From the Private Secretary

SIR JOHN HUNT,
CABINET OFFICE.

Possible Interruption of Western Oil Supplies from the Persian Gulf

The Prime Minister has read with interest the JIC paper on this subject about which you minuted to me on 1 October. She has asked me to pass on her thanks to those concerned with its preparation.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

3 October 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A0333

Prime Minister

MR. ALEXANDER

You will shortly be receiving a copy of JIC(79)(N) 61 entitled "Possible Interruption of Western Oil Supplies from the Persian Gulf".

You ought to know that the genesis of this paper lies in a remark which the Prime Minister made at the briefing meeting on 25th June for the Tokyo Summit when the possibility of interruption, particularly by a hostile power, was raised. Accordingly the JIC decided to take look at whether total or near total interruption of oil supplies from the Gulf area is likely or possible: and this paper is the result.

(John Hunt)

1st October, 1979

MT

Confidential Filing

Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister, Dr. Hammadi to the U.K., March 1981

IRAQ

NOVEMBER 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~21.1.81~~							
~~6.3.81~~							
~~10.3.81~~							
18-3-81							

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Iraq

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 March 1981

Dear Brian,

Visit of the Iraqi Foreign Minister,
Dr Sa'Adoun Hammadi: 9-11 March 1981

As expected, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was questioned closely during this visit by Dr Hammadi on the Government's policy towards arms supplies to Iraq and Iran. This subject came up first in tete à tete conversation, and the points made were subsequently reaffirmed in the official talks.

Dr Hammadi pressed Lord Carrington strongly not to allow any defence supplies, and in particular tank spares, to be shipped to Iran. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary explained our general policy and pointed out that, while hostilities continued, we had to take account of the obligations of neutrality. We had decided not to allow arms and ammunition ('lethal items') to go to either side while the present level of hostilities lasted.

On the question of spare parts, Dr Hammadi questioned the distinction between 'lethal' and 'non-lethal' items. He argued that spare parts could make the difference between a tank being operational and, therefore, 'lethal', and non-operational. Lord Carrington undertook that no spare parts would be supplied to Iran without the Iraqis being told in advance.

On the Kharg, Lord Carrington said that no decision had been taken on its release, but he pointed out that we might have to address this question in due course, and that the vessel could hardly be used effectively in the war by the Iranians since it was in poor condition; it was merely a support vessel and was only very lightly armed. He questioned whether its eventual release to the Iranians could in any way pose a threat to Iraq. Dr Hammadi nevertheless pointed out that it did have a gun and implied that the Iraqis would be reluctant to see it released to Iran.

Dr Hammadi said that British businessmen would be welcome to help in the reconstruction of war damage in Iraq provided their prices were right. He said that Iraq was keen to import a very large quantity of arms - if they could be had at the right price - because

/because

because of the high level of British technology and for reasons of language; there would be no need to go through the usual processes of tendering and so on. He specifically said that the Iraqi Trade Minister looked forward to accepting HMG's outstanding invitation in June and that the Iraqi Oil Minister also looked forward to visiting Britain. Lord Carrington considers that Dr Hammadi came here with the intention of taking a deliberate step towards the further improvement of Iraqi/British relations and that the visit was a success in this respect.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to other members of OD, and Sir Keith Joseph, Mr David Howell, Sir R Armstrong and the Head of Defence Sales.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

Yours ever,

Brian Norbury Esq
PS/Secretary of State for
Defence
Whitehall
London SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQ JS

cc MOD

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 10 March 1981

Dear Francis,

VISIT BY DR. HAMMADI

The Foreign Minister of Iraq, Dr. Hammadi, called on the Prime Minister yesterday afternoon. I enclose a record of their discussion.

I am sending a copy of this letter, and its enclosure, to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JS

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT.

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAQ, DR. SA'ADOUN HAMMADI, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 9 MARCH AT 1700

Present

The Prime Minister	Dr. Sa'adoun Hammadi
The Hon. Douglas Hurd	H.E. Mr. Shawi
H.E. Mr. S.L. Egerton	Mr. Ahmad al Samarrai
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander	

* * * * * * *

Bilateral Relations

After an exchange of courtesies, in the course of which Dr. Hammadi conveyed greetings from his President, and the Prime Minister thanked Dr. Hammadi for the action taken by his Government in the Sparkes case, the Prime Minister asked Dr. Hammadi how he viewed the general situation at present. Dr. Hammadi said that in the past there had been ups and downs in relations between Iraq and the United Kingdom. But during Lord Carrington's last visit, it had been agreed to make a new start. The Iraqi Government had decided to expand the relationship, assuming that was acceptable to the British Government. There were no impediments on the Iraqi side to such an expansion, whether in the fields of political, economic or cultural relations. Of course, improved relations should be seen as benefiting both parties. They would be based on respect for each side's political positions. But there were complementarities in the interests of both countries. The Prime Minister recalled the visit paid by Mr. John Davies to Baghdad when he had been the Opposition Spokesman for Foreign Affairs. This had opened the way to a new chapter in relations between the two countries. She was delighted to see Dr. Hammadi in London and would value closer bilateral relations, particularly in the economic field. Dr. Hammadi said that he found the Prime Minister's words very encouraging.

/Iran/Iraq War

Iran/Iraq War

Dr. Hammadi said that the Prime Minister was no doubt aware of the background to the conflict between Iraq and Iran. Iraq had crossed the Iranian frontier on 22 September. But the war had in fact started on 4 September with Iranian shelling of Iraqi cities. Iraq had always wanted good relations with Iran but the new regime in Tehran had thought they could overthrow other established governments, starting with that in Baghdad. They had sought to destabilise Iraq from within. They had stimulated subversive activities and had begun to play the old game of encouraging the Kurds. This last was a particularly sensitive issue for the Iraqi Government and they had resisted. Ultimately, large-scale military intervention had resulted.

As regards the longer term origin of the war, Dr. Hammadi said that in 1975 the Iraqi Government had had to accept the division of the Shatt Al Arab. This had been part of a package deal. When the Shah's regime had collapsed, his successors had wanted to hold on to their half of the package without observing the Iraqi part. Even if the war had not started in September, it would have started at some other time. The Iraqi Government was anxious to end the war, but they were very firm about regaining the Shatt Al Arab and the lands occupied by Iran. Iranian interference in Iraq would have to cease. The Iraqi Government had no ambitions in Iran. They did not want to disrupt the unity of the country. They wanted a stable and peaceful neighbour. More time would probably be needed to achieve this. Eventually the present abnormal situation in Tehran would end and the Iranians would come to their senses. At present it was impossible for the Iranian Government to take decisions.

The Iraqi Government was aware that Iran's military equipment came mainly from the West, including the United Kingdom. They knew of Iran's contacts with the British Government with a view to buying spare parts. In their view anything that was supplied to Iran would be used against Iraq. It would not help peace in the area.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister said that normal relations between the UK and Iran had not yet been resumed since Mr. Pyke was still in prison. Economic sanctions had lapsed but there were still limitations on the supply of military equipment. The British Government understood the requirements of neutrality in the Iran/Iraq conflict. Iraq had already been supplied with certain non-lethal equipment - including radios. Dr. Hammadi himself would be discussing with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office other related issues, including the repair of military equipment.

The Prime Minister asked about the effect of the conflict inside Iraq. Presumably the interruption of oil supplies was having an effect on the Iraqi economy. Dr. Hammadi said that there had been no adverse effects of any significance. The oil supply would soon be restored. The country's financial position was, in any case, sound. The population as a whole was more united than ever. They were agreed that while they wanted peace, they would not surrender. This was not only a question of simple nationalism. Iraq had always been regarded by Iran as a small country lying within Tehran's sphere of influence. The Iraqi people wanted to put an end to this and to be accepted as equals. The Prime Minister commented that Iraq had always been regarded here as a powerful and influential country.

Arab/Israel Dispute

Dr. Hammadi said that in recent months he had seen both M. Thorn and Mr. van der Klaauw. He had explained the Iraqi reaction to the various points in the European plan. He had the impression that Europe might be thinking that a plan lying somewhere between the outcome envisaged at Camp David and the conditions laid down by the Baghdad Conference would provide a solution. He had to say that such an approach would not be acceptable to the Arab countries as a whole. The points laid down at the Baghdad Conference represented the minimum that could form the basis of a plan likely to meet with the approval of the Arabs.

/The Gulf

The Gulf

Dr. Hammadi said that any increase in the military presence of the United States or European powers in the Gulf area would only result in an increase in the Soviet presence and of tension. There was already a Soviet presence in South Yemen. The Arab countries hoped that it might be possible to wean South Yemen away from the Soviet Union. An increased Western presence would have the opposite effect: the Soviet presence in South Yemen would increase. There was in any case no reason for an American military presence. This would not be popular as people in the area did not want a return to the old policy of military bases. The Prime Minister said that unless the countries in the region wanted it, there could be no military presence. She had told the Americans in Washington that if a Rapid Deployment Force was to be formed, the United Kingdom would be ready to make a modest contribution. A Rapid Deployment Force would not be for use only in the Gulf and it would not be stationed anywhere. But unless the Force had been organised, Western Governments would not be able to respond to appeals for help. There would be no question of bases. Western Governments would not want them. The Force would not be deployed unless and until it had been invited. Dr. Hammadi commented that there were already naval forces in the region. Mr. Hurd pointed out that they were not in the Gulf itself. Nor did their presence seem to have resulted in an increase in tension. The Prime Minister commented that we had been very anxious that tankers could continue to transit the Straits of Hormuz. Some of our friends in the region had been pleased that we had taken steps to ensure this. Things were now, of course, calmer than they had been last autumn. Dr. Hammadi said that he was relieved that the super powers had kept their distance from the Iran/Iraq conflict. However, he remained concerned about the implications of an increased military presence for the situation in South Yemen.

The discussion ended at 1745.

10 March 1981

Iraq

MR. ALEXANDER

The Foreign Office rang this afternoon to ask whether Douglas Hurd and our Ambassador to Iraq could attend Monday's meeting when the Prime Minister is due to see the Iraqi Foreign Minister. He will be accompanied by his Ambassador.

I told the Foreign Office that if it was their recommendation that these two should be invited, then you would also consent.

Agree?

6 March 1981

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

When the F.C.O. say that Dr Hammadi is not an easy interlocutor, they mean (I think) that he is a rather nasty & thoroughly priggy character. I doubt that you will change his mind on anything. I think it would probably be a good idea not to get too deeply into the Arab/Israeli dispute, & particularly the P.L.O.: he will inevitably say something awful! Given the size of the contacts that may be at issue, generalities might be best.

MT

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 March 1981

Dear Michael,

Call on the Prime Minister by the Iraqi Foreign Minister

9 March 1981

The Prime Minister has agreed to see Dr Sa'adoun Hammadi at 5.00 p.m. on 9 March. We assume that she will want Mr Hurd to be present.

Dr Hammadi will be accompanied by Ahmad al Samarrai, Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by Mr Shawi, the Iraqi Ambassador.

I enclose a brief, covering Points to Make and Essential Facts, and a copy of the Steering Brief by which the Foreign Secretary will be guided in his official talks on 10 March. I also enclose a Personality Note on Dr Hammadi, and Mr Ahmed al Samarrai.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes, despite the numerous obstacles to developing closer relations with the Iraqi regime, that we have to try to create the right political climate in which to allow our exporters to exploit the enormous potential which Iraq offers. The Iraqis are seeking to diversify their sources of military supplies and have expressed interest in a wide range of military equipment. The long-term prospects for sales across the board are enormous. The Foreign Secretary, therefore, sees the visit of Dr Hammadi as an opportunity to seek to convince the Iraqis that we want our relations on a firmer footing. He will also want to establish from the Iraqis how they would like to see this relationship develop. It will provide an opportunity for a frank exchange of views on bilateral issues, including some potentially awkward ones, like the case of Mr John Smith (whom we believe the Iraqis want to swap for the convicted assassin Hassan, now that they have released Mr Ned Sparkes): the Lord Privy Seal has agreed to tackle this at the lunch he is hosting for Dr Hammadi on 10 March. But Lord Carrington will also want to hear what they have to say on regional matters, particularly their attitude towards Gulf co-operation and on the current state of their relations with the Soviet Union.

Lord Carrington considers it is important that the visit should be a success. It has been made clear that other Iraqi Ministers will not visit the UK until Hammadi himself has done so successfully. Dr Hammadi is unfortunately not an easy interlocutor and tends to be taciturn. Lord Carrington will be meeting him briefly before he calls on the Prime Minister, when he hopes to get the visit off to a good start.

The half hour available for the call on the Prime Minister will not allow for detailed discussion of any one subject. She may, therefore, need to steer Dr Hammadi away from any attempt to make the conversation one-sided. She may wish to keep the discussion to general points, perhaps referring to our interest in fostering closer relations and touching briefly on our hope that a solution can be found to the war. She will also wish to mention, when Hammadi raises the question, our wish to be as helpful to the Iraqis as we can on such matters as the sales of military equipment. If time permits, she may want to refer to her recent visit to Washington (Hammadi may ask her about her reported comments on the Gulf and the Rapid Deployment Force), in which the Iraqis will be particularly interested. The Iraqis will be flattered if she is prepared to give a brief account of her impressions of the American Administration.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER - 9 MARCH

POINTS TO MAKE

Anglo/Iraqi relations

1. Hope your visit will lead to strengthening of bilateral relations. Regular contacts at Ministerial level valuable. Hope to see other Iraqi Ministers here in coming months. We want to establish closer ties across the board. Much encouraged that British companies have been successful in winning contracts. Believe we have much to offer each other in all fields.

Arab/Israel

2. European attitude positive. Venice Declaration marked beginning of an attempt to contribute to a negotiated settlement. Urgent need for a settlement. European efforts will continue. But Arab position must also evolve if progress is to be made. Each side should recognise rights of the other.

Iran/Iraq War

3. We hope that current Islamic initiative for cease-fire will be successful. We are not taking sides nor apportioning blame. We want to see peace in an area so vital to world economy. Continuing hostilities and instability will create opportunities for further Soviet encroachment in South Asia. How are the Islamic Good Office Committee progressing in their role as mediators?

Soviet aims in the area

4. Russian proposals for making the area a peace zone would only be credible if the Soviet Union withdrew their troops from Afghanistan.

/Gulf

Gulf Cooperation (defensive)

5. We believe Gulf states themselves must take the lead over their own security. We therefore welcomed the recent agreement between certain Gulf states on cooperation. We would like to remain in close consultation with all the Gulf states. Look forward to my own visit in April.

Arms supplies (defensive)

6. We wish to be as helpful to Iraq as possible within the constraints of our neutrality obligations. We have authorized numerous deliveries of non lethal items. Arms and ammunition more difficult. Understand discussions now under way for overhaul in Jordan of Chieftains captured from Iran.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Anglo/Iraqi relations

1. Iraqis frequently harp on about our 'colonial' past and 'responsibility' for Palestine. Sensitive and quick to take offence. Appear interested in strengthening their ties with the West, and with Europe in particular. Some evidence that they want to improve relations with Britain.

2. Iraqis treat politics and trade as interlinked. We need to create right political climate to exploit the enormous potential Iraqi market. Development budget in excess of US $10,000 million in 1979 and expected to rise steadily. British companies successful in recent months in winning a number of sizeable contracts. Exports in 1980 were £322 million approx (60% up on 1979) and still rising. But though we are gradually recovering from the freeze imposed at the time of our 1978 expulsion of the Iraqi diplomats, we remain (at 6.4% of the market) well behind Japan (24%), West Germany (18%), France (10%), Italy (8%) and the USA (8%).

Arab/Israel

3. Iraq never accepted Resolution 242. Views are hardline. But since Camp David the Iraqis have not pressed their opposition to negotiated settlement: their hostility has been directed at Camp David. Their attitude to European efforts is politely sceptical. They do not believe that we have any influence on US and Israel.

Iran/Iraq war

4. The war has bogged down. New tactics and offensives expected in Spring. Iraq unlikely to win military victory over the Iranians. Ready to negotiate. Unlikely to meet Iranian precondition of complete withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Iranian soil. Olof Palme believes he is making slow progress in his mediation. Good Office Committee appointed by Islamic Conference currently in the area. Some indications

/that

that their efforts to obtain a ceasefire, followed by Iraqi withdrawal supervised by an Islamic force, may win serious consideration from the two sides.

Gulf cooperation

5. Six Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman) signed an agreement on 4 February to promote political and economic cooperation. Though defence matters were not mentioned, there is little doubt that the Gulf states' common defence interests was a strong motive behind their cooperation. They claim that the Iraqis agreed to be excluded, for the time being at least, but Iraqi silence on the 4 February agreement suggests this may be over-optimistic.

Iraq/Gulf

6. Iraq's relations with Moscow have cooled in the past couple of years (notably over Afghanistan) as they have ended their isolation in the Arab world. These two factors have facilitated a rapproachement with the conservative Gulf states, as with Jordan. But there is residual distrust of them in the Gulf, both because of their size and military strength and because of their past record as trouble-makers for the traditional regimes.

Arms sales

7. The Iraqis are disillusioned with the USSR as arms suppliers and seeking alternatives in the West. The French are briskly grasping the opportunity, and the Italians (and perhaps other European countries also) are likely to emulate them. The potential is enormous since the Iraqis have the oil wealth to replace, in due course, their Russian arsenal and a larger population and a better technological base on which to build than any other Arab country east of Suez. We are constrained by our neutrality obligations, the danger of driving Iran into the arms of the Russians, and doubts about the durability and responsibility of the Iraqi regime. Nevertheless, we want to exploit the market as best we can under present circumstances and above all to

/keep

keep the door open for the massive future sales which could occur. We need therefore to appear as positive as possible to Hammadi, who will probably probe us searchingly on our attitude in principle to supplying Iraq.

VISIT OF THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER, 9-11 MARCH 1981

STEERING BRIEF

General

1. The visit of Dr Hammadi is an important step in the tricky and necessarily slow process of trying to establish a sound working relationship with Iraq, from which we can expect to derive considerable benefits, both politically and commercially.

2. Our relationship with Iraq has been generally bad since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958. As Iraq has grown in importance economically since the mid 70s (second in the league of Arab oil producers in the Middle East until recently and with a market of US $10,000 million +) so it has become increasingly important to rectify this. The Iraqis have shown signs of movement away from isolated extremism on many issues. They have become increasingly disillusioned with the USSR with whom they have a special friendship treaty and on whom they have relied heavily for arms supplies and technology, especially in the oil industry. In the past two to three years there has been a realignment of their foreign policies. Albeit for reasons of pragmatism, they are now co-operating more closely with their neighbours in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. They are looking to the West, and in particular to the EEC, as an alternative supplier of equipment across the board. This new situation is to our advantage and we should seek to exploit it. France has developed a special relationship with Iraq and is reaping the rewards. They have been successful in winning a number of major contracts, especially for the supply of military equipment.

3. The Secretary of State's visit to Baghdad in July 1979 was the first step towards putting our relations on a sounder footing. The release of Mr Ned Sparkes may be seen as evidence of the Iraqi interest in taking the process further. Dr Hammadi's

/visit

visit will provide an opportunity to convey to the Iraqis our wish to strengthen relations. He is however not a member of the Revolutionary Command Council and does not cut much ice in Baghdad. But the Iraqis are protocolaire and clearly see the Hammadi visit as the prerequisite before others come eg the Trade and Oil Ministers, and in due course perhaps an influential figure like Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister. Only through contacts with senior Iraqis will we be able to have the full and frank exchange of views necessary to get along side this difficult regime. It is important therefore that we make the Hammadi visit a success. It may not be easy. Dr Hammadi unfortunately lacks charm and tends to be taciturn. He may not prove an easy interlocutor.

UK Objectives

4. a) to convey to the Iraqis our wish to have closer relations, but based on mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

b) to explain our policy on arms supplies while hostilities with Iran continue: and to promote our interest in negotiating a wide range of military contracts on a longer term basis, and in enlarging our share of the lucrative Iraqi market for goods and services of all kinds.

c) to have an exchange of views of regional and international issues.

Probable Iraqi objectives

a) to establish our policy on arms supplies to them, and more particularly what we intend to supply to Iran.

b) to present their case for the invasion of Iran and to seek to convince us that right is on their side.

c) to raise such perennial irritants as media coverage and alleged support of Iraqi dissidents in this country.

d) to discuss bilateral agreements covering legal, cultural and trade matters.

5. Dr Hammadi is calling briefly on the Secretary of State shortly after his arrival on 9 March. He will then call on the Prime Minister. Two hours have been set aside for official talks on 10 March. The Secretary of State may wish to ask Dr Hammadi how he wishes to tackle the agenda. Subject to that, the discussion will probably have to start with the Iran/Iraq war, Arab/Israel and Soviet aims in the area (Briefs 7-9). British policy on arms supplies to Iraq and Iran (Brief 3) could follow from the discussion of the war between the two countries, but in any case there are a number of bilateral issues (including arms) to be covered and the Secretary of State may need to steer the discussion towards these after about an hour. Rather than become involved in detailed talks on the three agreements on cooperation Lord Carrington may wish to suggest that these be taken by officials at a separate session in the afternoon (Briefs 4-6). The Iraqis may be interested to have an account of the Secretary of State's impressions of the new American Administration.

6. If there is insufficient time to get through the agenda for the official talks, Mr Hurd has agreed to hold a brief meeting immediately after the LPS' lunch to cover outstanding points.

7. The social side of the programme includes a Theatre/Supper party hosted by Mr Hurd, a lunch hosted by the LPS and a dinner hosted by the Secretary of State.

8. A copy of the official programme is attached.

9. Leading personality reports on Dr Hammadi and Mr Ahmed Hussain Samarrai are attached.

67 SA'DOUN HAMMADI (DR)

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Born Kerbala 1930. Shia. Graduate of American University of Beirut; PhD (agriculture) Wisconsin University 1957; editor of the newspaper "Al Jumhouriya" after the 1958 Revolution; undertook the organisation of the Ba'ath Party in Libya in early 1960s and was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment; after serving about one year, was sent back to Baghdad, where he was put in prison by Qasim, January 1963; released and became Minister of Agrarian Reform February 1963; replaced because of his support for Ali Salih al Sa'adi's extremist group November 1963; after the November 1963 coup variously reported to be under arrest or to have fled the country; appointed an expert in agricultural planning with the United Nations December 1966.

Member of the Planning Board in October 1968 and Chairman of the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) November 1968; Minister of Oil and Minerals December 1969 (in addition to the Chairmanship of INOC); lost the Chairmanship of INOC mid-1971 but re-appointed 1973; Minister of Foreign Affairs November 1974.

Sa'adoun Hammadi played a leading part in the negotiations leading to Russian assistance to INOC in the Rumaila field and in all the negotiations with IPC culminating in the latter's nationalisation in 1972. As the responsible Minister and Chairman of INOC, he must be considered one of the architects of Iraq's present oil policy. But he was very obviously not the decision-taker, despite his talents, and the same applies in his present post. Is thought to have had Marxist leanings. As a Shia he may feel insecure. He is noted by fellow Ba'athis for taciturnity and lack of charm, personal handicaps which may partly account for his low position in the pecking-order. Though glum, poker-faced and not well disposed to the west, he has a first class mind and is both hard-working and professionally competent.

Married. Fluent English.

15 AHMAD HUSSAIN AL SAMARRAI

Under-Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Born c.1930. Native of Samarra. Career diplomat. Ambassador to Bulgaria 1975-77, Spain 1977-79, Iran 1979-80. Appointed senior Under-Secretary at the Foreign Ministry, 1980.

Competent and presentable, with little force of character and no influence. Friendly and helpful within his narrow limits, but careful not to speak out of turn.

Good English but prefers to use an interpreter, some Spanish.

VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY DR SA'ADOUN HAMMADI,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

9 - 11 MARCH 1981

ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN

(to be read in conjunction with programme attached).

TRANSPORT

Cars are provided by Government Hospitality Fund and seating plans are shown at Annex 1.

MONDAY 9 MARCH

Arrival

The following will be at the airport to welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs:

The Hon Douglas Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Brig J A C Cowan, Secretary, Government Hospitality Fund

Group Captain Robert Thomson, Escort Officer.

Call on Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

The following will also be present:

IRAQ

Sd Ahmqd Hussain al-Sammarrai
Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi
Sd Muhammad Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf

Call on the Prime Minister

The following will also be present:

IRAQ

Sd Ahmqd Hussain al-Sammara'i
Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi
Sd Muhammad Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf

UNITED KINGDOM
Mr D Hurd

Theatre/Supper evening
The following are also invited:

Sd Ahmad Hussain al-Sammara'i
Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi
Sd Muhammad Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf
Mr S Egerton

/Tuesday 10 March

TUESDAY 10 MARCH 1981

OFFICIAL TALKS AT FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

The following will also be present:

Iraq

Sd Ahmad Hussain al-Samarra'i
Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi
Sd Muhammed Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf
Sd Isam Abdul Ghani Mahbub

United Kingdom

Mr D Hurd
Sir John Graham/Mr J C Moberly
Mr S L Egerton
Mr H D A C Miers
Mr W I Rae

LUNCH HOSTED BY LORD PRIVY SEAL

The following are also invited:

Sd Ahmad Hussain al-Sammarra'i
Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi
Sd Muhammed Sa'eef Al-Sahhaf
Sd Isam Abdul Ghani Mahbub
Sd Mowafaq Mahmud Al-Ani
Mr S L Egerton

BRITISH MUSEUM

The following will accompany the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Sd Muhammed Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf
Mr S L Egerton

DINNER HOSTED BY SECRETARY OF STATE

The following are also invited:
Sd Ahmad Hussain al-Sammarra'i
Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi
Sd Muhammed Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf
Sd Mowafaq Mahmud Al-Ani
MR S. L. EGERTON.

J H W Reid (Miss)
Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
5 March 1981

Annex I

Car Seating Plan

Monday 9 March

Airport to Hotel

Car P	Foreign Minister Sd Ahmad Hussain al-Sammarra'i Escort Officer Special Branch
Car 1	Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi Sd Muhammed Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf Sd Isam Abdul Ghani Mahbub Special Branch
Car 2	Sd Abdul Latif Muhi Nuaimi Sd Mowafaq Mahmud Al-Ani Mr S L Egerton

Hotel to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 10 Downing Street and return to hotel

Car P	Foreign Minister Sd Ahmed Hussain Al-Sammarra'i Escort Officer Special Branch
Car 1	Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi Sd Muhammed Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf Mr S L Egerton Special Branch

Hotel to Coliseum, Savoy and return to hotel

as on journey to Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Tuesday 10 March

Hotel to Foreign and Commonwealth Office

as on previous journey to Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Hotel to Admiralty House

Car 2	Sd Isam Abdul Ghani Mahbub Sd Mawafaq Mahmud Al-Ani

Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Admiralty House

as on journey to Foreign and Commonwealth Office

/Admiralty House to

Admiralty House to British Museum return to Hotel

Car P	Foreign Minister Sd Muhammed Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf Mr J L Egerton Escort Officer Special Branch

Admiralty House to Hotel

Car 1	Sd Ahmad Hussain Al-Sammarra'i Ambassador Hisham al-Shawi
Car 2	Sd Isam Abdul Ghani Mahbub Sd Mowafaq Mahmud Al-Ani

Hotel to 1 Carlton Gardens and return to hotel

Car P	Foreign Minister Sd Ahmad Hussain al-Sammarra'i Escort Officer Special Branch
Car 1	Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi Sd Muhammad Al-Sahhaf Special Branch
Car 2	Sd Mowafaq Mahmud Al-Ani Mr S L Egerton

Wednesday 11 March

Hotel to Press Attaché's office

Car P	Foreign Minister Escort Officer Special Branch

Two cars will be available for the members of the official suite who wish to attend the Press Conference.

Central London to airport

as on inward journey from airport.

DISTRIBUTION (of programme and administrative plan)

10 Downing Street

Private Secretary/Prime Minister (2)
Press Office (2)

Iraq Embassy (6)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PS/Secretary of State (2)
PS/Lord Privy Seal (2)
PS/Mr Hurd (2)
Sir John Graham (1)
Mr J C Moberly (1)
Mr H D A C Miers (1)
Mr I Rae, MED (6)
News Department (3)
Security Department (3)
Resident Clerk (1)
Protocol and Conference Department (6)

Government Hospitality Fund

MFJ

B/F 6.381

Iraq

21 January 1981

Brief requested by phone SP 27.1.

Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 20 January about the visit of Dr. Hammadi to this country in March. She would be prepared to see Dr. Hammadi from 1700-1730 on Monday 9 March.

MODBA

G G H Walden Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

AZ

(1)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister -

You will see from the two letters attached that it seems likely we shall have the Foreign Ministers of Mexico & Iraq in London at the same time early in March. You have already agreed to see the Iraqi & will therefore, I fear, have to see the Mexican as well. You can manage them both, in fairly terms, on the afternoon of Monday 9 March. We would ensure there was an hour's gap between the two half hour meetings. Agree?

Yes ok Mark

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 January 1981

Dear Michael,

Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister, March 9, 10, 11

Dr Sa'adoun Hammadi has now accepted the Foreign Secretary's invitation to visit this country from 9 to 11 March. Paul Lever's letter of 14 November explains the background to this visit.

In your letter of 18 November you said that the Prime Minister had agreed in principle to receive Dr Hammadi. We now want to discuss an outline programme for the visit with the Iraqis and I should be grateful if you would let me know a suitable time for Dr Hammadi to call on Mrs Thatcher. At the moment, we have in mind official talks at the FCO on the morning of 10 March. Would the Prime Minister perhaps agree to see Dr Hammadi in the afternoon of that day?

Yours ever
Graham

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

Iraq.

File

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 November 1980

UK/Iraq Relations

As you will already be aware, the Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 14 November and has agreed that if the Iraqi Foreign Minister visits London she would receive him.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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(1)

Prime Minister

I doubt whether underlying Iraqi attitudes have changed all that much. However the situation has changed & Sparkes has been released. Considerations of 'realpolitik' argue in favour of your receiving Hammadi. Agree?

Yes

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 November 1980

Dear Michael,

UK/Iraq Relations

The Prime Minister may have seen, from FCO telno 496 to Baghdad (copy attached), that the Iraqis have suggested that it might now be opportune to ask the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Dr Sa'adoun Hammadi, to pay an official visit to the UK. This is in line with the recent overtures we have received from the Iraqis suggesting that they would like to develop a new and more favourable relationship with us.

The Prime Minister will remember that the visit which the Iraqi Foreign Minister was to have paid to this country in the summer was postponed at the last minute. One reason for this was the non-inclusion of a call on the Prime Minister in his programme.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that the climate of Iraq/UK relations has now changed and that we should seek to develop our relations. He thinks that we should sound out the Iraqis on whether their expressions of goodwill are genuine.

The problems which clouded our relationship in the summer have receded. Mr Sparkes has been released. Several months have passed since the seige of the Iranian Embassy in which the Iraqis were implicated. We have not had many recent reports of unsavoury activity by Iraqi agents in the UK.

Lord Carrington therefore proposes to pursue the idea of the Iraqi Foreign Minister paying a visit to the UK. Whether or not this becomes an official visit remains to be seen. But he is only likely to come if we can assure him that, provided the dates fit, a call on the Prime Minister can be included in his programme. The Foreign and

/Commonwealth

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

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Commonwealth Secretary very much hopes that the Prime Minister can agree to this.

Yours ever

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

PP BAGHDAD
RR AMMAN
GRS 478
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 131730 NOV 1980
TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 496 OF 13TH NOVEMBER 1980
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN
UK/IRAQ RELATIONS
FCO TELNO 477 (NOT TO ALL)

1. THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR CALLED ON GRAHAM ON 13 NOVEMBER AT HIS OWN REQUEST. AFTER FRIENDLY REFERENCES TO THE RELEASE OF SPARKES AND THE FAVOURABLE DOE DECISION ON PLANNING PERMISSION FOR THE IRAQI SCHOOL, HE SAID THAT HE WISHED TO DISCUSS HOW OUR RELATIONS COULD BE FURTHER IMPROVED. MR HURD HAD ENQUIRED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF HAMMADI VISITING THE UK ON HIS WAY BACK FROM NEW YORK. SHAWI SAID HE WONDERED WHETHER THE TIME MIGHT BE OPPORTUNE FOR US TO ASK HAMMADI TO PAY AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE UK, RATHER THAN ONE MADE IN PASSING. A VISIT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER MIGHT THEN LEAD TO VISITS BY OTHER MINISTERS. THE PROPOSAL FOR THE MOU ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH ITS PROVISION FOR A MIXED COMMISSION TO MEET REGULARLY, MIGHT BE REVIEWED:
AND THE PROPOSAL FOR UPDATING THE ANGLO/IRAQI CULTURAL AGREEMENT PURSUED.

2. GRAHAM SAID THAT HE BELIEVED A VISIT BY HAMMADI ON HIS RETURN FROM NEW YORK WOULD BE USEFUL. WE HAD NOT SUGGESTED AN OFFICIAL VISIT ON THIS OCCASION BECAUSE
SUCH VISITS TOOK TIME TO ARRANGE AND DEPENDED UPON THE AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH MINISTERS, WHO WOULD WISH TO GIVE FULL AND FURTHER ATTENTION TO IT, IN ADDIDTION, WE HAD NOT WISHED TO SUGGEST THAT AN IMPROVEMENT IN ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS DEPENDED UPON THE IRAQIS AGREEING TO RESUSCITATE THE OFFICIAL VISIT BY HAMMADI THAT HAD BEEN PROPOSED DURING THE SUMMER AND THEN POSTPONED. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOW LOOK INTO SHAWI'S PROPOSAL.

3. ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS GENERALLY, GRAHAM SAID THAT THERE WERE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST MIXED COMMISSIONS.

THERE WAS A TENDENCY FOR THESE TO START ENTHUSIASTICALLY BUT THEN TO FIND DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING MOMENTUM. HE WAS NOT AWARE THAT THERE WAS MUCH IN THE CULTURAL AGREEMENT THAT NEEDED UPDATING, THOUGH WE WERE ANXIOUS TO IMPROVE THE STATUS OF THE BRITISH COUNCIL IN IRAQ. WE FOR OUR PART HAD BEEN VERY WILLING TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ EVER SINCE GRAHAM HIMSELF HAD GONE TO BAGHDAD AS AMBASSADOR IN 1974. HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE NOW TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. HE REFERRED BRIEFLY TO THE VISIT OF GENERAL JANAB. HE COMMENTED THAT THE IRAQIS TENDED TO SET TESTS FOR THOSE WITH WHOM THEY CONTEMPLATED CO-OPERATION. THEY THEN ASSUMED THAT IF THEIR PROSPECTIVE PARTNERS DID NOT PASS ALL THOSE TESTS, THAT THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN CO-OPERATION. BUT THIS WAS NOT NECESSARILY RIGHT. AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT WAR, WE MIGHT PASS SOME TESTS BUT NOT ALL. SHAWI WOULD DO ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS A GOOD TURN IF HE COULD GET IT ACROSS TO HIS GOVERNMENT THAT THERE WAS GOODWILL ON THE BRITISH SIDE, BUT NOT EVERYTHING WAS POSSIBLE AT ONCE.

4. GRAHAM ALSO SOUGHT SHAWI'S HELP OVER THE ALTANIN (YOUR TEL NO 495). ICRC WAS MAKING THE RUNNING ON THIS QUESTION BUT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SHAWI COULD URGE THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES TO FACILITATE THE ALTANIN'S PASSAGE DOWNSTREAM. SHAWI UNDERTOOK TO TAKE THIS UP WITH BAGHDAD.

CARRINGTON

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PREM 19/813

PART 2

TOP SECRET

Confidential Filing

Internal Situation.
Iraqi/Iranian Relations.
Iraqi/Syrian Relations.
Threat to oil Supplies from the Gulf.

IRAQ

Part 1: April 1980
Part 2: October 1980

PREM 19/813

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
2.10.80.		12.3.81					
2.10.80		13.4.81					
6.10.80		4.5.81					
9.10.80		12.5.81					
		8.10.81					
10.10.80		16.11.81					
15.10.80							
17.10.80		15.12.81.					
20.10.80		30.12.81					
28.10.80		13.5.82					
31.10.80		24.5.82					
3.11.80		25.5.82					
5.11.80		1.6.82					
6.11.80		3.6.82					
7.11.80		10.6.82					
11.11.80							
13.11.80		ends					
24.11.80							
30.11.80							
4.12.80							
29.12.80							

PART 2 ends:-

Baghdad tel 361 10/6/82

PART 3 begins:-

FCO tel 168 to Brussels, covering
Tehran tel 381 28/6/82

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC (80) 34th Conclusions, Minute 1 (extract)	2.10.80
CC (80) 35th Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	16.10.80
CC (80) 36th Conclusions, Minute 3 (extract)	23.10.80
CC (80) 37th Conclusions, Minute 2	30.10.80
CC (80) 39th Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	6.11.80
CC (80) 43rd Conclusions, Minute 2	4.12.80
CC (81) 11th Conclusions, Minute 2	12.3.81
CC (82) 26th Conclusions, Minute 2	13.5.82
CC (82) 30th Conclusions, Minute 3	27.5.82

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed A M Wayland Date 13 September 2012

PREM Records Team

Iraq

GRS 250

CONFIDENTIAL

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FM BAGHDAD 101017Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 361 OF 10/06/82

INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS: UKMIS NEW YORK: WASHINGTON: UKDEL NATO: STOCKHOLM: MOSCOW: PARIS.

Prime Minister 2

INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS

MY IPT 360.

IRAQ-IRAN: CEASEFIRE OFFER.

1. FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI SUMMONED ME TODAY, 10 JUNE, TO ACQUAINT HMG, AS A PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER , OF THE TERMS OF IRAQ'S CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OFFER SUMMARISED IN MY IPT.

2. HAMMADI EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS A SERIOUS OFFER MADE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPEAL TO BOTH COUNTRIES BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE'S GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE WHICH HAD MET IN JEDDA FROM 6 TO 8 JUNE. THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WAS GRAVE AND COMPLICATED, SO IRAQ HAD THOUGHT IT OPPORTUNE, AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN ON HIS VISIT HERE ON 9 JUNE, TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE UNILATERAL OFFER TO END THE WAR WITH IRAN. EXPLAINING THE THIRD POINT OF THE RCC'S OFFER, HE SAID THAT IRAQ AIMED TO TRY AND SETTLE ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITH IRAN BILATERALLY, BUT WAS READY TO TAKE EVERYTHING TO ARBITRATION IF IRAN WAS NOT YET READY FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. THE POSSIBLE ARBITRATORS WERE SET OUT IN IRAQ'S ORDER OF PREFERENCE.
ANYTHING IRAQ'S FRIENDS COULD DO TO GET IRAN TO CONSIDER THIS OFFER SERIOUSLY WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED.

3. I ASKED WHERE THIS LEFT THE IDEA OF RESORTING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR A SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION ON THE MAIN ISSUES AGAINST WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED IRANIAN TERRITORY, WHICH TARIQ AZIZ HAD EXPLAINED TO ME 25 MAY (MY TEL NO 330). HAMMADI SAID THAT THE RCC'S THREE-POINT OFFER OF 10 JUNE TOOK PRIORITY OVER RESORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT IF IT WERE REJECTED BY IRAN, IRAQ WOULD HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO CONTINUE TO TRY AND USE THE SECURITY COUNCIL ROUTE.

/4.

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4. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO LEAVE WITH HAMMADI A COPY OF THE 9 JUNE STATEMENT OF THE TEN ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON (BONN TEL NO 545). HAMMADI READ THIS THROUGH AND SAID HE LIKED THE GOOD STRONG TEXT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKREP BRUSSELS.

EGERTON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

IRAQ/IRAN

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IRAQ/IRAN

CC(82) 31st 3.6.82 Item 2.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Iran/Iraq

Previous Reference: CC(82) 30th Conclusions, Minute 3

2. THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY said that Jordan's efforts to convene a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the continuing conflict between Iran and Iraq had failed to attract support. The course of the conflict did not at present pose a direct threat to King Hussein's own position.

The Cabinet -

Took note.

SECRET

IRAQ JF

10 DOWNING STREET

3 June 1982

From the Private Secretary

IRAN/IRAQ:
KING HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 2 June and has authorised the despatch of the two telegrams to Amman which you enclosed.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(1).

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 June 1982

Prime Minister

Agree with telegrams at Flags A & B?

A.J.C. 2/6

Dear John.

Iran/Iraq: King Hussein's Message to the Prime Minister

I enclose a draft message which the Prime Minister may wish to send to King Hussein in reply to the message the King sent to her on 19 May along with a copy of a message to President Reagan. Since then the King has summoned Mr Urwick (Amman telno 218) and sought UK support for an immediate meeting of the Security Council. The proposed message from the Prime Minister, along with the covering draft telegram to Amman, covers this latest request by the King. Copies of the relevant telegrams from Amman are enclosed.

Sir Anthony Parsons was informed, over the weekend, of King Hussein's initiative and of the Prime Minister's belief that we owed him a debt in the Security Council. The Council has already met for informal consultations at Jordanian prompting. But the initiative turned out to be ill-considered; the Iraqis themselves do not want a full Security Council meeting yet (and may not for some time) since they wish first to try to line up the necessary support in the non-aligned movement.

We and the Ten are keeping a close eye on developments. We are conscious that there is little that the Ten can usefully to to encourage a diplomatic solution, but we stand ready to help if we can. A proposal to make representations in Baghdad and Tehran is under consideration by the Ten. I enclose a copy of a statement that was issued by the Foreign Ministers on 24 May. This was well received in Iraq; we have no record of Iranian reactions.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
	CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD,UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, PARIS, MOSCOW, STOCKHOLM, BRUSSELS, ALGIERS, MUSCAT, UKREP BRUSSELS, TEL AVIV, MODUK (D14)
INFO ROUTINE BIS TEHRAN
YOUR TELNOS 207 & 218 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ WAR

1. MIFT contains the text of the Prime Minister's acknowledgement of King Hussein's message. Original will follow by bag.

2. In handing over the message you should refer to your audience with the King on 30 May and say that the Prime Minister wishes to respond sympathetically to the King's request for support at the United Nations, not least because of the magnificent Jordanian response over the adoption of Resolution 502. You should therefore assure the King that we take seriously the threat to the region posed by the conflict between Iran and Iraq, and that we intend to work for a constructive and

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword: honourable
File number	Dept: Private Office	Distribution: Standard: MED, NENAD, NAD, UND, EESD, ECD, WED, MAED, ES&SD, TRED, RID, ERD; ESID, CONS Dept, CONS EM Unit, Cabinet Office
Drafted by (Block capitals): J E HOLMES		
Telephone number: 233 4641		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

XY 48

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ZCZC
honourable outcome acceptable to both sides.
3. You should add that we understand that the Iraqis only want to bring the matter to the Council when they have obtained the necessary NAM support. We believe that it is likely to be necessary to give the Secretary General as much latitude as possible since the gulf between the two sides remains wide, and Iranian suspicions of the United Nations will need to be allayed if a constructive outcome is to be obtained. But we await the results of current discussions, particularly in Havana, and hope to remain in close touch with the Jordanians.
4. Strictly for your own information, like Sir A Parsons, we think the Jordanian approach to the Security Council ill-considered. It is difficult to understand why King Hussein should take an initiative which cuts across what the Iraqis themselves seem to want. We owe a debt in the Security Council to the King and we should therefore go along with him if at all possible (there might conceivably be advantage for us in diverting the Council from the Falklands though we have to be careful to avoid supporting language inconsistent with our current position in the council on the Falklands). But we have no real interest in having this question come to the Security Council in a way which will antagonise the Iranians and possibly even give the Soviet Union opportunities to improve their standing in Iran. We see no likelihood that the Council will be able to adopt a resolution of the kind suggested by the King. The best that it could probably do in present circumstances would be to ask the Secretary General (again) to explore the possibilities of a solution that was acceptable to both sides.

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SUBJECT cf MASTER ops

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
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PR. MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T 120A/82

FM FCO 021000Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEIDATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK DI4
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE BIS TEHRAN, ALGIERS, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, CAIRO, MUSCAT, TEL AVIV, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, MOSCOW, STOCKHOLM, BRUSSELS, UKREP BRUSSELS
MIPT. Following is text.

Your Majesty

I am most grateful for Your Majesty's message of 18 May and for your kind words of support which I greatly value.

It was good of you to send me a copy of your message to President Reagan. I have read it with interest and concern. My earnest hope is that there might be a way to bring the fighting between Iran and Iraq to an end by diplomatic means before others become involved in the conflict. As you will have seen from the statement issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten on 24 May, we and our European partners stand ready to help if the countries concerned feel there is a role we can usefully play.

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword /I have also
File number	Dept J E HOLMES	Distribution STANDARD MED, NENAD, NAD, UND, EESD, ECD WED, MAED, ESSD, TRED, RID, ESID, CONS DEPT, CONS EM UNIT, CABINET OFFICE
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Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

XY 48

	Classification and Caveats		Page
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I have also read with concern Mr Urwick's account of the anxieties you expressed to him on the evening of 30 May. I arranged for our Ambassador at the UN to be told forthwith of your belief that there should be an immediate meeting of the Security Council. I understand that the Security Council has already met for informal consultations, and that there will probably be a full meeting before long, but that, in accordance with Iraqi wishes, this is unlikely to take place until the outcome of discussions at the current Non-Aligned Meeting in Havana is known. We shall continue to follow events at the UN closely and I would like to assure you that the British delegation will keep in close touch with your own so that we may work together for an honourable and constructive outcome which will be acceptable to both sides.

I sincerely reciprocate your good wishes.

ENDS

PYM

NNNN

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword

GR 1200 CONFIDENTIAL TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM AMMAN 200645Z MAY 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 206 OF 19 MAY 1982

INFO MODUK (DI4B) PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ROUTINE ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK

IRAN/IRAQ

1. MY TWO IFTS (COPIED TO BAGHDAD AND WASHINGTON ONLY) CONTAIN THE TEXTS OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN AND OF A LETTER THE KING HAS SENT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN (ORIGINALS FOLLOW BY BAG). THE MESSAGES REFLECT THE KING'S GROWING CONCERN OVER THE GULF WAR AND HIS FEELING THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO SET IN HAND CONTINGENCY PLANNING BETWEEN ARAB STATES IN CASE IRANIAN FORCES CARRY THE WAR ONTO IRAQI SOIL.

2. WHEN SEEING KING HUSSEIN AT HIS HOME THIS AFTERNOON, I HAD ASKED HIM HOW HE VIEWED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF WAR SINCE OUR LAST MEETING ON 9 MAY (MY TELNO 193). THE KING BEGAN BY REPEATING WHAT THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF HAD SAID EARLIER IN THE DAY: THAT THE IRAQIS HAD DECIDED TO HOLD KHORRAMSHAHR WHATEVER THE COST AND IN SPITE OF JORDANIAN ADVICE THAT THE CITY WOULD PROVE DIFFICULT TO DEFEND (MY TELNO 205). THE KING SAID HE FEARED THAT, IF THE IRANIANS WON THE BATTLE FOR KHORRAMSHAHR, THEIR TROOPS WOULD ENTER IRAQ AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT STOP THE WAR UNTIL THEY HAD BROUGHT ABOUT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S DOWNFALL.

3. I THEN ASKED THE KING WHAT HE COULD TELL ME ABOUT HIS RECENT MEETINGS WITH OTHER ARAB LEADERS. AT THAT POINT HE LEFT THE ROOM FOR A WHILE AND RETURNED BEARING A HAND-WRITTEN LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER (WHICH, ALTHOUGH DATED 18 MAY, I AM CERTAIN HE WROTE ON THE SPOT) AND A COPY OF A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN WHICH HE HAD JUST GIVEN TO THE US AMBASSADOR.

4. AFTER ASKING ME TO READ THE MESSAGES, THE KING REFERRED TO CONSULTATIONS HE HAD HAD WITH OTHER ARAB STATES IN THE PAST WEEK. HE HAD SENT HIS PRIME MINISTER TO IRAQ ON 12 MAY AND HAD RECEIVED IRAQI FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN AMMAN ON 17 MAY (HE MENTIONED THAT THE IRAQIS, IN ADDITION TO GIVING THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER THE LATEST MILITARY PICTURE, HAD EXPRESSED INCREASING CONCERN OVER THE THREAT FROM THE KURDS, PARTICULARLY IN MOSUL). HE HAD HAD EXTENSIVE TALKS WITH SULTAN QABOOS OF OMAN DURING HIS VISIT TO JORDAN FROM 11-14 MAY AND WITH PRINCE TURKI OF SAUDI ARABIA ON 13-14 MAY. HE WAS ALSO KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF WAR ON 17 MAY.

5. THE KING, WHO REPEATEDLY EXCUSED HIMSELF FOR TROUBLING THE PRIME MINISTER WITH HIS PROBLEMS AT A TIME WHEN SHE HAD SO MANY PREOCCUPATIONS OF HER OWN, SAID HE NOW FELT IT ESSENTIAL TO PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLANS IMMEDIATELY TO ENABLE JORDAN AND OTHER ARAB STATES TO GO TO THE HELP OF IRAQ SHOULD THIS PROVE NECESSARY.

HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY DISTURBED TO HEAR FROM SULTAN QABOOS OF THE APPARENTLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE THE AMERICANS HAD TAKEN IN DISCUSSION WITH THE EGYPTIANS ABOUT HELP FOR IRAQ, IN WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY HAD URGED THE EGYPTIANS NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ARAB AFFAIRS. HENCE HE HAD FELT IT NECESSARY TO SEND A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

6. THE KING SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH HE STILL AWAITED A REPLY FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK, HE HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM SULTAN QABOOS THAT THE EGYPTIANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION IF NECESSARY SEMICLN THEY HAD OF COURSE ALREADY SENT MUCH DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ AND HAD ALSO, HE BELIEVED, OFFERED TO SEND EGYPTIAN OFFICERS. IT WENT WITHOUT SAYING THAT, IF THE EGYPTIANS WERE TO AGREE TO SENT TROOPS TO ASSIST IRAQ, THEY MUST BE FULLY READMITTED INTO ARAB RANKS. THEIR FORCES WOULD HAVE TO PASS THROUGH SAUDI ARABIA OR JORDAN, OR PERHAPS BOTH SEMICLN JORDAN WOULD NATURALLY GIVE EVERY ASSISTANCE. INDEED IF EGYPT WERE WILLING TO SEND TWO DIVISIONS, THE KING ENVISAGED THAT ONE EGYPTIAN DIVISION MIGHT STAY IN JORDAN RELEASING ONE JORDANIAN DIVISION TO GO TO IRAQ. IRANIAN ENTRY INTO IRAQ WOULD IN ANY CASE BRING INTO FORCE THE ARAB JOINT DEFENCE TREATY AND WOULD, THE KING THOUGHT, MAKE THE POSITION OF SYRIA AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES HELPING IRAN IMPOSSIBLE TO JUSTIFY.

7. I ASKED THE KING WHETHER HE FELT HE COULD AFFORD TO SPARE TROOPS TO HELP IRAQ, GIVEN THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO JORDAN FROM BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA. THE KING REPLIED THAT THIS WAS WHY HE HAD ASKED PRESIDENT REAGAN TO "KEEP ISRAEL OFF OUR BACKS," ESPECIALLY IF JORDANIAN INTERVENTION IN IRAQ WERE TO LEAD TO A DIRECT THREAT TO JORDAN FROM SYRIA. HE JUST HOPED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD REALISE WHAT WAS AT STAKE.

8. THE KING SAID HE HAD SPOKEN VERY CLEARLY TO PRINCE TURKI DURING HIS RECENT VISIT OF THE DANGERS AHEAD AND OF THE NEED FOR THE ARABS TO POOL THEIR RESOURCES IN ORDER TO MEET THE THREAT FROM IRAN BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE: ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE MUST BE EXTENDED TO EGYPT IN ORDER TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR HER TO COME TO THE HELP OF IRAQ, IF AN IRAQI COLLAPSE WAS TO BE AVOIDED. HE SAID HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY RESPONSE FROM THE SAUDIS.

COMMENT

9. THE KING'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN IS, EVEN BY THE STANDARDS OF THESE COMMUNICATIONS, EXCEPTIONALLY LONG-WINDED. THE ARGUMENT IS ON FAMILIAR JORDANIAN LINES AND, ACCORDING TO THE US AMBASSADOR WITH WHOM I HAVE SINCE COMPARED NOTES, IS UNLIKELY TO CARRY MUCH CONVICTION WITH THE AMERICANS. AMBASSADOR VIETS TOLD ME HE HAD PUT FORCIBLY TO THE KING THE US VIEW THAT ANY TILT BY THE AMERICANS TOWARDS IRAQ WOULD PUSH IRAN INTO THE ARMS OF THE SOVIET UNION.

/ 10. ACCORDING

10. ACCORDING TO VIETS, THE KING IS EXAGGERATING EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO INTERVENE SEMICLN THE US EMBASSY IN CAIRO APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT, AT THE VERY MOST, PRESIDENT MUBARAK WILL COMMIT ONLY TOKEN FORCES. VIETS TRIED HARD TO PIN DOWN THE KING ON WHETHER HE WOULD SEND REGULAR FORCES TO IRAQ: THE KING HAD REPLIED THAT, IF EGYPT SENT TROOPS, JORDANIAN FORCES WOULD BE AT THEIR SIDE. VIETS SUGGESTED TO THE KING THAT RENEWED EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO TRY TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS, BUT THE KING HAD ARGUED UNCONVINCINGLY THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT TIME TO BRING THE SECURITY COUNCIL INTO PLAY.

11. THE KING MENTIONED TO VIETS THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE BAHRAINI CROWN PRINCE SAYING THAT SENTENCE WOULD BE PASSED ON THE COUP PLOTTERS ON 20 MAY AND OF BAHRAINI CONCERN THAT THERE WOULD BE A RENEWED IRANIAN ATTEMPT TO SUBVERT THE REGIME: THE KING HAD PROMISED TO SEND UP TO A BRIGADE TO HELP BAHRAIN IF THIS WERE NECESSARY.

12. WHATEVER ONE MAKES OF ALL THIS, THERE WAS NO MISTAKING THE ALARMIST VIEW THE KING NOW TAKES OF THE COURSE OF THE WAR AND HIS FEAR THAT, IF IRAQ COLLAPSES, OTHER REGIMES IN THE GULF WILL ALSO FALL. THE FULL CONSEQUENCES OF THE RISKS HE HAS RUN BY IDENTIFYINGL JORDAN SO CLOSELY WITH IRAQ ARE BEGINNING TO SINK IN, AND HE SEEMS TO BE SEARCHING DESPERATELY FOR SOME WAY OF AVERTING THE DOWNFALL OF PRESIDENT SADDAM.

13. THE KING CLEARLY WANTS TO KEEP US CLOSELY INFORMED OF HIS THINKING, BUT HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS EXPECTING ANY HELP FROM US AT THIS STAGE.

URWICK

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FM AMMAN 311000Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 218 OF 31 MAY
AND TO IMMEDIATE DEKSBY 311300Z NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD: PRIORITY MODUK (DI4), ABU DHABI, ALGIERS, BAHRAIN, CAIRO, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MOSCOW, MUSCAT, PARIS, STOCKHOLM AND UKREP BRUSSELS

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 893: IRAN/IRAQ

1. KING HUSSEIN SUMMONED ME ON THE EVENING OF 30 MAY TO REQUEST OUR SUPPORT IN BRINGING THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE KING SAW MY US AND SOVIET COLLEAGUES SEPARATELY, AND HAD INTENDED ALSO TO SEE THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR BUT HE WAS NOT AVAILABLE. THE KING SAID HE WOULD BE INSTRUCTING JORDAN'S REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS TO CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. THE KING EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND TO HIS REQUEST IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS. HE CLAIMED THAT THE US RESPONSE TO HIS ORIGINAL REQUEST (MY TELNO 206) HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND THAT THE AMERICANS WERE DOING ALL THAT THEY COULD TO ENCOURAGE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES SUCH AS ALGERIA, TURKEY AND PAKISTAN TO TAKE THE CONFLICT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT HE FEARED THAT THIS MIGHT TAKE TOO LONG. HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE ON 29 MAY FROM PRESIDENT SADDAM THROUGH HIS HALF-BROTHER (PRESUMABLY BARZAN, WHOSE VISITS HERE ARE NOT PUBLICISED) URGING THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY AND HE FEARED THAT THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO TO ACT WITH SUFFICIENT SPEED. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A CLEAR-CUT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL BOARDERS AND AN END TO BELLIGERENCY ON BOTH SIDES, IN RETURN FOR WHICH THE IRAQIS WOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL REMAINING IRANIAN TERRITORY IN THEIR HANDS. BUT IF THE SITUATION CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE FOR A FEW DAYS MORE, IRANIAN FORCES MIGHT WELL BE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF BASRA AND IT WOULD BY THEN BE TOO LATE FOR A RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES TO BE EFFECTIVE.

3. THE KING SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD ALREADY APPROACHED US ON THIS MATTER. I CONFIRMED THIS, SAID THAT WE SHARED THE CONCERN OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION OVER THE PROLONGATION OF THE WAR AND WOULD WISH TO CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 321 TO BAGHDAD). WE FELT IT WOULD BE BEST IF ISLAMIC AND PARTICULARLY ARAB COUNTRIES COULD TAKE THE LEAD IN BRINGING THE MATTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE KING SAID

/HE

HE UNDERSTOOD OUR VIEW, BUT NONETHELESS HOPED FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR MOVES TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE. I SAID I FELT SURE WE WOULD WORK FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME IN THE COUNCIL.

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THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS BONN LUXEMBOURG ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO
INFO SAVING STRASBOURG

M I P T: DECLARATION OF THE TEN ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

1) THE TEN EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN AT THE CONTINUATION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN WHICH HAS NOW LASTED TWO YEARS AND CLAIMED VERY NUMEROUS VICTIMS, LED TO CONSIDERABLE MATERIAL DESTRUCTION, CREATED GRAVE SUFFERING FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, AND HAS DIVERTED SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES WHICH THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD WISHED TO DEVOTE TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

2) WHILE REAFFIRMING THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE SOVERIGNTY OF STATES AND OF NON INTERFERENCE IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE TEN EXPRESS THE GRAVE CONCERN WHICH THE CONTINUATION OF THE FIGHTING CAUSES THEM. THEY DEPLORE THIS THE MORE BECAUSE THEY HAVE LONG STANDING AND CLOSE LINKS WITH EACH OF THE TWO BELLIGERENTS AS WELL AS WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. THEY RECALL THAT SINCE 23 SEPTEMBER 1980 THEY HAVE TAKEN A POSITION IN SUPPORT OF AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

3) THE TEN PAY TRIBUTE TO THE PERSISTENT EFFORTS MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

/4.

4) THE TEN, FOR THEIR OWN PART, EARNESTLY DESIRE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES RECOGNISED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, SUCH AS THOSE DEFINED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS RESOLUTION NO 479 OF THE 28 OF SEPTEMBER 1980. THEY FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A JUST AND LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ASSURING THE SECURITY OF THE TWO STATES IN RESPECT FOR THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THEIR POLITICAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITY, IS MORE THAN EVER URGENT AND NECESSARY, IN ORDER TO PERMIT THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TO WHICH THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION ASPIRE.

5) THE TEN ARE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN EVERY EFFORT DIRECTED TOWARDS PEACE, TO THE EXTENT THAT EACH OF THE TWO PARTIES REQUEST THEM TO DO SO, AS WELL AS TO CONSIDER, WHEN HOSTILITIES HAVE CEASED, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATING IN THE RECONSUTRUCTION OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

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12 JUN 1982

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 011733Z JUN 82
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 903 DATED 1 JUNE 82
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, PARIS, JEDDA, TEHRAN
STOCKHOLM, CAIRO, AMMAN

MY TELNO 896: IRAN/IRAQ

1. I HAVE NOW SEEN BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 334. IF AND WHEN IRAN/IRAQ COMES FORMALLY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND IF THE IRAQIS ADVANCE THE POLICY ON WITHDRAWAL SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF BAGHDAD TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, I CANNOT SEE HOW WE CAN SUPPORT IT WITHOUT EXPOSING OURSELVES TO CHARGES OF HYPOCRISY AND DOUBLE STANDARDS. ADMITTEDLY, WE HAVE A CLEAR AND MANDATORY DEMAND FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLANDS, AND THE ONLY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION SO FAR ADOPTED ON IRAN/IRAQ (SCR 479) IS FUZZY AND NON-MANDATORY. BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE IRAQIS ARE OCCUPYING WHAT IS UNQUESTIONABLY IRANIAN TERRITORY. WE HAVE RIGHTLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM OUR TERRITORY AS PART OF A PACKAGE INVOLVING GENERAL PRINCIPLES, AND WE WOULD BE VERY EXPOSED IF WE TOOK A DIFFERENT ATTITUDE REGARDING IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. FOLLOWING IRAQI WITHDRAWAL, IF IT TOOK PLACE WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS, THIS PROBLEM WOULD OF COURSE CEASE TO EXIST FOR US, AND WE WOULD BE FREE TO SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT BY SAMARRAI.

2. THE SAME PROBLEM APPLIES TO A SLIGHTLY LESSER EXTENT TO KING HUSSEIN'S FORMULATION IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 218. THE PROBLEM WOULD OF COURSE BE TRANSFORMED IF THE IRANIANS OCCUPIED IRAQI TERRITORY. THEN WE WOULD BE ON SAFE GROUND TO SUPPORT CALLS FOR MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL.

/3

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3. I REALISE THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT DOING ANYTHING TO MAKE LIFE MORE DIFFICULT FOR KING HUSSEIN, AND I AM CONSCIOUS OF THE INVALUABLE SUPPORT HE GAVE US OVER SCR 502. BUT I HAVE TO SAY THAT THE INITIATIVE HE LAUNCHED WHICH LED TO THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL YESTERDAY (31 MAY) WAS A LEAD BALLOON. A NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WERE FURIOUS AT BEING DRAGGED BACK ON A PUBLIC HOLIDAY WHEN THEY KNEW THAT NEITHER IRAQ NOR IRAN NOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, NOR, SO FAR AS THEY COULD SEE, ANYONE EXCEPT JORDAN WANTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONVENE IMMEDIATELY. THEY WERE THEN TREATED TO A RAMBLING DISSERTATION BY HAZEM NUSEIBEH, THE CONTENT OF WHICH WAS WORTHY OF MR PECKSNIFF, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER WOULD HAVE DONE BETTER STYLISTICALLY.

PARSONS

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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From the Private Secretary

1 June 1982

IRAN/IRAQ

As I told you over the weekend, the Prime Minister commented, with reference to Sir A. Parsons' telegram No. 218 of 31 May, that we must do all we can to help, particularly as King Hussein was especially helpful to us in connection with UN Security Council Resolution 502.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SB

IRAN/IRAQ 26

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Mr. Coles informed.

N.B. We must do all we can to help. King Hussein was especially helpful in our Resolution 502

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INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD: PRIORITY ODUK (DIA), ABU DHABI, ALGIERS, BAHRAIN, CAIRO, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MOSCOW, MUSCAT, PARIS, STOCKHOLM AND UKREP BRUSSELS

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 893: IRAN/IRAQ

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2. THE KING EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND TO HIS REQUEST IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS. HE CLAIMED THAT THE US RESPONSE TO HIS ORIGINAL REQUEST (MY TELNO 206) HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND THAT THE AMERICANS WERE DOING [illegible] SUCH AS ALGERIA

2. THE KING EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND TO HIS REQUEST IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS. HE SAID THAT THE US RESPONSE TO HIS ORIGINAL REQUEST (MY TELNO 226) HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND THAT THE AMERICANS WERE DOING ALL THAT THEY COULD TO ENCOURAGE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES SUCH AS ALGERIA, TURKEY AND PAKISTAN TO TAKE THE CONFLICT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT HE FEARED THAT THIS MIGHT TAKE TOO LONG. HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE ON 29 MAY FROM PRESIDENT SADDAM THROUGH HIS HALF-BROTHER (PRESUMABLY BARZAN, WHOSE VISITS HERE ARE NOT PUBLICISED) URGING THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY AND HE FEARED THAT THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO TO ACT WITH SUFFICIENT SPEED. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A CLEAR-CUT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL BORDERS AND AN END TO BELLIGERENCY ON BOTH SIDES, IN RETURN FOR WHICH THE IRAQIS WOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL REMAINING IRANIAN TERRITORY IN THEIR HANDS. BUT IF THE SITUATION CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE FOR A FEW DAYS MORE, IRANIAN FORCES MIGHT WELL BE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF BASRA AND IT WOULD BY THEN BE TOO LATE FOR A RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES TO BE EFFECTIVE.

3. THE KING SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD ALREADY APPROACHED US ON THIS MATTER. I CONFIRMED THIS, SAID THAT WE SHARED THE CONCERN OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION OVER THE PROLONGATION OF THE WAR AND WOULD WISH TO CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 321 TO BAGHDAD). WE FELT IT WOULD BE BEST IF ISLAMIC AND PARTICULARLY ARAB COUNTRIES COULD TAKE THE LEAD IN BRINGING THE MATTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE KING SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR VIEW, BUT NONETHELESS HOPED FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR MOVES TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE. I SAID I FELT SURE WE WOULD WORK FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME IN THE COUNCIL.

URWICK
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 320 OF 25 MAY 82
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INFO ROUTINE MUSCAT, CAIRO
INFO SAVING BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, STOCKHOLM, ANKARA, ISLAMABAD, MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 317 (NOT TO ALL) : IRAN/IRAQ

1. THERE WERE SCENES OF JUBILATION IN TEHRAN WHEN THE LIBERATION OF KHORRAMSHAHR WAS ANNOUNCED ON THE AFTERNOON OF 24 MAY. THOUSANDS OF PRISONERS HAVE BEEN SHOWN ON TELEVISION AS WELL AS SCENES OF THE IRANIAN ENTRY INTO KHORRAMSHAHR. FOREIGN REPORTERS HAVE BEEN INVITED TO VISIT KHORRAMSHAHR AND SEE EQUIPMENT CAPTURED FROM THE IRAQIS, ETC.

2. THE MORALE OF THE REGIME WILL HAVE BEEN RAISED SKY-HIGH BY THE REGAINING OF KHORRAMSHAHR, WHICH EVIDENTLY CAME ABOUT THROUGH A COMBINATION OF SURRENDER AND RETREAT OF IRAQI UNITS AFTER SOME INITIAL FIGHTING. KHOMEINI HAS SAID THAT IRAN NOW SPEAKS TO NEIGHBOURING STATES FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS SAID THAT IRAN INTENDS TO PURSUE HER DEMANDS FOR REPARATIONS AND CONDEMNATION OF THE AGGRESSOR NOW THAT SHE HAS FORCED IRAQ TO WITHDRAW FROM ALMOST ALL HER TERRITORY. HE WARNED THE GULF STATES NOT TO THROW IN THEIR LOT WITH SADDAM THE AGGRESSOR BUT TO CHOOSE A PATH OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE WITH IRAN. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UAE AND QATAR CALLED AT THE MFA ON 24 MAY, NO DOUBT TO BE TOLD THE SAME. RAFSANJANI, WHO AFFECTS A MORE HAWKISH ATTITUDE THAN MOST OF THE IRANIAN LEADERS, HAS PROMISED ACTION SOON TO LIBERATE THE REST OF IRAN'S TERRITORY AND SAID HE THINKS IRAN WILL HAVE TO EXERT PRESSURE (UNSPECIFIED) ON IRAQ IF SHE IS TO GET HER TO PAY REPARATIONS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

RUNDLE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Iraq

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 May 1982

IRAN/ IRAQ WAR

The Prime Minister was grateful for your letter of 21 May. With regard to your paragraph 9, she commented that she would expect the Soviet Union to opt for Iran rather than Iraq, working through Syrian influence which Mrs. Thatcher understands is becoming greater in Iran.

The Prime Minister has also said that she would like to see a fresh JIC assessment of the Iraq/Iran situation. I should be grateful if David Wright (to whom I am copying this letter together with a copy of your own) could kindly set this in hand.

B/F
received
27/5/82

At a later stage the Prime Minister may wish to hold a meeting to discuss the Iraq/Iran situation.

A. J. COLES

S. M. J. Lamport, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 2073 OF 24 MAY 1982
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INFO SAVING STRASBOURG

M I P T: DECLARATION OF THE TEN ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

1) THE TEN EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN AT THE CONTINUATION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN WHICH HAS NOW LASTED TWO YEARS AND CLAIMED VERY NUMEROUS VICTIMS, LED TO CONSIDERABLE MATERIAL DESTRUCTION, CREATED GRAVE SUFFERING FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, AND HAS DIVERTED SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES WHICH THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD WISHED TO DEVOTE TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

2) WHILE REAFFIRMING THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE SOVERIGNTY OF STATES AND OF NON INTERFERENCE IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE TEN EXPRESS THE GRAVE

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3) THE TEN PAY TRIBUTE TO THE PERSISTENT EFFORTS MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

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(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 May 1982

Prime Minister

Would you like to see a fresh JIC assessment of the Iraq/Iran situation?

A.J.C. 21/5

Yes: and we might as well do it on 2.7 with the Iran/Iraq review.

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear John

IRAN/IRAQ WAR

The Prime Minister recently mentioned to Mr Hurd her concern about the course the Iran/Iraq war is taking and the implications for stability in the area.

2. The Iranians have now expelled Iraqi troops from virtually all of their southern province of Khuzestan and are preparing to assault Khorramshahr, which has symbolic importance because of the long and bloody Iranian defence of it in the early part of the war. The Iraqis have a corresponding interest in preventing its capture and have fortified it with a strong garrison.

3. Both sides have been talking of peace - the Iraqis because of the increasingly debilitating effort of the war, and the Iranians on terms which the Iraqis could not possibly accept. The Iranians are believed to be bent on overthrow of Saddam Hussein (as well as obtaining reparations). Even if they do not capture Khorramshahr soon, which would be a further serious blow to Saddam Hussein's chances of survival, the Iranians may be tempted to turn the screw on him by invading Iraq. They are only a few miles from Basra. The Iranians might try to stimulate an invitation to intervene from the Shi'ite majority in Iraq, which is concentrated in the south.

4. The moderate Arabs are gravely perturbed by the prospect of Saddam Hussein being overthrown. The Jordanians, Egyptians, Omanis and (we believe) the Saudis are particularly concerned. The smaller Gulf States are also worried: but because of their need to find some accommodation with their powerful neighbour, they will be reluctant to join in any action too obviously directed against Iran.

/5.

5. The Gulf Arabs have helped Iraq with money and the Egyptians have supplied ammunition and weapons. But there is little more they can do in practice - Iraq's problem is not lack of money and materials but lack of morale and motivation and bad military staff work.

6. There is little that the West can do to stop the war at present. The Americans have expressed their anxiety. But they have no clear idea of what ought to be done. We ourselves have no leverage over the Iranians. We could urge the Arabs to press the Iraqis to sue for peace more directly than they are at present in order to avert defeat. But any such suggestion by us could be deeply resented by our Arab friends. We cannot risk the potential damage to our interests. We think it best therefore to wait until there is more equilibrium in the situation - either as a result of the Iranians occupying Iraqi territory in the south to counter-balance Iranian territory still held by Iraq in the north, or else as a result of a bloody and debilitating stand-off for both sides in the battle for Khorramshahr. At that moment, it might be useful, or at least realistic for the Ten or the West as a whole to call for a cessation of hostilities. We are discussing the draft of a possible declaration in the Political Cooperation machinery of the Ten for use at an opportune moment.

7. Nor do we think that the situation would be helped by the West, or the United States, adopting a more explicit posture on the region's security. This could encourage a tendency towards polarisation and confrontation between Iran and the moderate Arabs across the Gulf. This would be highly undesirable. It may come but we should do nothing to encourage it. In particular, if the Americans assumed explicit responsibilities for security on the Arab side, this could have the effect of tempting the Soviet Union to offer similar help to the Iranians.

8. This danger of polarisation between moderate Arabs and a militant Iran supported by extremist Arabs such as Syria and Libya, and by the Soviet Union, suggests that the West should not react too precipitately in the present situation. Although the Syrians are at present cooperating with Iran to bring about the downfall of Saddam Hussein, their motives are primarily anti-Saddam Hussein, not pro-Iran. Moreover, they have not yet taken any military action themselves against Iraq and they would probably not welcome a Shi'a Islamic republic on the Khomeini model in Iraq (they would hope for a pro-Syria Ba'ath regime). Also it is to be doubted whether the Syrians would consider it in their interests to be more fully implicated with Iran in confronting the moderate Arabs after the defeat of Iraq, since this could be damagingly presented as joining Iran in an anti-Arab front. We should therefore do nothing to push Syria in a direction in which it would probably otherwise not wish to go.

/ 9.

9. Moreover, the Soviet Union seems at present to be in even more of a dilemma than the West. It would wish to avoid making the choice if at all possible between Iraq and Iran. Relations between Iran and the Soviet Union are not good. The Soviet Union's economic involvement in Iran remains significant. About 1500 technicians are working in steel, power and transport projects. But the regime in Tehran is stronger than a year ago and its policy and philosophy remains hostile to the Soviet Union and to the West. There are few signs that the Soviet Union has been able successfully to woo the Iranians or that the pro-Moscow Tudeh (communist) Party has so far gained any strength or influence. An Iranian victory over Iraq would be unlikely to give the Soviet Union any additional opportunities for mischief-making or extending its influence in Iran.

10. Mediation efforts by the United Nations (Mr Olaf Palme), the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Islamic Conference are in abeyance. We know that the latter have proposed mutual withdrawal followed by a ceasefire (rather than the more usual course of a ceasefire first) and that Iran would then be allowed to reoccupy her own territory up to the international border. The question of reparations etc would be dealt with under negotiating machinery to be established by the Islamic Conference. With Iran determined to overthrow Saddam Hussein and believing she has the means to do so, this proposal, however elegant, is unlikely to prove acceptable.

11. King Hussein's letter to President Reagan, of which he has sent a copy to the Prime Minister (Baghdad telegrams Nos 206-8) addresses many of the questions considered above. It would be wise to discuss this with the Americans before replying. FCO officials will be discussing the Middle East with their American counterparts on Monday, and King Hussein's letter will of course be included in the talks. We shall accordingly submit a draft reply for the PM to send to King Hussein as early as possible next week.

Yours ever

S M J Lamport
Private Secretary to Mr Hurd

20 MAI 1980

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FM AMMAN 200645Z MAY 82
TO PRIORITY FCO 10.DOWNING STREET. (2COPIES).
TELEGRAM NUMBER 206 OF 19 MAY 1982

INFO MODUK (DI4B) PRIORITY WASHINGTON. ROUTINE ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK

IRAN/IRAQ

1. MY TWO IFTS (COPIED TO BAGHDAD AND WASHINGTON ONLY) CONTAIN THE TEXTS OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN AND OF A LETTER THE KING HAS SENT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN (ORIGINALS FOLLOW BY BAG). THE MESSAGES REFLECT THE KING'S GROWING CONCERN OVER THE GULF WAR AND HIS FEELING THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO SET IN HAND CONTINGENCY PLANNING BETWEEN ARAB STATES IN CASE IRANIAN FORCES CARRY THE WAR ONTO IRAQI SOIL.

2. WHEN SEEING KING HUSSEIN AT HIS HOME THIS AFTERNOON, I HAD ASKED HIM HOW HE VIEWED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF WAR SINCE OUR LAST MEETING ON 9 MAY (MY TELNO 193). THE KING BEGAN BY REPEATING WHAT THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF HAD SAID EARLIER IN THE DAY: THAT THE IRAQIS HAD DECIDED TO HOLD KHORRAMSHAHR WHATEVER THE COST AND IN SPITE OF JORDANIAN ADVICE THAT THE CITY WOULD PROVE DIFFICULT TO DEFEND (MY TELNO 205). THE KING SAID HE FEARED THAT, IF THE IRANIANS WON THE BATTLE FOR KHORRAMSHAHR, THEIR TROOPS WOULD ENTER IRAQ AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT STOP THE WAR UNTIL THEY HAD BROUGHT ABOUT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S DOWNFALL.

3. I THEN ASKED THE KING WHAT HE COULD TELL ME ABOUT HIS RECENT MEETINGS WITH OTHER ARAB LEADERS. AT THAT POINT HE LEFT THE ROOM FOR A WHILE AND RETURNED BEARING A HAND-WRITTEN LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER (WHICH, ALTHOUGH DATED 18 MAY, I AM CERTAIN HE WROTE ON THE SPOT) AND A COPY OF A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN WHICH HE HAD JUST GIVEN TO THE US AMBASSADOR.

4. AFTER ASKING ME TO READ THE MESSAGES, THE KING REFERRED TO CONSULTATIONS HE HAD HAD WITH OTHER ARAB STATES IN THE PAST WEEK. HE HAD SENT HIS PRIME MINISTER TO IRAQ ON 12 MAY AND HAD RECEIVED IRAQI FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN AMMAN ON 17 MAY (HE MENTIONED THAT THE IRAQIS, IN ADDITION TO GIVING THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER THE LATEST MILITARY PICTURE, HAD EXPRESSED INCREASING CONCERN OVER THE THREAT FROM THE KURDS, PARTICULARLY IN MOSUL). HE HAD HAD EXTENSIVE TALKS WITH SULTAN QABOOS OF OMAN DURING HIS VISIT TO JORDAN FROM 11-14 MAY AND WITH PRINCE TURKI OF SAUDI ARABIA ON 13-14 MAY. HE WAS ALSO KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF WAR ON 17 MAY.

5. THE KING, WHO REPEATEDLY EXCUSED HIMSELF FOR TROUBLING THE PRIME MINISTER WITH HIS PROBLEMS AT A TIME WHEN SHE HAD SO MANY PREOCCUPATIONS OF HER OWN, SAID HE NOW FELT IT ESSENTIAL TO PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLANS IMMEDIATELY TO ENABLE JORDAN AND OTHER ARAB STATES TO GO TO THE HELP OF IRAQ SHOULD THIS PROVE NECESSARY.

HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY DISTURBED TO HEAR FROM SULTAN QABOOS OF THE APPARENTLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE THE AMERICANS HAD TAKEN IN DISCUSSION WITH THE EGYPTIANS ABOUT HELP FOR IRAQ, IN WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY HAD URGED THE EGYPTIANS NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ARAB AFFAIRS. HENCE HE HAD FELT IT NECESSARY TO SEND A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

6. THE KING SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH HE STILL AWAITED A REPLY FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK, HE HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM SULTAN QABOOS THAT THE EGYPTIANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION IF NECESSARY SEMICLN THEY HAD OF COURSE ALREADY SENT MUCH DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ AND HAD ALSO, HE BELIEVED, OFFERED TO SEND EGYPTIAN OFFICERS. IT WENT WITHOUT SAYING THAT, IF THE EGYPTIANS WERE TO AGREE TO SENT TROOPS TO ASSIST IRAQ, THEY MUST BE FULLY READMITTED INTO ARAB RANKS. THEIR FORCES WOULD HAVE TO PASS THROUGH SAUDI ARABIA OR JORDAN, OR PERHAPS BOTH SEMICLN JORDAN WOULD NATURALLY GIVE EVERY ASSISTANCE. INDEED IF EGYPT WERE WILLING TO SEND TWO DIVISIONS, THE KING ENVISAGED THAT ONE EGYPTIAN DIVISION MIGHT STAY IN JORDAN RELEASING ONE JORDANIAN DIVISION TO GO TO IRAQ. IRANIAN ENTRY INTO IRAQ WOULD IN ANY CASE BRING INTO FORCE THE ARAB JOINT DEFENCE TREATY AND WOULD, THE KING THOUGHT, MAKE THE POSITION OF SYRIA AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES HELPING IRAN IMPOSSIBLE TO JUSTIFY.

7. I ASKED THE KING WHETHER HE FELT HE COULD AFFORD TO SPARE TROOPS TO HELP IRAQ, GIVEN THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO JORDAN FROM BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA. THE KING REPLIED THAT THIS WAS WHY HE HAD ASKED PRESIDENT REAGAN TO ''KEEP ISRAEL OFF OUR BACKS,'' ESPECIALLY IF JORDANIAN INTERVENTION IN IRAQ WERE TO LEAD TO A DIRECT THREAT TO JORDAN FROM SYRIA. HE JUST HOPED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD REALISE WHAT WAS AT STAKE.

8. THE KING SAID HE HAD SPOKEN VERY CLEARLY TO PRINCE TURKI DURING HIS RECENT VISIT OF THE DANGERS AHEAD AND OF THE NEED FOR THE ARABS TO POOL THEIR RESOURCES IN ORDER TO MEET THE THREAT FROM IRAN BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE: ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE MUST BE EXTENDED TO EGYPT IN ORDER TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR HER TO COME TO THE HELP OF IRAQ, IF AN IRAQI COLLAPSE WAS TO BE AVOIDED. HE SAID HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY RESPONSE FROM THE SAUDIS.

COMMENT

9. THE KING'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN IS, EVEN BY THE STANDARDS OF THESE COMMUNICATIONS, EXCEPTIONALLY LONG-WINDED. THE ARGUMENT IS ON FAMILIAR JORDANIAN LINES AND, ACCORDING TO THE US AMBASSADOR WITH WHOM I HAVE SINCE COMPARED NOTES, IS UNLIKELY TO CARRY MUCH CONVICTION WITH THE AMERICANS. AMBASSADOR VIETS TOLD ME HE HAD PUT FORCIBLY TO THE KING THE US VIEW THAT ANY TILT BY THE AMERICANS TOWARDS IRAQ WOULD PUSH IRAN INTO THE ARMS OF THE SOVIET UNION.

/ 10. ACCORDING

10. ACCORDING TO VIETS, THE KING IS EXAGGERATING EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO INTERVENE SEMICLN THE US EMBASSY IN CAIRO APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT, AT THE VERY MOST, PRESIDENT MUBARAK WILL COMMIT ONLY TOKEN FORCES. VIETS TRIED HARD TO PIN DOWN THE KING ON WHETHER HE WOULD SEND REGULAR FORCES TO IRAQ: THE KING HAD REPLIED THAT, IF EGYPT SENT TROOPS, JORDANIAN FORCES WOULD BE AT THEIR SIDE. VIETS SUGGESTED TO THE KING THAT RENEWED EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO TRY TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS, BUT THE KING HAD ARGUED UNCONVINCINGLY THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT TIME TO BRING THE SECURITY COUNCIL INTO PLAY.

11. THE KING MENTIONED TO VIETS THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE BAHRAINI CROWN PRINCE SAYING THAT SENTENCE WOULD BE PASSED ON THE COUP PLOTTERS ON 20 MAY AND OF BAHRAINI CONCERN THAT THERE WOULD BE A RENEWED IRANIAN ATTEMPT TO SUBVERT THE REGIME: THE KING HAD PROMISED TO SEND UP TO A BRIGADE TO HELP BAHRAIN IF THIS WERE NECESSARY.

12. WHATEVER ONE MAKES OF ALL THIS, THERE WAS NO MISTAKING THE ALARMIST VIEW THE KING NOW TAKES OF THE COURSE OF THE WAR AND HIS FEAR THAT, IF IRAQ COLLAPSES, OTHER REGIMES IN THE GULF WILL ALSO FALL. THE FULL CONSEQUENCES OF THE RISKS HE HAS RUN BY IDENTIFYINGL JORDAN SO CLOSELY WITH IRAQ ARE BEGINNING TO SINK IN, AND HE SEEMS TO BE SEARCHING DESPERATELY FOR SOME WAY OF AVERTING THE DOWNFALL OF PRESIDENT SADDAM.

13. THE KING CLEARLY WANTS TO KEEP US CLOSELY INFORMED OF HIS THINKING, BUT HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS EXPECTING ANY HELP FROM US AT THIS STAGE.

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FM AMMAN 200700Z MAY 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 207 OF 19 MAY
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD AND WASHINGTON

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T 108c/82

MY TELNO 206: IRAQ/IRAN
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF
MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN DATED 18 MAY

BEGINS:

DEAR PRIME MINISTER
I EXTEND TO YOU MY SINCEREST GOOD WISHES AND SHARE WITH YOU YOUR CONCERNS RELATING TO THE FALKLAND CRISIS. PLEASE REST ASSURED OF OUR TOTAL SUPPORT OF YOUR POSITION.
I WOULD NOT WISH TO ADD TO YOUR PRESENT PREOCCUPATIONS BUT IN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP AND CONFIDENCE I FEEL I MUST APPRAISE YOU OF DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR AREA.
ENCLOSED IS THE COPY OF A MESSAGE I HAVE SENT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN OUR AREA.
KINDLY ACCEPT WITH MY HIGHEST ESTEEM MY BEST WISHES FOR EVERY FUTURE SUCCESS.

YOUR SINCERE FRIEND
HUSSEIN

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IRAQ/IRAN

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GRS 2500
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FM AMMAN 202710Z MAY 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 208 OF 19 MAY
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD AND WASHINGTON

MY TELS NOS 206 AND 207: IRAQ/IRAN
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM KING HUSSEIN DATED 18 MAY

BEGINS

BOTH NOOR AND I EXTEND TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT AND TO MRS. REAGAN, OUR WARMEST GREETINGS AND BEST PERSONAL WISHES.

THIS IS, INDEED, AN AWESOME AND EXTREMELY VOLATILE PHASE IN THE HISTORY OF OUR AREA. THE THREATS OF FRAGMENTATION AND DEVASTATING SECTARIAN STRUGGLES AMONGST MOSLEMS AND ARABS IN PARTICULAR, ARE EXTREMELY REAL AS IS THE THREAT TO THE ARAB IDENTITY, FREEDOM, AND FUTURE. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE VITAL INTERESTS OF SO MANY NATIONS IN THE WORLD ARE IN JEOPARDY INCLUDING JAPAN, EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND MANY OTHERS BOTH IN THE DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING WORLD. IN FACT, MR. PRESIDENT, AN ALWAYS DREADED STATE OF MILITARY CONFLICT MAY SHORTLY EMBROIL JORDAN. I WISH I COULD REPORT TO YOU OTHERWISE, BUT DEEM IT MY DUTY TO APPRAISE YOU OF THE FACTS.

THE FOCAL POINT OF DANGER IS THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR WHICH HAS RAGED FOR THE PAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS. THE TRAGEDY IS THAT IT HAS CONTINUED WITHOUT ANY SERIOUS AND DETERMINED EFFORT TO STOP IT IN TIME. IRAQ HAS NEVER HAD ANY TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVES IN IRAN. IRAQ WAS INTERNALLY SUBVERTED AND MILITARILY PROVOKED INTO WAR FOR HER LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE. IRAQ'S PROBLEMS BEGAN WHEN IT ASSUMED A DEFENSIVE POSTURE WHILE AWAITING NEGOTIATIONS TO REMOVE ONCE AND FOR ALL THE CAUSES FOR THE WAR BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BY CONCLUSIVE DEFINITION OF THEIR BORDERS ON THE BASIS OF RESPECT FOR HISTORICAL LEGITIMATE RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND SECURITY. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE IDEAL MOMENT TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND ALL HER ARAB NEIGHBORS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES AND TO BASE RELATIONS FOR ALL TIMES TO COME ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SOVEREIGN STATES. NONE OF THIS HAPPENED AND SUPPORT OF IRAN ENABLED HER TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE IN A SERIES OF BATTLES - ABADAN, BOSTAN, DEZFUL, AND NOW IRAQ IS DETERMINED TO FIGHT REGARDLESS OF COST, THE SEEMINGLY UNTENABLE BATTLE TO RETAIN KHORRAMSHAHR, THE ONLY REMAINING ASSET IT HOLDS IN IRAN, TO SECURE AN HONORABLE PEACE AND THE OBJECTIVES I OUTLINED BEFORE THE BATTLE BEGINS ON IRAQ SOIL.

THE PROBLEM LIES IN THE FACT THAT IRAN HAS BEEN SOUGHT OUT WITTINGLY OR UNWITTINGLY BY BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS THE PRIME PRIZE TO BE WON. IT IS A KNOWN FACT, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT IRAN HAS BEEN RAPIDLY RUNNING OUT OF OIL RESERVES. I KNOW OF THE PREVIOUS REGIME'S CONCERTED EFFORTS TO SECURE ECONOMIC PROGRESS BEFORE THAT EVENTUALITY MATERIALIZED AND THE FORMER REGIME'S EFFORTS IN SEARCHING FOR AND ATTEMPTING TO HARNESS ALTERNATE SOURCES OF ENERGY, INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR ONE, FOR PRECISELY THAT REASON. IRAN'S INTEREST IN OIL BELONGING TO HER NEIGHBORING STATES IS NOW OBVIOUS. IRAN'S METHOD OF SECURING IT IS BY WAR, THE THREAT OF WAR, AND BY INCITING SECTARIAN CONFLICT WITHIN THE AREA. I WARNED OF THIS ALL ALONG. IT IS THE REALITY OF THESE THREATS THAT CAUSED JORDAN AMONGST OTHER PAN-ARAB AND NATIONAL COMMITMENTS TO SUPPORT IRAQ. IRAQ TO US HAS BEEN THE ARAB BULWARK AGAINST THESE THREATS AND THE FIRST SOLID LINE OF DEFENCE EASTWARDS FOR THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD. IRONICALLY ENOUGH, THIS APPLIED EQUALLY TO OUR MANY MUTUAL INTERESTS.

MAY I SHARE WITH YOU, MR PRESIDENT, MY PERSPECTIVE OF THE OVERALL SOVIET POSITION IN THE AREA? THE SOVIET ASSETS IN IRAN HAVE GROWN RATHER THAN DIMINISHED. THE SOVIETS ARE IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS HAVE THEIR THIRD LONGEST BORDER WITH IRAN. THE SOVIETS ARE THE MOST LOGICAL INHERITORS OF THE PRESENT REGIME IN IRAN WHICH IS AN ANACHRONISM AND AN INSULT TO HUMAN RIGHTS, DIGNITY, AND THE TRUE TEACHINGS OF ISLAM. IRAN IS RIDING ON A TIDAL WAVE OF IGNORANCE, BITTERNESS, HATRED AND GREED WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONTAINED BY OUR COMBINED EFFORTS, IF NOT TOTALLY ISOLATED. IRAQ CHECKED IT AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO TO THE BEST OF ITS ABILITY SEMICLN BUT WITH FRESH AND CONTINUOUS SUPPORT THE IRANIAN TIDE MAY CAUSE UNTOLD DAMAGE BEFORE IT INEVITABLY EBBS. EVEN IF THE REMOTEST POSSIBILITY EXISTED IN TURNING THE TIDE IN ARAN TOWARDS FREEDOM, LIFE, AND PROGRESS, THIS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CAUSE OR REASON TO NEGLECT SHORING UP IRAQ AND THE REST OF THE AREA IN THE FACE OF OBVIOUS SOVIET DESIGNS. THE SOVIETS, IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY, ARE IN SYRIA, SOUTH YEMEN, ETHIOPIA, AND LIBYA. ALIGNED WITH THE ARAB STATES IN THIS GROUP SADLY IS ALGERIA. WITHIN THIS GROUP ARE ALL THE RADICAL ELEMENTS IN THE ENTIRE AREA. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN AND ARE FOSTERING THE CREATION OF AN AUTONOMOUS KURDISH STATE WITH DIRECT LAND CONTACT WITH SOVIET TERRITORY. THE HURMUZ STRAITS ARE IN GRAVE JEOPARDY. SOVIET SURROGATE STATES STRADDLE BAB EL MANDAB. THE ENTIRE AREA IS VITAL TO THE SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. IT IS THEIR WAY TO AFRICA AND OFFERS GREATER FRONTAGE ON THE MEDITERRANEAN. IT IS ONE OF THE MOST VITAL COMMUNICATIONS CROSSROADS IN OUR WORLD. IT IS A PRIMARY SOURCE OF ENERGY, THE CONTROL OF WHICH IS VITAL IN SHAPING THE WORLD'S DESTINY. INSTABILITY IN THIS AREA IS INSTABILITY IN THE WORLD, BOTH AT THE LEVEL OF THE DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS. THE PRIMARY BENEFICIARY OF SUCH INSTABILITY WOULD ONLY BE COMMUNISM AND THE SOVIET UNION. I KNOW WHAT A DEVASTATING SHOCK IT WAS TO THE

SOVIETS TO HAVE LOST EGYPT. I KNOW THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY POURED INTO SO MANY STATES IN OUR AREA AND IN SUCH ABUNDANCE THE MOST SOPHISTICATED OF THEIR WEAPONRY IF THEY WERE NOT SURE THAT IT WOULD BE IN SAFE AND LOYAL HANDS. THE SOVIETS WOULD NEVER RISK A REPEAT OF THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH EGYPT IN ANY OTHER STATE. NOR ARE THESE WEAPONS TO BE USED FOR ISRAEL'S DESTRUCTION SINCE AN ARAB-ISRAELI UNRESOLVED CONFLICT IS TO THE ADVANTAGE OF SOVIET STRATEGY. THE SOVIETS HAVE NEVER ONCE HINTED AT ANY POSSIBLE CHANGE OF THEIR UNEQUIVOCAL AND TOTAL COMMITMENT TO THE SURVIVAL AND SECURITY OF ISRAEL FOR ALL TIMES. THE SOVIETS HAVE CLAIMED ALL ALONG THEIR COMMITMENT TO A SOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM HASED ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND 338 IN ADDITION TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION INCLUDING THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE STIPULATED IN THE U.N. PARTITION PLAN OF 1947 BASED ON WHICH ISRAEL WAS CREATED. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALSO INCORPORATED INTO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, IN ADDITION TO THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND 338, REFERENCES TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

SOVIET ARMS ARE THUS IN THE HANDS OF SURROGATES WHO WOULD USE THEM IN OUR AREA PRIMARILY TO FURTHER SOVIET AIMS. IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO VISUALIZE SOVIET OR AMERICAN TROOPS APPEARING IN THE AREA, IN WHAT MAY WELL CREATE THE FLASHPOINT OF A DEVASTATING WORLD WAR. IT IS OBVIOUS TO ME HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS WITH LONG-RANGE DYNAMIC PLANNING AND THROUGH THEIR AVAILABLE ASSETS WITHIN THE AREA, ARE CONTINUALLY GAINING GROUND IN A MOST OMINOUS WAY.

LET US LOOK AGAIN AT IRAN AND WE WILL FIND IN SUPPORT OF MY THEORY OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET INDIRECT COOPERATION THERE, THE FACT THAT SYRIA, LIBYA, AND THEIR COLLABORATORS IN THE AREA, ARE SUPPORTING IRAN, WITHOUT LIMITATIONS, WITH SOVIET WEAPONRY AND EXPERTISE. NORTH KOREAN AND OTHER EASTERN BLOCK COUNTRIES, IF NOT THE SOVIETS DIRECTLY, ARE ALSO ON THE IRANIAN SIDE. OTHER FREE WORLD SOURCES ARE AVAILABLE TO IRAN TOGETHER WITH ISRAEL WHICH HAS BEEN SUPPLYING AMMUNITION, VITAL SPARE PARTS, AND EQUIPMENT ON THE ONE HAND. ON THE OTHER HAND, ISRAEL IS OBVIOUSLY USING ITS INFLUENCE IN THE UNITED STATES TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF ITS SUPPORT TO IRAN AND OBVIOUSLY TO CONVINCE WASHINGTON THAT IRAQ SHOULD NOT BE HELPED AND THAT JORDAN SHOULD NOT BE MILITARILY EQUIPPED. ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE IN REJECTING ALL THE BASIC PRINCIPLES, THE ACCEPTANCE OF WHICH WOULD FACILITATE RAPID PROGRESS TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AJUST, DURABLE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE, IS CONTINUOUSLY CAMOUFLAGED AND THUS MAINLY ACCEPTED, DEFENDED OR TOLERATED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS ARE MOST ISRAELI ACTIONS. HOW STRANGE, SIR, IT WAS TO BE ASKED OF JORDAN WOULD SUPPORT THE BRITISH RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLANDS AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHEN WE HAVE BEEN CALLING FOR THE UPHOLDING OF THE TWO PRINCIPLES INVOLVED FOR SO MANY YEARS, NAMELY THE INADMISSABILITY OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BY FORCE AND THE

SACRED RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. WOULD THE FALKLAND CRISIS HAVE ARISEN HAD THOSE PRINCIPLES BEEN APPLIED IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONTEXT SINCE NOVEMBER OF 1967? WE ARE NOW APPRAISED OF THE IMMINENT DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES' GOVERNMENT TO REENACT THE AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL. WAS I, SIR, NOT CORRECT ALL ALONG WHEN I WARNED OF POLARIZATION IN THE AREA AS AN ISRAELI PRIME OBJECTIVE? IS IT THEN SURPRISING THAT ISRAEL SHOULD SUPPORT IRAN IN HER WAR AGAINST THE ARAB NATION ALONGSIDE SUCH SEEMINGLY STRANGE COMPANY, OR FOR US TO CONCLUDE THAT AT LEAST UNWITTINGLY, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS HELPING THE SOVIETS, AGAINST YOUR BEST INTERESTS IN THE IRANIAN SITUATION?

MR. PRESIDENT, BEFORE LONG I FORESEE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN IRANIAN MILITARY PENETRATION INTO IRAQ. IRAN'S AND SYRIA'S ANNOUNCED OBJECTIVE IS TO TOPPLE THE REGIME IN BAHGDAD. IT IS IS OBVIOUS THAT WHAT IS SOUGHT TO REPLACE IT IS A REGIME THAT IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE IRANIAN SYRIAN ALLIANCE. IRAN AND HER ALLIES WOULD THUS SOON THREATEN THE ENTIRE NON-RADICAL ARAB AREA EAST OF SUEZ.

I ADDRESS YOU NOW, SIR, TO APPRAISE YOU OF THE ONLY TWO CHOICES OPEN TO US. THEY ARE: A) TO DESPATCH FORCES TO IRAQ TO ASSIST, IF POSSIBLE, TO AVERT POSSIBLE DISASTER. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED THE MOMENT IT APPEARS THAT IRANIAN FORCES ARE THREATENING TO MOVE INTO IRAQ. WE WOULD BE RISKING AT SUCH A POINT JORDAN'S EXPOSURE TO A DIRECT SYRIAN MILITARY THREAT WITH REDUCED JORDANIAN CAPABILITIES SEMICLN OR B) TO BE PREPARED TO INTERVENE MILITARILY AGAINST SYRIA IF IT MOVES MILITARILY AGAINST IRAQ. THE FACT IS THAT IF IRAQ FALLS, THEN THE ENTIRE AREA IS MORE THAN LIKELY LOST. OUR OPTIONS ARE THUS OBVIOUS AND LIMITED. THE GULF AND SAUDI ARABIA ARE MILITARILY A VACUUM. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR JORDAN, NOR EGYPT, MAY HAVE THE TIME TO REACT ADEQUATELY TO REVERSE THE COURSE OF A SUDDEN DISASTER THAT COULD OVERTAKE ANY STATE IN THE AREA. THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF IRAN AND THE VULNERABILITY OF THESE STATES WOULD PRECLUDE THAT. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY THE CASE IF, HEAVEN FORBID, WE SUFFERED A SERIOUS REVERSE IN IRAQ.

I BELIEVE THAT EGYPTIANS AND JORDANIANS SHOULD IDEALLY AND URGENTLY DEVELOP AND COMPLETE CONTINGENCY PLANS WILL ALL CONCERNED, LEADING TO POSSIBLE JOINT PREPOSITIONING OF TROOPS IN THREATENED AREAS. HENCE I HAVE INTENSIFIED MY EFFORTS WITH EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQ, THE GULF STATES, AND OMAN, THAT ALL LIKE-MINDED ARABS COME TOGETHER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ANTICIPATE ALL POSSIBILITIES AND TO BE IN A POSITION ALSO TO REACT ADEQUATELY TO ANY IRANIAN MOVE INTO IRAQ. UNDER NO CONDITIONS MUST WE PERMIT WEAKNESS TO LEAD TO A SUNNI-SHI ITE SECTARIAN CONFLICT WITHIN THE AREA - AN INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF A REVERSAL. WE FEEL WE MUST BE IN A POSITION TO INVOKE THE CHARTER OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE ARAB JOINT DEFENCE TREATY. I FEEL THAT THOSE AMONGST US WITH MATERIAL

MEANS SHOULD USE SOME OF THEM TO SAVE THE ARAB FUTURE RATHER THAN SUCCUMB TO BLACKMAIL AND FINANCE THEIR OWN DOWNFALL.

SIR, I BELIEVE THAT IF THINGS GO BADLY THE UNITED STATES WOULD INEVITABLY LOSE ALL IN THIS AREA. PEACE IN THE WORLD WOULD BE IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY AND ODDLY ENOUGHT, I BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL WOULD INEVITABLY ALSO LOSE. I AM TRYING, SIR, TO COPE TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITIES WITH REALITIES AND EVENTS. I HOPE THAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF ALL THE THREATS, AND ACTIVE COOPERATION, WILL HELP US AVERT DISASTER AND GAIN THE INITIATIVE AT LEAST ONCE, WHEN THERE IS SO MUCH AT STAKE.

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIVING YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 23RD, 1982, CARRIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WEST. ACCORDING TO YOUR WISHES WE REFRAINED FROM PRESENTING AN OFFICIAL REQUEST FOR AN F.16 F.5G MIX AND THE MOBILE ADVANCED HAWK. THE ISRAELI LOBBY IN WASHINGTON SEEMS, HOWEVER, TO BE SPARING NO EFFORT IN CAMPAIGNING AGAINST POSSIBLE FUTURE SALES TO JORDAN. HAVING NOT PRESENTED AN OFFICIAL REQUEST WE ARE IRONICALLY, HELPLESS TO REFUTE THEIR ARGUMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON A SUBJECT THAT FOR ALL PURPOSES DOES NOT EXIST. THE JMC MEETINGS WERE UNFORTUNATELY, AND IN MY CANDID OPINION, NON-PRODUCTIVE, IF NOT DISASTEROUS. THIS IS CERTAINLY TRUE IF YOU CONSIDER THE SIZE OF THE CHALLENGE WE FACE NOW AND THE IMMEDIATE URGENT GLARING INADEQUACIES WE SUFFER FROM. THE UNITED STATES' GOVERNMENT KNOWS WHAT WE POSSESS AND LACK IN ANY EVENT.

IN ALL OF THIS I CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THE UNITED STATES' GOVERNMENT MAY SERIOUSLY CONSIDER AND SUCCEED IN KEEPING ISRAEL OFF OUR BACKS WHILE WE FACE OUR DESTINY - WHATEVER IT BE.

FINALLY, I HOPE THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE MAY REALIZE AS I KNOW YOU DO, SIR, THAT WE ARE STILL YOUR FCIENDS AND COULD NOT BE OTHERWISE, REGARDLESS OF THE PRICE WE HAVE HAD TO AND MAY HAVE TO PAY FOR OUR FRIENDSHIP AND COMMUNALITY OF UNTARNISHED BELIEFS AND PRINCIPLES. IN ANY EVENT, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT COME WHAT MAY, WE ARE STOUT OF HEART. GOD HELP US ALL AND GUIDE OUR STEPS.

WITH MY HIGHEST ESTEEM AND BEST REGARDS.

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FM ALGIERS 301310Z DECEMBER 81
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 327 OF 30 DECEMBER
FOR INFO ROUTINE TO BAGHDAD WASHINGTON NEW YORK
SAVING FOR INFO TO BIS TEHRAN

IRAQ/IRAN WAR: ALGERIAN MEDIATION

1. I TACKLED LAKHDAR BRAHIMI (AMBASSADOR AT LARGE AND MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE) ABOUT THIS LAST NIGHT. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE ALGERIANS WERE INDEED CONSIDERING WHETHER TO CHANCE THEIR ARM. FOREIGN MINISTER BENYAHIA WAS PARTICULARLY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE QUESTION.

2. BRAHIMI SAID THAT OPINION WAS ABOUT EQUALLY DIVIDED. SOME, INCLUDING HIMSELF, TOOK THE VIEW THAT THE ALGERIANS SHOULD TRY. OTHERS FELT THAT SINCE IT WAS A HAND THEY COULD ONLY PLAY ONCE, THEY SHOULD WAIT UNTIL THE OMENS WERE MORE PROMISING.

3. BRAHIMI HAD VISITED BAGHDAD RECENTLY AND FOUND THE IRAQIS DESPERATE TO END THE WAR AND READY TO ACCEPT THE MOST MODEST OF IRANIAN FACE-SAVERS. IF KHOMENI WERE OUT OF THE WAY, BRAHIMI THOUGHT THE IRANIANS WOULD OBLIGE, BUT SO LONG AS THE OLD MAN DOMINATED THE SCENE, THE CHANCES OF A SUCCESSFUL PEACE INITIATIVE WERE SLIM.

4. STOCKHOLM'S LETTER. I SHOULD PREFER TO PASS THIS TO MY SWEDISH COLLEAGUE HERE, WITHOUT NAMING MY SOURCE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BIS TEHRAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FM BAGHDAD 151105Z DEC 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 766 OF 15/12/81
AND TO PRIORITY MODUK (FOR DI4): AND PRIORITY TEHRAN.
INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, JEDDA, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON, STOCKHOLM, DAMASCUS.
INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO, ANKARA, BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK AND TEL AVIV.

SIC

TEHRAN TEL NO 634 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN

1. ACCORDING TO IRAQI COMMUNIQUES, THE LATEST BATTLE WHICH BEGAN WITH AN IRANIAN ATTACK IN THE GILAN GHARB AND SAR POLE-ZOHAB (CENTRAL) SECTOR AT DAWN ON 11 DECEMBER HAS NOW ENTERED ITS FIFTH DAY. FIERCE FIGHTING IS SAID TO BE CONTINUING, WITH THE IRAQIS CLAIMING TO HAVE MOUNTED SUCCESSFUL COUNTER-ATTACKS IN WHICH 1,150 IRANIANS WERE KILLED IN THE PERIOD 11-13 DECEMBER AND A FURTHER 1,600 ON 14 DECEMBER, FOR THE LOSS OF A GRAND TOTAL SO FAR OF 133 IRAQIS.

2. ALTHOUGH THE FIGURES FOR IRANIAN CASUALTIES ARE PROBABLY EXAGGERATED, THE VIEW HERE, BASED ON THE TONE OF THE IRAQI COMMUNIQUES AND SOME CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, INCLUDING THE APPEARANCE OF IRANIAN POWS SAID TO HAVE BEEN CAPTURED IN THE GILAN GHARB AREA ON IRAQI TV, IS THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE, ON THIS OCCASION, MET WITH SOME SUCCESS, PERHAPS BECAUSE THEIR DEFENSIVE POSITIONS IN THIS HILLY REGION ARE MUCH STRONGER THAN THOSE IN THE RELATIVELY OPEN TERRAIN FURTHER SOUTH.

3. THERE HAS INEVITABLY BEEN SOME SPECULATION ABOUT WHY THE IRANIANS HAVE SWITCHED THEIR ATTACK FROM BOSTAN TO THE RELATIVELY WELL DEFENDED GILAN GHARB AREA. ONE POSSIBILITY BEING CANVASSED HERE IS THAT THE IRANIANS WISH TO PREVENT THE IRAQIS TRANSFERRING TROOPS FURTHER SOUTH TO REINFORCE ANY COUNTERATTACK ON THE SALIENT WHICH THE IRANIANS OPENED UP IN THE IRAQI LINES AROUND BOSTAN EARLIER THIS MONTH.

4. IRAQI COMMUNIQUES HAVE NOT MENTIONED ANY AIR RAIDS ON IRANIAN TOWNS, ALTHOUGH THEY REPORT CONSTANT SORTIES AGANIST BATTLEFIELD TARGETS. THE IRAQIS REPORT AN IRANIAN AIR RAID ON BASRA ON 14 DECEMBER. TWO F14S ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN SHOT DOWN IN A DOG-FIGHT OVER GILAN GHARB FOR THE LOSS OF ONE IRAQI PLANE ON 12 DECEMBER.

5. THE IRAQIS HAVE AT LAST PUBLICLY ADMITTED THE LOSS OF BOSTAN BUT CLAIM THAT THIS, AND THE CAPTURE OF A 2 KM SECTION OF AN 11 KM IRAQI HELD CORRIDOR AT SHAIB, NEAR BOSTAN, WERE THE ONLY IRANIAN SUCCESSES DURING THE 29 NOVEMBER TO 5 DECEMBER BATTLE, GAINED AT THE VAST COST OF MEN AND MATERIAL DETAILED IN MY TEL NO 759.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSES.

EGERTON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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FM BRIT INT SECT TEHRAN 070730Z DEC 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 619 OF 7 DECEMBER 81

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DI4), BAGHDAD

INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, AMMAN, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW.

INFO SAVING STOCKHOLM, ABU DHABI, UKDEL NATO, DAMASCUS, PARIS.

MY TELNO 612 (NOT TO ALL) : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. IRANIAN CASUALTIES IN THE BOSTAN OFFENSIVE ARE ESTIMATED HERE TO HAVE BEEN MORE THAN TWICE THE IRAQIS. HOSPITALS IN SHIRAZ, AHWAZ AND EVEN TEHRAN ARE FULL OF WAR-WOUNDED. BUT THIS WILL HAVE NO SIGNIFICANTLY ADVERSE EFFECT ON IRANIAN MORALE.

2. THE OFFENSIVE MAY HAVE BEEN TIMED PARTLY TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE WINTER RAINS, OIT LSO AS A RIPOSTE TO SADDAM'S SPEECH OF 23 NOVEMBER (BAGHDAD TELNO 725). THE CODE-NAME USED WAS ''THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM'', CONTRASTING IRAN'S MILITARY ACTIVITY WITH THE PASSIVITY OF THE FAHD PLAN DISCUSSED AT THE FEZ CONFERENCE. ACCORDING TO MILITARY ATTACHES HERE, IRAN HAD BEEN MOBILISING MORE MEN DURING THE LAST MONTH.

3. THE CHIEF OF JOINT STAFF, GENERAL ZAHIR-NEZHAD, HAS STRESSED IN AN INTERVIEW THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING CUT IRAQ'S LOGISTICAL ROUTE FROM AMAREH THROUGH BOSTAN TO SOUTHERN KHUZESTAN.

4. DOCUMENTARY FILM EVIDENCE HERE SHOWS BOTH THE COMMANDER OF THE GROUND FORCES, COLONEL SHIRAZI, AND THE HEAD OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, REZAI, AS HAVING BEEN AT OR NEAR THE FRONT WHEN THE OFFENSIVE BEGAN. IT IS HOWEVER RUMOURED THAT THERE IS BAD BLOOD BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS BECAUSE THE LATTER WERE GIVEN THE MAJOR ROLE. THE PRIME MINISTER, MOUSSAVI, HAS MADE A TOUR OF THE FRONT. IN AN INTERVIEW AFTERWARDS HE SAID THAT IF IRAQ CONTIMUED TO RESIST IRAN MIGHT HAVE TO CONTINUE THE ATTACK INTO IRAQI TERRITORY. THIS IS NOT TO BE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY, BUT IS INDICATIVE OF THE IRANIAN MOOD.

5. IRANIAN CLAIMS TO HAVE DOWNED 18 IRAQI AIRCRAFT SINCE 29 NOVEMBER ARE LIKELY TO BE FALSE, BUT NOT THE CLAIM TO HAVE SHOT DOWN A MIRAGE NEAR AHWAZ ON 3 DECEMBER AND CAPTURED THE PILOT, WHO IS NOW IN A TEHRAN HOSPITAL. HE HAS REPORTEDLY SAID THAT FRENCH TECHNICIANS ARE TRAINING IRAQI PILOTS IN IRAQ.

6. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THE OFFENSIVE WILL HAVE BROUGHT AN END TO THE WAR NO NEARER. THE IRANIANS CAN BE EXPECTED TO DIG IN FOR THE WINTER IF THE IRAQIS DO NOT MOUNT A SUCCESSFUL COUNTER ATTACK SOON. BADLY SHORT OF SERVICEABLE EQUIPMENT (THOUGH THEY MAY HAVE CAPTURED A LOT MORE FROM THE IRAQIS), THEY NEVERTHELESS SEEM COMMITTED TO FIGHTING ON WITH THEIR SUPERIOR MANPOWER.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

RUNDLE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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16 November 1981

Gulf Patrol

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of your letter to me of 12 November on this subject.

I am sending copies of this letter to Francis Richards (FCO), John Rhodes (Department of Trade) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

J. D. S. Dawson, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/9/4/2

12th November 1981

Dear Michael,

GULF PATROL

Thank you for your letter of 6th November.

We have not so far briefed the Sultan of Oman, though the FCO intends to issue guidance to Gulf posts on the change of notice for the ships on Patrol and to invite posts to brief host governments. The Defence Secretary shares the Prime Minister's views on the importance of carrying the Omanis with us, not least because of the considerable, if essentially discreet, support which they have provided to the Royal Navy in the conduct of the Patrol. He does not envisage that the change of notice will prompt any adverse reaction from the Sultan. We shall emphasise to the Omanis that we are retaining the flexibility to resume a constant patrol in the Straits of Hormuz area should this be necessary and that, whilst the Patrol would be placed at a maximum of 7 days' notice, for much of the time ships will be at shorter notice and will continue to deploy regularly in waters off the coast of Oman. We will also make it clear to Oman that ships on Patrol will continue to provide sea training for officers of the Sultan of Oman's Navy, and other training, on an opportunity basis - though the frequency of opportunity will inevitably decline.

You also asked about port visits. On the advice of HMA Muscat, visits to Muscat by ships on Patrol are currently limited to one visit every 6 months or so. This is in deference to Omani sensitivities about not being seen to be too closely associated with the Patrol. Indeed at the outset of the patrol, the Omanis had indicated that, whilst visits for emergency repairs would be acceptable, visits for recreational purposes would not. This earlier attitude has now softened and a very successful ship visit took place in early June. A second visit is not likely before December. Another important

M O'D B Alexander Esq

consideration is that independent recreational facilities in Muscat are almost non-existent, and hospitality for visiting ships' companies falls very heavily on the relatively small British community. We feel that it is not reasonable to over-tax this hospitality, which in June was most generous.

I am copying this letter to Francis Richards (FCO), John Rhodes (DOT), and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Richard Dawson.

(J D S DAWSON)

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 November, 1981.

Gulf Patrol

The Prime Minister has seen the Secretary of State for Defence's minute to her of 3 November on this subject. She has asked about the reaction of the Government of Oman. She has commented that Oman is a good friend of Britain, and that the Sultan is paying a State Visit to this country next year.

I should be grateful if you could let me know whether we have taken steps to brief the Sultan, and whether we have it in mind, for instance, to make regular port visits to the country.

I am sending copies of this letter to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Rhodes (Department of Trade), and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

David Omand, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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PRIME MINISTER

GULF PATROL

As you know, following President Carter's approach to you last year, we have maintained since last October two warships on patrol in the Gulf of Oman. This requires four warships and an average of three Royal Fleet Auxiliaries to be deployed East of Suez for most of the time. The cost of the operation is considerable - over £14m a year. Moreover, so long as ships have been required to remain at immediate notice in the Gulf of Oman it has not been possible to programme them to make visits to ports in the area in support of our general defence and foreign policy objectives.

2. The war between Iran and Iraq has settled down to a stalemate which could drag on indefinitely. We cannot discount the threat of isolated incidents against merchant shipping, particularly given the current internal chaos in Iran, but the threat of general disruption to shipping passing through the southern end of the Gulf, which was very real at the outbreak of the war, seems to have receded.

3. I have therefore agreed to an adjustment in the present pattern of deployment. Ships will in future be put on a maximum of seven days notice to reach the Straits of Hormuz. This will enable us to reduce for much of the time the number of warships required to be East of Suez from four to two (and so the cost of the operation) while at the same time allowing greater flexibility for visits to the Indian Ocean states such as Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka, and possibly also some of the Gulf States.

4. I understand that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is content to support the extension of notice on condition that we retain the flexibility to resume a constant patrol in the Straits of Hormuz should there be a serious deterioration in the Gulf. There is no problem about this. He also attaches, as I do, importance to expanding the political impact of the RN presence by the port visits to neighbouring countries that I hope will now be possible.

5. The US Administration sets great store by the retention of a constant RN presence in the Indian Ocean. This will of course continue. But since the total number will be reduced, I have asked that the Americans (who have themselves recently pulled back a Carrier Battle Group from the immediate vicinity of the Straits of Hormuz) should be alerted to our intentions and this will be done.

6. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Secretary of State for Trade, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence

3rd November 1981



Iraq

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 082305Z OCT 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1009 OF 8 OCTOBER,
INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN BAGHDAD MODUK (D14)
ROUTINE, JEDDA AMMAN KUWAIT AND WASHINGTON.
INFO SAVING TO STOCKHOLM ABU DHABI BAHRAIN DOHA AND MUSCAT.

TEHRAN TEL NO 489: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. WE HAVE HAD AN INDIRECT REPORT ABOUT THE MEETING BETWEEN CHATTY AND MOUSSAVI. ACCORDING TO THIS REPORT MOUSSAVI INDICATED TO CHATTY THAT HE REGARDED THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AS IRAN'S CHOSEN INTERMEDIARY, EXCLUDING BOTH PALME AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND THAT NOW THAT IRAN HAD RETAKEN ABADAN SHE WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER NEGOTIATIONS TO END THE WAR. CHATTY IS SUPPOSED TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. WE ARE FOLLOWING UP THIS REPORT.

2. MEANWHILE YOU MAY LIKE TO HAVE THE FULL TEXT OF MOUSSAVI'S CONDITIONS FOR THE ENDING OF THE WAR. THESE WERE

QUOTE

(1) THE UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL INVADING IRAQI FORCES FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN IRAN.
(2) FINDING THE AGGRESSIVE PARTY AND CONDEMNING IT IN A QUALIFIED INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL.
(3) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1975 ALGIERS TREATY (AT THE CEREMONIES OF WHICH THE HAPPY IRAQI PARTY WAS PHOTOGRAPHED EMBRACING THE CRIMINAL SHAH OF IRAN).
(4) PAYMENT OF PROPER COMPENSATIONS BY THE AGGRESSOR.

UNQUOTE

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL.

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

PARSONS

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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Extract from: Record of Conversation, Prime Minister/ Sec General of the United Nations - House of Commons Tuesday, 12 May at 1530hrs. Iraq

Subject file
United Nations
May 79,
Visit of Dr Waldheim

Iraq/Iran

Dr. Waldheim said that no solution was in sight. Both sides, and indeed the world at large, had grown accustomed to the war and neither would contemplate concessions. He had seen Mr. Palme in Geneva the previous day. Mr. Palme would be visiting the area again later in May.

Iraq

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FM BAGHDAD 041025Z MAY 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 236 OF 4 MAY, 1981

INFO ROUTINE TEHRAN UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN STOCKHOLM

SAVING JEDDA WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO MODUK (FOR DI4) NEW DELHI

MY TEL NO 224 AND TEHRAN TELNO 152: IRAQ/IRAN

1. AT A ROUTINE MEETING OF EC REPRESENTATIVES HERE ON 2 MAY, WE COMPARED NOTES ON THE CONTRADICTORY REPORTS ABOUT RECENT FIGHTING IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR OF THE LAND FRONTIER. THE CONSENSUS WAS AS FOLLOWS.

2. AN IRANIAN ATTACK MOUNTED ABOUT 13 APRIL FROM ILAM PROVINCE BY REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND PARATROOPERS, WITH SOME AIR SUPPORT, HAD MADE INITIAL GAINS. THE IRANIANS CLAIMED CAPTURE OF A RIDGE INSIDE IRAQ CALLED THE LANOON HEIGHTS (NOT MARKED ON ANY MAPS AVAILABLE TO US). ABOUT 18 APRIL THE OFFENSIVE PETERED OUT AND THE IRAQIS REGAINED CONTROL OF AREAS INSIDE IRAQ. FIGHTING WAS BITTER AND BOTH SIDES SUSTAINED HIGHER THAN USUAL LOSSES.

3. ABOUT 25 APRIL AN IRAQI COUNTER ATTACK BEGAN IN THE SERBIL ZAHAB REGION, EAST OF QASR-I-SHIRIN ON THE KERMANSHAH ROAD, AND ALSO AT GAILAN GHARB ABOUT 10 KILOMETRES FURTHER SOUTH. ARMOUR WAS USED AND SIX IRANIAN VILLAGES CAPTURED, WITH CLAIMS OF HEAVY LOSSES BY IRAN IN MEN AND EQUIPMENT. IRANIAN DEAD WERE PUT AT 1703 OVER 6 DAYS. IRAQI CASUALTIES WERE ADMITTED TO BE 221 OVER THE SAME PERIOD, BUT THIS FIGURE SHOULD BE MULTIPLIED BY ABOUT FIVE. A SMALL NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT ON EACH SIDE WERE SHOT DOWN, AND SOME TANKS KNOCKED OUT.

4. ROCALVE (FRANCE) SAID THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS BITTER BUT LOCALISED FIGHTING WAS THAT IT MARKED THE COLLAPSE OF THE IRANIAN SPRING OFFENSIVE FOR WHICH THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN WAITING SO ANXIOUSLY IN MID-APRIL. HIS PEOPLE WHO HAD VISITED THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE HERE DURING THE SERBIL ZAHAB COUNTER-ATTACK HAD FOUND THE IRAQIS SUPREMELY CONFIDENT ABOUT ITS OUTCOME. NOW THEY WERE WAITING FOR THE TERRAIN IN KHUZISTAN TO DRY OUT. BUT IT WAS NO (NO) LONGER EXPECTED THAT THERE WOULD BE A BIG IRAQI PUSH THERE BETWEEN MID-MAY AND MID-JUNE, WHICH MARKED THE END OF THE SPRING FIGHTING SEASON.

5. MORALE. JOHNS (DENMARK) ASKED WHAT EFFECT WAS DISCERNIBLE ON CIVILIAN MORALE IN BAGHDAD AND ELSEWHERE AS A RESULT OF THESE CLASHES. I SAID THAT THE GENERAL FEELING SEEMED TO BE CONCERN

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AT THE NUMBER OF ADMITTED IRAQI CASUALTIES. YET ANOTHER RECENT DECREE ANNOUNCING INCREASED BENEFITS IN CASH AND IN KIND FOR THE FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED IN ACTION SHOWED THAT THE AUTHORITIES WERE AWARE OF THIS CONCERN. WHILE THE IRAQI PROPAGANDA MACHINE WAS MAKING THE MOST OF THE VICTORY AT SERBIL ZAHAB (WHICH PRESIDENT HUSSAIN IS NOW REPORTED TO HAVE VISITED, ETC.) THE INCIDENTS THERE AND AT THE LANOON HEIGHTS COULD BE SEEN AS PART OF THE PROCESS IN WHICH BOTH SIDES WEAKENED EACH OTHER, THEREBY BRINGING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT NEARER. NOBODY HAD A DATE FOR PALME'S NEXT VISIT, THOUGH THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND NAM CONCILIATION EFFORTS REMAINED IN ORBIT.

6. ALL AGREED THAT IT WOULD TAKE A LITTLE LONGER FOR THE FULL SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE RECENT CLASHES TO BECOME APPARENT. WE ARE HAMPERED BY THE FACT THAT NO JOURNALISTS OR DEFENCE ATTACHES HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO VISIT ANY OF THE FRONTS RECENTLY.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

Extracts from Plenary mtg P.M./Gandhi New Delhi 15.4.83 Filed in India Pt I: Visit Policy.

At Mrs. Gandhi's request, Mr. Rao gave an account of the recent visit by three Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers and the Head of the PLO Political Department to Iran and Iraq. The Group had been asked by the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers to try to bring about peace between the two countries. In Iran, Mr. Rao said the Group had visited areas close to the righting. They had been to Dezful and Ahwaz, where there had been intermittent shelling. The purpose of the mission had been to listen to both sides and not to put forward concrete proposals. Mr. Rao noted that, following the failure of the Islamic Conference initiative, to get both sides to accept its proposals, the Non-Aligned Group had felt it more appropriate to try to understand the positions of both sides before making proposals. The Group had been received cordially "and with confidence". In Baghdad it had met Mr. Tariq Aziz and Mr. Izzat Ibrahim who had given them a full account of the Iraqi position. They had spoken of the incessant interference by Iran in Iraq's internal affairs, which had compelled the latter to send their troops in in sheer self-defence. The Iraquis were prepared to have a ceasefire and then negotiate on substantive aspects of the dispute, before withdrawing. The Iranian approach was exactly the opposite. However, the two positions were not as inflexible and diametrically opposed as they might appear. In informal discussion with the two sides, the Non-Aligned Group had found signs of flexibility which needed to be analysed carefully and built on. The Group would meet again in Algiers in two or three days time to compare notes. If issues were identified, on which further discussion with Iran and Iraq was necessary, there would be a second trip to Tehran and Baghdad. In answer to the PrimeMinister's question, Mr. Rao said that there was ground for hope, but a solution would take time. The Prime Minister said that it would be a great achievement if peace was

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brought to the area. It would make a great difference to the world economy and might bring down oil prices. Though Mrs. Gandhi doubted whether these would come down, the Prime Minister pointed out that this had happened and there was pressure even now on the premiums. Mr. Rao said that it was something that the fighting between the two countries had not escalated. The Prime Minister spoke of apprehensions that, if peace initiatives showed no sign of success, this might happen. Mr. Rao said that the Non-Aligned Group hoped that its initiative would reduce this danger. He referred to the efforts of others, including Mr. Palme. The latter was concerned primarily with the Shatt-el-Arab, though he accepted that this issue could not be seen in isolation. He had come to no conclusion about how to resolve it. All the strands of the Iran/Iraq dispute were interdependent.

Returning to the Iran/Iraq conflict, the Prime Minister said it would be a great achievement if the Non-Aligned Group could resolve it. Mrs. Gandhi said that the prestige of the two sides was involved. Mr. Rao added that, though the Non-Aligned Group had the goodwill of both sides, there were no hard issues to get to grips with. When the Prime Minister remarked that the conflict had started over differences about the Shatt-el-Arab, Mr. Rao said that the Iranians had taken the line that there would be no difficulty over resolving substantive issues, once the Iraqis had withdrawn. Sir John Graham asked whether they had insisted on observance of the 1975 agreement. Mr. Rao conceded that the Iranians would want to use that as a basis for discussion, but they were not inflexible about it. Bani Sadr had made it clear that Iran would be flexible on substantive issues. However, Mr. Rao did not rule out the possibility that Iran's position would harden once negotiations started. He said that both sides agreed that there must be a package solution. They accepted that specific aspects of the conflict could not be taken in isolation. Mrs. Gandhi said that the various issues would have to be resolved simultaneously so that neither side would lose face. Mr. Rao explained that when the Iranians said that a ceasefire and withdrawal of troops must take place simultaneously they meant that a decision about both must be taken at the same time and that withdrawal must follow as soon as possible after a ceasefire. Mrs. Gandhi recalled that at the start of the conflict, dignitaries from both sides had visited India and urged the latter to brand their opponents as the aggressors. Mr. Rao commented that both sides could only agree to a fact-finding mission on the understanding that its purpose was to identify the aggressor. It would be better to deal with the issues and leave the allocation of responsibility on one side.

18 April 1981

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 202 OF 13 APRIL, 1981
INFO ROUTINE DELHI JEDDA TEHRAN KUWAIT UKMIS NEW YORK STOCKHOLM
SAVING HAVANA MODUK (FOR DI4) WASHINGTON ISLAMABAD

WOGAN'S TELELETTER OF 9 APRIL TO GRAY: IRAQ/IRAN:

NON-ALIGNED GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE.

1. THE TEAM COMPOSED OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF INDIA, CUBA AND ZAMBIA, AND THE HEAD OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE PLO, DULY ARRIVED HERE ON 8 APRIL.

2. THE PRESS REPORTS THAT THEY WERE RECEIVED BY TARIQ AZIZ, RCC MEMBER AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, AND BY SAADUN HAMMADI, FOREIGN MINISTER, SITTING TOGETHER ON 9 APRIL. LATER THAT DAY THEY WERE SEEN BY IZZAT IBRAHIM, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE RCC.

3. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS IXSAHIM REAFFIRMED IRAQ'S COMMITMENT TO NON-ALIGNED PRINCIPLES AND READINESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE MISSION. IRAN HAD TURNED DOWN IRAQ'S REPEATED OFFERS OF A CEASEFIRE AND WAS THEREFORE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR'S CONTINUATION. HE REAFFIRMED THAT THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WOULD NOT (NOT) WITHDRAW FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY UNTIL IRAQI RIGHTS HAD BEEN SECURED AND A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT REACHED.

4. THE INDIAN EMBASSY, WHOSE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS A MEMBER OF THE MISSION, HAVE TOLD US THAT THE VISITS TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN WAS ESSENTIALLY (NEXT THREE WORDS UNDERLINED) PRISES DE CONTACT DESIGNED TO EXPLORE THE ATTITUDES OF BOTH SIDES. IN BAGHDAD THE MISSION HAD OBTAINED CLARIFICATION OF THE IRAQIS' ATTITUDE ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT, AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE IRAQIS HAD AGAIN CONFIRMED THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN PARA 86 OF THE DELHI NAM FOREIGN MINISTERS' DECLARATION (WETHERELL'S TELELETTER OF 16 FEBRUACY TO WOODS AND PARA 1 (III) OF MY TELELETTER OF 24 MARCH TO MIERS). BUT THEY NOW SAID THAT THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN INSURANCE AGAINST FURTHER IRANIAN INTERFERENCE AND INTERVENTION IN IRAQI INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE IRAQIS WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD TERRITORY UNTIL INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AGAINST SUCH INTERFERENCE COULD BE PROVIDED, AND ADDITIONALLY AS INSURANCE FOR IRANIAN REPARATIONS FOR THE WAR SEMICOLON

(B) THE IRAQIS HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN AN EARLY AND (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) QUICK SETTLEMENT. THEY DID NOT WANT A LONG DRAWN OUT NEGOTIATION SEMICOLON HOWEVER

(C) THEY HAD SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO (NO) WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES UNTIL A NEW FRONTIER (BY IMPLICATION BOTH LAND AND RIVERINE) HAD BEEN DEMARCATED AND INTERNATIONALLY GUARANTEED SEMICOLON

(D) THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSES OF THE WAR AND APPORTION BLAME FOR AGGRESSION SHOULD FORM PART OF THE PROCESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT SEMICOLON

(E) THE IRAQIS HAD STRONGLY EMPHASISED THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE TO IRAQ OF SOVEREIGNTY, INCLUDING FULL NAVIGATION RIGHTS, OVER THE WHOLE SHATT AL-ARAB.

5. THERE HAD BEEN NO (NO) DISCUSSION WITH THE IRAQIS ABOUT TERMS OF A CEASEFIRE.

6. THE INDIAN EMBASSY'S VIEW IS THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CLARIFICATIONS IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE MISSION WILL BE ABLE TO FIND SUFFICIENT COMMON GROUND BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN TO JUSTIFY ANY HOPES FOR A CEASEFIRE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THERE APPEAR TO BE NO (NO) PLANS FOR THE NAM MISSION TO RETURN IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IS SAID, IN ANY CASE, TO HAVE OTHER COMMITMENTS THAT WOULD PRECLUDE HIS PARTICIPATION IN A SECOND VISIT BEFORE THE END OF MAY.

7. COMMENT. THE PROFESSED IRAQI INTEREST IN AN EARLY SETTLEMENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE NAM 'PRINCIPLES' AT PARA 4 (A) AND (B) ABOVE IS CONTROVERTED BY THEIR STATED REFUSAL TO CONSIDER ANY MILITARY WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT HAVI NG ACHIEVED A SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTED SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SHATT AL-ARAB. A VIEW CURRENT HERE IS THAT NEITHER SIDE HAS YET BEEN BADLY ENOUGH HURT BY THE WAR TO HAVE MUCH INTEREST IN A CEASEFIRE ON T ERMS THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABVLE TO THE OTHER. BOTH APPEAR

TO BE WAITING FOR SOMETHING TO TURN UP. IN ANY CASE THIS YEAR THE RAINS HAVE BEEN VERY HEAVY UNTIL RECENTLY, AND THERE IS AT LEAST ANAOTHER MONTH BEFORE THE TERRAIN IN KHUZISTAN DRIES OUT SUFDFICIENTLY FOR MAJOR MOVEMENTS.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES
EGERTON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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INFO SAVING TO MOSCOW

MY TELNO 88 OF 10 MARCH AND BAGHDAD TELNO 144 OF 7 MARCH:
IRAQ/IRAN

1. WHEN SEEING KING HUSSEIN LAST NIGHT I ASKED FOR HIS IMPRESSIONS OF HIS RECENT VISIT TO IRAQ FROM 3-5 MARCH.

2. KING HUSSEIN CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN MUCH IMPRESSED BY THE DAY HE HAD SPENT VISITING IRAQI UNITS IN ONE SECTOR OF THE FRONT AND PARTICULARLY BY THE DIFFICULTIES THEY HAD HAD TO FACE OWING TO THE UNFAVOURABLE TERRAIN. HE WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT THE IRAQIS HAD SO FAR TRIED TO AVOID NEEDLESS MILITARY HUMILIATION OF IRAN, BUT WITH THE RAINY SEASON NOW COMING TO AN END AND WITH NO END TO THE WAR IN SIGHT, HE THOUGHT THE IRAQIS WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE OTHER THAN TO HIT THE IRANIANS REALLY HARD. MORALE IN THE IRAQI UNITS HE HAD VISITED WAS HIGH AND THE IRAQIS SEEMED TO BE COPING WELL WITH THEIR SUPPLY PROBLEMS.

3. THE KING SAID HE HAD FOUND THE IRAQI LEADERS MORE THAN EVER DISSILLUSIONED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE THOUGHT THEY WERE ONLY

3. THE KING SAID HE HAD FOUND THE IRAQI LEADERS MORE THAN EVER DISSILLUSIONED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE THOUGHT THEY WERE ONLY WAITING FOR AN END TO THE FIGHTING TO REVEAL FULLY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD LET THEM DOWN AND THAT, WHEN THEY DID SO, THERE WOULD BE A COMPLETE BREAK AND A FUNDAMENTAL REALIGNMENT OF IRAQI FOREIGN POLICY.

4. THE KING SAID HE HAD BEEN ''FLABBERGASTED'' BY THE INEPTITUDE OF THE ISLAMIC GOODWILL MISSION. THEY HAD VISITED BAGHDAD WHILE HE WAS THERE AND HAD LEFT A LARGE BATCH OF DOCUMENTS FOR THE IRAQIS IN SEALED ENVELOPES WITH THE REQUEST THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE OPENED UNTIL AFTER THE MISSION HAD LEFT. THEIR ACTUAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN VERY BRIEF. THE KING BELIEVED THAT THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD MISHANDLED MATTERS AND PUT THE EMPHASIS ON THE WRONG POINTS. THE MISSION ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE DRAWN A BLANK IN TEHRAN. I ASKED THE KING WHAT ELSE MIGHT BE DONE TO TRY TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AND END. HE THOUGHT, THAT AS LONG AS THE ISLAMIC MISSION PURPORTED TO BE STILL IN BUSINESS, THERE WAS LITTLE ANYONE ELSE COULD DO. AT PRESENT THE IRANIANS ONLY SEEMED PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE AN END TO THE WAR ON TERMS QUITE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE IRAQIS TO ACCEPT. THE KING SAID HE WAS HIMSELF COMPOSING A LONG MESSAGE CONCERNING THE MISSION TO PRINCE FAHD IN HIS CAPACITY AS HEAD OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO MOSCOW.

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

The Iran/Iraq Conflict: British Support to the Gulf Region

1. We have been studying the proposals contained in your letter of 5 November, and the paper enclosed with it, with great interest. (we do not appear to have a copy - will request one if received)

2. I am grateful to your officials and to the Service staffs for this valuable work. I agree with the general thrust of the conclusions. I am also content with the specific recommendations for the work which should be set in hand. To the extent that they are not already in train, the low level commitments can be pressed forward. In presenting them we should bear in mind the need to maximise the political benefit and leverage they give. General Perkins's recent visit is an excellent example of the benefits we can derive without any large commitment of British forces. Our willingness and ability to make a speedy and practical response to the UAE's enquiries has put us in a favourable light and should have laid to rest any lingering doubts the Rulers may have had that we had lost interest in them.

3. The paper has rightly concentrated on our response to the threats flowing from the Iraq/Iran conflict, for which purpose it ranks the possible responses under three broad headings in terms of their resource cost and of the political commitment they imply. I have no quarrel with this methodology. But the way in which the paper has followed this approach may, perhaps, tend to reduce its usefulness beyond the current crisis. It might be useful for our officials to meet soon to take stock of what is in hand. They might also consider revising the paper to serve as a basis for a longer term policy in the Gulf area. In particular they might look at the passages on the threat and

/possible

possible responses which highlight the point about the paper's longer term usefulness.

4. I understand that work is already well in hand on the most urgent priorities identified in the paper. I hope that we can agree that officials should meet early in the New Year to take matters further.

5. I am copying this minute to Sir Robert Armstrong.

C

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

29 December 1980

29 DEC 1980



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Prime Minister

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IRAQ/IRAN: SADDAM HUSSAIN'S 24 DECEMBER SPEECH

1. IN A SPEECH TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN SAID THAT IRAQI POSITIONS IN DEZFUL, GILAN, AHWAZ AND ABADAN WOULD CONSTITUTE IRAQ'S MILITARY FRONTIER FOR THE PERIOD OF THE PRESENT STATE OF WAR. THE MILITARY MAP THUS DRAWN AFFORDED THE BEST MEANS OF DEFENDING IRAQI TERRITORY: ANY WITHDRAWAL WOULD PUT IRAQ IN A WORSE POSITION. IRAQI FORCES WOULD THEREFORE REMAIN WHERE THEY WERE UNTIL IRAN CONCEDED IRAQI RIGHTS.

2. HE ALSO REVEALED THAT ''BECAUSE OF IRANIAN STUBBORNESS, IRAQI TROOPS IN KURDISTAN HAD BEEN ORDERED TO CLOSE ANY SALIENTS AND LOOPHOLES IN THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER. A WEEK AGO THEY HAD CROSSED INTO IRANIAN TERRITORY. IRAQ WAS NOW OCCUPYING THE BEST POSSIBLE MILITARY POSITIONS FROM THE JUNCTION OF THE IRANIAN, TURKISH AND IRAQI BORDERS IN THE NORTH, TO THE SHATT AL-ARAB IN THE SOUTH.

2. HE REPEATED THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT (NOT), AS ADVISED BY SOME, CONSIDER THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, ADDING (MORE INSISTPBTLY THAN IN HIS OTHER SPEECHES) THAT ALTHOUGH IRAQ QOULD HAVE HONOURED IT HAD IT NOT BEEN VIOLATED BY IRAN, THE LEGAL RIGHTS IT CONFERRED HAD ACCRUED IN ABNORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES, I.E. WHEN IRAN WAS BACKED BY US AND ZIONIST FORCES HOSTILE TO IRAQ.

/4.

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4. HUSSAIN'S REMARKS CONSTITUTE THE CLEAREST STATEMENT WE HAVE HAD RECENTLY OF THE REDUCED SCALE OF IRAQI MILITARY OBJECTIVES. THEY INDICATE A DETERMINATION TO CONSOLIDATE A LONG BUT SHALLOW FRONT AND AWAIT EVENTS IN IRAN, WHILE 'CREATING FACTS' THROUGH THE ABSORPTION OF EG. KHORRAMSHAHR INTO THE ADMINISTRATION (MY TEL NO 704). THE MENTION OF OPERATIONS IN KURDISTAN SUGGESTS, THAT THE IRANIAN AGITATION AMONG THE IRAQI KURDS MAY AGAIN BE BEGINNING TO TAKE EFFECT, AND THAT IRAQIS ARE CONSCIOUS THAT, IN THE WAR OF ATTRITION WHICH THEY NOW EXPECT, THE NORTH-EAST MAY IN TIME PROVIDE THE MOST PERSISTENT DRAIN ON THEIR RESOURCES.

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SAING TO TUNIS, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT.

MY TELNO 858: IRAN/IRAQ

1. AT OUR MEETING TODAY, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER THUNAYYAN ALSO ASKED ME TO PASS A MESSAGE FROM HIS GOVERNMENT TO HMG ON IRAN/IRAQ, WITH A VIEW TO ACTION BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL.

2. HE SAID THAT THE AMMAN SUMMIT'S DECLARATION MADE CLEAR THE ARAB'S POSITION ON THE CONFLICT: AND HE DID NOT THINK THOSE WHO WERE ABSENT WOULD DISAGREE. IF THE CONFLICT CONTINUED IT WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT NOT ONLY THE COMBATANTS, BUT THEIR NEIGHBOURS, THE REGION GENERALLY AND, EVENTUALLY, THE WHOLE GLOBE. ONLY THE USSR (AND ISRAEL) BENEFITTED FROM INSTABILITY IN THE AREA.

ONLY THE USSR (AND ISRAEL) BENEFITTED FROM INSTABILITY IN THE AREA. THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO BENEFIT TO THE WEST, INCLUDING THE UK. SAUDI ARABIA RECOGNISED AND APPRECIATED OUR CONCERN TO SEE A SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT - THUNAYYAN REFERRED TO OUR CONVERSATION THE PREVIOUS DAY (MY TELNO 856).

3. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT THOUGHT THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL PRESENTED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR STATES WITH HISTORIC TIES WITH BOTH COMBATANTS TO INTERVENE IN THE DISPUTE. THE AMMAN DECLARATION SHOWED THAT IRAQ WAS READY TO CONSIDER A SOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF A CEASEFIRE AND (SIC) PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. (I CAN FIND NO REFLECTION OF THE LATTER POINT, WHICH SEEMS INHERENTLY UNLIKELY, IN AMMAN TELNO 491.) NOW WAS THE TIME FOR POWERS OUTSIDE THE REGION TO BRING PRESSSURE TO BEAR ON BOTH PARTIES TO BEGIN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

4. SINCE THUNAYYAN WENT STRAIGHT ONTO THE MESSAGE IN MIPT, I WAS NOT CALLED UPON TO COMMENT.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS AMMAN STOCKHOLM
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Read in full

MY TELNO 1865: IRAN/IRAQ: PALME MISSION

1. PALME CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING (26 NOVEMBER) IN MY CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. HE SAID THAT HIS VISIT TO THE AREA HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE CONFLICT WAS DEEPLY ROOTED IN HISTORY. THE ONLY NEW INGREDIENT WAS THE ATTEMPTED EXPORT OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. HE NOW SAW CLEARLY THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUICK SOLUTION. THE WAR WOULD NOT BE STOPPED BY ECONOMIC OR RESUPPLY FACTORS. WHAT HAD STRUCK HIM MOST WAS THE MILITARY EUPHORIA ON BOTH SIDES. BOTH WERE CONVINCED THAT THEY COULD STILL MAKE MAJOR MILITARY GAINS (THE IRANIANS HAD TALKED OF REACHING BAGHDAD) AND HAD MADE TOTALLY CONTRADICTORY CLAIMS ABOUT THE MILITARY SITUATION. HE THOUGHT THAT BOTH ACCEPTED THAT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION WOULD BE NECESSARY IN THE END BUT BECAUSE OF THIS MILITARY EUPHORIA NEITHER WAS READY FOR IT YET, THOUGH THE IRAQI ATTITUDE WAS LESS NEGATIVE THAN THE IRANIAN. THE PROBLEM WAS THUS ONE OF TIMING: WHEN WAS THE MOMENT TO LAUNCH DIPLOMATIC PROPOSALS? THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION DEPENDED ON THE MILITARY SITUATION AND HE HAD FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN RELIABLE INFORMATION ON THAT. HE HAD BEEN TAKEN TO THE ''FRONT'' AT DEZFUL AND KERMANSHAH BUT HAD FOUND LIFE IN BOTH TOWNS TO BE ENTIRELY NORMAL. THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF THE WAR HAD BEEN SOME DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE ROCKET ATTACKS IN DEZFUL AND THE DISTANT SOUND OF ARTILLERY FIRE.

3. IN IRAQ HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY SADDAM. THE IRAQIS HAD PRESENTED THEIR ARGUMENTS SKILFULLY. THEY HAD EXPRESSED READINESS TO NEGOTIATE BUT THEY WERE SHARPENING THEIR TERMS ALL THE TIME, ESPECIALLY ON THE SHATT. SADDAM AND TARIQ AZIZ HAD MADE VEILED THREATS ABOUT THE ETHNIC FRAGILITY OF IRAN, APPARENTLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO PUT PRESSURE ON PALME TO GET THE IRANIANS TO MOVE TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE OF THE IRAQI TERMS.

4. IN IRAN, HE HAD SEEN RAJAIE AND BANI SADR. BEHESHTI HAD BEEN EVASIVE BUT HE HAD SPOKEN TO HIM ON THE TELEPHONE. RAJAIE HAD NOT BEEN INTERESTED IN THE PRACTICALITIES OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. HE SAW THE WAR AS A STRAIGHT FIGHT BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL. WHEN PALME HAD ASKED HIM HOW THE IRAQIS COULD WITHDRAW WITHOUT A CEASEFIRE, RAJAIE HAD MERELY REPLIED THAT THE PROPHET HAD SAID THAT MUSLIMS SHOULD NEVER ATTACK AN ENEMY WHO HAD TURNED HIS BACK.

/ BANI SADR,

BANI SADR, PALME SAID, NOW LIVES PERMANENTLY IN DEZFUL, SURROUNDED BY REGULAR ARMY OFFICERS. PALME BELIEVED THAT HE WAS TRYING TO MAKE THE REGULAR ARMY HIS POWER BASE, CAPITALISING ON THE REGULAR OFFICERS' DISAFFECTION WITH THE AYATOLLAHS. BANI SADR HAD BEEN VERY TOUGH, SAYING THAT HIS OBJECTIVE WAS TO BRING DOWN SADDAM EITHER BY MAKING HIM LOSE THE WAR OR BY FORCING HIM TO ACCEPT TERMS SUFFICIENTLY HUMILIATING TO ENSURE HIS OVERTHROW BY HIS RIVALS IN IRAQ. BANI SADR WAS STILL LOOKING FOR INTERNATIONAL ''CONDEMNATION'' OF IRAQ AND TALKED OF HAVING SADDAM EVENTUALLY CONDEMNED AS A CRIMINAL BY SOME NUREMBERG-TYPE TRIBUNAL.

5. PALME SAID THAT THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN VERY FORTHCOMING ABOUT THE SHIPS TRAPPED IN THE SHATT. BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO AN INFORMAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (NOT TO BE CALLED A ''CEASEFIRE'') OVER THE WATERWAY WHILE THE SHIPS WERE EVACUATED FLYING THE RED CROSS FLAG. THE IRAQIS WOULD HAVE TO DO SOME DREDGING FIRST. PALME HAD ASKED FOR CONFIRMATION OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS IN WRITING AND WAS HOPING FOR THE IRANIAN RESPONSE TODAY. (WALDHEIM SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ME THAT THIS HAD NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING BUT THAT HE HAD URGED PALME NEVERTHELESS TO PROCEED WITH HIS PLAN). PALME SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT THIS OPERATION MIGHT TAKE PLACE AT THE BEGINNING OF DECEMBER THOUGH THE IRAQIS COULD STILL MAKE DIFFICULTIES OVER DREDGING, THE CLEARING OF ORDNANCE AND GUARANTEES THAT IRAN WOULD NOT TAKE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF THE CEASEFIRE. HE WAS EXPLORING WITH IMCO WHETHER THEY COULD HELP WITH PILOTS AND PROVIDE SOME KIND OF UN OBSERVATION OF THE OPERATION WHICH MIGHT REASSURE BOTH SIDES. PALME ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO EVACUATION OF THE SHIPS BOTH FOR COMMERCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS AN EVENTUAL NEGOTIATION.

6. WALDHEIM ADDED LATER THAT NONE OF PALME'S IRANIAN INTERLOCUTORS HAD MENTIONED THE CAPTIVE OIL MINISTER. PALME HAD EVENTUALLY RAISED THIS HIMSELF WITH BANI SADR WHO HAD DISMISSIVELY SAID THAT THE MINISTER HAD BEEN WARNED NOT TO GO SO NEAR THE FRONT AND THAT THE IRANIANS ATTACHED NO IMPORTANCE TO HIS EARLY RELEASE. ONE OF BANI SADR'S GENERALS HAD ADDED ''HE IS ONLY ONE OF THOSE REVOLUTIONARIES ANYWAY''.

7. PALME STRESSED THAT HE WAS BEING VERY CAUTIOUS NOT TO SAY ANYTHING IN PUBLIC WHICH COULD BE REPRESENTED AS A VALUE JUDGEMENT ABOUT THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE CONFLICT, AS THIS WOULD WRECK HIS CHANCES OF MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS. HE AGREED WITH ME THEREFORE THAT IT WAS UNDESIRABLE FOR WALDHEIM TO BRIEF THE COUNCIL ORALLY IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. THE UN HAS TODAY ISSUED AN ANODYNE PRESS STATEMENT BUT AS SOME MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAVE BEGUN TO ASK FOR FULLER BRIEFING WALDHEIM HAS DECIDED TO CIRCULATE A BRIEF WRITTEN REPORT, HOPING THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO LEAVE IT AT THAT FOR THE TIME BEING.

/ 8. ASSUMING

8. ASSUMING THAT THE EVACUATION OF THE SHIPS GOES AHEAD IN EARLY DECEMBER AS PLANNED, PALME IS THINKING IN TERMS OF RETURNING TO THE AREA SOME TIME IN THE SECOND HALF OF DECEMBER. HE DOES NOT WANT TO LOSE THE PERSONAL CONTACTS HE HAS MADE THIS TIME, BUT SEES NO POINT IN RUSHING BACK UNTIL HE HAS SOME MORE SPECIFIC IDEAS TO FLOAT. TO THIS END HE PLANS TO USE THE NEXT FEW WEEKS STUDYING THE MILITARY SITUATION, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SHATT DISPUTE, THE ELEMENTS THAT MIGHT GO INTO A NON-INTERFERENCE AGREEMENT AND POSSIBLE ROLES FOR THE UN. HE RETURNS TO STOCKHOLM TODAY BUT WILL BE BACK IN THE UNITED STATES ON A PRIVATE SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT NEXT WEEK.

9. I THINK THAT PALME HAS MADE AN EXCELLENT START. HE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN VERY WELL RECEIVED BY THE VARIOUS PERSONALITIES IN BOTH COUNTRIES, WHICH, AS I ADVISED HIM ON 14 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 1786), SHOULD BE HIS FIRST OBJECTIVE. SO FAR HE IS DOING MUCH BETTER THAN PRESIDENT ZIA, HABIB CHATTY OR THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER. BUT HE MENTIONED MORE THAN ONCE THAT HE FELT HAMPERED BY HIS IGNORANCE OF THE MILITARY SITUATION AND ASKED WHETHER WE COULD HELP. I SAID THAT OUR INFORMATION SUGGESTED THAT THIS WAS A LOW-INTENSITY WAR, CERTAINLY MUCH LOWER THAN THE COMBATANTS OR THE PRESS WOULD LEAD US TO BELIEVE. I ADDED THAT IF HE COULD STOP OVER IN LONDON ON ONE OF HIS FORTHCOMING JOURNEYS, I WAS SURE THAT YOU WOULD BE ABLE TO ARRANGE A BRIEFING FOR HIM AND THAT I WOULD ASK FOR A MESSAGE ON THIS TO BE PASSED TO HIM VIA H M AMBASSADOR IN STOCKHOLM. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO SET UP SOMETHING ON THESE LINES AND THAT STOCKHOLM CAN BE INSTRUCTED TO KEEP PALME INFORMED OF SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE MILITARY FRONT.

PARSONS

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1865 OF 24 NOVEMBER

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Iraq

MY TELNO 1833 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ - MR PALME'S MISSION

1. WHEN I SAW WALDHEIM THIS MORNING ABOUT FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL BUSINESS, HE TOLD ME THAT PALME HAD JUST TELEPHONED HIM FROM GENEVA. HE WILL BE COMING TO NEW YORK TOMORROW AFTERNOON (25 NOVEMBER) AND WILL SEE WALDHEIM AT ABOUT 1700 HOURS.

2. WALDHEIM SAID THAT PALME HAD TOLD HIM THAT HIS MISSION HAD GONE MUCH BETTER THAN THE PESSIMISTIC REPORTS IN THE MEDIA HERE HAVE SUGGESTED. THE ATMOSPHERE IN BOTH TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD HAD BEEN GOOD AND, ALTHOUGH BOTH SIDES TALKED TOUGH ABOUT THEIR MILITARY AIMS, THEY CLEARLY WISHED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS THE IRANIANS HAD ATTACKED THE IRAQIS, NOT THE U N. THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY FORTHCOMING AND VERY POSITIVE ABOUT THE U N.

3. PALME SAID THAT BOTH SIDES HAD NOW AGREED TO RELEASE THE TRAPPED SHIPS (MY TEL 1786 PARA 5 AND UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 495). INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED FOR A WEEK'S CEASEFIRE TO ENABLE THE SHIPS TO LEAVE. THE DETAILS WOULD BE COORDINATED WITH IMCO AS WELL AS WITH THE ICRC.

4. PALME SAID THAT MALMIERCA'S MISSION HAD FAILED COMPLETELY AND THAT HE HAD RETURNED TO HAVANA. THE ISLAMIC CONGRESS EMISSARY (MR CHATTY) HAD FARED NO BETTER. NEVERTHELESS, WALDHEIM SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK PALME INTENDED TO RETURN VERY SOON TO THE MIDDLE EAST, THOUGH HE MIGHT HAVE MORE TO REPORT THAN HE HAD SAID ON THE TELEPHONE IF THIS TURNS OUT TO BE THE CASE, I THINK IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO RESIST PRESSURE FROM MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL FOR AN ORAL REPORT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. AS I POINTED OUT TO WALDHEIM, THE DISADVANTAGE OF THIS IS, OF COURSE, THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ORAL REPORT WILL INEVITABLY LEAK, THUS COMPLICATING PALME'S FURTHER EFFORTS. THE ONLY WAY TO AVOID THIS WOULD BE FOR PALME TO RETURN TO TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD BY THE WEEKEND IN WHICH CASE WALDHEIM MIGHT JUST BE ABLE TO HOLD THE LINE BY SAYING THAT HIS GOOD OFFICES WERE CONTINUING AND THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO DEFER HIS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL UNTIL THE NEXT ROUND WAS COMPLETE.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 242200Z NOV 80
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1860 OF 24 NOVEMBER 1980
INFO WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, PARIS, MOSCOW, AMMAN.

MY TELNO 1755: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I ASKED MCHENRY THIS MORNING (24 NOVEMBER) IF THERE HAD BEEN A FURTHER CONTACT WITH TROYANOVSKY. HE SAID THAT TROYANOVSKY HAD GOT IN TOUCH WITH HIM A COUPLE OF DAYS AGO. HE HAD RECEIVED AUTHORITY FROM MOSCOW TO SEE IF THE US AND USSR COULD WORK SOMETHING OUT TOGETHER. HOWEVER, TROYANOVSKY'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO LEAVE THINGS ALONE UNTIL THE OUTCOME, IF ANY, OF THE PALME MISSION WAS CLEAR.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 655 OF 24/11/80

INFO TO PRIORITY AMMAN, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW , UKMIS NEW YORK

SAVING TO DAMASCUS

AMMAN TEL NO 482. IRAQ/IRAN: ATTITUDE OF TKHE SUPERPOWERS.

1. THE COMPLEMENT TO THIS VERY INTERESTING REPORT IS THAT EAGLETON OF THE US INTERESTS SECTION HERE TOLD ME LAST WEEK THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN RECEIVED, FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE HIS ARRIVAL IN IRAQ EARLIER THIS YEAR, BY MINISTER OF STATE HAMID ALWAN AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. ALWAN HAD SAID THAT THE TIME WAS RIPE FOR CLOSER US'IRAQI RELATIONS, AND THAT EAGLETON COULD COUNT ON ACCESS IN FUTURE TO HIM (ALWAN) WHEN EVER HE NEEDED IT.

2. EAGLETON ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT THAT HIS REPEATED EXPLANATIONS HAD GOT THE IRAQIS OVER THE HUMP OF THE US DOLLARS 550 MILLION PACKAGE OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT, PART OR ALL OF WHICH WOULD BE RELEASED TO IRAN (AFTER CLOSE US INSPECTION OF THE DETAILED LIST), IF AND WHEN THE HOSTAGES WERE FREED. THE IRAQIS WOULD CERTAINLY MAKE A GREAT FUSS ON THEIR PROPAGANDA MACHINE AS AND WHEN THIS PAID-FOR EQUIPMENT WAS DELIVERED, BUT WOULD NOT (NOT), EAGLETON THOUGHT, THROW THE INTERESTS SECTION OUT OF THE COUNTRY IN RETALIATION. HIS STAFF HAD IN ANY CASE ALREADY BEEN SLIMMED DOWN TO THE MINIMUM. THE IRAQIS' MAIN OBJECTIVE NOW WAS TO GET THE AMERICANS TO UNDERTAKE NOT (NOT) TO SUPPLY IRAN WITH ANY REPEAT ANY WARLIKE MATERIAL BEYOND THE US DOLLARS 550 MILLION PACKAGE.

3. THE GENERAL CONSENSUS HERE AMONY MY COLLEAGUES REMAINS THAT THE FORMAL RESTORATION OF US-IRAQI RELATIONS IS STILL SOME WAY OFF.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 172 OF 23 NOVEMBER 1980
INFO JEDDAH KUWAIT BAHRAIN ABU DHABI DUBAI MUSCAT AMMAN MODUK (FOR DMAO)
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON PARIS

GULF SECURITY SITUATION

1. WHEN I CALLED ON THE AMIR ON 22 NOVEMBER FOR A GENERAL TALK, HE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY ABOUT THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, AND THE IRANIAN INTERNAL SITUATION. HE FEARED THAT THE FIGHTING COULD SPREAD, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE IRANIAN AIR ATTACKS ON KUWAIT, ON WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TELEPHONED HIS SYMPATHIES TO THE KUWAITIS. HE THOUGHT HE HAD SEEN AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE HAD BEEN THREE SUCH ATTACKS.

2. HE SAW LITTLE HOPE OF AN EARLY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, GIVEN THE IRANIANS' INTRANSIEANT RESPONSE TO OLOF PALME AND OTHER POTENTIAL MEDIATORS, THEIR TOTAL DENIGRATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS EFFORTS FOR PEACE, AND THE AMORPHOUS NATURE OF THE PRESENT IRANIAN REGIME. YASSER ARAFAT, WHO PASSED THROUGH HERE BRIEFLY LAST WEEK, HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD LOST ALL HIS EARLIER ENTHUSIASM FOR THE IRANIANS : INSTEAD OF HAVING A DISCUSSION WITH A GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, ONE QUOTE HAD TO TALK TO A HUNDRED PEOPLE UNQUOTE.

3. WE DISCUSSED QATAR'S DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS, AND HM GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE TO THE QATAR ARMED FORCES. THE AMIR WAS CLEARLY STILL WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AIR ATTACKS ON QATAR'S OIL INSTALLATIONS - WHICH HE CHARACTERISED WITH A LAUGH AS BEING QUOTE YOUR UNQUOTE (IE THE UK'S) RESPONSIBILITY : AND HE QUESTIONED ME ON THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES OF OUR SQUADRON NOW IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. I SAID THAT ROCKETS WERE THE ONLY ANSWER TO LOW-LEVEL AIR ATTACK (SO LEAVING AN OPENING FOR MAJOR REPRESENTATIONS TO HIM ON BEHALF OF RAPIER).

4. HE SAID HE HAD NOT HAD TIME TO DO MORE THAN READ HIS MINISTER OF STATE'S REPORT ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S CONFERENCE IN AMMAN, THOUGH HE HAD SUMMONED HIM BACK FOR THAT EVENING TO REPORT TO HIM PERSONALLY. HE WAS SORRY THAT KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO WOULD NOT BE AT THE SUMMIT, AS A PROPONENT OF MODERATION.

5. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE FOLLOWED ME IN TO SEE THE AMIR, WITH A WRITTEN MESSAGE TO HIM FROM PRESIDENT GISCARD.
6. SIGNIFICANTLY ALSO, - AND CONTRARY TO THE SENSE OF HIS REMARKS TO LORD STRATHCONA EARLIER THIS MONTH - KHALIFA EXPRESSED
/////

SATISFACTION AND RELIEF OVER THE CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE US, NOW THAT HE HAD SEEN THE CALIBRE OF THE ADVISERS WHOM GOVERNOR REAGAN WAS ENLISTING. HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S VACILLATIONS AND U-TURNS IN POLICY HAD ALWAYS DISQUIETED HIM. HE WAS GLAD THAT EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN THE VAN, WERE NOW IN CONTACT WITH REAGAN. HE ASSUMED THAT THE PM WOULD BE SEEING HIM SHORTLY.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1755 OF 11 NOVEMBER
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON BAGHDAD MOSCOW PARIS AMMAN

MY TELNO 1732: IRAN/IRAQ

1. AFTER WHAT THE US MISSION DESCRIBED AS SOMETHING OF A STRUGGLE WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, MCHENRY GOT AUTHORITY TO TALK TO TROYANOVSKY (USSR). HE DID SO THIS AFTERNOON (11 NOV) AND BRIEFED ME AFTERWARDS.

2. MCHENRY SAID THAT HE HAD SUGGESTED TO TROYANOVSKY THAT US AND SOVIET INTERESTS COINCIDED IN THE NEED TO END THE FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. IT HAD FOR THE MOMENT BEEN CONTAINED BUT THERE WAS ALWAYS A DANGER OF A FLARE UP RISKING INVOLVEMENT OF THE TWO SUPER-POWERS. HE DID NOT THINK THAT ACTION BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WAS LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE WRONG TO CROSS WIRES WITH WALDHEIM'S PROPOSED MISSION. THE FACT WAS THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD INFLUENCE WITH THE PARTIES AND SHOULD USE IT. TROYANOVSKY KNEW THE NECESSARY INGREDIENTS FOR ANY DEFINITIVE RESOLUTION IE CEASE FIRE, WITHDRAWAL, NON-INTERFERENCE, NEGOTIATIONS ETC. MCHENRY THOUGHT THAT THEY MIGHT CONSIDER WORKING TOWARDS A KIND OF RESOLUTION 242 RELATED TO THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT.

3. TROYANOVSKY'S REACTION WAS GENERALLY POSITIVE, ALTHOUGH HE NATURALLY SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO THINK ABOUT IT AND CONSULT MOSCOW. HE SAID THAT, WHETHER OR NOT THE US BELIEVED THIS, THE SOVIET UNION WANTED AN END TO THE FIGHTING. THE CONFLICT WAS ONLY BENEFITING ISRAEL. IF THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS ACTED TOGETHER AND EFFECTIVELY, THIS WOULD REINTRODUCE THE US INTO THE MIDDLE EASTERN ACT IN A BIG WAY, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS MIGHT ARGUE THAT SUCH A COURSE HAD THE DISADVANTAGE OF DOING THE SAME FOR THE SOVIET UNION. TROYANOVSKY ALSO ASKED WHETHER MCHENRY THOUGHT THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WOULD APPROVE OF SOVIET/AMERICAN CO-OPERATION AT SUCH AN EARLY STAGE. MCHENRY REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD DO WORSE THAN START OFF ON THE RIGHT FOOT WITH A REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION. TROYANOVSKY AND MCHENRY AGREED THAT THE CHINESE WOULD NOT LIKE SUCH AN INITIATIVE AND TROYANOVSKY ADDED THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT BE DIFFICULT 'FOR THEIR OWN REASONS'.

4. THEY AGREED TO KEEP THEIR CONVERSATION VERY MUCH TO THEMSELVES. MCHENRY TOLD TROYANOVSKY THAT HE HAD NOT MENTIONED THE CONTACT TO ANYONE ELSE. HE DID NOT TELL TROYANOVSKY THAT HE WAS KEEPING ME INFORMED.

5. PETRIE OF THE US MISSION WARNED ME LATE ON 10 NOVEMBER THAT MCHENRY WAS GOING TO SEE TROYANOVSKY. HE ALSO GAVE ME A COPY OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY I.F.T.). THIS HAD BEEN PREPARED IN

THE STATE DEPARTMENT. IT WAS OUTRAGIOUSLY BLUNT BUT ILLUSTRATED THE LINES ON WHICH THE AMERICANS WERE WORKING. THE AMERICANS SAY THEY HAVE NOT SHOWN IT TO ANYONE ELSE. THEY HAVE ASKED US NOT TO REVEAL KNOWLEDGE OF IT TO AMERICAN OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON OR ELSEWHERE.

6. I HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS THAT, IF THEY WANT THEIR EXERCISE TO BE EFFECTIVE, THEY MUST ACT WITH COMPLETE DISCRETION. FIRST, THEY MUST LET WALDHEIM'S INITIATIVE, WHICH IS NOW IMMINENT (MY TELNO 1754), HAVE A CHANCE. SECONDLY THEY MUST KEEP THEIR DRAFT PAPER OUT OF THE PRESS LEST IT BE PUBLICLY DENOUNCED PREMATURELY BY BOTH OF THE PARTIES. I EMPHASISED THAT A CONCEPT IN MCHENRY'S MIND OF PRODUCING A RESOLUTION UNACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES IN THE HOPE OF EVENTUALLY DRAWING THEM TOWARDS IT WAS INVALID IN THE CASE OF IRAN/IRAQ. IF THE IRANIANS AND THE IRAQIS GOT WIND OF SOMETHING WHICH WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM, THEIR PROBABLE REACTION WOULD BE PUBLICLY TO DENOUNCE IT, THUS PAINTING THEMSELVES INTO CORNERS FROM WHICH THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO EXTRICATE THEMSELVES. THE ANALOGY OF 242 WAS IMPERFECT. IN THE JUNE WAR, THE ARABS HAD BEEN COMPREHENSIVELY THRASHED AND WERE EAGER TO GRASP LIFE LINES. FOR THEM, 242 WAS A GODSEND BECAUSE, IN EFFECT, IT REQUIRED THE ISRAELIS TO SURRENDER TERRITORY AND THE ARABS ONLY TO SIGN BITS OF PAPER ABOUT PEACE. THE AMERICANS TOOK THESE POINTS WELL.

7. I THINK THAT THE ABOVE IS A PROMISING DEVELOPMENT PROVIDED THAT THE AMERICANS CAN AVOID LEAKING IT TO THE PRESS PREMATURELY EITHER DIRECTLY OR BY INFORMING TOO MANY MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1732 OF 7 NOVEMBER 1980
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, PARIS, AMMAN.

MY TELNO 1722 (NOT TO AMMAN): IRAN/IRAQ.

1. KAISER (BANGLADESH) TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING (7 NOVEMBER). HE SAID THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE WORKING ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION. HIS PRIVATE OPINION WAS THAT IT WOULD BE TWO OR THREE WEEKS BEFORE THE TIME WOULD BE RIPE TO SURFACE IT.

2. KAISER HAD HAD AN INTERESTING CONVERSATION WITH TROYANOVSKY (USSR). THE LATTER HAD SAID THAT ALTHOUGH NO ONE BELIEVED IT, THE FACT WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTED URGENT ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO STOP THE WAR AND BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS.

3. THIS DOES NOT SURPRISE ME. DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS I HAVE DETECTED A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN THE RUSSIAN POSITION HERE, AWAY FROM THEIR ORIGINAL PRO-IRAQI STANCE. THEY ARE NOW PREPARED TO BE MORE EVEN HANDED AND THERE IS ON THE FACE OF IT MORE AFFINITY BETWEEN THEIR ATTITUDE AND THAT OF THE UNITED STATES.

4. I MADE THIS POINT TO VANDEN HEUVEL (US) AT DINNER LAST NIGHT AND I HAVE SINCE TOLD HIM OF KAISER'S CONVERSATION WITH TROYANOVSKY. I SAID TO VANDEN HEUVEL THAT, ALTHOUGH LONG TERM SOVIET AND AMERICAN OBJECTIVES WERE OBVIOUSLY DIFFERENT, I HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, IN THE SHORT TERM, THEY BOTH WANTED THE SAME THING IE AN END OF THE WAR AND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE IMMEDIATE DISPUTES. I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ACTIVITY BY PERIPHERAL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE. IT SEEMED A PITY THAT SOVIET/US RELATIONS WERE NOW SO DISTANT THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO COME TOGETHER AND ACT FIRMLY EVEN WHEN THEIR INTERESTS COINCIDED. IF THEY WERE TO GIVE A LEAD, THE COUNCIL WOULD FOLLOW AND WE MIGHT GET SOMEWHERE. HAD THEY BEEN SPEAKING BILATERALLY TO THE RUSSIANS EITHER IN NEW YORK OR ELSEWHERE?

5. VANDEN HEUVEL TOOK MY POINT VERY READILY AND SAID THAT HE AGREED ENTIRELY WITH MY THESIS. THERE HAD, SO FAR AS HE KNEW, BEEN NO BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE AND I REALISED THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GET ANYTHING POSITIVE DONE ON THE UNITED STATES SIDE IN THE WAKE OF THE ELECTIONS. BUT HE WOULD CERTAINLY FEED THIS THOUGHT INTO THE MACHINE.

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TELNO 460 OF 6 NOV 80

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING TO TEL AVIV

BAGHDAD TELNO 605 OF 5 NOVEMBER: IRAQ/IRAN

1. MR EGERTON'S ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IS VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH WHAT KING HUSSEIN HAS BEEN SAYING TO ME HERE ABOUT HIS EXCHANGES WITH THE IRAQI PRESIDENT (SEE FOR EXAMPLE MY TELS NOS 430, 447 AND 459). I HOPE TO FIND OUT MORE AFTER TARIQ AZIZ HAS BEEN TO AMMAN FOLLOWING HIS VISIT TO PARIS, BUT IN OUR EXCHANGES ON THIS SUBJECT KING HUSSEIN HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT BOTH HE AND SADDAM PUT MORE FAITH IN A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAN IN THE OTHER PEACE INITIATIVES NOW UNDER WAY.

2. AT THE SAME TIME THE KING HAS GIVEN ME THE VERY STRONG IMPRESSION THAT HE DOES NOT WISH THIS LEFT ENTIRELY IN THE HANDS OF THE FRENCH AND THAT IDELLY HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE BRITAIN AND FRANCE WORKING TOGETHER. HE SETS ALL THIS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF TOTAL IRAQI DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND DISTRUST OF THE UNITED STATES, AND ALSO OF HIS BELIEF THAT WE NOW HAVE A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO PUT OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ ON A NEW FOOTING AND AT THE SAME TIME GAIN SUBSTANTIAL COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGES FOR OURSELVES RATHER THAN LEAVING THE FIELD TO THE FRENCH. KING HUSSEIN HAS ALSO RECOGNISED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO BUILD THE NEW RELATIONSHIP FOR WHICH HE HOPES WITH IRAQ UNTIL THE SPARKES AND SMITH CASES ARE SATISFACTORILY SETTLED: HENCE HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO TRYING TO RESOLVE THEM.

3. THERE IS OF COURSE A STRONG ELEMENT OF SELF-INTEREST IN ALL THIS. THE IRAQIS ARE IN A MESS, KING HUSSEIN IS FOR BETTER OR WORSE IN IT WITH THEM AND HE IS LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT. BUT I THINK DUE WEIGHT SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO WHAT I HAVE FOUND IN MANY DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM IN RECENT MONTHS TO BE AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT STRAND IN HIS THINKING. THIS IS THAT THE PART PLAYED BY THE TWO SUPER-POWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS HAD PROVED DEEPLY HARMFUL TO THE ARABS AND THAT THE LONG-TERM AIM OF ARAB POLICY SHOULD BE TO REDUCE THE DEGREE OF INTERFERENCE BY BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IN ARAB AFFAIRS AND PARTICULARLY TO GET RID OF SOVIET AND US MILITARY FACILITIES IN THE AREA. HE SEES EUROPE IN AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT LIGHT: COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE SHED THEIR IMPERIAL PAST AND VALUABLE COMMERCIAL PARTNERS WITH WHOM THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA CAN HAVE

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AN EQUAL AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP. BUT ABOVE ALL HE LOOKS TO BRITAIN, BECAUSE OF HER LONG EXPERIENCE OF THE AREA AND OF HIS OWN CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH US AND ADMIRATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF, TO TAKE A LEAD.

4. SOME OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS OF COURSE ALSO APPLY TO HIS THINKING ABOUT ARAB/ISRAEL, ALTHOUGH HE KNOWS THAT WITHOUT US PRESSURE THE ISRAELIS WILL NEVER BE PERSUADED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: BUT HE BELIEVES EUROPE HAS A KEY ROLE TO PLAY IN INFLUENCING THE AMERICANS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

5. THE KING IS MUCH LESS GOOD ON DETAIL AND, WHEN I TRY TO PIN HIM DOWN ON PRECISELY WHAT WE SHOULD DO, USUALLY TRIES TO AVOID COMMITTING HIMSELF. THIS SEEMS AT LEAST PARTLY FROM A DISLIKE OF TELLING OTHERS WHAT TO DO (JUST AS HE STRONGLY RESENTS AMERICAN ATTEMPTS TO DICTATE TO HIM) AND ALSO BECAUSE BY TEMPERAMENT HE TENDS TO ESCHEW DETAIL AND CONCENTRATE ON THE BROAD POLICY ISSUES

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 915 OF ø6 NOVEMBER 198ø
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND AMMAN.
INFO SAVING TO BONN AND MOSCOW.

VISIT TO PARIS OF MR TAREQ AZIZ

1. I ASKED THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ELYSEE THIS MORNING IF HE COULD TELL ME ANYTHING ABOUT MR TAREQ AZIZ'S VISIT TO PARIS YESTERDAY.

2. WAHL SAID THAT THE IRAQI ATTITUDE WAS NOW A BLEND OF SATIS-FACTION AND EMBARRASSMENT - SATISFACTION THAT THEY HAD SEIZED THE TERRITORY WHICH THEY FELT THEY NEEDED FOR BARGAINING WITH IRAN AND EMBARRASSMENT BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT FIND A WAY OF BRINGING IRAN TO BARGAIN. WAHL SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF MR TAREQ AZIZ'S FIRST VISIT TO PARIS. DURING IT PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD IMPRESSED ON HIM THE NEED FOR THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT TO CLARIFY PUBLICLY ITS OBJECTIVES, TO AVOID EN-LARGING THE WAR AND NOT TO MAKE UNNECESSARY ENEMIES. SUBSEQUENTLY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD SEEMED TO HAVE HOISTED IN THESE POINTS.

3. ON THIS OCCASION A NEW ELEMENT HAD EMERGED IN THE IRAQI ARGUMENT. THEY WERE NOW SAYING THAT THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WOULD NOT REMAIN CONTENT FOR LONG WITH AN INDETERMINATE SITUATION AND WOULD WANT TO PRESS ON TO NEW OBJECTIVES. IRAQ NEEDED CERTAIN SUPPLIES AND WOULD BE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY AMERICAN HELP BEING GIVEN TO IRAN. IRAQ WOULD HAVE TO TURN TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR HELP IF DEVELOPMENTS APPEARED TO BE AGAINST IRAQ'S INTERESTS. WAHL SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DONE HIS BEST TO PERSUADE THE IRAQIS TO BE OPEN TO THE INITIATIVES OF THE NON-ALIGNED, OF THE ARAB STATES AND IN THE UNITED NATIONS. HE DREW MY ATTENTION TO REUTER AND AFP REPORTS OF WHAT TAREQ AZIZ HAD SAID AFTER LEAVING THE ELYSEE YESTERDAY. I ASSUME THAT YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE REUTER TAPES. TAREQ AZIZ WAS ACCUSING THE US ADMINISTRATION OF BEING PRO IRANIAN AND SAID THAT DIRECT OR INDIRECT AID FROM THE US ENCOURAGED TEHRAN TO CONTINUE WAR AND THIS WAS DAMAGING TO THE INTERESTS AND SECURITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST REGION. WAHL AGREED WITH ME WHEN I COMMENTED THAT THIS SEEMED TO BE BAD LINE FOR TAREQ AZIZ TO HAVE TAKEN. HE ADDED THAT IN CONVERSATION TAREQ AZIZ HAD INSISTED THAT IRANIAN AIRCRAFT WERE FLOWN BY ISRAELI PILOTS. THERE WAS NOTHING ONE COULD DO TO STOP HIM TALKING LIKE THIS BECAUSE HE COULD NOT ADMIT THAT THE IRANIANS WERE RESISTING SUCCESSFULLY.

4. WAHL WENT INTO A LONGISH ACCOUNT OF THE FRENCH RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ, SAYING THAT IT HAD STARTED WHEN MONSIEUR CHIRAC WAS PRIME MINISTER AND HAD THEN BEEN PURSUED BY MONSIEUR BARRE, THE

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AIMS ON THE FRENCH SIDE BEING SIMPLY TO SECURE A SOURCE OF OIL AND TO OPEN A MARKET FOR FRENCH EXPORTS. IN THE COURSE OF TIME THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD COME TO UNDERSTAND THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAIN DID NOT WANT TO BE COMPLETELY COMMITTED TO THE SOVIET UNION AND WAS PREPARED TO MOVE INTO A BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH WESTERN POWERS. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD UNDERSTOOD ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS THAT THE US GOVERNMENT (HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED BRZEZINSKI) AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SYMPATHISED WITH WHAT FRANCE WAS DOING. IT WAS STILL IMPORTANT NOT TO LEAVE IRAQ TO THE SOVIET UNION, BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TRY TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO LIMIT THEIR PRESENT ADVENTURE.

5. I ASKED WAHL ABOUT FRENCH ARMS SUPPLIES FOR IRAQ. HE DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY BUT SEEMED TO INDICATE CLEARLY THAT HE THOUGHT THE MIRAGE F1 AIRCRAFT ORDERED BY IRAQ WOULD HAVE TO BE DELIVERED WHEN THEY WERE READY. HE SAID THAT FRANCE WAS OF COURSE DOING NOTHING AT ALL TO ACCELERATE THE COMPLETION AND DELIVERY OF THESE AIRCRAFT. BUT EVEN IF THE AIRCRAFT WERE TO BE DELIVERED IRAQ WOULD NOT HAVE THE PILOTS TO FLY THEM. THERE WERE SOME PILOTS BEING TRAINED IN FRANCE BUT THEY WOULD NOT BE READY BY THE TIME THE AIRCRAFT WERE. DELIVERY OF THE AIRCRAFT WOULD THEREFORE HAVE A SYMBOLIC RATHER THAN A PRACTICAL VALUE.

6. I ASKED WAHL WHAT THE POSITION WAS OVER THE RESEARCH REACTOR WHICH FRANCE WAS SUPPLYING TO IRAQ. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH TECHNICIANS AT THE REACTOR SITE HAD BEEN REDUCED TO 2Ø AND THE URANIUM FUEL HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THE REACTOR. AS IT HAD BEEN IRRADIATED THERE WAS NO FEAR THAT THE IRAQIS COULD DO ANYTHING WITH IT. IT WAS AT PRESENT BEING GUARDED BY THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES. STEPS WERE IN HAND TO ACTIVATE INSPECTION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS BY THE IAEA.

7. IN AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A CLEAR IMPRESSION OF WAHL'S ATTITUDE I SUGGESTED THAT IT SEEMED POSSIBLE THAT IRAN MIGHT BECOME THE RUSSIA FOR SADDAM HUSAIN'S GRANDE ARMEE. WAHL SAID HE FEARED THAT THIS MIGHT BE SO. WHEN I ASKED ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY AT TEHRAN HE COMMENTED THAT HE HOPED THE IRANIANS WOULD NOT BE TEMPTED TO LOOK FOR HOSTAGES THERE BECAUSE OF FRANCE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

HIBBERT.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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FM PARIS ø61652Z NOV 8ø
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 914 OF 6 NOVEMBER 198ø
INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND AMMAN
INFO SAVING BONN AND MOSCOW

IRAQ/IRAN: FRENCH ASSESSMENT

1. WHEN MINISTER SAW SERVANT (SOUS-DIRECTEUR IN CHARGE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE QUAI) ON 5 NOVEMBER, HE ASKED HIM FOR A FRENCH ASSESSMENT OF IRAQI INTENTIONS. SERVANT SAID THAT THE FRENCH THOUGHT THE IRAQIS WERE LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT OF THE WAR. HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY A REFERENCE IN A SPEECH BY SADDAM HUSSEIN BEFORE THE IRAQI NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO THE EFFECT THAT IRAQ WAS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS IN RETURN FOR RECOGNITION OF THEIR RIGHTS. THIS HAD NEVER BEEN EXPRESSED SO CLEARLY BEFORE IN A PUBLIC SPEECH IN IRAQ (BAGHDAD TEL NO 6ø5 REFERS).

2. JAMES ASKED WHETHER TAREQ AZIZ WOULD ASK FOR MORE FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT. SERVANT SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO INTERRUPTION IN THE SUPPLIES OF FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ. THE BULK OF IT WAS RADAR AND SPARE PARTS AT PRESENT. THERE WERE NO AIRCRAFT BEING SUPPLIED THOUGH THE MIRAGE F1 WERE ON ORDER. ONE OF IRAQ'S PROBLEMS WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS LIMITING ITS SUPPLIES OF ARMS AND SPARE PARTS.

3. JAMES ASKED WHETHER THE PRO-IRAQI STANCE OF FRANCE WAS CAUSING PROBLEMS IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH IRAN. SERVANT SAID THAT UP TILL NOW THE IRANIANS HAD NOT EXPRESSED ANY SPECIAL CONCERN AT FRANCE'S CLOSE CONNECTIONS WITH IRAQ. THE NEW FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAD ARRIVED AND WAS AT WORK. BUT THE LONGER THE WAR CONTINUED THE MORE HOSTILE THE IRANIAN ATTITUDE TO FRANCE WOULD BECOME.

4. THE FRENCH WERE USING THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE IRAQIS TO SHOW AS MUCH MODERATION AS POSSIBLE. THE DIFFICULTY WAS, HOWEVER, THAT THE IRANIANS SHOWED NO SIGNS OF BEING PREPARED TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS. THE FRENCH SAW NO SPECIAL INITIATIVE FOR THEMSELVES EXCEPT BY WORKING ON THE IRAQIS AND THROUGH THE NON-ALIGNED AND ISLAMIC GROUPS, ESSENTIALLY IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

5. FOR THE TIME BEING THE FRENCH WERE FINDING THEIR OIL ELSEWHERE AND THEY HAD NO PARTICULAR PROBLEM. SERVANT'S EXPECTATION WAS THAT THE WAR WOULD DRAG ON FOR SOME TIME YET. THE FRENCH ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE IRAQIS HAD NO PROBLEMS WITH MORALE IN THE ARMY AND THAT THE BA'ATH PARTY STRUCTURES WERE HOLDING UP WELL TO THE STRAINS. AS REGARDS SOVIET POLICY, THE FRENCH BELIEVE THE RUSSIANS' PRIME OBJECTIVE WAS TO AVOID TAKING SIDES. IN THE LONGER TERM THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO RE-ESTABLISH THEIR INFLUENCE IN IRAQ AND TO BEGIN TO ACQUIRE INFLUENCE IN IRAN. THE FRENCH THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS AND GENERALLY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST TO WORK AGAINST THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAQ.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BONN AND MOSCOW

HIBBERT.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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IRAQ/IRAN

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQ

01 211 6402

B M Norbury Esq
Private Secretary
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON
SW1

5 November 1980

Dear Brian,

IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT: MOD PRESENTATION

You copied your letter of ~~28~~ October to George Walden to Julian West.

We are very interested in the proposed DIS presentation on the Iran/Iraq conflict since the likely duration and outcome of the war has such important implications for the world oil market, and would accordingly like to attend in strength. As regards Ministerial attendence, the Secretary of State, together with Mr Norman Lamont and Mr John Moore would like to be present. We should also like four places for Senior Officials, and one for a private secretary.

Of the two dates offered we would prefer Monday 10 November since there is a danger of the Tuesday date clashing with the meeting of E planned for 11 a.m. on that day. I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely,

Geoff Dart

G S DART
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

5 NOV 1980

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 19

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
~~STR J GRAHAM~~
(Stet.) ~~MR J C MOBERLY~~
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
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Read in full

SIR A. ACLAND

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 031000Z NOV 80
FM AMMAN 030900Z NOV
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 447 OF 03 NOV
INFO BAGHDAD, BONN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, LUXEMBOURG, MOSCOW, PARIS, ROME, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 445 OF 1 NOVEMBER (NOT TO ALL):

IRAN/IRAQ

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN ON 1 NOVEMBER, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A DEAL BETWEEN IRAN AND THE US ON THE HOSTAGES AND OF US AGREEMENT TO RELEASE DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAN WERE UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND AND HAD BEEN THE MAIN TOPIC OF HIS RECENT EXCHANGES WITH THE IRAQI PRESIDENT. HE EXPRESSED EXTREME CONCERN OVER THE LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS, ESPECIALLY IF AS A RESULT IRAN WERE EVENTUALLY TO COME OUT ON TOP IN THE WAR (THE FIRST TIME HE HAS MENTIONED THIS POSSIBILITY TO ME). HE SAID THAT FOR THE ARABS THIS WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC AND THAT THEY WOULD FIND THEMSELVES SQUEEZED BETWEEN IRAN AND ISRAEL: IT MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN.
2. THE KING TOLD ME THAT HE HAD WRITTEN A LONG LETTER TO SADDAM TWO DAYS PREVIOUSLY, IN WHICH HE HAD SET OUT THE ISSUES AS HE SAW

2. THE KING TOLD ME THAT HE HAD WRITTEN A LONG LETTER TO SADDAM TWO DAYS PREVIOUSLY, IN WHICH HE HAD SET OUT THE ISSUES AS HE SAW THEM AND THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ARAB WORLD. HE WAS EXPECTING THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER LATER THAT DAY AND HOPED TO BE ABLE TO DISCUSS ALL THIS WITH HIM (TODAY'S PRESS REPORTS A BRIEF VISIT TO AMMAN BY HAMMADI, WHO WAS RECEIVED BY KING HUSSEIN AND LEFT FOR NEWYORK ON 2 NOVEMBER). HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO SADDAM AGAIN THAT MORNING ON THE TELEPHONE.

3. THE KING SAID THAT HE THOUGHT SOME FORM OF EUROPEAN MOVE TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AN END WAS NOW MORE NEEDED THAN EVER AND HE HOPED SOMETHING MIGHT COME OF RECENT CONTACTS. ONE DIFFICULTY HE SAW WAS THAT, APART FROM OURSELVES AND THE FRENCH, THE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTIRES HAD LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OR UNDERSTANDING OF THE AREA. PRINCE HASSAN'S RECENT VISIT TO PARIS RECEIVED A BRIEF MENTION, BUT THE KING CLEARLY DID NOT WISH TO BE DRAWN ON IT.

4. THE KING REVERTED TO WHAT HE TERMED IRAQ'S KEEN INTEREST IN ACQUIRING CHIEFTAIN TANKS (SEE MY TELNO 430 OF 28 OCTOBER, PARA 6). I SAID THAT I DID NOT THINK WE COULD PURSUE THIS SUBJECT WITH THE IRAQIS WHILE THE CONFLICT WAS IN PROGRESS, AND HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS. BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT WE COULD AT LEAST START THINKING ABOUT IT, LOOKING AT WHEN WE COULD OFFER DELIVERY ETC AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF IRAQ'S WISH TO LESSEN HER DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION.

5. THE KING DID NOT, EVEN BY IMPLICATION, LINK THIS QUESTION WITH THE DETAINED BRITISH SUBJECT (MY TUR, NOT TO ALL). BUT WHAT SEEMS TO BE SADDAM'S OBSESSION (SHARED BY THE KING) OVER THE POSSIBLE RELEASE OF US MILITARY SUPPLIES TO IRAN, IRAQI ANGER OVER SOVIET REFUSAL TO ALLOW ARMS SUPPLIES TO GET THROUGH TO IRAQ (WHICH SADDAM DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE ADMITTED TO KING HUSSEIN UNTIL HIS LATEST VISIT TO BAGHDAD ON 27/28 OCTOBER) AND THE IRAQI DESIRE TO COUNTERBALANCE WHAT THEY SEE AS IMPENDING US RESUPPLY OF IRAN MUST, I THINK BE INFLUENCING THE IRAQIS IN THEIR DEALINGS ON THIS MATTER.

URWICK

NNNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Iraq

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

31 October 1980

B.M. Norbury, Esq.,
Private Secretary,
Ministry of Defence,
Main Building,
Whitehall,
LONDON. S.W.1.

3/XI

Dear Brian,

IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT : MOD PRESENTATION

You sent me a copy of your letter of 28 October to George Walden.

Our nominees for your presentation are the Chief Secretary and Mr. R.G. Lavelle; the preferred date is 11 November. If the presentation has to take place on 10 November, then we should like Mr. F.R. Barratt and Mr. J.E. Hansford to attend. Perhaps you could settle the arrangements with their offices.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely

John Wiggins

A.J. WIGGINS

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

IRAN/IRAQ

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
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HD/ES & SD
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CONFIDENTIAL
FM BAGHDAD 300953Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 579 OF 30/10/80
INFO IMMEDIATE WARSAW (DESKBY 301200Z) FOR P.S.
PRIORITY AMMAN, KUWAIT, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND BAHRAIN
INFO SAVING TO UK DEL NATO.

Read in full.

DESKBY 301200Z

KUWAIT TELS 619 TO YOU AND 38 TO US: LORD GEORGE-BROWN.

1. LORD GEORGE-BROWN VISITED BAGHDAD AT THE INVITATION OF PRESIDENT HUSSAIN FROM 1330 HOURS ON 29 OCTOBER UNTIL 0800 HRS ON 30 OCTOBER. HE HAD A TWO HOUR MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ OF THE RCC AND THEN TWO HOURS WITH THE PRESIDENT. I BRIEFED HIM OVER LUNCH ON 29 OCTOBER, AND DICKSON DEBRIEFED HIM THIS MORNING BEFORE HE RETURNED TO KUWAIT. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF WHAT HE TOLD DICKSON. ON SPARKES, GEORGE-BROWN'S REMARKS ARE IN MY IFT.

2. GEORGE-BROWN SAID THAT HE HAD FOUND SADDAM HUSSAIN WEARY, ALTHOUGH CONFIDENT ABOUT THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE WAR. TARIQ AZIZ HAD BEEN VERY RELAXED. THEY REALISED THAT THEIR EARLIER STRATEGY HAD BEEN WRONG, AND HAD SETTLED DOWN NOW TO A WAR OF ATTRITION.

AZIZ HAD BEEN VERY RELAXED. THEY REALISED THAT THEIR EARLIER STRATEGY HAD BEEN WRONG, AND HAD SETTLED DOWN NOW TO A WAR OF ATTRITION. IRAQ HAD TAKEN THIS INTO ACCOUNT IN DECIDING IT NEEDED NEITHER MEN NOR MATERIAL HELP FROM OUTSIDE. IT HAD IN FACT REFUSED TWO SUCH OFFERS. IT HAD LOST ONLY ABOUT TWO PER CENT OF ITS ARMOUR. THE LOSSES OF MEN HOWEVER IN GETTING INTO KHORRAMSHAHR HAD BEEN HEAVY, AND THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED NOT (NOT) TO SEND INFANTRY OR ARMOUR INTO AHWAZ OR DEZFUL. HE HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO ENTER ABADAN, BUT IT WAS COMPLETELY ENCIRCLED. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD BEEN ASTONISHED BY THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT WHICH THE SHAH HAD STOCKPILED, AND FREELY ADMITTED THAT THE IRANIAN WEAPONS AND AIRCRAFT WERE MUCH BETTER THAN WHAT IRAQ HAD. HOWEVER IRANIAN TROOPS WERE NOT CAPABLE OF USING THEM IN MANY CASES, AND MUCH HAD BEEN CAPTURED WITHOUT A FIGHT. THE IRANIANS HAD HAD HUGE LOSSES, EG. EIGHTY TWO TANKS IN TWELVE HOURS AT AHWAZ, AND TWENTY NINE IN THREE HOURS AT DEZFUL. ALL THE DIVISIONS OF IRAN'S FORCES WERE NOW COMMITTED IN THE SOUTH WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE IN TEHRAN. SADDAM REMARKED THAT THE WAY INTO IRAN WAS NOW OPEN FOR THE RUSSIANS.

3. SADDAM WAS INCENSED ABOUT THE APPARENT US WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE SPARE PARTS FOR IRAN IF THE HOSTAGES WERE RELEASED. ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD NOT AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR, IT WOULD CERTAINLY PROLONG IT, AND WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR THE WHOLE AREA. THE PRESIDENT TOLD GEORGE-BROWN THAT IF THE WAR CONTINUED, HIS POLITICAL FLEXIBILITY WOULD BE SEVERELY CURTAILED. HE HAS FOUND WHEN VISITING FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED IN THE WAR THAT THEY URGED HIM REPEATEDLY NOT (NOT) TO GIVE UP ONE INCH OF LAND GAINED. THIS WAS A FAIR REFLECTION OF PUBLIC OPINION, HE CLAIMED. HE WOULD HAVE FEWER OPTIONS OPEN TO HIM THE LONGER THE WAR CONTINUED. TARIQ AZIZ DID NOT AGREETL WITH THIS VIEW AND SAID SO TO SADDAM .LC
HE SAID WITH QUOTE CHILLING
DELIBERATION UNQUOTE THAT IF IRANIAN FORCES WITHDREW INTO THE CITIES, AS WAS OFTEN THE CASE WITH AN ARMY IN DIFFICULTIES, HE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO BOMBARD THEM INTO SUBMISSION. HE MENTIONED AHWAZ AND DEZFUL PARTICULARLY. IRAQI COLUMNS HAD IN FACT MOVED AWAY FROM AHWAZ AND DEZFUL BACK TOWARDS THE EASTERN BANK OF THE SHATT, SO AS TO MAKE QUITE CLEAR THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE DESIGNS ON IRANIAN DERRITORY. HE IMPLIED THAT IRAQI MILITARY EXPERTISE AND STRATEGY WERE NOT (NOT) UP TO THE TAKS OF CAPTURING THESE TWO CITIES.

4. SADDAM REPEATED THAT HE WAS PREPARED FOR A CEASEFIRE AT ANY TIME, AND HAD NO INTENTION OF RETAINING ANY IRANIAN TERRITORY. HE REQUIRED HOWEVER ABSOLUTE GUARANTEES ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT AL ARAB, AND THE OTHER AREAS WHICH HAD BEEN CONCEDED UNDER THE 1975 AGREEMENT, BUT WHICH HAD NOT BEEN HANDED OVER AND WHICH THE IRANIANS HAD THEN USED TO SHELL IRAQI POSITIONS FROM

UNDER THE 1975 AGREEMENT, BUT WHICH HAD NOT BEEN HANDED OVER AND WHICH THE IRANIANS HAD THEN USED TO SHELL IRAQI POSITIONS FROM SINCE 4 SEPTEMBER. NEGOTIATION WAS NOT (NOT) POSSIBLE IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, SADDAM CONTINUED , ALTHOUGH HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH ANY ESTABLISHED CENTRAL AUTHORITY IN IRAN. IF THE WAR CONTINUED, THEN THERE WOULD ALSO BE A SERIOUS DANGER OF THE FRAGMENTATION OF IRAN WHICH (ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT DESIRE IT) HE WOULD PROBABLY ENCOURAGE IF IT WOULD BRING THE WAR TO A SPEEDIER END. HE HAD MADE AN OFFER TO THE EXILED IRANIANS BAKHTIAR, JAM AND AMINI TO COME BACK AND TAKE PART IN THE RUNNING OF THE CAPTURED TERRITORIES. THEY HAD ACCEPTED THIS.

5. LORBWGEORGE-BROWN TOLD US THAT WE MAY EXPECT TO HEAR THAT THESE EXILES HAVE AGREED TO SET UP SOME SORT OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

6. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT RULE OUT AN INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE IN THE SHAPE OF A DEMILITARISED ZONE ALONG THE EASTERN BANK OF THE SHATT IF THAT WAS WHAT WAS REQUIRED TO ENSURE IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY AND AT THE SAME TIME ILLUSTRATE THAT IRAQ DID NOT WISH TO OCCUPY IRANIAN TERRITORY. LORD GEORGE-BROWN TOLD US THAT IN KUWAIT HE HAD LEANRED (POSSIBLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OR THE FOREIGN MINISTER) THAT THE WIDTH OF TERRITORY THE IRAQIS BELIEVED THEY NEEDED TO CONTROL BEFORE THEY WOULD CEASE THEIR ADVANCE INTO KHUZISTAN WAS A STRIP ELEVEN KILOMETRES WIDE FROM THE EASTERN BANK OF THE SHATT.

7. TARIQ AZIZ AND THE PRESIDENT DISAGREED COMPLETELY ON THE BRITISH POSITION. THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT THAT AN OFFICIAL LINE TOWARDS IRAQ WAS GOOD ALTHOUGH THE MKODIA WAS GENERALLY HOSTILE. HE HAD HAD SEPARATE REPORTS THAT TWO BRITISH AMBASSADORS IN OTHER CAPITALS HAD PUT IT ABOUT THAT WE WERE DISQUIETED THAT IRAQ HAD DONE SO WELL MILITARILY. TARIQ AZIZ SAID THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THESE AMBASSADORS WAS, IN FACT, TYPICAL OF HMG'S VIEW, AND THAT HMG HAD ALREADY MADE A DECISION TO FOLLOW THE AMERICANS IN RESUPPLY TO IRAN OF SPARE PARTS IF THE HOSTAGES WERE RELEASED. THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT THAT HMG HAD NOT (NOT) YET TAKEN SUCH A DECISION, BUT THAT IF THEY DID, THE RESULTS WOULD BE EXTREMELY DAMAGING TO UK INTERESTS THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD. WHEN LORD GEORGE-BROWN ASKED WHAT SUCH DAMAGE WOULD AMOUNT TO, SADDAM HUSSAIN DID NOT ELABORATE. HE DID REPEAT HOWEVER THAT IT WOULD PROLONG THE WAR, WHICH WAS HARDLY IN LINE WITH HIMG'S EXPRESSED WISH TO SEE IT BROUGHT TO AN EARLY END.

8. ON THE SUBJECT OF ARAB SOLIDARITY, SADDAM SAID THAT HE HAD SENT HIS MINISTER OF DEFENCE TO BAHRAIN WHEN THE AUTHORITIES THERE

8. ON THE SUBJECT OF ARAB SOLIDARITY, SADDAM SAID THAT HE HAD SENT HIS MINISTER OF DEFENCE TO BAHRAIN WHEN THE AUTHORITIES THERE SHOWED SIGNS OF FALTERING, AND THAT THEY WERE MUCH STIFFENED AS A RESULT.

9. THE INTERPRETER, MAZIN ZAHAWI, WITH WHOM LORD GEORGE-BROWN HAD A WORD WHILE WAITING TO SEE THE PRESIDENT, VOLUNTEERED THAT SOME SECTIONS OF THE IRAQI FORCES HAD BEEN VERY INEFFICIENT. FOR EXAMPLE THEIR RADAR HAD MISREAD THE BLEEPS AND SHOT DOWN A NUMBER OF THEIR OWN PLANES.

10. LORD GEORGE-BROWN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD REMARKED THAT HE WAS VERY HAPPY THAT HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO RECEIVE THAT DAY THE CREDENTIALS OETHE NEW BRITISH AMBASSADOR WHO HAD MADE A VERY FAVOURABLE IMPRESSION ON HIM, AND WITH WHOM HE HAD ENJOYED HIS CONVERSATION (SUMMARY IN MY TEL NO 574 (NOT TO ALL).

11. GEORGE-BROWN ASKED US PARTICULARLY TO RESPECT HIS CONFIDENCE. THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID THAT HE HAD NOT SPOKEN TO ANYONE ELSE IN SUCH FRANK TERMS, AND TRUSTED HIM. GEORGE-BROWN SAID THAT IF OTHER POINTS OCCURRED TO HIM HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DIVULGE THEM ON RETURN TO LONDON.

12. SEE MY IFT, NOT TO ALL.

EGERTON

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CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 415
CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS 3Ø165ØZ OCT 8Ø
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 898 OF 3Ø OCTOBER 198Ø
INFO BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, JEDDA, TEL AVIV AND BONN

Read Gill

MY TELNO 89Ø: IRAN/IRAQ: VISIT OF M MORIZET

1. WHEN MINISTER CALLED TODAY ON M LECLERCQ, DIPLOMATIC COUNSELLOR AT THE ELYSEE, HE ASKED HIM WHAT THE BACKGROUND WAS TO THE VISIT OF M MORIZET TO BAGHDAD.

2. LECLERCQ SAID THE IDEA HAD BEEN TO MAKE A GESTURE TOWARDS PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD HAD A NUMBER OF CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS AND SEVERAL MESSAGES HAD PASSED BETWEEN PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT GISCARD. THE IRAQIS WERE NOT DOING WELL IN THEIR WAR AGAINST IRAN. WHEN AGHA SHAHI HAD PASSED THROUGH PARIS THE OTHER DAY, HE HAD SAID THE IRANIANS WERE DISORGANISED BUT PROSECUTING A WAR WITH FULL NATIONAL SUPPORT. THE IRAQIS WERE COMPARITIVELY WELL ORGANISED BUT THE LEADERSHIP WAS COMPLETELY CUT OFF FROM THE POPULAR ROOTS. LECLERCQ SAID THE REPUTATION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD SUFFERED AND, GIVEN THE FRENCH INTERESTS IN IRAQ, THE PRESIDENT HAD JUDGED IT WISE TO MAKE A GESTURE IN HIS DIRECTION. MORIZET HAPPENED TO BE IN PARIS AT THE TIME ATTENDING A CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS AND HAD THEREFORE BEEN USED AS ENVOY, GIVEN HIS GOOD CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQIS FROM HIS TIME AS AMBASSADOR THERE.

3. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ANY FRENCH INITIATIVE. THE ONLY INITIATIVES WHICH WERE LIKELY TO RUN WERE THOSE UNDERTAKEN BY THE ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED GROUPS. JAMES ASKED ABOUT A REPORT IN THE PARIS PRESS THAT THE FRENCH WERE MAKING PROPOSALS FOR A CEASEFIRE AT THE UNITED NATIONS. LECLERCQ SAID THAT THE IRAQIS HAD ASKED THE FRENCH TO HELP IN ENSURING THAT ANY RESOLUTION THAT WAS PUT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE A BALANCED ONE AND SHOULD NOT MERELY CONDEMN IRAQ. THE FRENCH WERE PREPARED TO HELP IRAQ IN THIS WAY. LECLERCQ SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH POLICY IN THE IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE WAS DIFFERENT BUT COMPLEMENTARY. .THE FRENCH WERE MAINLY CONCERNED WITH THE POSSIBLE COLLAPSE OF PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME AND IRAQ'S POSSIBLE RETURN TO SOVIET INFLUENCE. THEY WERE IN FAVOUR OF THE EVOLUTION WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN IRAQ OVER THE LAST YEAR TOWARDS A LESS PRO-SOVIET POLICY. HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE MORE CONCERNED THAN THE FRENCH WITH THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF TOTAL COLLAPSE OF THE IRANIAN REGIME AND OF THE ENSUING RISK OF AN EXPANSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAN AND IN THE AREA GENERALLY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ALTHOUGH

ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH HAD AN EMBASSY IN IRAN AND INDEED THEIR AMBASSADOR HAD ARRIVED IN TEHRAN YESTERDAY, THEY HAD LITTLE INFLUENCE ON OR CONTACT WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AT THE PRESENT TIME. THE FACT THAT THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE IRAQIS WERE CLOSE DID NOT FAVOUR THEM IN IRANIAN EYES.

HIBBERT.

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD		ADDITIONAL DISTN.
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OUT TELEGRAM

29.10.80 29

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
SECRET-BURNING BUSH/DEDIP	IMMEDIATE

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GRS
CLASS
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TEL NO

ZCZC
GRS
SECRET-BURNING BUSH
DEDIP

MS Read in full.

FM FCO 291615Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE WARSAW
TELEGRAM NUMBER
FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM HEAD OF PLANNING STAFF
QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS, 27 OCTOBER

1. The Secretary of State may wish to have a short account of the Quadripartite discussion on Iran/Iraq on 27 October.

2. Our new move of circulating in advance a list of questions about Western action helped to focus discussion on policy. The French will now circulate a note of the points agreed ad referendum on 27 October and of those on which there was no agreement. We shall be free to comment on the formulations used. The next meeting will be on 13 November in Paris.

3. There was general agreement that stalemate persisted in the war; that the four should continue for the moment to leave others to lead in mediation efforts; that the Russians were still keeping their options open; and that it would not be in Western interests for the Soviet Union to be a party to any new arrangement concerning territory or navigation in the Gulf after the war.

4. In discussion of Naval matters, there were differences on

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword: whether
File number	Dept: S/S Office	Distribution: Limited Head of Planning Staff PS Sir J Graham Mr Bullard cc M Alexander, No 10
Drafted by (Block capitals): C L G Mallaby		
Telephone number: 233 4333		
Authorised for despatch: RMJL 29/X		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

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whether action would be appropriate only after an interruption of shipping in the Gulf. The Americans seemed to envisage that action might be necessary when interruption was only threatened. The conclusion was that there would be no Naval action before political decisions by governments; that high level consultations between the four and maybe Australia and New Zealand would be needed before the decisions were taken; and that the need for these consultations would arise if anything happened which impinged on freedom of navigation. This implies that consultations would take place in the event of an interruption or if an interruption was threatened. It was thought that the consultations might take place among Heads of Government and/or Foreign Ministers. The French agreed after some discussion that a quickly convened meeting of the four Political Directors might be an element in the consultations and that contact between Christopher and the three Ambassadors in Washington could be borne in mind as a possibility.

5. The French suggested some further guidelines: that we should not allow an event which threatened shipping in the Gulf to pass without any Western reaction; that we should act speedily if such an event took place; that we should not act punitively or in retaliation but in order to restore freedom of navigation; and that we should act to the degree necessary to achieve this result but no more.

6. The French displayed a strong preference for taking Naval action alone in response to certain types of incident, for instance if a merchant vessel was involved which belonged to France or a country friendly to France or was carrying oil for France. They recognised that a broader threat to shipping would require action by all the Western Navies in the area. It was pointed out in discussion that the nearest Naval units to an incident involving a single tanker would be the right ones to take action.

7. The Americans firmly opposed our MOD's insistence on Naval

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convoying of tankers as the right way to keep the Gulf open. The Americans argued that escorted convoys would not work for vast tankers which had to keep 18 miles apart, and that convoying in narrow Straits would be difficult. They advocated their sectoral approach, under which each Navy would have responsibility for a designated area of water. They suggested that this would allow for a kind of convoying if necessary: merchant ships could be seen through one sector by the Navy responsible there and handed on to another Navy when entering the next sector. The Americans did not give a straight answer when asked whether they were satisfied that merchant vessels would be persuaded to enter the Gulf under these Naval arrangements. (We are going over these matters again with MOD.) The best conclusion the Quadripartite discussion could reach was that only the Navies could reconcile these important differences about the best type of Naval action and that the Naval talks, which the French still insist should remain bilateral, should be speeded up and should take account of the Political Directors' discussion.

8. There were differences about whether the agreement of littoral states would be needed before any Naval action. The elastic formulation agreed upon was that we should secure the agreement of the littoral states. The French argued that some, for instance Kuwait, might prefer not to be consulted before Naval action. The Americans also revealed that, while preferring to act jointly with friendly Navies, they might do so alone if necessary: the main thing was that the US intended to keep shipping moving in the Gulf.

9. In a discussion about the hostages, the Americans said that they had no intention, if there was a deal, of supplying to Iran military equipment not already contracted for. But military goods worth $400 million were already waiting to go. There were three categories. The first was sophisticated equipment which the US had decided not to deliver even before the hostages were seized;

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this would not be released. The second category was spares and less advanced equipment; this would be released. The third was major pieces of equipment belonging to Iran which were being overhauled or modernised in the US. Here decisions would be taken case by case. The French argued against the US going too far too fast in rebuilding relations with Iran. US support for Iran as well as Israel could create the feeling that the Americans were anti-Arab on everything. The American reply was that domestic opinion would not allow the US again to become the protector of Iran. The US wanted to be the protector of Israel and of Saudi Arabia, while trying also to keep Iraq away from the Soviet Union.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

28

Mr. Alexander
No 10 Downing St.

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TO IMMEDIATE WARSAW
TELEGRAM NUMBER 508 OF 29 OCTOBER

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM HEAD OF PLANNING STAFF
QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS, 27 OCTOBER
1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY WISH TO HAVE A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE QUADRIPARTITE DISCUSSION ON IRAN/IRAQ ON 27 OCTOBER.
2. OUR NEW MOVE OF CIRCULATING IN ADVANCE A LIST OF QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN ACTION HELPED TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON POLICY. THE FRENCH WILL NOW CIRCULATE A NOTE OF THE POINTS AGREED AD REFERENDUM ON 27 OCTOBER AND OF THOSE ON WHICH THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT. WE SHALL BE FREE TO COMMENT ON THE FORMULATIONS USED. THE NEXT MEETING WILL BE ON 13 NOVEMBER IN PARIS.
3. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT STALEMATE PERSISTED IN THE WAR: THAT THE FOUR SHOULD CONTINUE FOR THE MOMENT TO LEAVE OTHERS TO LEAD IN MEDIATION EFFORTS: THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL KEEPING THEIR OPTIONS OPEN: AND THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN WESTERN INTERESTS FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO BE A PARTY TO ANY NEW ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING TERRITORY OR NAVIGATION IN THE GULF AFTER THE WAR.
4. IN DISCUSSION OF NAVAL MATTERS, THERE WERE DIFFERENCES ON WHETHER ACTION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE ONLY AFTER AN INTERRUPTION OF SHIPPING IN THE GULF. THE AMERICANS SEEMED TO ENVISAGE THAT ACTION MIGHT BE NECESSARY WHEN INTERRUPTION WAS ONLY THREATENED. THE CONCLUSION WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO NAVAL ACTION BEFORE POLITICAL DECISIONS BY GOVERNMENTS: THAT HIGH LEVEL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE FOUR AND MAYBE AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WOULD BE NEEDED BEFORE THE DECISIONS WERE TAKEN: AND THAT THE NEED FOR THESE CONSULTATIONS WOULD ARISE IF ANYTHING HAPPENED WHICH IMPINGED ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. THIS IMPLIES THAT CONSULTATIONS

WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE EVENT OF AN INTERRUPTION OR IF AN INTERRUPTION WAS THREATENED. IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE CONSULTATIONS MIGHT TAKE PLACE AMONG HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND/OR FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE FRENCH AGREED AFTER SOME DISCUSSION THAT A QUICKLY CONVENED MEETING OF THE FOUR POLITICAL DIRECTORS MIGHT BE AN ELEMENT IN THE CONSULTATIONS AND THAT CONTACT BETWEEN CHRISTOPHER AND THE THREE AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON COULD BE BORNE IN MIND AS A POSSIBILITY.

5. THE FRENCH SUGGESTED SOME FURTHER GUIDELINES: THAT WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW AN EVENT WHICH THREATENED SHIPPING IN THE GULF TO PASS WITHOUT ANY WESTERN REACTION: THAT WE SHOULD ACT SPEEDILY IF SUCH AN EVENT TOOK PLACE: THAT WE SHOULD NOT ACT PUNITIVELY OR IN RETALIATION BUT IN ORDER TO RESTORE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION: AND THAT WE SHOULD ACT TO THE DEGREE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THIS RESULT BUT NO MORE.

6. THE FRENCH DISPLAYED A STRONG PREFERENCE FOR TAKING NAVAL ACTION ALONE IN RESPONSE TO CERTAIN TYPES OF INCIDENT, FOR INSTANCE IF A MERCHANT VESSEL WAS INVOLVED WHICH BELONGED TO FRANCE OR A COUNTRY FRIENDLY TO FRANCE OR WAS CARRYING OIL FOR FRANCE. THEY RECOGNISED THAT A BROADER THREAT TO SHIPPING WOULD REQUIRE ACTION BY ALL THE WESTERN NAVIES IN THE AREA. IT WAS POINTED OUT IN DISCUSSION THAT THE NEAREST NAVAL UNITS TO AN INCIDENT INVOLVING A SINGLE TANKER WOULD BE THE RIGHT ONES TO TAKE ACTION.

7. THE AMERICANS FIRMLY OPPOSED OUR MOD'S INSISTENCE ON NAVAL CONVOYING OF TANKERS AS THE RIGHT WAY TO KEEP THE GULF OPEN. THE AMERICANS ARGUED THAT ESCORTED CONVOYS WOULD NOT WORK FOR VAST TANKERS WHICH HAD TO KEEP 18 MILES APART, AND THAT CONVOYING IN NARROW STRAITS WOULD BE DIFFICULT. THEY ADVOCATED THEIR SECTORAL APPROACH, UNDER WHICH EACH NAVY WOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR A DESIGNATED AREA OF WATER. THEY SUGGESTED THAT THIS WOULD ALLOW FOR A KIND OF CONVOYING IF NECESSARY: MERCHANT SHIPS COULD BE SEEN THROUGH ONE SECTOR BY THE NAVY RESPONSIBLE THERE AND HANDED ON TO ANOTHER NAVY WHEN ENTERING THE NEXT SECTOR. THE AMERICANS DID NOT GIVE A STRAIGHT ANSWER WHEN ASKED WHETHER THEY WERE SATISFIED THAT MERCHANT VESSELS WOULD BE PERSUADED TO ENTER THE GULF UNDER THESE NAVAL ARRANGEMENTS. (WE ARE GOING OVER

THESE MATTERS AGAIN WITH MOD.) THE BEST CONCLUSION THE QUADRIPARTITE DISCUSSION COULD REACH WAS THAT ONLY THE NAVIES COULD RECONCILE THESE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES ABOUT THE BEST TYPE OF NAVAL ACTION AND THAT THE NAVAL TALKS, WHICH THE FRENCH STILL INSIST SHOULD REMAIN BILATERAL, SHOULD BE SPEEDED UP AND SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS' DISCUSSION.

8. THERE WERE DIFFERENCES ABOUT WHETHER THE AGREEMENT OF LITTORAL STATES WOULD BE NEEDED BEFORE ANY NAVAL ACTION. THE ELASTIC FORMULATION AGREED UPON WAS THAT WE SHOULD SECURE THE AGREEMENT OF THE LITTORAL STATES. THE FRENCH ARGUED THAT SOME, FOR INSTANCE KUWAIT, MIGHT PREFER NOT TO BE CONSULTED BEFORE NAVAL ACTION. THE AMERICANS ALSO REVEALED THAT, WHILE PREFERRING TO ACT JOINTLY WITH FRIENDLY NAVIES, THEY MIGHT DO SO ALONE IF NECESSARY: THE MAIN THING WAS THAT THE US INTENDED TO KEEP SHIPPING MOVING IN THE GULF.

9. IN A DISCUSSION ABOUT THE HOSTAGES, THE AMERICANS SAID THAT THEY HAD NO INTENTION, IF THERE WAS A DEAL, OF SUPPLYING TO IRAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT NOT ALREADY CONTRACTED FOR. BUT MILITARY GOODS WORTH DOLLARS 400 MILLION WERE ALREADY WAITING TO GO. THERE WERE THREE CATEGORIES. THE FIRST WAS SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT WHICH THE US HAD DECIDED NOT TO DELIVER EVEN BEFORE THE HOSTAGES WERE SEIZED: THIS WOULD NOT BE RELEASED. THE SECOND CATEGORY WAS SPARES AND LESS ADVANCED EQUIPMENT: THIS WOULD BE RELEASED. THE THIRD WAS MAJOR PIECES OF EQUIPMENT BELONGING TO IRAN WHICH WERE BEING OVERHAULED OR MODERNISED IN THE US. HERE DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN CASE BY CASE. THE FRENCH ARGUED AGAINST THE US GOING TOO FAR TOO FAST IN REBUILDING RELATIONS WITH IRAN. US SUPPORT FOR IRAN AS WELL AS ISRAEL COULD CREATE THE FEELING THAT THE AMERICANS WERE ANTI-ARAB ON EVERYTHING. THE AMERICAN REPLY WAS THAT DOMESTIC OPINION WOULD NOT ALLOW THE US AGAIN TO BECOME THE PROTECTOR OF IRAN. THE US WANTED TO BE THE PROTECTOR OF ISRAEL AND OF SAUDI ARABIA, WHILE TRYING ALSO TO KEEP IRAQ AWAY FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED
HEAD/PLANNING STAFF
PS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR BULLARD

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FM AMMAN 281712Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 430 OF 28 OCT 80

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD BONN DAMASCUS JEDDA MOSCOW PARIS ROME TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 428 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY KING HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON IMMEDIATELY ON HIS RETURN FROM IRAQ. HE CLAIMED HE HAD FOUND IRAQI MORALE HIGH AND PRESIDENT SADDAM CONFIDENT IN THE STRENGTH OF HIS POSITION AND IN THE BELIEF THAT AN OPPORTUNITY NOW EXISTED TO ACHIEVE A LASTING SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE GULF.

2. THE KING SAID HE HAD BEEN SHOWN LARGE QUANTITIES OF CAPTURED IRANIAN EQUIPMENT, MUCH OF IT BRAND NEW, INCLUDING CHIEFTAIN AND M60 TANKS, SCORPIONS AND 155MM ARTILLERY. THE IRAQIS WERE, HOWEVER, BEGINNING TO RUN SHORT OF AMMUNITION AND SPARE PARTS. SINCE THE START OF THE CONFLICT THE RUSSIANS HAD COMPLETELY SHUT OFF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO IRAQ AND HAD FORBIDDEN SOVIET VESSELS WHICH HAD BEEN ON THEIR WAY TO IRAQ WHEN THE WAR BEGAN TO LAND THEIR CARGOES IN ARAB PORTS, IN SPITE OF OFFERS TO RECEIVE THEM FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. 170 TANKS AND IMPORTANT CONSIGNMENTS OF AMMUNITION AND SPARES WERE THUS BEING PREVENTED FROM REACHING IRAQ. THE IRAQIS HAD HAD VERY HEATED EXCHANGES WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THIS SUBJECT: ACCORDING TO THE KING, THE IRAQIS WERE NOW COMPLETELY DISILLUSIONED WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WERE LOOKING FOR NEW AND CLOSER RELATIONSHIPS WITH WESTERN EUROPE.

3. THE KING SAID HE HAD OF COURSE DISCUSSED THE VARIOUS CURRENT PEACE INITIATIVES WITH THE IRAQI PRESIDENT. SADDAM REMAINED VERY SCEPTICAL OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEDIATION ATTEMPT AND, ALTHOUGH HE HAD GONE ALONG WITH THE ISLAMIC INITIATIVE DID NOT SEEM TO THINK THAT IT WAS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESULTS. HE HAD HOWEVER BEEN MUCH ENCOURAGED BY HIS DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD'S EMISSARY (KING HUSSEIN UNDERSTOOD HE WAS AT PRESENT IN BAGHDAD AND REPRESENTED A EUROPEAN MEDIATION ATTEMPT: I TOLD THE KING THAT I DID NOT KNOW ON WHAT BASIS HE HAD BEEN SENT). THE FRENCH ENVOY HAD APPARENTLY SUGGESTED TO THE IRAQIS THAT A CEASE-FIRE SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE PLACE WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED. THIS WAS VERY MUCH IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM'S OWN INCLINATION AND SADDAM HOPED THAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD NOW PURSUE THE ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT ON THESE LINES (PRESUMABLY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ALTHOUGH THE KING DID NOT SAY SO).

4. THE KING THEN WENT ON TO GIVE A (PRETTY DISCOURAGING) ACCOUNT OF SADDAM'S CURRENT THINKING ON THE MAIN ISSUES. SADDAM HAD REITERATED THAT HE WAS NOT SEEKING TERRITORIAL GAINS OR THE DISMEMBERMENT OF IRAN. NONETHELESS HE HAD REFERRED TO ARABISTAN AS AN ARAB ISSUE AND TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME NEW STATUS FOR THE CITY OF KHORAMSHAHR, SUCH AS THE REVIVAL OF THE OLD ARAB SHEIKHDOM. HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST MIGHT ONE DAY WELCOME THIS, ESPECIALLY IF THE REST OF IRAN WERE TO FALL UNDER COMMUNIST RULE. SADDAM HAD ALSO REFERRED TO THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THE 3 ISLANDS AND TO THE THREAT THEY COULD PRESENT TO WESTERN SECURITY IF THEY WERE TO FALL INTO THE WRONG HANDS, AND STILL SEEMED TO BE THINKING OF THEIR RETURN TO ARAB RULE. ON THE SHATT, SADDAM HAD SAID HE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL TO REVERT TO THE POSITION WHICH EXISTED BEFORE THE 1975 TREATY (THE CONDITIONS WHICH IRAQ HAD THEN ACCEPTED HAVING PROVED IMPOSSIBLE) AND THAT IRAQ SHOULD HAVE FULL SOVREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT: THE IRANIANS HAD IN ANY CASE BUILT A CANAL WHICH LESSENED THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE SHATT, WHEREAS IT WAS IRAQ'S ONLY OUTLET TO THE SEA. THE KING MADE NO REFERENCE TO SADDAM'S VIEWS ON DELINEATION OF THE NORTH WESTERN FRONTIER BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN.

5. THE KING SAID HE WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSING HIS VISIT WITH ANY OTHER WEST EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVES IN AMMAN FOR THE TIME BEING (THE FRENCH AMBASSADOG IS IN ANY CASE IN PARIS) AND ASKED ME NOT TO REVEAL WHAT HE HAD SAID TO MY EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES HERE. HOWEVER HE HOPED YOU MIGHT DRAW ON WHAT HE HAD SAID IN DISCUSSING WITH OTHER EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS WHAT SHOULD NOW BE DONE TO TERMINATE THE CONFLICT. I DID NOT THINK IT PROFITABLE AT THIS STAGE TO START A DISCUSSION WITH THE KING ON WHY PRESIDENT SADDAM'S IDEAS WERE UNLIKELY IN THEIR PRESENT FORM TO PROVIDE A FRUITFUL BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION WITH THE IRANIANS: PRESUMABLY THEY IN ANY CASE REPRESENT A MAXIMAL IRAQI OPENING POSITION.

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6. KING HUSSEIN ALSO MENTIONED KEEN IRAQI INTEREST IN THE CHIEFTAIN TANK AND OTHER BRITISH DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND IN THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT VENTURES WITH JORDAN AND THE UK FOR THE ASSEMBLY OF LAND ROVERS AND ROLLS ROYCE DIESEL ENGINES (BOTH OF WHICH HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE JORDANIANS). HE SAID THAT JORDAN AND IRAQ WOULD BE FORMING A JOINT COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITIES MORE FULLY. I ASSUME ALL THIS WAS INTENDED TO INCREASE OUR INTEREST IN IRAQ'S NEW ENTHUSIASM FOR CLOSER LINKS WITH BRITAIN AND WESTERN EUROPE.

7 SEE MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 429 (NOT TO ALL) ON BRITISH SUBJECTS IMPRISONED IN IRAQ.

URWICK

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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MO 3/9/4/2

28th October 1980

Dear George,

IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT: MOD PRESENTATION

My Secretary of State has asked the Defence Intelligence Staff to give a presentation on the Iraq/Iran conflict. We are trying to arrange this for Monday 10th November at 10 a.m. or Tuesday 11th November at the same time.

My Secretary of State wondered whether Ministers, and senior officials, from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Treasury, and the Departments of Trade and Energy would like to attend this presentation and I should be grateful for advice from you, and those to whom I am copying this letter, by the end of this week with an indication of the preferred date. We might have to limit the attendance of officials if there was undue competition for seats but we can consider that further in the light of bids.

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Gomersall (Private Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal), John Wiggins and Terry Mathews (Treasury), Stuart Hampson (Trade) and Julian West (Energy). Copies also go to Michael Alexander at No 10 and David Wright (Cabinet Office), the latter of whom may wish to consider whether Sir Robert Armstrong or a member of the Cabinet Secretariat would wish to attend. We are inviting the Chairman of JIC.

Yours ever,
Barry

(B M NORBURY)

G G H Walden Esq

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TELNO 428 OF 28 OCT 80
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD DAMASCUS JEDDA TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

Read in full.

YOUR TELNO 877 OF 22 OCTOBER TO UKMIS NEW YORK: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. KING HUSSEIN, ACCOMPANIED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, LEFT FOR BAGHDAD LATE ON 26 OCTOBER AND IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO AMMAN THIS AFTERNOON. NO NEWS OF THIS VISIT HAS YET BEEN RELEASED HERE.

2. MY US COLLEAGUE (PLEASE PROTECT) SAW KING HUSSEIN SEVERAL TIMES LAST WEEK, BOTH TO CARRY OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS REFERRED TO IN YOUR TUR AND ALSO TO TRY TO ALLAY JORDANIAN AND IRAQI ANXIETIES CONCERNING A POSSIBLE US DEAL WITH IRAN ON THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES. VELIOTES TOLD ME THAT HE HAD FLOATED WITH THE KING A NUMBER OF IDEAS AS IF THEY WERE HIS OWN ON ELEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON IRAN/IRAQ TO COVER BOTH WITHDRAWAL AND NON-INTERVENTION IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL

BOTH WITHDRAWAL AND NON-INTERVENTION IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS: THE AMERICAN HOPE WAS THAT THE UNDERTAKING ON NON-INTERVENTION, WHICH WAS REALLY INTENDED TO APPLY TO THE IRANIANS, MIGHT MAKE THE IDEA OF WITHDRAWAL MORE PALATABLE TO THE IRAQIS. KING HUSSEIN HAD REACTED PREDICTABLY, CLAIMING THAT THE REAL AGGRESSOR HAD BEEN IRAN AND THAT THE DEMAND FOR TOTAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AMOUNTED TO TAKING SIDES IN THE CONFLICT.

3. ON THE POSSIBLE RELEASE OF US ARMS SUPPLIES FOR IRAN, VELIOTES SAID HE HAD TOLD THE KING BLUNTLY THAT THERE MIGHT WELL BE SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION IN US WAREHOUSES AWAITING SHIPMENT TO IRAN, WHICH HAD BEEN BLOCKED AS A RESULT OF THE TRADE EMBARGO AFTER THE SEIZURE OF THE HOSTAGES. THERE WAS THEREFORE NO GUARANTEE THAT SOME ARMS SUPPLIES MIGHT NOT REACH THE IRANIANS AS A RESULT OF ANY AGREEMENT REACHED WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, BUT HE VERY MUCH DOUBTED WHETHER THEY WOULD MAKE ANY REAL IMPACT ON THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

4. KING HUSSEIN TOLD VELIOTES A FEW DAYS AGO THAT HE INTENDED GOING TO BAGHDAD AGAIN FOR TWO MAIN REASONS:

A. TO REVIEW THE LATEST MILITARY SITUATION SEMICOLON

B. TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION. WHILE THE KING DID NOT TELL VELIOTES IN TERMS THAT HE WOULD BE TRYING TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT SADDAM TO DISCUSS WAYS IN WHICH THE WAR MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO AN END, VELIOTES'S OWN PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT, WHEREAS 10 DAYS AGO KING HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE TAKEN A NEGATIVE VIEW ON ALMOST ANY OF THE POSSIBLE CURRENT PEACE INITIATIVES (SEE MY TELS NOS 413 AND 419), HE HAD SINCE MODIFIED HIS ATTITUDE AND, IF HE SENSED PRESIDENT SADDAM WAS HIMSELF LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT, WOULD BE WILLING TO ENCOURAGE HIM.

5. VELIOTES BELIEVES THAT THE SAUDIS ARE INFLUENCING THE KING IN THIS DIRECTION. FOLLOWING HIS RECENT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, KING HUSSEIN WAS ASKED BY PRINCE FAHD TO SEND HIS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (WHO IS ALSO IN OVERALL CHARGE OF JORDAN'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES) TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. GENERAL SHAKER VISITED SAUDI ARABIA ON 24 OCTOBER SEMICOLON ON SHAKER'S RETURN KING HUSSEIN RECEIVED A FURTHER MESSAGE FROM PRINCE FAHD. BASED ON A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, VELIOTES DEDUCES THAT THE SAUDIS ASKED KING HUSSEIN TO TAKE THE LEAD WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM IN DISCUSSING WAYS OF TERMINATING THE CONFLICT.

6. THE SAUDIS ALSO WISHED TO DISCUSS WITH GENERAL SHAKER A REPORT

6. THE SAUDIS ALSO WISHED TO DISCUSS WITH GENERAL SHAKER A REPORT THEY HAD RECEIVED THAT SYRIA AND LIBYA HAD AGREED THAT LIBYA SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN TARGETTING RADICAL PALESTINIAN GROUPS AGAINST CONSERVATIVE ARAB REGIMES. GENERAL SHAKER ALSO REFERRED TO A REPORT WHICH HE BELIEVED TO BE WELL-FOUNDED THAT LIBYA HAD GIVEN SYRIA US DOLLARS 500 MILLION IN CASH AND HAD ALSO PROMISED TO PAY FOR AN ADDITIONAL US DOLLARS 1,000 MILLION WORTH OF ARMS PURCHASES FROM THE SOVIET UNION. SHAKER HAD TOLD VELIOTES THAT, WITH IRAQ LIKELY TO BE PREOCCUPIED WITH IRAN FOR MANY YEARS TO COME, JORDAN WOULD NO LONGER BE ABLE TO RELY ON IRAQI ASSISTANCE IN RESISTING SYRIAN THREATS TO THE JORDANIAN REGIME.

7. VELIOTES SPEAKS VERY FREELY, BUT IT IS NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE TO BE SURE HOW FAR HE IS ADDING HIS OWN PERSONAL INTERPRETATION TO WHAT HE HAS BEEN TOLD. I HOPE TO SEE BOTH KING HUSSEIN AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SHORTLY AFTER THEIR RETURN FROM IRAQ AND OBTAIN A CLEARER IDEA OF WHETHER OR NOT KING HUSSEIN SEES ANY POSSIBILITY OF NUDGING THE IRAQIS TOWARDS A CESSATION OF THE CONFLICT.

8. MEANWHILE IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION JORDANIAN MINISTERS ARE MAKING NO SECRET OF THEIR UNEASE OVER THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WHEN I SAW HIM ON 27 OCTOBER DESCRIBED THE WAR AS A ''TOTAL DISASTER'' BUT HAD NO NEW IDEAS ON HOW IT MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO AN END. THE JORDANIAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION (WHO IS ALSO ACTING PRIME MINISTER DURING MR BADRAN'S ABSENCE IN IRAQ) TOLD LORD HOME THIS MORNING THAT THE IRAQIS HAD ''COMPLETELY MISCALCULATED'': THEY HAD BEEN BANKING ON A QUICK VICTORY FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATIONS FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH AND HAD ENTIRELY FAILED TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES. BUT HE TOO COULD SEE NO EARLY END TO THE CONFLICT.

URWICK

NNNN

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 October 1980

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GISCARD

The Prime Minister has approved the text of the message to President Giscard enclosed with your letter to me of 27 October. The message has issued this morning on the direct line.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (MOD) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(27)

SUBJECT

T 212/80

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 212/80

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PARIS FROM LONDON
SECRET GOVERNMENTAL 0024
BT
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GISCARD.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT,
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 24 OCTOBER ABOUT THE IRAN/IRAQ CRISIS. I WAS GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR LETTING ME KNOW IN ADVANCE OF YOUR DECISION TO SEND TO THE AREA A MINESWEEPING FLOTILLA WHICH WILL BE OPERATIONAL ON 20 NOVEMBER.

I CERTAINLY AGREE WITH YOU THAT IF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, OR FOR THAT MATTER THE WATERS OF THE PERSIAN GULF, WERE TO BE MINED THIS WOULD PRESENT A GRAVE THREAT TO OIL SUPPLIES VITAL TO THE WORLD.

FOR OUR PART WE HAVE ON STAND-BY A SPECIALISED MINING CLEARANCE TEAM. THIS TEAM WITH ITS EQUIPMENT IS AIR-TRANSPORTABLE AND COULD THEREFORE BE IN THE AREA AT SHORT NOTICE. IT WOULD CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT COMPLEMENT TO EFFORTS WHICH YOU AND OTHER COUNTRIES ARE ABLE TO MAKE.

MEANWHILE I BELIEVE IT REMAINS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FOR ALL OF US TO CO-ORDINATE ACTION IN THIS WAY, IF WE ARE TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE THREATS AND TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION, WITHOUT PROVOKING THE VERY DANGERS WHICH WE ARE SEEKING TO AVOID.

YOURS SINCERELY,
MARGARET THATCHER.

00 281230Z

PARIS FROM LONDON
SECRET GOVERNMENTAL ØØ24
BT
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GISCARD.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT,
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 24 OCTOBER ABOUT THE IRAN/IRAQ CRISIS. I WAS GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR LETTING ME KNOW IN ADVANCE OF YOUR DECISION TO SEND TO THE AREA A MINESWEEPING FLOTILLA WHICH WILL BE OPERATIONAL ON 2Ø NOVEMBER.

I CERTAINLY AGREE WITH YOU THAT IF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, OR FOR THAT MATTER THE WATERS OF THE PERSIAN GULF, WERE TO BE MINED THIS WOULD PRESENT A GRAVE THREAT TO OIL SUPPLIES VITAL TO THE WORLD.

FOR OUR PART WE HAVE ON STAND-BY A SPECIALISED MINING CLEARANCE TEAM. THIS TEAM WITH ITS EQUIPMENT IS AIR-TRANSPORTABLE AND COULD THEREFORE BE IN THE AREA AT SHORT NOTICE. IT WOULD CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT COMPLEMENT TO EFFORTS WHICH YOU AND OTHER COUNTRIES ARE ABLE TO MAKE.

MEANWHILE I BELIEVE IT REMAINS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FOR ALL OF US TO CO-ORDINATE ACTION IN THIS WAY, IF WE ARE TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE THREATS AND TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION, WITHOUT PROVOKING THE VERY DANGERS WHICH WE ARE SEEKING TO AVOID.

YOUR SINCERELY,
MARGARET THATCHER.

GOVT.0024.

[for transmission on the direct line to Paris.]

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GISCARD

T 212/80

S E C R E T

My Dear President,

Thank you for your message of 24 October about the Iran/Iraq crisis. I was grateful to you for letting me know in advance of your decision to send to the area a minesweeping flotilla which will be operational on 20 November.

I certainly agree with you that if the Straits of Hormuz, or for that matter the waters of the Persian Gulf, were to be mined this would present a grave threat to oil supplies vital to the world.

For our part we have on stand-by a specialised mining clearance team. This team with its equipment is air-transportable and could therefore be in the area at short notice. It would constitute an important complement to efforts which you and other countries are able to make.

Meanwhile I believe it remains extremely important for all of us to co-ordinate action in this way, if we are to be able to respond to the threats and take effective action, without provoking the very dangers which we are seeking to avoid.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher.

NO DISTRIBUTION GIVEN BY COMMCEN.

28/X

26(A)

Type for transmission in draft due.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 October 1980

Prime Minister

Apse attaches draft reply to Pres. Giscard.

27/x

Dear Michael,

Agreed pm

Iraq/Iran: Minesweeping in the Gulf:
Message from President Giscard

I attach a self-explanatory draft reply to the message from President Giscard enclosed with your letter to me of 24 October.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Roderic Lyne

pp (P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

SECRET

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/telelotter/despatch/note~~ XXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

President of the French Republic

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

My dear President,

Thank you for your message of 24 October about the Iran/Iraq crisis. I was grateful to you for letting me know in advance of your decision to send to the area a minesweeping flotilla which will be operational on 20 November.

I certainly agree with you that if the Straits of Hormuz, or for that matter the waters of the Persian Gulf, were to be mined this would present a grave threat to oil supplies vital to the world.

For our part we have on stand-by a specialised mining clearance team. This team with its equipment is air-transportable and could therefore be in the area at short notice. It would constitute an important complement to efforts which you and other countries are able to make.

Meanwhile I believe it remains extremely important for all of us to co-ordinate action in this way, if we are to be able to respond to the threats and take effective action, without provoking the very dangers which we are seeking to avoid.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

SECRET



ZZ PARIS
GRS 758
SECRET
FM FCO 271230Z OCTOBER 80
TO FLASH PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 415 OF 27 OCTOBER.
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS (D STAFF), ACDS (OPS) DS5, DNOT), WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING BONN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO
FOR BULLARD
WASHINGTON TELEGRAMS NOS 4390 AND 4391: DEFENCE ISSUES IN THE PERSIAN GULF

1. IT IS CLEAR FROM BARTHOLOMEW'S COMMENTS RECORDED IN WASHINGTON TUR THAT ALTHOUGH THERE HAS RECENTLY APPEARED TO BE A GREATER DEGREE OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IN THE NAVY-TO-NAVY TALKS IN LONDON, THERE IN FACT REMAINS A WIDE GULF BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES OVER CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

2. AS WE SEE IT, THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US IN THE UNDERLYING CONCEPT. FOR OUR PART WE HAVE ALWAYS MAINTAINED THAT IT IS HARD TO ENVISAGE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH NAVAL ACTION IN ADVANCE OF A STOPPAGE OF SHIPPING WOULD NOT PROVOKE PRECISELY THE DANGERS WHICH WE HOPE TO AVOID. INDEED, WE CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISK OF PRECIPITATE ACTION. WE NOTE THAT BARTHOLOMEW STATES THE FIRM US VIEW THAT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PREVENT A STANDSTILL. WE HAVE HOWEVER YET TO VISUALISE A CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH TAKES THE RISKS SIGNIFICANTLY BEYOND THE PRESENT POSITION BUT FALLS SHORT OF ONE IN WHICH FORCE IS USED OR THREATENED, THUS EFFECTIVELY CLOSING THE STRAITS. FROM THIS DIFFERENCE SPRINGS THE GAP IN OUR OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS.

3. IN OUR VIEW SHIPPING MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO A STANDSTILL NOT ONLY BY HOSTILE (IE IRANIAN) ACTION BUT BY THREAT OF ACTION. A THREAT MIGHT TAKE THE FORM EITHER OF A DECLARATION THAT IRAN HAD QUOTE CLOSED UNQUOTE THE STRAITS AND WOULD REGARD AS HOSTILE ANY VESSEL ATTEMPTING PASSAGE, OR A STATEMENT THAT IRAN HAD MINED

THE STRAITS. IN EITHER CASE WE BELIE?E THAT TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, AND ALMOST REGARDLESS OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE THREAT, MERCHANT SHIPPING WOULD BE BROUGHT TO A STANDSTILL. THUS A THREAT WOULD HAVE MUCH THE SAME EFFECT AS AN OUT-OF-THE-BLUE ATTACK ON A MERCHANT VESSEL (EG BY AIRCRAFT OR SURFACE SHIPPING). AS WE SEE IT, THEREFORE, THE MOST IMPORTANT CONTINGENCY FOR WHICH TO PLAN IS ONE IN WHICH THE TASK WILL BE TO BRING ABOUT AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF MERCHANT TRAFFIC THROUGH THE STRAITS AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN CLOSED EITHER BY FORCE OR BY THREAT OF FORCE.

4. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT IS MEANT BY BARTHOLOMEW'S STATEMENT TNAT THE US BELIEVE THAT THE NAVIES SHOULD ACT TO PREVENT A STANDSTILL. IT IS PRECISELY IN ORDER TO DETER THE USE OR THE THREAT OF FORCE THAT WE HAVE POSITIONED SURFACE VESSELS IN THE GULF OF OMAN. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THIS ACTION (WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE US NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE US AND FRENCH PRESENCE OUTSIDE IN FACT ALREADY AMOUNT TO A ZONAL OR SECTORAL APPROACH) WILL REMAIN A SUFFICIENT DETERRENT TO PREVENT A CLOSURE. BUT IN OUR VIEW TO DO MORE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN SHIPPING IS PASSING NORMALLY THROUGH THE GULF RUNS THE RISK OF BEING REGARDED AS PROVOCATIVE.

5. FROM THIS BASIC DIFFERENCE OF VIEW OF THE SCENARIO APPEARS TO STEM THE GAP BETWEEN OUR CONCEPT AND THAT OF THE AMERICANS ABOUT ESCORTING. THE ESSENTIAL POINT IS THAT, FOLLOWING A CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS, NAVIES ON THE SPOT WILL HAVE TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RE-ESTABLISH THE CONFIDENCE OF SHIPPERS AND INSURERS. IT REMAINS OUR VIEW THAT NOTHING SHORT OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR ESCORTING GROUPS OF SHIPS, AT LEAST IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, WILL DO THIS. BARTHOLOMEW APPEARS TO RECOGNISE THIS IN HIS SUGGESTION FOR A COMPROMISE (LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 4 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 4390).

6. AS REGARDS THE FRENCH, WE ENTIRELY ACCEPT THAT THE AMERICANS ARE WORKING WITHIN WHAT THEY UNDERSTAND TO BE POLITICALLY TOLERABLE LIMITS. BUT HERE AGAIN THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN US ARISES FROM THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH WE AND THE AMERICANS ENVISAGE THE USE OF NAVAL VESSELS. WE UNDERSTAND

THAT THE FRENCH HAVE SAID THEY WOULD CONSIDER JOINT OPERATIONS ONLY IN EXTREMIS. A SHIPPING STANDSTILL IN THE GULF WOULD SURELY BE A CONTINGENCY SUFFICIENTLY EXTREME TO WARRANT CO-OPERATION IN THE KIND OF COURSE OF ACTION WE ENVISAGE.

7. GRATEFUL IF BULLARD COULD MAKE THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 2 TO 6 ABOVE TO HIS US INTERLOCUTOR. HE COULD ADD THAT, IF NOTHING ELSE, BARTHOLOMEW'S COMMENTS HAD REVEALED THAT, IN SPITE OF APPARENT PROGRESS IN THE NAVY-TO-NAVY TALKS, THERE WAS STILL A CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF BASIC MISUNDERSTANDING. THIS REINFORCED OUR VIEW THAT THERE WAS AN URGENT NEED FOR WIDER CONSULTATIONS, NOT ONLY AT THE MILITARY LEVEL, BUT ALSO AT THE POLITICAL.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 October 1980

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GISCARD

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has just received from President Giscard on the direct line. You will no doubt wish to consider whether we should offer any comment on the message.

I am sending copies of this letter, and its enclosure, to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

CS

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Prime Minister 2/

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T218/80

ZZ 241102Z
LONDRES DE PARIS
SECRET GOUVERNEMENTAL 110
BT
DE MONSIEUR VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
A
MADAME MARGARET THATCHER
PREMIER MINISTRE DU ROYAUME UNI
LONDRES

PARIS LE 24 OCTOBRE 1980

MON CHER PREMIER MINISTRE,

LES AUTORITES IRANIENNES ONT LAISSE ENTENDRE QUE LE MINAGE DU DETROIT D'ORMUZ N'ETAIT PAS EXCLU.

A NOTRE CONNAISSANCE, LES ETATS-UNIS NE DISPOSENT COMME MOYENS DE DRAGAGE DANS CETTE ZONE QUE DE TROIS HELICOPTERES DONT L'EFFICACITE EST EVIDEMMENT MOINDRE QUE CELLE D'UN ENSEMBLE DE BATIMENTS SPECIALISES.

C'EST POURQUOI J'AI DECIDE D'ENVOYER DANS LA ZONE UNE FLOTILLE COMPOSEE DE DEUX CHASSEURS DE MINES, DE TROIS DRAGUEURS OCEANIQUES ET D'UN BATIMENT DE SOUTIEN LOGISTIQUE.

LES BATIMENTS APPAREILLERONT LE MARDI 28 OCTOBRE 1980. LES PREMIERS D'ENTRE EUX DOIVENT ARRIVER A DJIBOUTI LE 11 NOVEMBRE. LA FLOTILLE SERA OPERATIONNELLE LE 20 NOVEMBRE.

JE VOUS PRIE DE CROIRE, MON CHER PREMIER MINISTRE, EN MES SENTIMENTS LES MEILLEURS.

VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING

BT

CFN 28 OCTOBRE 1980 11 NOVEMBRE 20 NOVEMBRE

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DESKBY 230930Z
FM BAGHDAD 230730Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 549 OF 23/10/80
AND SAVING TO IMMEDIATE HM YACHT BRITANNIA (FOR PS) DESKBY 231100Z
AND IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK DESKBY 231100Z
FO INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS AMMAN KUWAIT TEL AVIV
AND BONN

UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 1560,1567 AND 1568 IRAQ/IRAN

1. I AGREE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD REACT BADLY, AT THIS STAGE, TO A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF THE TYPE OUTLINED BY - ARDAKANI (IRAN). THIS IS BECAUSE IRAQ HAS NEITHER MADE DEMON- - STARABLY SIGNIFICANT GAINS IN KHUZISTAN, NOR BEEN RECEIVED AS LIBERATORS BY THE ARABS THERE.

2. WHAT SADDAM WOULD CONSIDER ADEQUATE GAINS IN THAT REGION IS A QUESTION I DISCUSSED ON 21 OCTOBER WITH THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (MAJOR GENERAL FURSDON) AND GUARDIAN (DAVID FAIRHALL) DEFENCE CORRESPONDENTS, BOTH RECENTLY BACK FROM OCCUPIED KHUZISTAN AND ABOUT TO RETURN TO THE UK AS NO (NO) FURTHER PRESS TRIPS TO THE FRONT ARE BEING PERMITTED BY THE IRAQIS . BOTH THOUGHT THAT SADDAM'S MINIMUM PLAN NOW COMPRISED SEIZURE OF THE PORT AND MOST OF THE TOWN OF KHORRAMSHAHR: THE SEALING OFF OF ABADAN: AND THE NEUTRALISATION OF DEZFUL, WITH ITS UNDERGROUND JOINT COMMAND CENTRE AND MILITARY AIRPORT. NEITHER THE CAPTURE OF AHWAZ NOR BANDAR KHOMEINI WAS NEARLY AS IMPORTANT: THE FORMER BEING SPRAWLY WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO HOLD. FURSDON SAID THAT AN ADDED COMPLICATION WAS THE CROSS-COUNTRY IRAQI SUPPLY LINE FROM AMARA TO DEZFUL, WHICH INVOLVED A RIVER CROSSING (OF THE KARKHEH, A TRIBUTARY OF THE KARUN), AND WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE SECURE BEFORE THE RAINS STARTED IN NOVEMBER. THE THREAT TO THIS SUPPLY LINE FROM LOW-FLYING PHANTOMS WAS CONSIDERABLE, BOTH WITHIN IRAN AND ON THE KUT TO AMARA HIGHWAY, WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN PROHIBITED TO CIVILIAN TRAFFIC, AND IS JAMMED DAILY WITH RESUPPLY CONVOYS. THERE SEEMED TO BE LITTLE IRAQI ACK-ACK OR INTERCEPTION IN THIS SECTOR. FURSDON REMARKED THAT IT WAS LUCKY THAT THE IRANIANS DID NOT YET SEEM TO HAVE OR BE USING NAPALM, THE IDEAL ANTI-PERSONNEL WEAPON FOR DEALING WITH CONVOYS: NOR APPARENTLY ANY LAND OR SEA MINES.

3. COMMENT.

IN THIS CURIOUS WAR, A NON-WIN BY IRAQ WILL BE SEEN AS TANTAMOUNT TO FAILURE. SADDAM HAS PUT HIS PEOPLE ON NOTICE, IN HIS EID SPEECH (MY TEL NO 541) THAT THEY MAY BE IN FOR A

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CONFIDENTIAL

LONG HAUL. THIS IS AN UNWELCOME MESSAGE, PARTICULARLY TO THE IRAQI ARMY, WHO HAVE NEITHER THE TRAINING NOR I SUSPECT THE PATIENCE, TO BE AN ARMY OF OCCUPATION. THEY MUST BE WONDERING WHY THE IRAQI AIRFORCE HAS NOT (NOT) YET BEEN HEAVILY COMMITTED.

4. UKMIS TEL NO. 1568, JUST RECEIVED. TEXT OF PROPOSED STATEMENT SEEMS ADMIRABLE. IF A REFERENCE TO FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN ALL WATERWAYS IN THE AREA COULD BE WORKED INTO ITS PARA. 6 THAT WOULD SUIT THE IRAQIS (C.F. PARA 3. OF FCO TEL NO. 420 TO ME).

EGERTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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FM WASHINGTON 221910Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4353 OF 22 OCTOBER 1980
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK STOCKHOLM HMY BRITANNIA (FOR WALDEN)

Read in full.

FOLLOWING FROM FRETWELL IN AMBASSADOR'S ABSENCE ON TOUR.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1561: U.S. HOSTAGES IN IRAN

1. THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF ACTIVITY IN TRAIN RELATING TO THE HOSTAGES, SOME OF WHICH HAS BEEN REFLECTED IN MATERIAL FROM SOURCES WHICH MUST ON NO ACCOUNT BE QUOTED OR COMPROMISED. ARDAKANI'S REMARK PROVIDES USEFUL COLLATERAL.

2. U.S. OFFICIALS ARE EXTREMELY TIGHT-LIPPED ON THIS SUBJECT. THEIR FINGERS WERE BURNED WHEN THE ELABORATE DEAL TO SECURE THE HOSTAGES' RELEASE COLLAPSED JUST WHEN SUCCESS WAS IN SIGHT EARLIER IN THE YEAR. THEY ARE FEARFUL THAT ANY DEAL WHICH IS NOW EMERGING WILL SIMILARLY BE FRUSTRATED BY AN IRRATIONAL IRANIAN ACT OR SOME UNACCEPTABLE NEW DEMAND AT THE LAST MOMENT. THEY ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OF THE QUESTION IN RELATION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. VEST TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT CHRISTOPHER MIGHT BE ABLE TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THE HOSTAGES ON FRIDAY, BUT THAT IN THE MEANTIME NO-ONE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD AUTHORITY TO DO SO.

3. WE KNOW FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN PUTTING TOGETHER THE ELEMENTS OF THEIR RESPONSE TO THE DEMANDS FORMULATED BY KHOMEINI ON 12 SEPTEMBER. THEY HAVE FOR INSTANCE ASSEMBLED COMPREHENSIVE DOCUMENTATION ABOUT THE HISTORY OF U.S./IRANIAN RELATIONS (WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 4064). THEY HAVE TRIED OUT VARIOUS FORMULAE FOR THE APOLOGY WHICH THE IRANIANS AT ONE TIME DEMANDED, ALTHOUGH THAT NO LONGER SEEMS TO BE A CENTRAL ISSUE. THEY HAVE PUBLICLY OFFERED TO UNFREEZE IRANIAN ASSETS (APPARENTLY IGNORING THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH WILL ARISE FROM THE NUMEROUS COURT ACTIONS IN WHICH CLAIMS HAVE BEEN MADE ON THE ASSETS AND WHICH MAY TAKE A LONG TIME TO RESOLVE). THEY HAVE EXPRESSED U.S. INTEREST IN THE CONTINUING INTEGRITY OF IRAN.

/4. THE

4. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE IRANIANS ON THESE AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS THROUGH A RANGE OF INTERMEDIARIES IN TEHRAN AND IN EUROPE. THEY HAVE ALSO TRIED TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE IRANIANS THROUGH ALL AVAILABLE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION, INCLUDING BOTH ARAB AND WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. THEY HAVE HELD OUT BAIT IN THE FORM OF THE PROMISED RELEASE OF SOME ARMS SUPPLIES ALREADY PAID FOR BY THE IRANIANS:
AND THEY HAVE UNDERLINED THE DAMAGE WHICH THE DISPUTE IS CAUSING TO IRAN ITSELF. THEY HAVE PROBABLY SOUGHT TO CONVEY THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD BE A BETTER BET THAN REAGAN FOR BOTH THE ARAB WORLD AND IRAN, BECAUSE OF HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO SEEK A GENUINE SOLUTION FOR THE PALESTINIANS (A THEME OF WHICH THERE WERE ECHOES IN U.S. CONTACTS WITH LIBYA IN THE BILLYGATE AFFAIR).

5. IN THE LAST FEW DAYS BOTH CARTER AND MUSKIE HAVE MADE PUBLIC STATEMENTS INDICATING A TILT TOWARDS IRAN IN ITS CONFLICT WITH IRAQ - THE REFERENCES TO IRAQI AGGRESSION AND INVASION, THE STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF IRAN, ETC. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THESE STATEMENTS ARE SIMPLY DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE AND ENCOURAGE IRANIANS WHO WANT TO SETTLE THE HOSTAGE PROBLEM OR WHETHER THEY ARE PART OF AN AGREED SCENARIO REQUIRING THE PRESIDENT TO COMMIT HIMSELF PUBLICLY ON THESE POINTS.

6. I PICKED UP AN OBSCURE HINT FROM A SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME ARGUMENT WITHIN THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION ABOUT HOW TO RESPOND TO RAJAI'S SUGGESTION THAT THE U.S. SHOULD WITHDRAW THE FOUR AWACS AIRCRAFT FROM SAUDI ARABIA. THE QUESTION HAD BEEN RESOLVED, HE THOUGHT DEFINITIVELY, IN FAVOUR OF RETAINING THE AWACS. BUT THE FACT THAT THE QUESTION COULD BE CONSIDERED AT ALL SUGGESTS THAT SOME PEOPLE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVE THAT A SOLUTION IS CLOSE AND THAT IT WOULD BE WORTH ONE FINAL PUSH TO BRING IT OFF, EVEN AT A SIGNIFICANT COST.

/7. THE

7. THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE HOSTAGE-TAKING FALLS ON 4 NOVEMBER AND BOTH CANDIDATES ARE HIGHLY CONSCIOUS OF THE ELECTORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ANY DEAL WHICH CAN BE DONE BEFORE THEN. VIEWS DIFFER ABOUT WHETHER THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES OR THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A DEAL WOULD BE AN ELECTION-WINNER FOR CARTER, BUT THE RESULTING SENSE OF RELIEF AND EVEN EUPHORIA WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE A CONSIDERABLE IMPACT. IT IS NO DOUBT AS A PRECAUTION AGAINST THIS THAT REAGAN HAS NOW STARTED TO CRITICISE CARTER FOR THE FACT THAT THE HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN HELD AT ALL.

8. IN SHORT ALL THE PIECES WHICH CAN BE PUT TOGETHER ARE NOW IN PLACE FOR A DEAL ON THE HOSTAGES AND THE ADMINISTRATION WILL GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO PULL IT OFF IN THE NEXT 12 DAYS. HOPES HAVE BEEN DASHED BEFORE AND THERE IS STILL NO CERTAINTY THAT KHOMEINI WILL FINALLY DECIDE TO PRESS THE BUTTON FOR THEIR RELEASE, BUT MY BEST GUESS IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVE A DEAL IS NOW WITHIN REACH.

HENDERSON

LIMITED

HD/MED	PS/MR RIDLEY
HD/NAD	PS/PUS
HD/NENAD	SIR E YOUDE
HD/DEF D	SIR J GRAHAM
HD/PUSD	SIR A ACLAND
HD/PLANNING STAFF	MR DAY
HD/ERD	MR J MOBERLY
PS	MR HARDING
PS/LPS	MR P H MOBERLY
PS/MR HURD	LORD BRIDGES

23 OCT 1930

CONFIDENTIAL

Iraq.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~XXX~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/9/4/2

20th October 1980

Prime Minister (2)

Dear Michael,

GULF OF OMAN PATROL

You wrote on 14th October conveying the Prime Minister's agreement to the strengthening of our naval presence in the Persian Gulf area. This is to let you know that on the latest timings we have HMS ALACRITY will join HMS COVENTRY in the Gulf of Oman on Wednesday, 22nd October.

We are assuming that there will be a need to maintain two warships (plus afloat support) on patrol in the Gulf of Oman for the foreseeable future. We can provide this presence up until the beginning of December by detaching ships on rotation from the RN Task Group but thereafter the patrol will be conducted by ships sailed from the UK.

I should perhaps also mention that we are looking urgently at the possible threat of mining in the Persian Gulf and at ways of dealing with it. This is one of the subjects being pursued within the current Naval Staff talks with the United States, but for our part we have taken the precaution of placing four mine-hunters on notice: they could arrive in the Gulf within six weeks of a decision to sail them. A naval clearance diving team could however be got there inside a week.

I am copying this letter to Paul Lever (FCO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(D B OMAND)

M O'D B Alexander Esq

CONFIDENTIAL



20 OCT 1980



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GR 375 CONFIDENTIAL

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FM MUSCAT 180816Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 298 OF 18 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE HMY BRITANNIA, (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY), WASHINGTON,

PRIORITY JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI

INFO SAVING PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 297: IRAN/IRAQ

1. MOBERLY AND I HAD A FURTHER SESSION WITH QAIS ZAWAWI LAST EVENING AT HIS SUGGESTION. IT EMERGED THAT HE HAD SEEN THE US AMBASSADOR EARLIER IN THE DAY. YUSUF ALAWI (UNDER SECRETARY MFA) WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK, WAS ALSO PRESENT.

2. ARISING OUT OF HIS LATEST ENCOUNTER WITH MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE, ZAWAWI MADE THE FOLLOWING PARTICULAR POINTS:-

A) THE OMANIS HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE TERM ''INTERNATIONAL FORCE'' WHICH THE AMERICANS SEEMED TO BE USING IN THE CONTEXT OF NAVAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING. THEY WOULD PREFER SOME MORE AMBIGUOUS PHRASE:

B) THEY SAW THE NEED FOR THOSE CONCERNED (IE AMERICANS, FRENCH AND OURSELVES) TO ESTABLISH A UNIFIED NAVAL COMMAND WITH WHOM THE OMANIS COULD DISCUSS THE DEVELOPING SITUATION, RATHER THAN HAVING TO DEAL WITH EACH BILATERALLY:

C) HE HOPED THAT OUR OWN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMERICANS WOULD LEAD TO A DEFINITE CONTINGENCY PLAN. HE REALISED THAT THIS COULD NOT BE READY FOR SOME WHILE BUT HE WOULD BE IN LONDON IN EARLY NOVEMBER AND LOOKED FORWARD TO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS THEN, THOUGH THE OMANIS WOULD OF COURSE MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THIS EMBASSY MEANWHILE.

3. THE AMERICANS HAD OFFERED TO SHARE WITH THE OMANIS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM AWACS, BUT THE OMANIS HAD RESPONDED CAUTIOUSLY. BEFORE REACHING ANY FIRM AGREEMENT IN THIS REGARD THEY WANTED TO KNOW WHAT IT MIGHT INVOLVE IN THE WAY OF ANY AMERICAN TEAM OR SPECIAL INSTALLATIONS IN OMAN. BY THE SAME TOKEN, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF CURRENT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US, ZAWAWI HAD MADE CLEAR TO WILEY THAT THE OMANIS WISHED THE DISCUSSIONS TO MOVE SLOWLY AT A PACE DICTATED BY THE OMANIS.

4. YUSUF ALAWI WAS FULL OF THE IDEA THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CONTEMPLATING A SPARES-FOR-HOSTAGES DEAL WITH THE IRANIANS. MOBERLY COMMENTED THAT THIS POSSIBILITY HAD BEEN RAISED WITH HIM IN OTHER GULF STATES, AND HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT WE CONSIDERED IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY.

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5. OUR CONTACTS WITH ZAWAWI DURING MOBERLY'S VISIT HAVE BEEN HIGHLY SATISFACTORY AND BODE WELL FOR CONTINUING CLOSE CONSULTATION AS THE REGIONAL SITUATION DEVELOPS.

FCO PASS SAVING TO PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK

LUCAS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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SECRET
FM WASHINGTON 182305Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4321 OF 18 OCTOBER 1980,
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS(D STAFF), ACDS (OPS) DS 5, DNOT), H M Y BRITANNIA (FOR WALDEN)
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT,
INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN
INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO

YOUR TELNO 1658: IRAN/IRAQ - DEFENCE ISSUES

1. FRETWELL ACTED TODAY ON THESE INSTRUCTIONS WITH BARTHOLOMEW (STATE DEPARTMENT), WHO WORKS VERY CLOSELY WITH THE PENTAGON ON THESE MATTERS.

2. BARTHOLOMEW WAS GLAD TO HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT THE NAVAL TALKS IN LONDON WERE NOW MAKING BETTER PROGRESS, RECOGNISING THAT OWING TO THE URGENCY OF THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION THE U S HAD GOT OFF TO A ROCKY START WITH INCOMPLETE INSTRUCTIONS. OUR EARLIER EXPRESSION OF DISSATISFACTION HAD BEEN USEFUL.

3. HE NOTED THAT THE TWO NAVIES SEEMED TO BE MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE U S SECTOR CONCEPT AND OUR OWN IDEAS WHICH APPEARED MORE AKIN TO CONVOYING. CONVOYING IMPLIED A GREATER DEGREE OF INTEGRATION IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE. THE U S PREFERENCE FOR THE SECTOR CONCEPT HAD BEEN PARTLY INFLUENCED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THEY HAD FORESEEN A MORE INTEGRATED STRUCTURE LEADING TO PROBLEMS WITH THE FRENCH AND THE GULF STATES AND PERHAPS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, WHOSE REACTION COULD BE HOSTILE.

4. BARTHOLOMEW UNDERTOOK TO LET US HAVE CONSIDERED U S COMMENTS NEXT WEEK. HE ASSUMED (AND FRETWELL CONFIRMED) THAT WE WOULD WANT TO CONTINUE DISCUSSING THESE POINTS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL AS WELL AS IN THE NAVAL TALKS. HIS PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR T U R WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE U S WOULD AGREE, AS LONG AS THE OMANIS WOULD CO-OPERATE:

(B) THE U S HAD ALREADY DONE SOME THINKING ABOUT EXTENDING AIR COVER, INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE USE OF SAUDI FACILITIES AND PERHAPS THE SAUDIS THEMSELVES TAKING UP SOME OF THE AIR-DEFENCE RESPONSIBILITY WITH, FOR EXAMPLE, THEIR F 5'S:

(C) THE U S HAD THOUGHT IN TERMS OF A LESS INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE (SEE PARA 3 ABOVE) (IN ANY CASE THEY PREFERRED TO TALK ABOUT A ''CO-ORDINATING NETWORK'' RATHER THAN A ''COMMAND STRUCTURE''):

(D) NO COMMENT:

(E) U S CO-OPERATION WITH THE FRENCH LOCALLY HAD BEEN GOOD. METHODS AND CHANNELS FOR COMMUNICATION AND CO-ORDINATION HAD BEEN SATISFACTORILY ARRANGED. THE EXERCISE EVIDENTLY HAD A POLITICAL GREEN LIGHT FROM PARIS, SO LONG AS IT WAS CONDUCTED IN A LOW KEY ON THE SPOT. THE FRENCH HAD NOT COMMENTED SO RESTRICTIVELY ABOUT ACTIVE NAVAL COOPERATION TO THE U S AS TO US ALTHOUGH THEY INSISTED ON PRESERVING THEIR INDEPENDENCE IN DECISION-MAKING:

(F) THIS IS COVERED IN MY 2 I F T'S:

(G) AS EARLIER REPORTED (MY TELNO 4309), THE U S HAD ALREADY FOCUSSED ON THE MINING THREAT. THEY WERE STEPPING UP THEIR OWN ANTI-MINING CAPABILITY, AND WOULD WANT TO EXPLORE THAT OF OTHERS. PROPOSALS WERE SHORTLY TO BE PUT TO THE SAUDIS.

5. BARTHOLOMEW THEN GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF RECENT U S APPROACHES TO THE GULF STATES (YOUR TELNO 391 TO MUSCAT), WHICH HAD COVERED BOTH THE CO-ORDINATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND AIR-DEFENCE. SEE MY 2 I F T'S.

F C O PASS SAVING , MOSCOW. UKDEL NATO.

HENDERSON.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FM WASHINGTON 182310Z OCT
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4322 OF 18 OCTOBER 80.
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS (D STAFF), ACDS (OPS) DS5, DNOT) AND HMY BRITANNIA (FOR WALDEN).
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT.
INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN.
INFO SAVING UK MIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW AND UK DEL NATO.

M.I.P.T. : U.S. TALKS WITH GULF STATES ON NAVAL COORDINATION.

1. BARTHOLOMEW DESCRIBED THE RESULTS OF RECENT U.S. APPROACHES TO THE GULF STATES (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 391 TO MUSCAT) IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS.

SAUDI ARABIA.
2. AS THE RESULT OF AMBASSADOR WEST'S DISCUSSIONS WITH FAHD, SULTAN AND ABDULLAH, THE SAUDIS HAD AGREED TO BEGIN BILATERAL PLANNING. THIS WOULD COVER JOINT SUPPLY MEASURES, INCLUDING COUNTER-OPERATIONS AGAINST MINING EXTENDING BEYOND SAUDI WATERS. THE U.S. NAVY TEAM WOULD BE PURSUING THESE TALKS TODAY WITH THE SAUDIS. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PROCEDURES FOR EXCHANGING INFORMATION ON THREATS TO SHIPPING AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF. THE SAUDIS HAD THUS AGREED TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN IMPROVING THE DEFENCE SITUATION IN THE AREA.

OMAN.
3 FOLLOWING THE OMANI APPROACH IN WASHINGTON, WHICH HAD BEEN FOLLOWED UP IN MUSCAT, THE OMANIS HAD AGREED TO NAVAL TALKS WITH THE U.S. AND WERE CONSIDERING ALLOWING THE U.S. INCREASED ACCESS TO THEIR FACILITIES TO EASE COORDINATION. THEY HAD EMPHASISED THAT THEY WANTED THESE TALKS TO BE BILATERAL, AND WOULD PREFER THE U.S. TO HOLD SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE OTHER GULF STATES INVOLVED. THEY HAD ALSO NOTED THE LIMITED CAPABILITIES OF THE REST OF THE GULF STATES, AND THEIR OWN OPPOSITION TO THESE STATES BECOMING INVOLVED IN THE DEFENCE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

KUWAIT.
4 IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE RESPONSE TO MOBERLY THAT THE KUWAITIS WERE IN A SPECIAL POSITION AND WOULD NOT COOPERATE. THE U.S. WOULD NOT PURSUE THE ISSUE WITH THEM BUT WOULD KEEP THEM INFORMED ON A SPORADIC BASIS. IT WAS NOTED HOWEVER THAT THE KUWAITIS HAD WELCOMED THE ARRIVAL OF THE AWACS AND THE U.S. GUIDED-MISSILE CRUISER (USS LEAHY) IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEFENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA (PAKENHAM'S LETTER TO LOGAN OF 15 OCTOBER).

UAE.
5. UAE LEADERS HAD EXPRESSED KEEN INTEREST IN THE U.S. APPROACH BUT HAD GIVEN NO SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE AND CONTENTED THEMSELVES WITH

LISTENING CALMLY TO WHAT THE U.S. HAD TO SAY. THERE HAD BEEN NO REACTION TO THE USS LEAHY'S ARRIVAL, AND NO ATTEMPT TO PICK UP THE AWACS INFORMATION OFFER. IT HAD HOWEVER BEEN VOLUNTEERED THAT IN A REAL EMERGENCY THE UAE WOULD ALLOW U.S. SHIPS TO USE THEIR PORTS FOR REPAIRS. THE QUESTION HAD BEEN POSED WHAT THE U.S. WOULD DO IF IRAN ATTACKED THE SMALLER GULF STATES. THE U.S. RESPONSE HAD BEEN THAT WASHINGTON'S CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE GULF STATES AND ITS OWN INTEREST IN THE AREA HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR. ANY REQUESTS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE WOULD RECEIVE EARLY AND HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION. THIS SEEMED TO SATISFY THE UAE LEADERS. THE MINIMUM U.S. REQUIREMENT FROM THE UAE WAS THEIR SILENT ASSENT TO WESTERN ACTIVITIES. THE U.S. WOULD NOT PUSH THE QUESTION WITH THEM AT THIS POINT BUT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF THE OTHER GULF STATES WERE TO LEARN OF THE SAUDI ATTITUDE TOWARDS NAVAL COORDINATION. THIS WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON.

6. REFERRING TO FRETWELL'S EARLIER BRIEFING ON OUR RECENT ACTIONS WITH THE UAE (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1661, DURING WHICH FRETWELL ALSO DREW ON PARAGRAPH 2 OF MUSCAT TELEGRAM NO 298) BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD LIKE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US TO ENSURE THAT WE WERE ALL WORKING ALONG THE SAME LINES.

QATAR.

7 THERE HAD BEEN NO REACTION OF SUBSTANCE, APART FROM GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT MULTILATERAL PLANNING FOR CONTINGENCIES IN THE GULF WAS PRUDENT. SOME INTEREST HAD BEEN INDICATED IN THE AWACS INFORMATION OFFER. THE U.S. ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE QATAR POSITION AMOUNTED TO SILENT ASSENT.

BAHRAIN.

8 AGAIN NO REACTION OF SUBSTANCE, AND NO RESPONSE TO THE AWACS INFORMATION OFFER. THE BAHRAINIS HAD SAID THAT IN THEIR VIEW NEITHER IRAN NOR IRAQ WOULD SEE IT IN THEIR INTERESTS TO INTERFERE WITH GULF SHIPPING. THE U.S. THOUGHT THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME LINGERING SUSPICION IN BAHRAIN THAT SOMETHING AS YET UNEXPLAINED LAY BEHIND THE ARRIVAL OF THE USS LEAHY.

9. BARTHOLOMEW'S CONCLUSION WAS ''SO FAR SO GOOD'', WITH THE EXCEPTION OF KUWAIT. PERSONALLY HE FELT THAT THE U.S. HAD RECEIVED A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE FROM THE GULF STATES AS A WHOLE, BUT THE NEXT STEPS WOULD OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

10. SEE M.I.F.T.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING MOSCOW AND UKDEL NATO

HENDERSON

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S E C R E T
FM WASHINGTON 182315Z OCT
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4323 OF 18 OCTOBER 80.
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS (D STAFF), ACDS (OPS) DS5, DNOT). AND HMY BRITANNIA (FOR WALDEN).
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT.
INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA AND BAHRAIN.
INFO SAVING UK MIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW AND UK DEL NATO.

M.I.P.T. : U.S. TALKS WITH GULF STATES ON AIR DEFENCE.

1. BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THAT THERE WERE TWO ASPECTS TO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GULF STATES ABOUT AIR DEFENCE:

(I) THE PROVISION VIA THE AWACS OF INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL THREATS:
AND
(II) THE POSSIBILITY OF INTEGRATED AIR DEFENCE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GULF STATES. THIS SECOND PROPOSAL HAD ONLY BEEN RAISED WITH THE SAUDIS AND OMANIS WHO WERE IN A SPECIAL CATEGORY.

2. ON THE AWACS INFORMATION OFFER, HE HAD ALREADY DESCRIBED THE REACTION OF THE OTHER GULF STATES (MIPT).
THE OMANIS HAD ASKED FOR A U.S. TECHNICAL TEAM, EITHER FROM SAUDI ARABIA OR FROM THE U.S., TO VISIT MUSCAT TO PURSUE THE OFFER. THIS THE U.S. WOULD NOW BE ARRANGING. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE OMANIS HAD BEEN TOLD THAT, SINCE THE AWACS ORBIT DID NOT COVER THEIR TERRITORY, SOME LINK MIGHT NEED TO BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE AWACS AND THE CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT IN THE ARABIAN SEA TO COVER THEIR INTERESTS. TECHNICALLY, HE NOTED, THE INFORMATION FROM RIYADH COULD BE PASSED EITHER BY SIMPLE LAND LINES OR BY STATIONING A U.S. TEAM (OF ABOUT 10 MEN) IN OMAN TO HANDLE THE TRANSFER OF INFORMATION.

3. ON INTEGRATED AIR DEFENCE, THE U.S. HAD SUGGESTED TO THE OMANIS THAT THEY MIGHT WISH TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER AMONG THE GULF STATES. NO SUBSTANTIVE REPLY HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED FROM MUSCAT, BUT PRELIMINARY REACTIONS WERE FAVOURABLE. THE SAUDIS ALSO SEEMED INTERESTED AND THE U.S. EMBASSY IN JEDDA HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EXPLORE THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CONCEPT FURTHER WITH THEM.

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WITH THEM. (BARTHOLOMEW UNDERLINED THAT IN ALL THESE APPROACHES U.S. REPRESENTATIVES HAD BEEN EMPHASISING THE U.S. POSITION OF NEUTRALITY AND NON-BELLIGERENCE IN RESPECT OF THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT). THE U.S. HAD INDICATIONS THAT SULTAN MIGHT DISCUSS THE AIR DEFENCE CONCEPT DURING HIS PRESENT VISIT TO OTHER GULF STATES. THEY HAD LEARNED (AND THIS WAS VERY SENSITIVE) THAT THE SAUDIS WERE ALREADY EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVING SOME OF THEIR OWN RADAR CAPABILITY INTO BAHRAIN.

4. FRETWELL ASKED WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO INSTALL A REAL AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY IN THE GULF STATES. BARTHOLOMEW REPLIED THAT, IN THE CASE OF SAUDI ARABIA, IT WAS PARTLY A MATTER OF REALISING THE POTENTIAL OF WHAT THEY ALREADY HAD.
THIS INCLUDED FILLING GAPS IN THEIR RADAR AND COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES, IMPROVING LINKS WITH THE HAWK SYSTEMS AND INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR F5S. FOR THE UAE AND BAHRAIN, GREATER INITIAL INVESTMENT WOULD BE NEEDED. THE FORMER HAD INDICATED INTEREST IN NEW SAM SYSTEMS AND THE U.S. HAD BEEN DISCUSSING WITH THE BAHRAINIS FOR SOME TIME THE SUPPLY OF HAWK MISSILES. BARTHOLOMEW EMPHASISED THAT THE U.S. HAD NO READY-MADE SCHEME FOR INTEGRATED AIR DEFENCE IN THE GULF.
AS THEY HAD TOLD THE OMANIS, THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A SCHEME WOULD BE POSITIVELY UNHELPFUL, IN PUTTING TOO MUCH OF A WESTERN STAMP ON THE DEFENCE OF THE GULF STATES.

FCO PASS SAVING MOSCOW AND UK DEL NATO.

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You may like to glance through this tel. & the three replies from Washington. No need to read it in detail.

MJ

SECRET
FM F C O 171607Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1658 OF 17 OCTOBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS(D STAFF)), ACDS (OPS), DS 5, DNOT, JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT
INFO PRIORITY H M ROYAL YACHT BRITANNIA (FOR S OF S)
INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO

YOUR TELNO 4272: IRAN/IRAQ - DEFENCE ISSUES

1. WE FAVOUR KEEPING OPEN EVERY CHANNEL TO THE US ADMINISTRATION. EVEN THOUGH YOU HAVE NOW SEEN MUSKIE (YOUR TELNO 4276), IT WOULD BE VALUABLE TO MAINTAIN YOUR USEFUL DIALOGUE WITH KOMER AND WITH STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.

2. THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE US NAVY REPRESENTATIVES HERE ARE NOW BEING BETTER BRIEFED TO RUN A PROPER DIALOGUE WITH THE ROYAL NAVY. OUR REPRESENTATIONS ALSO SEEM TO HAVE RESULTED IN A USEFUL EVOLUTION IN THE PENTAGON'S THINKING ON THE SORT OF NAVAL PROTECTION EXERCISE THAT WOULD BE NEEDED IN AN EMERGENCY. MUCH MORE STAFF WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE (AS THE TWO NAVIES ARE AWARE) AND MANY ISSUES STILL DEMAND CLOSER AND MORE COORDINATED POLITICAL MANAGEMENT. IN PARTICULAR IT IS IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DECISION TO PUT INTO EFFECT NAVAL MEASURES OF THE KIND NOW BEING DISCUSSED SHOULD BE TAKEN JOINTLY BY THE GOVERNMENTS WITH SHIPS TAKING PART. THE MEETING WITH CHRISTOPHER WILL BE USEFUL TO THAT END BUT YOU SHOULD ALSO MAKE THIS POINT TO YOUR CONTACTS. TO COUNTER KOMER'S REMARK THAT THERE WOULD BE CONSULTATION, IF THERE WERE TIME, YOU COULD POINT OUT THAT, WHILE ANY ATTACK WOULD CREATE A CRISIS, THERE

IS PERHAPS NO OVER-RIDING NEED FOR INSTANT REACTION, GIVEN THE HIGH LEVEL OF WESTERN OIL STOCKS.

3. ON THE NAVAL LEVEL, THE AMERICANS NOW SEEM TO AGREE WITH THE RN VIEW THAT:

(A) UNTIL A REAL THREAT TO FREE PASSAGE IN THE GULF MATERIALISES, USN, RN AND PRESUMABLY FRENCH NAVAL FORCES NOW ON STATION OUTSIDE THE STRAITS SHOULD REMAIN THERE ON PATROL (PERHAPS WITH CLOSER COORDINATION TO PREVENT CONFUSION AND OVERLAPPING)SEMI-COLON

(B) THE JOINT ALLIED RESPONSE TO ANY MILITARY THREAT TO THE STRAITS AND THE GULF, WHICH WOULD EFFECTIVELY HAVE CLOSED THEM TO UNPROTECTED MERCHANT SHIPPING, WOULD BE TO MOUNT A SET-PIECE OPERATION TO ESCORT A SMALL NUMBER OF MERCHANT SHIPS THROUGH TO THEIR GULF DESTINATIONS. THIS WOULD INVOLVE AIR COVER FROM THE SEVENTH FLEET. THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE WOULD BE TO RESTORE THE SHIPPING COMMUNITY'S CONFIDENCE. ANY MERCHANT SHIP, WHATEVER FLAG SHE WAS FLYING, COULD AVAIL HERSELF OF THIS PROTECTION SEMI-COLON

(C) THIS OPERATION WOULD BE REPEATED UNTIL THE THREAT HAD DIMINISHED SUFFICIENTLY FOR SHIPOWNERS AND INSURERS TO PUT THEIR SHIPS INTO THE GULF WITHOUT NAVAL SUPERVISION.

4. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK AGAIN TO THE PENTAGON (AND ALSO IF YOU JUDGE IT APPROPRIATE TO STATE DEPARTMENT AT SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL). YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE GLAD THAT OUR RESPECTIVE NAVIES' IDEAS SEEM NOW TO BE CONVERGING. YOU COULD EXPLAIN OUR OWN THINKING ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE LATEST CONCEPT:

(A) WE ASSUME THAT THE OMANIS WOULD ALLOW OUR NAVAL FORCES TO OPERATE IN THIS FASHION INSIDE THEIR CLAIMED TWELVE MILE TERRITORIAL SEA, AND THAT THE NON-BELLIGERENT GULF STATES WOULD DO LIKEWISE.

(B) ONLY THE US BATTLE GROUP IN THE AREA COULD SUPPLY THE AIR COVER WHICH WOULD BE A PREREQUISITE FOR NAVAL ESCORT OPERATIONS AS DESCRIBED. BUT SUCH FLEET AIRCOVER COULD PROBABLY NOT

OPERATE NORTH OF, SAY, BAHRAIN. IF SHIPS NEEDED TO BE ESCORTED FURTHER THAN THIS (AND NOT ALL WOULD), THEN THIS GAP MIGHT NEED TO BE COVERED BY LANDBASED FLIGHTS. IF SO, FROM WHERE, AND WHAT PRIOR DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE WOULD BE NEEDED?

(C) A STRAIGHTFORWARD AND WORKABLE COMMAND STRUCTURE WILL BE NEEDED, WITH WHICH THE FRENCH CAN ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES. THE ESTABLISHED RADFORD/COLLINS ARRANGEMENT (FOR CONTROL OF SHIPPING), FOR WHICH WELL UNDERSTOOD RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TUR - HAVE NOW BEEN DRAWN UP, IS OUR PREFERRED FRAMEWORK.

(D) WE THINK CURRENT FORCE LEVELS ARE ADEQUATE TO THE TASK.

(E) ARE NAVAL DISCUSSIONS IN THE AREA IN STEP WITH THOSE ELSEWHERE? (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE FRENCH SAY THAT ONLY IN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES COULD THEY CONSIDER ACTIVE NAVAL COOPERATION SEMI COLON BUT DOUBTLESS BILATERAL TALKS WILL CONTINUE LOCALLY.)

(F) A NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING OPERATION WOULD NEED TO BE MOUNTED TO LIAISE WITH MERCHANT SHIPPING. WE ENVISAGE THAT THIS COULD BE BASED ON FACILITIES AFLOAT, WITH HELICOPTER SUPPORT, IF A SHORE-BASED OPERATION WAS POLITICALLY DIFFICULT. OMAN MIGHT BE WILLING TO COOPERATE, BUT IN ANY CASE PROVISION OF NECESSARY FACILITIES IN ADVANCE OF ANY PROTECTION OPERATION WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

(G) THE THREAT OF MINING REMAINS. A MERE CLAIM TO HAVE MINED AN AREA IN THE GULF MIGHT REQUIRE IT TO BE SWEPT BEFORE TRAFFIC COULD BE RESTORED. EARLY CONSIDERATION THEREFORE NEEDS TO BE GIVEN TO ESTABLISHING A WESTERN MINE-CLEARING CAPABILITY IN THE AREA. THERE IS NONE AT PRESENT, ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THE SAUDIS HAVE A 4 COASTAL MINESWEEPERS.

5. PROBLEMS SUCH AS THESE, WHICH ARE FAR FROM BEING RESOLVED ON THE TECHNICAL LEVEL, CARRY WIDE-RANGING POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. THAT THEY ARE NOW UNDER ACTIVE DISCUSSION ILLUSTRATES THAT OUR TWO NAVIES ARE COMMUNICATING USEFULLY. BUT THE NEED TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE POLITICAL COORDINATION OF THE OPERATION, IN PARTICULAR SOME MECHANISM FOR PROMPT POLITICAL

CONSULTATION TO OVERSEE ANY NAVAL OPERATION, REMAINS. WE ARE WORKING ON IDEAS TO MEET THIS NEED AND WILL BE PUTTING THEM TO CHRISTOPHER NEXT WEEK.
FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION THE NEED, IT SEEMS TO US, IS FOR A GROUP IN ONE OF THE FOUR CAPITALS, AT A SUFFICIENTLY INCONSPICUOUS LEVEL TO ESCAPE PUBLICITY, TO BE ABLE TO MEET DAILY OR AT SHORT NOTICE, TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION AND TO FEED BACK PROPOSALS FOR APPROVAL IN CAPITALS. THE QUADRIPARTITE MACHINERY AT POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL IS ADMIRABLE FOR ITS PURPOSE BUT BUT INVOLVING AS IT DOES REPRESENTATIVES FROM CAPITALS IT CANNOT FULFIL THE NEED FOR DAY-TO-DAY CONTACT. THE REPRESENTATIVES IN THE GROUP SHOULD THUS, IT SEEMS TO US, BE COUNSELLORS FROM EMBASSIES MEETING WITH OFFICIALS OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT, PROBABLY IN WASHINGTON.

6. YOU SHOULD DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE AMERICANS TO MUSCAT TELNO 297, PARAS 4 AND 5, AND SAY THAT WE PROPOSE THAT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OUR NA IN MUSCAT SHOULD BRING THE CSON IN ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF OUR THINKING. WE WOULD HOPE THE AMERICANS WOULD ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH THIS.

7. COPY ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT RAISE THESE MATTERS WITH THEIR US, FRENCH OR GERMAN COLLEAGUES, OR WITH THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS, WITHOUT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 180136Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1540 DATED 17 OCTOBER 80
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, ROUTINE MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKMIS GENEVA, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, KUWAIT, JEDDA, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, ROME, BELGRADE, DACCA.
MY TELNO 1521: SECURITY COUNCIL: IRAQ/IRAN

1. IN THE MOST CROWDED SECURITY COUNCIL CHAMBER ANYONE COULD REMEMBER, PRIME MINISTER RAJAIE SPOKE FOR OVER AN HOUR THIS EVENING. IT WAS A TOTALLY UNYIELDING PERFORMANCE WHICH, OFFERED NO HOPE OF AN EARLY CESSATION OF THE HOSTILITIES, OR REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY BREAKTHROUGH ON THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES WAS IMMINENT.

2. IN HIS HARANGUE AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN, THE US, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND, IN PASSING, EGYPT, THE SOVIET UNION, MOROCCO, AND THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, HE ONLY BRIEFLY REFERRED TO THE STRONG POINT OF THE IRANIAN CASE, IE THE PROVISION IN ARTICLE 6 OF THE 1975 TREATY FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES WITHOUT RESORT TO FORCE.

3. RAJAIE SAID THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD COMMITTED HIS AGGRESSION BASED ON RIDICULOUS PRETEXTS, AND HIS FORCES, LIKE HITLER'S, HAD ACTED WITHOUT MERCY. ACCUSING THE IRAQI FORCES OF PLUNDER, RAPE AND TORTURE, HE APPEALED TO THE CONSCIENCES OF THE PEOPLES OF THE ENTIRE WORLD, AND IN PARTICULAR, THE MOSLEM PEOPLES, TO SIT IN JUDGEMENT. IT WAS SURPRISING THAT THOSE WHO PROFESSED BELIEF IN HUMAN DIGNITY, REMAINED ALOOF AND DECLARED THEIR

SIT IN JUDGEMENT. IT WAS SURPRISING THAT THOSE WHO PROFESSED BELIEF IN HUMAN DIGNITY, REMAINED ALOOF AND DECLARED THEIR NEUTRALITY IN THE FACE OF OPEN AGGRESSION. THE RESISTANCE OF THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES AND PEOPLE HAD STUPEFIED THE WORLD. THEY WERE PREPARED TO FIGHT A PROLONGED WAR UNTIL THE IRAQI PEOPLE BECAME AWARE OF THE TYRANNICAL AND ''DEPENDENT'' NATURE OF SADDAM'S REGIME AND BY OVERTHROWING THE REGIME, COULD DEAL A LETHAL BLOW TO US IMPERIALISM WHICH DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WAS HELPING IRAQ. ALL WHO HELPED SADDAM, AND HE HIMSELF, WOULD DIE IN THE DESTRUCTION. US AWAC'S AND RUSSIAN TUPOLEVS WOULD NOT WIN. GOOD WOULD TRIUMPH OVER EVIL AND THE DAY WOULD COME WHEN THE CRIMINAL, SADDAM, WOULD BE JUDGED BY A REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL IN IRAQ. IRAQ'S AIM WAS TO TOPPLE THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY REGIME AND IT HAD BLINDLY FOLLOWED THE INSTRUCTIONS OF ITS MASTERS, THE SUPERPOWERS. ITS ACTIONS NOW SHOULD BE COMPARED WITH ITS FAILURE EVER TO FIGHT AGAINST THE INVADERS OF JERUSALEM.

4. IRAQ HAD GIVEN ASYLUM AND SUPPORT TO THE LACKEYS OF THE US AND THE PAHLAVI HENCHMEN. IRAQ CLAIMED TO BE FIGHTING THE US, BUT NEVER ATTACKED THE SHAH'S US-DOMINATED ARMY. THEIR CURRENT ACTION WAS ''A US MISSION WITHOUT A US APPEARANCE.'' THE US SAW IN THIS ATTACK AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THEIR HOSTAGES TO BE FREED. PUPPET REGIMES OF THE US, EG JORDAN, EGYPT AND MOROCCO, WERE PRIMARY SUPPLIERS OF EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ VIA THE PORT OF AQABA. EGYPTIAN PILOTS AND CREWS, AND UNITS OF THE JORDANIAN ARMY, WERE ACTIVE IN IRAQ. THERE WAS A BUILD-UP OF SUPERPOWER FORCES AND FLEETS IN THE AREA, AND MILITARY AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN CONCLUDED BETWEEN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AND MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES. THE US, WHICH HAD REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OLYMPICS BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, NONETHELESS WAS TAKING PART IN THIS WAR AND AT THE SAME TIME, ENGAGING IN SALT TALKS. HENCE SOVIET WEAPONS COULD BE SENT VIA THE US LACKEY, JORDAN, TO IRAQ.

5. IN AN ATTEMPT TO DECEIVE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION , THE IRAQIS NOW SAID THEY WANTED A CEASEFIRE. OTHER COUNTRIES UNFORTUNATELY SUPPORTED THAT REQUEST. IRAN HEREBY DECLARED THAT A FAIR SETTLEMENT COULD ONLY BE FOUND IF THE AGGRESSOR WAS CONQUERED AND PUNISHED - ''THAT IS OUR FINAL POSITION.'' IRAN RELIED ON GOD AND THE PEOPLE'S WILL. HE WAS NOT HERE TO ASK THE COUNCIL TO DO ANYTHING. HE WAS HERE TO EXPOSE WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN IRAN. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO HELP OPPRESSED PEOPLE BECAUSE OF THE VETO. EVEN WHEN IT ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS, IT COULD NOT IMPLEMENT THEM EG. ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA. HE HAD COME TO REMIND THE MAJOR POWERS AND FORCES OF EVIL THAT AN END MUST BE PUT TO THEIR PLOTS AGAINST THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION WHICH WOULD NEVER BE VANQUISHED. NO DECISION OF THE COUNCIL WOULD CHANGE IRAN'S POSITION. THEY WOULD FIGHT

WITH THEIR BARE HANDS. THEY WOULD WIN.

6. AFTER RAJAIE HAD WALKED OUT SAADOUN HAMMADI (IRAQ) SPOKE AT GREAT LENGTH, DRAWING LARGELY ON HIS STATEMENT OF 15 OCTOBER, IN AN ATTEMPT TO REBUT RAJAIE'S ARGUEMENTS. HE ARGUED INTER ALIA THAT IRAN HAD VIOLATED THE PACKAGE DEAL ENSHRINED IN ARTICLE 4 OF THE 1975 TREATY AND THAT THE WHOLE TREATY HAD THEREFORE CAME TO AN END. HENCE ARTICLE 6 (PROCEDURES FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ITS TERMS) NO LONGER APPLIED. IRAQ THEREFORE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ''ACT IN SELF-DEFENCE''.

7. MCHENRY (US) THEN SPOKE BRIEFLY ON THE HOSTAGES, FOR OBVIOUS DOMESTIC REASONS. HE SPOKE OF THEIR PLIGHT AND OF THE NEED FOR THEM TO BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DECISION OF THE ICJ. TAKING UP A RHETORICAL QUESTION BY RAJAIE AS TO HOW THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THE WAR WAS GOING TO HELP THE HOSTAGES, MCHENRY SAID THAT IT WAS THE VERY PRINCIPLES WHICH RAJAIE HIMSELF HAD EXPOUNDED THAT SHOULD OBLIGE IRAN TO RELEASE THEM. IT WAS IRONICAL THAT RAJAIE HAD REFERRED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S INABILITY TO IMPLEMENT ITS RESOLUTIONS BECAUSE OF THE SUPERPOWERS, WHEN IT WAS IRAN WHICH HAD FOR MONTHS BEEN IN BLATANT DEFIANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

8. THERE WAS THEN AN EXCHANGE OF INCREASINGLY STERILE RIGHTS OF REPLY BETWEEN IRANIAN AND IRAQI REPRESENTATIVES, THE PRINCIPALS HAVING LEFT. MCHENRY WAS TEMPTED TO JOIN IN BUT SENSIBLY DID NOT DO SO.

9. RAJAIE'S STATEMENT APPEARS TO LEAVE THE COUNCIL COMPLETELY BLOCKED. EVEN A CALL ON THE COUNCIL TO CONDEMN IRAQI AGGRESSION AND DEMAND IRAQI WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS DISCOURAGING THAN HIS TOTAL REJECTION OF ANY ROLE FOR THE COUNCIL. IN FACT, HIS POINT WAS NOT SO MUCH THAT THE IRAQIS SHOULD WITHDRAW, BUT THAT THE AGGRESSOR SHOULD BE CONQUERED AND PUNISHED. MY FIRST REACTION IS THAT THE TWO SIDES WILL HAVE TO SLOG IT OUT FOR SOME TIME TO COME BEFORE EITHER OR BOTH BECOME AMENABLE TO MEDIATION BY ANY INTERNATIONAL BODY.

10. RAJAIE IS SAID TO BE LEAVING HERE TOMORROW (18 OCTOBER) AND TO BE SPENDING TWO DAYS IN ALGIERS ON HIS WAY HOME.

PARSONS

NNNN

GR 220 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM ABU DHABI 160915Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 340 OF 16 OCTOBER

INFO DUBAI AND MODUK

YOUR TELNO 226 OF 14 OCTOBER

SECURITY OF THE GULF.

1. YOUR PARA 4. A MEMBER OF MY STAFF HAS SPOKEN TO ZAKI NUSSEIBEH, WHO INTERPRETED FOR ZAID AND GISCARD AT THEIR 75 MINUTE MEETING ON 15 OCTOBER.

2. NUSSEIBEH WAS DISCREET BUT GAVE A STRONG IMPRESSION THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN EXTREMELY POSITIVE, AND HAD COVERED LONG-TERM COOPERATION PLANS INCLUDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. AIR DEFENCE IN PARTICULAR WAS PROBABLY DISCUSSED.

3. HE ALSO GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT ZAID OPPOSED MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE AMERICANS AND LOOKED INSTEAD TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AMONG WHICH WE MIGHT SUPPOSE FRANCE TO BE ESPECIALLY FAVOURED.

4. NUSSEIBEH SAID THAT THE UAE HAD DECIDED IN ADVANCE OF THE VISIT TO ALLOT FRANCE AN ADDITIONAL 50,000 B/D OF CRUDE AND INFORMED GISCARD OF THIS ON HIS ARRIVAL.

5. THE EXTENT TO WHICH ZAID WAS PLEASED WITH THE TALKS IS SHOWN BY HIS UNPRECEDENTED FIRST PERSON STATEMENT ABOUT THEM, WHICH APPEARED IN THE LOCAL PRESS ON 16 OCTOBER.

ROBERTS

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
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FM JEDDA 161147Z OCT 80

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 759 OF 16 OCTOBER

AND IMMEDIATE ROME, PRIORITY WASHINGTON MUSCAT, ROUTINE MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, DOHA, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI AND DUBAI.

YOUR TELNO 391 TO MUSCAT: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE TELLS ME THAT HE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT A WEEK AGO TO TELL THE SAUDIS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL THAT THE USA WAS DETERMINED THAT THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN, ASSURRED THAT SAUDI ARABIA SHARED THIS AIM, AND WAS THEREFORE PROCEEDING WITH CONSULTATIONS WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH ABOUT CONTINGENCY PLANNING. AMBASSADOR WEST HAD TO WAIT 4 OR 5 DAYS FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH PRINCE FAHD. BY THAT TIME USS LEAHY HAD ALREADY ENTERED THE GULF AND THERE WAS PUBLIC NEWS OF FRENCH UNITS IN THE AREA. WEST TOLD FAHD THAT HE PRESUMED THESE MOVES WERE THE RESULT OF THE CONSULTATIONS. FAHD SAID ''FINE''.

2. WEST SAW PRINCE SULTAN THIS MORNING AND REITERATED THE USA'S RESOLVE TO KEEP THE LANES OPEN IN ANY EVENTUALITY AND THEIR INTENTION TO CONSULT WITH OTHER INTERESTED AND FRIENDLY POWERS AND TO KEEP THE SAUDIS INFORMED. HE GAVE SULTAN EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT OR CRITICISE, BUT SULTAN READILY AGREED TO WHAT WAS PROPOSED.

TO OBJECT OR CRITICISE, BUT SULTAN READILY AGREED TO WHAT WAS PROPOSED.

3. I COMMENTED THAT THIS ATTITUDE WAS IN LINE WITH WHAT PRINCE TURKI HAD TOLD ME BUT AGAINST THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THUNAYYAN) AND OTHER OFFICIALS IN THE MFA AND THE VIEWS AIRED REGULARLY IN THE LOCAL PRESS. WEST SAID THIS WAS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE GAP BETWEEN PRINCE SAUD AND PRINCE FAHD. SAUD HAD MADE STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS TO THE EFFECT THAT FOREIGN POWERS SHOULD KEEP OUT OF THE GULF AND THAT THE LOCAL STATES COULD LOOK AFTER THEIR OWN COMMUNICATIONS. HE MUST KNOW THAT THIS WAS NONSENSE, BUT AS USUAL HE WAS INCLINED TO TAKE THE STANDARD ARAB NATIONALIST LINE.

4. WEST ADDED THAT SAUD HAD JUST LEFT FOR TEN DAYS HOLIDAY IN PARIS WITH HIS DEPUTY MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MANSOURI. WHEN I EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT SAUD SHOULD GO AWAY AT A TIME OF CRISIS, WEST COMMENTED THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SAUD WAS MIFFED BECAUSE THE BIG DECISIONS WERE TAKEN BY OTHERS AND THAT HE MIGHT HAVE HAD ''HIS WRIST SLAPPED'' OVER HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. TURKI ON THIS ISSUE WAS, PRIVATELY AT LEAST, WITH FAHD AND SULTAN AND AGAINST HIS BROTHER SAUD.

5. WEST SAID THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY CONVINCED THAT IF WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD TO INTERVENE IN GULF SECURITY, THEY WOULD GET FULL SUPPORT FROM THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT IN PRIVATE, THOUGH HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE WHAT THEIR PUBLIC ATTITUDE WOULD BE.

6. NOW THAT WE HAVE THIS CLARIFICATION OF SAUDI VIEWS AT THE TOP AND GIVEN THAT FAHD AND SULTAN WILL BE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE PILGRIMAGE FROM NOW ON FOR A WEEK, I DO NOT REPEAT NOT PROPOSE TO TRY FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH EITHER OF THEM UNLESS YOU WISH TO DISTANCE HMG FROM THE AMERICAN APPROACH. I TAKE IT THAT AS OF NOW, THOUGH YOU ARE NOT ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH AMERICAN PROCEDURE, YOU WOULD NOT WISH TO MAKE WHAT WOULD HAVE TO BE A CONSPICUOUS EFFOKN TO EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US.

CRAIG

P S TO P M NO 10 DOWNING ST

GR 225
UNCLASSIFIED
FM TEL AVIV 160915Z OCT 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 491 OF 16 OCTOBER
INFO WASHINGTON BRUSSELS LUXEMBOURG AMMAN AND CAIRO
INFO SAVING DAMASCUS BAGHDAD BEIRUT

MY TEL NO 485: IRAN/IRAQ/ISRAEL

1. IN AN INTERVIEW IN THE JERUSALEM POST TODAY, SHAMIR IS QUTED AS SAYING THAT HE HOPED THE EC NINITIATIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST WAS DYING. HE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION DURING HIS RECENT VISITS TO THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE THAT THERE WAS NOW MUCH LESS INTEREST IN THE INITIATIVE IN THE LIGHT OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. WHILE THE EC HEADS OF STATE HAD INCLUDED CONSIDERATION OF THE INITIATIVE, AND THE THORN MISSION, ON THE AGENDA FOR THEIR DECEMBER SUMMIT MEETING, HE WAS ''NOT SO SURE THEY WILL DECIDE ANYTHING''.

2. SHAMIR ADDED THAT MANY PEOPLE WERE COMING TO REALISE THE VALIDITY OF ISRAEL'S LONG-STANDING CONTENTION THAT THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WAS NOT THE SOLE OR MAIN CAUSE OF INSTABILITY IN THE REGION. THE PROBLEM WAS NOT TODAY ''THE BURNING ISSUE'': UNDERSTANDABLY ENOUGH, THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' CONCERNS WERE RIVITTED ON THE STATE OF THE OIL LIFELINE THROUGH THE GULF. HE HOPED THE WAR WOULD BRING HOME THE FACT THAT LONG-TERM WESTERN OVER-DEPENDENCE ON INHERENTLY UNSTABLE STATES FOR CRUCIAL OIL SUPPLIES WAS A HIGHLY DANGERIOUS CONDITION.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

ROBINSON

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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Read in full.

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
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FM MUSCAT 161541Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 297 OF 16 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE ROME (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE), WASHINGTON,
PRIORITY DUBAI, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, KUWAIT, JEDDA, BAGHDAD,
AMMAN
INFO SAVING PARIS, BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV

YOUR TELNO 391: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. MOBERLY AND I HAD AN HOUR WITH QAIS ZAWAWI THIS MORNING AND HALF AN HOUR WITH THE SULTAN (WITH ZAWAWI IN ATTENDANCE) THIS AFTERNOON.

2. MOBERLY SPOKE ON BOTH OCCASIONS ABOUT THE GENERAL OBJECTS OF HIS CURRENT TOUR, AND ADDED SPECIFIC EXPLANATIONS OF OUR RESPONSE TO ZAID'S APPROACH AND OF NAVAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING, DRAWING AS APPROPRIATE ON YOUR TELS 391 AND 392.

3. ZAWAWI ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN ZAID'S REQUEST AND THE BRITISH NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND WAS TOLD THERE WAS NOT. HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO SAUDI ATTITUDES AND SAID THAT THE OMANIS PROPOSED TO SUGGEST REACTIVATING THE TAIF GROUP OF THE SIX OF 1979 (I.E. GULF STATES OTHER THAN IRAQ AND IRAN) IN ORDER TO POINT THE MORAL THAT THE DANGER WHICH THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING DISCUSSED THERE HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO COUNTER WAS NOW FACING THE SIX AND THAT FACILITIES FOR THE WESTERN POWERS WERE NECESSARY TO BALANCE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE AREA.

IN THE AREA.

4. ZAWAWI WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SPOKEN TO THE OMANIS ABOUT THE PROPOSED NAVAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING (CURIOUSLY, MY U.S. COLLEAGUE HAD NOT MENTIONED THIS APPROACH WHEN HE SAW MOBERLY AT MY HOUSE LAST NIGHT). THE OMANIS THOUGHT THAT THIS REQUIRED BROADER CONSULTATIONS AND THAT IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THE PURPOSE OF ANY INTERNATIONAL NAVAL ACTION WOULD BE LIMITED TO MAINTAINING FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF NAVIGATION.

5. THE OMANIS HAD ALSO DISCUSSED WITH THE AMERICANS IN WASHINGTON THEIR WISH TO IMPROVE OMANI DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AREA, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING ALTERNATIVE SEA LANES IF THE NORMAL CHANNELS WERE BLOCKED (HIS THOUGHT HERE WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR).

6. MOBERLY REPLIED THAT WE WOULD WELCOME IT IF THE OMANIS COULD PERSUADE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SIX TO CO-ORDINATE THEIR RESPONSE TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THIS WAY. BUT HE HAD DETECTED SIGNS OF NERVOUSNESS FURTHER UP THE GULF AT BEING SEEN TO BE GETTING TOGETHER. IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE NECESSARY TO AVOID PREMATURE PUBLICITY ABOUT CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND THE TIMING OF ANY MEASURES PROPOSED WOULD NEED CAREFUL JUDGMENT, OTHERWISE NEGATIVE REACTIONS IN THE AREA COULD FRUSTRATE EFFECTIVE ACTION.

7. ZAWAWI THOUGHT THAT SOME NERVOUSNESS IN THE REGION WAS NOT ALTOGETHER UNWELCOME. HE REAFFIRMED OMAN'S NEUTRALITY IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT ''ALTHOUGH WE HAD SOME DIFFICULTIES IN THE BEGINNING''. COMMENTING ON MOBERLY'S UNDERLINING OF YOUR RECOGNITION THAT THE VARIOUS PROBLEMS FACING THE REGION ARE INTERCONNECTED AND THAT PROGRESS ON THE PALESTINE ISSUE IS ESSENTIAL, ZAWAWI SAID THAT THE ARABS SHOULD REALISE THAT U.S. SUPPORT OF ISRAEL WAS NOTHING NEW, THAT IT WAS PROBABLY LESS NOW THAN IT HAD EVER BEEN AND THAT CO-OPERATION WITH THE AMERICANS MADE MORE SENSE THAN THE REVERSE.

8. AT THE AUDIENCE, MOBERLY REPEATED MORE BRIEFLY WHAT HE HAD SAID TO ZAWAWI. QABOOS GAVE HIS SEAL OF APPROVAL, AS IT WERE, TO ZAWAWI'S REPLY, AND EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE FOR THE MESSAGE WHICH MOBERLY HAD CONVEYED BUT DID NOT ENTER INTO ANY DETAILED DISCUSSION EXCEPT TO STRESS THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO PROVIDE ANY FACILITIES THAT MIGHT BE REQUIRED FROM OMAN.

9. BOTH QABOOS AND ZAWAWI WELCOMED OUR RESPONSE TO ZAID AND NEITHER REACTED BY SUGGESTING SIMILAR ACTION IN OMAN. BOTH ALSO AFFIRMED THEIR READINESS TO MAINTAIN CONTINUING CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH US AS THE SITUATION IN THE AREA EVOLVED.

FCO PASS SAVING TO PARIS, BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV

LUCAS

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 520
CONFIDENTIAL
FM AMMAN 161225Z OCT 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 419 OF 16 OCT 80
INFO PRIORITY ROME (FOR PS SECRETARY OF STATE) AND WASHINGTON
ROUTINE BAGHDAD JEDDA TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK
SAVING TO DAMASCUS

MY TELNO 413 OF 15 OCTOBER: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I HAVE SINCE COMPARED NOTES WITH THE US AMBASSADOR WHO ALSO SAW KING HUSSEIN ON THE EVENING OF 14 OCTOBER. VELIOTES OBTAINED THE CLEAR IMPRESSION FROM THE KING THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN WANTED TO BE IN FULL CONTROL OF ABADAN AND KHORRAMSHAHR BEFORE RESPONDING TO ANY PEACE INITIATIVE AND THAT THIS WAS ONE REASON WHY SADDAM WAS NOT IN AN IMMEDIATE HURRY TO RESPOND TO CURRENT MEDIATION EFFORTS. BUT VELIOTES THOUGHT THAT BOTH SADDAM AND KING HUSSEIN WERE WORRIED THAT THE ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION DESCRIBED IN PARAS 6 AND 7 OF MY TUR WOULD BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND THAT IRAQ MIGHT THEN COME UNDER PRESSURE FROM WORLD OPINION, AND EVEN FROM WITHIN IRAQ, TO DECLARE A CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAW FROM THE IRANIAN TERRITORY THEY HAD OCCUPIED. HOWEVER VELIOTES ALSO THOUGHT THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS BEGINNING TO SEE THAT A PROLONGATION OF HOSTILITIES COULD HAVE UNFAVOURABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR IRAQ: THE KING HAD HIMSELF ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM MIGHT BE IN FOR TROUBLE WITH THE IRAQI SHI'ITES IF THE CONFLICT CONTINUED.

2. IN SPEAKING ABOUT HIS RECENT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABI, KING HUSSEIN HAD ADMITTED THAT ''THE SAUDIS DID MORE LISTENING THAN TALKING''. VELIOTES HAD ASKED THE KING IF THE SAUDIS HAD ANY IDEAS ON HOW THE CONFLICT MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO AN END. THE KING SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT, BUT REVEALED THAT THEY HAD SHOWN CONCERN LEAST IT SHOULD SPREAD TO OTHER COUNTRIES. THE SAUDIS HAD ALSO APPARENTLY REVEALED UNEASE ABOUT IRAQ'S POSITION ON THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA: THE KING TOLD VELIOTES THAT HE HAD HAD TO EXPLAIN THIS AT SOME LENGTH.

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CONFIDENTIAL

3. ACCORDING TO VELIOTES (PLEASE PROTECT), THE US AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV HAD DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB WITH THE ISRAELIS REGARDING THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE PUBLIC WAR OF NERVES THE ISRAELIS HAD MOUNTED AGAINST JORDANIAN AID TO IRAQ (WHICH THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES HAD TOLD THE US AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV WAS QUITE DELIBERATE). VELIOTES HAD NOW RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO TELL THE KING THAT THE ISRAELIS, IN HAILING A SHIP IN THE GULF OF AQABA AND ASKING WHAT CARGO IT CARRIED, HAD NOT IN THE US VIEW ACTED CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: INDEED US COASTGUARDS DID THIS REGULARLY OFF THE AMERICAN COAST IN CHECKING ON DRUG SMUGGLING ETC. THE US DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD DELIBERATELY TRY TO IMPEDE SHIPPING PASSING THROUGH THE GULF. IT WAS THE CLEAR US VIEW THAT THE GULF OF AQABA WAS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY AND THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NO RIGHT WHATEVER TO IMPEDE THE PASSAGE OF SHIPPING UNLESS IT WERE WITHIN ISRAELI TERRITORIAL WATERS (THIS MATTER IS NOT QUITE CLEAR, AS THE ISRAELIS CLAIM 6 MILES AND THE US DOES NOT RECOGNISE THEIR CLAIM TO AS MUSH AS THIS.

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO DAMASCUS

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FM WASHINGTON 161730Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4288 OF 16 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE ROME (FOR WALDEN), PARIS (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR), BONN (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR), UKDEL NATO (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR),

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

MY TELNO 4276

IRAQ/IRAN: ALLIED CONSULTATION

1. MUSKIE'S REMARKS, MADE TO ME WITHIN HOURS OF A VERY DIFFERENT VIEWPOINT EXPRESSED TO ME BY KOMER, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REFLECT THE DISARRAY THAT EXISTS HERE IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ON FOREIGN AND STRATEGIC POLICY.

2. MUSKIE'S APPROACH REMAINS CAUTIOUS, HIS TECHNIQUE SOCRATIC. HE WANTS TO FEEL HIS WAY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IMPOSE IT. HE IS WARY OF LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS THAT COULD INVOLVE FAR-REACHING MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS AND EVENTUALLY ALSO MAKE THE U.S. MORE UNPOPULAR IN THE REGION AND NOT NECESSARILY MORE ABLE TO SECURE OIL. HE IS CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGER OF PROVIDING THE SOVIETS WITH A PRETEXT FOR INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN THE REGION.

3. THE OTHER MAIN SCHOOL OF THOUGHT, LED BY BRZEZINSKI, HAROLD BROWN AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GENERALLY, FAVOURS USING THE PRESENT CRISIS TO ESTABLISH A PERMANENT DEFENCE POSITION FOR THE U S A IN THE GULF. THEY WISH TO SEIZE UPON CURRENT SAUDI FEAR, PARTICULARLY OF AIR RAIDS FROM IRAN, TO CREATE THE FORWARD FACILITIES NECESSARY FOR THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES, SO THAT THEY COULD IN THE LAST RESORT ESTABLISH A THIN RED LINE TO TRY TO DETER OR BLOCK A SOVIET MILITARY ADVANCE INTO THE AREA. THEY SEE THE INITIAL SAUDI INVITATION TO THEM AS THE LONG-SOUGHT CARD OF ENTRY SEMICLN AND NOW THAT THEY HAVE THEIR FOOT IN THE DOOR, THEY ARE NOT GOING TO BE PERSUADED EASILY TO TAKE IT OUT. THEY PERCEIVE A LINK BETWEEN THEIR GROWING CONNECTION WITH EGYPT AND THEIR NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SAUDIS, THE ONE HELPING THE OTHER AND BOTH HELPING TO OVERCOME THE HANDICAP IMPOSED ON THEIR MIDDLE EAST POLICY BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL.

4. THAT PUTS IT VERY BALDLY BUT IT IS THE BASIC LINE-UP AT THE MOMENT AND THE SUBJECT OF OPEN PRESS SPECULATION. THERE WILL OF COURSE BE NO RECONCILIATION AND NO CLEAR-CUT POLICY UNTIL AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS SEMICLN AND EVEN THEN IT MAY TAKE TIME.

5. YOU MIGHT WELL ASK WHAT AMERICA'S ALLIES ARE MEANT TO DO IN THIS UNTIDY SITUATION. THE ANSWER INEVITABLY IS THAT WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO TRY TO MUDDLE THROUGH UNTIL NOVEMBER, BEARING IN MIND THE NOT ALTOGETHER HEARTENING THOUGHT THAT EVEN THEN, THE HOUSE HERE MAY NOT BE PUT IN ORDER QUICKLY: THE REPUBLICANS, IF THEY WIN, WILL TAKE SEVERAL MONTHS TO SETTLE IN SEMICLN THE DEMOCRATS, IF THEY ARE RETURNED, ARE EXPECTED TO GO IN FOR A CONSIDERABLE SHAKE-UP SEMI-CLN AND, HOWEVER LIBERATED FROM IMMEDIATE POLITICAL PRESSURES HE MAY BE, I DO NOT SEE CARTER SUDDENLY BECOMING A DYNAMIC LEADER. BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT WE CAN DRAW ANY USEFUL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT OUR DEALINGS WITH THE UNITED STATES IN TERMS EITHER OF POLICY OR TACTICS UNTIL WE KNOW THE ELECTION RESULTS AND WHO ARE THE PEOPLE IN PLACE. AMERICA'S CONFUSION SHOULD BE EUROPE'S CHANCE BUT, SEEN FROM HERE, EUROPE DOES NOT SEEM ABLE TO HARNESS ITSELF TO FILL THE VACUUM. WHAT IS GALLING AND DISTURBING ARE THE CONTINUING SIGNS THAT, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PUBLIC POLEMICS AND THE DAMPER IMPOSED BY THE ADMINISTRATION ON TALK OF DISARRY IN THE ALLIANCE, EUROPE IS STILL CONSIDERED HERE BY IMPORTANT SEGMENTS OF THE CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION TO BE WAYWARD, SELFISH AND PREPARED NEITHER TO HELP THEMSELVES NOR THE ALLIED CAUSE GENERALLY. IT MAY BE WRONG TO RAISE THE SPECTRE OF MANSFIELDISM BUT IT WOULD BE EQUALLY WRONG TO DISCOUNT THE LIKELIHOOD OF TROUBLE FOR EUROPE IN THE NEXT CONGRESS.

HENDERSON

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PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
SIR J GRAHAM
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
MR P MOBERLY
CABINET OFFICE

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GR 355
S E C R E T

SECRET

18

FM FCO 161728Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELNO. 1650 OF 16 OCTOBER,
AND TO IMMEDIATE: BONN, PARIS,
INFO IMMEDIATE ROME (FOR WALDEN).

YOUR TELNO4276: IRAQ/IRAN: ALLIED CONSULTATIONS.

1. WE SHALL LET YOU KNOW THE FRENCH AND GERMAN RESPONSES AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE THEM. (PARIS TELNOS 852 AND 857 SUGGEST THAT THE FRENCH REPLY MAY BE NEGATIVE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE GERMANS ARE HESITATING: THEY MAY SUGGEST, INSTEAD OF A MINISTERIAL MEETING AS WE HAD PROPOSED, THAT THE MEETING ALREADY FIXED AT POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL FOR 27 OCTOBER BE GIVEN SPECIFIC TASKS OF AN OPERATIONAL CHARACTER..) AT ANY RATE WE PROPOSE TO GIVE THEM BOTH UNTIL THE WEEKEND TO RESPOND. THIS MEANS THAT TUESDAY 21 OCTOBER IS THE EARLIEST REALISTIC TIME FOR A MEETING HERE.

2. IF THE FRENCH AND/OR THE GERMAN REPLY IS NEGATIVE, WE SHALL WANT TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER OR NOT TO GO AHEAD BILATERALLY WITH THE AMERICANS ALONE. OUR PRESENT VIEW IS THAT THIS WOULD RISK SERIOUSLY DAMAGING THE QUADRIPARTITE FORUM WITHOUT BRINGING THE BENEFITS OF CO-ORDINATION WHICH WE HAD HOPED TO SECURE BY A MEETING OF THE FOUR. IT MIGHT BE DIFFERENT IF THERE WERE A CHANCE OF CHRISTOPHER COMING TO LONDON IN SECRET, WHICH WE JUDGE TO BE IMPOSSIBLE, OR AS PART OF A EUROPEAN TOUR, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE ORGANISED SEPARATELY AND BY THE AMERICANS.

3. IN CONVEYING THE FOREGOING TO THE AMERICANS YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE PROPOSE TO KEEP ABSOLUTELY QUIET ABOUT THE IDEA OF A MEETING IN LONDON AND HOPE THAT THEY WILL DO LIKEWISE. IF IT SHOULD LEAK, NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL TAKE THE LINE THAT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF HAS NATURALLY LED TO A GOOD DEAL OF INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATION ON THE VARIOUS ASPECTS AND THAT THE IDEA OF A VISIT BY CHRISTOPHER TO EUROPE REPEAT EUROPE IS ONE OF MANY THAT HAVE BEEN UNDER ?CONSIDERATION.

4. THE FOREGOING IS SUBJECT TO ANY COMMENTS WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY WISH TO SEND.

5. BONN AND PARIS: PLEASE INFORM THE GERMANS AND FRENCH THAT CHRISTOPHER IS WILLING TO COME TO LONDON ON THE BASIS SUGGESTED IN MY TELNO 389 TO BONN AND THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THEIR REACTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PLEASE ALSO TELL THEM ABOUT THE CONTINGENCY PRESS LINE SUGGESTED IN PARA. 3 ABOVE.

CARRINGTON

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HD/MED
HD/DEF D
HD/EESD
HD/MAED
PS
PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
SIR J GRAHAM
MR BULLARD
MR P MOBERLY
LORD BRIDGES
MR BRAITHWAITE

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

1) Mr Lankester. MS 2
2) Prime Minister.

MS

WEEKLY OIL REPORT

IRAN/IRAQ

1. Fighting continues between Iran and Iraq; a prolonged stalemate seems certain. Iraqi refinery capacity may now be down to 60,000 bd; Iraqi oil export facilities in the Gulf have reportedly all been damaged as well as the pumping facilities for the export pipeline through Turkey. There is no indication of the Syrians being prepared to allow Iraqi use of the export pipeline through Syria. The Iranians probably still have 140,000 bd refinery capacity. The main Iranian export terminal at Kharg Island has been damaged although offshore facilities lower down the Gulf are apparently still exporting 200,000 bd. Both sides appear to have adequate supplies of fuel to continue fighting. How long damaged facilities will take to repair once fighting stops is hard to estimate; much will depend on which key and hard to replace items have been affected. According to the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) the Iraqi loading facilities on the Gulf could take several months to repair.

OPEC

2. There have been numerous reports about production increases by Gulf producers, led by Saudi Arabia. The Kuwaiti, Qatari, UAE and Saudi Oil Ministers met in Saudi Arabia on 10 October after Yamani had visited those countries and Bahrain earlier in the week. Their communique said that the Ministers had decided "to take certain measures to rectify the situation and alleviate the problems, particularly of the developing countries".

3. The extent to which Kuwait, Qatar and UAE commited themselves to any increase in planned production is obscure. It looks as if Kuwait where liftings were already planned to rise to 1.7 or 1.8 mbd for seasonal reasons agreed in principle to do more to help developing countries going short. Qatar and UAE may have offered relatively small increases. What appears to be an authoratative statement of the Saudi position in MEES says that ARAMCO's allowable production will be raised from 9. mbd to between a minimum of 10 mbd and a

maximum of 11 mbd. Decisions on production level will be taken monthly (other press reports suggest that the chosen level is at present 10.4 mbd). The incremental production is designed to help governmental and company customers hard hit by loss of Iranian and Iraqi supplies. ARAMCO is apparently to act as the export channel for the oil. It is not clear whether Saudi Arabia will take on new customers and decisions on disposal have apparently not yet been made.

4. The Saudi initiative appears to have been decided on when spot market prices started to rise and designed primarily to forestall a surge in prices which would, inter alia, have destroyed groundwork laid for the introduction of the Long Term Strategy. It may also have been motivated by a wish to assist the Iraqis (who earlier requested increases from other Gulf producers) and third world countries particularly hard hit.

5. The OPEC preparatory meeting due to have been held in London on 14/15 October to discuss the long term strategy has been called off; plans for the Summit in Baghdad on 4 November have apparently now been shelved.

6. Until the precise levels of Saudi, UAE and Kuwaiti production become clearer it is difficult to estimate exactly the current balance between oil supply and demand. But companies continue to report high stocks and, trading on the spot market is very thin. It may be as little as 1.5 mbd which can at present be met easily from stocks. Spot crude prices have not risen above the levels they reached before the Saudi action: Arab light $4 up on mid September levels at $36, top quality African crudes at $37. Prices for heavy fuel oil rich crude are still firming, however, reflecting in part the loss of fuel oil production from Abadan.

GREECE

7. Under a Memorandum of Understanding signed with the Greek Government last November, British firms were to have been favoured in a number of projects, including the supply by GEC of a 2 x 350 MW coal-fired power station and the associated supply by NCB and Shell of the coal; in return, Greece would be sold some North Sea oil. However, some members of the Greek Government now want the contracts put out to international tender, thereby shelving the understanding with the UK. This prevented the signature of the contracts during the Prime Minister's visit to Greece last month. The Secretary of State for Trade [illegible] pursued the matter when he visited Athens on 12-14 October.

Our Ambassador in Athens believes that Britain still has a chance of gaining the contracts with Greece.

J E D'ANCONA
CIP 2
ROOM 1409
EXT 5509

15 October 1980

WEEKLY ENERGY REPORT

PS/Prime Minister
PS/Secretary of State
PS/Minister of State
PS/Mr Moore
PS/Mr Lamont
PS/PUS
Mr D le B Jones
Mr Beasley
Mr T P Jones
Mr Custis
Mr Herzig
Mr Priddle
Mr Spain
Mr Morphet
Mr Monger
Mr Manley
Mr Guiness
Mr Kelly
Mr Price
Mr Hampton
Mr Scarr
Dr Palmer
CIP PRINCIPALS
Mr Portillo
Miss Moxey
Mr Carr
Miss Brown FCO
Mr Tatham FCO
Mr Fall FCO
Mr McIntyre Treasury
Mr Turnbull Treasury
Mr Jones Washington
Mr Smith UK DEL OECD Paris
Mr Bone UK Rep Brussels
Mr Thomas BE Tokyo
Mr Westmacott BE Paris
Mr Longworth BE Bonn
Ms Probyn BE Oslo
Mr Sullivan BE The Hague
Mr Bache BE Vienna

17 OCT 1980



GRS 730 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 151815Z OCT 80

Read in full

TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 857 OF 15 OCTOBER 1980
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, JEDDA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA AND BAHRAIN
INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, LUXEMBOURG, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS

MR

IRAN/IRAQ: FRENCH POLICY

1. ALTHOUGH I HAVE REPORTED ASPECTS OF FRENCH POLICY IN A NUMBER OF RECENT TELEGRAMS (EG NOS 838, 847 AND 852), IT MAY BE USEFUL AT THIS STAGE IF I TRY TO DRAW TOGETHER THE THREADS (BEARING IN MIND THAT SOME ASPECTS OF THE PICTURE, EG, CONTACTS BETWEEN NAVIES, ARE NOT KNOWN IN DETAIL TO US IN PARIS). THE GAME WHICH THE FRENCH FIND THEMSELVES PLAYING IS VERY COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT.

2. THE FRENCH ARE HEAVILY COMMITTED TO IRAQ. THEIR PAST INVESTMENT, BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC, HAS BEEN AIMED PRIMARILY AT INCREASING THE SECURITY OF FRENCH OIL SUPPLIES AND SELLING ARMS AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY TO IRAQ IN ORDER TO OFFSET A VERY LARGE BILL FOR OIL. IT IS NOT EASY FOR THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO DO OTHER THAN MAINTAIN SOME PUBLIC BIAS IN FAVOUR OF IRAQ, AT ANY RATE AS LONG AS IRAQ LOOKS AS IF IT IS WINNING. THE WAY THE WAR IF GOING MUST BE GRADUALLY UNDERMINING CONFIDENCE HERE THAT THE FLOW OF IRAQI OIL COULD REVERT TO FORMER LEVELS AT AN EARLY DATE OR THAT ARMS AND OTHER EXPORTS TO IRAQ (EG NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY) CAN CONTINUE TO FLOW WITHOUT CAUSING EMBARRASSMENT FOR FRANCE ELSEWHERE. THE FRENCH ARE FOR THE MOMENT HOLDING ON TO THEIR PROFITABLE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ, BUT A GOOD DEAL LESS IS BEING HEARD ABOUT ITS ''PRIVILEGED'' NATURE.

3. IRAN HAS TURNED SOUR FOR FRANCE AS FOR OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES IN SPITE OF THE HELP GIVEN TO KHOMEINI IN THE PAST. FOR THE MOMENT FRANCE OWES IRAN NOTHING BUT FOR LONG-TERM REASONS IS ANXIOUS NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED BY IRAN AS UNFRIENDLY.

4. FRANCE IS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGER THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, WITHOUT BEING SURE WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT DO THIS BY HELPING IRAN OR BY HELPING IRAQ. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WILL CERTAINLY WISH TO AVOID FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE TAKING SIDES IN A WAY WHICH MIGHT LINE HER UP CLEARLY ON THE WRONG SIDE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

5. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS WITHOUT DIFFICULTY THAT THE US ALONE ARE LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO BRING ENOUGH WEIGHT TO BEAR TO COUNTER-BALANCE UNTOWARD DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF, BUT IT REMAINS A CENTRAL POINT OF FRENCH POLICY THAT FRANCE CANNOT BE SEEN TO DEFER TO US LEADERSHIP EITHER IN NATO OR, A FORTIORE, OUTSIDE. IRONICALLY THE FRENCH WISH TO HAVE THE REALITY OF THE US PRESENCE AND PERHAPS OF US ACTION IN THE GULF AREA WITHOUT THE APPEARANCE, AND THE APPEARANCE OF FRENCH PRESENCE AND ACTION WITHOUT THE REALITY.

6. THE FRENCH NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, WHILE NOT ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION IN THE GULF, IS SOMETHING OF A WINDFALL FOR FRENCH POLICY THERE AT THE PRESENT TIME. WITH A COUPLE OF LARGE FRIGATES AND FOUR CORVETTE-SIZED SHIPS PLUS SUPPORTING ELEMENTS, THE FRENCH CAN TALK OF HAVING A LITTLE FLEET IN THE AREA. THANKS TO THEIR BASE FACILITIES AT JIBUTI THEY CAN CHOOSE FROM DAY TO DAY WHETHER TO SAY THE SHIPS ARE ON NORMAL STATION OR PRESENT IN THE VICINITY OF THE CRISIS. GIVEN THAT FRENCH APPEARANCES ARE ADMIRABLY LOOKED AFTER IN THIS WAY, ALL THAT REMAINS FOR THEM TO DO IS TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE FIRMLY IN TOUCH WITH THE REALITY OF THE AMERICAN PRESENCE. FOR THIS NOTHING MORE THAN BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH WASHINGTON IS NECESSARY.

7. THESE VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS SEEM TO DETERMINE THE FRENCH ATTITUDE TO PROPOSALS FOR PRACTICAL COLLABORATION ON A 3 OR 4 POWER BASIS IN RELATION TO EVENTS IN THE GULF. THE FRENCH ATTITUDE IS LIKELY TO DEVELOP IN THE DIRECTION WHICH YOU WISH ONLY IF EVENTS ON THE GROUND BEGIN TO LOOK MORE DANGEROUS AND FRANCE'S ATTITUDE OF WATCHING AND WAITING BEGINS TO LOOK LIKE NON-PARTICIPATION AND BEING LEFT ASIDE.

8. FOR THE MOMENT THE FRENCH ARE KEEPING WELL IN WITH THE ARABS BY THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISRAEL AND BY VAGUE ASSURANCES OF READINESS TO BE HELPFUL TO THE GULF STATES. MAINTENANCE OF THE FLOW OF OIL TO FRANCE REMAINS A DOMINANT FRENCH PRIORITY. 72% OF FRANCE'S OIL IMPORTS HAVE BEEN COMING FROM GULF STATES. PRESIDENT GISCARD IS SAID TO HAVE USED HIS STOP-OVER IN ABU DHABI ON 14 OCTOBER TO SECURE ASSURANCES FOR INCREASED OIL FROM THE UAE. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE 14 BILLION FRANC NAVAL ORDER FROM SAUDI ARABIA IS A SURE SIGN THAT FRANCE HAS EVERY INTEREST SIMPLY IN HOPING THAT NOTHING GOES MORE WRONG THAN IT HAS ALREADY. IT MAY BE NOTED IN PASSING THAT THE LITTLE FRENCH FLEET IN THE INDIAN OCEAN HAS SERVED A VERY IMPORTANT AIM FOR FRANCE BY ACTING AS A SORT OF DISPLAY PLATFORM TO HELP SELL FRENCH NAVAL EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE GULF.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

HIBBERT.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

STANDARD

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

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FROM WASHINGTON 151745Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4276 OF 15 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE ROME (FOR WALDEN), BONN AND PARIS.

Read in full.

YOUR TELNOS 389 AND 391 TO BONN.

IRAQ/IRAN: ALLIED CONSULTATION

1. I DECIDED TO SEE MUSKIE IN ORDER TO HAND OVER THE MESSAGE AND TO BRING HOME TO HIM PERSONALLY YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE LACK OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION ON A MATTER THAT COULD HAVE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES FOR ALL OF US. HE WAS CAMPAIGNING YESTERDAY BUT SAW ME THIS MORNING ACCOMPANIED BY WARREN CHRISTOPHER AND GEORGE VEST.

2. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THERE WAS A SERIOUS DANGER OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND DISAGREEMENT DEVELOPING BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC UNLESS SOME OF THE UNDERLYING POLITICAL ISSUES COULD BE DISCUSSED. THE UNITED STATES HAD ASKED US TO TAKE PART IN AN INTERNATIONAL NAVAL FORCE AND HAD SUGGESTED A CONCEPT BY WHICH THIS FORCE WOULD OPERATE. THERE HAD BEEN NAVAL TALKS ABOUT THIS IN LONDON AND IT WAS NOW SUGGESTED THAT THESE SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE COMMANDERS IN THE GULF. BUT EXTREMELY IMPORTANT POLITICAL QUESTIONS WERE INVOLVED: TO WHAT EXTENT WAS IT MILITARILY FEASIBLE, AS PROPOSED BY THE USA, TO LEAVE THE INITIAL REACTION TO SOME INCIDENT TO THE GULF STATES THEMSELVES? WHAT WERE THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR THE SUGGESTED INTERNATIONAL NAVAL FORCE? HOW LONG WAS THIS NAVAL FORCE INTENDED TO REMAIN IN EXISTENCE? THESE WERE ALL HIGHLY POLITICAL ISSUES, WHICH COULD NOT BE DEALT WITH BY NAVAL OFFICERS OPERATING IN THE AREA. THEY HAD TO BE CONSIDERED AT A POLITICAL LEVEL, AND AT A VERY SENIOR ONE.

3. THEN THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF US INTENTIONS AS A WHOLE IN THE GULF, THE ATTITUDES OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED AND OUR OWN INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGION. A GREAT DEAL WAS APPEARING IN THE UNITED STATES PRESS AT THE MOMENT ABOUT THE NEW COMMITMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE GULF. ASSUMPTIONS WERE BEING MADE ABOUT THE ATTITUDES OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. I WISHED TO TELL MR MUSKIE FRANKLY THAT I KNEW THERE WAS A FEELING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE FORCING THE PACE A BIT. AT ANY RATE, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR US TO HAVE EVIDENCE OF THE READINESS OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT TO WELCOME ADDITIONAL US INVOLVEMENT. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO KNOW MORE OF THE PRESENT US INTERPRETATION OF THE ATTITUDES OF THE OTHER GULF STATES TO INCREASED UNITED STATES MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGION.

/4. FOR ALL

SECRET

4. FOR ALL THESE REASONS, WE WANTED URGENT POLITICAL TALKS AND HOPED THAT WARREN CHRISTOPHER COULD GO TO LONDON IN THE NEAR FUTURE. YOU WERE MAKING SIMILAR PROPOSALS TO THE FRENCH AND FRG FOREIGN MINISTERS.

5. MUSKIE SAID THAT HE WAS VERY SYMPATHETIC TO THESE QUESTIONS AND TO OUR PROPOSALS. INDEED HE DREW ''COMFORT'' FROM THEM. HE EXPLAINED THE ORIGINS OF THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL NAVAL FORCE. THE IDEA HAD BEEN ADVANCED TO MEET A SUDDEN EMERGENCY. (COMMENT: INDEED, WE UNDERSTAND THAT IT WAS ADVANCED BY THE WHITE HOUSE WITHOUT MUSKIE'S BEING CONSULTED). THE SITUATION WAS NOT AT THE MOMENT DANGEROUS AND IT WAS THEREFORE ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE THAT WE SHOULD TALK TOGETHER ABOUT THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS.

6. THE TRUTH WAS, HE ADMITTED - SOMEWHAT DISARMINGLY THOUGH PERHAPS ALSO SOMEWHAT FRIGHTENINGLY - THAT HE HIMSELF AND CHRISTOPHER AND THE OTHERS CONCERNED HAD NOT SO FAR HAD TIME TO DISCUSS IT AMONG THEMSELVES. HE REPEATED HIS GREAT SYMPATHY WITH OUR QUESTIONS.

7. HE ALSO ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DEBATE IN WASHINGTON ON WHAT TO DO: WHETHER TO USE THE PRESENT EMERGENCY AS A MEANS OF ESTABLISHING SOME MORE PERMANENT US PRESENCE IN THE AREA. HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE ELEMENTS WHO, TO USE MY PHRASE, WERE EAGER TO ''FORCE THE PACE''. HE TOLD ME THAT IT WAS CERTAINLY NOT INTENDED THAT THE NAVAL FORCE SHOULD BE PERMANENT. NOR WAS THE DESPATCH OF AWACS TO SAUDI ARABIA PERMANENT. THERE HAD BEEN A CHANGE IN THE SAUDI ATTITUDE BUT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO SAY THAT ANY LONG-TERM PREDICTIONS OR ARRANGMENTS COULD NOW BE MADE. HE HIMSELF WOULD ALSO LIKE MORE EVIDENCE OF THE REAL INTENTIONS OF THE SAUDIS AND OF THE OTHER GULF STATES. CHRISTOPHER INTERJECTED THAT HE THOUGHT THE US VIEW ON THE HESITATIONS OF THE OTHER GULF STATES TO COMMIT THEMSELVES MORE OPENLY TO THE AMERICANS WAS ENTIRELY IN LINE WITH OURS. INDEED, THE OPINIONS WE HAD EXPRESSED ON THIS SUBJECT HAD HAD CONSIDERABLE EFFECT ON AMERICAN THINKING.

8. MUSKIE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT LONDON WOULD BE A GOOD PLACE FOR A POLITICAL MEETING. HE KNEW THAT CHRISTOPHER LIKED GOING THERE. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO HAVE TOO MANY MEETINGS IN PARIS. IT WAS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO TRY TO ESTABLISH RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND TO DISCUSS THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS THAT YOUR MESSAGE REFERRED TO.

9. I SAID THAT IT THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO TALK ABOUT WHAT WE THOUGHT THE SOVIET INTENTIONS AND REACTIONS WERE LIKELY TO BE. MUSKIE AGREED. HE SAID THAT GROMYKO HAD PUT TO HIM HIS EXTREME CONCERN ABOUT THE IDEA OF A MULTINATIONAL FLEET IN THE GULF.

/10. I SAID

10. I SAID THAT THERE WAS YET ANOTHER PROMINENT ARTICLE IN THE US PRESS TODAY, ONE BY KAREN HOUSE ON THE FRONT PAGE OF THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (REPORTED SEPARATELY) ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A NEW US STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA. IT WAS OBVIOUSLY WRONG THAT THE PRESS SHOULD BE PUBLISHING AUTHORATATIVE ARTICLES ON THESE POLITICAL ISSUES WHEN NO DISCUSSIONS WERE TAKING PLACE ON THEM BETWEEN THE ALLIES.

11. MUSKIE ASKED ME WHETHER I THOUGHT THAT THE FRENCH WOULD COME TO THE PROPOSED FOUR POWER POLITICAL TALKS. I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW BUT IT STRUCK ME THAT THERE MIGHT BE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE FRENCH RELUCTANCE TO HAVE ANYTHING MORE THAN BILATERAL TALKS ON STRICTLY NAVAL MATTERS (WHICH RAISED ALL SORTS OF SENSITIVE ISSUES FOR THEM) AND THEIR ATTITUDE TO POTENTIAL QUADRIPARTITE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS WHICH IN GENERAL THEY HAD ALWAYS FAVOURED.

12. CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE COMPLETELY RIGHT TO RAISE THESE QUESTIONS AND HE HIMSELF WAS EAGER TO COME OVER FOR TALKS WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

13. IT WAS LEFT THAT I WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM AGAIN AS SOON AS WE HAD HEARD FROM THE OTHER TWO COUNTRIES AND HAD HIT UPON A DATE.

HENDERSON

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
SIR J GRAHAM
MR BULLARD
MR P MOBERLY
LORD BRIDGES
MR BRAITHWAITE

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CONFIDENTIAL

Weekend Box (2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister:
You asked for these three
pieces of background.

15 October 1980

Dear Michael,

Iran/Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 13 October.

/A I attach a copy of the 1971 Treaty of Friendship between the UAE and the UK. Exactly similar agreements were signed the same year with Bahrain and Qatar. None of these agreements mentions military matters. But all three agreements speak of the need to encourage educational, cultural and commercial links, and refer to 'consultation on matters of mutual concern in time of need'. This phrase provided the basis for the offer John Moberly recently made to UAE leaders on behalf of Lord Carrington to send an emissary to Abu Dhabi to discuss the UAE's security needs, following hints from prominent figures there that they would welcome some form of assurance from us. It does not however amount to any undertaking of a military nature. We have no defence agreement with the UAE.

/B I enclose a copy of the text of the Security Council resolution No 479 which called on Iran and Iraq to end the fighting.

/C I also enclose a background note on the 1975 Algiers Agreement.

Yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

CONFIDENTIAL

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

The United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

Considering that the United Arab Emirates has assumed full responsibility as a sovereign and independent State;

Determined that the long-standing and traditional relations of close friendship and co-operation between their peoples shall continue;

Desiring to give expression to this intention in the form of a Treaty of Friendship;

Have agreed as follows :

Article 1

The relations between the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland shall be governed by a spirit of close friendship. In recognition of this, the Contracting Parties, conscious of their common interest in the peace and stability of the region, shall :

(a) consult together on matters of mutual concern in time of need;

(b) settle all their disputes by peaceful means in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Contracting Parties shall encourage educational, scientific and cultural co-operation between the two States in accordance with arrangements to be agreed. Such arrangements shall cover among other things :

(a) the promotion of mutual understanding of their respective cultures, civilisations and languages;

(b) the promotion of contacts among professional bodies, universities and cultural institutions;

(c) the encouragement of technical, scientific and cultural exchanges.

The Contracting Parties shall maintain the close relations already existing between them in the field of trade and commerce. Representatives of the Contracting Parties shall meet from time to time to consider means by which such relations can be further developed and strengthened, including the possibility of concluding treaties or agreements on matters of mutual concern.

Article 4

This Treaty shall enter into force on today's date and shall remain in force for a period of ten years. Unless twelve months before the expiry of the said period of ten years either Contracting Party shall have given notice to the other of its intention to terminate the Treaty, this Treaty shall remain in force thereafter until the expiry of twelve months from the date on which notice of such intention is given.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at the day of 1391 H., corresponding to the day of 1971 A.D., in the Arabic and English languages, both texts being equally authoritative.

For the United Arab Emirates :

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland :

UN RESOLUTION ON IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT ADOPTED BY SECURITY COUNCIL, 26 SEPTEMBER 1980.

Having begun consideration of the item entitled ''The situation between Iran and Iraq'',

Mindful that all member states have undertaken the charter obligations to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered,

Mindful as well that all members are obliged to refrain in their international relations from the threat of or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,

Recalling that under Article 24 of the Charter the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Deeply concerned about the developing situation between Iran and Iraq:

1. Calls upon Iran and Iraq to refrain immediately from any further use of force and to settle their dispute by peaceful means and in conformity with principles of justice and internationa law.

2. Urges them to accept any appropriate offer of mediation or conciliation or to resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice that would facilitate the fulfilment of their charter obligations.

3. Calls upon all other states to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict.

4. Supports the efforts of the Secretary-General and the offer of his good offices for the resolution of this situation.

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within forty-eight hours.

THE 1975 ALGIERS ACCORD BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ: BACKGROUND NOTE

1. In the early 1970s relations between Iran and Iraq were hostile. There was a long-standing dispute over the boundary in the Shatt-al-Arab river and the control of navigation there, as well as some disagreement over the land frontier. Iraq supported dissident movements among minority groups in Iran including the Arabs of Khuzistan and the Baluchis. Iran gave ever-increasing cross-border assistance to the Kurdish leader in Iraq, Mulla Mustapha Barzani, who had been at war with the Baghdad government on and off since the early 1960s. Iraq also resented Iran's occupation of three islands, Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, in 1971 at the time of the British withdrawal from the Gulf. (The islands, situated near the Straits of Hormuz, had been in dispute between Iran and the Trucial States - now the United Arab Emirates.)

2. In 1975 Iran and Iraq signed agreements which in effect settled the main points of dispute between them until the Iranian revolution in 1979. These agreements consisted of
(a) A Joint Communiqué signed at Algiers in March 1975.
(b) A Treaty Relating to the State Boundary and Good Neighbourliness signed at Baghdad in June 1975. Attached to this were Protocols concerning the redemarcation of the land boundary, the delimitation of the river boundary, and border security.
(c) An Agreement on Regulations Concerning Navigation on the Shatt-al-Arab signed in Baghdad in December 1975.

3. These agreements meant that Iraq surrendered her claim to the waters of the Shatt-al-Arab beyond the thalweg (deep water channel), a claim based on historical and treaty right and till then bitterly defended; that she implicitly recognised Iran's occupation of the three Gulf islands; and that in return she obtained the withdrawal of Iranian support for the Kurds and demarcation of the land border.

4. The agreements worked well. The land border was demarcated and the Iraqis established control over the Kurdish north. Propaganda attacks

/ceased

ceased, and so did attempts at subversion. Detailed regulations for joint navigation in the Shatt-al-Arab were drawn up (control having previously been in the Iraqis' hands). It is not clear to what extent they were implemented, but neither side is known to have made complaints on the subject up to the time of the Iranian revolution.

5. For Iraq the most contentious issue in the 1975 agreements was the concession of a thalweg frontier in the Shatt-al-Arab. The frontier traditionally lay along the Iranian bank. This was recognised in international treaties going back to 1913 and most recently in the 1937 treaty between Iran and Iraq. (The 1913 Constantinople Protocol signed by Britain, Russia, Turkey and Persia did, however, provide for a thalweg frontier off Khorramshahr to facilitate navigation there, and the 1937 treaty provided additionally for a thalweg frontier off Abadan). In attempting to justify the present hostilities the Iraqis have argued that the 1975 treaty was imposed upon them by outside powers at a time when they were militarily weak. The Iranians, for their part, have argued in the past that it is not equitable for the frontier to lie on their side of the river; but elsewhere in the world there are examples both of international frontiers following the thalweg and of such frontiers following one bank of a river.

16 OCT 1980

SECRET

cc: MOD BK
CO
file
16
Iraq

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 October 1980

Message to President Carter

Further to Paul Lever's letter to me of 14 October, I enclose the text of the message from the Prime Minister to President Carter about the situation in the Gulf in the form in which it has been despatched over the direct line to the White House. As you will see it is as drafted except for the addition of a new penultimate paragraph and the change which you put to me with regard to the paragraph on insurance.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

TR.

SECRET

SECRET

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, 15 OCTOBER

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your message of 9 October about the conflict between Iran and Iraq and the situation in the Gulf area generally. I am grateful to you for letting me have your assessment of recent developments.

I agree that there are four particular objectives we should be pursuing.

The first, an early ending of hostilities, is of over-riding importance, although I believe we must be patient, as neither party to the fighting seems yet ready for peace on realistic terms. Our respective governments are nevertheless doing what they can to prepare for the time, although the prospects are not yet promising. This matter should certainly remain before the Security Council. I too had useful talks with President Zia who seemed pessimistic about his chances of taking matters further for the time being. It may be that another mediator, perhaps from India or another non-aligned country, could build on the foundations he has laid and pursue talks with the two sides.

Your second objective, that we must prevent the conflict being extended, is of crucial importance. I agree that your efforts so far seem to have been successful. Indeed there seems to be a growing realisation, for example in the attitude of King Hussein, of the dangers. We must keep this up.

As regards contingency preparations to protect shipping in the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, it has been helpful to have an early sight of your plans. Our comments on these have been passed to you through various channels, most recently by our Embassy in Washington. You will know that we welcome the general

/ concept

concept of concerted action to ensure freedom of navigation and to protect the oil flow so essential to us all, and are ready and able to play our part. But we have certain reservations about some aspects of your proposals. In particular, I doubt whether, if the threat to close the Straits were to be realised, the concept of operations now being discussed would be effective in restoring confidence among ship-owners and masters.

I hope you will share our view that in order to avoid misunderstanding and perhaps miscalculation, it is of the utmost importance that there should be joint consultations among those Western Governments most closely concerned in this matter and whose forces will be involved. I consider that our immediate objective should be to establish clear political guidelines for naval commanders in the area so that together they can draw up contingency operational plans. We shall have two warships plus associated support vessels in the Gulf of Oman on 22 October; and other ships will be exercising with yours from next week in the Indian Ocean. With this in mind, Peter Carrington is proposing to Mr. Muskie that Mr. Christopher should visit London very soon for joint talks with us, the French and, if they wish to join us, the Germans. I hope you can agree.

On the related question of insurance, we are as you know ready to take part in talks although we do not see any immediate need for action.

Fourthly, you suggest we should be willing to respond to certain requests for assistance from those non-belligerent friends in the area who may feel threatened by the current situation. I entirely agree. We have already been in touch with certain of the Gulf Rulers and the Saudis about the possibility of providing aid for defensive purposes. Our thinking is at a very preliminary stage. We shall be examining the possibilities urgently, and shall keep you informed. It is

/ essential

SECRET

essential that we work closely together both to avoid duplication, which would have serious political implications, besides being wasteful, and to avoid gaps in our efforts.

More generally, I believe that we should be thinking in terms of continuing exchanges of information and analysis on the whole range of problems in the area. I would like to see the new Quadripartite machinery developed in this direction.

Finally, I look forward to maintaining close and direct contact with you as the situation develops.

Yours sincerely,
Margaret Thatcher

SECRET

SSN - 2410
DTG - 151129Z

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

For transmission on the direct line to the White House.

15A

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, 15 OCTOBER

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your message of 9 October about the conflict between Iran and Iraq and the situation in the Gulf area generally. I am grateful to you for letting me have your assessment of recent developments.

I agree that there are four particular objectives we should be pursuing.

The first, an early ending of hostilities, is of over-riding importance, although I believe we must be patient, as neither party to the fighting seems yet ready for peace on realistic terms. Our respective governments are nevertheless doing what they can to prepare for the time, although the prospects are not yet promising. This matter should certainly remain before the Security Council. I too had useful talks with President Zia who seemed pessimistic about his chances of taking matters further for the time being. It may be that another mediator, perhaps from India or another non-aligned country, could build on the foundations he has laid and pursue talks with the two sides.

Your second objective, that we must prevent the conflict being extended, is of crucial importance. I agree that your efforts so far seem to have been successful. Indeed there seems to be a growing realisation, for example in the attitude of King Hussein, of the dangers. We must keep this up.

As regards contingency preparations to protect shipping in the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, it has been helpful to have an early sight of your plans. Our comments on these have been passed to you through various channels, most recently by our Embassy in Washington. You will know that we welcome the general

/ concept

Revised page 2
cc FCO
MOD
CO

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I hope you will share our view that in order to avoid misunderstanding and perhaps miscalculation, it is of the utmost importance that there should be joint consultations among those Western Governments most closely concerned in this matter and whose forces will be involved. I consider that our immediate objective should be to establish clear political guidelines for naval commanders in the area so that together they can draw up contingency operational plans. We shall have two warships plus associated support vessels in the Gulf of Oman on 22 October; and other ships will be exercising with yours from next week in the Indian Ocean. With this in mind, Peter Carrington is proposing to Mr. Muskie that Mr. Christopher should visit London very soon for joint talks with us, the French and, if they wish to join us, the Germans. I hope you can agree.

On the related question of insurance, we are as you know ready to take part in talks although we do not see any immediate need for action.

Fourthly, you suggest we should be willing to respond to certain requests for assistance from those non-belligerent friends in the area who may feel threatened by the current situation. I entirely agree. We have already been in touch with certain of the Gulf Rulers and the Saudis about the possibility of providing aid for defensive purposes. Our thinking is at a very preliminary stage. We shall be examining the possibilities urgently, and shall keep you informed. It is

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SECRET

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More generally, I believe that we should be thinking in terms of continuing exchanges of information and analysis on the whole range of problems in the area. I would like to see the new Quadripartite machinery developed in this direction.

Finally, I look forward to maintaining close and direct contact with you as the situation develops.

Yours sincerely,
Margaret Thatcher

SECRET

15

T 203/80

cc Master OPS

SUBJECT

Fg. 15/X

CAB/WTE HSE 001/15

GRS 970

SECRET
IMMEDIATE
151129Z OCT 80
FROM CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
BT

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 9 OCTOBER ABOUT THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AND THE SITUATION IN THE GULF AREA GENERALLY. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR LETTING ME HAVE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

I AGREE THAT THERE ARE FOUR PARTICULAR OBJECTIVES WE SHOULD BE PURSUING.

THE FIRST, AN EARLY ENDING OF HOSTILITIES, IS OF OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE, ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE WE MUST BE PATIENT, AS NEITHER PARTY TO THE FIGHTING SEEMS YET READY FOR PEACE ON REALISTIC TERMS. OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS ARE NEVERTHELESS DOING WHAT THEY CAN TO PREPARE FOR THE TIME, ALTHOUGH THE PROSPECTS ARE NOT YET PROMISING. THIS MATTER SHOULD CERTAINLY REMAIN BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I TOO HAD USEFUL TALKS WITH PRESIDENT ZIA WHO SEEMED PESSIMISTIC ABOUT HIS CHANCES OF TAKING MATTERS FURTHER FOR THE TIME BEING. IT MAY BE THAT ANOTHER MEDIATOR, PERHAPS FROM INDIA OR ANOTHER NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY, COULD BUILD ON THE FOUNDATIONS HE HAS LAID AND PURSUE TALKS WITH THE TWO SIDES.

YOUR SECOND OBJECTIVE, THAT WE MUST PREVENT THE CONFLICT BEING EXTENDED, IS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE. I AGREE THAT YOUR EFFORTS SO FAR SEEM TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. INDEED THERE SEEMS TO BE A GROWING REALISATION, FOR EXAMPLE IN THE ATTITUDE OF KING HUSSEIN, OF THE DANGERS. WE MUST KEEP THIS UP.

AS REGARDS CONTINGENCY PREPARATIONS TO PROTECT SHIPPING IN THE GULF AND THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, IT HAS BEEN HELPFUL TO HAVE AN EARLY SIGHT OF YOUR PLANS. OUR COMMENTS ON THESE HAVE BEEN PASSED TO YOU THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS, MOST RECENTLY BY OUR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. YOU WILL KNOW THAT WE WELCOME THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF CONCERTED ACTION TO ENSURE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND TO PROTECT THE OIL FLOW SO ESSENTIAL TO US ALL, AND ARE READY AND ABLE TO PLAY OUR PART. BUT WE HAVE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT SOME ASPECTS OF YOUR PROPOSALS. IN PARTICULAR, I DOUBT WHETHER, IF THE THREAT TO CLOSE THE STRAITS WERE TO BE REALISED, THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS NOW BEING DISCUSSED WOULD BE EFFECTIVE IN RESTORING CONFIDENCE AMONG SHIP-OWNERS AND MASTERS.

I HOPE YOU WILL SHARE OUR VIEW THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING AND PERHAPS MISCALCULATION, IT IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT THERE SHOULD BE JOINT CONSULTATIONS AMONG THOSE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED IN THIS MATTER AND WHOSE FORCES WILL BE INVOLVED. I CONSIDER THAT OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO ESTABLISH CLEAR POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR NAVAL COMMANDERS IN THE AREA SO THAT TOGETHER THEY CAN DRAW UP CONTINGENCY OPERATIONAL PLANS. WE SHALL HAVE TWO WARSHIPS PLUS ASSOCIATED SUPPORT VESSELS IN THE GULF OF OMAN ON 22 OCTOBER: AND OTHER SHIPS WILL BE EXERCISING WITH YOURS FROM NEXT WEEK IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. WITH THIS IN MIND, PETER CARRINGTON IS PROPOSING TO MR MUSKIE THAT MR CHRISTOPHER SHOULD VISIT LONDON VERY SOON FOR JOINT TALKS WITH US, THE FRENCH AND, IF THEY WISH TO JOIN US, THE GERMANS. I HOPE YOU CAN AGREE.

ON THE RELATED QUESTION OF INSURANCE, WE ARE AS YOU KNOW READY TO TAKE PART IN TALKS ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT SEE ANY IMMEDIATE NEED FOR ACTION.

FOURTHLY, YOU SUGGEST WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO RESPOND TO CERTAIN REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THOSE NON-BELLIGERENT FRIENDS IN THE AREA WHO MAY FEEL THREATENED BY THE CURRENT SITUATION. I ENTIRELY AGREE. WE HAVE ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH CERTAIN OF THE GULF RULERS AND THE SAUDIS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING AID FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. OUR THINKING IS AT A VERY PRELIMINARY STAGE. WE SHALL BE EXAMINING THE POSSIBILITIES URGENTLY, AND SHALL KEEP YOU INFORMED. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER BOTH TO AVOID DUPLICATION, WHICH WOULD HAVE SERIOUS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS, BESIDES BEING WASTEFUL, AND TO AVOID GAPS IN OUR EFFORTS.

MORE GENERALLY, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD BE THINKING IN TERMS OF CONTINUING EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF PROBLEMS IN THE AREA. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE NEW QUADRIPARTITE MACHINERY DEVELOPED IN THIS DIRECTION.

FINALLY, I LOOK FORWARD TO MAINTAINING CLOSE AND DIRECT CONTACT WITH YOU AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS.

YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER.

BT

NNNN

SENT AT 151314ZZ BRH

SECRET (1) 14

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
With the agreement of the FCO, I have added a new paragraph at the end of the first. Are amended lines?

14/X

14 October 1980

Dear Michael,

Message from President Carter

Thank you for your letter of 9 October.

I attach a suggested draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Carter. Lord Carrington discussed this with the Prime Minister this morning: the reply provides an opportunity for the Prime Minister to impress upon the President the importance we attach to properly co-ordinated multilateral discussions on naval contingency planning in the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. Lord Carrington proposes in addition himself to send messages to Mr Muskie, M. Francois-Poncet and Herr Genscher suggesting a quadripartite meeting in London to be attended by Warren Christopher and his opposite numbers, to discuss the whole situation.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London

SECRET

DSR 11 (Revised)

SECRET

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

The Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

President Carter

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your message of 9 October about the conflict between Iran and Iraq and the situation in the Gulf area generally. I am grateful to you for letting me have your assessment of recent developments.

I agree that there are four particular objectives we should be pursuing.

The first, an early ending of hostilities, is of overriding importance, although I believe we must be patient, as neither party to the fighting seems yet ready for peace on realistic terms. Our respective governments are nevertheless doing what they can to prepare for the time, although the prospects are not yet promising. This matter should certainly remain before the Security Council. I too had useful talks with President Zia who seemed pessimistic about his chances of taking matters further for the time being. It may be that another mediator, perhaps from India or another non-aligned country, could build on the foundations he has laid and pursue talks with the two sides.

/Your

Enclosures—flag(s).....

SECRET

SECRET

Your second objective, that we must prevent the conflict being ~~expanded~~ extended, is of crucial importance. I agree that your efforts so far seem to have been successful. Indeed there seems to be a growing realisation, for example in the attitude of King Hussein, of the dangers. We must keep this up.

As regards contingency preparations to protect shipping in the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, it has been helpful to have an early sight of your plans. Our comments on these have been passed to you through various channels, most recently by our Embassy in Washington. You will know that we welcome the general concept of concerted action to ensure freedom of navigation and to protect the oil flow so essential to us all, and are ready and able to play our part. But we have certain reservations about some aspects of your proposals. In particular I doubt whether, if the threat to close the Straits were to be realised, the concept of operations now being discussed would be effective in restoring confidence among ship-owners and masters. I hope you will share our view that in order to avoid misunderstanding and perhaps miscalculation, it is of the utmost importance that there should be joint consultations among those Western governments most closely concerned in this matter and whose forces will be involved. I consider that our immediate objective should be to establish clear political guidelines for naval commanders in the area so that together they can draw up contingency operational plans. We shall have 5 ships, plus associated

/support

support vessels, in the area on 29 October. With this in mind, Peter Carrington is proposing to Mr Muskie that Mr Christopher should visit London very soon for joint talks with us, the French and, if they wish to join us, the Germans. I hope you can agree.

On the related question of insurance, we are as you know ready to take part in talks although. We do not see any immediate need for action, ~~but certainly it will be needed to supplement naval activity should there be a real threat to the security of shipping in the Gulf.~~

~~Finally~~ Fourthly, you suggest we should be willing to respond to certain requests for assistance from those non-belligerent friends in the area who may feel threatened by the current situation. I entirely agree. We have already been in touch with certain of the Gulf Rulers and the Saudis about the possibility of providing aid for defensive purposes. Our thinking is at a very preliminary stage. We shall be examining the possibilities urgently, and shall keep you informed. It is essential that we work closely together both to avoid duplication, which would have serious political implications, besides being wasteful, and to avoid gaps in our efforts.

~~I look forward to maintaining close contact with you on all these matters.~~

Yours

89280 Dd 532113 200M 2/79 StS

More generally I believe that we should be thinking in terms of continuing exchanges of information and analysis on the whole range of problems in the area. I would like to see the new Quadripartite machinery developed in this direction.

Finally, I look forward to maintaining close and direct contact with you as the situation develops.

CONFIDENTIAL

File

Iraq

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 October 1980

IRAN/IRAQ

As I mentioned to you on the telephone, the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary discussed briefly this morning the question of our naval presence in the Persian Gulf area. The Prime Minister said that she was anxious that the presence of HMS Coventry should be reinforced as soon as possible by the addition of at least one other vessel. You told me that this was already in hand.

I am sending copies of this letter to Paul Lever (FCO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

David Omand, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 500 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 1471742Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 458 OF 14 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON BAGHDAD MODUK (AUS D STAFF) MUSCAT ABU DHABI DUBAI BAHRAIN DOHA ISLAMABAD KUWAIT JEDDA STOCKHOLM NEW DELHI

IRAN/IRAQ EXERCISE BEACON COMPASS

1. THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER CALLED ON THE LORD PRIVY SEAL TODAY ON INSTRUCTIONS.

2. SIR J PLIMSOLL SAID THAT AUSTRALIAN MINISTERS HAD REVIEWED RAN PARTICIPATION IN THE EXERCISE. THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF, THE EXERCISE WOULD BE OPEN TO MISINTERPRETATION BY IRAQ AND IRAN AND PLAY INTO COMMUNIST HANDS. THEY CONSIDERED THAT THE TIMING AND SCALE WERE WRONG IN RELATION TO THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT. THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR IN IRAQ HAD ALREADY BEEN APPROACHED ABOUT THE INADVISABILITY OF HOLDING THE EXERCISE. SIR J PLIMSOLL WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE (TO SHOW STRENGTH POST AFGHANISTAN) WOULD NO LONGER BE FULFILLED. FOR THESE REASONS THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD PREFER TO SEE THE EXERCISE CANCELLED AND HOPED THAT THE UK WOULD AGREE.

3. THE LPS SAID THAT WE SAW THE EXERCISE IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOW NOT FULFILL THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE, GIVEN THE INCREASING CONCERN OF GULF RULERS FOR REASSURANCE IT HAD TWO NEW PURPOSES TO WHICH WE ATTACHED IMPORTANCE:

A. IT WOULD PROVIDE REASSURANCE TO THE RULERS THAT WESTERN POWERS WERE ABLE AND WILLING TO OPERATE IN THE NORTHERN INDIAN OCEAN:
B. SINCE THERE WAS AT LEAST A POSSIBILITY THAT WESTERN POWERS MIGHT NEED TO PROVIDE NAVAL PROTECTION FOR MERCHANT SHIPPING IN THE GULF, THE EXERCISE PROVIDED GOOD COVER FOR DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL VESSELS IN THE GENERAL VICINITY WITHOUT UNDULY RAISING THE TEMPERATURE:

4. THE LPS ADDED THAT, GIVEN THE UNSATISFACTORY CO-ORDINATION OF PLANNING WITH THE AMERICANS, PARTICIPATION IN THE EXERCISE PROVIDED US WITH A LEVER TO INDUCE THE AMERICANS TO TAKE HEED OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THIS. MOREOVER TO PULL OUT OF THE EXERCISE ENTIRELY WOULD LOOK WEAK IN THE EYES OF THE GULF RULERS, WOULD PROBABLY ANNOY THE AMERICANS (AND INCIDENTALLY WOULD WEAKEN OUR HANDS IN DEALING WITH THEM) AND COULD BE DELIBERATELY MISINTERPRETED BY THOSE HOSTILE TO US FOR ALL THESE REASONS, AND BECAUSE WE BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT BOTH TO DILUTE THE STRONG AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND SHOW A WILLINGNESS TO CO-OPERATE WITH THEM, THE UK BELIEVED THE EXERCISE SHOULD GO AHEAD. HE HOPED THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD AGREE TO IT DOING SO.

5. SIR J PLIMSOLL UNDERTOOK TO REPORT OUR VIEWS TO CANBERRA BUT DID NOT RULE OUT A DECISION BY THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTERS TO PULL OUT.

6. WE THINK IT IMPORTANT TO RETAIN AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE REINFORCE WHAT HAS BEEN SAID HERE AT A SUITABLY SENIOR POLITICAL LEVEL DRAWING ON THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 3-4 ABOVE.

7. GRATEFUL IF BAGHDAD AND OTHER POSTS WOULD REPORT ANY REPRESENTATIONS THEY MAY HAVE RECEIVED ABOUT THE EXERCISE.

CARRINGTON

MINIMAL
DEF DEPT
MED
SPD

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

IRAQ/IRAN

GRS 18ø
UNCLASSIFIED
FM PARIS 141214Z OCT 8ø
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 85ø OF 14 OCTOBER 198ø
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE BONN AND JEDDA
INFO SAVING KUWAIT DOHA ABU DHABI AND DUBAI

IRAN/IRAQ: INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT BANI SADR

1. IN AN INTERVIEW IN THIS WEEK'S EDITION OF THE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, PRESIDENT BANI SADR IS QUOTED AS MAKING INTER ALIA THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

''IF THE IRAQI ARMY FIGHTS ALONE, WE SHALL SOON STRIKE IT A FATAL BLOW. HOWEVER IF OTHER COUNTRIES INTERFERE, IT COULD TAKE A LONG TIME. BUT WE HAVE THE MEANS TO MAKE THEM UNDERSTAND THAT WE SHALL SPARE NO-ONE: IF THE GULF COUNTRIES ENTER THE WAR, WE SHALL DESTROY THEIR OIL INSTALLATIONS ..... WE SHALL ATTACK HORMUZ IF THE WAR SPREADS AND IF THE GREAT POWERS TAKE PART THROUGH INTERMEDIARY COUNTRIES''.

''(IRAN WILL END THE WAR) WHEN THE REGIME OF SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS BEEN BROUGHT DOWN. TO DO THAT WE ARE READY TO CARRY THE FIGHTING INSIDE IRAQ''.

''WHEN (IRANIAN) TERRITORY IS LIBERATED, NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN - NOT OVER THE SHATT-AL-ARAB, THE TWO BORDERING COUNTRIES HAVING THE RIGHT TO FREE PASSAGE: BUT DISCUSSIONS COULD TAKE PLACE OVER THE SEVERAL HUNDREDS OF SQUARE KILOMETRES WHICH THE IRAQIS CLAIM BY ILAM, BETWEEN KHUZISTAN AND KERMANSHAH''.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

HIBBERT.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED
NENAD
NAD
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ECD
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CONS EM UNIT
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
IRAQ/IRAN

GR 270
UNCLASSIFIED
FM TEL AVIV 140800Z OCT 80
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 486 OF 14 OCTOBER
INFO AMMAN BAGHDAD WASHINGTON AND CAIRO
INFO SAVING TO EC POSTS, BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS

MY TEL NO 475 AND AMMAN TELNO 396: IRAN/IRAQ/ISRAEL

1. SHAMIR, TALKING TO HIS SENIOR OFFICIALS ON 13 OCTOBER AFTER HIS RETURN FROM EUROPE, IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE EC INITIATIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS FADING FAST, MAINLY BECAUSE OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. EUROPEAN OPINION WOULD FIND IT RIDICULOUS IF EC POLITICIANS WERE TO CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON THEIR INITIATIVE WHEN THE REST OF THE WORLD WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE GULF WAR. MOREOVER, THE ARGUMENT THAT THE EC INITIATIVE FILLED A VACUUM CAUSED BY THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS WOULD SOON BE INOPERATIVE. BUT WHILE ISRAEL WAS SOMETIMES ESTRANGED AND ALIENATED IN EUROPE, SHE WAS ALMOST ''PART OF THE FAMILY'' IN THE US: ITS INTERESTS WERE SEEN AS AN ELECTORAL CONSIDERATION AND ITS POSITIONS AND VIEWS WERE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN US MIDDLE EAST POLICY.

2. SHAMIR IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HOWEVER THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR ENDED, IT WOULD BE TO ISRAEL'S DISADVANTAGE. WHICHEVER SIDE WON, IT WAS LIKELY TO BECOME THE MAJOR GULF POWER AND MORE OPENLY HOSTILE TO ISRAEL EVEN IF THERE WERE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, THE TWO SIDES MIGHT LATER TURN ON ISRAEL TOGETHER.

3. PRESS REPORTS THAT THERE ARE NOW 43 SHIPS AT AQABA WITH CARGO FOR IRAQ (FOUR SOVIET, FOUR CUBAN, THREE RUMANIAN, TWO YUGOSLAV, ONE IRAQI, ONE SYRIAN AND THE REST, WEST EUROPEAN). THIS IS SAID TO BE THREE TIMES THE NORMAL NUMBER. THE CARGOES ARE REPORTED TO INCLUDE AMMUNITION, SPARE PARTS AND SUPPLIES, BUT NO (NO) HEAVY WEAPONS.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

ROBINSON

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN
ARAB/ISRAEL

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

Informing Lord Thomas we shall persevere.

A copy to me & to Mr Alexander (No 10)

Immediate. 13D

GRS 540
SECRET
FM PARIS 141620Z OCT 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 852 OF 14 OCTOBER 1980
INFO ROUTINE BONN, WASHINGTON, MODUK (AUS(D STAFF), DS 5, ACDS(OPS)), JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT AND AMMAN.
INFO SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, E TEL AVIV, UKDEL NATO, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS.

SECRET

15/X

2. Repeat immediate to Rome for PS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1624 TO WASHINGTON: IRAN/IRAQ: NAVAL COOPERATION

1. MINISTER SPOKE ON 14 OCTOBER ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED TO ROBIN, POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE QUAI. HE REINFORCED THE POINT THAT BILATERAL TALKS COULD LEAD TO CONFUSION AND POSSIBLY ILL-CONSIDERED ACTION.

2. ROBIN SAID THAT THE FRENCH POSITION REMAINED UNCHANGED. THEY WERE READY TO HAVE BILATERAL NAVAL TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS AND BRITISH, BUT NOT TRILATERAL CONVERSATIONS. AT THE PRESENT TIME THEY CONSIDERED THAT THE FRENCH, US AND BRITISH HAD DONE ENOUGH BOTH BY DECLARATION AND BY ACTION TO DETER INTERRUPTION OF TRAFFIC THROUGH THE GULF. IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATED AND THERE EMERGED A REAL THREAT TO FREE MOVEMENT OR WORSE, ROBIN GAVE HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT BE READY TO RECONSIDER THEIR PRESENT ATTITUDE. BUT THEY THOUGHT THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN SO FAR AND THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN HAND WERE SUFFICIENT AND THESE COULD BE ADEQUATELY COORDINATED ON A BILATERAL BASIS.

3. THE FRENCH HAD A POLITICAL OBJECTION TO TRILATERAL COOPERATION AT THIS STAGE. IT WOULD INCREASE THE VISIBILTY OF THE WEST'S ACTIONS IN THE GULF AND WOULD INEVITABLY BECOME KNOWN TO THE GULF STATES AND TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE FRENCH MADE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTION TAKEN TO DETER INTERRUPTION OF MOVEMENT IN THE GULF AND ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT PROMOTE THE RESTORATION OF WESTERN INFLUENCE IN THE GULF AREA.

4. JAMES SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE SURELY NOT OPPOSED TO A GREATER DEGREE OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THIS AREA. IN THE PAST THEY HAD CRITICISED THE AMERICANS FOR NOT DOING ENOUGH. ROBIN SAID THAT THE FRENCH WISHED TO WEIGH CAREFULLY THE REPERCUSSIONS THAT ANY INCREASE IN AMERICAN INFLUENCE WOULD HAVE ON THE SOVIET UNION. ANYTHING THE AMERICANS DID WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A SOVIET RIPOSTE. THIS PREOCCUPIED THE FRENCH.

5. ROBIN SAID THAT THEY WOULD TAKE CAREFUL NOTE OF BRITISH VIEWS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF TRILATERAL COOPERATION. WHEN JAMES PRESSED ROBIN TO RE-CONSIDER THE FRENCH ATTITUDE, ROBIN SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER WERE LEAVING TODAY FOR CHINA MEANT THAT THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE OF A CHANGE UNLESS THE SITUATION DETERIORATED DRAMATICALLY.

6. THE FRENCH ATTITUDE DESCRIBED ABOVE WAS ALSO REFLECTED IN A CONVERSATION I HAD WITH THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY. HARTMAN TOLD ME THAT THE REACTIONS THE AMERICANS HAD RECEIVED WERE ALL CONSISTENT WITH THE VIEW THAT THE FRENCH WERE PREPARED TO HAVE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BUT NOT TRILATERAL.

7. THE ABOVE SUGGESTS THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ARE CONCERNED TO MAINTAIN AN APPEARANCE OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE GULF AREA AND TO AVOID BEING SEEN TO BE IN TOO CLOSE NAVAL OR MILITARY COLLABORATION WITH THEIR ALLIES, PARTICULARLY THE AMERICANS. THIS IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH A READINESS TO MAINTAIN CLOSE AND CONFIDENTIAL CONTACTS WITH THE U.S. NAVY IN WASHINGTON AND POSSIBILY ON THE SPOT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

HIBBERT.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

LIMITED
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/MED
HD/DEF D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
SIR J GRAHAM
MR BULLARD
LORD BRIDGES
MR P H MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE

[NOT ADVANCED]

GRS 530
SECRET

SECRET

13C

FM F C O 141625Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE BONN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 389 OF 14 OCTOBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS WASHINGTON ROME (FOR WALDEN)

MIPT: IRAQ/IRAN: ALLIED CONSULTATIONS

1. FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED TEXT OF MESSAGES TO MUSKIE/FRANCOIS-PONCET.
BEGINS: I AM INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT IN OUR VARIOUS RESPONSES, BOTH IN ACTIONS ON THE GROUND AND IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING, THE FOUR WESTERN GOVERNMENTS PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED (ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS PRECLUDED FROM TAKING PART IN MILITARY MEASURES, THEY ARE OF COURSE DEEPLY CONCERNED) ARE FAILING TO WORK AS CLOSELY TOGETHER AS WE SHOULD, AND ARE RUNNING THE RISK EITHER OF TREADING ON EACH OTHER'S TOES OR OF FAILING TO UNDERTAKE NECESSARY ACTIONS, BECAUSE WE ASSUME THAT SOMEBODY ELSE WILL BE DOING IT.

2. ONE EXAMPLE IS THE NAVAL PLANNING WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON BETWEEN OURSELVES AND YOU AND THE FRENCH/OURSELVES AND THE AMERICANS AND YOU AND THE AMERICANS. WE/WE AND THE AMERICANS HAVE HAD SOME TALKS IN LONDON ABOUT A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, AND I AM TOLD THAT THE US INTENTION IS THAT FURTHER PLANNING SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL, IE TO THE NAVAL COMMANDERS IN THE GULF OF OMAN. BUT THE CONCEPT THAT I HAVE SEEN, WHILE WHOLLY ADEQUATE FOR THE CURRENT SITUATION, IN WHICH THE THREAT OF A CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ IS MERELY A POTENTIAL ONE, WOULD NOT, SO BRITISH EXPERTS BELIEVE, BE ADEQUATE TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE TO TANKER OWNERS AND MASTERS, SHOULD SHIPPING COME UNDER ACTUAL ATTACK IN THE STRAITS OR THE GULF. IN THAT EVENT, TOO, BRITISH EXPERTS BELIEVE THAT ANY NAVAL MEASURES WOULD HAVE TO BE SUPPLEMENTED, IF THEY WERE TO BE EFFECTIVE IN RESTORING CONFIDENCE, BY STEPS BY GOVERNMENTS TO ASSUME, OR UNDERWITE, WAR RISK INSURANCE COVER. THIS HAS NOT YET BEEN CONSIDERED MULTILATERALLY IN ANY DETAIL.

3. BUT MY CONCERNS EXTEND WIDER THAN THESE NAVAL TALKS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN APPROACHED, BOTH BY THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UAE, WITH THE LATTER OF WHOM WE HAVE A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, WHICH REQUIRES US TO CONSULT IN TIME OF NEED, ABOUT THE PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE AND PROTECTION. CLEARLY WESTERN RESOURCES ARE LIMITED, AND IN THE INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE WE OUGHT ALL TO BE CONCERTING OUR EFFORTS, BOTH IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE GREATEST EFFECT AND ALSO TO AVOID TAKING MEASURES INDIVIDUALLY WHICH, IN ISOLATION, MAY SEEM DESIRABLE BUT CUMULATIVELY MIGHT BY INADVERTENCE HAVE UNDESIRABLE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS.

4. WITH ALL THIS IN MIND, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOUR COULD MEET, AT A SENIOR POLITICAL LEVEL, BOTH TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND TO REACH DECISIONS WHICH CAN SERVE AS CLEAR GUIDELINES FOR OUR OFFICIALS. IF YOU AGREE, I WOULD HOPE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR WARREN CHRISTOPHER/YOUR REPRESENTATIVE TO VISIT LONDON IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR JOINT TALKS. I MYSELF UNFORTUNATELY SHALL BE AWAY DYRING THE NEXT TEN DAYS, BUT IAN GILMOUR WILL BE AVAILABLE AND WOULD BE GLAD TO TAKE PART. ALTERNATIVELY, WE COULD CONSIDER SOME OTHER MEETING PLACE IF THAT SUITED YOU AND THE FRENCH/AND THE AMERICANS. EVEN IF SUCH A MEETING WERE TO BECOME KNOWN TO THE PRESS, I DO NOT THINK THAT SHOULD BE AN OBSTACLE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. I AM THEREFORE WRITING IN SIMILAR TERMS POTH TO JEAN FRANCOIS PONCET/ED MUSKIE AND HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER. ENDS.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED
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MAED
PS
PS|LPS
PS|MR HURD
PS|PUS
SIR A. ACLAND
SIR J. GRAHAM
MR BULLARD
MR P.H. MOBERLY
MR J.C. MOBERLY
LORD BRIDGES
MR BRAITHWAITE

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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GRS 160

SECRET

SECRET

FM F C O 141625Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE BONN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 388 OF 14 OCTOBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME (FOR WALDEN)

MIPT: IRAQ/IRAN: ALLIED CONSULTATIONS

1. FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED TEXT OF A MESSAGE TO HERR GENSCHER. BEGINS: I HAVE BEEN CONCERNED AT THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE COORDINATION OF THE VARIOUS RESPONSES TO THE IRAQ/IRAN CRISIS WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. I KNOW THAT YOU ARE PRECLUDED FROM DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY MEASURES TAKEN IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA. NONETHELESS, I BELIEVE IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE KEEP CLOSELY TOGETHER IN ALL THIS, GIVEN THAT THE DISCUSSION WOULD NO DOUBT STRAY INTO POLITICAL MATTERS, SINCE ALL OUR INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED. I AM THEREFORE SENDING YOU A COPY OF A MESSAGE WHICH I HAVE ADDRESSED TO ED MUSKIE AND JEAN FRANCOIS-PONCET, SUGGESTING A MEETING IN LONDON, OR ELSEWHERE. I SHOULD BE VERY GLAD IF YOU FELT IT POSSIBLE TO BE REPRESENTED.

CARRINGTON

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A.ACLAND
SIR J.GRAHAM
MR BULLARD

MR.P.H.MOBERLY
MR. J.C.MOBERLY
LORD BRIDGES
MR BRAITHWAITE

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OO BONN
GRS 82
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FM FCO 141600Z OCTOBER 1980
TO IMMEDIATE BONN
TELEGRAM NO 387 OF 14 OCTOBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME (FOR WALDEN)
IRAN/IRAQ: ALLIED CONSULTATIONS

1. MY TWO IFTS CONTAIN THE DRAFTS OF MESSAGES FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE. THE FIRST DRAFT IS TO HERR GENSCHER, THE SECOND TO MR MUSKIE AND M. FRANCOIS-PONCET. SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION FROM THE PS IN ROME THAT THE TEXTS ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, PLEASE DELIVER ALL THREE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

CARRINGTON
NNNN

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DISTRIBUTION

LIMITED	PS/PUS
MED	SIR A ACLAND
DEFENCE	MR BULLARD
ENS AND SD	MR GRAHAM
MAED	MR P H MOBERLY
PS	MR J C MOBERLY
PS/LPS	LORD BRIDGES
PS/MR HURD	MR BRAITHWAITE

GR 200
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM ABU DHABI 140850Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 334 OF 14 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE DUBAI AND MODUK
ROUTINE MUSCAT.

MY 331 to Your 222

YOUR TELNO 331:

SECURITY OF THE GULF.

1. IN MY ABSENCE IN DUBAI, FIRST SECRETARY SAW THE MINISTER OF STATE THIS MORNING AND PUT THE SUGGESTIONS IN YOUR PARA 4.

2. AS EXPECTED RASHED ABDULLAH, WHILE APPRECIATING OUR READINESS TO SEND A TEAM AT SHORT NOTICE, REGRETTED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN ANYBODY COMING TO START DISCUSSIONS BEFORE OR DURING THE ID HOLIDAY. HE SAID HOWEVER THAT SUCH A TEAM WOULD BE MOST WELCOME ''A DAY OR TWO AFTER THE ID''. HE ALSO DECLINED THE SUGGESTION THAT ONE MAN COULD COME OUT THIS WEEK TO HOLD PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS.

3. SINCE ON THE DAY OR TWO FOLLOWING AN ID UAE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE NORMALLY ONLY WORKING AT HALF STRENGTH, I SUGGEST THAT THE FIRST PRACTICAL DATE FOR GENERAL PERKINS AND HIS TEAM TO ARRIVE WOULD BE 25 OCTOBER. HOWEVER I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL AND WOULD UNDERLINE OUR WILLINGNESS TO START SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS IF ONE MEMBER OF PERKIN'S STAFF COULD ARRIVE ON 22 OCTOBER.

ROBERTS
BT

IMMEDIATE

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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

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CABINET OFFICE DIO

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
~~MR J C MOBERLY~~
MR BRAITHWAITE
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CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY
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NBPT

Secretary of State for Defence

14/X

IRAN/IRAQ : DEPLOYMENT OF HM SHIPS

The deployment of HMS COVENTRY to the Gulf of Oman has proved a valuable step. It has confirmed HMG's willingness and ability to play a part in the protection of western interests in the Gulf whilst at the same time creating an opportunity to exercise some influence on the plans of our allies. The ship's presence has also added conviction to the assurances that we have needed to give to Gulf rulers about our concern for their security.

2. Although the fighting between Iraq and Iran now seems to be moving at a slower pace the dangers posed by the conflict to freedom of navigation in the Gulf have not diminished. The possibility remains that either of the parties might be tempted into an irrational gesture against neutral shipping. Western naval powers may still need to undertake a naval control of shipping exercise. We therefore think that it would be prudent to move a second Royal Navy ship to the area as soon as possible. The Foreign Secretary had a word with the Prime Minister about this just before he left for Italy this morning, and I understand she agrees.

3. I believe that our officials have already discussed this possibility, and that HMS ALACRITY, currently in Singapore, is best placed for such a move. I know that certain ships are already programmed to visit Gulf ports early next month after taking part in Exercise Beacon Compass. But there is no knowing how quickly our ships might be needed. It would also be wise to maintain some parity in numbers between ourselves and those of our allies who have ships already there or nearby, since otherwise our advice on the possible deployment of ships into the Gulf itself may be discounted.

/4. I am

4. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Prime Minister.

I.H.G.

14 October 1980

14 OCT 1960

Cmnr' Minute.

Mr Wade-Gery
Mr Hastie-Smith
Mr DJ. Wright

12A

First instance of warning against US plan.

I hope I have answered their questions adequately.

SECRET

GRS 850
SECRET
FM FCO 130933Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1624 OF 13 OCTOBER
AND TO PRIORITY PARIS AND BONN
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS (D STAFF), DS 5, ACDS (OPS)),
PRIORITY JEDDA KUWAIT BAGHDAD ABU DHABI DUBAI DOHA BAHRAIN MUSCAT AND AMMAN
INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW TEL AVIV UKDEL NATO CAIRO AND DAMASCUS
YOUR TELNO 4235: IRAN/IRAQ: DEFENCE ISSUES.

1. IT IS REASSURING TO KNOW THAT THE AMERICANS ARE GOING SLOW ON TALKS ON NAVAL COOPERATION WITH THE GULF STATES. ON THE OTHER HAND, BARTHOLOMEW'S PROPOSAL THAT THE OTHER POINTS WE HAVE RAISED WITH THEM SHOULD BE PURSUED IN THE NAVAL TALKS IS NOT PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. THE NAVAL TALKS HERE HAVE BEEN LITTLE SHORT OF A FIASCO. OUR INTERLOCUTORS (CINCUSNAVEUR) ARE ON THE PERIPHERY AND CANNOT SUSTAIN A SERIOUS DIALOGUE. THEY HAVE ANYWAY TOLD US THAT THE PENTAGON NOW WISHES TO TRANSFER THE NAVAL TALKS TO THE LOCAL COMMANDERS IN THE GULF AREA AND THAT MEANWHILE THE PLANNING CONCEPT SET OUT IN THE SECOND US PAPER HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE SO THAT THE LOCAL US COMMANDER ON US MIDWAY CAN DRAW UP AN OPERATIONAL PLAN ON THAT BASIS.

2. IF THIS INFORMATION IS ACCURATE, THE AMERICANS APPEAR TO HAVE TAKEN SCANT ACCOUNT OF THE COMMENTS WE HAVE MADE. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE SPEAK AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL IN STATE DEPARTMENT AND ALSO IN THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

(A) WE CONTINUE TO HAVE IMPORTANT MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE SECOND US PAPER. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE BASIC PLANNING CONCEPT OF DIVIDING THE SEA AREAS INTO ZONES IS LIKELY, IN THE EVENT OF A SERIOUS INCIDENT, TO PROVIDE SHIPOWNERS WITH THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE TO RESUME PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND IN THE GULF. INDEED THE AMERICAN PLAN IS A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT IS BEING DONE AD HOC ALREADY.

(B) WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THE LITTORAL STATES COULD ADEQUATELY PROTECT THEIR OWN WATERS IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF REAL DIFFICULTY: THIS APPLIES PARTICULARLY TO THE OMANI RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE KEY PART OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

(C) WE NOTE WHAT BARTHOLOMEW SAYS ABOUT AIR COVER. BUT HAVE THE AMERICANS CONSIDERED THE CONSEQUENCES OF DESTROYING HOSTILE AIRCRAFT OVER OR ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY? HOW WOULD THIS SQUARE WITH A NEED FOR DE-ESCALATION? THERE WOULD ALSO BE A NEED FOR LIAISON AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL, WHICH ARGUES FOR CLOSER NAVAL COORDINATION THAN AT PRESENT ENVISAGED.

(D) WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICANS APPRECIATE THE VITAL NECESSITY OF ADEQUATE POLITICAL CONTROL. THIS APPLIES IN THE PRESENT SITUATION OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND BEGIN UNDERLINING A FORTIORI END UNDERLINING IN A REAL CRISIS.

(E) WE RECOGNISE THAT THE FRENCH HAVE EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO MULTILATERAL NAVAL DISCUSSION. IN OUR VIEW WE SHOULD NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO IMPRESS ON THE FRENCH THE VALUE OF JOINT PLANNING. THE RISKS OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISCALCULATION MUST BE GREATER IF ARRANGEMENTS ARE ONLY DISCUSSED ON A BILATERAL BASIS. THIS IS A SITUATION WHICH POTENTIALLY AFFECTS US ALL, AND HAVING BEEN INVITED TO PARTICIPATE, WE BELIEVE THAT PLANNING AND ACTION MUST BE JOINT.

3. YOU SHOULD ALSO TELL THE AMERICANS THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING OUR MISGIVINGS ABOUT US PLANNING, WE ARE INSTRUCTING THE CAPTAIN OF HMS COVENTRY NOW IN THE GULF TO MAKE CONTACT WITH HIS US AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES. WE ARE DOING THIS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT A CHANNEL FOR COMMUNICATION ABOUT PRACTICAL NAVAL ISSUES REMAINS OPEN. BUT THE CAPTAIN IS BEING TOLD TO RESERVE THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON POLITICAL ISSUES THAT MAY ARISE AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT NO POLITICAL DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO PUT ANY OPERATIONAL MEASURES INTO EFFECT. MEANWHILE WE ARE CONSIDERING WHAT STEPS NEED TO BE TAKEN TO ESTABLISH POLITICAL CONTROL AND WOULD WELCOME AN EARLY INDICATION OF US THINKING. FINALLY WE SHOULD BE GLAD TO LEARN HOW FAR THE US HAVE GOT IN THEIR TALKS WITH THE OMANIS AND SAUDIS.

4. MEANWHILE THE GERMAN MFA HAVE APPROACHED THE EMBASSY IN BONN WITH A SUGGESTION FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSION ON NAVAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE GULF. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE GERMANS ARE CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBLITY OF PRECIPITATE OR ILL-CONSIDERED AMERICAN ACTION. BUT THE EMBASSY THINK THEY ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH THE AMERICANS ARE HANDLING THIS. WE SEE THIS APPROACH FROM BONN AS A POSSIBLE WAY OF INVOLVING THE FRENCH MORE CLOSELY WITH OUR THINKING. WE SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF BONN COULD REPLY TO THE GERMANS MAKING THE POINT THAT, WHILE OF COURSE WE WOULD WELCOME BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, WE WONDER WHETHER THE GERMANS MIGHT NOT SEE ADVANTAGE

/IN OUR

IN OUR DOING THIS BEGIN UNDERLINING A TROIS END UNDERLING WITH THE FRENCH. FOR THE TIME BEING WASHINGTON SHOULD NOT (NOT) MENTION THIS GERMAN APPROACH TO THE AMERICANS.

5. PARIS SHOULD SPEAK TO ROBIN, GIVING HIM A FULL ACCOUNT OF OUR VIEWS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 ABOVE. THEY SHOULD REINFORCE THE POINT THAT CONTINUED SEPARATE SETS OF BILATERAL TALKS ON THE NAVAL NET ARE A RECIPE FOR CONFUSION, ARE LIKELY TO COMPOUND THE DANGERS OF INADEQUATE POLITICAL CONTROL AND, IF THE WORST CAME TO THE WORST, COULD LEAD TO ILL-CONSIDERED ACTION. OUR STRONG PREFERENCE CONTINUES TO BE TO INVOLVE IN THE NAVY-TO-NAVY PLANNING TALKS ALL THREE COUNTRIES WITH SHIPS IN THE AREA. WE TRUST THEREFORE THAT THE FRENCH WILL RECONSIDER THEIR REFUSAL TO TALK BEGIN UNDERLINING A TROIS END UNDERLINING.

6. OTHER POSTS TO WHOM THIS TELEGRAM IS REPEATED SHOULD TREAT IT AS STRICTLY FOR THEIR PRIVATE INFORMATION ONLY. WE SEE A REAL DANGER THAT WIDE DISCUSSION OF THESE AMERICAN CONTINGENCY PLANS, DISTORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION, MAY HAVE THE EFFECT OF INCREASING, RATHER THAN DECREASING, TENSION, AND PERHAPS EVEN OF PROVIDING IRAN WITH THE TRIGGER OR ETHE EXCUSE FOR SOME WILD MOVE IN OR AROUND THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/MED
HD/DEF D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
SIR J GRAHAM
MR BULLARD
LORD BRIDGES
MR P H MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE

also copied to Mr Alexander
10, Downing Street.

File

CONFIDENTIAL

log

ASG

BF 14-10-80

13 October 1980

Flashwired 6/10/80

QUADRIPARTITE MEETING: 6 OCTOBER

The Prime Minister has seen Mr. Mallaby's record of the above meeting. As a result she has asked for a background note on the terms of:

(a) The 1971 Anglo-UAE Defence Agreement;

(b) The Security Council Resolution referred to in paragraph 9 of the record; and

(c) The 1975 Algiers Agreement.

I should be grateful if you could let me have this as soon as possible.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

George Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22 18

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
~~SIR E YOUDE~~
SIR J GRAHAM
~~MR J C MOBERLY~~
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
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~~CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT~~
HD/ES & SD
HD/MAED
HD/DEF D
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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~
SIR A ACLAND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

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ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 131330Z

FM TRIPOLI 131200Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TEL NUMBER 452 OF 13 OCTOBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, JEDDAH, WASHINGTON.
IRAQ/IRAN: LIBYAN ATTITUDE

1 AS YOU WILL ALREADY KNOW FROM AGENCY REPORTS, THERE HAVE BEEN TWO FURTHER, AND UNEXPECTEDLY RAPID, DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MY TELELETTER NO 769 OF 9 OCTOBER TO MILES, NENAD.

2 FIRST, QADHAFI SENT MESSAGES TOWARDS THE END RJ LAST WEEK TO KING KHALID AND GULF RULERS DEMANDING WITHDRAWAL OF US AWACS AIRCRAFT AND BASES FROM THE ARAB PENINSULAR AND GULF, AND CALLING FOR AN ALIGNMENT ''WITH THE MUSLIMS IN IRAN''.

3 SECOND, IRAQ HAS BROKEN OFF RELATIONS WITH LIBYA (AND SYRIA). THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR AND HIS STAFF WERE ALL WITHDRAWN ON 11 OCTOBER.

4 FURTHER DETAILS AND COMMENTS FOLLOW.

FOES

GRS 980

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 131735Z OCT 80
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4266 OF 13 OCTOBER
INFO PRIORITY JEDDA, ROUTINE MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT.
INFO SAVING CAIRO, TEL AVIV, ABU DHABI, DAMASCUS, DOHA, PARIS,
BONN, AMMAN.

Read in full

IRAN/IRAQ: U.S. AID TO SAUDI ARABIA

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES CARRIED ON 12 OCTOBER A LONG ACCOUNT, BASED ON OFFICIAL BRIEFING, OF THE U.S. DELIBERATIONS LEADING UP TO THE DISPATCH OF AWACS TO SAUDI ARABIA ON 29 SEPTEMBER. TEXT BY BAG, FOLLOWING WERE MAIN POINTS.

2. ON 26 SEPTEMBER THE SAUDIS SENT THE AMERICANS ON C I A CHANNELS A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE AGAINST POSSIBLE IRANIAN ATTACK, ALSO REFERRING TO THEIR OWN PREPARATIONS TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST IRAN, IF NECESSARY. THEY HAD BEEN ALARMED BY THE IRANIAN WARNINGS AGAINST ALL WHO HELPED IRAQ, GIVEN THAT IRAQI PLANES HAD LANDED ON THEIR AIRFIELDS AND USED THEIR AIRSPACE TO FLY TO OMAN.

3. ON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE, WHICH WAS NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT THE HELP EXPECTED FROM THE U.S., OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON UNDER BRZEZINSKI'S LEADERSHIP WORKED OUT A SERIES OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES. THE MINIMUM WAS THE DESPATCH OF FOUR AWACS. OTHERS WERE: TO SEND TO SAUDI ARABIA TWO F-14 SQUADRONS (40 PLANES) FROM THE USS EISENHOWER IN THE ARABIAN SEA SEMICLN TO SEND TWO F-15 SQUADRONS THERE FROM THE U.S. SEMICLN AND/OR TO STATION HAWK ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERIES IN SAUDI ARABIA WITH U.S. CREWS (SEVERAL HUNDDRED MEN). THESE MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS WERE FAVOURED BY THE PENTAGON WHO HAD BEEN PRESSING THE SAUDIS TO ALLOW THE U.S. TO STOCKPILE EQUIPMENT THERE FOR FUTURE USE.

4 WHILE THESE OPTIONS WERE BEING PREPARED, THE SITUATION WAS COMPLICATED BY REPORTS FROM U.S. AND BRITISH INTELLIGENCE THAT IRAQI HELICOPTERS AND PLANES WERE PLANNING TO USE OMANI AND PERHAPS SAUDI FACILITIES TO ATTACK IRANIAN BASES ACROSS THE GULF AND ON THE TUNBS/ABU MUSA. A FIRST MEETING OF SUBSTANCE ON THE ISSUES, ON THE AFTERNOON OF 27 SEPTEMBER, BROUGHT NO DECISION ABOUT AID TO THE SAUDIS. BUT IT WAS AGREED THAT BOTH THE SAUDIS AND OMANIS SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED FROM GIVING SUPPORT TO THE IRAQIS. THE PRESIDENT (AT CAMP DAVID) ORDERED ONE AWACS SENT TO THE U K IN CASE THE OPTION OF USING IT IN SAUDI ARABIA WAS PURSUED.

5. THE FOLLOWING DAY A SECOND MEETING WAS HELD AT THE WHITE HOUSE BETWEEN BRZEZINSKI, BROWN AND MUSKIE (WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM MAINE WHERE HE HAD SPENT THE PREVIOUS TWO DAYS). MUSKIE, FOLLOWING HIS OWN MEETING IN NEW YORK WITH GROMYKO ON 25 SEPTEMBER WAS VERY

/ CONSCIOUS

CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO PRESERVE U.S. AND SOVIET NEUTRALITY AND NON-INTERVENTION IN THE CONFLICT. THE RESULT OF THE WHITE HOUSE MEETING WAS AGREEMENT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO PUSH THE SAUDIS INTO LONGER-TERM COMMITMENTS AT THIS TIME. THE MEETING CONCLUDED, AFTER SOME HEATED EXCHANGES (WITH MUSKIE ON ONE SIDE AND BRZEZINSKI AND BROWN ON THE OTHER), THAT WHILE THE U.S. NEEDED TO DEMONSTRATE ITS CONCERN FOR SAUDI SECURITY, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO INTRODUCE ANY OFFENSIVE MILITARY SYSTEMS. BRZEZINSKI AND BROWN ACCEPTED THAT FOR THE MOMENT THE DESPATCH OF THE AWACS WAS SUFFICIENT, PARTLY BECAUSE THE U.S. NAVY REPORTED THAT THE F-14'S FROM THE U S S EISENHOWER COULD BE FLOWN TO THE SCENE IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS IN LESS THAN TWO HOURS.

6. A FORMAL REQUEST FROM THE SAUDIS FOR THE AWACS WAS ELICITED BY GENERAL JONES AND AMBASSADOR WEST IN JEDDA ON 29 SEPTEMBER, TOGETHER WITH SAUDI AGREEMENT THAT THE DESPATCH SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC. AT THE SAME TIME INTELLIGENCE SOURCES REPORTED THAT THE IRAQI PLANES IN SAUDI ARABIA AND OMAN WERE BEING WITHDRAWN. THE FORMAL DECISION TO SEND THE AWACS WAS TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT LATER THE SAME DAY, WHILE CONGRESS WAS BEING BRIEFED ON THESE DEVELOPMENTS.

7. A PENTAGON OFFICIAL IS QUOTED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES REPORT AS CLAIMING THAT THE U.S. RESPONSE DISCOURAGED THE IRANIANS, DEMONSTRATED THE COMMITMENT TO THE SAUDIS AND IN THE LONGER TERM QUOTE OPENED THE DOOR TO MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE MILITARY COLLABORATION WITH THE SAUDIS UNQUOTE. A WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE U.S. ACTION STOPPED THE MINDLESS GRAVITATION OF SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER GULF STATES TOWARDS IRAQ, AND PLACED THE U.S. QUOTE IN A MUCH BETTER POSITION TO MOVE AHEAD ON BUILDING A SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR SOUTH WEST ASIA UNQUOTE. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, HOWEVER, THE STATE DEPARTMENT REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE A POLICY OF CAUTION, MAINTAINING NEUTRALITY AND AVOIDING PROVOCATION TO THE RUSSIANS.

FC O PASS SAVING CAIRO, TEL AVIV, ABU DHABI, DAMASCUS, DOHA, PARIS, BONN, AMMAN.

HENDERSON

[PASSED SAVING AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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GR 525
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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 407 OF 13 OCT
INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, BONN, PARIS, ROME, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK AND WASHINGTON
IRAN/IRAQ: JORDANIAN INTEREST IN POSSIBLE EUROPEAN MOVE.

1. MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE SAW MARWAN QASEM, THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, ON 11 OCTOBER, THE DAY AFTER THE LATTER'S RETRUN FROM NEW YORK, AND CONVEYED TO HIM A FORMAL DENIAL THAT WEST GERMANY WAS SENDING MILITARY SPARES TO IRAN (MY TELNO 397 OF 10 OCTOBER NOT TO ALL REFERS).

2. QASEM (WHO SHOWED NONE OF THE OPTIMISM JORDANIANS HAVE EVINCED HITHERTO ABOUT THE IRAQIS' ABILITY TO END THE WAR ON THEIR TERMS) EMPHASISED THE NEED TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO A RAPID CONCLUSION. HE CLAIMED THAT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE WAS NOT IN ANY POSITION TO STOP IT AND SUGGESTED THAT THE EUROPEANS SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN TRYING TO DO SO. QASEM THOUGHT THAT THE TIMING FOR SUCH AN INITIATIVE WAS NOW MORE PROPITIOUS, AS THE CONFLICT HAD INCREASED THE AUTHORITY WIELDED WITHIN IRAN BY THE IRANIAN PRESIDENT: FOR EXAMPLE, HE ATTRIBUTED IRAN'S AGREEMENT TO TAKE PART IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TO BANI-SADR'S GREATER SAY IN THE DIRECTION OF IRANIAN AFFAIRS. QASEM WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE MIGHT BE BASED ON TRYING TO CONVINCE THE IRANIANS TO ACCEPT FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1975 ALGIERS TREATY AS THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT. HE EMPHASISED THAT IRAQ HAD NO CLAIM WHATEVER TO KHUZESTAN (NOT QUITE WHAT THE IRAQIS WERE SAYING TO THE JORDANIANS EARLIER ON) AND THAT ADHERENCE TO THE 1975 TREATY MIGHT OFFER A FACE-SAVING DEVICE FOR BOTH SIDES. QASEM SUGGESTED THAT A SUCCESSFUL INITIATIVE BY THE EUROPEANS WOULD GREATLY STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION IN THE AREA, WHEREAS CONTINUATION OF THE CONFLICT MIGHT WELL HAVE VERY GRAVE CONSEQUENCES: HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE DANGER THAT ISRAEL MIGHT TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION.

3. QASEM ALSO SAW MY FRENCH AND ITALIAN COLLEAGUES ON 12 OCTOBER. I UNDERSTAND HE PUT A SIMILAR PROPOSAL TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, WITH THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE THAT WHEN SPEAKING TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR HE HAD SEEMED IN A CONSIDERABLE HURRY TO SEE A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE LAUNCHED WHEREAS WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THE FOLLOWING

/DAY

CONFIDENTIAL

DAY HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS NO PARTICULAR HASTE. MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE IS FAR FROM CLEAR WHETHER QASEM'S PROPOSAL REPRESENTED A THOUGHT-OUT JORDANIAN POSITION OR WHETHER QASEM, WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY REPORTS THAT THE WAR WAS GOING BADLY FOR THE IRAQIS, WAS MERELY FLOATING AN IDEA IN ORDER TO SEE WHAT REACTION HE GOT.

4. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT TO SEE QASEM MYSELF TOMORROW MORNING AND HOPE TO BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH HOW FAR PARA2 ABOVE REPRESENTS CONSIDERED JORDANIAN THINKING. I ALSO HOPE TO SEE KING HUSSEIN WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO.

URWICK

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTN.
IRAQ/IRAN

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
~~SIR K YOUDE~~
SIR J GRAHAM
~~MR J C MOBERLY~~
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Sir A Acland

GR 260
SECRET
FROM ABU DHABI 130914Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 331 OF 13 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE DUBAI AND MODUK
ROUTINE DOHA BAHRAIN JEDDA KUWAIT AND MUSCAT

MY TELNO 329: SECURITY OF THE GULF.

1. WHEN I TOOK MOBERLY THIS MORNING TO CALL ON THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, RASHED ABDULLAH, THE LATTER SAID THAT BOTH SHAIKH ZAYED AND SHAIKH RASHED HAD NOW AGREED THAT OUR OFFER TO SEND AN EXPLORATORY TEAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. THE MATTER WAS NOW IN THE HANDS OF SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN RASHED, THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE, AND OF SHAIKH KHALIFA BIN ZAYED, THE DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER, WHO WAS LOOKING INTO THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF RECEIVING THE PROPOSED TEAM. RASHED ABDULLAH EXPECTED TO HEAR FROM THEM VERY SOON, AFTER WHICH MY DEFENCE ATTACHE WOULD BE PUT IN TOUCH WITH AN APPROPRIATE CONTACT TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS.

2. RASHED ABDULLAH MENTIONED THAT THE UAE WAS IN CLOSE TOUCH

THEM VERY SOON, AFTER WHICH MY DEFENCE ATTACHE WOULD BE PUT IN TOUCH WITH AN APPROPRIATE CONTACT TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS.

2. RASHED ABDULLAH MENTIONED THAT THE UAE WAS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND THE OTHER GULF STATES TO DISCUSS THEIR COMMON DEFENCE PROBLEMS AND NEEDS IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. SAUDI ARABIA WAS ALREADY RECEIVING NEW EQUIPMENT FROM THE US AND WAS FLYING DEFENSIVE PATROLS WITH F-15S. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERLINE THAT THE OFFER TO SEND AN MOD TEAM HAD BEEN MADE ONLY TO THE UAE AND WAS NOT FOR DISCUSSION WITH GULF NEIGHBOURS. RASHED ABDULLAH CONFIRMED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS.

ROBERTS
BT

NNNN

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
~~MR J C MOBERLY~~
MR BRAITHWAITE
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Sir I Acland

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GR 250
SECRET
FROM ABU DHABI 130415Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 130800Z OCT)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 329 OF 13 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE DUBAI, MODUK
ROUTINE DOHA, BAHRAIN, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT.

MY TELNO 328: SECURITY OF THE GULF.

1. SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL THIS MORNING, MOBERLY WAS RECEIVED BY SHAIKH ZAYED AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TELNO 220. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS SPEAKING WITH YOUR PERSONAL AUTHORITY AND THAT HE WOULD BE CONVEYING SHAIKH ZAYED'S REACTIONS DIRECTLY TO YOU.

2. SHAIKH ZAYED'S INITIAL COMMENT WAS THAT HE WOULD HAVE HOPED THAT WE WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO REASSURE HIM IN THIS WAY AT AN EARLIER STAGE IN THE CRISIS. HAVING GOT THAT OFF HIS CHEST, HOWEVER, HE WENT ON TO EXPRESS WARMEST APPRECIATION OF OUR READINESS TO CONSULT CLOSELY, TO CONSIDER MILITARY

OF OUR READINESS TO CONSULT CLOSELY, TO CONSIDER MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN PRINCIPLE AND TO MAKE THE SPECIFIC OFFER OF READINESS TO SEND A SMALL MOD TEAM TO EXAMINE THE UAE'S NEEDS AND FACILITIES. SHAIKH ZAYED SAID HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH US SOON ABOUT THE LATTER OFFER AFTER DISCUSSING IT WITH HIS ADVISERS.

3. SHAIKH ZAYED ADDED THAT OUR READINESS TO SUPPORT HIM IN THIS WAY WOULD GENERATE RENEWED CONFIDENCE AND HE WENT ON TO SPEAK FULSOMELY ABOUT HOW THIS WAS A SYMBOL THAT AFTER A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UK AND THE UAE WAS NOW RESTORED TO ITS PROPER LEVEL.

4. SHAIKH ZAYED'S FURTHER COMMENTS ON THE SITUATION ARE IN MIFT.

ROBERTS
BT

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 October 1980

Discussed by Prime Minister + Lord Carrington earlier today.

Dear Michael,

Iran/Iraq

You asked for an account of recent developments.

Situation on the ground

The Iraqis are continuing to advance from Khorramshahr towards Abadan and also towards two other ports about 60 miles away, Bandar Khomeini and Bandar Mashur. The main military activity is in the south, but there is some activity in the central/northern sector where the Iraqis are still apparently attempting to seize the city of Dezful, and are attacking south of Ahwaz. They have not yet, as far as we know, cut the strategic oil pipe-lines in that area. In the air Iranian activity has decreased significantly in the last week, whilst Iraqi activity has increased. The Iranians seem nevertheless to have caused substantial damage to the Iraqi oil installations though it is far from clear how long it would take to repair. At sea there is little change: Iranian vessels continue to patrol in the Straits of Hormuz but are not interfering with the normal passage of ships. The disposition of other naval forces in the area is shown in the attached map.

Attempts at mediation

The main focus is in New York. The President of the Security Council (Troyanovsky, USSR) called consultations of the whole on 10 October and informed members that Ardakani (Iran) had received instructions to participate in a formal Council meeting. This might take place very soon. Troyanovsky said he would arrange the timing once he had confirmation that the Iranians were ready. The likely outcome of this meeting is not yet clear but it is mildly encouraging that the Iranian has instructions to participate.

Chatti, the Secretary General to the Islamic Conference, has been despatched once again to Tehran and Baghdad by President Zia, but we have no news of how he has been doing.

There have been no other initiatives on mediation, but both the Iranians and the Iraqis have told the Indian Government that they hope the Indians would be willing to help towards this end.

/Shipping

Shipping

Action in the UN to secure the release of trapped ships may provide an opportunity for a limited ceasefire, although neither side has yet responded to the Secretary-General's appeal of 11 October.

Three British ships (one UK registered and two registered in Hong Kong) are trapped in Basra but are in no immediate danger. One UK registered ship, the Altanin, with 38 persons on board is in a much riskier position off Khorramshahr. The Consul from Baghdad has gone to the area to try to arrange with the local military authorities for the disembarkation of all but a skeleton crew. The owners have been advised that unless the situation becomes intolerable, no landing should be attempted without the agreement of the Iraqi military. Priority has been given on the advice of the Embassy in Baghdad to securing Iraqi co-operation for this operation in the first instance. We are, however, in touch with a number of other countries with shipping trapped in the Shatt-al-Arab about the possibility of joint demarches to both Iran and Iraq to allow the ships to leave.

Oil

Shipping continues to pass to and from the Gulf ports, other than those in Iraq and Iran, normally. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE have raised output in order to offset, for the benefit of developing countries, the loss of Iraqi and Iranian oil.

UK contribution to security in the Gulf

HM Coventry is now deployed in the Gulf of Oman. We are discussing with the MOD how best to move another ship to the area immediately.

We have informed the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zaid, that, in the spirit of our Friendship Treaty, we stand ready in principle to provide military assistance if asked. We have told the Shaikh that we would like to send a small team, mainly from the MOD, to consult the Rulers on the UAE's likely needs and on what the local facilities are. As a first step a former commander of the Sultan of Oman's Army is flying out to the Gulf this week where he will meet Mr J C Moberly. (There is some difficulty because of a local holiday, the 'Id al Adha, but we believe it is important to react swiftly.)

/Consultations

Consultations with our Allies

We have not yet told our allies of the initiative to help the UAE. When the arrangements for General Perkins' visit have been completed, we intend to tell the Americans and French in general terms.

My impression is that Lord Carrington is still rather concerned at the inadequacy of allied consultations. There was a useful Quadripartite discussion in Paris last week and there will be another meeting there on 27 October. But so far there has not been much enthusiasm on the part of our partners for giving them a more politico-military content. There is still too much of an impression of separate approaches and inadequate coordination. We shall continue to press upon the Americans and French the need for close contact and some form of military consultations.

Lord Carrington did not see this letter before despatch, but will see a copy over-night.


I am copying this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

G. G. H. Walden

(G G H Walden)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street


USS SEALIFT CARIBEAN
USS SEALIFT ATLANTIC
USS LASALLE [AGF]
USS HART [FF]
USS VOGUE [FF]
USS LAWRENCE [DDG]
KRIVAK 693 [FF]
KRIVAK 729 [FF]
HMS COVENTRY
RFA OLWEN
MOSKGALVO [AMO]
USS EISENHOWER [CV]
USS MIDWAY [CV]
USS VIRGINIA [CGN]
USS PARSONS [DDG]
USS SOUTH CAROLINA [CGN]
USS LEAHY [CGN]
USS REGAL [AF]
USS NOVA SOTA [AOR]
USS HAMMOND [DD]
USS PHEARY [DD]
USS KALAMAZOO [AOT]
USS DETROIT [AOE]
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USS WICHITA [AOR]
KASHIN 562 [DDG]
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USS KIRK [FF]
USS SEALIFT CHINASEA
USS SAMPLE [FF]
USS LANGS [FF]
USS AJAX [AOR]
USS COURIER [AOR]
USS MERCURY [DD]
USS JUPITER [FF]
DIEGO GARCIA

10-10-80.

M D J D B Alexander Esq

020

With the compliments of

George Walden.

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

File No.

Department DEFENCE

Drafted by (Block Capitals) D H GILLMORE

Tel. Extn. 233 3372

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Security Classification: SECRET

Precedence: IMMEDIATE 9

DESKBY Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched (Date) (Time) Z

POSTBY Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.)

(Security Class.) SECRET

(Codeword)

(Restrictive Prefix)

(Caveat/ Privacy Marking)

(Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE (precedence) WASHINGTON (post) Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post) (PRIORITY) PARIS BONN

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE: MODUK (AUS (D STAFF), DS 5, ACDS (Ops)), PRIORITY: JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, AMMAN, DAMASCUS

SAVING TO (for info) UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, UKDEL NATO, CAIRO,/

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ORD BRIDGES
R P H MOBERLY
R BRAITHWAITE

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO 4235: IRAN/IRAQ: DEFENCE ISSUES

1. It is reassuring to know that the Americans are going slow on talks on naval cooperation with the Gulf States. On the other hand, Bartholomew's proposal that the other points we have raised with them should be pursued in the naval talks is not particularly helpful. The naval talks here have been little short of a fiasco. Our interlocutors (CINCUSNAVEUR) are on the periphery and cannot sustain a serious dialogue. They have anyway told us that the Pentagon now wishes to transfer the naval talks to the local Commanders in the Gulf area and that meanwhile the planning concept set out in the second US paper has been approved by the Secretary for Defense so that the local US Commander on US Midway can draw up an operational plan on

/that

that basis.

2. If this information is accurate, the Americans appear to have taken scant account of the comments we have made. You should therefore speak at an appropriately high level in State Department and also in the White House on the following lines:

(a) We continue to have important misgivings about the second US paper. In the first instance we do not believe that the basic planning concept of dividing the sea areas into zones is likely, in the event of a serious incident, to provide shipowners with the necessary confidence to resume passage through the Straits of Hormuz and in the Gulf. Indeed the American plan is a description of what is being done ad hoc already.

(b) We do not consider that the littoral states could adequately protect their own waters in circumstances of real difficulty; this applies particularly to the Omani responsibility for the key part of the Straits of Hormuz.

(c) We note what Bartholomew says about air cover. But have the Americans considered the consequences of destroying hostile aircraft over or on their own territory? How would this square with a need for de-escalation? There would also be a need for liaison and operational control, which argues for closer naval coordination than at present envisaged.

(d) We are not convinced that the Americans appreciate the vital necessity of adequate political control. This applies in the present situation of contingency planning and a fortiori in a real crisis.

(e) We recognise that the French have expressed

/opposition

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

opposition to multilateral naval discussion. In our view we should nevertheless continue to impress on the French the value of joint planning. The risks of misunderstanding and miscalculation must be greater if arrangements are only discussed on a bilateral basis. This is a situation which potentially affects us all, and having been invited to participate, we believe that planning and action must be joint.

3. You should also tell the Americans that, notwithstanding our misgivings about US planning, we are instructing the Captain of HMS Coventry now in the Gulf to make contact with his US and French colleagues. We are doing this in order to ensure that a channel for communication about practical naval issues remains open. But the Captain is being told to reserve the Government's position on political issues that may arise and to make clear that no political decision has been taken to put any operational measures into effect. Meanwhile we are considering what steps need to be taken to establish political control and would welcome an early indication of US thinking. Finally we should be glad to learn how far the US have got in their talks with the Omanis and Saudis.

4. Meanwhile the German MFA have approached the Embassy in Bonn with a suggestion for bilateral discussion on naval contingency planning in the Gulf. There is no evidence that the Germans are concerned at the possibility of precipitate or ill-considered American action. But the Embassy think they are worried about the way in which the Americans are handling this. We see this approach from Bonn as a possible way of involving the French more closely with our thinking. We should therefore be grateful if Bonn could reply to the Germans making the point that, while of course we would

/welcome

welcome bilateral discussions, we wonder whether the Germans might not see advantage in our doing this á trois with the French. For the time being Washington should not (not) mention this German approach to the Americans.

5. Paris should speak to Robin, giving him a full account of our views set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. They should reinforce the point that continued separate sets of bilateral talks on the naval net are a recipe for confusion, are likely to compound the dangers of inadequate political control and, if the worst came to the worst, could lead to ill-considered action. Our strong preference continues to be to involve in the Navy-to-Navy planning talks all three countries with ships in the area. We trust therefore that the French will reconsider their refusal to talk á trois.

6. Other posts to whom this telegram is repeated should treat it as strictly for their private information only. We see a real danger that wide discussion of these American contingency plans, distorted by the Soviet Union, may have the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, tension, and perhaps even of providing Iran with the trigger or the excuse for some wild move in or around the Straits of Hormuz.

13/10

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 170
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BAHRAIN 110435Z OCT 80
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 165 OF 11 OCTOBER
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON BAGHDAD KUWAIT ABU DHABI DUBAI DOHA MUSCAT JEDDA PARIS BONN MOSCOW AMMAN

IRAN/IRAQ

1. WHEN JOHN MOBERLY CALLED ON THE AMIR YESTERDAY THE LATTER EXPLICITLY STATED THAT WHILE BAHRAIN'S SYMPATHIES WERE STRONGLY WITH IRAQ ITS OFFICIAL POLICY WAS TO STAND WELL AWAY FROM THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT.
2. HE WAS GLOOMY ABOUT THE CHANCES OF AN EARLY SUCCESS FOR MEDIATION ATTEMPTS. QUOTE HOW COULD A FIRE BE PUT OUT WHEN MORE WOOD WAS BEING PUT ON IT FROM BEHIND UNQUOTE - BY SYRIA AND THE PLO? HE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ARAB WORLD OF THE SYRIA-USSR FRIENDSHIP TREATY AND SPOKE IN FAMILIAR TERMS OF THE WAY THE RUSSIANS WERE WINNING TRICK AFTER TRICK IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITHOUT THE NEED FOR SUCH VISIBLE ACTIONS AS FLEET MOVEMENTS, BECAUSE OF THE ALLEGED AMERICAN FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THE AREA.
3. AT THE SAME TIME HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT WAS UNLIKELY TO SPREAD AND CAUTIONED AGAINST ANY INVOLVEMENT BY THE SUPER-POWERS. HE AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO WAS PRESENT, MAINTAINED THAT IT WAS UP TO THE GULF STATES THEMSELVES TO KEEP THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ OPEN.

WALKER

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD
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FM DOHA 111400Z OCT 80
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 145 OF 11 OCTOBER
INFO WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW AND AMMAN.

IRAQ/IRAN.

WHEN THE AMIR RECEIVED MOBERLY THIS MORNING, HE QUESTIONED HIM CLOSELY ABOUT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. HE EXPRESSED HIS WARM APPRECIATION OF THE GENERAL MESSAGE OF REASSURANCE AND SUPPORT WHICH MOBERLY GAVE HIM DRAWING ON PARA 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 220 TO ABU DHABI. HE SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE BRIEFING HE HAD BEEN RECEIVING ON A REGULAR BASIS FROM THE EMBASSY, AND CONFIRMED HIS WISH TO STAY IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD NO PARTICULAR REQUESTS TO PUT TO US AT PRESENT BUT THAT THE SITUATION COULD CHANGE FROM ONE DAY TO THE NEXT. WITH REGARD TO MEDIATION HE HAD FEW EXPECTATIONS FROM THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE BUT HE SAW SOME HOPE OF PROGRESS THROUGH THE U.N. HE THOUGHT THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER'S EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS NOW FOR THE IRANIAN CASE TO BE PUT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT MARK A SIGNIFICANT AND POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. HE WAS SCEPTICAL, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE PRESENT IRANIAN LEADERSHIP WERE CAPABLE OF FOLLOWING A CONSISTENT AND LOGICAL COURSE AND AGREED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT DISCERN WHERE THE REAL POWER IN IRAN NOW LAY. SHAIKH KHALIFA AGREED THAT IN THE MEANTIME OUR EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS CONTAINING THE CONFLICT AND THAT WE SHOULD ALL MOVE ONLY WITH THE GREATEST CAUTION.

2. UNUSUALLY AS WE LEFT SHAIKH KHALIFA, SHAIKH HAMAD, THE HEIR APPARENT, ASKED US TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION WITH HIM. HE EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT THE VUNERABILITY OF QATAR, LIKE THE OTHER SMALLER STATES IN THE GULF, IN THE LIGHT OF IRANIAN THREATS TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THEM SHOULD THEY BE PERCEIVED AS HELPING IRAQ. IN THIS CONTEXT HE ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHAT WE THOUGHT QATAR'S REACTION SHOULD BE TO IRAQI REQUESTS FOR EITHER MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. MOBERLY SAID THAT THOUGH WE COULD UNDERSTAND THAT QATARI SYMPATHIES COULD BE WITH THE IRAQIS AS FELLOW ARABS, ANY DEPARTURE FROM QATAR'S STATED POLICY OF NEUTRALITY WOULD BE MOST UNWISE. THOUGH SMALL AMOUNTS OF ECONOMIC AID MIGHT BE LESS PROVOCATIVE TO THE IRANIANS, HIS PERSONAL ADVICE WOULD BE TO STEAR CLEAR OF ANY INVOLVEMENT FOR THE TIME BEING. SHAIKH HAMAD SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY AGREED WITH THIS VIEW.

3. SHAIKH HAMAD SEEMED ANXIOUS TO ESTABLISH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH US ABOUT THE REACTION TO ANY ATTACK: IT WOULD BE TOO LATE, HE SAID, TO CONCERT MEASURES AFTER THE EVENT. ON THE OTHER HAND HE SEEMED AS ANXIOUS AS THE KUWAITIS AND THE BAHRAINIS TO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BE SEEN, AS MILITARY COOPERATION WITH

/ US

US (AND A FORTIORI (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) THE AMERICANS) E.G. HE MADE HIS VIEW CLEAR THAT THE NAVAL VISIT PLANNED FOR MID-NOVEMBER MIGHT NOW BE IN OPPORTUNE FOR THIS REASON, THOUGH HE PROMISED A FIRM DECISION ON THIS LATER.

4. IN CONCLUSION SHAIKH HAMAD UNCONSCIOUSLY ECHOED THE BAHRAINI FOREIGN MINISTER'S LANGUAGE IN STRESSING THAT THE WHOLE QUESTION OF SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE WEST CONTINUED TO BE BEDEVILLED BY THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THAT IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN LARGELY FORGOTTEN AFTER A MONTH FOR THIS REASON. HASSAN KAMEL, THE AMIR'S ADVISER, DEVELOPED THE SAME THEME AT LENGTH AT A SUBSEQUENT MEETING.

5. THOUGH SHAIKH KHALIFA REMAINS RESILIENT IN HIS APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS, HE AND SHAIKH HAMAD ARE CLEARLY VERY WORRIED BY QATAR'S DEFENCELESSNESS AND BY THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF THE PRESSURES UPON THEM.

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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SECRET
DESKBY 110500Z
FM F.C.O. 102250Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 220 OF 10 OCTOBER
AND TO DUBAI, MODUK, PRIORITY DOHA, BAHRAIN,
INFO JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT.

YOUR TELNO 322: SECURITY OF THE GULF

1. I WISH TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF JOHN MOBERLY'S VISIT TO THE U.A.E. TO CONVEY ASSURANCES TO U.A.E. LEADERS OF MY PERSONAL CONCERN AND INTEREST IN THE SECURITY OF THE GULF AT THIS DIFFICULT TIME.

2. IN SPEAKING TO U.A.E. LEADERS YOU AND HE SHOULD SAY THAT HE IS TRAVELLING WITH MY PERSONAL AUTHORITY AND THAT I SHALL BE TAKING A CLOSE INTEREST IN HIS REPORT UPON HIS RETURN. THE FOLLOWING POINTS COULD BE MADE:

A. WE ALL HAVE THE STRONGEST INTEREST IN NOT SEEING THE CONFLICT SPREAD. THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGHOUT THE GULF ARE OF VITAL INTEREST TO US ALL:

B. I GREATLY APPRECIATE THE BALANCED AND WISE JUDGMENT OF GULF GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAS PREVENTED THEM FROM BECOMING EMBROILED IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT:

C. I SHARE THE CONCERN OF THOSE IN THE GULF WHO SAY THAT THE WEST, IN MAKING CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR E.G. SHIPPING SHOULD AS FAR AS POSSIBLE REFRAIN FROM TAKING ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE THOUGHT THE BEGINNING OF SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT IN THE AREA:

D. ON SECURITY QUESTIONS OF THIS NATURE WE WISH TO ACT ONLY WITH THE AGREEMENT OF, AND INDEED AT THE INVITATION OF, GULF STATES - AS THE AMERICANS HAVE OVER A.W.A.C.S. TO SAUDI ARABIA:

E. WE WISH TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE GULF ON THEIR SECURITY NEEDS AS WELL AS ON WIDER QUESTIONS SUCH AS ENERGY. WE HOPE THEY WILL NOT HESITATE TO CONSULT US IF THEY THINK WE CAN HELP:

F. THE DECISION BY SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES TO INCREASE THEIR OIL PRODUCTION HAS BEEN EXTREMELY WELCOME TO THE WHOLE WEST.

3. ON BRITISH ASSURANCES TO THE U.A.E. OF A MILITARY NATURE (SIMILAR TO WHAT THE FRENCH ARE REPORTED TO HAVE OFFERED), YOU SHOULD SAY THAT IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR FRIENDSHIP TREATY, WE STAND READY IN PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE IF ASKED. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT WHILE MINISTERS ARE CONSIDERING WHAT THEY MIGHT DO TO HELP IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WOULD LIKE TO SEND A SMALL TEAM, MAINLY FROM THE M.O.D., TO CONSULT WITH THE RULERS ON THE U.A.E.'S LIKELY NEEDS, AND ON WHAT THE LOCAL FACILITIES ARE. IN THIS WAY EFFECTIVE CONTINGENCY PLANS COULD BE LAID. IT WOULD OF COURSE BE IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN THE SECRECY OF SUCH A VISIT. YOU SHOULD AVOID BEING DRAWN AT THIS STAGE ON THE EXACT FORM OUR ASSISTANCE MIGHT TAKE, THOUGH YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE DEFENSIVE IN NATURE.

4. (FOR BAHRAIN AND DOHA).

WE DO NOT WISH TO GENERATE SIMILAR REQUESTS FROM OTHER GULF STATES. IF H.M. REPRESENTATIVES IN BAHRAIN AND DOHA RECEIVE ENQUIRIES ABOUT MILITARY ASSISTANCE THEY SHOULD SIMPLY TAKE NOTE, AND REPORT BACK, WITHOUT COMMITMENT. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT WE WOULD IN PRACTICE BE ABLE TO DEPLOY CERTAIN TYPES OF ASSISTANCE TO MORE THAN ONE PLACE AT A TIME.

CARRINGTON

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IRAQ/IRAN

Resident Clerk has been informed

COVERING SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

Following your meeting in Brighton this afternoon with Lord Carrington and Mr. Pym, the FCO would like to send to Abu Dhabi the attached telegram setting out our response to the approach we have received from the UAE.

The key paragraph is paragraph 3, and this seems to me to be wholly consistent with the conclusions which you reached this afternoon with Lord Carrington and Mr. Pym.

Paragraph 4 of the draft telegram is necessary because while the FCO think it important to keep our other posts in the Gulf area in the picture, they are anxious - and the MOD even more so - not to be faced by similar requests for help from the UAE's neighbours. If a number of Gulf States ask us for assistance, we would have difficulty in responding to all of them, given the limitations on our own resources.

The FCO would like to dispatch the telegram tomorrow, Saturday. Are you content with it?

Agreed

Yes MT

(SGD) C.A.W.

10 October 1980

COVERING SECRET

5374312241 JED 0532199 300M 8/79 GWB LTD GP 870

File No.

Department: MED

Drafted by (Block Capitals): H D A C Miers

Tel. Extn.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Security Classification: SECRET
Precedence: IMMEDIATE
DESKBY Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time) Z	POSTBY Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.)

(Security Class.) SECRET

(Codeword)

(Restrictive Prefix)

(Caveat/ Privacy marking)

(Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE (precedence) ABU DHABI (post) Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE DUBAI, PRIORITY DOHA, BAHRAIN

IMMEDIATE MOD

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

Iraq/Iran

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

Yourtel no 322 of 7 October : Security of the Gulf

1. I wish to take the opportunity of John Moberly's visit to the UAE to convey assurances to UAE leaders of my personal concern and interest in the security of the Gulf at this difficult time.

2. In speaking to UAE leaders you and he should say that he is travelling with my personal authority and that I shall be taking a close interest in his report upon his return. The following points could be made:

a. We all have the strongest interest in not seeing the conflict spread. The Straits of Hormuz and freedom of navigation throughout the Gulf are of vital interest to us all ;

/b

b. I greatly appreciate the balanced and wise judgment of Gulf governments which has prevented them from becoming embroiled in the current conflict;

c. I share the concern of those in the Gulf who say that the West, in making contingency plans for eg shipping should as far as possible refrain from taking actions which might be thought the beginning of superpower involvement in the area ;

d. on security questions of this nature we wish to act only with the agreement of, and indeed at the invitation of, Gulf states - as the Americans have over AWACS to Saudi Arabia ;

e. we wish to keep in close touch with the Gulf states on their security needs as well as on wider questions such as energy. We hope they will not hesitate to consult us if they think we can help ;

f. the decision by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to increase their oil production has been extremely welcome to the whole West.

3. On British assurances to the UAE of a military nature (similar to what the French are reported to have offered), you should say that in the spirit of our friendship treaty, we stand ready in principle to provide such assistance if asked. You should add that while Ministers are considering what they

/might

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

might do to help in certain circumstances, we would like to send a small team, mainly from the MOD, to consult with the rulers on the UAE's likely needs, and on what the local facilities are. In this way effective contingency plans could be laid. It would of course be important to maintain the secrecy of such a visit. You should avoid being drawn at this stage on the exact form our assistance might take, though you should make it clear that it would be defensive in nature.

4. (For Bahrain and Doha)
We do not wish to generate similar requests from other Gulf states. If HM Representatives in Bahrain and Doha receive enquiries about military assistance they should simply take note, and report back, without commitment. It is unlikely that we would in practice be able to deploy certain types of assistance to more than one place at a time.

54200(22454)DD.0532198 300M 7/79 GWB LTD.GP.870

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cc/Cab office

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

10 October 1980

Iran/Iraq: Military Aid to the Gulf States

The Prime Minister met the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary in the Grand Hotel at Brighton this afternoon to consider what response should be given to the approach which we had had from the UAE seeking from us offers of support and assurances of military protection in the context of the Iran/Iraq conflict. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that in deciding what answer to give to the Gulf Rulers who had asked for help we should bear in mind that the French had already made it clear that they were ready to provide military support for the Gulf States. The UAE claimed that they would prefer to look to the United Kingdom, as old friends, for assistance. If our response was negative, our relations with them would suffer and our trade with them was likely to be damaged. If, on the other hand, France was more forthcoming, she would probably gain from our loss. Nonetheless, it would not be wise to give the UAE a blanket assurance of help, for this could lead us into an open-ended military commitment which we might regret. Rather, our response should be to tell them that we would like to consult with them, as the terms of our Treaty of Friendship with them required us to do in times of crisis and need. The purpose of these consultations would be to establish what facilities the UAE already had and what military help they required so that we could assess what we might be able to do.

The Defence Secretary said that he was very anxious to avoid an open-ended commitment which might suck in more and more British troops. The fact was that we could not provide more than a fairly limited amount of military assistance.

The Prime Minister said that they were agreed that we should respond positively to the approaches which the Gulf States had made to us. But we should not go further at this stage than the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had proposed. Lord Carrington, in consultation with Mr. Pym, should arrange for the UAE to be told that we were ready to send someone out to the Gulf to assess what help they needed so that we had a basis for contingency planning. We should offer consultations only to those States that had approached us for support, and we should seek to keep our response confidential. The

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Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should consider further the question of telling our quadripartite partners what we had decided to do.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

G. A. WHITMORE

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

KRB

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 20

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
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Sir A Acland

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS 101130Z OCT 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 847 OF 10 OCTOBER 1980
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON ABU DHABI DUBAI AND JEDDA
INFO SAVING TO BAGHDAD MOSCOW AND UKDEL NATO

DUBAI TELNO 117 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN: FRENCH VIEWS

1. PRESIDENT GISCARD IS EXPECTED TO MAKE A ONE AND A HALF HOUR TRANSIT STOP IN THE UAE ON 14 OCTOBER (NOT 12 OCTOBER AS REPORTED IN ABU DHABI TELNO 322) ON HIS WAY TO CHINA AND A SIMILAR STOP ON HIS WAY BACK ON 22 OCTOBER. FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE NOT GIVEN US MUCH NEW INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR INTENTIONS BUT THE FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTS WHAT YOU ALREADY KNOW.

2. LEVITTE, DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISER AT THE ELYSEE, TOLD THE HEAD OF CHANCERY ON 9 OCTOBER THAT GISCARD WOULD MEET SHAIKH ZAID IN ABU DHABI. ALTHOUGH THERE MIGHT BE SOME BI-LATERAL QUESTIONS INCLUDING FOLLOW-UP TO THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED DURING PRESIDENT GISCARD'S VISIT LAST MARCH, DISCUSSION WOULD PROBABLY CONCENTRATE ON IRAN/IRAQ. PRESIDENT GISCARD WAS LIKELY

ABLY CONCENTRATE ON IRAN/IRAQ. PRESIDENT GISCARD WAS LIKELY TO REASSURE THE UAE OF FRENCH SUPPORT SHOULD THE CONFLICT SPREAD. LEVITTE THOUGHT THAT THIS RISK HAD FURTHER DIMINISHED SINCE THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN MY TELNO 831 (NOT TO ALL). HOWEVER, PRESIDENT GISCARD WAS PREPARED TO AUTHORISE FRENCH MILITARY ACTION. LEVITTE DID NOT SPECIFY WHAT THIS ACTION MIGHT BE OR THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT MIGHT OCCUR, BUT HE IMPLIED IT WOULD BE AUTHORISED IF THE UAE OR FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WERE SERIOUSLY THREATENED. THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION ON THIS SCORE WAS ''NOT TO BE TAKEN LIGHTLY''. LEVITTE ADDED THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT ACT INDEPENDENTLY OF THE UNITED STATES. ANY FRENCH (AND OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN) ACTION MIGHT BE LARGELY SYMBOLIC, BUT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ACT ALONE, SINCE THIS COULD PROVIDE THE SOVIET UNION WITH A STRONGER PRETEXT FOR INTERVENTION. FINALLY LEVITTE SAID THAT THE PROVISION OF US EQUIPMENT FOR SAUDI ARABIA APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN HANDLED SKILLFULLY. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WESTERN ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE IN RESPONSE TO LOCAL REQUESTS.

3. ON CROWN PRINCE HASSAN OF JORDAN'S VISIT TO PARIS (AMMAN TELNOS 386 AND 49Ø, NOT TO ALL), LEVITTE CLAIMED TO HAVE NO DETAILS OF THE TETE-A-TETE DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT HAD BEEN THE MAIN, AND PERHAPS ONLY, SUBJECT AND THAT PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD CAUTIONED THE JORDANIANS AGAINST DIRECT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT. HE HAD NO DETAILS OF PRESIDENT GISCARD'S MEETING WITH THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER ON 8 OCTOBER.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

HIBBERT

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 1Ø/1218Z DA/GVL

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR HURD
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SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
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FM AMMAN 091132Z OCT 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 394 OF 09 OCT
INFO MODUK (D14B), BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK AND WASHINGTON.

JORDAN AND IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I CALLED ON THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES THIS MORNING, PRIMARILY TO SEEK HIS IMPRESSIONS ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO BAGHDAD WITH KING HUSSEIN AND ALSO TO OBTAIN PRECISE CONFIRMATION FROM HIM OF THE EXTENT OF JORDANIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT (I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY HIS COMMENTS ON KING HUSSEIN'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW AND POSSIBLE JORDANIAN ARMS PURCHASES FROM THE RUSSIANS).

2. ON THE MILITARY SITUATION, GENERAL SHAKER CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN VERY FAVOURABLY IMPRESSED BY THE IRAQI MILITARY EFFORT AND IN PARTICULAR BY THEIR ABILITY TO DEPLOY SUCH LARGE MILITARY FORMATIONS EFFECTIVELY AGAINST IRAN. HE THOUGHT THEIR COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES WERE WORKING SMOOTHLY AND THAT ON THE WHOLE IRAQI MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MORALE WAS HOLDING UP WELL. HE REMARKED THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD TAKEN THE KING AND HIMSELF INTO AN ALMOST WHOLLY SHI'ITE QUARTER OF BAGHDAD AND THAT EVEN THERE THEY HAD BEEN ENTHUSIASTICALLY RECEIVED. HE READILY ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAD COME AS AN UNWELCOME SURPRISE TO THE IRAQIS. THE IRAQIS WERE NOW PREPARING FOR A LONG HAUL AND WERE, FOR EXAMPLE,

IRAQIS WERE NOW PREPARING FOR A LONG HAUL AND WERE, FOR EXAMPLE, BUILDING ROADS TO PROVIDE ACCESS INTO THE IRANIAN TERRITORY WHICH THEY HAD CAPTURED. HE THOUGHT THEY COULD AFFORD TO SIT IT OUT, AND REGARDED THEIR CONTROL OF OIL PIPELINES AS THE KEY TO BRINGING ABOUT THE EVENTUAL DOWNFALL OF THE KHOMEINI REGIME. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, PLACE MUCH FAITH IN THE EFFORTS OF IRANIAN EXILES TO SET UP A RIVAL REGIME AND READILY AGREED WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT THEY COULD SCARCELY HOPE FOR SUCCESS IF THEY WERE SEEN TO BE DEPENDING ON A VICTORIOUS IRAQ.

3. GENERAL SHAKER WAS EMPHATIC THAT THE IRAQIS HAD NOT REQUESTED ANY FORM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE, EITHER MEN ORMATERIAL, BEFORE, DURING OR SINCE KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD. I ASKED HIM WHETHER THE JORDANIANS HAD BEGUN ANY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ AND HE EMPHATICALLY DENIED THIS. HE EQUALLY DISMISSED ISRAELI AND OTHER REPORTS OF JORDANIAN UNITS EITHER BEING ON THEIR WAY OR BEING STOOD READY FOR DESPATCH TO IRAQ AS COMPLETELY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. THE IRAQIS DID NOT NEED SUCH HELP, AND HAD PLENTIFUL RESERVES OF BOTH MEN AND MATERIAL. NOR DID HE FORESEE THAT THEY WOULD NEED JORDANIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE EVEN IF THE WAR WERE TO BE PROLONGED FOR SOME MONTHS.

4. AS FAR AS OTHER FORMS OF HELP WERE CONCERNED, IT WAS NO SECRET THAT IRAQI CIVIL AIRCRAFT AND A FEW MILITARY TRANSPORTS HAD MADE USE OF JORDANIAN AIRFIELDS (GENERAL SHAKER HOWEVER SPECIFICALLY DENIED THAT ANY IRAQI FIGHTER AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN DEPLOYED TO JORDANIAN AIRFIELDS). SUCH ASSISTANCE WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE OTHER HELP JORDAN WAS EXTENDING TO IRAQ, FOR EXAMPLE THROUGH INCREASED USE OF THE PORT OF AQABA FOR IRAQI CARGOES. BUT THE JORDANIANS HAD NOT GONE BEYOND THIS AND, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD OFFERED THE IRAQIS FULL USE OF THE KING HUSSEIN MEDICAL CENTRE FOR THE TREATMENT OF CASUALTIES, NONE HAD SO FAR BEEN SENT.

5. I ASKED THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF SYRIA TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT. HE REFERRED TO THE IRAQI BELIEF THAT THE SYRIANS WERE SUPPLYING BOTH MEN AND MATERIAL TO IRAN: HE SAID THAT JORDAN HAD NO INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE FOR THIS, BUT THAT HE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE JORDANIANS WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED OVER THE SUBVERSIVE THREAT TO JORDAN FROM SYRIA, WHICH HE THOUGHT HAD INCREASED AS A RESULT OF JORDANIAN/SYRIAN DIFFERENCES WITH REGARD TO THE WAR, AND WOULD REMAIN VERY WATCHFUL.

6. MY DEFENCE ATTACHE SAW GENERAL SHAKER EARLIER IN THE MORNING AND IS REPORTING IN GREATER DETAIL HIS MILITARY IMPRESSIONS ON THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT.

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Read in full

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FM FCO 090947Z OCT 80
TO PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 246 OF 9 OCTOBER
INFO ROUTINE DOHA DUBAI KUWAIT BAGHDAD BAHRAIN ABU DHABI MUSCAT JEDDA ALGIERS DAMASCUS CAIRO STOCKHOLM WASHINGTON PARIS BONN OTTAWA CANBERRA WELLINGTON NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD MOSCOW BRUSSELS DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG THE HAGUE COPENHAGEN ROME ANKARA UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 384: (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ.

1. OUR POSTURE ON THIS DISPUTE DIFFERS SOMEWHAT FROM THAT OF THE AMERICANS. FOR EXAMPLE IN OUR APPRECIATION OF THE NEED TO INTERVENE, AND OUR ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTSM I TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE THINKING BEHIND OUR COMPARITIVE INACTIVITY IN MY BBC 4 INTERVIEW OF 2 OCTOBER.

2. THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS MAY BE OF USE IN CONTACTS WITH THE KING. I AM REPEATING THEM TO A WIDE SELECTION OF POSTS FOR BACKGROUND.

(A) OUR UNIQUE VULNERABILITY TO IRAQI HOSTILITY (BECAUSE OF OUR HISTORICAL ROLE THROUGH THE MANDATE, OUR PAST POSITION IN THE GULF AND SUSPECTED SYMPATHY WITH U.S POLICY ON PALESTINE) INHIBITS US FROM PRESSING TOO SOON OR TOO MUCH IN ISOLATION OUR FUNDAMENTAL DISTASTE FOR THIS IRAQI ADVENTURE WHICH, THROUGH CYNICAL REPUDIATION OF AN INTERNATIONALLY BINDING LEGAL AGREEMENT ONLY 5 YEARS OLD, FOLLOWED BY THE OPPORTUNISTIC INVASION OF A NEIGHBOUR, HAS ERODED RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED SYSTEM FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. WE LACK THE POLITICAL STRENGTH, AND COMMERCIAL COMPETITIVENESS, TO RISK BEING ACCUSED BY THE ARABS AS A WHOLE OF WORKING AGAINST THIS NEW 'ARAB' CAUSE THAT THEY SEEM TEMPTED, OR COMPELLED, TO ESPOUSE - IN PUBLIC AT ANY RATE.

(B) WE HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE ACCEPTABLITY OF A FORWARD POLICY IN THE GULF (FCO TELNO 1598 TO WASHINGTON (NOT TO ALL)). WE BELIEVE IF THERE IS TO DEVELOP A SITUATION IN WHICH THE WEST, ESPECIALLY THE U.S., CAN PLAY A STRONG MILITARY PART IN THE AREA, WHICH WE AGREE IS DESIRABLE, IT MUST BE CULTIVATED OVER TIME AND PROBABLY CAN ONLY BE BROUGHT TO FRUITION IN THE WAKE OF REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE. TO FORCE IT ON TO UNWILLING GOVERNMENTS RISKS UNDERMINING THEM.

(C) WE DO NOT IN ANY CASE BELIEVE THAT THE TIME IS OPPORTUNE FOR ANY SIGNIFICANT INITIATIVE, WHETHER BY OURSELVES OR OTHERS, TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT. THERE ARE VIRTUES IN PATIENCE (BBC INTERVIEW OF 2 OCTOBER).

3. IT FOLLOWS THAT, FOR THE TIME BEING, WE HAVE TO CONFINE OUR POLICY TO THE FOLLOWING:

(A) WORKING AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF THE CONFLICT (SEE THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESULOLUTION, THE DECLARATION OF THE NINE, AND APPROPRIATE REPPESENTATIONS IN THE GULF: MY TELNO 203 TO ABU DHABI). YOU MAY CERTAINLY THEREFORE POINT OUT TO THE KING THE DANGERS OF THE PRESENT WAR AND OF THE INVOLVEMENT IN IT OF OTHERS.

(B) ENCOURAGING ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION BY THOSE IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE THE PARTIES (EG THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OR OTHER THIRD WORLD ELEMENTS, SUCH AS THE N.A.M, BUT SEE FCO TELNO 659 TO DELHI), EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN EARLY PROGRESS.

(C) WAITING FOR THE PARTIES TO REALISE THAT NO SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE IF EACH MAINTIANS ITS PRESENT ATTITUDE. SUCH REALISATION COULD COME AS A RESULT OF A CHANGE OF REGIME IN EITHER COUNTRY, OR LOSS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT (MORE LIKELY IN THE CASE OF IRAQ , AS AND WHEN THE ARABS BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH THIS ADVENTURE: WE MUST STAND READY TO ENCOURAGE, BUT NOT TO ANTICIPATE, SUCH DISILLUSIONMENT).

(D) REFRAINING FROM ANY SPECIFICALLY BRITISH INITIATIVES WHICH COULD SERVE TO STIR THINGS UP AND DAMAGE OUR OWN INTERESTS, WHILE WORKING FOR A COLLECTIVE WESTERN OR EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE CRISES. E.G. THROUGH THE IEA ON OIL, THROUGH THE EC POLITICAL COOPERATION MACHINERY ON STATEMENTS OF POLICY (THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS AREMET ON 7/8 OCTOBER)

(E) WORKING WITH OUR ALLIES AND THE MINIMUM OF PUBLICITY ON CONTINGENCY PLANS, E.G. JOINT NAVAL MEASURES TO ENSURE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION: POSSIBLE INGREDIENTS OF AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT: POSSIBLE COLLECTIVE PRESSURE TO BE BROUGHT ON THE BELLIGERENTS THROUGH DENIAL OF ARMS, ECONOMIC PRESSURE, ETC.

4. SO FAR EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE CONFLICT SPREADING HAVE PROVED SUCCESSFUL. WE MAY HAVE TO GO FURTHER IF IT SHOWS SIGNS OF SPREADING. EVEN IF IT DOES NOT, A PERIOD OF STALEMENT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN MAY FOLLOW. MEANWHILE, WE NEED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE REGION. IN PARTICULAR:

(A) WE CAN EXCHANGE INFORMATION ABOUT THE CONFLICT AND ANALYSES RELATED TO IT, E.G. ON SOVIET ATTITUDES.

(B) WE CAN REASSURE OUR FRIENDS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO FEEL THREATENED BY THE CONFLICT, THAT WE SHARE THEIR CONCERN AND DO NOT INTEND TO CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR THEM, E.G BY PREMATURE INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL FORCES (FCO TELNO 1599 TO WASHINGTON)

/(C) WE CAN

(C) WE CAN CONFIDE IN THEM OUR VIEWS ON CERTAIN IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISES (E.G ON OIL SUPPLY, SHIPPING INSURANCE) AND THANK THEM WHERE APPROPRIATE, FOR THEIR DECISIONS TO INCREASE OIL PRODUCTION.

5. TO FURTHER THESE EXCHANGES, RECIPIENTS HAVE BEEN SENT BY BAG COPIES OF BRIEFING MATERIAL PREPARED IN THE DEPT DURING THE WEEK.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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SECRET

Secretary of State

Sir J Graham

Private Secretary

IRAN/IRAQ: MILITARY AID TO GULF STATES

Problem

1. Certain Gulf rulers have approached us looking for offers of support and assurances of military protection. There are indications that the French have made similar offers to the Rulers. What action should we take?

Recommendation

2. I understand that the Secretary of State wishes to discuss this tomorrow with the Prime Minister. I recommend that he should do so, having first spoken to Mr Pym, and that he should seek agreement that we should offer a general assurance to Gulf States. I submit a draft telegram of instructions. I further recommend that the MOD be asked to give further consideraton to the options that might need to be examined. MED concur.

Background

3. The UK has Treaties of Friendship (which expire in 1981) with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. These require us to consult in times of crisis and need. We also have a Treaty of Friendship with Oman. British Loan Personnel are currently serving in all these countries and in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia with which we have no such Treaty.

4. The Gulf Rulers are already aware of the implications for them of the present conflict. It is likely that if the war continues they will look to the West for some form of reassurance and/or assistance in maintaining the integrity of their States. Both because of their historical ties with us and because they fear the involvement of both superpowers if they were to turn to the Americans, the Gulf Rulers are likely to look first to the UK for help. The Ruler of Ras al Khaimah has already indicated that he would prefer our help
A to that of anyone else (Dubai telno 38 to Abu Dhabi). The UAE Minister
B of Petroleum has made similar points (Abu Dhabi telno 322). In his

/telegram

C telegram no 117 from Dubai, HM Ambassador has suggested that the UAE is already looking to us for reassurance. It is likely that Bahrain and Qatar would also look in our direction.

5. The French appear to have offered some form of unspecified assistance to the UAE. Their performance in Zaire and their covert help to Saudi Arabia during the Mecca incident indicates that they will be ready to deliver. We need to show a willingness to give similar assurances.

Argument

6. There a number of possible scenarios in which the Gulf States may seek outside aid. These range from threats to internal security caused by internally or externally inspired subversion to full-scale war against them. If either Iran or Iraq were to launch an all-out attack by land or sea on the Gulf States, UK resources would not be sufficient by themselves to repel such an attack. Moreover it would be impossible for the UK alone to put troops on the ground in sufficien numbers in a short time-scale. But there are a number of lesser scenarios where the UK could render aid, eg:

(a) internal security problems overstretching local resources;
(b) rescue of a Ruler beleaguered in his Residence as a result of internal disorder;
(c) air attacks on Gulf States.

(a) could probably be dealt with by using up to a battalion of infantry or an RN Royal Marine Commando. A force of this size (Spearhead battalion) is always on standby in the UK for duty abroad. It and its air transport are at 72 hours' notice to move, with the leading company at 24 hours' notice. The Overseas Anti-Terrorist Team (Pulpitt) drawn from No 22 SAS is always on 24 hours' standby, and is trained and equipped in such a way that alone or supported by infantry up to battalion strength could undertake a rescue mission as in (b) above.

7. The greatest immediate threat to the area is, however, probably from air attack. The Gulf States and their oil instalations, ports and airfields are particulalry vulnerable. An Iranian attack in retaliation for alleged support for Iraq cannot be ruled out. The RAF could provide, at about 72 hours' notice, a range of possible elements of assistance. A Rapier detachment could be made available from the unit now deployed at RAF Lossiemouth. AEW aircraft and

mobile radar could also be deployed. At the other extreme a squadron of RAF air defence aircraft might be made available by removing them from the UK Air Defence Region. All of these steps would involve NATO-committed forces / In all of these cases, of course, it would be necessary to inform SACEUR,. Moreover, if steps of this kind had to be taken in parallel with the despatch of the Spearhead battalion, we would face severe problems of airlift.

8. As far as the Navy is concerned, HMS Coventry is, of course, already in the area and the RFA Olwyn will join her in the Gulf of Oman tomorrow. The remainder of Task Force 318.0 is still in the Far East within ten days' steaming time of the Gulf, where, on the basis of plans made before the present Iraq/Iran crisis, they are due to make port visits.

9. An alternative which would perhaps provide as large a measure of assistance, but one that is less visible, would be the despatch of a Rapier detachment in the guise of either a Defence Sales Team, or a specialised training detachment.

10. We have been in touch with MOD officials to alert them to the possible need to look urgently at contingency planning to deal with the sort of scenarios outlined above. The MOD are deeply concerned at the risk of giving an open-ended commitment which would add to the already marked overstretch of our defence resources. They are also worried about the precedent that the giving of such a commitment could have elsewhere in the world. They have been told, however, that the political requirement to be in a position to give some reassurance and perhaps active assistance to the Gulf Rulers is a very strong one. But they point out that the problems of supporting and resupplying UK forces on the ground after the initial deployment would be considerable. There would also be a need for adequate communications back up. And the cost in terms of fuel resources alone would, in present economic circumstances, have important repercussions elsewhere.(eg in NATO).

D H Gillmore
Defence Department

9 October 1980

/cc to

S3842 (21688) DD.0532043 100M 9/78 GWB LTD. GP.870

XY 42

File No.

Department MED

Drafted by (Block Capitals) K J PASSMORE

Tel. Extn. 4774

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Security Classification: SECRET

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

DESKBY Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched (Date) (Time) Z

POSTBY Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.)

(Security Class.) SECRET

(Codeword)

(Restrictive Prefix)

(Caveat/ Privacy marking)

(Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE (precedence) ABU DHABI (post) Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) JEDDA, KUWAIT

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

Iraq/Iran

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[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO.322 OF 7 OCTOBER: SECURITY OF THE GULF

1. I wish to use the opportunity of John Moberly's visit to the UAE to convey assurances to UAE leaders of my personal concern and interest in the security of the Gulf at this difficult time.

2. In speaking to UAE leaders you and he should say that he is travelling with my personal authority and that I shall be taking a close interest in his report upon his return. The following points could be made:-

a. We all have the strongest interest in not seeing the conflict spread. The Straits of Hormuz are of vital interest to us all;

and freedom of navigation throughout the Gulf

b. I greatly appreciate the balanced and wise judgment of Gulf governments which has prevented them from becoming embroiled in the current conflict;

c. I share the concern of those in the Gulf who say that the West, in making contingency plans for eg. shipping should as far as possible refrain from taking actions which might be thought the beginning of superpower involvement in the area;

d. on security questions of this nature we wish to act only with the agreement of, and indeed at the invitation of, Gulf states - as the Americans have over AWACS to Saudi Arabia;

e. we wish to keep in close touch with the Gulf on their security needs as well as on wider questions such as energy. We hope they will not hesitate to consult us if they think we can help; ~~on any way.~~

f. the decision by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to increase their oil production has been extremely welcome to the whole West.

3. ~~If you are asked about~~ On British assurances to the Gulf states of a military nature, or for any commitment similar to what the French are reported to have offered Abu Dhabi, you should say that in the light of our Treaty of Friendship we have been considering what assistance we might make available if Gulf rulers asked for it. In principle, as conditions prevailing at the time of a request from Gulf rulers might dictate,

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Lord Carrington thinks this is too explicit.

WE WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE CERTAIN AIR DEFENCE ELEMENTS, A BATALLION SIZED UNIT OF GROUND FORCE TROOPS, OR MORE LIMITED NUMBERS OF SPECIALISED FORCES. IF WE WISHED TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE, HOWEVER, WE WOULD NEED TO SET IN HAND MORE DETAILED ASSESSMENTS. DO RULERS THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO DO SO? IN ANY CASE WE SHOULD GIVE THESE CONTACTS AND CONSULTATIONS NO PUBLICITY.

4. ON PARA 3 ABOVE BAHRAIN AND DOHA HAVE DISCRETION TO SPEAK TO APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF QATARI AND BAHRAINI GOVERNMENTS IF THEY DEEM IT OPPORTUNE.

WE WOULD BE READY TO LOOK URGENTLY AT THE POSSIBLITY OF PROVIDING PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE. WE SHOULD FIRST WISH TO MAKE A MORE DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITION ON THE GROUND. THIS WOULD NATURALLY INVOLVE CONTACTS AND CONSULTATIONS, WHICH WE HOPE COULD BE GIVEN NO PUBLICITY.

SECRET

S4200(22454)DD.0532198 300M 7/79 GWB LTD.GP.870

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 October 1980

Message from President Carter

I enclose the text of a message to the Prime Minister from President Carter about the situation in the Middle East. This will clearly require a relatively early response. We should perhaps aim to reply by the middle of next week.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

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FM PRESIDENT CARTER
TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
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S E C R E T VIA CABINET OF ICE CHANNELS WH07472

SUBJECT

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T200/80

cc Master Ops

OCTOBER 9, 1980

DEAR MARGARET:

IN ADDITION TO THE EVOLUTION OF EVENTS IN POLAND, ABOUT WHICH I COMMUNICATED TO YOU OCTOBER 7, DURING THESE DAYS WE SHARE A COMMON CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA, AND I WISH TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH AND TO BE SURE THAT YOU ARE ADVISED OF OUR VIEWS AND ACTIONS.

IN MY VIEW THERE ARE FOUR OBJECTIVES WHICH WE SHOULD BE PURSUING. FIRST, WE SHOULD BE DOING WHAT WE CAN TO BRING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION AND TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A FAIR AND LASTING SOLUTION. ITS CONTINUATION SERVES NO ONE'S INTEREST.

SECOND, WE SHOULD BE WORKING TO DISCOURAGE ANY EXPANSION OR ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT, APPROACHING THIS FROM OUR OWN POSITION OF STRICT IMPARTIALITY TOWARDS THE COMBATANTS.

THIRD, WE SHOULD BE MAKING THE NECESSARY CONTINGENCY PREPARATIONS TO ENABLE US TO ENSURE UNIMPEDED MOVEMENT OF SHIPPING IN THE GULF AND THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

FOURTH, WE SHOULD BE WILLING, IN APPROPRIATE CASES, TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THOSE NON-BELLIGERENT FRIENDS IN THE AREA WHO MAY FEEL THREATENED BY THE CURRENT SITUATION.

I REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE WAR IS CONTINUING. IN MY CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT ZIA OF PAKISTAN ON FRIDAY, I ENCOURAGED HIM TO CONTINUE THE TASK WITH WHICH HE HAS BEEN CHARGED BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. WE SHOULD KEEP THE MATTER BEFORE THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. AS WE FACE THE PROSPECT OF A PROTRACTED CONFLICT OF ATTRITION WITH AN OCCASIONAL FLARE-UP, WE SHOULD NOT RELAX OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO FIND A FORMULA WHICH WILL END THE CONFLICT. IF THE SITUATION SETTLES INTO AN UNRESOLVED STALEMATE OR RESULTS IN A MAJOR IMBALANCE, THE THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND TO OUR VITAL INTERESTS WILL PERSIST.

OUR VARIOUS EFFORTS HAVE, WE BELIEVE, REDUCED THE IMMEDIATE DANGER OF EXPANSION AND ESCALATION. NEVERTHELESS

END OF PAGE 01

THE TEMPTATION EXISTS ON THE PART OF JORDAN AND THE GULF STATES TO SHOW THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH IRAQ. WE BELIEVE THAT CONSPICUOUS ACTS OF SUPPORT FOR IRAQ COULD INCREASE THE RISK PARTICULARLY TO THE GULF STATES AND INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER INTERRUPTION OF VITAL OIL SUPPLIES. YOUR OWN RECENT EFFORTS WITH THE OMANIS WERE MOST IMPORTANT. I HOPE THAT YOU AGREE WITH ME THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO DISCOURAGE ESCALATION.

ON THE QUESTION OF THE UNIMPEDED MOVEMENT OF SHIPPING, LET ME THANK YOU FOR YOUR RAPID RESPONSE TO MY MESSAGE OF LAST WEEK. NOW THAT CONTACTS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED AND OUR THOUGHTS ON THE BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR A NAVAL COORDINATION EFFORT HAVE BEEN CONVEYED TO YOUR GOVERNMENT AND OTHER ALLIES, WE ARE INTRODUCING FOR CONSIDERATION A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS BY OUR NAVIES SHOULD THE SITUATION REQUIRE IT.

WITH SOME 15 MILLION BARRELS OF OIL PER DAY PASSING THROUGH THOSE WATERS, WE MUST PRESS AHEAD WITH THIS PLANNING. AND ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE OF WAR INSURANCE HAS BECOME LESS ACUTE, WE WOULD ALSO WELCOME AN EXCHANGE WITH YOU ON THIS MATTER.

WITH RESPECT TO THE SECURITY OF NON-BELLIGERENTS, THE SAUDIS HAVE COME TO US WITH THEIR CONCERNS THAT EXPANSION OF THE WAR COULD LEAD TO AIR ATTACKS ON OIL FACILITIES IN THE KINGDOM. WE ARE, ACCORDINGLY, TAKING STEPS TO BOLSTER SAUDI AIR DEFENSE.

WE ARE SENDING TO SAUDI ARABIA U.S. AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL AIRCRAFT, AND COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AS WELL AS GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE RADAR. THESE AIRCRAFT AND RADAR WILL SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE SAUDI SELF DEFENSE CAPABILITY BY PROVIDING EARLY WARNING. WE ARE CONSULTING FURTHER WITH SAUDI ARABIA ON WHAT ELSE THEY MIGHT NEED TO PROTECT SAUDI OIL FACILITIES FROM AIR ATTACK.

I HAVE TAKEN THESE STEPS IN RECOGNITION OF THE GREAT STAKE THE WEST HAS IN THE CONTINUED NORMAL FLOW OF SAUDI OIL= TO GIVE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE TO THE SAUDI MONARCHY THAT ITS FRIENDS WILL STAND BY IT IN ITS HOUR OF STRONGLY FELT NATIONAL NEED= AND TO AVOID FURTHER INSTABILITY IN THE REGION WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD EXPLOIT.

DEFENSIVE HELP OF THIS KIND TO OUR NON-BELLIGERENT FRIENDS DOES NOT REPRESENT A DEPARTURE FROM THE BASIC POSTURE OF NEUTRALITY AND NON-INVOLVEMENT IN THIS CONFLICT WHICH IT SEEMS IN OUR INTEREST TO PURSUE. GIVEN THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS WE ALL HAVE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE GULF, IT SEEMS TO ME THIS IS CLEARLY OUR WISEST POLICY.

END OF PAGE Ø2

I AM GIVING THIS ASSESSMENT TO YOU BECAUSE OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER ALLIES MUST COMMUNICATE CLOSELY AS THIS CRISIS EVOLVES.

SINCERELY,
JIMMY CARTER

THE RIGHT HONORABLE
MARGARET THATCHER, M.P.,
PRIME MINISTER,
LONDON

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£7472

NNNN

HOW IS THAT??

RECEIVED FINE TKU AT 1612/09 RK

FCS/80/150

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY

1. I was sorry that you were not after all able to visit Iraq during your recent visit to the Middle East.

2. Our Ambassador in Baghdad has telegraphed to say that the Iraqis now plan to mount the Trade Fair from 15 November, and that he would greatly value your presence there on the British Day which he hopes to have on 16 November. I understand that you would be willing to attend, but that you would like to be reassured that a visit by yourself to the Baghdad Trade Fair would be worthwhile and that it is a realistic proposition in the circumstances.

3. I am sure that your presence at the Fair would be valuable. The Iraqis regard the event as important, and attendance by VIPs from overseas as the touchstone of individual countries' views of the Iraqi market. Although one cannot say that the presence of a Cabinet Minister will produce dividends in the form of contracts, it is clear that countries which do not send such high level representatives will be handicapped in their pursuit of government business, which is what counts in Iraq. And we are, for other reasons, already at a disadvantage in that market vis-a-vis our European competitors. Although our exports at £250 million show a healthy increase, we have yet to secure a really big contract, for which some political gesture beforehand is probably necessary.

4. Whether the Iraqis are being realistic in aiming to mount the Fair as soon as mid-November, I cannot say: certainly their plan for a quick strike against Iran has misfired and the two countries may be in for a longish conflict. But I would hope that the international community would have found some way of arranging a durable ceasefire in less than six weeks from now. It is unlikely that the air raid damage to Baghdad will be so severe as to rule out a Trade Fair in the immediate aftermath of

/a

a ceasefire, though I suspect that life in the city will be uncomfortable for some time to come. I would expect the Iraqis to make every effort to mount the Fair on schedule, provided that they judge it safe to do so.

5. Our Ambassador has pointed out that despite the obvious uncertainties we need to respond to the Iraqi announcement fairly soon. It would be most helpful therefore if you could let me know before too long whether or not you would, in principle, be prepared to attend the British Day at the Fair. The decision on whether or not it will be feasible for you to do so will need to be taken later in the light of developments.

6. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, to John Nott and to Robert Armstrong.

C

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

8 October 1980

-8 OCT 1980



IRAN/IRAQ

IMMEDIATE

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
~~SIR E TOUDE~~
SIR J GRAHAM
~~MR J C MOBERLY~~ Sir A Acland
MR BRAITHWAITE
HD/MED
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 728 OF 8TH OCTOBER 1980
REPEATED PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, AMMAN, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, DOHA, MUSCAT, TRIPOLI.

YR TELNO 535: IRAQ/IRAN

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY CALLED ON THE DIRECTOR OF ARAB AFFAIRS IN THE MFA THIS MORNING TO HAND OVER A DOCTORED VERSION OF TUR. SHURA WAS AS GRATEFUL AS EVER FOR THIS INFORMATION.

2. SHURA WAS CLEARLY WORRIED THAT THE WAR MIGHT SPILL OVER INTO THE ARAB GULF STATES. HE THOUGHT THAT IF IRAN BEGAN TO LOSE HEAVILY, OR IF IT INTERPRETED ANY JORDANIAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR AS THE BEGINNING OF A GENERAL ARAB LINE-UP AGAINST IRAN, THEN IT MIGHT SEEK TO CLOSE THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND ATTACK KUWAIT, WHOSE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ WAS PUBLICLY KNOWN. GRAY ASKED WHETHER IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY SAUDI ARABIA WOULD, AS INDICATED BY PRINCE SAUD, INTERVENE TO SUPPORT KUWAIT SEMI COLON SHURA THOUGHT SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD STOP SHORT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION.

INTERVENE TO SUPPORT KUWAIT SEMI COLON SHURA THOUGHT SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD STOP SHORT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION. GRAY SUGGESTED THAT CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS MIGHT ALSO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE US ADMINISTRATION TO INTERVENE WITH NAVAL FORCES TO ENSURE FREE NAVIGATION SEMI COLON SHURA DID NOT COMMENT, EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THAT WOULD BRING IN THE USSR TOO.

3. GRAY REFERRED TO SHURA'S STATEMENT WHEN LAST THEY MET THAT IRAQ HAD PLANNED A LONG WAR SEMI COLON ON WHAT WAS THIS BASED? SHURA SAID IT WAS HIS OWN INTERPRETATION OF IRAQI ACTIONS IN DISPERSING THEIR AIRCRAFT AROUND THE PENINSULA AND DIVERTING THEIR SHIPS TO AQABA. HE SEEMED SURPRISED THAT IRAQI TROOPS WERE STILL ADVANCING.

4. ON SYRIAN ATTITUDES, SHURA SAID HE EXPECTED ASSAD TO SIGN A FRIENDSHIP TREATY IN MOSCOW: THE REASON WAS THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES. HE THOUGHT THE TREATY WOULD BE ON PDRY RATHER THAN IRAQI LINES. BUT HE DID NOT EXPECT SYRIA (AND EVEN LESS LIBYA) TO BE DRAWN MILITARILY INTO THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR, THOUGH THEY WOULD PROBABLY PROVIDE HELP WITH WAR MATERIEL.

5. SHURA ASKED WHAT CHANCES THERE WERE OF A CHANGE OF REGIME IN TEHRAN. GRAY REFERRED TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF TUR: (WE HAD DELETED LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 8) SHURA SEEMED DISAPPOINTED.

6. SHURA CAME FROM AND WAS RETURNING TO A MEETING WITH HIS DEPUTY MINISTER ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION DURING THE HAJJ. HE TOLD GRAY THAT THE SAUDIS EXPECTED TROUBLE BETWEEN THE IRAQIS AND IRANIANS EVEN WITH THE REDUCED NUMBERS NOW ARRIVING SEMI COLON AND ALSO A MARCH BY THE LIBYANS ON THEIR EMBASSY TO DEMAND ITS CONVERSION TO A PEOPLE'S BUREAU.

CRAIG

NNNN

IRAN/IRAQ

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PS
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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
~~SIR E YOUDE~~
SIR J GRAHAM
~~MR J O MOBERLY~~
MR BRAITHWAITE
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Sir I Gilmour

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TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 38 OF 8 OCTOBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO
INFO PRIORITY MODU BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA HKUWAIT MUSCAT PARIS
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 322 TO FCO: IRAN/ IRAQ

1. I RECEIVED A MESSAGE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THAT THE RULER OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH WISHED TO SEE ME ON AN URGENT AND CONFIDENTIAL MATTER. I CALLED ON HIM THIS MORNING. THE CROWN PRINCE, SHAIKH KHALID, WAS ALSO PRESENT.

2. SHAIKH SAQR SAID THAT A FEW DAYS AGO HE HAD VISITED SHAIKH ZAID IN ABU DHABI. THEY HAD DISCUSSED THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTINUING IRAQ/ IRAN WAR, AND HAD AGREED THAT IRAN WAS UNLIKELY TO BE AMENABLE TO MEDIATION BY ANY CONCEIVABLE COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES. IRAN HAD ALREADY THREATENED THE U A E AND OTHER STATES WITH RETALIATION FOR THEIR ALLEGED SUPPORT FOR IRAQ.

3. SHAIKH ZAID HAD REVEALED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED UNSPECIFIED OFFERS OF SUPPORT FROM FRANCE, WHICH HE WAS DISPOSED TO ACCEPT. SAQR HAD ARGUED VERY STRONGLY THAT BRITAIN HAD FAR GREATER HISTORICAL LINKS WITH AND EXPERIENCE OF THE AREA, AND IT WOULD THEREFORE BE GREATLY PREFERABLE TO RELY ON US. HE THOUGHT THAT ZAID HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THESE ARGUMENTS, BUT SOME SORT OF RESPONSE FROM

OF COUNTRIES. IRAN HAD ALREADY THREATENED THE U A E AND OTHER STATES WITH RETALIATION FOR THEIR ALLEGED SUPPORT FOR IRAQ.

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RM THIS APPROACH SEEMS TO FIT WITH THAT BY MANA AL-OTEIBA REPORTED IN YOUR TUR. WHATEVER THE NATURE OF THE FRENCH CONTACTS WITH ZAID, THEY HAVE CLEARLY DISMAYED SOME OF HIS ADVISERS AND OTHER SHAIKHS. SOME POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM US WOULD THEREFORE BE VERY TIMELY.

5. I TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY OF ASKING SHAIKH SAQR WHETHER HE HAD RECEIVED ANY IRAQI REQUEST FOR USE OF FACILITIES IN RAS AL-KHAIMAH FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAN. HE SAID CATEGORICALLY THAT HE HAD NOT: ANY SUCH SUGGESTION WAS MERELY A MALICIOUS RUMOUR ORIGINATING IN ABU DHABI. HE KNEW OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT TO OMAN, BUT SAID THAT THE TARGET, IF AN OPERATION HAD BEEN MOUNTED, WOULD HAVE BEEN BANDAR ABBAS AND NOT REPEAT NOT THE ISLANDS. THE IRAQIS HAD GIVEN HIM AN ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE THAT NO ATTACK WOULD BE MADE ON THESE WITHOUT U A E KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEE.

HASKELL

BT

[Issued Saving, as requested.]

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FM FCO 081454Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 245 OF 8 OCTOBER 1980
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD WASHINGTON
PRIORITY JEDDA KUWAIT DAMASCUS DOHA ABUD DHABI MUSCAT UKMIS NEW YORK
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 382 (NOT TO ALL) : IRAQ/IRAN

1. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR CALLED ON GRAHAM THIS MORNING AT HIS REQUEST. HE SAID THAT, AS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD KNOW, JORDAN HAD TAKEN A POSITION IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ. THIS WAS IN CONFORMITY WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ARAB LEAGUE CHARTER AND MARCHED WITH THEIR OWN FEELINGS. NEVERTHELESS, THEIR SUPPORT DID NOT INVOLVE THE DESPATCH OF ANY MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR PERSONNEL AND WAS CONFINED TO DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND THE FACILITATION OF TRANSIT THROUGH JORDAN FROM AQABA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR AGREEMENT WITH IRAQ. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN PRESSING THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, OVER THIS SUPPORT, AND HE WISHED TO ENQUIRE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEW.

2. GRAHAM SAID THAT WE HAD NOTED THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION. WE DEPLORED THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN: NOT ONLY DID IT INVOLVE THE TEARING UP OF A SOLEMN TREATY BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS REGULATING THEIR BORDER, BUT THE FIGHTING WAS IN AN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AREA AND, ESPECIALLY IF IT SPREAD,WOULD PUT AT RISK THE INTERESTS OF MANY OF US, BOTH WITHIN THE REGION AND OUTSIDE. WE DID NOT YET SEE HOW THE CONFLICT COULD BE BROUGHT TO AN EARLY END, BUT WE THOUGHT IT EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE AREA OF COLICT SHOULD NOT BE WIDENED AND THAT OTHER STATES SHOULD NOT BE DRAWN IN. WE HOPED, THEREFORE, THAT IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT, THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD COUNSEL CAUTION AND THE NEED TO SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

3. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THAT KING HUSSEIN, WITH HIS WIDE EXPERIENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL FIELD, WOULD USE HIS POSITION PRECISELY TO THESE ENDS.

4. THERE WAS THEN SOME GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE STATE OF THE

FIGHTING, THE POSITION OF VARIOUS ARAB STATES, AND THE RISK THAT IRAN MIGHT, EITHER IN RETALIATION FOR ALLEGED SUPPORT OF IRAQ OR AS AN ACT OF DESPERATION, ATTACK TARGETS IN THE LITTORAL STATES OF THE PERSIAN GULF. THE AMBASSADOR ACCEPTED THAT SUCH ACTION COULD WELL LEAD TO WESTERN INTERVENTION, AND VOLUNTEERED THAT THAT WAS TO BE AVOIDED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. IN CONCLUSION, THE AMBASSADOR REPEATED THE ASSURANCE THAT, SO FAR AS HE KNEW, THERE WAS NO PLAN IN THE AIR TO SEND MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ: THERE WAS NO NEED SINCE THE IRAQIS HAD ONLY COMMITTED SO FAR THREE DIVISIONS.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTN.
IRAQ/IRAN

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FM WASHINGTON 082355Z OCT 80
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4236 OF 8 OCTOBER
INFO MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, JEDDA, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING PARIS, BONN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN.

IRAN/IRAQ: US/SOVIET CONTACTS.

1. IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN WISCONSIN ON 6 OCTOBER (WHICH HAS RECEIVED SCANT NOTICE IN THE NATIONAL MEDIA), PRESIDENT CARTER REVEALED THAT HE HAD EXCHANGED LETTERS WITH BREZHNEV ABOUT THE WAR. BREZHNEV'S LETTER HAD BEEN HANDED OVER DURING THE GROMYKO/MUSKIE CONTACTS IN NEW YORK.

2. ASKED IF THE RUSSIANS WERE AS ANXIOUS AS THE US TO KEEP THE CONFLICT CONFINED TO THE PRESENT PARTICIPANTS, CARTER SAID: QUOTE I HOPE SO. MY BELIEF IS THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT WANT WAR TO BREAK OUT IN A GENERAL WAY THROUGHOUT THE PERSIAN GULF. THE BIGGEST THREAT TO OUR SECURITY WOULD BE IF THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE TEMPTED TO MOVE INTO IRAN OR INTO AN AREA WHERE THEY CAN CONTROL THE PERSIAN GULF OR ACCESS TO IT. THIS WOULD BE A DIRECT THREAT NOT ONLY TO OUR OWN SECURITY BUT THE SECURITY OF OTHER WESTERN NATIONS WHO DEPEND ON OIL SUPPLIES FROM THAT REGION FOR THEIR ECONOMIC WELL-BEING UNQUOTE.

F C O PASS SAVING PARIS, BONN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS AND AMMAN.

HENDERSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 4234 OF 8 OCTOBER
INFO MODUK, BAGHDAD AND JEDDA
INFO SAVING PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, TEL AVIV, CAIRO,
UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN
AND DOHA

M I F T: IRAN/IRAQ: US POSITION

1. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS OF WARREN CHRISTOPHER'S SPEECH YESTERDAY IN BOSTON:

(I) THE US HAVE VITAL INTERESTS AT STAKE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA AND WILL DEFEND THEM. THE US PURPOSE IS NOT TO DOMINATE THE AFFAIRS OF ANY NATION IN THE REGION BUT TO HELP BUTTRESS THEIR INDEPENDENCE. THE US HAS NOTHING TO GAIN BY CONTINUATION OF THE CONFLICT OR BY TAKING SIDES IN IT. THE IRAN HOSTAGE ISSUE MAKES PEACE ALL THE MORE IMPERATIVE.

(II) THE LOCATION OF CURRENT HOSTILITIES MAKES THE CONFLICT MORE DANGEROUS. ''IF THE IRAQIS TAKE AND ATTEMPT TO KEEP KHUZESTAN, THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT WOULD BE FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED, AND THE DANGER DRAMATICALLY SHARPENED.''

(III) THE US REFUSAL TO TAKE SIDES IS NOT A SIGN OF INDIFFERENCE. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SEIZURE OF TERRITORY BY FORCE AND THE WIDER IMPLICATIONS. THE US HAS SUPPORTED THE PEACE EFFORTS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND WILL CONTINUE TO URGE RESTRAINT ON ALL EXTERNAL POWERS. WE EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO EXERCISE ITS OWN SELF-DISCIPLINE. WHILE SOVIET CLAIMS ABOUT US PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFLICT ARE UNTRUE AND IRRESPONSIBLE, THE RUSSIANS HAVE GENERALLY BEHAVED WITH CAUTION. THEY SHOULD PERSIST IN SUPPORTING AN EARLY END TO THE WAR.

(IV) THE US ALSO SEEK TO PREVENT THE CONFLICT FROM SPREADING. ''THE OTHER STATES OF THE GULF AND THE ARABIAN PENINSULA HAVE GROUNDS FOR DEEP CONCERN. THEY DESERVE OUR HELP, WHEN THEY ASK FOR IT, IN DETERRING THE POSSIBILITY OF UNPROVOKED ATTACK.'' HENCE THE DESPATCH OF AWACS TO SAUDI ARABIA. ''THEIR PURPOSE IS STRICTLY DEFENSIVE - TO PROVIDE WARNING TIME AND TO ASSIST THE SAUDIS IN THEIR OWN DEFENSE IF THERE IS SUCH A NEED. THEIR PRESENCE HAS NOT ALTERED IN ANY WAY OUR NEUTRALITY IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT.''

(V) THE US WISH TO KEEP THE CONFLICT FROM ENDANGERING THE FLOW OF OIL, AND NOTE THE CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION ADOPTED BY SAUDI ARABIA AND SOME OTHER PRODUCERS.

/2. SUMMING

2 SUMMING UP, CHRISTOPHER EMPHASISED THAT THE US WERE NEUTRAL AND WOULD NOT INTERVENE ON EITHER SIDE, THEY EXPECTED THE SOVIET UNION TO ACT WITH RESTRAINT, AND WOULD WORK FOR AN EARLY END TO THE FIGHTING. FURTHERMORE, ''NEUTRALITY IN THIS CONFLICT DOES NOT MEAN AMERICAN INDIFFERENCE. WE WILL DEFEND OUR VITAL INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.

SPECIFICALLY:

- THERE MUST BE NO INTERFERENCE WITH FREE TRANSIT IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ AND THE PERSIAN GULF. WE WILL DO WHAT IS REQUIRED TO PREVENT SUCH INTERFERENCE.
- TO PREVENT THE CONFLICT FROM EXPANDING IN WAYS WHICH THREATEN THE SECURITY OF THE REGION, WE WILL ALSO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM NON-BELLIGERENT FRIENDS IN THE AREA WHO FEEL THREATENED BY THE CONFLICT.''

FCO PASS SAVING: PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, TEL AVIV, CAIRO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN, DOHA

HENDERSON (REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 4233 OF 8 OCTOBER
INFO MODUK, BAGHDAD AND JEDDA
INFO SAVING PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN AND DOHA
IRAN/IRAQ: US POSITION

1. WARREN CHRISTOPHER (DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE), YESTERDAY SET OUT CURRENT US THINKING IN A SPEECH IN BOSTON. SUMMARY IN M I F T, TEXT BY BAG (NOT TO ALL).

2. THE PRESS HAS PICKED OUT THE REFERENCES TO THE US BEING WILLING TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM NON-BELLIGERENTS IN THE AREA WHO FEEL THREATENED BY THE CONFLICT. THE NEW YORK TIMES ALSO REPORTS THAT US AMBASSADORS IN SUCH COUNTRIES AS OMAN, KUWAIT AND THE UAE HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONVEY TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS US READINESS TO SUPPLY THEM WITH INFORMATION FROM THE AWACS OPERATING FROM SAUDI ARABIA, MORE AWACS FOR THEMSELVES, GROUND RADAR AND OTHER DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT TO HELP PROTECT THEM AGAINST IRANIAN AIR ATTACK, PROVIDED THAT RECIPIENTS AVOIDED DIRECT OR INDIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT.

3. THE PRESS ALSO REPORTS THAT, AS PART OF THE POLICY OF DISCOURAGING THIRD COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR, THE US HAD COMMUNICATED CLEARLY AND EMPHATICALLY TO JORDAN THEIR UNHAPPINESS WITH THE CURRENT ATTITUDE IN AMMAN, BUT THAT THIS HAD HAD LITTLE EFFECT.

4. IT WAS ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY BY THE PENTAGON THAT GENERAL PIOTROWSKI THE US COMMANDER OF ALL AIR DEFENCE SQUADRONS, HAD ARRIVED IN SAUDI ARABIA WITH A 20-MAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEAM. HE WOULD BE MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT AND TO WASHINGTON ON

(I) INTEGRATING THE US AIR-DEFENCE SYSTEMS INTO THE SAUDI NETWORK: AND

(II) IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REST OF THE SAUDI AIR-DEFENCE NETWORK.

FCO PASS SAVING PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, TEL AVIV, CAIRO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN AND DOHA (REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

HENDERSON

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ADDITIONAL DISTN.
IRAQ/IRAN

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 072115Z OCT 80
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1456 OF 7 OCTOBER
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
INFO MOSCOW BONN PARIS JEDDA BAGHDAD TEL AVIV

— Passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under FOI Exemption.
C M Wayland
13 September 2012

MY TELNO 1436 (NOT TO ALL) AND WASHINGTON TELNO 4202:
US INTENTIONS: IRAN/IRAQ

1. THE UNITES STATES ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS PUZZLING. APART FROM MUNOZ LEDO (MEXICO)* ~~*~~ MCHENRY IS THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL WHO IS ACTIVELY PRESSING FOR THE COUNCIL TO MOVE INTO PUBLIC SESSION TO 'BEGIN DICUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE'.

2. THE REST OF US IE THE FOUR WESTERN MEMBERS PLUS THE OTHER NON-ALIGNED DO NOT BELIEVE THAT COUNCIL ACTION AT PRESENT CAN STOP THE FIGHTING, NOR DO WE BELIEVE THAT THE TIME IS RIPE - ALTHOUGH THIS TIME MAY WELL COME - FOR THE COUNCIL TO ACT EFFECTIVELY IN ITS PEACE-KEEPING/MEDIATION ROLE. WE SEE NO PURPOSE IN ACTIVITY FOR ACTIVITY'S SAKE. PUBLIC DEBATE ON THE SUBSTANCE WOULD ONLY MEAN TAKING SIDES. FOR EXAMPLE, EVEN A STRAIGHT-FORWARD CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE WOULD BE PRO-IRAQI WHILE CEASE-FIRE PLUS WITHDRAWAL [illegible] FOR THE COUNCIL TO START

WOULD BE PRO-IRANIAN. A FORTIORI, FOR THE COUNCIL TO START DISCUSSING WHO WAS THE MORE TO BLAME OVER BREACHES OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT OR WHERE THE BOUNDARY SHOULD RUN IN THE SHATT EL ARAB AND THE LAND FRONTIERS WOULD BE EXTREMELY AWKWARD. VERY FEW COUNCIL MEMBERS WOULD BE PREPARED TO SPEAK ON SUCH TOPICS AND, IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF THE COUNCIL ADOPTING A RESOLUTION GOING BEYOND SCR 479, IT WOULD EITHER CONTINUE TO ALIENATE THE IRANIANS OR ALIENATE THE IRAQIS, THUS DAMAGING ITS CHANCES OF BEING ABLE TO ACT EFFECTIVELY WHEN THE RIGHT MOMENT COMES.

3. WE AND THE OTHER WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL PUT ALL THIS TO THE AMERICANS ON 6 OCTOBER AT A MEETING CALLED BY MCHENRY. HE ACCEPTED THE FORCE OF OUR ARGUMENTS BUT CONTINUED TO HANKER AFTER PUBLIC DEBATE.

4. IT MAY BE THAT MCHENRY'S ATTITUDE REFLECTS HIS OWN VIEWS ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCIL ETC, (HE SAID THAT WE WERE ALLOWING THE COUNCIL TO BE PUSHED INTO A POSITION WHERE IT COULD ONLY ACT IF THE COMBATANTS WANTED IT TO) BUT HIS MISSION TELL US THAT HE IS UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. IT OCCURS TO ME THAT A PARTIAL ANSWER MAY BE THAT THE ISRAELI LOBBY HAVE BEEN CRITICISING THE ADMINISTRATION ON THE GROUND THAT THEY DO NOTHING TO PREVENT THE ARABS FROM RUSHING INTO FORMAL SESSIONS OF THE COUNCIL, EXCORIATING ISRAEL AND THE US AND ADOPTING OFFENSIVE RESOLUTIONS. HOW IS IT THEN THAT THEY ARE SITTING BACK AND ALLOWING UNSAVOURY COUNTRIES LIKE IRAQ AND IRAN TO CONDUCT A MAJOR WAR WITHOUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL EVEN MEETING? MCHENRY'S REMARKS AT LAST FRIDAY'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS LEND SOME CREDENCE TO THIS THEORY (MY TELNO 1444).

5. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE AMERICANS MAY SEE PUBLIC SESSIONS OF THE COUNCIL AS A MEANS TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE SOVIET UNION. HOWEVER, WHEN MY NORWEGIAN COLLEAGUE SAID AT THE MEETING ON 6 OCTOBER THAT A FIRM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR WOULD BRING THE NON-ALIGNED BEHIND A SUPER-POWER CONSENSUS, SILENCE FELL ON THE US DELEGATION. IT IS IN FACT DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW PUBLIC DISCUSSION COULD BRING THIS ABOUT.

6. WHEN WE COMPARED NOTES AFTER THE MEETING BROKE UP, WE HAD A FEELING, ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT TO DEFINE, THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CASTING ABOUT TO FIND SOMETHING PRO-IRANIAN TO DO. IF SO, IT MAY BE THAT THEY SEE A COUNCIL MEETING AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SAY SOMETHING IN PUBLIC WHICH THEY MIGHT HOPE WOULD HAVE A FAVOURABLE EFFECT ON THE HOSTAGES PROBLEM.

PARSONS

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 071436Z OCT 80
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1455 DATED 7 OCTOBER 80
INFO PRIORITY ANKARA, DAMASCUS, TRIPOLI, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, JEDDA, AMMAN, PARIS, MOSCOW, BONN.

IRAN/IRAQ

1. MY TURKISH COLLEAGUE TOLD ME IN STRICT CONFIDENCE ON 6 OCTOBER THAT THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT HAD FORMALLY ASKED FOR TRANSIT RIGHTS THROUGH TURKEY FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES DESTINED FOR IRAN. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD ASKED THE TURKS FOR PERMISSION FOR THEIR AIRCRAFT TO OVER-FLY TURKEY WITH MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THE TURKS HAD REFUSED BOTH REQUESTS.

PARSONS

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
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IRAN/IRAQ

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SIR J GRAHAM
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INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS AND WASHINGTON,
INFO PRIORITY BONN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, ABU DHABI BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, AMMAN, DOHA, TEL AVIV.

IRAQ/IRAN.

WHEN MOBERLY CALLED TODAY ON THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, SHAIKH SALIM AL SABAH THE LATTER EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN ABOUT IRANIAN THREATS DIRECTED SPECIFICALLY AGAINST KUWAIT. HE SAID THAT KUWAIT HAD TAKEN ALL POSSIBLE STEPS TO DEFENCD HERSELF AND ADDED WITH SOME EMPHASIS THAT KUWAIT MUST RELY ON HER OWN EFFORTS IN THIS SITUATION. HE THEN REFERRED TO KUWAIT'S OBLIGATIONS TO IRAQ UNDER THE ARAB LEAGUE CHARTER AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN THE LAST RESORT KUWAIT WOULD BE BOUND TO SIDE WITH IRAQ, THOUGH HE RECOGNISED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S AMBITION TO BE THE NEW NASSER COULD POSE AS MUCH OF AN EVENTUAL

AMBITION TO BE THE NEW NASSER COULD POSE AS MUCH OF AN EVENTUAL THREAT TO KUWAIT AS THE PRETENSIONS OF IRAN.

2. WHILE SHAIKH SALIM SAID HE WOULD WARMLY WELCOME FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO EXCHANGE ASSESSMENTS WITH US ABOUT THE EVOLVING SITUATION, HE DID NOT SEE MUCH SCOPE FOR CO-ORDINATION OF POLICY OWING TO KUWAIT'S INABILITY TO TAKE A NEUTRAL POSITION. THOUGH HE DID NOT RULE OUT A TIP AND RUN ATTACK, HE WAS INCLINED TO DISCOUNT THE LIKELIHOOD OF A ~~CARIOUS~~ SERIOUS IRANIAN MOVE AGAINST ANY OF THE GULF STATES SINCE THE IRANIANS WOULD KNOW THAT THIS WOULD INVOLVE SAUDI ARABIA AND SAUDI ARABIA'S FRIENDS. HE WAS REASSURED BY A CONCILLIATORY STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT BANI SADR HEARD ON THE RADIO THIS MORNING. HE URGED THAT WE WORK WITH THE AMERICANS AND IF NECESSARY THE RUSSIANS AT THE U N OR THROUGH THE ISLAMIC OR NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENTS TO ENCOURAGE BANI SADR TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS. KUWAIT DID NOT WISH TO SEE MORE FIGHTING OR SOVIET OR U S INVOLVEMENT. A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION HAD TO BE FOUND QUICKLY.

3. SHAIKH SALIM ALSO SPOKE SEVERAL TIMES OF THE SOVIET NEED FOR OIL IN THE LATTER PART OF THE 1980'S AND SPECULATED THAT THIS WOULD PREDISPOSE THE RUSSIANS TO LOOK FOR WAYS OF EXPLOITING THE SOLUTION TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. HE SEEMED VERY NERVOUS BOTH ABOUT THE RISKS OF THE CONFLICT REMAINING UNRESOLVED FOR LONG AND ABOUT POSSIBLE SUPER-POWER INVOLVEMENT. THE NEAREST HE CAME TO RECOGNISING A ROLD FOR THE AMERICANS WAS IN HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE SOZPORT OF SAUDI ARABIA BY HER ''FRIENDS'' MIGHT DETER IRANIAN ATTACKS.

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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

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SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 382 OF 07 OCT
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DI4) AND WASHINGTON.
ROUTINE ANKARA, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI AND UKMIS NEW YORK
IRAQ/IRAN

1. ON KING HUSSEIN'S RETURN FROM BAGHDAD ON THE EVENING OF 5 OCTOBER HE SUMMONED MY US COLLEAGUE TO CHECK ON A REPORT WHICH THE IRAQI PRESIDENT HAD RECEIVED FROM THE SAUDIS, ALLEGEDLY BASED ON A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER AND MR MUSKIE FROM WHICH THE SAUDIS CLAIMED TO HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE AMERICANS WERE SUPPLYING DOLLARS 50 MILLION WORTH OF MILITARY SPARES TO IRAN. AMBASSADOR WILKES SAW KING HUSSEIN AGAIN ON THE AFTERNOON OF 6 OCTOBER

DOLLARS 50 MILLION WORTH OF MILITARY SPARES TO IRAN. AMBASSADOR VELIOTES SAW KING HUSSEIN AGAIN ON THE AFTERNOON OF 6 OCTOBER (ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY PICKERING FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO WAS HERE ON A BRIEF VISIT) AND WAS ABLE TO CLEAR UP THE MISUNDERSTANDING. APPARENTLY THE SAUDIS HAD ASKED WHAT REQUESTS THE AMERICANS HAD RECEIVED FOR SPARES PRIOR TO THE SEIZURE OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HOSTAGES AND HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN OUTSTANDING REQUEST FROM THE IRANIANS FOR 50 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF SPARES BUT THAT SINCE THEN ALL SUCH TRANSACTIONS HAD OF WANNIACUOO BEEN FROZEN. THIS HAD GOT MUDDLES IN TRANSMISSION BY THE SAUDIS AND HAD REACHED PRESIDENT SADDAM IN THE MUCH MORE DAMAGING VERSION DESCRIBED ABOVE.

2. DURING THESE TWO INTERVIEWS WITH KING HUSSEIN, AMBASSADOR VELIOTES LEARNT A GOOD DEAL ABOUT KING HUSSEIN'S RECENT VISIT TO BAGHDAD AND HIS DISCUSSIONS THERE WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN (HE ASKED THAT HIS CONFIDENCE BE FULLY PROTECTED). ON THE QUESTION OF SAUDI ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ, KING HUSSEIN HAD MENTIONED THAT TWO SOVIET VESSELS DESTINED FOR IRAQI PORTS WHICH HAD BEEN WAITING AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR IRAQ HAD BEEN DIVERTED TO SAUDI PORTS AND THAT THEIR CARGOES WERE BEING TRANSPORTED BY LAND FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO IRAQ.

3. KING HUSSEIN AFFIRMED THAT SULTAN QABOOS'S STANDING WITH IRAQ WAS NOW VERY HIGH AND THAT HE HAD GAINED A LOT OF POINTS WITH THE IRAQIS BY HIS INITIAL AGREEMENT TO MAKE FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO IRAQ AND HAD NOT LOST AS A RESULT OF THE SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF THE OFFER. (THE KING HAS OF COURSE A STRONG INTEREST IN MAKING THE BEST TO THE AMERICANS OF THIS UNHAPPY AFFAIR).

4. PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD EXPRESSED SATISFACTION OVER DENIALS BY SOUTH KOREA, TAIWAN AND TURKEY THAT THEY WERE SENDING MILITARY SPARES TO IRAN. THE KING SAID THAT THE TURKS HAD EARNED PARTICULARLY GOOD MARKS WITH THE IRAQIS BY THEIR RAPID REPAIR OF THE OIL PIPELINE. HOWEVER THE IRAQI PRESIDENT HAD ~~TO~~ CLAIMED ~~HE~~ THAT LIBYA AND SYRIA WERE SUPPLYING EQUIPMENT (NOTABLY STRELLA HAND-HELD ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES AND SAM 6S) AND SENDING MEN TO IRAN, AND THAT THE IRAQIS HAD CAPTURED EQUIPMENT WITH LIBYAN AND SYRIAN MARKINGS AND EVEN SOME PRISONERS FROM THESE COUNTRIES.

5. PRESIDENT SADDAM CONTINUED STRONGLY TO SUSPECT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD TAKEN PART IN THE ATTACK ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR INSTALLATION, PARTLY BECAUSE THE ATTACK HAD BEEN SO ACCURATE. HE WAS ALSO DISTURBED BY PRESS REPORTS, APPARENTLY EMANATING FROM KUWAIT, THAT ISRAEL WAS PLANNING TO BLOCK THE SHIPMENT OF SUPPLIES DESTINED FOR IRAQ THROUGH AQABA.

6. KING HUSSEIN ASSURED AMBASSADOR VELIOTES THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM

6. KING HUSSEIN ASSURED AMBASSADOR VELIOTES THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD NOT REQUESTED ANY MILITARY HELP FROM JORDAN DURING HIS VISIT AND THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD CLAIMED HE HAD NO NEED FOR IT. HE TOLD THE KING THAT IRAQ HAD LOST 30 AIRCRAFT AND 50 TANKS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE FIGHTING: MOST OF THE TANKS HAD BEEN LOST IN KHORRANSHAHR AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT HAD BEEN A MISTAKE TO SEND TANKS INTO THE CITY. PARTLY FOR THIS REASON, THE IRAQIS HAD DECIDED TO STAY OUTSIDE THE CITIES OF AHWAZ AND DEZFUL AND AVOID BECOMING INVOLVED IN STREET FIGHTING. HE CLAIMED THAT THE OIL PIPE-LINES NEAR DEZFUL WHICH LINK TEHRAN AND THE SOUTHERN OIL FIELDS HAD BEEN CUT BY IRAQI TROOPS. PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD SAID HE WAS WORRIED BY SEVERAL IRANIAN ATTEMPTS TO BOMB DAMS ON THE EUPHRATES WHICH, IF SUCCESSFUL, COULD RESULT IN MANY THOUSANDS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

7. MY US COLLEAGUE HAD PREVIOUSLY ON INSTRUCTIONS SPOKEN IN STRONG TERMS TO KING HUSSEIN ABOUT THE DANGERS THE AMERICANS SAW IN ANY EXTENSION OF THE FIGHTING AND ON THE NEED TO TREAD VERY CAREFULLY WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBLE FUTURE OF KHUZESTAN. THE KING CLAIMED TO VELIOTES THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED KHUZESTAN AT LENGTH WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM AND HAD ALSO COUNSELLED CAUTION. PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD CLAIMED AT ONE POINT IN THEIR DISCUSSION THAT LARGE-SCALE EXECUTIONS HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE OF PRO-IRAQI ARABS IN KHUZESTAN. HE HAD GONE ON TO ASSERT THAT THE BEST OUTCOME OF THE WAR WOULD BE IF PRO-WESTERN MILITARY ELEMENTS WERE TO TAKE OVER IN IRAN AND CREATE A GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH IRAQ AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES COULD ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS, BUT HAD EXPRESSED FEARS THAT A MORE LIKELY OUTCOME WAS A COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER IN IRAN. HE HAD ENQUIRED OF THE KING WHETHER THERE WAS NOT SOME WAY IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE COULD ''SIT AND THINK ABOUT THE PROBLEM WITH THEIR ARAB FRIENDS'' WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO KHUZESTAN'S FUTURE. PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD SAID HE DID NOT ENVISAGE IRAQ NEED BE A PARTICIPANT IN ANY SUCH TALKS SEMICLN KING HUSSEIN HAD ALSO FORMED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE IRAQIS WERE NOT YET READY FOR DIRECT DEALINGS WITH THE US.

8. VELIOTES THINKS WE ARE LIKELY TO HEAR MORE FROM THE IRAQIS AND JORDANIANS ABOUT KHUZESTAN AND INTENDS URGING THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO INITIATE TALKS WITH US ON THIS SUBJECT, SO THAT WE CAN DEVELOP OUR OWN THINKING FURTHER. HE TOLD ME THAAAAAAAAAAT THE AMERICANS HAD INCORPORATED IN THEIR INSTRUCTIONS FOR HIM TO USE WITH THE KING THE POINT I HAD PREVIOUSLY MADE ON A PERSONAL BASIS TO KING HUSSEIN ABOUT THE RISK OF A NEEDLESS PROLONGATION OF THE WAR IF THE IRANIANS GOT TO KNOW OF IRAQI INTENTIONS FOR AN INDEPENDENT OR AUTONOMOUS KHUZESTAN (SEE PARA 7 OF MY TELNO 363 OF 28 SEPTEMBER).

KHUZESTAN (SEE PARA 7 OF MY TELNO 353 OF 28 SEPTEMBER).

URWICK
BT

PARA 4 LINE 5

HOWEVER THE IRAQI PRESIDENT HAD CLAIMED THAT LIBYA AND SYRIA WERE

RGRTKS BWANA .. THASS ME ZNB .. EREONE MORE OOO THEN ME DCR AT T'END

CCN PARA 1 LINE 14

WORTH OF SPARES BUT THAT SINCE THEN ALL SUCH TRANSACTIONS HAD OF COURSE BEEN FROZEN.

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TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1598 OF 6 OCTOBER
INFO PARIS BONN JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK KUWAIT BAGHDAD ABU DHABI
MOSCOW BAHRAIN MUSCAT AMMAN DOHA TEL AVIV
YOUR TELNO 4202: IRAQ/IRAN - US INTENTIONS

1. THE FORECAST IN PARA 1(B)(I) OF YOUR TUR THAT THE AMERICANS WILL WISH TO INVOLVE WESTERN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY FRANCE AND THE UK, IN TALKS ON NAVAL COOPERATION, AND THAT THEY MAY SUGGEST JOINT EXPLORATORY APPROACHES TO THE GULF STATES, HAS BEEN FULFILLED. THE US EMBASSY HERE HAVE DELIVERED 2 PAPERS (TEXT BY BAG). THE PAPERS ASK WHETHER WE WOULD AGREE THAT THE GULF STATES SHOULD BE URGENTLY CONSULTED ABOUT 'A CO-ORDINATED NAVAL EFFORT IN THE GULF AND STRAITS AREA, WITH ACTIVE MILITARY PARTICIPATION BY OTHER CONCERNED STATES AND STATES IN THE GULF, TO ASSURE THE PROTECTION OF OUR MUTUAL INTEREST IN PROTECTION OF NAVIGATION'. THIS WOULD INVOLVE JOINT PATROLLING WITH LOCAL NAVIES AND MORE FACILITIES FOR THE US IN BAHRAIN AND OMAN. A SIMILAR APPROACH HAS BEEN MAD IN PARIS.

2. WE ARE REPEATING TO YOU (NOT TO ALL)FCO TELNO 392 TO PARIS OUTLINING OUR PRELIMINARY REACTION. WE BELIEVE IT IS PREMATURE TO BE PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE GULF STATES TO ACCEPT AND A FORTIORI TO COOPERATE IN SUCH A FORCE. A BETTER COURSE WOULD BE TO CARRY ON OUR PRESENT CONTACTS WITH THEM AND TO TRY IN THE COURSE OF THESE TO BRING OUT THE NEED FOR SUCH A FORCE, IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WILL THEMSELVES ASK FOR PROTECTION OF THIS SORT, IF THE THREAT DEVELOPS. AN EXCEPTION TO THIS COULD BE OMAN, WHERE THE PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO BE MORE WARMLY RECEIVED AND WHOSE ACTIVE COOPERATION IS MORE NECESSARY.

3. WHILE WE DO SHARE THE AMERICAN'S SENSE OF URGENCY ON THE

/NEED

NEED FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING OF A TECHNICAL NATURE, WE DOUBT IF THERE IS SUCH URGENCY OVER THE APPROACHES. IN PARTICULAR WE QUESTION THEIR PERCEPTION, (PARA 1A OF YOUR TUR) THAT THEY ARE NOW 'NEEDED' IN THE GULF. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE (YOUR TUR NO 4200) THAT EVEN THE INVITATION TO SEND AWACS WAS CONTRIVED AND WE NOTED THE SAUDI HESITATIONS OVER PUBLICITY.

4. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS AND ON OUR PRELIMINARY REACTIONS. WE SHALL ALSO BE CONSIDERING WHETHER AND IF SO WHEN ANYTHING SHOULD BE SAID TO THE RUSSIANS.

5. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT AS FAR AS POSSIBLE ALL THESE CONTACTS AND DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT PUBLICITY.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD		ADDITIONAL DISTN.
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WED	CABINET OFFICE	
ES&SD		

Weekend Box - Prime Minister (2) Ba

You may like to glance through this record of Monday's discussion in Paris. It does not give any great impression of urgency or the French are still keeping their distance. There will be another meeting in three weeks time. S/S

SECRET - BURNING BUSH
NOT FOR ENTRY

Mr Miers, NED

cc: PS
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PUS
Mr Bullard
Sir J Graham
Sir A Acland
Lord Bridges
Mr J C Moberly
Mr P H Moberly
Mr Gillmore, Defence Dept.
Mr Heap, ESSD
Mr Fall, EESD
Mr R Wade-Gery, Cabinet Office
Personal to HM Ambrs. at
Washington
Paris
Bonn
UKDEL NATO

QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS, PARIS, 6 OCTOBER

IRAQ/IRAN

General Assessment

1. There was a long and generally very satisfactory discussion. Everyone agreed with Mr Vest's prognosis of a "prolonged, low-intensity struggle", i.e. stalemate caused by Iraq's inability to advance much further and Iran's to eject the Iraqi invaders. A widening of the conflict was not thought likely in the immediate future, although a rash move by either side, especially perhaps Iran, could not be ruled out. The Americans thought that Iran's naval and air activity could probably continue for some time and that the "psychological fervour" of the revolution could well carry Iran through the difficult period ahead, even if, for example, kerosene for cooking ceased to be available. Iraq, on the other hand, was better placed to obtain supplies, for instance from Jordan.

2. It was generally felt that the Arabs did not want either Iraq or Iran to emerge from the war as clear victor and thus as top dog in the area. This was also agreed to be the Western interest.

3. During this discussion, the French displayed a strong tendency to see through Iraqi eyes. They thought, for instance, that Iraq had got Khuzestan. They played down the danger of escalation and only after some discussion subscribed to the point (recorded above) that rash acts were possible. They did, however, say that the Iraqi Government, despite its apparent strength, could collapse suddenly if there was a major external shock.

4. The French were disposed to stress the limited nature of Iraq's political objectives. But Mr Bullard pointed out that they were significant in relation to the history of the area. I think everyone accepted Mr Bullard's view that a settlement which was humiliating to Iran, and which was brought about when Iran is unusually weak, would be a recipe for more trouble in the future. The French thought that the inclusion in Iraq's objectives of the return of the Islands to Arab rule had been designed to gain Arab support; this point was possibly less central in Iraqi minds than the other objectives.

/ Soviet attitude

Soviet attitude

5. On the Soviet attitude, I think everyone agreed with our view that the Russians were being even-handed because they were uncertain about what would happen and about where Soviet interests would lie. They were keeping all their options open. These included military moves; a diplomatic initiative on the lines of Tashkent; or a move to make gains if Iran broke up. The Americans added that another Soviet aim was probably to use the crisis to spread the impression that the Americans would not stand by their friends in the region; hence the Soviet propaganda about non-interference. The French mentioned the possibility that the Russians in due course might seek a division of influence with the Americans in the general area of the Near East (this fits with the general French tendency to see the area from the Gulf to Afghanistan as a single chess board; another French remark was that Iraq, with its likely new influence, might want to make friends with Afghanistan).

6. We were given an account of an "oral statement" made by the Soviet Ambassador in Washington to Mr Muskie on 4 October. Dobrynin said that it was important that the US and the Soviet Union should have a precise and clear view of each other's positions about Iran/Iraq. The Soviet position remained that neither large powers nor small should interfere. The Soviet Union would adhere to this principle on the understanding that the United States and others also did so. There would be all sorts of consequences if anyone interfered militarily. Dobrynin asked some questions, but evidently not in a hectoring way, about the AWACS in Saudi Arabia.

7. The French said that, if the Russians went for a peaceful settlement between Iran and Iraq, this would show that the invasion of Afghanistan had not been part of a major offensive towards warm waters. More convincingly, M. Robin said that, while the movements of Western ships to the general area of the crisis and the provision of AWACS to Saudi Arabia were good moves, the West should bear in mind that the Russians could see our purpose as being to take advantage of the Iran/Iraq situation to tighten a Western grip on the area.

Diplomatic action

8. It was generally agreed that there was little that the Western countries could immediately do to promote a settlement. It was better to encourage Islamic mediation than non-aligned. We should keep on talking to Iraq's lesser neighbours, if only to counter-balance wilder influences. A return to the Security Council was not desirable now but might be necessary in due course. The elements of a settlement were not yet visible.

/ Arms sales

Arms sales

9. On Western arms sales to the belligerents, Mr Bullard said that the United Kingdom had received no requests. Because of sanctions, we would not supply arms to Iran. If Iraq sought British arms, we would probably decline, citing the Security Council Resolution. Did the other three have the same policy? The American and German replies were unequivocally that arms would not be supplied. M. Robin mentioned that France would not supply arms to Iran but did not reply specifically on Iraq.

Naval contingencies

10. Mr Vest explained the "preliminary concept" for coordinated naval activity in the Gulf which was put to us by the US Embassy in two communications during the weekend. He stressed that the various naval contingents would remain under national command. The purpose would be to deter interference with shipping, i.e. avoid the use of force. Mr Bartholomew was coordinating this in the State Department and would be glad to answer any questions from Ambassadors there. Mr Vest also explained the US reasons for wanting to approach Gulf States about this matter without delay. Mr Bullard gave preliminary comments in accordance with FCO telegram No 392 to Paris. The French agreed that it was premature to approach the Gulf States. The Germans displayed some nervousness about action which might look like "imperialism" or smack too much of superpower interference. Messrs Vest and Blackwill indicated that they too agreed personally with Mr Bullard; they said that there was, however, a strong head of steam in Washington behind the idea of talking immediately to the Gulf States about naval matters. They therefore suggested that the British idea of describing our concern to the Gulf States, in the hope that they would themselves suggest contingency discussions, should be advocated by the British, French and German Ambassadors in Washington. (Instructions are in hand.)

11. In the French view, the preparatory measures had been taken by moving ships to the area. This also provided an element of deterrence. Naval talks were the place to consider what action to take if shipping was harrassed or the Straits were blocked. France preferred to talk bilaterally to the US Navy, while the British did the same, although trilateral talks were not ruled out at some stage. (M. Robin later said that he had made this point on instructions, although in his own view trilateral talks would make practical sense.) Mr Bullard made clear our preference for trilateral talks. The Americans said that they would accept bilateral or trilateral ones. They should anyway be under close political direction. The Germans are being kept informed about American thinking on naval matters. The Americans have also put their ideas for substantive discussion to New Zealand and for information to Italy and Australia.

/12. Although

12. Although this was not explicitly agreed, I think the result of this discussion is that the naval talks should now look at the US "preliminary concept" in terms of military feasibility, and report back to Political Directors.

13. Messrs Vest and Blackwill said "Yes" in unison to Mr Bullard's question whether there was a US decision to take, if the Straits were closed for whatever reason, whatever action might be necessary to reopen the Gulf. The impression given by this exchange was, however, that the US Government was working on the firm assumption that the necessary action would be taken rather than that an explicit decision to this effect had been reached.

14. The Germans suggested that thought should be given to "politica orchestration" before any naval action in the Straits. Prior approaches might be made to a number of countries, in the hope inter alia of eliciting non-aligned statements in favour of the principle of freedom of navigation. Moves in the UN might be for consideration. It was agreed that this aspect should be discussed at the next Quadripartite meeting of Political Directors on 27 October.

Oil

15. There was little discussion of oil supplies or marine insurance. The French mentioned interestingly that the Iraqi Government had said that it would ensure that France did not run short of oil. The implication seemed to be that Iraq would persuade its friends to help France if necessary. The Americans summarised an intelligence assessment of the damage to oil facilities in Iran and Iraq. It was due to be conveyed in full to HMG through other channels on 6 October. They said that military damage to oil installations had so far been small. The only significant damage had been to storage areas and pipelines, not processing plant. It would probably be possible, in technical terms, to restore the export capacity of Iran and Iraq quite quickly after hostilities ended.

Some lesser points

16. a) The Americans assessed the Iraqi Army to be within 10 kilometres of the Northern pipeline from Dezful and in a position to cut it when they wanted (this may not accord with the views of MOD as of the weekend).

b) The French, while being sure that Iraq would not accept the internationalisation of the Shatt, wondered whether any international arrangements about navigation might be for consideration.

c) The Americans mentioned the low level surveillance system which today's press reports as being installed in Saudi Arabia to complement AWACS.

/ d) Mr Vest

d) Mr Vest asked whether the Anglo-UAE Defence Agreement of 1971 might be relevant to the present situation. Mr Bullard deflected the question.

e) The Germans suggested that we should study the legal status of the Straits of Hormuz, in case we needed legal arguments to defend any naval action there in due course. Others agreed and this will no doubt come up at the next meeting on 27 October.

f) The Americans said that they would turn down any proposal by the Soviet Union that it should join in efforts to prevent the blocking of the Gulf. They would argue that the US had a far greater interest than the Soviet Union and that a superpower condominium was undesirable. The French agreed.

g) The French did not mention their earlier idea of trying to bargain with the Arabs about the fate of the Gulf islands.

C L G Mallaby

7 October 1980

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Planning Staff
W11 233-4533

IRAN/IRAQ

Iraq

ADVANCE COPIES 22

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SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY
MR BRAITHWAITE
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 647 OF 6 OCTOBER
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON AND JEDDA - ROUTINE TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK AND AMMAN
INFO SAVING KHARTOUM, TRIPOLI AND DAMASCUS

IRAN/IRAQ WAR

1. WHEN I ACCOMPANIED MR DAVID STEEL AND A GROUP OF LIBERALS TO CALL ON PRESIDENT SADAT ON 4 OCTOBER, SADAT WAS ASKED ABOUT THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. HE SAID HE REMAINED ABSOLUTELY NEUTRAL AND CONDEMNED BOTH SIDES. THEY WERE IRRESPONSIBLE AND WOULD BOTH SUFFER. IT LOOKED AS IF IRAQ WAS IN FOR TROUBLE HAVING UNDER-ESTIMATED THE CAPACITY OF THE IRANIAN AIRFORCE. SYRIA, LIBYA AND ALGERIA WERE OPPOSING IRAQ. NOW IRAN WAS WRONGLY THREATENING THE SMALLER GULF STATES. THESE NO LONGER HAD CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES.

2. THE SITUATION PRESENTED GREAT DANGERS, THEREFORE , AND THE WEST SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THE CONFLAGRATION DID NOT SPREAD. WE WOULD

2. THE SITUATION PRESENTED GREAT DANGERS, THEREFORE , AND THE WEST SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THE CONFLAGRATION DID NOT SPREAD. HE WOULD REVEAL A SECRET WHICH HE HAD NOT REVEALED PUBLICLY BECAUSE HE DID NOT WANT TO CAUSE TROUBLE FOR SAUDI ARABIA, BUT HE KNEW THAT WHEN SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD VISITED SAUDI ARABIA RECENTLY HE HAD WARNED THE SAUDIS OF HIS INTENTIONS AND THEY HAD PASSED THIS TO THE AMERICANS. PRESIDENT CARTER HAD DONE NOTHING. IN THIS SITUATION THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE MORE RESOLUTE. HE HAD EXPRESSED HIMSELF VEHEMENTLY TO THIS EFFECT IN AN INTERVIEW AND PRESIDENT CART HAD COMPLAINED TO HIM, JUST NOW, THAT THIS WAS REFLECTING BADLY ON HIM (CARTER). CARTER WAS A GOOD FRIEND, THOUGH HESITANT, AND SADAT DIDN'T WANT TO CAUSE HIM TROUBLE, BUT THE US HAD A RESPONSIBILITY. WESTERN EUROPE, WHICH WOULD BE MUCH MORE AFFECTED THAN THE US BY ANY INTERRUPTION IN OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF, SHOULD PUT PRESSURE ON THE US. HE DIDN'T WANT NATO TANKS TO STAND LIKE SCARECROWS IN THE FIELDS OR WESTERN CIVILISATION, WITH WHICH EGYPT WAS BOUND UP, TO BE PUT AT RISK.

3. HE HAD BEEN ANNOYED TOO AT NOT BEING INFORMED THAT THE US ALREADY HAD A NAVAL FORCE INSIDE THE GULF. THIS WOULD BE USED TO LIMIT THE WAR.

4. NOW THAT THE SHAH HAD DISAPPEARED EGYPT WAS THE ONLY STABILISING FORCE IN THE AREA, WITH CORRESPONDING RESPONSIBILITIES. THIS WAS WHY, PRESIDENT SADAT SAID, HE HAD OFFERED FACILITIES TO THE UNITED STATES IN EGYPT. NOT BASES: HE NEEDED ARMS BUT NO MEN. HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO MAKE THESE FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE ALSO IN ORDER TO PRESERVE STABILITY IN THE GULF.

FCO PASS SAVING KHARTOUM, TRIPOLI AND DAMASCUS.

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INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS PRIORITY BONN JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK KUWAIT BAGHDAD ABU DHABI MOSCOW BAHRAIN MUSCAT AMMAN DOHA TEL AVIV

IRAQ/IRAN: US INTENTIONS

1. YOU KNOW FROM LAST WEEKEND HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO PERCEIVE ANY PATTERN OF US POLICY ON THE IRAQ/IRAN CRISIS: BUT CERTAIN STRANDS SEEM TO BE EMERGING THAT I SHALL TRY TO DESCRIBE THOUGH, BEING AS THEY ARE WITHOUT DESIGN OR INTENT, TOO MUCH SHAPE SHOULD NOT BE ATTACHED TO THEM.

(A) SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR, THE US GOVERNMENT HAVE HAD DIFFICULTIES IN GIVING SUBSTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT'S SECURITY COMMITMENT TO DEFEND THE GULF FROM EXTERNAL ATTACK, PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE RELUCTANCE OF SOME OF THE COUNTRIES TO BECOME VISIBLY INVOLVED, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN THE US ARE UNPOPULAR WITH MOST OF THE ARAB WORLD OVER PALESTINE AND LOATHED IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. BUT THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT AND THE NEW THREAT TO THE GULF HAVE SUDDENLY CHANGED THE SCENE. THANKS TO THE FEAR OF AN ATTACK FROM IRAN THAT MIGHT FLOW FROM IRAQI ACTION, THE USA ARE NOW WANTED, AND THERE IS LESS INHIBITION ON THE PART OF THE GULF STATES IN EXPRESSING THEIR WISHES. THE USA HAS BEEN VOUCHSAFED THE LEVERAGE THAT FOR SO LONG HAS ELUDED THEM. THE PRESIDENT'S SECURITY COMMITMENT RELATED TO AN EXTERNAL THREAT: NO MATTER IF IT IS AN INTERNAL THREAT THAT OFFERS AMERICA AN ENTRY INTO THE AREA NOT JUST WITH LOCAL ACQUIESCENCE BUT BY LOCAL INVITATION.
BY CONTRAST, THE SOVIET UNION, UNTIL RECENTLY THE TERTIUS GAUDENS OF ANY TROUBLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NOW LOOK UNCOMFORTABLE. THEY CANNOT WANT THE WAR EITHER TO CONTINUE OR TO SPREAD: IT IS AWKWARD FOR THEM IF THEIR ARMS-CLIENT, IRAQ, IS IN DIFFICULTY: NOR CAN IT HELP THEM IN IRAN THAT IRAQ IS ATTACKING THE IRANIANS WITH SOVIET ARMS: IT DOES NOT SUIT THEM AT ALL THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD BE INVITED IN TO PLAY A HAND IN THE GULF (HENCE THE CHANGE IN THE SOVIET TUNE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE FIGHTING).

(B) FOR THE USA, THE CONTINUED INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA IS PARAMOUNT. THE USA CANNOT MISS THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET THE SAUDIS WISH FOR HELP: NOR MUST THEY DO ANYTHING TO LET THE SAUDIS DOUBT THE RELIABILITY OF AN AMERICAN LINK. IN PRACTICE, IMMEDIATE AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT CAN TAKE TWO FORMS:

/(1)

(I) NAVAL COOPERATION

DISCUSSIONS ARE TAKING PLACE WITH THE SAUDIS ABOUT THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS WESTERN NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND THE GULF: THESE ALSO EMBRACE THE QUESTION OF THE ATTITUDE OF OTHER GULF STATES. THE USA WILL ALSO WISH TO INVOLVE WESTERN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY FRANCE AND THE UK, AND THEY MAY WISH THEM TO JOIN IN EXPLORATORY APPROACHES TO THE GULF STATES.

(II) AWACS/HAWKS

AN AMERICAN TECHNICAL TEAM IS NOW IN SAUDI ARABIA DISCUSSING HOW BEST TO LINK UP THE AWACS WITH SAUDI AIR DEFENCES, NOTABLY THEIR HAWK MISSILES. INTEREST IN AWACS INFORMATION IS EXPECTED FROM THE OTHER GULF STATES. THIS INTEREST MAY REACH THE AMERICANS THROUGH THE SAUDIS, WHO HAVE REACTED POSITIVELY TO THE IDEA OF SHARING THE AWACS INFORMATION. MEANWHILE, THERE IS AN AMERICAN MILITARY SURVEY TEAM IN BAHRAIN WHO WILL EXPLORE WITH THE BAHRAINIS THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING AN AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM LINKED WITH THE AWACS. OTHER GULF STATES MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING THEIR AIR DEFENCES.

(C) WHAT IS ALSO AT ISSUE IS THE LONGER TERM READINESS OF THE USA TO BECOME INVOLVED, NOT JUST IN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND WARNING, BUT IN OPERATIONS IN DEFENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA OR THE GULF STATES IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK (EG FROM IRAN). THIS IS A DELICATE MATTER AND THE PUBLIC EXPRESSION BY THE AMERICANS OF ANY SUCH READINESS WOULD REQUIRE VERY CAREFUL HANDLING ON THEIR PART. THE PRESENT POSITION IS HELD BY MEANS OF THE CURRENT TALKS ON NAVAL AND AWACS COOPERATION. IT MAY BE THAT THE SAUDIS DO NOT WANT ANYTHING GOING FURTHER AT THE MOMENT. THERE ARE OF COURSE CONGRESSIONAL ASPECTS (WAR POWERS ACT) BUT MY OWN GUESS IS THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD BE READY TO BECOME INVOLVED IN DEFENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA PROVIDED THERE WAS A CLEAR INVITATION: INDEED I THINK THAT THIS IS JUST THE OPENING THEY MAY BE LOOKING FOR.

(D) THE US GOVERNMENT DO NOT SEE ANY IMMEDIATE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING CLOSE TO IRAQ. THEY ARE TEMPTED BY THE IDEA THAT IF THINGS GO BADLY FOR IRAQ IN THE WAR AND IF THE SOVIETS ARE NOT THOUGHT TO HAVE GIVEN BAGHDAD THE FULL SUPPORT THEY EXPECTED, THE LATTER MAY BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH THE SOVIET ALLIANCE. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE FRENCH HAVE WRITTEN OFF IRAN AND HAVE DECIDED TO PUT THEIR SHIRT ON IRAQ.

/(E) THE

(E) THE AMERICANS DO NOT, REPEAT NOT, FAVOUR THE DISMEMBERMENT OR DISINTEGRATION OF IRAN: THE SOVIETS WOULD BE TEMPTED TO MOVE IN: THE OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE EASED: THE IRAQIS WOULD BE TEMPTED TO CLING ON TO THE OIL OF KHUZESTAN AND EXPLOIT THIS FOR THEIR USE: A DANGEROUS VACUUM WOULD BE CREATED:ANY INCREASE IN IRAQI POWER OR INFLUENCE WOULD BE CONTRARY TO US INTERESTS. IT IS NOT REALISTIC, THE AMERICANS REALISE, TO HOPE THAT THE IRANIANS WILL, IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, SEE THEIR INTEREST AS LYING IN CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE USA: NEVERTHELESS, THE AMERICANS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE IRANIANS WILL NOT PERCEIVE THE DANGERS OF COMPLETE ISOLATION, NOT TO MENTION THEIR DEPENDENCE UPON AMERICAN EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. THEY HAVE SENT MESSAGES TO IRAN EXPLAINING THE AWACS EXERCISE: THEY WANT TO GET IT ACROSS TO THE IRANIANS THAT THEY ARE NOT IN LEAGUE WITH THE IRAQIS AND THAT US POLICY IS TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF IRAN.

(F) LOOKING A LITTLE FURTHER AHEAD, THE US/ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP MAY BY AFFECTED BY THE EXISTENCE OF US DEFENCE FACILITIES IN EGYPT AND OMAN AND PERHAPS IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES MAY ALREADY BE WORRIED BY THIS AS THEY ARE THE US CANCELLATION OF STRATEGIC TALKS AND NAVAL MANOEUVRES.

2. AS I HAVE SUGGESTED, IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO THINK THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE FORMULATED CLEAR-CUT POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO RECENT EVENTS. NEVERTHELESS, THE SCENE HAS SHIFTED AND THERE DOES SEEM TO BE SCOPE FOR US MOVEMENT BEYOND THE CONFINES OF RECENT YEARS: AND A THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES AT STAKE, OF THE MEANS OF CONSULTATION ABOUT POLICIES, AND INDEED OF WHAT THOSE POLICIES SHOULD BE, SHOULD BE AMONG THE FIRST PRIORITIES FOR ALL OF US AFTER THE NOVEMBER ELECTION.

3. PARIS, PLEASE SHOW BULLARD.
HENDERSON

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FM MUSCAT 040938Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 283 OF 4 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, ROUTINE BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA

WASHINGTON TELNO 41644 IRAQ/IRAN/OMAN

1. I COMPARED NOTES WITH MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE THIS MORNING. WE AGREED LARGELY ON HOW AND WHY THE PROPOSED IRAQI OPERATION HAD BEEN PUT ON AND THEN CALLED OFF, THOUGH I DID NOT REPEAT NOT REVEAL MY CONVERSATION WITH BENNETT (PARA 7 AND 8 OF MY TELNO 279). WILEY SAID THAT WHEN HE SAW THE SULTAN IN SALALAH ON 1 OCTOBER TO DELIVER THE ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, THE SULTAN HAD TAKEN THE LINE THAT HE HAD KNOWN ALL ALONG THAT THE TIME LIMIT HE HAD PUT ON THE IRAQI OPERATION (TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN 48 HOURS OF THE FORMAL JAQI REQUEST ON 26 SEPTEMBER) WOULD RENDER ITS IMPLEMENTATION IMPOSSIBLE (IE PRECISELY THE INTERPRETATION ZAWI HAD GIVEN ME ON THE SAME DAY BUT ALLEGEDLY AS HIS OWN PERSONAL THOUGHT). NEVERTHELESS THE SULTAN HAD GIVEN WILEY AN ASSURANCE THAT THE EPISODE WOULD NOT BE REPEATED. ZAWAWI HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO EMPHASISE THAT AMERICAN REPRESENTATIONS HAD NOT BEEN A DECISIVE FACTOR IN CALLING OFF THE OPERATION.

3. GENERAL JONES HAD COME AND GONE. HE DID NOT CALL ON THE SULTAN, BUT WILEY WAS CONFIDENT THAT HIS TALKS WITH ZAWAWI AND GHAZALI, TOGETHER WITH HIS VISITS TO MASIRAH AND TO THE US FLEET IN THE AREA, HAD GIVEN HIM A USEFUL FEEL FOR THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE AMERICANS ARE OPERATING HERE.

4. AS REGARDS THE ACCESS AGREEMENT ASPECT (PARA 2 OF TUR) WILEY SAID THAT THE IRAQI EPISODE HAD RAISED IN AN ACUTE FORM THE DELICATE QUESTION OF THE PRECISE APPLICATION OF THE VERY GENERAL ASSURANCES GIVEN IN THE PRESIDENT'S CONFIDENTIAL LETTER TO QABOOS (DETAILS OF WHICH WILEY HAS NEVER REVEALED TO ME). HE WAS CERTAIN IN HIS OWN MIND THAT THE ASSURANCES DID NOT EXTEND TO ATTACKS PROVOKED BY THE OMANIS THEMSELVES, BUT FURTHER ELUCIDATION WOULD NO DOUBT BE REQUIRED.

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5. WHAT WAS EXERCISING WILEY ABOVE ALL ELSE WAS THE LEAKS REPORTED TODAY FROM BOTH WASHINGTON AND LONDON. HE WAS CLEAR (AND DEPRESSED) THAT THERE HAD BEEN A DELIBERATE LEAK IN WASHINGTON ABOUT AMERICAN ACTIVITY IN CONTAINING THE CONFLICT IN THE GULF AREA. WHILE THE LEAK WAS UNDERSTANDABLE IN ELECTORAL TERMS IT WAS BOUND TO UNDERMINE OMANI CONFIDENCE AND MAKE THEM EVEN LESS PREPARED TO CONSULT BEFORE EMBARKING ON SUCH VENTURES AS THE IRAQI OPERATION. WILEY ALSO REFERRED TO ALLEGED LEAKS IN LONDON TO THE EFFECT THAT BRITAIN HAD MODERATED US REACTIONS TO THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT (PERHAPS A GARBLED ACCOUNT OF THE INTERVIEW REPORTED IN VERBATIM 119/80). HE EXPECTED BOTH OF US TO BE TAKEN TO TASK BY THE OMANIS. I HAVE HAD NO SUCH INDICATIONS SO FAR, ALTHOUGH WE KNOW THAT THE OMANIS WERE ANGERED BY PHILIP WHITFIELD'S REPORT ABOUT AN IRAQI MILITARY PRESENCE HERE (PARA 6 OF MY TELNO 279).

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4198 OF 3 OCT 80

FOR NEWS DEPT.

YOUR TEL NO 1591 : IRAN/IRAQ : PRESS.

1. FOLLOWING THE WALL STREET JOURNAL STORY (MY TEL NO 4186), BRZEZINSKI EVIDENTLY WENT OVER THE GROUND WITH HENRY BRANDON (AND 3 OR 4 OTHERS) IN SOME DETAIL : BRANDON ASKED ME WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN A DIVISION OF LABOUR WHEREBY WE WORKED ON THE OMANIS AND THE AMERICANS ON THE SAUDIS (I DENIED THIS). AS AGREED WITH THE PRIVATE SECRETARY, I CONFIRMED TO HIM UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT WE AND THE AMERICANS HAD WORKED TO PREVENT THE WAR SPREADING TO THE LOWER GULF. WE CAN EXPECT THE STORY TO BREAK OUT IN FAIRLY FULL AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL TERMS.

2. TRANSCRIPT OF SOFS'S BBC INTERVIEW NOW AVAILABLE HERE.

HENDERSON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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FM MUSCAT 020703Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 279 OF 2 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY JEDDA, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, MODUK, ROUTINE BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA

MR TUNNELL'S TELNO 276 (NOT TO AMMAN): IRAN/IRAQ: OMANI INVOLVEMENT

1. FOLLOWING MY RETURN FROM LEAVE, I SAW IN SUCCESSION ON 1 OCTOBER QAIS ZAWAWI (AT MY REQUEST) AND AVM BENNETT (AT HIS).

2. ZAWAWI CONFIRMED THAT THE IRAQI OPERATION WAS OFF. IT HAD BEEN VIABLE ONLY BETWEEN 26 AND 28 SEPTEMBER (AND PERHAPS THE SULTAN HAD REALISED ALL ALONG THAT HIS CHEQUE WAS UNLIKELY TO BE CASHED). THE ONLY REMAINING IRAQI AIRCRAFT ON OMANI SOIL (THE TWO HELICOPTERS) WOULD BE LEAVING WITHIN 24 TO 48 HOURS AND THE DANGER OF IRANIAN RETALIATION HAD (SIC) THEREFORE BEEN AVERTED. (ACCORDING TO BENNETT, THE TWO AIRCRAFT ARE ONLY AWAITING ''CLEARANCE'' FOR THEIR RETURN JOURNEY).

3. I SAID THAT YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE SULTAN WHICH I HAD BROUGHT BACK WITH ME (AND WHICH ZAWAWI UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY

ONLY AWAITING ''CLEARANCE'' FOR THEIR RETURN JOURNEY).

3. I SAID THAT YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE SULTAN WHICH I HAD BROUGHT BACK WITH ME (AND WHICH ZAWAWI UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY TO HM IN SALALAH) HAD OF COURSE BEEN WRITTEN IN DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES. NEVERTHELESS I THOUGHT THAT ITS THEME - YOUR CONCERN TO AVOID WIDENING THE CONFLICT, TOGETHER WITH BRITAIN'S CONTINUING SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FOR THE SULTAN - REMAINED RELEVANT.

4. HAVING READ THE MESSAGE, ZAWAWI ENQUIRED ARCHLY WHETHER WE WOULD LIKE IT PUBLICISED. I REPLIED WITH AN EMPHATIC NEGATIVE, STRESSING THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO EMBARRASS THE OMANIS NOR TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION IN BAGHDAD THAT WE WERE TRYING TO FRUSTRATE ARAB CAUSES. ZAWAWI THOUGHT THAT A BONUS OF THE EPISODE HAD BEEN THAT THE IRAQIS (WHO HAD NATURALLY BELIEVED THAT THE BRITISH, THROUGH THEIR LSP IN THE OMANI FORCES, WOULD BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR AGAINST THE PROPOSED OPERATION) HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY OMAN'S INDEPENDENCE AS WELL AS BY HER WILLINGNESS TO HELP (CF. PARA 2 OF TUR). THE OMANIS MIGHT WELL NEED THIS CREDIT IN BAGHDAD LATER.

5. I SAID THAT SO FAR AS LSP WERE CONCERNED IT HAD BEEN MY INTENTION (ON INSTRUCTIONS), AFTER CONSULTATION WITH HIM, TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SERVICE COMMANDERS THAT IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES INVOLVING THE SULTANATE THEY WERE TO PLAY THEIR FULL PART IN DEFENDING OMANI SOIL. ZAWAWI SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT OF THIS NOR ANY OBJECTION TO MY SPEAKING TO THE SERVICE COMMANDERS IN THIS SENSE.

6. IN TRYING TO PUT AS GOOD A FACE AS POSSIBLE ON THE SULTAN'S DECISION TO ACCEDE TO THE IRAQI REQUEST FOR FACILITIES, ZAWAWI INADVERTENTLY REVEALED THAT HE HAD KNOWN OF THE DECISION SOME 12 HOURS IN ADVANCE (PRESUMABLY AFTER THE JORDANIAN APPROACH - SEE PARA 7 BELOW) AND ADMITTE ITHAT HE MUST TAKE HIS SHARE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR NOT HAVING CONTESTED IT. IN CLAIMING THAT THE SULTANATE HAD BEEN IN GOOD COMPANY (THOUGH HE AGREED WITH ME THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN POOR CONSOLATION) HE PRESSED ME FOR INFORMATION ON THE ATTITUDES OF OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO THE CONFLICT. I DREW ON YOUR TELNO 202 TO ABU DHABI AND AMMAN TELNO 368 TO YOU, AS WELL AS OTHER RECENT REPORTS, IN EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT BY AND LARGE ARAB GOVERNMENTS HAD BEEN VERY CIRCUMSPECT. ZAWAWI SAID THAT THE OMANIS HAD MADE A STATEMENT OF THEIR NEUTRALITY (THIS WAS REPORTED ON THE LOCAL RADIO ON 30 SEPTEMBER, TOGETHER WITH A DENIAL OF ANY IRAQI MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE SULTANATE WHICH WAS APPARENTLY IN

SEEN VERY CIRCUMSPECT. ZAWAWI SAID THAT THE OMANIS HAD MADE A STATEMENT OF THEIR NEUTRALITY (THIS WAS REPORTED ON THE LOCAL RADIO ON 30 SEPTEMBER, TOGETHER WITH A DENIAL OF ANY IRAQI MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE SULTANATE WHICH WAS APPARENTLY IN RESPONSE TO AN ENQUIRY FROM THE BBC, BUT NEITHER MFA NOR MINISTRY OF INFORMATION CAN PRODUCE A TEXT). HE ALSO REFERRED TO A BBC REPORT THAT KING KHALID HAD MADE AN UNCOMPROMISINGLY PRO-IRAQ STATEMENT (WHICH THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR HAD DENIED TO HIM) AND TO CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS MADE ON QATAR'S BEHALF BY SHAIKH SUHAIM (PRO-IRAQ) AND ISSA KAWARI (NEUTRAL), THOUGH ZAWAWI AGREED WITH ME THAT THE FORMER WAS HARDLY TO BE TAKEN AS REPRESENTING THE EMIR.

7. THE OBJECT OF COMMANDER SULTAN OF OMAN'S AIR FORCE IN SEEING ME WAS CLEARLY TO PUT THE BEST POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTION ON HIS OWN ROLE IN THE AFFAIR (BUT TO BE FAIR GENERAL WATTS, WHO HOLDS NO PARTICULAR BRIEF FOR BENNETT, TOLD ME HE THOUGHT CSOAF HAD DONE A GOOD JOB ON THIS OCCASION). HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN SUMMONED ON 24 SEPTEMBER TO SEE THE SULTAN IN SALALAH THE NEXT DAY. LEAVING SALALAH ON 25 SEPTEMBER WAS AHMAD LOZI, A CLOSE CONFIDANT OF KING HUSSAIN. QABOOS TOLD BENNETT THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM HUSSAIN ASKING HIM TO ACCEDE TO THE IRAQI REQUEST. BENNETT CLAIMS TO HAVE COUNSELLED CAUTION, TO HAVE REALISED AT AN EARLY STAGE THAT THIS WOULD BE UNAVAILING AND THEREFORE TO HAVE GONE ALONG WITH THE IRAQI PLAN WHILE TAKING CARE TO POINT OUT THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN ITS WAY. THE IRAQI EMISSARIES HAD ARRIVED IN SALALAH ON 26 SEPTEMBER, 12 HOURS AFTER LOZI'S DEPARTURE, WHEN QABOOS TOLD THEM OF HIS POSITIVE DECISION. THEREAFTER BENNETT HAD TAKEN THEM ROUND THE COURSE (EG TO MUSANDAM) AS A RESULT OF WHICH THEY HAD REACHED THE INDEPENDENT CONCLUSION THAT THE PROPOSED OPERATION WAS A NON-STARTER. BENNETT HAD RETURNED TO SALALAH ON 28 SEPTEMBER TO TELL THE SULTAN THIS AND TO SEEKSPERMISSION TO ''STAND DOWN''. QABOOS HAD AGREED APPARENTLY WITHOUT DEMUR, WHILE EXPRESSING SOME CONCERN ABOUT KING HUSSAIN'S REACTION. ZAWAWI WAS THEREUPON SENT POST-HASTE TO JORDAN TO EXPLAIN MATTERS (AN ITEM WHICH HE DID NOT REVEAL TO ME).

8. I ASKED BENNETT

A) WHY HE HAD NOT SEEN FIT TO REPORT THE SULTAN'S DECISION TO HMG AT ONCE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF HIS OPPOSITION TO IT, DELICATE THOUGH I REALISED HIS POSITION WOULD BE. HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL GUIDELINES GIVEN HIM BY CGS, AND THAT AS EVENTS HAD DEVELOPED IT HAD NOT PROVED NECESSARY (CF. GENERAL THE O'MORCHOE'S ACTION WITH MY

A) WHY HE HAD NOT SEEN FIT TO REPORT THE SULTAN'S DECISION TO HMG AT ONCE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF HIS OPPOSITION TO IT, DELICATE THOUGH I REALISED HIS POSITION WOULD BE. HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL GUIDELINES GIVEN HIM BY CGS, AND THAT AS EVENTS HAD DEVELOPED IT HAD NOT PROVED NECESSARY (CP. GENERAL THE O'MORCHOE'S ACTION WITH MY PREDECESSOR OVER THE UAE BORDER PROBLEM TWO YEARS AGO) SEMI COLON

B) WHETHER THE SULTAN MIGHT HAVE CALCULATED THAT THE OPERATION WAS A NON-STARTER ANYWAY. HE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS AN INTERPRETATION WHICH WE SHOULD FOSTER SEMI COLON

C) IF THE IRAQIS HAD ANY REASON TO FEEL THAT ''THE BRITISH'' HAD SABOTAGED THEIR PLAN. HE REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS, AND THAT THEY HAD NOT SAID SO AT THE TIME, THOUGH THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THEY WOULD NOT SAY SO ON RETURN TO BAGHDAD.

9. I HAVE ALSO SPOKEN ON THE LINES OF PARA 5 ABOVE TO ALL THREE SERVICE COMMANDERS (WHO, AS IT HAPPENED, WERE FOREGATHERED AT MY HOUSE LAST NIGHT AT A FAREWELL PARTY FOR CSON ARRANGED BEFORE MY RETURN.

10. IT IS CLEAR FROM OTHER CONVERSATIONS I HAVE HAD IN THE PAST TWO DAYS THAT QABOOS' DECISION TO GO ALONG WITH THE IRAQIS HAS AROUSED A STORM OF CRITICISM WITHIN THE ''ESTABLISHMENT'' (SALEM GHAZALI WAS QUOTED TO ME AS HAVING DESCRIBED IT AS ''THE WORST DECISION HIS MAJESTY HAS EVER MADE''.) AS USUAL, HOWEVER THE ''ESTABLISHMENT'' FAILED - IF IT EVER TRIED - TO DISSUADE HIM. BUT THEIR CONFIDENCE (AND OURS) IN HIM MUST HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED (QABOOS REMARKED TO CSON IN A DIFFERENT BUT NOT UNRELATED CONTEXT A COUPLE OF DAYS AGO THAT ONE HAD TO TAKE RISKS AND HE FOUND IT RATHER EXCITING TO DO SO EXCLAMATION MARK). THE AFFAIR REINFORCES THE DOUBTS ABOUT THE SULTAN'S JUDGMENT EXPRESSED IN MY DESPATCH OF 5 JULY. I THEREFORE ENDORSE MR TUNNELL'S COMMENT IN PARA 4 OF TUR THAT WE HAVE SOME HARD THINKING TO DO ON HOW TO HANDLE THE REGIME.

11. WE MAY ALSO NEED TO RECONSIDER THE POSITION OF SERVICE COMMANDERS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. IF THE OPERATION HAD GONE AHEAD WITH THE CONSEQUENCES WE ENVISAGED, BENNETT'S SILENCE WOULD HAVE LOST US TWO VALUABLE DAYS IN WHICH TO REACT (I.E. BETWEEN THE TIME BENNETT KNEW WHAT WAS AFOOT ON 25 SEPTEMBER AND THE TIME ZAWAWI SPOKE TO TUNNELL ON 27 SEPTEMBER).

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FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 021530Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1416 OF 2 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON BAGHDAD

INFO ROUTINE BONN PARIS MOSCOW NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD UKDEL NATO

MT

MY TELNO 1414: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. AT THE END OF LAST NIGHT'S ISLAMIC CONFERENCE MINISTERIAL MEETING (PARA 2 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE), AGHA SHAHI TOLD JOURNALISTS OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO THE IRAQI CEASEFIRE OFFER. THEY ARE:

(I) CESSATION OF IRANIAN MILITARY ACTION AND OF ANY AIR RECONNAISANCE OVER IRAQI TERRITORY:

(II) CESSATION OF STATEMENTS BY THE IRANIAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP REJECTING THE CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS:

(III) THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO IRANIAN MILITARY CONCENTRATIONS AT THE LINE OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO ARMIES OR ANYWHERE ON THE IRAQI BORDER.

(IV) THAT THE CEASEFIRE OFFER WOULD LAPSE IF AT THE TERMINATION OF THE SET PERIOD THERE WAS NO CLEAR PUBLIC DECLARATION BY QUOTE THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY IN IRAN UNQUOTE ACCEPTING THE CEASEFIRE AND IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. SHEMIRANI (IRAN) FLATLY REJECTED THESE CONDITIONS.

PARSONS

IMMEDIATE

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IRAN/IRAQ

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

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From the Private Secretary

2 October 1980

MESSAGE FROM CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

I enclose the text of a message to the Prime Minister from Chancellor Schmidt received here this morning. This results from the Prime Minister's message of 28 September.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G. G. H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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CONFIDENTIAL

It looks as though the French may be being even more active with the Arabs than we had thought!

GRS 135
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FM PARIS 011136Z OCT 80
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 830 OF 1 OCTOBER 1980
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON BONN AND BAGHDAD

IRAN/IRAQ: FRENCH VIEWS

1. IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH THE MINISTER (ECONOMIC) AT THE INAUGURATION OF A VIDEO-COMMUNICATIONS EXHIBITION IN CANNES ON MONDAY THE FRENCH MINISTER FOR INDUSTRY, M GIRAUD, ASKED WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO JOIN THE FRENCH IN SUPPORTING OR RE-AFFIRMING THAT THERE IS A LEGITIMATE ARAB EMIRATE CLAIM TO THE LOWER GULF ISLANDS. GIRAUD SUGGESTED THAT THIS COULD BE DONE IN RETURN FOR AN ASSURANCE BY THE IRAQIS THAT THEY WOULD NOT EXTEND THE PRESENT CONFLICT IN ORDER TO RE-POSSESS THE ISLANDS BY FORCE. IN REPLY PETRIE LIMITED HIMSELF TO DESCRIBING THE BRITISH POSITION ON THE LINES OF YOUR GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO 101. M GIRAUD'S SUGGESTION AT A CHANCE MEETING DOES NOT OF COURSE CONSTITUTE A FORMAL PROPOSAL, BUT IT MAY BE OF INTEREST TO YOU AS A POINTER TO THINKING IN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

HIBBERT.

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 4162 OF 1 OCTOBER
INFO PRIORITY JEDDA BAGHDAD KUWAIT MODUK
ROUTINE AMMAN BAHRAIN ABU DHABI DUBAI DOHA MUSCAT UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TEL 4154: IRAQ/IRAN/SAUDI ARABIA - AWACS

1. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT THE KUWAITIS HAVE ALREADY PUT OUT A FEELER ABOUT ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE FROM THE AWACS. OTHER GULF STATES ARE THOUGHT LIKELY TO FOLLOW SUIT SOON. PROVIDED THE SAUDIS AGREE (THEIR VIEWS ARE BEING SOUGHT TODAY), STATE DEPARTMENT AT WORKING LEVEL ARE INCLINED TO ACCEDE TO SUCH REQUESTS, DESPITE THE POTENTIAL RISK OF COMPROMISING DECLARED US NEUTRALITY BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN IF ANY AWACS INTELLIGENCE FINDS ITS WAY TO BAGHDAD.
2. OTHER US GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS WILL BE INVOLVED BEFORE A FINAL DECISION IS TAKEN.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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SIR J GRAHAM Sir A ACLAND
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GRS 170
CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS 011445Z OCT 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 831 OF 01 OCTOBER 1980
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD.
INFO ROUTINE BONN.
INFO SAVING TO ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO AND MOSCOW.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

TELECON LEVER/YOUNG: IRAN/IRAQ: GULF ISLANDS

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY ASKED THE DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISER AT THE ELYSEE THIS MORNING WHETHER THE FRENCH HAD HAD FURTHER CONTACT WITH THE IRAQIS OVER THE GULF ISLANDS SINCE OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE ELYSEE LAST WEEKEND. LEVITTE SAID THAT, AS FAR AS HE WAS AWARE, THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH THE IRAQIS. AS WE KNEW (SEE PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TELEGRAM NO. 825) PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD WARNED TARIQ AZIZ ON 25 SEPTEMBER OF THE DANGERS OF ANY ATTACK AGAINST THE GULF ISLANDS. LEVITTE BELIEVED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD TAKEN ON BOARD THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS. THE RISK OF AN ATTACK SEEMED TO HAVE RECEDED SOMEWHAT IN THE LAST TWO OR THREE DAYS PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE RETICENCE SHOWN BY THE GULF ARAB RULERS AND BY WESTERN LEADERS AND ALSO, OF COURSE, BECAUSE OF THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE IRAQ/IRAN FRONTIER.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

HIBBERT.

2

G E H E I M -

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
DER BUNDESKANZLER

BONN, DEN 1. OKTOBER 1980

SEHR VEREHRTE FRAU PREMIERMINISTER,
LIEBE MARGARET,

FUER IHR FERNSCHREIBEN VOM 28. SEPTEMBER DANKE ICH IHNEN. ICH TEILE IHRE BESORGNISSE UEBER DIE ENTWICKLUNG IM PERSISCHEN GOLF, DIE IN VIELERLEI HINSICHT ERNSTE GEFAHREN HERAUFBESCHWOERT. WAS UNSERE OELVERSORGUNG AUS DEM PERSISCHEN GOLF ANGEHT, SO WURDEN DIESE FRAGEN AUF DER SITZUNG DER OELMARKTGRUPPE DER INTERNATIONALEN ENERGIEAGENTUR AM 29. UND 30. SEPTEMBER IN PARIS EINGEHEND EROERTERT.

ICH WUERDE ES FUER SEHR GEFAEHRLICH HALTEN, WENN DIE KAEMPFE NOCH LAENGER ANDAUERTEN. UNSERE BOTSCHAFTER IN BAGDAD UND TEHERAN WURDEN DAHER ANGEWIESENN DIE PRAESIDENTEN BEIDER LAENDER AUFZUSCHEN UND UNSER DRINGENDES INTERESSE ZU UNTERSTREICHEN, DIE KAMPFHANDLUNGEN ZU LOKALISIEREN, SIE SOBALD WIE MOEGLICH ZU BEENDEN UND DIE FREIE SCHIFFAHRT IM GOLF ZU GEWAEHRLEISTEN. DAS GLEICHE IST HIER DEM IRAKISCHEN BOTSCHAFTER UND DEM IRANISCHEN GESCHAEFTSTRAEGER MITGETEILT WORDEN.

ICH BIN EBENFALLS DER AUFFASSUNG, DASZ WIR UNS WEGEN DER WEITEREN ENTWICKLUNG ENG UND SORGFAELTIG KONSULTIEREN SOLLTEN. HIERFUER HALTE AUCH ICH ES FUER WUENSCHENSWERT, DASZ DIE VIER POLITISCHEN DIREKTOREN HIERUEBER IM RAHMEN UNSERER BEWAEHRTEN VIERER-ZUSAMMENARBEIT KONSULTATIONEN AUFNEHMEN. ICH DENKE, DASZ DIE FRANZOESISCHE SEITE ALSBALD NACH M. FRANCOIS-PONCETS RUECKKEHR AUS NEW YORK HIERZU EINLADEN WIRD. WIR SIND AN EINER BALDIGEN EINBERUFUNG EINES SOLCHEN TREFFENS SEHR INTERESSIERT.
MIT FREUNDLICHEN GRUESZEN
YOUR
HELMUT SCHMIDT

- S E C R E T -

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR

BONN, 1. OCTOBER 1980

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T194/80.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,
DEAR MARGARET,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TELEGRAM OF 28 SEPTEMBER. I SHARE YOUR CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF WHICH IN VARIOUS WAYS HAVE GIVEN RISE TO SERIOUS DANGER. AS REGARDS OUR OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE PERSIAN GULF, THESE MATTERS WERE DISCUSSES IN DEPTH AT THE MEETING OF

THE OIL MARKET GROUP OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY ON 29 AND 30 SEPTEMBER IN PARIS.

IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS IF THE FIGHTING WERE TO CONTINUE FOR MUCH LONGER. OUR AMBASSADORS IN BAGHDAD AND THRAN HAVE THEREFORE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CALL IN THE PRESIDENTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES TO STRESS

THAT WE CONSIDER IT URGENTLY NECESSARY THAT THE FIGHTING SHOULD BE LOCALIZED AND STOPPED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND THAT FREE PASSAGE FOR

SHIPPING IN THE GULF SHOULD BE GUARANTEED. THE SAME HAS BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR AND THE IRANIAN CHARGE D AFFAIRES IN BONN.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE CHOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. I, TOO, DEEM IT DESIRABLE THAT THE FOUR POLITICAL DIRECTORS SHOULD BEGIN CONSULTATIONS ON THIS MATTER WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CO-OPERATION WITHIN THE GROUP OF FOUR WHICH HAS PROVED SO VALUABLE UP TO NOW. I THINK THAT THE FRENCH SIDE WILL SEND OUT INVITATIONS FOR A MEETING OF THIS KIND AS SOON AS M. FRANCOIS-PONCET RETURNS FROM NEW YORK. WE WOULD LIKE THE MEETING TO BE HELD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

YOURS SINCERELY,
HELMUT SCHMIDT

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Prime Minister

Ref. A03098

MR. ALEXANDER

While I was in Washington on Thursday, 25th September 1980 for a meeting of Personal Representatives, I called on Dr. Brzezinski at the White House, at his request, at 3.00 pm that day.

2. At that stage the Prime Minister's reply to the message from the President about contingency planning in relation to the situation in the Gulf had not yet been received in the White House. I was able to assure Dr. Brzezinski that the President could expect a prompt and positive answer. I reported separately by telegram what Dr. Brzezinski told me about the French response.

3. We agreed that the conflict was unlikely to be brought to an end until the Iraqis had achieved their objectives, whatever those were. At present they seemed to be limited, and not far short of being realised; but it could well be that the objectives themselves might be extended, if Iraqi operations on the ground continued to be successful. It would not be possible to expect an end to the fighting for at least another few days. Dr. Brzezinski said that the statement which had been made by the President the previous day had been designed primarily to reassure and calm oil markets, with a view to avoiding the development of the sort of scramble and price rise which followed the Iranian revolution and the Shah's departure into exile. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we should consider making a similar statement. (I was able to mention this to the Secretary of State for Energy in the British Embassy at Washington later that day, and he said that his meeting the following day with the American Secretary for Energy might provide the opportunity for saying something of that kind.)

4. Dr. Brzezinski and I briefly discussed the situation in Afghanistan. We agreed that it appeared that the Russians were not intending significantly to increase their own commitment in the country, but were settling down for a long haul. Dr. Brzezinski said that there were signs that the Russians were seeking to train an Afghan force capable of taking more of the load of "pacification" off the Soviet troops.

5. On Poland, we agreed that the Polish Government, under pressure from the Soviet Government, would be at pains to try to whittle away concessions that had been won. The danger of Soviet military intervention was not by any means past, though there were no signs of preparation for it at present. Dr. Brzezinski drew a parallel with Czechoslovakia in 1968: he said that, if one set out a schedule of the events of 1968, what had happened so far in Poland appeared to take one about half way through that schedule. The parallels were in many respects disturbingly similar. But he thought that the Soviet Government would be very reluctant to intervene in Poland, partly because of their commitments elsewhere and partly because they could expect more resistance in Poland than they encountered in Czechoslovakia, including resistance by the Polish Army.

6. We very briefly discussed crisis management. I said that it had been a convenient coincidence that at the time of the conflict in the Persian Gulf Foreign Ministers had been assembled in New York for the United Nations General Assembly, and it had been possible to have consultations speedily at a high level. Dr. Brzezinski agreed that that had been convenient, and thought that we should need to provide ourselves with machinery for quadripartite consultation which could if necessary be quickly and discreetly activated. We did not pursue this discussion in detail, though I commended the proposals for consultation in Paris discussed by the four Foreign Ministers in New York.

7. Dr. Brzezinski said that he hoped that after the election we might think in terms of another meeting of the kind which we had had with Monsieur Wahl and Herr von Staden in Venice. Again, and for obvious reasons, we did not pursue this, though we agreed to be in touch after the election.

8. I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr. Walden.

RCA

(Robert Armstrong)

30th September, 1980

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DESKBY 010830Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 302223Z SEPT 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1405 OF 30 SEPTEMBER.
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD AND UKDEL NATO.

MY TEL NO 1399: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. AT IRAQI REQUEST, SAADOUN HAMMADI MET MUSKIE AT NOON TODAY (29 SEPTEMBER).

2. THE US MISSION (PLEASE PROTECT) HAS GIVEN US AN ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSION. MUSKIE BEGAN BY EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING. IF THE SEA LANES WERE PLACED IN JEOPARDY, THE US WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO ABOUT DEFENDING THEM. MUSKIE EXPLAINED THAT THE AWAC'S HAD BEEN SENT TO SAUDI ARABIA AT SAUDI REQUEST. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM HAMMADI ABOUT WHAT THE US WANTED, MUSKIE SAID THAT THE US WOULD LIKE TO SEE AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THESE COULD COVER THE 1975 TREATIES, THE NEW TERRITORIES REQUIRED BY THE IRAQIS, AND POSSIBLY THE THREE GULF ISLANDS.

3. HAMMADI SAID THAT IRAQ HAD NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS AND WOULD ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT CONDITIONS. THIS POSITION WAS DESIGNED TO ATTRACT THE IRANIANS, THOUGH IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO GET THEM TO THE TABLE. THEY WOULD EVENTUALLY COME, HOWEVER, EITHER BECAUSE OF IRAQI MILITARY PRESSURE OR BECAUSE OF A CRUMBLING OF THE IRANIAN REGIME. FOR MUSKIE'S OWN INFORMATION, THE TWO IRAQI NON-NEGOTIABLE CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT WERE A REVERSION TO THE TRADITIONAL AND HISTORICAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER IRAQI LANDS, INCLUDING THE SHATT-AL-ARAB, AND A GUARANTEE FROM THE IRANIANS OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN IRAQI INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

4. HAMMADI ASKED ABOUT HINTS IN THE US PRESS THAT THE AMERICANS WERE PREPARED TO DO A DEAL WITH THE IRANIANS ON SPARE PARTS IN RETURN FOR THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. MUSKIE ADAMANTLY DENIED THIS.

5. THROUGHOUT THE TALKS HAMMADI STRESSED THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD BE PATIENT. THE QUESTION OF FURTHER SECUPITY COUNCIL ACTION OR HIS APPEARANCE BEFORE IT DID NOT ARISE. IN CONCLUSION, HAMMADI DECLARED THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT GO BACK TO THE PRE-1975 SITUATION AND ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF THE US AND HER ALLIES IF THE CURRENT REGIME IN IRAN WAS QUOTE CUT DOWN TO SIZE UNQUOTE.

/6. WALDHEIM

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6. WALDHEIM THIS EVENING ISSUED THE REPORT CALLED FOR IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 479. THE ONLY POINT OF INTEREST IT CONTAINS IS THE NEWS THAT THE IRANIAN MISSION HERE HAS TOLD WALDHEIM THAT HE WILL RECEIVE AN OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL FOR A CEASE-FIRE BY THE MORNING OF 1 OCTOBER.

PARSONS

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 370 OF 30 SEP 80

INFO PRIORITY TO ABU DAHBI ALGIERS ANKARA BAGHDAD BAHRAIN DAMASCUS DOHA DUBAI JEDDA KUWAIT MUSCAT TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

Read in full

JORDAN AND THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT

1. KING HUSSEIN SENT CROWN PRINCE HASSAN TO BAGHDAD ON 29 SEPTEMBER WITH A MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT SADDAM EXPRESSING JORDAN'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQ. ACCORDING TO ACCOUNTS IN TODAY'S JORDANIAN PRESS THE MESSAGE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE RECOVERY OF ALL LANDS BELONGING TO IRAQ AND OF IRAQ'S RIGHTS IN THE SHATT AL ARAB AND ALSO TO THE RESTORATION OF THE 3 ARAB ISLANDS IN THE GULF SEIZED BY IRAN AND TO THE NEED FOR AN END TO THREATS OF DOMINATION BY IRAN OVER OTHER ARAB GULF COUNTRIES. THE MESSAGE ALSO CALLED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ARAB/IRANIAN RELATIONS ON A NEW AND SOUNDER FOOTING SO THAT THE GULF CEASED TO BE AN AREA OF TENSION AND RIVALRY.

2. THE JORDANIAN NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL MEETING ON 29 SEPTEMBER, AFTER HEARING A STATEMENT BY THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER, ALSO DECLARED ITS FULL SUPPORT FOR IRAQ IN ITS BATTLE TO '' LIBERATE USURPED ARAB LANDS'' AND APPEALED TO OTHER ARAB STATES TO RALLY BEHING IRAQ REGARDLESS OF THEIR DIFFERENCES. THE COUNCIL CALLED ON ISLAMIC COUNTRIES TO ''AVERT FURTHER BLOODSHED AMONG MOSLEM BROTHERS AND PUT AN END TO THE WAR'' AND CALLED ON ARAB STATES TO REJECT ANY INTERVENTION IN THE GULF, ESPECIALLY ON THE PART OF THE BIG POWERS.

3. KING HUSSEIN'S RECEPTION OF THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS IN AMMAN YESTERDAY IS ALSO WIDELY REPORTED IN TODAY'S PRESS. ADNAN ABU ODEH, THE JORDANIAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION (HE IS ALSO ACTING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHILE THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IS IN NEW YORK) WHOM I SAY THIS MORNING TOLD ME THAT THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD NOT BROUGHT ANY SPECIAL MESSAGE TO JORDAN AND THAT HE HAD MERELY BEEN TRANSITING AMMAN ON HIS WAY TO NEW YORK.

4. ABU ODEH WAS STILL EXPECTING THE PAKISTANI PRESIDENT TO COME THROUGH AMMAN LATER TODAY ON HIS WAY FROM BAGHDAD TO NEW YORK AS HIS AIRCRAFT IS APPARENTLY STILL HERE (ALTHOUGH THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR DOES NOT THINK HE WILL DO SO: SEE MY TELNO 366, NOT TO ALL). ABU ODEH SAID THAT THE JORDANIANS KNEW OF NO OTHER PEACE INITIATIVES AT PRESENT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS AWARE OF PRESS REPORTS THAT KUWAIT AND ALGERIA MIGHT BE TRUING TO MOUNT SOME FORM OF MEDIATION. WHILE WELL AWARE THAT IRAN'S MILITARY

CAPABILITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE AIR AND AT SEA, WAS BY NO MEANS EXHAUSTED, ABU ODEH WAS CLEARLY HOPING FOR AN EARLY END TO THE FIGHTING AND OPINED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR ALL OF US IF IRAQ CAME OUT ON TOP.

5. WE STILL HAVE LITTLE OR NO EVIDENCE OF DIRECT JORDANIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ AND BOTH KING HUSSEIN IN SPEAKING TO ME AND THE JORDANIAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN DISCUSSION WITH MY DEFENCE ATTACHE TODAY (REPORTED SEPARATELY TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, COPY TO FCO) HAVE CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT ANY SUCH HELP HAD BEEN REQUESTED. WE KNOW THAT TWO IRAQI MILITARY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT WERE IN JORDAN FOR A WHILE AND THAT SOME IRAQI CIVIL AIRCRAFT ARE ALSO ON JORDANIAN AIRFIELDS (REPORTED BY MY AIR ATTACHE TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE TODAY). REPORTS BY TRAVELLERS OF JORDANIAN MILITARY VEHICLES HEADING TOWARDS IRAQ APPEAR TO BE WITHOUT FOUNDATION. ISRAELI PRESS REPORTS OF JORDANIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ SEEM (ACCORDING TO MY US COLLEAGUE: PLEASE PROTECT) TO FORM PART OF A WAR OF NERVES BEING CONDUCTED BY THE ISRAELIS AGAINST JORDAN AND US/JORDANIAN RELATIONS IN PARTICULAR.

6. THE JORDANIANS ARE, HOWEVER, HELPING THE IRAQIS IN OTHER WAYS. FOR EXAMPLE IRAQI CARGOES (CIVIL, AS FAR AS WE KNOW) ARE BEING GIVEN PRIORITY AT AQABA WITH THE RESULT THAT AQABA PORT IS NOW SERIOUSLY CONGESTED AND THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES ARE HAVING PROBLEMS IN FINDING SUFFICIENT LORRIES TO CARRY FREIGHT TO IRAQ (SEE OUR TELNO CREDA 114 OF 30 SEPTEMBER TO DOT).

7. THE JORDANIANS REMAIN VERY PREOCCUPIED OVER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE IRANIANS MAY BE RECEIVING MILITARY SPARES THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES, A QUESTION KING HUSSEIN RAISED WITH ME ON 28 SEPTEMBER (SEE PARAS 3 AND 8 OF MY TELNO 363). MY US COLLEAGUE TOLD ME TODAY THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD TELEPHONED HIM AT MIGNIGHT ON 28 SEPTEMBER IMMEDIATELY AFTER HE HAD SEEN THE PAKISTANI PRESIDENT: PRESIDENT ZIA HAD APPARENTLY TOLD THE KING THAT THE IRANIANS HAD ASSURED HIM THEY WERE RECEIVING ALL THE MILITARY SPARES THEY NEEDED. THE US AMBASSADOR WAS ABLE TO GIVE THE KING A FIRM ASSURANCE THE FOLLOWING MORNING, ON THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON, THAT THE US WAS NOT SENDING ANY MILITARY SPARES TO IRAN AND WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO GRANT PERMISSION FOR THIRD COUNTRIES TO DO SO IF THEY WERE CONSULTED.

URWICK

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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PREM 19/1148

UN Special Sessions on Disarmament.

UNITED NATIONS

PTI: February 1982.

PREM 19/1148

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~12.2.82~~		~~21.6.82~~					
~~18.2.82~~		~~24.6.82~~					
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~~3.3.82~~		~~25.6.82~~					
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~~16.3.82~~		~~6.7.82~~					
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~~19.4.82~~							
~~19.5.82~~							
~~27.5.82~~							
~~1.6.82~~							
~~10.6.82~~							
~~15.6.82~~							

PART 1 ends:-

AJC to FCO. 19.10.83

PART 2. begins:-

PGRGZ du. CUBLAR TO PM. 4.2.88

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(82) 35th Meeting, item 3	24/06/1982

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray Date 18/2/2013

PREM Records Team

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 October, 1983

UK Attitude Towards Disarmament at the UNGA

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 18 October.

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CC Sec AP (2).

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 October 1983

Prime Minister.

F.C.O. conclusions on how we should handle disarmament resolutions at this year's UNGA.

A.J.C. 19/10

Jan John.

UK Attitude Towards Disarmament at the UNGA

I am writing about the approach we should adopt towards the debate on disarmament issues in the UN First Committee this autumn, in the light of the views expressed by the Prime Minister to Sir John Thomson and Sir Antony Acland during her visit to New York. At that time the Prime Minister instructed that a greater effort should be made at the UN to present our case on disarmament more clearly and effectively in the First Committee, and to put forward our own proposals for progress in this area even when on occasion they would not command overwhelming support. You may find it useful to have a brief account of where matters now stand.

Following the Prime Minister's visit to New York, FCO Ministers considered the issue in detail. Sir Geoffrey Howe endorsed last week instructions to our Mission to the UN and to our Disarmament Delegation (which has the lead role in the First Committee), in line with the views expressed by the Prime Minister. In summary our representatives were instructed to review this area with special care and, following close consultation between the FCO and MOD, to pursue the possibilities of making our voting record on UN disarmament issues more attractive to domestic public opinion; to continue to avoid giving even UN respectability to resolutions with adverse implications to our security or other national interests; and to explore in the "Barton" Group of Western countries and with our closest Allies the balance of advantage in placing our views firmly on the record, even with the prospect of significant opposition being registered by other UN members.

We recognise that such an approach could give rise to new problems, particularly in the context of the UN, where the insistence by the Soviet Union, her allies and leading members of the non-aligned on "disarmament by declaration" provide an in-built majority for resolutions often contrary to Western interests. It is worth noting also that our own record in previous years of resisting such measures has been criticised by the Government's opponents and others who misunderstand the nature of the debate or the issues at stake. A review of our earlier record suggests that we will have little scope for changing our votes this year; indeed, we must expect that in 1983 we will face even more resolutions which we cannot accept.

/Our representatives

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Our representatives in New York have been instructed to continue to work for consensus on disarmament resolutions wherever this is possible without sacrifice of principle. They have also been told to encourage our Western partners to support separate Western resolutions on issues where the non-aligned and the Eastern Bloc are determined to press unacceptable proposals to a final vote which they will inevitably win. As a result, a contrary Western resolution may appear, in UN terms, to be a defeat for the West. However, it will enable us to get our own views firmly on the record and to make our subsequent justification of our voting record to domestic opinion that much easier. We do not under-estimate the problems for obtaining the necessary support for this strategy from enough of our Western partners to make it worthwhile (the Irish and the Greeks, at least, can be relied upon to be positively unhelpful); and we recognise that it may therefore be more prudent on occasion not to press our resolution to a final vote but to withdraw it at the last moment, having formally recorded our views in the earlier stages of the debate.


In the light of our experience during this session of the First Committee, we will review the application of similar tactics at subsequent sessions of the UN.

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

010

UNITED NATIONS
Special Session on Disarmament
1982



UN.

RM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 19 July, 1982

SECOND UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of the minute of 13 July by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

F Richards, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

(2)

Prime Minister

To note.

A.J.C. 13/7

PM/82/57

PRIME MINISTER

Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament

1. The Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament ended on Saturday, 10 July without agreement being reached on the main items on the agenda. The Session confined itself to a consensus report of proceedings, and reached agreement on guidelines for a World Disarmament Campaign to be run by the United Nations within its existing budget. The guidelines call for unimpeded access to information in East and West alike.

2. The Special Session opened with national statements by leaders of delegations. Of the 19 heads of state and government who addressed the Assembly, 10 were from the West. Your own statement on 23 June, stressing that the fundamental issues were how to defend peace with freedom, and how arms control could contribute to the fulfilment of that task, was very well received. Mr Gromyko's statement, containing a message from President Brezhnev pledging that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, was the basis of the Russian approach to the Session. Western speakers exposed the pledge as incomplete when compared with the NATO undertaking that no Alliance weapons would be used except in response to an attack. Amongst the Non-Aligned, moderate opinion was in the ascendant at first under the leadership of Pakistan. But as the Session progressed, the hard line advocated by India, Brazil and Mexico prevailed and ensured that differences could not be bridged.

3. The two main items on the agenda, a review of progress since the First Special Session in 1978 and a draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and the guidelines for a World Disarmament Campaign, were discussed in Working Groups. On the first two items, it was the insistence of the Non-Aligned on nuclear disarmement in accordance with a strict timetable, and their refusal to consider parallel discussion of conventional disarmament, which prevented agreement being reached. Our Delegation made it clear that we could only subscribe to measures of nuclear disarmement which maintain or enhance security, and thus

protected our position against demands for nuclear disarmament which might call into question our policy for defence through deterrence.

4. We made particular efforts to co-ordinate the defence of Western interests at the Session as a way of ensuring that we were not dangerously isolated. These efforts were successful. The Russians will nevertheless now seek to lay on NATO responsibility for the failure of the Special Session to reach agreement. It will be some time before the Non-Aligned, the promoters of the Session, take stock of their position and their inability to extract additional commitments for nuclear disarmament. Non-Governmental Organisations in this country will be disappointed at the outcome of the Session and may be critical of our role there. But we steadily advised them not to expect much of the Session and we can point to our efforts to widen public understanding of disarmament issues through support for a World Disarmament Campaign.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
13 July 1982



1) Mr Holmes
2) Prime Minister

United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
845 Third Avenue New York NY 10022

R P Nash Esq
UND
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 026/6

Date 6 July 1982

Dear Ronald,

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT

1. I enclose a letter from the Secretary General to the Prime Minister, together with a copy for your files, expressing thanks for the photograph which Mrs Thatcher gave him on 23 June. Although dated 26 June, it did not reach us until 2 July and missed Friday's bag.

Yours ever,

M I Goulding

Mr Holmes (Private office)
Could you possibly pass this on to No 10?
Ronald Nash
7/7

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

26 June 1982

Excellency,

I should like to thank you for the photograph which you so kindly gave to me during your recent visit to the United Nations.

You may be sure that I very much appreciated this thoughtful gesture. Let me also take this opportunity to thank you again for your very constructive participation in the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and for the extremely useful discussions we were able to have on this occasion.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

Her Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
London

COPY/COPIE

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

26 June 1982

Excellency,

I should like to thank you for the photograph which you so kindly gave to me during your recent visit to the United Nations.

You may be sure that I very much appreciated this thoughtful gesture. Let me also take this opportunity to thank you again for your very constructive participation in the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and for the extremely useful discussions we were able to have on this occasion.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

Her Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
London

SUBJECT cc Master ops

US Declassified

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

29 June 1982

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T 139 A/82

Dear Ron,

It was as always a pleasure to see you last Wednesday and I much enjoyed the opportunity for a good talk. Thank you very much for all the arrangements which were made.

The last three months have been a difficult period and I remain most grateful for all the support and help which we have received from the United States.

I was sorry to hear of Al Haig's resignation. I am writing to thank him for all his help. Such changes, whatever the reasons, are always sad. But as you know George Schultz is very highly regarded here and we shall be delighted to work with him. There will be much for America and Britain to do together in the months ahead.

Yours ever,

Margaret

The President of the United States of America

file DSG
cc Ro

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 June 1982

Dear Tony,

Many thanks for all you did for me in New York on Tuesday and Wednesday last. It was a pleasure to see you again.

I am sad to think that I am now writing to a retired member of the Diplomatic Service. You have given the country splendid service, and you know how especially grateful I am to you for your cool advice and well-directed activity during these last three months. I thought it right to say so in the House of Commons on Thursday. As you will see from the enclosed extract from Hansard, others joined in.

Thank you. My best wishes to Lady Parsons. Enjoy your retirement. It will not be entirely uninterrupted by further work - indeed it would be a waste if it were - but you have certainly earned some rest.

We shall look forward to seeing you on your return.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Sir Anthony Parsons, G.C.M.G., M.V.O., M.C.

A16

file

da

cc FCO

UN

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 June 1982

Dear Secretary-General.

I write to thank you most warmly for the arrangements made for my visit to New York on 23 June. I much enjoyed our talks and shall remember with special pleasure the lunch which you so kindly gave for me. I am much looking forward to seeing you here on 14 July.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Senor Perez de Cuellar

da

FILE

da

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 June 1982

Dear Nicko,

Thank you for the arrangements made for my very brief visit to Washington on Wednesday - and please pass on my thanks to the members of your staff. It was an agreeable way to end a hectic day.

I hope you will manage to have a rather quieter time now than has been possible in the last three months. Everyone here remains full of admiration for all you did to present the British case in America during that time.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Sir Nicholas Henderson, G.C.M.G.

What astonishing events after left. I am so sorry Pt Haig resigned. MT

da

US Declassified

3

SUBJECT

UN

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 138/82

CAB/WTE 001/25

ZZ WTE

FLASH

SECRET

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FM NO.10 DOWNING STREET
TO WHITE HOUSE

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Also cc
Sec Unit
Expats USSR
Part 2

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

DEAR RON,

WHEN WE DISCUSSED ON 23 JUNE THE EFFECT ON JOHN BROWN ENGINEERING (JBE) OF AMERICAN SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, YOU TOLD ME THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMPANY HAD INDICATED RECENTLY TO YOUR OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON THAT THE DECISION TO EXTEND THE SANCTIONS WOULD NOT CAUSE THEM GREAT FINANCIAL DISTRESS. I SAID THAT I WOULD ENQUIRE INTO THE MATTER AND ADVISE YOU FURTHER.

JBE'S VIEWS HAVE BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON. THE COMPANY'S REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR TO US OFFICIALS THEIR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE FAR REACHING RESULTS OF THE COMPANY BEING FORCED BY RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION TO ABANDON A CONTRACT WHICH THEY ENTERED INTO IN GOOD FAITH AT A TIME WHEN THE GOODS CONCERNED WERE NOT EMBARGOED. LAST WEEK THEY CONFIRMED TO US OFFICIALS THAT FAILURE TO SHIP THE TURBINES WOULD HAVE VERY DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES. THE PRECISE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE CAUSED CANNOT BE ASSESSED AT PRESENT. AT WORST UNINSURED COSTS AND DAMAGES COULD BE AS MUCH AS POUNDS STERLING 100 MILLION. JBE COULD WELL BE FORCED OUT OF BUSINESS AND THIS WOULD LEAD TO 1700 JOB LOSSES IN THE COMPANY IN AREAS OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT IN SCOTLAND: THERE WOULD ALSO BE EFFECTS UPON COMPONENT SUPPLIERS. THE STABILITY OF THE GROUP AS A WHOLE MIGHT BE THREATENED. THE CHAIRMAN OF JOHN BROWN HAS CONFIRMED THESE FACTS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE SINCE OUR MEETING IN WASHINGTON.

WE SEE THE FURTHER MEASURES WHICH YOU ANNOUNCED ON 18 JUNE AS WRONG IN PRINCIPLE BECAUSE OF THEIR EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION DIRECTLY TO BRITISH COMPANIES. THEY WILL IF PROCEEDED WITH CAUSE SERIOUS ECONOMIC DAMAGE IN THE UK QUITE APART FROM ADDING TO JBE'S PROBLEMS. WE ARE ALREADY RECEIVING REPORTS OF BRITISH COMPANIES FACED WITH LOSSES OR THE THREAT OF CLOSURE AS A RESULT OF THESE MEASURES. YOUR PEOPLE WILL TELL YOU THAT WE HAVE STRONGLY OPPOSED THE EXERCISE OF EXTRA-TERRITORIAL POWERS IN THE PAST, AND ARE THEREFORE BOUND TO REACT TO ITS NEW EXTENSION.

AS YOU KNOW, THE VIEWS AND POLICIES OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ARE IN VERY CLOSE HARMONY. IT WOULD BE UNHAPPY IF, IN PUBLIC EYES, THIS HARMONY WERE TO BE OVERSHADOWED BY THE VERY SEVERE CONSEQUENCES OF YOUR MEASURES FOR BRITISH COMPANIES. I THEREFORE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE WILLING TO RECONSIDER THESE MEASURES IN THE WIDER POLITICAL, AS WELL AS THE SPECIFICALLY ECONOMIC, CONTEXT.

JBE'S PROBLEM IS NOW BOTH VERY SERIOUS AND URGENT. I WOULD GREATLY VALUE YOUR HELP IN SOLVING THIS PROBLEM BY 2 JULY WHEN THE FIRST SHIPMENTS ARE DUE.

MY BEST WISHES,
MARGARET.

BT

NNNN

SENT 251908Z JH

RG RG QSL UR MSG AT 1908Z AND PLS IF U HAVE TRF AGAIN
TO GIVE US SOME BELLS ONT TYY
TTYN KKK

Hot Line - Flash

SECRET

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Dear Ron,

When we discussed on 23 June the effect on John Brown Engineering (JBE) of American sanctions against the Soviet Union, you told me that representatives of the company had indicated recently to your officials in Washington that the decision to extend the sanctions would not cause them great financial distress. I said that I would enquire into the matter and advise you further.

JBE's views have been misunderstood in Washington. The company's representatives have repeatedly made clear to US officials their deep concern about the far reaching results of the company being forced by retrospective legislation to abandon a contract which they entered into in good faith at a time when the goods concerned were not embargoed. Last week they confirmed to US officials that failure to ship the turbines would have very damaging consequences. The precise extent of the damage caused cannot be assessed at present. At worst uninsured costs and damages could be as much as £100 million. JBE could well be forced out of business and this would lead to 1700 job losses in the company in areas of high unemployment in Scotland; there would also be effects upon component suppliers. The stability of the group as a whole might be threatened. The Chairman of John Brown has confirmed these facts to the Secretary of State for Trade since our meeting in Washington.

We see the further measures which you announced on 18 June as wrong in principle because of their extra-territorial application directly to British companies. They will if proceeded with cause serious economic damage in the UK quite apart from adding to JBE's problems. We are already receiving reports of British companies faced with losses or the threat of closure as a result of these measures. Your people will tell you that we have strongly opposed the exercise of extra-territorial powers in the past, and are therefore bound to react to its new extension.

/ As you know,

SECRET

As you know, the views and policies of our two governments on relations with the Communist countries are in very close harmony. It would be unhappy if, in public eyes, this harmony were to be overshadowed by the very severe consequences of your measures for British companies. I therefore hope that you will be willing to reconsider these measures in the wider political, as well as the specifically economic, context.

JBE's problem is now both very serious and urgent. I would greatly value your help in solving this problem by 2 July when the first shipments are due.

My best wishes,
Margaret.

10 DOWNING STREET

Duty Clerk

1) Please despatch the message to President Reagan on the hot line as soon as possible today.

2) Please copy it to
Mr. Rees DOT
Mr. Holmes F/C.O.
Mr. Spencer DOI.

A.J.C. 25/6

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE 1 VICTORIA STREET LONDON SW1H 0ET Telephone 01-215 7877

2

SECRET

From the Secretary of State

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
London SWI

25th June 1982

Dear John,

As requested in your letter of 24 June to Brian Fall, I attach a draft message for the Prime Minister to send to President Reagan. This has been cleared at official level with the FCO. The passage on JBE has been cleared with Sir John Mayhew Sanders.

We are now receiving reports from a number of British subsidiaries of US companies about the effects of the new measures announced on 18 June. It is too early to assess the full effect but by way of example the Walter Kidde Co, employing 700 people in Northolt has reported that a major part of its current order book is tied up with the Siberian Gas Pipeline and that it may go out of business if the new measures are not withdrawn.

I am copying this to the recipients of yours, Brian Fall and Jonathan Spencer (Industry).

Yours ever,

Jonathan Rees

JONATHAN REES
Private Secretary

SECRET

DRAFT

Addressed to:

~~The Hon Ronald Reagan~~

File No.

Copies to:

Enclosures:

Originated by:
(Initials and date)

PMSC 25/6/82

Seen by:
(Initials and date)

Type for signature of

PM

(Initials and date)

Dear Ron

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE

When we discussed on 23 June the effect on John Brown Engineering (JBE) of American sanctions against the Soviet Union, you told me that representatives of the company had indicated recently to your officials in Washington that the decision to extend the sanctions would not cause them great financial distress. I said that I would enquire into the matter and advise you further.

JBE's views have been misunderstood in Washington. The company's representatives have repeatedly made clear to US officials their deep concern about the far reaching results of the company being forced by retrospective legislation to abandon a contract which they entered into in good faith at a time when the goods concerned were not embargoed. Last week they confirmed to US officials that failure to ship the turbines would have very damaging consequences. The precise extent of the damage caused cannot be assessed at present. At worst uninsured costs and damages could be as much as £100m. JBE could well be forced out of business and this would lead to 1700 job

losses in the company in areas of high unemployment in Scotland; there would also be effects upon component suppliers. The stability of the group as a whole might be threatened. The Chairman of John Brown has confirmed these facts ~~the foregoing~~ to the Secretary of State for Trade since our meeting in Washington.

3 We are The further measures which you announced on 18 June are ~~objectionable~~ wrong in principle ~~to us~~ because of their extra-territorial application directly to British companies. They will if proceeded with cause serious economic damage in the UK quite apart from adding to JBE's problems. We are already receiving reports of British companies faced with losses or the threat of closure as a result of these measures. Your people will tell you that we have strongly opposed the exercise of extra-territorial powers in the past, and are therefore bound to react to its new extension.

4 As you know, the views and policies of our two governments on relations with the Communist countries are in very close harmony. ~~We have given you a great deal of support in your efforts to promote a greater degree of prudence in the management of East/West economic relations.~~ It would be unhelpful if, in public eyes, this harmony were to be overshadowed by the very severe consequences of your measures for British companies. I therefore hope that you will be willing to reconsider these measures in the wider political, as well as the specifically economic, context.

5 JBE's problem is now both very serious and urgent. I would greatly value your help in solving this problem by 2 July when the first shipments are due.

~~With~~ My best wishes

Margaret.

United States (Prime Minister's Visit)

3.30 pm

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement on my visit to New York and Washington yesterday.

In New York, I addressed the United Nations special session on disarmament and had discussions with the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly. I have placed in the Library a copy of my speech to the special session. I emphasised that disarmament, properly defined, is the balanced and verifiable reduction of armaments in a manner which enhances peace and security.

As regards nuclear weapons, I welcomed President Reagan's radical proposals for substantial cuts in strategic weapons and for eliminating a whole class of intermediate-range systems—the zero option. I called for a balanced reduction in conventional weapons; commended the fresh proposals which are being made in the Vienna talks on mutual and balanced force reductions; urged a new impetus for a convention banning the development and possession of chemical weapons; and advocated a special effort to agree on new mandatory confidence and security-building measures in Europe.

Throughout, I emphasised the need for stringent verification of arms control agreements. And I expressed my conviction that the aim of all these measures must be to defend the values in which we believe and to uphold international law and the United Nations charter. We have a right and a duty to defend our own people whenever and wherever their liberty is challenged.

In my discussions with Mr. Perez de Cuellar, we reviewed the prospects for a ceasefire in the Lebanon and discussed how such a ceasefire could be maintained.

I gave the Secretary-General an account of the present situation in the Falkland Islands. I emphasised our wish for a permanent cessation of hostilities, though I have to report that so far the Argentine's response has been negative. I also referred to the repatriation of well over 10,000 prisoners, but I explained that we could not return them all until we were satisfied that hostilities would not be reopened. The Falkland Islanders would be preoccupied for some time to come with the task of reconstruction, none the less, Britain would in due course seek to bring the islands to full self-government. Mr. Perez de Cuellar stated that he remained ready to act as a channel of communication between Britain and Argentina, if this would help.

My talks with Mr. Kittani, the President of the General Assembly, were devoted mainly to the special session and Middle East matters.

I was particularly glad to be in New York during the last week of Sir Anthony Parsons' term of service as our representative at the United Nations. His contribution and abilities have been widely and rightly praised. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]

Subsequently, at the invitation of President Reagan, I visited Washington where we had valuable and friendly discussions. We discussed at some length the tragic situation in the Lebanon. The President described the latest American efforts, through Mr. Habib, to promote a solution. We also discussed the current situation in the Falkland Islands. I emphasised our wish to do all we can to promote peace and stability in the South Atlantic. The President repeated his view that our action to repossess the islands had been taken to uphold the vital principle that aggression should not pay.

We discussed East–West relations. The President explained that his recent decision to extend restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union had been based on the principle that normal relations with that country were not possible so long as there was no progress towards liberalisation in Poland. I endorsed the need for such progress while reiterating the reasons why we thought existing commercial contracts should be exempted from the American restrictions.

I also conveyed the concern felt in this country, and elsewhere in the European Community, at the decision by the United States Government to impose countervailing duties on steel imports from the Community.

Finally, I expressed my gratitude for the impressive success of the FBI in defeating attempts by the Provisional IRA illegally to purchase weapons in the United States of America and to export them for use in Northern Ireland.

Mr. Michael Foot (Ebbw Vale): May I express our concurrence with the representations that the Prime Minister made on those last two matters? All of us should join in the tribute that she paid to Sir Anthony Parsons, because he played a conspicuous part in securing support for resolution 502. We certainly wish to congratulate him on the part that he played.

Some of the matters that the Prime Minister raised will be discussed in coming weeks, but I should like to press her on the discussions that she may have had with President Reagan about the Lebanon and the extremely critical situation there. Did she support the proposal for maintaining a United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon? What proposal will she and President Reagan put forward to secure that? What other measures should be taken? Does she agree with the President about trying to re-establish the rights of the State of Lebanon and will she give us an account of that?

The report that the Prime Minister has given us today about her speech on disarmament had a slightly better tone than the original speech. Are the proposals that she made and those outlined in her statement the beginning and end of the proposals that the Government intend to put forward at the disarmament conference? We believe that there should be a debate in the House on the special session and discussions about the further proposals that the British Government should advance. At the special session, did she put forward disarmament proposals that differ in any way from those put forward by the President of the United States? Finally, will she consider fresh representations on disarmament to try to make the special session a success?

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman has asked me about the Lebanon. Yesterday a ceasefire was negotiated. It was the eighth ceasefire during the sad and tragic sequence of events. However, I believe that it has now been broken. Obviously our great desire is to stop further fighting in West Beirut and on the main road to Damascus. Mr. Habib continues to make efforts to achieve a ceasefire that will hold.

Most people wish to see once again a fully independent Lebanon under the control of its own strong Government. It is easy to say that, but, as the right hon. Gentleman knows from Lebanon's history, it is very difficult to obtain. However, although it will not be easy, we must

continue to try. The life of the UNIFIL forces has been extended by two months by a United Nations resolution that we voted for. It is important to try to keep them in position and to encourage various nations to take part.

The disarmament proposals that I put forward were pretty comprehensive and covered nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons. I congratulated those who had negotiated the agreements on outer space and on the sea bed and I also called for further confidence and security-building measures. There was not much that was not covered.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: I remind the House that there is a further statement, and that the main business is covered by an allocation of time motion. Therefore, I propose to allow questions only until five minutes to four, by the clock.

Mr. David Steel (Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles): I endorse what the Prime Minister has said about Sir Anthony Parsons, who has had both a distinguished and a strenuous period of service at the United Nations. During the Prime Minister's talks at the United Nations, was there any discussion about strengthening the mandate and the organisation of the United Nations peacekeeping forces? Does the right hon. Lady have any hope that the permanent members of the Security Council will take some action about that?

The Prime Minister: No. I am afraid that it is one of the ironies and tragedies that the mandatory resolutions of the Security Council cannot be implemented because the United Nations does not have its own peacekeeping force. I do not know anyone who sees any immediate possibility of securing such a peacekeeping force.

Sir Anthony Kershaw (Stroud): The whole House will endorse the Prime Minister's view that the development of the Falkland Islands is desirable. However, no State or financial institution will invest in the Falkland Islands if there is any prospect, however remote, that the Argentines will resume sovereignty over the area.

The Prime Minister: I emtirely agree with my hon. Friend. That has been one of the problems in securing sufficient investment and has stoped various Governments from making greater investment. It is one of the reasons why we shall have to consider the longer term defence of the islands. There is not the slightest shadow of a doubt that in the immediate future and the middle term that will have to carried out by us.

Mr. Stanley Newens (Harlow): Did the right hon. Lady raise the question of the pernicious international arms trade that facilitated the supply of arms to Argentina in its aggression against the Falkland Islands, and facilitates the supply of arms to Israel while it invades the Lebanon? Is it not time that the right hon. Lady took action to stop the trade in weapons of death?

The Prime Minister: That matter was not discussed at the United Nations General Assembly yesterday. There have been various proposals made on a regional basis, but none of them has ever proved practicable. The hon. Gentleman is wrong if he suggests that there should be no supply of arms. Each and every nation has the right to defend its own people and territories. The fact that we sell arms helps us to have our weapons at a lower cost and keeps some 140,000 people in work.

With regard to the sale of arms to Argentina, as I said to the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot) on Tuesday, Governments of both parties have sold arms to Argentina. We carried it on on the same basis—of considering the matter on its merits.

Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport): Is the Prime Minister aware that the Government will be judged, not by cheap jibes about whether they are ready to fire shots, but by whether they so conduct themselves that no shots need to be fired? The tone of the Prime Minister's speech in New York was such that it sounded more as if she wanted to beat ploughshares into arms. *[Interruption.]* Hon. Members should read the speech. Will the Prime Minister say whether in the two arms negotiations in which Great Britain should be playing a major part—the comprehensive test ban treaty and the mutual and balanced force reduction talks in Vienna—there has been one positive step taken during her Premiership?

The Prime Minister: The talks in Vienna have continued for over nine years—and that period covers rather a lot of Labour government. It is unfortunate that not much has been achieved. If the right hon. Gentleman takes a reasonable view, he will know why. We have found it difficult to obtain from the Soviet Union the actual numbers of forces they have in conjunction with the Warsaw Pact countries.

I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will be extremely disappointed to know that the speech I made to the General Assembly received more applause than any other speech made during the last three weeks.

Sir Frederic Bennett (Torbay): Reverting to the tragic position in Lebanon, the Prime Minister will doubtless recall that a couple of days ago both Front Bench spokesmen emphasised that, however hard Europe might try, the main responsibility for ending the Israeli attack upon Lebanon lies with the United States of America. Did my right hon. Friend find that there was an awareness of that fact that can be speedily acted upon?

The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend. The only country that can bring pressure to bear upon Israel is the United States of America, and it is very much aware of that. I tried to get across the fact that if there is to be a proper solution of this problem there must be a solution to the problem of the future of the Palestinian people.

Mr. Dick Douglas (Dunfermline): Did the Prime Minister obtain from President Reagan an understanding that our defence role would be a North Atlantic role? Was there any intimation from the President that he would be willing to have United States forces in the Falkland Islands as we would be straining our international defence role if we had to garrison and keep naval forces there?

The Prime Minister: We did not discuss very much the possibility of a multi-national force in the Falkland Islands. I say "very much" because such a multi-national force is frequently mentioned. There is no possibility of having one for some months. It is too early to consider it.

Sir Bernard Braine (Essex, South-East): In her discussions with the President and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, did my right hon. Friend glean any evidence that they were aware of the utter unfitness of Argentina to have any control over the democratic Falkland Islands community? Did she remind them that among the thousands of people who had disappeared, most

[Sir Bernard Braine]

of whom had been tortured and killed, in Argentina—in the years that the Labour Party was in office—there were United Kingdom subjects, who can be named, and that successive British Governments had been pressurised by international communities into negotiating with Argentina? Did she make that plain to those two gentlemen?

The Prime Minister: I have made it perfectly clear time and again, both to the American Government and a number of others, that there is no question of sovereignty to negotiate. The islands are British sovereign territory and their people are British subjects who wish to keep their British way of life. There is nothing on sovereignty to negotiate. We negotiate on sovereignty only with the people of the territory itself. I pointed out to the United Nations that there are 45 nations in the United Nations who obtained their independence through us. I said that with us they enjoyed democracy, which is something that the Argentine citizens would love to have.

Mr. Ioan Evans (Aberdare): As the world is spending over $500 billion on the arms race and there are 50,000 weapons with the destructive power of a million Hiroshimas, would the right hon. Lady address herself to the fears of mankind about the arms race and adopt a more constructive approach to reducing military expenditure? Will she withdraw the White Paper, "Statement on the Defence Estimates 1982", which embarks on a massive programme of spending on the Trident as well as £14,000 million on the arms race?

The Prime Minister: With regard to what the hon. Gentleman said about nuclear weapons, 90 per cent. of world expenditure is on conventional arms. There has been no nuclear warfare since the bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, but there have been some 140 conventional conflicts which have led to about 10 million deaths.

With regard to what he said about disarmament, of course people have fears. A few moments ago Opposition Members were accusing us of not having had sufficient armaments in the Falkland Islands and of that having attracted war.

Sir John Biggs-Davison (Epping Forest): On the issue of the equipment that my right hon. Friend did well to obtain from the United States, was she able to inform the President that Her Majesty's Government are compiling a record of Argentine war crimes, including the indiscriminate laying of mines which requires this equipment and the bestial pillaging by the soldiery of civilian property?

The Prime Minister: I gave the President a very full account of the situation in the Falkland Islands. I gave as much detail as I possibly could, incorporating some of the treatment of the islanders by the Argentine troops. I also told him of the great difficulty we were experiencing over the indiscriminate laying of plastic mines which cannot be detected. It is customary under the Geneva convention to mark the fields and positions where mines have been laid. That has not been done by the Argentines. There is also a disarmament convention which forbids the laying of plastic mines but, of course, the Argentine is not a signatory.

Mr. Frank Hooley (Sheffield, Heeley): Did the Prime Minister point out to President Reagan that it is grotesque for his Administration to encourage American farmers to earn millions and millions of dollars by exporting grain to the Soviet Union while it tries to put British workers out of work at John Brown by refusing permission for it to supply essential equipment for the Siberian gas line and also inhibits exports from Sheffield of important steel products?

The Prime Minister: As the hon. Gentleman will have gathered from my statement, I spoke strongly about John Brown's contracts. Normally, when new restrictions are put on trade, it is customary to exempt existing contracts. I pointed out the relationship with the wheat exports to which the hon. Gentleman has referred and the fact that these would be likely to continue. The President pointed out that there would be restraint on manufactured exports from the United States. Finally, I said to the President that if we were suddenly to have prohibitions from the United States on exports of vital parts of equipment that we need to export from here, people in future would not put orders with the United States because they would be liable to cancellation. All these points were made. I shall be taking the matter further.

Sir William Clark (Croydon, South): Is my right hon. Friend aware that the overwhelming majority of people in this country are delighted by the warm welcome that she received at the United Nations? Is this not proof that world leaders admire the firm stand that the Government took over the Falklands issue? Was the question of interest rates raised during her discussions with the President in order to accelerate the disappearance of the world recession?

The Prime Minister: The phrase most frequently used by those with whom I conversed afterwards was that the speech at the United Nations was realistic and balanced. They welcome both realism and balance in these matters.

I did not discuss interest rates with the President. I discussed them with a number of other people whom I met because the matter is causing us some concern. It is also causing some concern in the United States. It is stopping the very expansion that the United States needs. I made clear that we wish to have the deficit down because we are ready to take advantage of an expansion in world trade. We wish therefore to see American interest rates come down so that ours can stay down where they are now, or go lower.

Mr. James Lamond (Oldham, East): Since the United Nations' own specialist committee has reported that there is no problem on verification of disarmament, and since Mr. Gromyko, in his speech earlier in the session, said that the Soviet Union was ready to sign an agreement banning the development of all chemical weapons, that it was ready to make the statement unilaterally that the Soviet Union would never use nuclear arms first and that it was in full support of the freeze proposals put forward in the American Congress by Senator Edward Kennedy, what other steps are required before the right hon. Lady and the President of the United States are ready to talk meaningfully about disarmament?

The Prime Minister: Not all the problems over verification have been solved by a very long way. Words are not enough. There has to be readiness to have inspection on the spot. That is difficult to maintain.

There have been disquieting but fairly well documented reports that chemical weapons have been used in South-East Asia. We have urged the United Nations to consider the evidence. The hon. Gentleman mentioned the Russian undertaking not to use nuclear weapons first. I have pointed out that the more effective undertaking is that recently given by NATO not to use any of its military weapons to attack first. That is the undertaking we await from the Soviet Union—if it could be given with full, proper, trustworthy and credible assurances.

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 250045Z
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELNO 2239 OF 24 JUNE 1982,
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK,
BONN, PARIS,
INFO SAVING CONSULS GENERAL IN USA.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. I THINK THAT WHAT PROMPTED THE AMERICAN INVITATION FOR A SHORT VISIT HERE AFTER THE UN WAS THEIR WISH TO SHOW RESPECT AND ADMIRATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS SUCCESS. THE MAY ALSO HAVE WANTED TO BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE LATIN AMERICANS THAT, THOUGH THEY HAD COME DOWN ON THE BRITISH SIDE IN THE CONFLICT, THEY WERE READY TO TRY TO PERSUADE US ''NOT TO SLAM DOORS'' TO USE HAIG'S PHRASE TO ME, REGARDING THE FUTURE. IN THE EVENT, THOUGH THE FALKLANDS WERE DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT, THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THE FUTURE: THE TALK WAS EXCLUSIVELY ABOUT THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT RECEIVED EXTENSIVE MEDIA COVERAGE. THE PRIME MINISTER GAVE INTERVIEWS IN NEW YORK ON 23 JUNE WHICH WERE CARRIED LIVE ON ALL THREE OF THE NETWORK NEWS PROGRAMMES. IN ADDITION, YESTERDAY'S THREE MAIN EVENING NEWS PROGRAMMES (WHICH HAVE A COMBINED AUDIENCE OF OVER 17 MILLION) ALL COVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE WHITE HOUSE AND HER SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE. THERE WAS FURTHER COVERAGE OF THIS MORNING'S TELEVISION PROGRAMMES.

3. I WAS STRUCK BY HOW ALMOST ALL THE QUESTIONS IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE WERE DEVOTED TO THE FALKLANDS AND TO PROBING OUR INTENTIONS FOR THE FUTURE AND THIS IS REFLECTED IN TODAY'S COVERAGE, THE MAIN THEME BEING WHAT THE WASHINGTON POST CALLS THE PRIME MINISTER'S TOUGHLY-WORDED REASSERTION OF BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY. CONTRARY TO PRESS EXPECTATIONS AND TO SOME PRIOR BRIEFING BY THE LATIN AMERICAN LOBBY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THE PRESS NOTE THAT THE PRESIDENT BROUGHT NO PRESSURE TO BEAR ON US ON THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLANDS. THE WASHINGTON POST CONTRASTS WHAT IT CALLS THE PRESIDENT'S BLANDLY-WORDED STATEMENT TO THE PRESS AFTER THE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERFORMANCE AT HER SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE AND HER REITERATION THAT THE FALKLANDS ARE BRITISH AND WILL REMAIN SO. THE PRESS ALSO NOTE THAT IN A SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE, WHEN HAIG BRIEFED JOURNALISTS ON THE AMERICAN VIEW OF THE TALKS, THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION THAT THE US DISAGREED WITH THE UK APPROACH. HAIG IS QUOTED AS SAYING: ''WE WOULD'T EXPECT ANYONE TO TELL US HOW TO DEAL WITH OUR PROPERTY AND WE'RE NOT GOING TO PRESUME TO TELL HER.'' WHEN ASKED FOR THE US VIEW ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, HAIG REFERRED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS COMMENTING THAT MRS THATCHER HAD STATED THE POSITION VERY CLEARLY.

4. THE PRESS PICK UP THE FACT THAT THE MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE WAS USED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO RUB IN HER CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE US ADMINISTRATION'S LATEST DECISIONS ON THE ABILITY OF JOHN BROWN TO FULFIL THE CONTRACTS IT HAS ENTERED INTO FOR THE SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE. THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTS THIS AS THE ONLY APPARENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER, BUT NOTES THAT THERE IS NO SUGGESTION THAT THE US IS GOING TO CHANGE ITS POSITION. AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY HAIG SAID THAT : ''JUST AS MRS THATCHER HAS HER PRINCIPLES, OUR PRESIDENT HAS HIS''.

5. UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK HAVE ALREADY REPORTED ON THE WARM RECEPTION WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER WAS ACCORDED IN NEW YORK YESTERDAY. THIS IS REFLECTED IN THE PRESS COVERAGE OF HER VISIT TO NEW YORK WHICH ALSO DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE ENTHUSIASM WITH WHICH HER SPEECH WAS GREETED BY THE UNITED STATES.

HENDERSON

FCO/WHITEHALL
NAD

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cc Master

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 June 1982

Dear Brian,

PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN

I enclose the record of the conversation which took place at the White House on 23 June.

There is one point which requires rapid action. The Prime Minister told President Reagan that she would make enquiries as to the precise facts about John Brown's attitude to the recent American decision to extend the embargo on the export of certain goods to the Soviet Union, since the Americans seemed to have obtained from the firm the impression that they were not particularly concerned about it. The Prime Minister would be grateful if the Secretary of State for Trade could take this matter up urgently with John Brown and let her have an account of the situation which can then be conveyed to the US Government. It would be most helpful if contact with the firm could be made this week.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Rhodes (Department of Trade), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Halliday (Home Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

I should be grateful if circulation of the record could be closely restricted to those who have an operational need to know its contents.

Yours ever

John Coles.

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT REAGAN AT THE WHITE HOUSE AT 1700 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY, 23 JUNE 1982

Present:

Prime Minister	President Reagan
Sir Nicholas Henderson	Vice-President Bush
Mr Whitmore	Mr Haig
Mr Gillmore	Judge Clark
Mr Coles	Mr Rentschler

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The Prime Minister opened the conversation by expressing warm gratitude for the successful operation recently conducted by the FBI against arms smuggling by the Provisional IRA in the United States.

President Reagan said that he wished to raise the question of the sanctions applied by the United States to the Soviet Union in connection with Poland. His recent decision that these sanctions should be extended was based on a point of principle. When they had originally been imposed, it had been made clear that they would be kept in being until there had been some internal liberalisation in Poland, either in respect of the position of Mr. Lech Walesa or the release of detainees or the restoration of a dialogue with Solidarity. He knew that his decision to extend the sanctions affected John Brown but representatives of the Company had indicated recently in Washington that it would not cause them great financial distress. He had hoped that following his discussions on this problem in Europe

President Mitterrand or Chancellor Schmidt would have indicated to the Russians that if they worked actively to influence the Polish situation the sanctions might be lifted. Private representations to the Russians could be effective. During his recent meeting with Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Haig had raised certain internal questions. For example, he had raised the case of a young man on hunger strike in the Soviet Union who had relatives in the United States. Within 48 hours the Soviet media had indicated that the release of this young man was likely.

The Prime Minister said that we had wanted existing contracts to be exempted from the American sanctions. The latest decision would cause us serious problems in an area which already had heavy unemployment. It would be said that the damage caused to Britain by the American decision was proportionally much greater than that caused to the United States whose main exports to the Sovet Union were of grain rather than of manufactured goods.

President Reagan said that when Mr. Carter had originally imposed the grain embargo, in connection with Afghanistan, American farmers had complained that they alone were being asked to bear a burden. Consequently, he had promised in his presidential campaign that he would remove this discrimination. The existing grain agreement was now coming to an end. The Russians were pressing for the conclusion of a new agreement but the United States had so far declined to open discussions. The Prime Minister said that she presumed there would be a new grain agreement. President Reagan said that he hoped that the Russians would take some step that would make this possible. The Prime Minister enquired whether she could, therefore, say publicly that there would not be a new agreement. President Reagan replied that none had yet been negotiated.

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Mr Haig said that even if there were no agreement, grain would continue to be sold on the market. The Prime Minister commented that in that case American farmers would not suffer. But John Brown's employees would. The company was ready to commence implementation of this contract with the Soviet Union and only needed American rotors to be able to do so. If they were prevented from going ahead, they would be disinclined to buy sophisticated equipment from the United States again. She would be pressed on this matter on her return. She could say that the latest decision was seen by the Americans as being based on principle but the fact was that US grain would continue to be sold while John Brown could not purchase the necessary rotors from elsewhere. President Reagan said that the Americans were prepared to be painted as the villains. But if the Russians brought about change in Poland, then the decision on sanctions could be changed.

The Prime Minister asked again whether she could state that the Wheat Agreement would not be renewed. Judge Clark stated that this question had not be discussed, much less decided. Mr Haig added that so far some $850 m worth of United States exports of manufactured goods had been affected by the sanctions. The President's latest decision would bring the figure to about $1 billion. The Prime Minister pointed out that the John Brown contract was worth £400 m. Sir Nicholas Henderson observed that British exports to the Soviet Union were on a downward trend while American exports were rising.

President Reagan repeated that John Brown had not expressed great concern to the US Government about the latest decision. Sir Nicholas Henderson suggested that there must have been some

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misunderstanding because their statements to us had been quite different. President Reagan suggested that John Brown could obtain the equipment they needed from the French subsidiary of the American company concerned. Judge Clark commented that legal proceedings had now begun. This would lead to delay and the hope must be that there would be change in Poland during that time. The Americans believed that the Russians had not taken seriously the original decision on sanctions. It was hoped that the latest decision would induce a change of mind.

The Prime Minister said that she would arrange for a further discussion with John Brown because our clear understanding was that they were seriously worried about the situation. Meanwhile, there seemed little doubt that the US would continue to export wheat to the Soviet Union by one means or another and thus total American exports to the Soviet Union would continue to rise. European firms would be reluctant to order sophisticated equipment from the United States in future and would go elsewhere. Existing contracts should have been exempted. The effect of the United States decisions was to prevent the fulfilment of normal commercial engagements. America's word was at stake. President Reagan said that it had been made clear at the time of the original decision what the consequences would be. Judge Clark said that John Brown had originally claimed that 1700 jobs would be at risk but the figures seemed to have changed recently. The Prime Minister said that she intended to enquire into the precise facts. But there would be much resentment in Britain if America's exports to Russia continued to rise while ours went down.

The Prime Minister said that we were also concerned

about the recent United States decision in respect of steel imports from European countries. This was a matter for the European Community but if the Community did not take it up through the courts, we should probably do so. She believed that the British Steel Corporation would contest the decision. It would cost us £50 m in exports of specialised steel and job losses which, as with those in the case of John Brown, would be sustained in Scotland. Sir Nicholas Henderson emphasised that the matter was a very serious one. We had reduced our steel exports to the United States by an enormous percentage. But British Steel was now likely to be badly hurt by the American decision.

The Prime Minister then described the latest situation in the South Atlantic. We had returned around 10 thousand prisoners of war to Argentina. Many of the prisoners we had taken had been in very bad condition. The Argentine Armed Forces appeared to keep their officers in luxury but to have little regard for their other ranks. Some officers had had to be allowed to keep their small arms because they were afraid their own troops might attack them. Some of the soldiers had been in an appalling state, suffering from trench foot, dysentery and parasites. The medical treatment given by the Argentines to their wounded had been well below an acceptable standard.

Sometime ago we had sent a message to President Galtieri through the Swiss Government that we would send back the prisoners, lift sanctions and remove the exclusion zones if we received an assurance that hostilities had been permanently ended. We had received no direct reply.

/ The Argentine

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The Argentine note to the United Nations had been very equivocal. Intelligence reports suggested that while many units were reverting to normal states of alert, the air force at Rio Grande was still on a high level of security. We did not know why. The first group of prisoners which had been repatriated had apparently been taken to camps and not allowed to go home.

President Reagan asked whether we could confirm that some conscripts had been shot in their feet. The Prime Minister said that she had read this story but could not confirm it. We were retaining some 600 officers, pilots and engineers until a permanent cessation of hostilities had been achieved. They would shortly be put on a boat to Ascension, and, in the absence of a satisfactory Argentine statement, might be flown from there to Britain. Then, if the elapse of time revealed that hostilities were not being resumed we might send them back. Another serious problem had been caused by the indiscriminate sowing of plastic mines, whose position was not, as the rules of war required, marked. Four of our personnel involved in mine removal had already been wounded. This was very demoralising. Mr. Haig said that the United States had a good deal of specialised equipment available which he thought could be flown into Port Stanley. President Reagan asked that this should be investigated. The Prime Minister said that this would be most helpful. Meanwhile, we were removing about 3,000 of our troops from the Falklands. But our ships were still vulnerable. We were worried that some wild action might be contemplated by the Argentinians.

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Time was now needed for reconstruction and rehabilitation. Mr. Hunt was returning as Civil Commissioner shortly and teachers and doctors would be going back. At a later stage, we would discuss the future with the Islanders. We would probably bring them closer to self-government, perhaps resembling the situation in American possession such as Guam.

The President suggested that the United Kingdom needed a peaceful settlement which relieved us of the burden of defending the Islands for a lengthy period. The Prime Minister said that we should be obliged to defend the Islands. The runway would have to be extended, Rapier batteries established and further aircraft deployed. President Reagan asked whether, with the new Government in Argentina, there might be a better prospect of a genuine peace. The Prime Minister replied that this might be possible. But we should have to proceed slowly. The attitude of other Latin American countries had been by no means uniform. A recent leader in a prominent Brazilian newspaper had praised the British action. After her speech in the United Nations General Assembly earlier in the day, the representatives of Colombia, Chile and one other Latin American country had offered their congratulations. We would do everything possible to restore normal relations with other countries of Latin America, and believed that they would respond positively.

The Prime Minister said that events in the Lebanon had produced a mood in Arab countries the like of which she had never seen before.

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They found Israel's actions in the Lebanon utterly disproportionate. President Reagan said he was aware of this. The Arab countries accused the United States of collusion with Israel. The Prime Minister commented that Prince Saud had agreed with her when she had told him recently that she did not believe the stories of United States/Israeli collusion.

President Reagan said that he had sent Mr. Habib to the area to try to secure a ceasefire. He had been very blunt with Mr. Begin during the latter's recent visit to Washington. But he believed that the accounts of the slaughter of civilians had been much exaggerated. The present situation could offer a great opportunity for a Lebanon which had been torn apart for seven years. The Lebanese themselves saw a great need to disarm the PLO. The seven separate Lebanese factions had come together and were discussing the formation of a central authority and a single army. Mr. Habib was trying to promote a settlement. The Israelis wanted a new Lebanese Government to be established, a multi-lateral force to be constituted and all foreign troops to be withdrawn from the country. The Prime Minister asked where the Palestinians were to go. President Reagan said that it was necessary to distinguish between the PLO and the Palestinians. Many of the latter were content to remain in the Lebanon. Mr. Begin had told him that the Israelis had discovered in the Lebanon arms supplies of a far greater quantity than could ever be used by the PLO. Indeed, it looked as though the Soviet Union had been establishing its own arms depots in the Middle East. The removal of these weapons would be a major undertaking for the Israelis. The Prime Minister asked what kinds of weapons had been discovered. Mr. Haig referred rather vaguely to sophisticated

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rocketry and large quantities of ammunition for conventional Soviet weapons.

The Prime Minister said that she found the Soviet attitude to the Lebanese situation rather puzzling. She assumed that they would be concerned about the reputation of the Soviet equipment in Syrian hands which had fared so badly. President Reagan agreed that the Russians had been unpleasantly surprised by the success of the American equipment supplied to Israel. Soviet tanks and planes had been no match for their American counterparts.

Mr. Haig said that the situation was now critical. Mr. Habib had just met the Salvation Council and had presented to them firm propositions. He thought that Sharon would not refrain from entering Beirut unless the PLO made firm commitments to disarm, to leave Beirut and to shed some of their leaders. Mr. Habib was now waiting for answers from Yasser Arafat. The Prime Minister asked what would happen to Major Haddad. Mr. Haig replied that his forces would have to be honourably absorbed. Major Haddad would be retired comfortably to another country. So far, Mr. Begin had not objected to these propositions.

The Prime Minister said that the task of constructing a Government in the Lebanon would be very difficult. The PLO would be forced back to terrorism. And the question would remain - where would the Palestinians go? We felt a special obligation. It was we who had walked out of Palestine. The Israelis were Finlandising Lebanon. The Arabs believed that Jordan would be the next to suffer. When the latest situation had developed she had feared that a third world

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recession would be brought about by Arab action on oil. But so far this had not happened. Mr. Haig commented that this was because most Arabs wanted the Lebanese situation to be straightened out. The Prime Minister observed that the Arabs made the valid criticism that the Middle East went from crisis to crisis but the underlying problem was never dealt with. President Reagan said that he had told Mr. Begin that in return for American patience with Israel he wanted real commitments to deal with the Palestinian problem. Mr. Begin had faced strong criticism on the Hill and had left Washington in a more sober frame of mind. The Prime Minister said that she understood Congressional criticism of Israel. Israel's friends felt let down. The Israelis were inflicting massive suffering and were refusing to let international relief agencies help. President Reagan commented that there had been a great change in American attitudes to Israel.

The conversation ended at 1800 hours.

A.J.C.

23 June 1982

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

24 June 1982

Call by the Prime Minister on the President of the General Assembly on Wednesday 23 June

The Prime Minister, accompanied by Sir Anthony Parsons, Mr. David Summerhayes and me, called upon Mr. Ismet Kittani, the President of the United Nations General Assembly, at 1030 hours today.

Apart from passing references to earlier speeches in the Special Session on Disarmament and to the Lebanon, the conversation was confined to the Iran/Iraq war. Mr. Kittani said that Iraq had earlier made three proposals. First, there was a war going on and it should be stopped with a ceasefire. Second, there had been an occupation of Iranian territory but Iraq was now willing to vacate it and to withdraw to her own borders. Finally, there should be some kind of international arbitration process aimed at resolving the disputes which had originally led to the outbreak of war. Iran had turned down this approach by Iraq, maintaining that it was all a plot by Iraq to strengthen her own position. Iraq was therefore proceeding unilaterally. She had implemented a ceasefire under which Iraqi forces would open fire only in self defence, and she was withdrawing unilaterally to within her own borders. Iraq would try to involve the Security Council, with a view to getting a reasonable resolution on the matter. There were two envoys from Baghdad at the United Nations now, and they were seeing members of the Security Council.

In response to a question by Sir Anthony Parsons, Mr. Kittani said that Iran had seized on an offer which a number of Gulf countries had earlier made to contribute to a reconstruction fund for both Iran and Iraq and were now claiming that this was an agreement to pay Iran reparations. They were quoting figures and presenting the matter as an Iranian demand which the Arabs had accepted they would have to meet.

/Mr. Kittani

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Mr. Kittani went on to say that he was doubtful whether it would ever be possible to reach a compromise with Ayatollah Khomeini. He regarded all negotiations as wrong because they led to compromise and that was sacrilegious. He had got rid of the Shah and he believed that he had brought down President Carter. He saw President Saddam Hussein, by comparison, as a very little man. Khomeini was a vindictive man who believed "he had a direct line to Allah". Mr. Kittani said that he wanted Britain and Iraq's other friends to see the dangers of the situation. The Gulf countries were getting even more jittery than Iraq herself.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. WHITMORE

Brian Fall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

23 June 1982

Dear Brian,

PRIME MINISTER'S CALL ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

I attach at Annex A the record of the meeting which the Prime Minister had earlier today with the UN Secretary General in New York.

An hour or so after the meeting de Soto gave Goulding the piece of paper at Annex B. He told Goulding that it represented the points which the Secretary General had "been trying to make" in his conversation with the Prime Minister. It did not require any response from us: there was no question of the Secretary General "putting pressure" on the United Kingdom nor of setting new deadlines for a response. It was simply that Perez de Cuellar wanted the Prime Minister to have a written note of the points he had been attempting to put to her. In reply to Goulding's question, de Soto said that the Secretary General had not decided when he would need to report again to the Security Council: that depended on developments.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its attachments to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Clive Whitmore.

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A MEETING HELD BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL IN NEW YORK ON WEDNESDAY 23 JUNE 1982 AT 0945

Present:

Prime Minister	Senor Perez de Cuellar
Sir Anthony Parsons	Mr. Brian Urquhart
Mr. David Summerhayes	Senor Alvaro de Soto
Mr. Clive Whitmore	Mr. Michael Stopford
Mr. Bernard Ingham	

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Southern Africa

The Prime Minister said that Senor Perez de Cuellar was well remembered in Britain for the enormous help he had given at the time of Rhodesia's transition to independence. The British Government had made it clear at the outset of that process that it would accept the result of the election whatever it was. There had been others, however, who would let it be known that they would accept only an outcome which suited them. Against this background, it had been very useful to have Senor Perez de Cuellar there as an independent observer. After Britain's success in bringing Rhodesia to independence, there had been those who thought that she should try to perform the same role with regard to Namibia.

Senor Perez de Cuellar said that he was glad that he had been able to play a useful role at the time of Rhodesian independence. As regards Namibia, there was now a feeling of hope and we must do all we could to maintain that mood. In reply to a question by the Prime Minister, he explained that the double vote scheme had been discarded as too complicated a system for Africans new to voting.

Lebanon

Mr. Urquhart said that the latest news from Lebanon was not good. Fighting around Beirut and on the road to Damascus had begun again, though it was not clear who had started it. The

/ battle

battle was now mainly between Israel and Syria, with the PLO joining in from time to time. Beirut airport was closed. Yesterday, Mr. Philip Habib's efforts to establish a ceasefire had appeared to come to nothing, and the UN did not know what turn his negotiations would now take. Israel was being very difficult about assistance for casualties. They were very critical of the Red Cross and wanted to conduct all relief operations themselves. Senor Perez de Cuellar added that the Israelis wanted to distribute all relief themselves no matter where it came from.

Mr. Urquhart went on to say that the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) was due to come up for renewal next month. He understood that Lebanon had said some time ago that they did not want the ADF extended. The Syrians, on the other hand, had made it plain that they intended to stay in Lebanon.

The question of who should contribute to a force to guarantee any ceasefire in Lebanon was causing the American Government difficulties. They did not want to take on this task themselves, and their reluctance was understandable. It would be a far trickier and more complex undertaking than the MFO in Sinai. Israel, on the other hand, would not accept a UN force. Rather, they wanted a force which was underpinned by one of the great powers. He wondered whether a possible answer was a UN force underpinned by guarantees from the great powers. Senor Perez de Cuellar added that most countries were reluctant to contribute to such a force because they felt that to do so would identify them with the Israeli invaders.

Mr. Urquhart said that relations between and within the different confessional factions in Lebanon were thoroughly tangled. Mr. Jumblatt had now joined the new Lebanese Government. He was an important channel to the PLO. The position of the PLO was a cause of very serious concern. So long as it remained in strength and heavily armed in Western Beirut, the possibility remained that Israel would attack that part of the city. The resulting casualties and damage would be appalling.

/ Senor Perez de Cuellar

Senor Perez de Cuellar said that it was essential to keep the PLO in being. Yasser Arafat had certainly been a terrorist, as had a number of now prominent Israeli politicians, but he was the only interlocutor available. He was in fact a reasonable man. The Americans had been wrong in not dealing with him, even indirectly. His position in relation to other Palestinian leaders was now very difficult.

Sir Anthony Parsons said that if the PLO was broken, we would go back ten years to the era of hijacking and other acts of international terrorism.

Falkland Islands

Senor Perez de Cuellar said that the new President of the Argentine did not have the full support of the Navy and Air Force. The political situation in Buenos Aires was obscure. He still had the mandate which had been given to him by the Security Council, though he felt that there was nothing he could do at present. Nonetheless, at some stage, in consultation with the British Government, he would have to do something. There was always the possibility that a member of the Security Council would suddenly ask what he had been doing in fulfilment of the mandate.

The Prime Minister said that she agreed that it was difficult to see what he could do at present. As soon as British forces had repossessed the Islands, the British Government had sent a message to the Junta through the Swiss saying that they were prepared to start the process of repatriating the many Argentine prisoners, provided that there was a total cessation of hostilities between the two countries. We had also proposed that in those circumstances the economic measures and exclusion zones instituted by both parties should be lifted. In short we were seeking to get back to normal as soon as possible. But the Argentines' response, which had been contained in their letter to the Secretary General, had been negative. It was still not clear whether the Argentine accepted that there had been a complete cessation of hostilities. Under the Geneva Convention, we did not have to repatriate prisoners until all active hostilities had ceased. Nonetheless,

/ so many

so many of the Argentines taken prisoner in the Falkland Islands had been in bad shape, that we had been anxious to send them back to the Argentine as quickly as possible. We had found that disease was widespread among them, and many were badly fed. The Argentines had agreed to allow British ships into Puerto Madryn which had speeded up the process of repatriation and we had now sent back some 10,000 out of a total of about 11,600. Until such time as the Argentines accepted a complete cessation of hostilities, we proposed to keep some 600 prisoners made up mainly of senior officers, pilots and technicians. We could keep this number in the Falklands in reasonable conditions. Even so, if the undertaking we wanted from the Argentines on the cessation of hostilities was not forthcoming, the prisoners would before long be taken by ship to Ascension Island and thence to the United Kingdom. There were also 35 Argentines who had volunteered to help clear the mine fields which had been laid during the occupation of the Islands. The Argentines had not recorded where they had laid the mines. This was contrary to international law. The lack of information about the whereabouts of the mines posed very real dangers. Moreover, the mines were made of plastic and were therefore very difficult to locate. They would be a danger for a long time to come, and already four British soldiers had been injured in trying to clear them.

The Falkland Islanders had been through a traumatic period of invasion and occupation. Mr. Rex Hunt would be returning shortly to become the Civil Commissioner. The Commander of the Land Forces would be the Military Commissioner. Mr. Hunt's presence would help restore confidence among the Islanders. For many months to come the main preoccupation would be with practical reconstruction. The problems would be considerable, and we should not be able to rush them. Our objective would be to make the Islanders feel that life was returning to normal. The practicalities would absorb them for quite a period. This was just as well, for time healed wounds more quickly than anything else.

/ Looking further

Looking further ahead, Britain would try to accelerate the process of giving the Falkland Islanders self-government. Much had already been done in this direction and now we should try to give them complete self-government.

Britain would continue to seek Argentine acceptance of a complete cessation of hostilities. But if they did not respond and if there was, nonetheless, a reasonable period in which they took no hostile military action against the Falkland Islands and British forces, Britain would assume that there was in practice a complete cessation of hostilities.

The Prime Minister hoped that time would heal Argentine wounds too. It had been her Government which had restored diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina, and until the invasion of the Falkland Islands we had believed that we were getting on well with Argentina. The invasion had thrust us into a new situation.

Senor Perez de Cuellar said that friendship between Britain and Argentina must be restored in due course. They were two countries which had been linked happily for many years. Would Britain resume negotiations about the Falkland Islands with Argentina?

The Prime Minister said that she agreed that eventually Anglo-Argentine friendship would have to be restored. The immediate need was to agree upon a cessation of hostilities. We could then build on that. With the passage of time she hoped to be able to make overtures to Argentina leading to a restoration of diplomatic relations. But one immediate problem was that during the present crisis it had been very difficult to know whom we were dealing with in Buenos Aires, and it remained to be seen whether the change in the leadership there would improve matters in that respect.

Senor Perez de Cuellar said that he was worried that there would be a continuing focus of tension in the South Atlantic. This would be very damaging for the whole of Latin America. It would help lessen tension if a dialogue was started. But he saw that there must be a complete cessation of hostilities first.

The Prime Minister said that Britain wanted to be as friendly as possible with Argentina and with Latin America as a whole. It was worth emphasising that Latin America was not a monolithic entity. Some Latin American countries - for example, Brazil - had been very helpful during the Falklands crisis. She did not feel that the UK had lost the friendship of those countries. Nonetheless, she saw problems looming in the future: the dispute between Venezuela and Guyana was one example.

Senor Perez de Cuellar said that he was in touch with Venezuela. He wanted to avoid a repetition of the Falklands episode. The Venezuelan Government would be sending someone to discuss the problem with him shortly. Their Foreign Minister had promised him that Venezuela would not use force but would pursue all peaceful means of solving the dispute. He believed that there was reason for hope.

The Prime Minister repeated that Britain would do everything possible to improve relations with Argentina. We recognised that they would be sensitive and bruised and would need to be handled slowly and gently for some time.

Senor Perez de Cuellar said that he was at Britain's disposal to act as a channel of communication in this process. This was not just a matter of his mandate from the Security Council. He believed that Argentina trusted him insofar as they trusted anyone. Something had to be done, though he accepted that this would be later and not now. There was no need for a special initiative: his mandate was there and could be used. He hoped the Prime Minister would think it over. He emphasised that he was not putting pressure on her.

Looking back, it was remarkable how close to agreement we had got. But as Mr. Haig had said to him recently, we now knew why agreement had eluded us: the Argentine had had no leadership. It was very sad. Argentina had so many advantages such as racial unity and extensive natural resources. Nor

/ was she

was she "exactly a young African country" but that was how she behaved politically.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister and Senor Perez de Cuellar agreed that they would tell the press that they had discussed the Falkland Islands in general terms and had assessed the situation together.

The meeting ended at 1027 hours.

23 June 1982

-- Despite the present difficulties, restoration of normal relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina should be attainable in time because of compelling common interests.

-- Given existing sensibilities, the United Nations could facilitate communication and understanding between the two sides.

-- The Secretary-General's good offices are, of course, available as mandated by the Security Council, to which he will need to report in due course.

-- The Secretary-General would be prepared to explore with both sides possible ways of resolving immediate problems and achieving a resolution of underlying differences.

-- The initiation of a flexible procedure for the diplomatic solution of these differences as called for by Security Council Resolution 502 could well be the key to a comprehensive cessation of hostilities.

-- The Secretary-General would welcome any ideas the United Kingdom might suggest in this context.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Whitmore

cc Sir A Parsons

FALKLANDS

After the Prime Minister's statement in the General Assembly this morning, Mr de Soto gave me the attached piece of paper, asking that I pass it to you. He said that it represented the points the Secretary-General had 'been trying to make' in his conversation this morning with the Prime Minister. It did not ask for any response from us; there was no question of the Secretary-General 'putting pressure' on the U.K. nor of setting new deadlines for a response. It was simply that Mr Perez de Cuellar wanted the Prime Minister to have a written note of the points he had been trying to make. In reply to my queston, Mr de Soto said that the Secretary-General had not decided when he would need to report again to the Security Council; that depended on developments

M I Goulding

23 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM ON DISARMAMENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER -

1. I assume that the Prime Minister does not want to contribute to the cant usually talked about disarmament, and it would be immensely refreshing if she could state a few unpopular home truths on the matter. For example: there is no correlation between the size of armaments and the probability of war, nor between 'arms races' and the causes of wars. Some wars have been preceded by 'arms races' and some have not. Some 'arms races' have culminated in war and some have not. Few historians any longer believe that the arms race before 1914 provided more than a contributory cause to the outbreak of World War One, and even fewer that the Second World War was the result of any arms race. There would be general agreement, however, that the adventurism of the Axis Powers was stimulated by the military weakness of the status quo powers, France, Britain and the United States. Perceptions of military weakness have been at least as potent a cause of war as fears of military strength, and disarmament can under certain circumstances be at least as effective a cause of war as great armaments. (British unilateral disarmament in the South Atlantic is an interesting case in point.) I would be happy to write a brief paper dealing with this question if it were thought useful, but I enclose a copy of a recent lecture I gave which elaborates some of the arguments referred to above.

2. What matters then is not disarmament as such but peace, and disarmament is only desirable if it can be shown to contribute to peace. So long as sovereign states exist they will continue to make provision for their security, and will engage in a process of 'competitive modernization' in armaments as in every other field of technology. Arms cannot be frozen at a given point of technological development. Each generation will equip itself with the most effective weapon-systems, as with the most effective transport, communications, health-preserving and nutritive systems, that technology makes possible.

3. We must therefore be clear over what the real problems are with which the development of armaments presents us. I suggest that these are three.

1) Their expense
2) Their effect on international stability
3) Their inhumanity

4. Cost

The problem of escalating costs is self-evident, and provides the only effective incentive to serious arrangements for disarmament. All major powers, not excluding the Soviet Union, would welcome proposals that genuinely provided them with equal security at less cost. One does not have to share the liberal view that money spent on weapons would be better spent on aid to the Third World in order to accept that defence costs tend to absorb an unacceptably high proportion of all national budgets.

5. Stability

Armaments can be 'destabilising' in two ways. An increase in the military capability of one nation is normally countered by a comparable increase in that of its rivals, leaving both countries poorer but no more secure. In addition, certain kinds of weapons-systems can be seen as offering such an immediate threat of an effective 'first strike' that the adversary will be under a constant temptation to 'pre-empt'. the first of these processes produces 'arms races' that may not be dangerous in themselves but impose grave burdens on all national economies. The second can result in situations of such mutual mistrust that any political crisis may erupt unnecessarily and disastrously into nuclear war. For both these reasons, increase in armaments can result not in greater security but in considerably less.

6. Restraint

In spite of all our efforts, wars may occur; and after every war, peace must be made. Relations must be re-established with the adversary, the damage repaired and an improved political structure created. It is thus a matter of political prudence, as well as a moral imperative, that the war itself should be conducted with the greatest possible restraint and humanity and that laws of war, carefully worked out over generations, should be observed. Nuclear weapons must thus be seen always as deterrents, and preferably as deterrents simply to the opponent's use of his own nuclear weapons. Much

of the moral and intellectual force behind the 'Peace Movement' today arises from the belief that we have abandoned this concept of deterrence and are planning to use nuclear weapons in the conduct of war. A firm reassertion of the original concept of nuclear deterrence would bring the Government much political and moral credit.

7. Any disarmament proposals should address themselves specifically to the above questions. The object, clearly stated, should be to work towards a stable international system in which nations can preserve their security at minimal cost, being neither provoked by the strength of their rivals into a ruinously expensive armaments competition nor tempted by their weakness into military adventurism. Their weapons should also be such that, if an armed conflict should occur, it could be conducted with the greatest possible 'economy of force'; that is, with weapons that will inflict the least possible damage on civilians and on the environment, making it possible to observe those restraints within war that are mandatory on a Christian society.

8. Problems of arms control can be broken down under four heads:

1) The central nuclear balance
2) The European balance
3) Regional balances (including nuclear proliferation)
4) Qualitative control - CBW, etc.

9. The central balance is primarily a matter of negotiation between the USA and the USSR, and I assume that the UK would not wish to dissociate itself from the US proposals for deep cuts in strategic systems as a means for achieving maximum stability at minimal cost. Regional balances are a matter for the countries concerned, but there is no harm in reminding a UN audience that arms reductions are a matter of concern for small nations no less than for great - especially since the economic burden on the former is so very much greater than on the latter. The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to concentrate, in any detailed proposals she has to make, on items 8.(2) and 8.(4) above.

10. Any proposals for arms control agreements over the European balance will need to carry the approval of our NATO allies, so any initiatives the Prime Minister has in mind will already have been agreed in discussion with them. If the following ideas have not already been approved it is thus too late to consider them, but I put them forward for what they are worth.

1) The main destabilizing factor in Europe is the overwhelming Soviet superiority in conventional forces. At present stability is maintained only by an allied commitment to a first use of nuclear weapons that Soviet nuclear parity makes decreasingly convincing. Stability can be restored only by either a substantial increase in alliance conventional forces, or a substantial

reduction in Soviet forces. Clearly the latter would be in every way preferable. A new impetus should therefore be given to the MBFR negotiations as a matter or urgency.

2) Support should be given to the US proposal for a 'zero option' on the emplacement of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) such as SS20s, Pershing IIs and cruise missiles.

3) Consideration should be given to the elimination of battlefield nuclear weapons of which the military value is doubtful, whose effect on the local environment would be devastating, and whose present is highly destabilising.

4) We should continue to press for the elimination of chemical and biological weapons from all military planning and stockpiles.

11. Although it is not immediately relevant to the UN Special Assembly, it might be useful if the NATO allies could agree among themselves as to what they would consider to be a desirable and practicable 'model' of force levels and structures that would take account of the security needs of both sides in Europe at the lowest feasible cost. To the best of my knowledge we have never negotiated with any such objective, however notional, in mind, and such a concept would add clarity to our proposals.

Michael Howard

DISARMAMENT: A BRIEF HISTORICAL NOTE

I

1. There is little to recall about discussions of disarmament before 1914. It was not even something imposed on vanquished by victors.

2. There were, however, numerous suggestions for securing "perpetual peace" in the 18th century in which measures of what would now be called disarmament would have played a part.

3. The two conferences at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 concerned themselves primarily with measures to secure rules of war, treatment of civilians, wounded and prisoners, the rights and obligations of neutrals etc. But the first Conference did include a ban on gas warfare, dum dum bullets, &"projectiles thrown from balloons". Britain sought at the second conference to secure some limitation of armaments.

.../ cont.

II

4. The Treaty of Versailles insisted on specific and radical measures of German disarmament to be carried out under Anglo-French military control. These were looked upon as a foretaste of, or introduction to, "the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations" (Part V of the Treaty).

5. These clauses were put forward in an international mood which accepted that great armaments were themselves a cause of war - particularly the naval "arms race" between Germany and Britain. The mood was articulated by President Wilson in his speeches in 1918.

6. Much of the proposed German disarmament was carried but there were numerous evasions. Many of them - perhaps most - became known to the allied control commission in the 1920s. But Britain and France did not agree how these evasions were to be handled. After 1930 the control commission was withdrawn. After 1933

.../ cont

Hitler stepped up rearmament and in 1935 specifically denounced all the clauses on disarmament in the treaty of Versailles.

7. There were several attempts to carry forward the disarmament clauses in the Treaty of Versailles to countries other than Germany, e.g. the naval treaties of 1921-22 and 1930 which affected most of the powers which then had substantial navies. There was a protocol banning the use of gas in war (1925), a convention on international (private) arms traffic (1925), plans for the renunciation of war e.g. the Kellogg Pact (1928) and finally a disarmament conference at Geneva in 1932. This last led to nothing, basically, because of divergencies between France and the others: France desired a system of international police and insisted that security must precede disarmament. The Germans demanded equality of treatment. The US in June 1932 proposed a one third cut in all "defence components".

.../ cont

8. A subsequent meeting of this conference did secure a "No Force declaration" by which the major powers promised not to resolve differences between them by force. Other discussions revolved around a scheme put forward by Britain by which all European armies would be reduced by specific figures, and France and Germay would be permitted equality. The US supported this but the plan failed formally at least because Germany, by then with Hitler as Chancellor, refused to agree that the SA (storm troops) should be counted in. The conference met again in 1934 briefly.

9. These efforts seemed to have been wrecked as much by France as by Germany but it is understandable that after 1914-18 the French should be fearful and it is inconceivable that Germany would have been restrained while Hitler was in power. There were arguments (e.g. by Lord Cecil) - still sometimes heard - that, had it not been for French intransigence in 1932, the German government of

.../ cont

of Dr Bruning might have been saved and Hitler kept from power. It is hard to give credence to such "if onlys".

III

10. After 1945, naturally the first series of efforts concentrated on the issue of nuclear weapons. Most of the prewar protocols and conventions on the use of force were, as it were, absorbed in the Charter of the UN. The US put forward ideas to secure the internationalisation of nuclear energy the Barmch Plan (1946-47). This was opposed by the Soviet Union, who were nearer the development of nuclear weapons than anyone supposed: their first nuclear weapon was tested in 1949.

11. Between then and the 1960s there were a series of far reaching but rather over ambitious

.../ cont

disarmament plans which sought formally to secure "general and complete disarmament" including the abolition of all nuclear weapons. These were usually discussed in the UN disarmament Commission or its sub committee. After 1955, however, it was admitted that there was no possibility of achieving a world in which it would be proved that all nuclear weapons had been beyound all doubt dismantled. This led to the pursuit of less ambitious schemes for "arms control", to become the subject of academic and theoretical debate and study in the US and Europe during the 1960s. Meantime the post war mood, unlike that in 1919, was one in which it was supposed that war in 1939 had been caused by excessive disarmament of a unilateral type.

12. Some understandings of a limited kind were achieved e.g. the partial Test Ban treaty (1963), the Antarctic treaty (1959), the Outer Space treaty (1967), the treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), the Nuclear non proliferation treaty (1968) and the SALT I treaty (1970).

.../ cont

13. Discussions in the UN or its subcommittees of primarily interested powers in the late 'forties and 'fifties centred also on ways whereby substantial measures of "conventional" disarmament - reduction of armaments and forces to the level "strictly necessary for the mainenance of internal security" - might be interwoven with the measures agreed on nuclear weapons. These discussions, though of value in discovering information about Soviet attitudes to weapons in general, led to nothing.

14. Meantime the situation changed as a result of:

(a) the Soviet decision, apparently taken after the Cuban crisis of 1962, to devote every effort to reach at least equality with the US in nuclear weapons and methods of delivery to prevent a similar occurrence arising in which the USSR would have to back down again.

.../ cont

(b) the achievement of this aim in the 1970s. partly as a result of US decisions in the late 1960s to have a policy of minimum deterrence;

(c) rapid technological advances which changed the whole history of weapons in the 1970s; and

(d) the achievement by the Soviet Union of an ocean going navy.

14. In the 1970s direct talks between the US and USSR followed the achievement of SALT I, about further measures of strategic arms limitation. A SALT II treaty was signed in 1979 but not ratified by the US because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It would seem that both sides have kept to the provisions of this non-ratified treaty.

15. Other disarmament conferences, including other powers were held at Geneva and Vienna e.g.

.../ cont

those affecting force levels in Europe and intermediate range weapons. On the whole direct conversations between the super powers have seemed a wiser course in recent years than special UN conferences, though after the first special session on Disarmament (1978) UN activities began again and a UN disarmament centre was founded - largely devoted to gathering information.

IV

16. There seem to me to be seven main points - perhaps obvious - which need to be taken into account when discussing disarmament:

(a) the power of nuclear weapons and the speed with which they can be delivered is a new dimension in the

.../ cont

world, even though politicians and generals who may give the order to use them may not be very different from those in the past.

(b) in the new countries of the so called Third World armies play an essential civil function comparable to that exercised by monarchies in the past. Armed forces can be the only institution which keeps the nation concerned together.

(c) similarly in these countries we have seen a steady growth in military rule. Nor can military intervention in politics by excluded even in Europe e.g. Spain, Portugal and Greece,

.../ cont

perhaps even Italy, countries where there remain threats of military rule. Even France has experienced a coup d'etat with a distinct military flavour within the last 25 years.

(d) many of the threats to peace are not caused by regular armies but by irregular ones - e.g. terrorists, guerrillas etc.

(e) the great powers' allies need to be watched. If, for example, the USSR were to agree to cut her armed forces by a third, there is an obvious chance that she would make up the difference by using Cubans or others as an international brigade - anyway outside Europe.

.../ cont

(f) the "Third World" has recently been increasing its arms fast. It seems as if the Soviet Union remains the principal supplier of these weapons.

(g) There is ample documentation for the fact that the Soviet Union has in recent years devoted enormous resources to propaganda in favour of its own version of disarmament specifically to further its own strategic interest. It may be that the present interest in disarmament in Western Europe is indirectly mainly due to this Soviet campaign, though naturally such a thing would be hard to prove. (Particularly useful recent document on this matter is "Moscow and the Peace Offensive" published by the Heritage Foundation, No.184).

Mr. Coles
SG 22/6 Ambassador

TOAST BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE LUNCHEON IN HONOUR OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM - 23 JUNE 1982

The SG's toast for tomorrow.

MLL 22/6

MADAM PRIME MINISTER, EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

IT IS A VERY GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME, MADAM PRIME MINISTER, TO HAVE THIS FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO WELCOME YOU TO THE UNITED NATIONS. YOUR DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT DEMONSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE THE UNITED KINGDOM ATTACHES TO THESE EFFORTS TOWARDS THE CREATION OF A MORE STABLE AND SECURE WORLD. LET ME ALSO CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS MORNING AND ON YOUR ENCOURAGING EXPRESSION OF YOUR COUNTRY'S COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE OF DISARMAMENT.

THE UNITED KINGDOM OCCUPIES A SPECIAL PLACE IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND IN THE HISTORIC MISSION ENTRUSTED TO THIS ORGANIZATION BY THE CHARTER. ONE OF THE FOREMOST ARCHITECTS OF THE WORLD BODY, FROM ITS CONCEPTION IN THE ATLANTIC CHARTER TO ITS REALIZATION IN SAN FRANCISCO WAS AN EMINENT PREDECESSOR OF YOURS, WINSTON CHURCHILL. EVEN IN THE DARKEST DAYS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR HE WAS ABLE TO LOOK BEYOND THE FIGHTING AND THE DESTRUCTION IN PLANNING FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION TO PRESERVE THE FUTURE PEACE. IT WAS TOGETHER WITH THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION THAT CHURCHILL, IN 1943 IN TEHERAN, RECOGNIZED THE RESPONSIBILITY - AND I QUOTE "RESTING UPON US AND ALL THE UNITED NATIONS TO MAKE A PEACE ... AND BANISH THE SCOURGE AND TERRO OF WAR FOR MANY GENERATIONS."

MADAM PRIME MINISTER, YOUR COUNTRY'S PROFOUND COMMITMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS, IS AS VITAL TODAY AS IT WAS AT THE FOUNDING OF THE ORGANIZATION. AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER ARE RESPECTED AND THAT PEACE AND SECURITY ARE MAINTAINED. THIS ORGANIZATION, WHICH WAS BORN OUT OF THE ASHES OF A DEVASTATING WAR, NEEDS ALL OF THE VISION AND DEDICATION POSSESSED BY ITS FOUNDERS IF IT IS TO REALIZE THEIR HOPES FOR THE FUTURE.

IF I MAY QUOTE THE FAMOUS WORDS OF ANOTHER ENGLISHMAN, JOHN DONNE, "NO MAN IS AN ISLAND ENTIRE OF ITSELF: EVERY MAN IS A PIECE OF THE CONTINENT, A PART OF THE MAIN". WE HAVE GROWN TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE INCREASING INTERDEPENDENCE OF OUR WORLD, BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL, BUT WE HAVE STILL NOT DRAWN THE NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS. EVERY CONFLICT RUNS THE RISK OF ESCALATING AND THREATENING THE GENERAL PEACE. OUR MODERN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, CAPABLE OF MASS DESTRUCTION, IS ALL TOO LIKELY TO ASSUME ITS OWN GRIM LOGIC AND LEAD TO EVENTS WHICH WE CAN NO LONGER CONTROL.

FACED WITH THIS AWESOME PERSPECTIVE, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT WE RESOLVE TO STRENGTHEN THE ONLY EXISTING UNIVERSAL MACHINERY FOR SECURITY AND THE SOLUTION OF CONFLICTS, NAMELY THE UNITED NATIONS. OUR ORGANIZATION POSSESSES THE MEANS TO PRESERVE THE FABRIC OF PEACE, BUT ONLY IF IT IS USED DETERMINEDLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR THE SUPPORT WHICH YOUR COUNTRY, MADAM PRIME MINISTER, HAS CONSISTENTLY EXTENDED TO SO MANY OF THE UNITED NATIONS' ENDEAVOURS, THUS RISING TO THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES I HAVE MENTIONED. LET ME ALSO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PAY A PERSONAL TRIBUTE TO YOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, SIR ANTHONY PARSONS, WHOSE BRILLIANCE, GOOD WILL AND INTEGRITY I HAVE VALUED MOST DEEPLY.

MADAM PRIME MINISTER,

I KNOW THAT YOUR STAUNCH PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO THE IDEALS OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND SELF-FULFILLMENT, AND YOUR ATTACHMENT TO FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, WILL CONTINUE TO BE A SOURCE OF STRENGTH EVEN IN DIFFICULT TIMES. YOUR RESOLUTION, VISION AND COURAGE INSPIRE THE CONFIDENCE WE NEED IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS A LIFE OF JUSTICE AND DIGNITY FOR ALL HUMANKIND.

EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I WOULD LIKE YOU TO JOIN ME IN A TOAST TO HER EXCELLENCY PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER AND TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.

MR INGHAM

PRIME MINISTER'S TELEVISION INTERVIEWS: ROOM 2818, UN PLAZA

The three breakfast television shows have a combined audience of 14 - 15 million and are closely watched by senior officials and commentators. The Prime Minister's interviews therefore will help set the tone for questions at the Press Conference at the United Nations and the Press Conference after the talks with President Reagan.

2. The style of the breakfast television shows is relaxed and informal. Apart from Mr Hottelet (CBS), the interviewers do not have a specialised knowledge of foreign affairs topics. Their objective will be to give the Prime Minister an opportunity to explain her policies in three or four areas: follow up questions are unlikely to be aggressive.

3. The subjects most likely to be covered are:

a) The Falklands. Future negotiations? US pressure on Britain? UN involvement? Can Britain afford to keep a garrison in the Islands? Effect on NATO? Effect on US relations with Latin America? US sanctions?

b) Meeting with President Reagan. What will the Prime Minister say to him about the Falklands? What other topics will be discussed?

c) East-West relations. What prospects of progress on disarmament? Attitude on sanctions against the Soviet Union including the gas pipeline project?

d) Middle East. Attitude to the Israeli invasion? What can the European Community do?

e) Britain. Prospects for the economy? Early general election?

g) Britain and the Community. Effect of dropping of sanctions against Argentina? Budget contribution.

/...

GOOD MORNING AMERICA: (7.12 - 7.22)

"Good Morning America" is the most popular of the three breakfast television programmes with an audience of over six million. The programme's news presenter, Mr Steven Bell, is flying from Washington for the interview. Mr Bell, who is 47, has been with "Good Morning America" since it was launched in 1976. Before that he has had assignments with ABC as a White House correspondent (covering Presidents Nixon and Ford), as a Vietnam war correspondent, and bureau chief in Hong Kong. He frequently covers major overseas events, and was in London for the President's visit earlier this month.

NBC "Today": (7.37 - 7.47)

"Today" is only marginally less popular than its closest rival "Good Morning America". The interview will be conducted by the programme's Washington news presenter, Mr Chris Wallace. Son of one of the best known correspondents in US television, Mr Wallace is one of the youngest senior correspondents in network television. He joined "Today" last year after working on NBC's "Evening News" programme. He made his national reputation with reports from the Conventions in the 1980 election campaign.

CBS "Morning News": (8.12 - 8.20)

CBS' breakfast programme has been considerably less successful in the ratings than its two rivals, but until recently has concentrated more on hard news. The interview will be conducted by Mr Richard Hottelet who has been CBS' UN correspondent since 1960. Mr Hottelet joined CBS as a correspondent in Europe towards the end of World War II and served as Bonn correspondent from 1951 to 1956. As the most distinguished of the networks' UN correspondents he has interviewed many visiting Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers, including Lord Carrington. He is likely to focus the discussion in a more searching manner than the other interviewers on United Nations topics.

P M Nixon
BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES

cc: Sir A Parsons
Mr Summerhayes
Mr Goulding
Mr Thorne

Mr Coles

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH

1. Since my earlier minute two new guests have been added to the list:

Mr Ismat Kittani, the current President of the General Assembly. A professional Iraqi diplomat of great ability, whose normal post is Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry in Baghdad. Chaired the Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference in 1980. A Kurd.

Miss Edmonde Dever, Permanent Representative of Belgium and currently President of the Ten in New York. (She has cancelled a lunch she was giving in honour of Kittani tomorrow in order to be able to accept the Secretary-General's invitation.) She is personable and a good professional diplomat.

M I GOULDING

22 June 1982

Mr Coles

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: SECRETARY GENERAL'S LUNCH

1. I submit brief notes on the personalities whom the Secretary General has invited:

Mr Tony Street

Foreign Minister of Australia. Provided staunch support over the Falklands and made a magnificent speech in the Security Council.

Mr and Mrs David Anderson

Permanent Representative of Australia to the UN. He is sound but dull. She is very nice, lively and intelligent; was brought up in New Caledonia.

Mr and Mrs Luc de la Barre de Nanteuil

Permanent Representative of France since January 1982. Career member of the French Diplomatic Service; previously Permanent Representative to the European Communities in Brussels and Ambassador to The Hague. Currently President of the Security Council. A difficult colleague; arrogant and unpredictable. Both he and his wife have good English.

Mrs Francis Pometta

Newly arrived Permanent Observer of Switzerland. Intelligent, sensitive, energetic, un-Swiss.

Mrs Marietta Tree

American socialite and UN buff; at one time a member of the US Mission to the UN. Friend of Roy Jenkins.

Mrs Brooke Astor

Another American socialite and professional hostess.

Mr David Rockefeller

Well known to the Prime Minister.

Mrs Lucille Mair

Jamaican. Special Adviser to UNICEF on Women's development and Secretary General designate of the International Conference on Palestine. Able and ambitious but good company.

/Mr and Mrs B Urquhart

Mr and Mrs Brian Urquhart

He is Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, responsible inter alia for UN peacekeeping forces. The most senior Briton in the Secretariat (joined in 1945). Currently disheartened by the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon. She is American, his second wife, a journalist with Time.

M I Gm

22 June 1982

M I Goulding

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FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY : MY TELNO 2205 TO FCO:
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. THE OUTLINE PROGRAMME REMAINS AS IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE BUT THERE ARE ONE OR TWO ADDITIONAL POINTS OF WHICH YOU SHOULD BE AWARE.

2. HAIG AND I WILLIMEET THE PRIME MINISTER AT ANDREWS AIRFORCE BASE TOMORROW AND WILL COME IN TO WASHINGTON WITH HER BY HELICOPTER. THERE WILL BE NO FORMALITIES ON ARRIVAL AT THE WHITE HOUSE ALTHOUGH THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A BRIEF PHOTO CALL.

3. THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO START OFF HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER TETE-A-TETE IN THE OVAL OFFICE FOR 10-15 MINUTES. THEREAFTER OTHERS WOULD JOIN THE MEETING WHICH WOULD BE LIMITED TO FIVE A SIDE. ON THE AMERICAN SIDE WILL BE THE PRESIDENT, HAIG, CLARK, MEESE AND PERHAPS VICE PRESIDENT BUSH. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET BLAIR HOUSE OPENED UP AS AN OFFICE (BECAUSE IT IS UNDERGOING REPAIRS) BUT WE HAVE ARRANGED FOR THOSE MEMBERS OF THE PRIME MINISTERS PARTY NOT INVOLVED IN THE DISCUSSIONS TO BE ACCOMMODATED IN AN OFFICE IN THE WHITE HOUSE CLOSE TO THE OVAL OFFICE WHERE THERE WILL BE TELEPHONES OPERATING VIA THE WHITE HOUSE SWITCHBOARD. IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO LAY ON A SECURE SPEECH FACILITY AT THE WHITE HOUSE BUT IF ANY MEMBER OF THE PARTY NEEDS TO TALK ON A SECURE LINE TO LONDON THEY CAN COME TO THE EMBASSY TO DO SO. TELEGRAMS WILL BE DELIVERED BY SAFE-HAND TO THE WHITE HOUSE. IF ANY TYPING NEEDS TO BE DONE AT THE WHITE HOUSE, WE SUGGEST THAT A PORTABLE TYPEWRITER IS BROUGHT FROM THE VC10.

4. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT HOW LONG THE RESTRICTED SESSION OF TALKS WILL LAST BUT THE PLAN IS THAT AT SOME STAGE, THERE SHOULD BE A LARGER MEETING IN THE CABINET ROOM WHICH, ON THE AMERICAN SIDE, WOULD INVOLVE (IN ADDITION TO THE PRESIDENT, HAIG AND CLARK) WEINBERGER, COMMERCE SECRETARY BALDRIGE (FOR ANY DISCUSSION OF THE PIPELINE JOHN BROWN) MEESE, BAKER AND DEAVER AND ONE OR TWO OTHER OFFICIALS.

CONFIDENTIAL

4 5. AT THE END OF HER TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT SHOULD GO OUT TO THE SOUTH LAWN TO MAKE BRIEF STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS (THERE WILL BE NO QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS). THE PRESIDENT WILL THEN TAKE HIS LEAVE OF THE PRIME MINISTER WHO WILL BE TAKEN BY CAR FROV THE WHITE HOUSE TO BLAIR HOUSE WHERE A ROOM WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE IN CASE THE PRIME MINISTER WISHES TO PAUSE FBR A FEW MOMENTS BEFORE HER PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1815 APPROX IN THE NEW EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING NEXT DOOR (IMMEDIATELY BEHIND BLAIR HOUSE).

5 6. AT THE END OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL LEAVE BY CAR FOR THE REFLECTING POOL WHERE HAIG WILL TAKE LEAVE OF HER. I WILL GO BY HELICOPTER WITH THE PRIME MINISTER TO ANDREWS AIR FGRCE BASE.

6 7. THIS ARRANGEMENT WILL ENABLE US TO HAVE FOUR ADDITIONAL PLACES AVAILABLE ON THE HELICOPTERS FOR THE JOURNEY FROM WASHINGTON TO ANDREWS. GIVEN THAT ONE OF THE JOURNALISTS (MS VAN HATTEM) WILL NOT BE RETURNING TO LONDON ON THE VC10, THIS WILL MEAN THAT ONLY TWO MEMBERS OF THE PARTY, CANNOT BE ACCOMMODATED OC HELICOPTERS FOR THE RETURN JOURNEY AND WILL THEREFORE NEED TO REMAIN AT ANDREWS AIRFORCE BASE. YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO DECIDE IN ADVANCE WHO SHOULD STAY BEHIND.

7 8. WE HAVE ARRANGED A MINIBUS FOR THOSE JOURNALISTS WHO WILL BE COMING IN FROM ANDREWS TO ATTEND THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE. THIS WILL GET THEM TO THE NEW EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING IN PLENTY OF TIME. GRATEFUL IF THEY COULD BE FORE-WARNED THAT, IN ORDER TO GET INTO THE CONVOY LEAVING FOR THE REFLECTING POOL AT THE END OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THEY WILL NEED TO LEAVE IMMEDIATELY THE PRIVE MINISTER DOES. THE HELICOPTER TAKINGITHE JOURNALISTS TO ANDREWS WILL TAKE OFF AHEAD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S HELICOPTER.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 76 OF 21 JUNE 1982
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 56: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO UNSSD II

1. MIFT CONTAINS A REVISED VERSION OF THE NEW YORK ELEMENTS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROGRAMME AND DETAILS OF THE GUEST LIST FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH.

2. WE HAVE ASKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OFFICE IF THEY COULD INCLUDE MR GOW MP IN THE LUNCH. UNFORTUNATELY THEY ARE UNABLE TO DO SO AS THE TABLE IS ALREADY FULL. BUT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM ABOUT ADDING MR GOW TO THE PARTY ACCOMPANYING THE PRIME MINISTER WHEN SHE CALLS ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

3. WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO THE AUSTRALIAN MISSION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE UNABLE TO MEET PRIVATELY WITH MR STREET. THEY UNDERSTOOD. MR STREET WILL BE AT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH.

4. A REVISED VERSION OF THE SPEAKERS' LIST FOR 22 AND 23 JUNE HAS BEEN SENT BY FACSIMILE TO BROUCHER, ACDD. ARGENTINA HAS INSCRIBED TO SPEAK ON THE EVENING OF TUESDAY, 22 JUNE. SIR A PARSONS OR MR WHYTE WILL SPEAK IN REPLY THAT EVENING IF ANY REPLY IS REQUIRED. THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES ON 23 JUNE.

SUMMERHAYES

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FM WASHINGTON 220033Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2206 OF 21 JUNE 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. ON THE SUBJECTS LIKELY TO COME UP WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER SEES PRESIDENT REAGAN, YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF CURRENT US THINKING:

(A) FALKLANDS

WITH EVIDENT SATISFACTION AT OUR MILITARY VICTORY, ON WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS ALREADY CONGRATULATED THE PRIME MINISTER WARMLY GOES A DESIRE TO TRY TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN DONE TO US RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA. THERE IS A TENDENCY TO EXAGGERATE THAT DAMAGE AND THE EXTENT OF REAL LATIN AMERICAN SYMPATHY FOR ARGENTINA. ON THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS, THE AMERICANS WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A NEUTRAL POSITION AND WILL TRY TO PRESS ON US THE NEED TO HOLD OUT THE PROSPECT OF TALKS AT SOME STAGE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT APPEAR TO REALISE THAT AFTER THE EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE AND THE LOSS OF LIFE ON OUR SIDE IT IS QUITE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT US TO MOVE IN SUCH A DIRECTION NOW. BUT THIS WILL NOT STOP THEM BELIEVING THAT EXERTING PRESSURE ON US WILL HELP THEM WITH THEIR RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA: BUT I DOUBT IF THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF WILL TRY TO PRESS SUCH IDEAS AT ALL STRONGLY ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON THIS OCCASION.

(B) LEBANON

THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE CONCENTRATES ON THE NEED TO CONSOLIDATE A CEASEFIRE AND DEFUSE THE SITUATION IN WEST BEIRUT. THERE ARE STILL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION. WEINBERGER HAS CONDEMNED THE ISRAELI USE OF FORCE IN LEBANON AND IS NOT KEEN ON US PARTICIPATION IN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. OTHERS, INCLUDING HAIG, SEE THE OPPORTUNITY TO GET THE SYRIANS OUT OF LEBANON AND PURSUE THE IDEA OF LEBANON FOR THE LEBANESE, WHILE BELIEVING THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PLO AS A MILITARY FORCE MAY REDUCE TENSION IN THE AREA. I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT HAIG'S VIEWS WILL PREVAIL. THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT OF CREATING ANY EFFECTIVE LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OR AUTHORITY AND THAT, WHATEVER THE DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE PLO, THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WILL NOT GO AWAY.

LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SO THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY CAN BE DEPLOYED IN WEST BEIRUT. THE AMERICANS CONTINUE TO TALK OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. HAIG WILL BE LOOKING FOR FURTHER SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND THE ESTABLISHMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL OF AN EXPANDED KEEPING FORCE TO WHICH HE MAY HOPE THE EUROPEANS MIGHT CONTRIBUTE.

(C) EAST/WEST RELATIONS

HAIG HAD A VERY UNPRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION WITH GROMYKO, ABOUT WHICH HE HAS SENT YOU A MESSAGE. VERY LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE, THOUGH HAIG PROFESSED TO DETECT SOME GLIMMER OF A SUGGESTION THAT

THE RUSSIANS MAY BE PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE IN A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT IF ONE CAN BE ACHIEVED. THE AMERICANS SEEM TO HOPE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY HELP IN GETTING THE CUBANS OUT OF ANGOLA.

(D) SIBERIAN PIPELINE

THE PRESIDENT WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH THE INADEQUATE RESULTS ACHIEVED AT VERSILLES ON THE QUESTION OF CREDITS FOR THE SOVIET UNION: AND AMERICAN DISAPPOINTMENT WAS COMPOUNDED BY MITTERRAND AND SCHMIDT'S REMARKS AFTERWARDS. THE RESULT HAS BEEN THAT THOSE LIKE HAIG WHO FAVOUR A POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH THE ALLIES AND THE EXEMPTION OF EXISTING CONTRACTS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CARRY THE DAY. THE US VIEW IS THAT WHILE THEY CANNOT PERSUADE THE EUROPEANS TO GIVE UP THE PIPELINE PROJECT, THEY WILL SEEK TO IMPEDE IT TO THE FULL EXTENT THEY CAN. THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF SYMPATHY HERE WITH THE PREDICAMENT OF JOHN BROWN (WE ARE RECOGNISED TO HAVE BEEN MORE SUPPORTIVE OF US POLICIES OVER POLAND THAN THE OTHER EUROPEANS). BUT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT SEEN HOW IT CAN MAKE AN EXCEPTION IN ONE CASE WITHOUT AFFECTING ITS GENERAL POLICY. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE BEEN MADE WELL AWARE THAT THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US. THE PRESIDENT WILL BE EXPECTING THE PRIME MINISTER TO RAISE THE MATTER.

(E) STEEL

THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY OF IMPRESSING ON THE PRESIDENT THE DANGER OF TRIGGERING A REALLY SERIOUS EEC/US ECONOMIC CONFRONTATION IF THINGS CONTINUE ON THEIR PRESENT COURSE.

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FM WASHINGTON 220030Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2205 OF 21 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. THE WHITE HOUSE ARE CONTENT WITH THE PROPOSED TIMETABLE OUTLINED IN YOUR TELNO 56 TO UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK. ON PRESENT PLANS, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE MET AT ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE BY HAIG AND WILL FLY FROM THERE BY HELICOPTER TO THE REFLECTING POOL WHICH IS ONLY A FEW MINUTES BY CAR FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. STATE DEPARTMENT ARE ARRANGING FOR TWO HELICOPTERS, WHICH CAN ACCOMMODATE A TOTAL OF 14 PEOPLE ON OUR SIDE. THEY SAY THAT THIS IS THE MAXIMUM NUMBER FOR WHICH THEY EVER CATER AND THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE A BIGGER HELICOPTER OR A THIRD HELICOPTER FOR ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF THE PARTY AND THE PRESS. WE ARE EXPLORING WAYS AROUND THIS.

2. BLAIR HOUSE IS CLOSED FOR RENOVATIONS. IF IT CANNOT BE OPENED UP TO PROVIDE OFFICE ACCOMMODATION WE WILL FIND A SUITABLE ALTERNATIVE. THE PRESS CONFERENCE WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE NEW EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING (BEHIND BLAIR HOUSE). THIS WILL BE EASIER THAN BLAIR HOUSE FROM THE SECURITY POINT OF VIEW. ALL THE FOLLOWING GROUPS WOULD BE INCLUDED: WHITE HOUSE PRESS CORPS, RESIDENT BRITISH PRESS CORPS AND THOSE TRAVELLING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, AND THE TV NETWORKS.

3. THE WHITE HOUSE WILL LET US KNOW TOMORROW WHO WILL BE WITH THE PRESIDENT AT THE TALKS, BUT NUMBERS, AT LEAST INITIALLY, ARE LIKELY TO BE LIMITED ON THE AMERICAN SIDE TO THE PRESIDENT, HAIG, CLERK AND ONE OR TWO OTHERS.

4. AGAINST THE ABOVE BACKGROUND, THE OUTLINE PROGRAMME FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT IS AS FOLLOWS.

1630 ARRIVE ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE. MET BY HAIG, LUCKY ROOSEVELT (HEAD OF PROTOCOL), STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS AND MYSELF. BY HELICOPTER TO THE REFLECTING POOL AND THENCE BY CAR TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR
1700- TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN
1815
1815- PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE NEW EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
1840
1840 LEAVE BY CAR FOR THE REFLECTING POOL
1850 BY HELICOPTER TO ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE
1910 DEPART ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE.

IN PRACTICE, THE ABOVE TIMINGS MAY SLIP SOMEWHAT: IF THE TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT LAST UNTIL 1815 IT IS UNLIKELY, THAT THE PRESS CONFERENCE CAN BEGIN MUCH BEFORE 1830.

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FM UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK 212330Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 77 OF 21 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

MIFT: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO UNSSD II,

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1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT OUTLINE PROGRAMME FOR THE NEW YORK ELEMENTS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT (22-23 JUNE):

BEGINS

TUESDAY 22 JUNE.
20.40 ETA JFK (VC 10)
MET BY SIR A PARSONS AND MR SUMMERHAYES
MR NIXON WILL ALSO BE PRESENT
21.30 ARRIVE HOTEL - UN PLAZA

WEDNESDAY 23 JUNE.
07.10 LIVE INTERVIEW WITH ABC TV: GOOD MORNING AMERICA
(AT UN PLAZA HOTEL)
07.40 LIVE INTERVIEW WITH NBC TV: TODAY SHOW
(AT UN PLAZA HOTEL)
08.10 LIVE INTERVIEW WITH CBS TV: MORNING NEWS
(AT UN PLAZA HOTEL)
08.45 HAIRDRESSER
09.45 CALL ON SECRETARY-GENERAL: ACCOMPANIED BY SIR A PARSONS, MR SUMMERHAYES, MR WHITMORE.
10.30 CALL ON PRESIDENT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 38TH FLOOR
11.00 PM TO ADDRESS SPECIAL SESSION.
11.30 ACCEPT CONGRATULATIONS (IN INDONESIAN LOUNGE)
12.00 ON RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE AT UN (CONFERENCE ROOM 4)
12.40 SEPARATE INTERVIEWS AT UN (STUDIO 8) WITH:
BBC RADIO : PAUL REYNOLDS OR JAMES LONG
BBC TV : MARTIN BELL

BBC TV : MARTIN BELL
ITN : TREVOR MCDONALD
IRN : ANDREW MANDERSTAM

13.15 LUNCH WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL: 3 SUTTON PLACE - GUEST LIST BELOW: PERSONALITY NOTES WILL BE PROVIDED.

14.40 DEPART BY CAR FOR KENNEDY AIRPORT

15.20 DEPART KENNEDY AIRPORT FOR WASHINGTON.

ENDS

2. FOLLOWING IS GUEST LIST FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH:

BEGINS

SECRETARY-GENERAL	
PRIME MINISTER	
MR TONY STREET	AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
MR AND MRS DAVID ANDERSON	AUSTRALIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
MR AND MRS LUC DE LA BARRE DE NANTEUIL	FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
MR AND MRS BRIAN URQUHART	UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR SPECIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS
MRS FRANCES POMETTA	SWISS PERMANENT OBSERVER
MRS MARIETTA TREE	
MRS BROOKE ASTOR	
MR DAVID ROCKEFELLER	
MRS LUCILLE MAIR	SPECIAL ADVISER TO UNICEF ON WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT
SIR ANTHONY PARSONS	
MR DAVID SUMMERHAYES	
MR AND MRS HAMILTON WHYTE	
MR C A WHITMORE	

ENDS

SUMMERHAYES

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FM FCO 211230Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1213 OF 21 JUNE
FROM CONFERENCE SECTION. FOR MISS B. DAVIS
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON 23 JUNE
1. PASSENGER LIST ON RAF VC10 AS FOLLOWS:- (NOT IN PROTOCOL ORDER)

1. THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER MP
2. MR C A WHITMORE, PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY
3. MR A J COLES, PRIVATE SECRETARY
4. MR B INGHAM, CHIEF PRESS SECRETARY
5. MR H COLVER, PRESS OFFICER
6. MR I GOW MP, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVATE SECRETARY
7. MISS C STEVENS , DUTY CLERK
8. MRS D GREEN , SECRETARIAL ASSISTANT
9. MRS R MEADOWCROFT, SECRETARIAL ASSISTANT
10. SUPT G CAWTHORNE , DETECTIVE
11. SGT B STREVENS , DETECTIVE
12. MR D H GILLMORE CMG , AUSS, FCO
13. MR J ENSOLL, COI
14. MR C HAMPSON, DAILY MIRROR
15. MR D HEALY, PRESS ASSOCIATION
16. MR D BUCHAN, DAILY STAR
17. MR R CARROLL, THE SUN
18. MR J WIGHTMAN, DAILY TELEGRAPH
19. MS M VAN HALTEM, FINANCIAL TIMES
20. MR G GREIG, DAILY MAIL.

2. ALL PASSENGERS SHOULD BE AIRLIFTED BY HELICOPTER TO WHITE HOUSE/BLAIR HOUSE. GRATEFUL IF PRIVATE OFFICE COULD BE SET UP IN BLAIR HOUSE. PLEASE SEND RELEVANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS. AN ENGINEER SHOULD BE IN PRIVATE OFFICE ON PARTY'S ARRIVAL TO INSTALL SECURE SPEECH DEVICE, WHICH WILL BE BROUGHT BY DUTY CLERK.

3. A SAFEHAND SERVICE BETWEEN THE EMBASSY AND PRIVATE OFFICE IN BLAIR HOUSE SHOULD OPERATE AS REQUIRED FOR DURATION OF VISIT.
4. THE DUTY CLERK WILL NOT BRING ALL BOXES OFF THE VC10. A SECURITY OFFICER FROM THEEMBASSY SHOULD THEREFORE BE AT THE AIRPORT FOR THE AIRCRAFT'S ARRIVAL AND REMAIN ON BOARD UNTIL PARTY'S DEPARTURE.

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cc: Mr Ingham

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From the Private Secretary

21 June, 1982

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

I discussed the draft programme for this visit with the Prime Minister in the light of President Reagan's request at the weekend that she should if possible make time for a brief discussion with him.

I enclose a copy of the programme as we now see it. You will note that we have deleted the bilateral meeting with the Australian Foreign Minister. There will be no time for this - and the Prime Minister received him in London recently. Perhaps appropriate apologies could be made.

Our Press Section will make the media arrangements direct with those concerned.

I have considered whether, in view of the inclusion of Washington, we should expand the team of advisers. But I do not think this is necessary. We should be grateful if David Gilmore would accompany us throughout.

A. J. COLES

B Fall, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

POSSIBLE REVISED PROGRAMME FOR WEDNESDAY, 23 JUNE

?0700	Breakfast TV (in hotel)
0900	Hairdresser
0945	Call on Secretary General
1030	Call on President of General Assembly
1100	Prime Minister to address Special Session
1130	Accept congratulations
1200	On record Press Conference at UN
1240	BBC Radio, BBC TV, ITN, IRN interviews
1315	Lunch with Secretary General
1445/1500	Depart by helicopter to Kennedy Airport
1515	Depart Kennedy Airport
1630	Arrive Andrew's Airport, Washington
1655	Arrive White House by helicopter
1700-1800/1815	Talks with President Reagan
1815-1840	Press Conference
1840	Depart White House by helicopter
1905	Depart Andrew's Airport, Washington

0730, Thursday, 24 June - Arrive UK

NEW YORK BRIEFS

1. Steering Brief
2. Points to Make
3. Falkland Islands
4. Middle East
5. Iran/Iraq War
6. Global Negotiations

WASHINGTON BRIEFS

(a) Existing Contracts (John Brown)

(b) US Steel Measures

(c) Middle East

(d) Falklands

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 22/23 JUNE

STEERING BRIEF

1. Attachments

(a) Programme;

(b) UN Secretary-General: Personality Note;

(c) President of the General Assembly: Personality Note;

(d) Members of UK Delegation;

(e) List of Speakers;

(f) Guest list for Secretary-General's lunch;

(g) Brief on UNSSD II.

2. Introduction

Leaders or foreign ministers of all major countries have attended UNSSD II. The Non-Aligned are critical of the nuclear powers for the lack of progress in disarmament since UNSSD I in 1978. Groups pressing for more rapid progress have organised actions of protest.

3. Objectives

(a) To emphasise to the international community and our own public that we will match our justifiable defence policies with a realistic and constructive approach to disarmament;

(b) to promote Western cohesion on disarmament issues;

(c) to maintain support for non-proliferation;

(d) to resist Soviet and Non-Aligned propaganda and to reject unrealistic disarmament proposals;

(e) to gain support for our policies in the South Atlantic;

(f) to cement relations with the new Secretary-General.

4. Tactical Handling

Meeting with the Secretary-General

He will want to concentrate on the two crises in his first few

/months

months in office: the Falklands and the Lebanon. It would be appropriate to thank him for the great effort he made to help over the Falklands. The Prime Minister might also mention that she is looking forward to seeing him and his wife when they visit London in July. (She is offering him lunch.) His understanding of spoken English is not as good as might appear, though he speaks it quite well.

The Prime Minister will lunch with the Secretary-General. The guests will include the Australian Foreign Minister, who asked for a meeting with the Prime Minister.

Meeting with Mr Kittani, President of the General Assembly

This is purely a courtesy call. Sir A Parsons can advise if required.

Speech

The Prime Minister will be the first speaker of the day. She will be followed by Spain (possibly the Spanish Foreign Minister) and, in the afternoon, by Mr Street, the Australian Foreign Minister. Other speakers that day are from minor Third World countries.

The Belgian Foreign Minister spoke on the first day of the debate on behalf of the Ten. Other Western leaders have included President Reagan, Chancellor Schmidt and M. Cheysson. Mr Gromyko spoke on 14 June.

TV and Press Interviews

Arrangements are being made by No 10 direct with UKMis New York.

5. Other briefing

Separate briefing has been submitted on the Falklands and the Middle East and on the Prime Minister's visit to Washington.

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MRS FRANCES POMETTA	SWISS PERMANENT OBSERVER
MRS MARIETTA TREE	
MRS BROOKE ASTOR	
MR DAVID ROCKEFELLER	
MRS LUCILLE MAIR	SPECIAL ADVISER TO UNICEF ON WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT
SIR ANTHONY PARSONS	
MR DAVID SUMMERHAYES	
MR AND MRS HAMILTON WHYTE	
MR C A WHITMORE	

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B

MR JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR

1. Born 1920 in Lima. Graduated in Law from the Catholic University, Lima, 1943. Joined the Peruvian Diplomatic Service 1944 and served in the Peruvian Embassies in Paris, London, La Paz and Rio. From 1964 he was successivelyAmbassador in Berne, Head of the Foreign Ministry, Peru's first Ambassador in Moscow, and Permanent Representative at the UN. In October 1975 he became the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus, and, after a brief interlude as Peruvian Ambassador in Caracas, was appointed UN Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs in 1979. He later became the Secretary-General's Personal Representative for Afghanistan and at the Rhodesian independence elections. He resigned in May 1981 and was nominated Peruvian Ambassador to Brazil but his appointment became a political issue in the Peruvian Parliament, and he left the service of the Peruvian Government the same year.

2. In the 1981 contest for the Secretary-Generalship he became one of the compromise candidates only after Waldheim and Salim (Tanzania) agreed to withdraw from the contest. The Russians immediately made clear that he was the only one they could accept. In the subsequent ballot he received the necessary nine votes. His nearest rival gained ten but was vetoed by the Russians.

3. He is an able diplomat, non-Latin in temperament, self-effacing and modest. He shuns the limelight, thinks hard before acting, and has said that he does not want to serve more than one term. He regards his years in London and Paris as formative and professes special admiration for the UK. His attempts to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Falklands crisis were scrupulously impartial. The failure was not his fault.

4. He speaks perfect French. His English is less good and he does not always understand what is said. His spoken English is better and he handles questions from the media adroitly.

5. His first marriage, by which he had two children, ended in divorce. His second wife is Marcela Temple de Perez de Cuellar, a Peruvian, whose father is of British origin.

ISMAT KITTANI (Iraq)

President of UN General Assembly since September 1981

GENERAL

Born 1929. Kurd, from leading family near Amadiyah. Career diplomat in Iraqi Diplomatic Service through successive revolutions. Made his peace with present government after 1968 coup.

EDUCATION, POSTS IN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE AND UN

BA in political sciences, Lux College USA.
Joined Iraqi MFA 1952. From 1953-1981 occupied various diplomatic and UN posts including Under-Secretary of Iraqi MFA and Assistant Secretary-General. Secretary-General Baghdad Arab Summit Conference, November 1978. Chairman of Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, Geneva, August 1980.

ELECTION TO POST OF ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT

Position rotates annually between main regional groupings. Usually grouping concerned agrees a nomination and Assembly endorses. Last year, unusually, contested election with candidates from Iraq, Singapore and Bangladesh.

PERSONALITY AND PERFORMANCE IN POST

Kittani has considerable intelligence and charm, as well as being professionally very competent. Westernised. There had been fears that he might be unable to preside impartially because of Iraq's war with Iran. However, he has fulfilled his office without any suggestion of bias and has been an able and effective President.

D

UK DELEGATION TO UNSSD II

Sir A Parsons GCMG MVO MC
Permanent Representative to the UN

Mr D M Summerhayes CMG
Ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament

Mr L J Middleton
Counsellor, Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament

~~Mr J S Chick~~
~~Heads of Arms Control and Disarmament Department, FCO~~

Mr N A Thorne, First Secretary

Mrs J I Link, First Secretary

Mr R A Pullen, First Secretary

Miss J E F Wright, Third Secretary

Footnote

Mr Frank Judd, former Labour Minister and Director of VSO, has agreed to act as independent adviser to the Delegation in liaison with NGOs.

E

UNSSD II: General Debate (8-23 June)

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UND, FCO

Speakers List as at: 10 June

(P = President; PM = Prime Minister; FM = Foreign Minister; PR = Permanent Representative)

R of R = Right of Reply

DSU 0813

Tuesday, 8 June

AM		PM	
1.	Singapore	1.	Iran (FM)
2.	Morocco (DFM)	2.	Democratic Yemen (FM)
3.	Belgium (FM)	3.	Sierra Leone/
4.	Sweden (PM)	4.	Qatar
5.		5.	Samoa

R of R = Iraq

Wednesday, 9 June

AM		PM	
1.	Mexico (FM)	1.	Sri Lanka (FM)
2.	Thailand (DFM)	2.	Japan (PM)
3.	Austria (FM)	3.	Kuwait
4.	Brazil	4.	Venezuela
5.		5.	Portugal
6.		6.	Maldives (FM)
7.		7.	/

/ = Changes from last version (4 June)

Thursday, 10 June

Yugoslavia (Head of State)

AM		PM	
1.	/	1.	Afghanistan (FM)
2.	GDR (FM)	2.	Indonesia (FM)/
3.	Pakistan (FM)	3.	Finland (PM)/
4.		4.	Angola (FM)/
5.		5.	Jordan (FM)/
6.		6.	Ghana/
7.		7.	UNESCO/

Friday, 11 June

Cyprus (President)

AM		PM	
1.	Ireland (PM)	1.	Algeria (FM)
2.	Philippines	2.	France (FM)
3.	China (FM)	3.	India (FM)
4.	Holy See/	4.	Congo (FM)
5.	Hungary (FM)/	5.	Zaire
6.		6.	Seychelles (FM)

Monday, 14 June

Panama (Head of State)

AM	PM
1. FRG (PM)	1. Peru
2. Poland (FM)/	2. New Zealand
3. Madagascar	3. Denmark (PM)/
4.	4. Zambia (FM)
5.	5. Uganda (PM)/
6.	6. Mozambique (FM)
7.	7. Senegal (FM)/
8.	8. Chile (FM)

Tuesday, 15 June

AM	PM
1. Italy (PM)	1. Iceland (FM)
2. USSR (FM)/	2. Netherlands (PM)/
3. Luxembourg (FM)	3. Niger
4. Norway (PM)	4. Nigeria (FM)/
5.	5. Vietnam (DFM)
6.	6. Guyana
7.	7. Sudan
8.	8. Botswana/

Wednesday, 16 June

AM		PM	
1.	Cuba (V. President)	1.	UNITED KINGDOM (PM)
2.	Czechoslovakia (FM)	2.	Nepal
3.	Spain	3.	Mali
4.	Cameroon	4.	Nicaragua
5.	Turkey (FM)/	5.	Suriname
6.		6.	Dem Kampuchea
7.		7.	Mongolia (FM)/
8.		8.	IAEA/

Thursday, 17 June

USA (President)

AM		PM	
1.		1.	Bangladesh (PM)
2.		2.	Malta (FM)/
3.		3.	Bulgaria (FM)
4.		4.	Burma
5.		5.	Jamaica (FM)
6.		6.	Ethiopia/
7.		7.	Iraq/
8.		8.	Albania/

Friday, 18 June

AM	PM
1. Israel (PM)	1. Honduras (FM)/
2. Bahamas	2. Kenya
3. Canada (PM)	3. Malaysia/
4. Greece (FM)	4. Libya
5.	5. Bahrain
6.	6. Zimbabwe (FM)
7.	7. Cape Verde
8.	8. Argentina/
9.	9. Antigua and Barbuda/

Monday, 21 June

AM	PM
1. Upper Volta (FM)	1. Bhutan
2. Ukraine (FM)	2. Egypt
3. Somalia	3. Tanzania (FM)
4. Gabon	4. Burundi (FM)
5.	5. Yemen
6.	6. Syria
7.	7. Uruguay
8.	8. Dominican Republic/
9.	9. Guinea/
10.	10. UNEP/

Up-to-date version as at 5 pm on 21 June

Tuesday, 22 June

AM	PM
1. Fiji (PR)	1. Papua New Guinea (PR)
2. Byelorussia SSR (FM)	2. Benin
3. Romania (FM)	3. Trinidad & Tobago
4. Lebanon	4. Rwanda
5. Tunisia	5. Togo
6.	6. Mauritania
7.	7. St Vincent & Grenadine (FM)
8.	8. Argentina
9.	9. Oman
10.	10. Arab League

Wednesday, 23 June

AM	PM
1. UNITED KINGDOM (PM)	1. Bolivia
2. Spain	2. Lao
3. Grenada (FM)	3. Australia (FM)
4. Colombia (FM)	4. United Arab Emirates
5. UNDP	5. Guyana
6.	6. Mauritius
7.	7. Liberia
8.	8. Costa Rica

F

GUEST LIST FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH

Secretary-General	
Prime Minister	
Mr Tony Street	Australian Foreign Minister
Mr and Mrs David Anderson	Australian Permanent Representative
Mr and Mrs Luc de la Barre de Nanteuil	French Permanent Representative
Mr and Mrs Brian Urquhart	Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs
Mrs Frances Pometta	Swiss Permanent Observer
Mrs Marietta Tree	
Mrs Brooke Astor	
Mr David Rockefeller	
Mrs Lucille Mair	Special Adviser to UNICEF on Women's Development
Sir Anthony Parsons	
Mr David Summerhayes	
Mr and Mrs Hamilton Whyte	
Mr C A Whitmore	

G

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 22/23 JUNE

UNSSD II

Points to Make

1. Welcome discussion of disarmament. Nuclear disarmament must be balanced by measures in non-nuclear field. Security of nuclear weapon states depends on balance of deterrence.

2. Special Session can give fresh impetus to disarmament negotiations taking place outside United Nations, eg INF, MBFR, START.

3. Need a practical and realistic approach. Declaratory proposals are no use. Must work for specific verifiable agreements; hence our support for renewed US/USSR negotiations on nuclear weapons.

4. Need for constructive approach. States view their security requirements differently. But search for common ground, for specific and achievable agreements must continue.

5. Comprehensive programme of disarmament has to be flexible. No place for legal language, or predetermined timetable of negotiations.

/Background

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 22/23 JUNE

UNSSD II

Background

1. The main items on the agenda of UNSSD II are a review of progress since UNSSD I in 1978, consideration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and a review of UN disarmament machinery. The dates of the Session are 7 June - 9 July.

2. UNSSD II is dominated by the strength of feeling among the non-aligned over the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations and notably on nuclear questions, to which they attach overriding importance. The nuclear powers, and particularly the US, are coming under heavy criticism.

3. The 'Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament' (CPD), commissioned by UNSSD I, has been under negotiation in the Committee on Disarmament (CD). Discussions in the CD showed a wide gulf between the non-aligned, who demand a legally binding programme with a strict time-frame which lays emphasis on achieving nuclear disarmament in the early stages, and the West, which is aiming for a more realistic programme with no artificial time constraints. The Soviet Union and its allies favour a vague, declaratory approach. No real progress was made in the CD and differences will have to be resolved or circumvented at UNSSD II itself. Work is now proceeding in drafting groups under direction of a working group.

4. UNSSD II is a focus of attention by the peace movements, and demonstrations and protests have occurred. Up to 150 representatives of British Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have attended. Mr Frank Judd, Director of the VSO and former Labour Minister is acting as independent adviser to the UK Delegation in liaison with NGOs.

5. Among the statements made at UNSSD II, those of President Reagan and Mr Gromyko have attracted most public attention. President Reagan reiterated his four proposals for arms control: the

/elimination

elimination of land-based intermediate-range missiles; a one-third reduction in strategic ballistic missile warheads; a substantial reduction in NATO and Warsaw Pact ground and air forces; and new safeguards to reduce the risk of accidental war. He also proposed a conference to develop the UN instrument for reporting of military budgets. Mr Gromyko's speech included a message from President Brezhnev pledging the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. He also announced that the Soviet Union would be placing part of its peaceful nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards system: a welcome move.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 15/16 JUNE
UNSSD II

Points to Make

1. Welcome Special Session. Hope it will give fresh impetus to disarmament negotiations taking place outside United Nations, eg INF, MBFR, START.

2. Need a practical and realistic approach. Declaratory proposals are no use. Must work for specific verifiable agreements; hence our support for renewed US/USSR negotiations on nuclear weapons.

3. Need for constructive approach. States view their security requirements differently. But search for common ground, for specific and achievable agreements must continue.

4. Comprehensive programme of Disarmament has to be flexible. No place for legal language, or predetermined timetable of negotiations.

5. Measures of nuclear disarmament will, of course, have a high priority but must be balanced by parallel measures in non-nuclear field; security of nuclear weapon states depends on possession of such weapons as a deterrent.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 15/16 JUNE

UNSSD II

Background

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/Up

Up to 150 representatives of British Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) will attend. Mr Frank Judd, Director of the VSO and former Labour Minister is acting as independent adviser to the UK delegation in liaison with NGOs.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 15/16 JUNE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

POINTS TO MAKE

APPRECIATE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS

1. We are grateful for your sustained attempts to create the conditions necessary for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. There is considerable admiration in Britain for your untiring commitment, which has I believe strengthened the standing of the UN.

OUR MILITARY ACTION FORCED ON US BY ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE

2. We are still faced after 10 weeks with continuing Argentine intransigence in their refusal to implement Security Council Resolution 502 and withdraw their forces. The conflict was forced on us against our will. But we were obliged to resort to military action in self-defence, and to protect the Falkland Islanders. We cannot allow the Argentines to maintain or consolidate their position on the Islands. We remain open to diplomatic progress; but you must be as doubtful as we are of the prospect of a change of heart in Buenos Aires.

WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT ARGENTINE DEPARTURE WILL BRING AN END TO HOSTILITIES

3. Our objectives are clear and limited. The Argentine forces must leave. We have absolutely no wish to prolong hostilities beyond the point where all Argentine forces have left the Islands. We sincerely hope that Argentina will recognise this, and will be prepared to adopt a similar position.

NEXT REQUIREMENT IS RECONSTRUCTION

4. We are already giving urgent attention to the economic and social rehabilitation and further development of the Islands, and the possible options for their future political development and security. However, these are difficult and complex tasks, and cannot be undertaken hurriedly. We hope that once peace and proper administration are reestablished we will be able to call on the understanding and cooperation of the international community, including organs of the United Nations, in the process of renewal. We trust that the international community will respond. Everyone's best interests lie in a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for the region.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 15/16 JUNE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

BACKGROUND

1. The Secretary-General's actions in the crisis so far have been:

(a) 6-19 May

The Secretary-General held a series of consultations in New York with the British and Argentine UN representatives, leading up to the British draft interim agreement of 17 May and the Argentine response of 19 May.

(b) 19 May

The Secretary-General tabled an Aide Memoire.
In reply we said that we would need to see substantive Argentine reaction before we could respond in detail to the Aide Memoire. No substantive Argentine response received.

(c) 26 May

Security Council Resolution 505 gave Secretary-General a mandate for further exchanges which he pursued.

(d) 31 May

Secretary-General put forward a 5 point plan. We said it was unacceptable. The Argentines made their acceptance subject to impossible conditions.

(e) 2 June

Secretary-General reported the lack of progress to the Security Council.

(f) 5 June

After the vetoing of Panamanian/Spanish Security Council

resolution on 4 June

Secretary-General put forward further proposals in a confidential message to the Prime Minister and to President Galtieri. We and the Argentines responded that they were unacceptable.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Original brief filed in Washington with letter as brief D.

Regards

Daily Herald

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON
FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. The Secretary-General and President Reagan are likely to be concerned about:

i. our immediate intentions with regard to the remaining prisoners of war and economic sanctions, the total exclusion zone and the 12-mile limit;

ii. our longer term intentions for the future of the Islands;

iii. relations with Latin America.

Immediate Intentions

2. Our aim since the fall of Port Stanley has been to secure an assurance from the Argentines that they regard hostilities in the South Atlantic as at an end. None has been forthcoming. The Argentine Note of 18 June to the UN Secretary-General, which talks of a 'de facto cessation of hostilities', is not at all the same thing. In these circumstances we must put first the safety of the Islanders and of our forces, and it would be wrong at this stage to lift the TEZ or the 12-mile limit. At the same time we shall not be maintaining our full strength on the Islands. About 4,000 troops are expected to return home shortly. We shall also be sending out sappers to help get the Islands running properly again.

3. Our European partners have decided that their economic measures against Argentina should be lifted since 'it is possible to hope that hostilities are now definitely at an end', but the Ten stressed that if this expectation was not fulfilled, a new situation would arise to which the Ten would have to react immediately. The Ten also agreed that

/decisions

decisions to stop arms supplies to Argentina would remain in force. We for our part will maintain for the time being economic measures against Argentina. We hope that the non-EC countries which have undertaken sanctions will do the same. It is especially important that an arms embargo be maintained.

4. As for prisoners of war, the Geneva Convention obliges us to return POWs after the cessation of active hostilities. We are not satisfied that this stage has yet been reached. We shall need to see what happens once the political situation in Buenos Aires has become clearer. But we have continued our humanitarian policy of returning POWs quickly, and nearly 11,000 have been taken back to Argentina in the last few days - for the most part in better condition than when they surrendered.

The Future of the Islands

5. Our first tasks have been humanitarian: to return as soon as possible the great majority of the prisoners of war, including all the wounded, and to clear up the mess on the Islands so that the Islanders can resume their way of life. This latter task is more difficult than we had expected and will consume much of our energies in the near future. Indiscriminately laid mines have to be cleared, and much of the Islands' infrastructure must be repaired.

6. We are not wedded to the exact status quo on the Islands. As life returns to normal we shall be able to give attention to the future, in consultation with the Islanders. In accordance with the principle of self-determination one way forward would be for the Islanders' elected representatives to have an expanded role in the government of the Islands. Our aim will be to allow them to live secure and prosperous lives on the basis of friendly relations with neighbouring countries. But we cannot rush into decisions on how this can best be done. It is in any

/case

case totally unrealistic to expect that after all the traumas the Islanders have been through, and the British lives lost, we should now sit down and negotiate with Argentina on her sovereignty claim.

Relations with Latin America

7. We recognise the need to restore relations of confidence with the region. While damage done to Western/Latin American relations should not be exaggerated, we will be moving to mend fences with tact and urgency, both bilaterally and with our European partners. We should like the Falkland Islands to be able to live in peace and harmony with the region.

8. We recognise also the difficulties which US support for us had caused for their relations with Latin America and we understand that they will wish to move quickly to repair the damage. In the longer term, we see advantage in involving countries of the region in the Falklands' security and economic development. We also wish to build relations of friendship and confidence with the countries of Latin America.

The Role of the UN

9. The Secretary-General may ask the Prime Minister what role we see for the UN and perhaps for the Secretary-General himself in the future. Perez de Cuellar has told Sir Anthony Parsons that he will have to tell the Prime Minister that he cannot ignore his 'mandate', and that he will ask her how long she thinks it will be before we can contemplate any kind of negotiation. (The Secretary-General presumably has in mind SCR 505 which requested him to undertake a renewed mission of good offices, and urged Britain and Argentina to cooperate with him 'with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands').

/10.

10. We are grateful to the Secretary-General for his tremendous efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis - which failed through Argentine intransigence and not through any fault of his - but we do not want him to launch any new initiatives. What is needed now is a pause for rehabilitation and reflection. In these changed circumstances we do not see a role at present for the UN.

The Role of the US

11. We are grateful to President Reagan for his message of congratulations as well as for US support, especially military supplies, during the crisis. We agree that a just war requires a just peace; but it is the Islanders who have suffered injustice. President Reagan may wish to expand the three elements relating to the future of his message:

i. enhancement of the long-term security of the South Atlantic. We agree with the need for this. We would welcome American ideas on, and participation in, arrangements which could guarantee the security of the Falkland Islands. (If President Reagan asks about the implications of maintaining forces in the South Atlantic for our defence commitment to NATO, the Prime Minister might say that there will need to be adjustments in our defence posture but that these will be within the framework of last year's defence policy review.)

ii. mitigation of Argentine hostility. We too want this, and have not ourselves sought a quarrel. But the initiative must surely be with Argentina.

iii. improvement in the relations of both UK and US with Argentina. We too are keen to achieve this. Have the Americans any plans for a programme of

/economic

economic assistance to Argentina as a stabilising and confidence-building measure? Any other American ideas?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
21 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

Revised

PRIME MINISTER's MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN: 23 JUNE

MIDDLE EAST

Points to make

Lebanon

1. We share hope that the Israeli invasion may have created a situation in which a new consensus can be found in Lebanon, freed from the worst of the Syrian and Palestinian pressures. But before reconciliation in Lebanon can be effective, Lebanon must be freed from Israeli pressure too. Any arrangement negotiated while Israeli troops are there will be bitterly opposed inside and outside Lebanon and cannot last.

Palestine

2. Lebanon for the Lebanese is only possible if there can be at least part of Palestine for the Palestinians. Glad your message acknowledges the importance of the Palestinian question. In this respect Israeli action is misguided, if the purpose is as Israel has stated to destroy the structure of terrorism. If they attack Beirut and destroy the PLO leadership there, the result will be despair throughout the Palestinian Diaspora, and probably the return to terrorism as their only option. Destroy Arafat and Qaddumi: what is left but Habash and Abu Nidal? Your people are concentrating on trying to make autonomy work, but even if they succeed autonomy is unfortunately irrelevant to the majority of Palestinians who remain outside the territories in which it would apply.

Threat to Beirut

3. Must at all costs prevent the appalling bloodshed of an attack on Beirut. No one in the Middle East will believe that you have not got the leverage to stop it. Urge you to declare publicly before the event that, whatever the position up to now, this use of US arms could not be described as

/self-

self-defence.

Peacekeeping

4. The international force which will no doubt be needed will face political difficulties, and we must keep closely in touch. We supported your move to extend UNIFIL's mandate. We believe the best approach is to start from the existing UN force, UNIFIL, and if possible stay within the UN framework. A non-UN force (Sinai style) would risk being damned as doing the Israelis' work in Lebanon for them.

Humanitarian Aid

5. The British Government has pledged almost £250,000 of humanitarian aid to the victims of the conflict in Lebanon. This is being channelled through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Lebanese Red Cross and other agencies. We are also contributing through the European Community to an ICRC appeal.

Anglo-US talks

6. Glad you can accept that we should have official discussions on all this. Look forward to seeing your people in London as soon as possible.

Original

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 15/16 JUNE

POINTS TO MAKE

Middle East

Lebanon

1. Must achieve Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in accordance with SCR 509. Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected. UN important role to play in any future arrangements to restore peace in the area. Perhaps some lessons to be learned for future operations of UNIFIL. But we have to be realistic about what UN forces can do.

2. Do not understand Israeli claim to be acting in accordance with Article 51 of UN Charter and parallels she is drawing with our action in the Falklands. Differences are plain. Argentinians invaded British territory and then refused to obey Security Council's call for withdrawal. So we had to act. Israel has invaded Lebanon in disregard of Lebanon's sovereignty. Of course Israel has security concerns. But this is not the way to protect her citizens. Palestinian problem has to be tackled at its roots, and peacefully.

Arab/Israel

3. Lebanon tragedy underlines importance of reading comprehensive settlement protecting both Palestinian right to self-determination, and Israel's right to security. Ten will continue to work actively towards this goal. Will remain closely in touch with US who have crucial role to play.

/Background

BACKGROUND

Lebanon (map attached) (Updating will be provided as necessary)

1. As of 9 June Israeli activity had widened considerably to include attacks on Tripoli (over 40 miles north of Beirut), a landing near a PLO naval base 10 miles north of there, and on the outskirts of Beirut, and massive air attacks on Syrian missile bases in the Beka'a valley. Israel has therefore gone far beyond her stated objectives of establishing a 40 kms buffer zone. Some members of the Israeli government undoubtedly see an opportunity to restructure the Lebanon in such a way as to exclude the Syrians and PLO forces. We see such an objective as unrealistic and attempts to achieve it highly dangerous.

2. UNIFIL is still in Southern Lebanon although some troop contributors (Norwegian, Irish) want to pull out. The UN Secretariat is threatening to remove the force altogether. It is not yet clear what future role the Israelis or Americans have in mind for UN forces once a ceasefire has been established. But extension of UNIFIL northwards eg to north of Sidon (the 40 kms line) would need many more troops, and, more important, USSR approval. This seems unlikely to be forthcoming, especially as the Israelis seem to envisage an enhanced role for Major Haddad who has hitherto controlled, with Israeli support, an enclave north of the Israel/Lebanon border. Negotiations will therefore be extremely difficult. A further complicating factor is that UNIFIL's present mandate will expire on 19 June.

3. Copies of SCR's 508 and 509 and Sir A Parson's explanation of vote are attached, together with the statement issued in Versailles on 6 June.

Arab/Israel

4. The Lebanese Crisis is dominating Middle East diplomacy both in the region and at the UN. But when the fighting has died down, the Palestinian problem will remain. The Arab world will expect the Europeans to redouble their efforts with the Americans in the face of the latest Israeli onslaught. It is too early to say how the military defeat of the PLO in Lebanon will affect attitudes among the Arabs to a negotiated settlement. But continuing activity by the Europeans to promote a settlement offering real security to all the parties will be essential if there is to be any hope of drawing the Moderate Arabs and the Americans closer together in the medium term. Preparations are in hand for a statement to be issued by the European Council (28-29 June) reaffirming the Ten's commitment to diplomacy based on the Venice principles.

GPS 300
UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 052345Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 060800Z)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 942 OF 5 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV AMMAN DAMASCUS
PRIORITY JEDDA CAIRO PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON: SECURITY COUNCIL.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SCR 508.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
RECALLING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 425 (1978), 426 (1978) AND THE ENSUING RESOLUTIONS, AND MORE PARTICULARLY, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 501 (1982).
TAKING NOTE OF THE LETTERS OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON DATED 4 JUNE 1982 (S/15161 AND S/15162),
DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE DETERIORATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN LEBANON AND IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AREA, AND ITS CONSEQUNCES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION,
GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE VIOLATION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, INDEPENDENCE, AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON,
REAFFIRMING AND SUPPORTING THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 4 JUNE 1982 (S/15163), AS WELL AS THE URGENT APPEAL ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 4 JUNE 1982,
TAKING NOTE OF THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
1. CALLS UPON ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AND NO LATER THAN 0600 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON SUNDAY, 6 JUNE 1982:
2. REQUESTS ALL MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE IN A POSITION TO DO SO TO BRING THEIR INFLUENCE TO BEAR UPON THOSE CONCERNED SO THAT THE CESS-ATION OF HOSTILITIES DECLARED BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 490 (1981) CAN BE RESPECTED:
3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO UNDER TAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION.
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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

GRS ...5

UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 070800Z (FCO)
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 070301Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 951 OF 6 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV DAMASCUS AMMAN WASHINGTON,
MODUK,
PRIORITY CAIRO BAGHDAD PARIS AND JEDDA.

MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION 509.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 425 (1978) OF 19 MARCH 1978 AND 508 (1982) OF 5 JUNE 1982,
GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION AS DESCRIBED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING THE NEED FOR STRICT RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY SOVEREIGNTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES,
1. DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAW ALL ITS MILITARY FORCES FORTHWITH AND UNCONDITIONALLY TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES OF LEBANON;
2. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES OBSERVE STRICTLY THE TERMS OF PARAGRAPH 1 OF RESOLUTION 508 (1982) WHICH CALLED ON THEM TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER.
3. CALLS ON ALL PARTIES TO COMMUNICATE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION WITHIN 24 HOURS:
4. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE QUESTION.

ENDS

PARSONS

STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

GPS 260
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 060800Z (FCO)
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 052346Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 943 OF 5 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV AMMAN DAMASCUS
PRIORITY JEDDA CAIRO PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

MY 2 IPT'S: ISRAEL/LEBANON: SECURITY COUNCIL.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE.

BEGINS

MR PRESIDENT, I CANNOT EMPHASISE TO STRONGLY THE SHOCK AND HORROR FELT BY MY GOVERNMENT AND BY THE PEOPLE OF BRITAIN AT THE DASTARDLY TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL TO LONDON, MR SHLOMO ARGOV A MOST DISTINGUISHED AND RESPECTED MEMBER OF THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY. WILL ALL HOPE AND PRAY FOR HIS LIFE AND HIS RECOVERY FROM HIS WOUNDS.
AS THE COUNCIL WILL KNOW THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES HAVE MADE ARRESTS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS APPALLING CRIME. FOUR MEN ARE IN CUSTODY AS A RESULT OF PRELIMINARY ENQUIRIES THE POLICE HAVE DISCOVERED A LIST OF NAMES WHICH INCLUDES NOT ONLY AMBASSADOR ARGOV BUT ALSO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PLO IN LONDON.
MR. PRESIDENT, THIS ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT, HOWEVER DESPICABLE, DOES NOT IN ANYWAY JUSTIFY THE MASSIVE ATTACKS ON LEBANESE TOWNS AND VILLAGES BY THE ISRAELI AIRFORCE : ATTACKS WHICH HAVE ALREADY INFLICTED MAJOR LOSS OF LIFE, CASUALTIES AND DAMAGED TO PROPERTY. THESE ACTIONS HAVE ALSO LED TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE PRECARIOUS CEASE FIRE WHICH HAS NOW BEEN IN EFFECT IN SOUTH LEBANON SINCE JULY 1981. IT IS IMPERATIVE, IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE IN THE REGION AND FOR THE SAKE OF THE SUFFERING PEOPLE IN LEBANON, THAT THERE IS NO ESCALATION OF FIGHTING AND THAT THE CEASEFIRE IS IMMEDIATELY RESTORED.
MY DELEGATION THEREFORE WARMLY SUPPORTS THE RESOLUTION WHICH THE COUNCIL HAS JUST ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AND STRONGLY URGES ALL CONCERNED TO COMPLY WITH ITS TERMS.
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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FM UKDEL VERSAILLES 061220Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NUMBER 02 OF 6 JUNE 1982
AND TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO,
EC POSTS, OTTAWA, TOKYO

MIPT: LEBANON/ISRAEL

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF APPEAL.

BEGINS

1. WE ARE SHOCKED BY THE NEWS REACHING US FROM LEBANON AND THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AREA. WE ARE DEEPLY MOVED BY THE LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE, THE SUFFERING AND DESTRUCTION. WE THINK THAT THIS CYCLE OF VIOLENCE, IF IT WERE TO CONTINUE, COULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WHOLE AREA.

2. WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE UNANIMOUS ADOPTION BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OF A RESOLUTION EXPRESSING GRAVE CONCERN AT THE VIOLATION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON AND CALLING ON ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER. WE HAVE ALSO TAKEN NOTE OF THE APPEAL ADDRESSED TO THE PARTIES BY MR. PEREZ DE CUELLAR, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE U.N., AND OF A MESSAGE SENT BY HIM TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, AS CHAIRMAN OF THIS MEETING.

3. WE STRONGLY ENDORSE THE URGENT APPEALS BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR AN IMMEDIATE AND SIMULTANEOUS CESSATION OF VIOLENCE, AND WE CALL UPON ALL THE PARTIES TO HEED THESE APPEALS, IN ORDER THAT PEACE AND SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE AREA BE SAFEGUARDED.

4. EACH OF OUR GOVERNMENTS WILL USE ALL THE MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE.

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CYPRUS
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SYRIA
Tripoli
Beirut
Damascus
Area of Map
ISRAEL
Tel Aviv-Yafo
West Bank
Amman
Jerusalem
SAUDI ARABIA
JORDAN
EGYPT
Cairo
Road
Airfield
Area of Enlargement
Traditional Christian Area
Phalange Dominated
Syrian Dominated
LEBANON
BEKAA VALLEY
Palestinian Dominated
UNIFIL AREA
UNIFIL Area
IRON TRIANGLE
Christian Dominated
HULA VALLEY
GOLAN
HEIGHTS
(Israeli occupied)
ISRAEL
JORDAN
SYRIA
MT. HERMON
BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL
Beaufort Castle
Armistice Lines 1949
DMZ
LINE A
LINE B
UNDOF ZONE
TAPLINE
IZHAK-BEN YAAKOV
Beirut
Sidon
Tyre
Jazzin
Ad Dāmūr
Ayn Şawfar
Zahlah
Ta'lbaya
Anjar
Ghazzah
Kāmid al Lawz
Jubb Jannin
Mashghārah
Rāshayyā
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Marj Uyūn
An Nabatiyah
Az Zrārīyah
Qa'qa'iyat al Jisr
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Ma'rakah
Ar Rashidiyah
Qānā
Ṭibnīn
Al Ṭayyibah
Metulla
Majdal Shams
Mas'adah
Buq'ātā
Qiryat Shemona
Ḥinah
Mazra'at Bayt Jinn
Ash Shawmarah
Al Jibbayn
Rosh Haniqra
Bint Jubayl
'Aynātā
Ramot Naftali
Līsa
Rumaysh
Bezet
Elon
Kerem Ben Zimra
'Alma
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Nahariyya
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Ash Shajarah
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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK - 15-16 JUNE

IRAN/IRAQ WAR

Points to Make

OBJECTIVES

1 Any action at UN should work towards just and honourable settlement acceptable to both sides.

2 Arab or Islamic states, not the West, should take lead in making realistic proposals. We understand that there was considerable activity by the Iraqis and Iranians at the NAM meeting at Havana. The Islamic Conference is also embarked on a new initiative.

FURTHER ACTION

3 What role does the Secretary General see for the UN at this stage?

4 Did Mr Cordovez find anything during his trip to Havana to suggest possibility of constructive UN role or concensus among NAM states on basis for a settlement?

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK - 15-16 JUNE

IRAN/IRAQ WAR

Background

ACTION IN UN

1 Iranians will be enraged by anything short of an even-handed resolution. A purely Western initiative would be unacceptable to them. A Security Council Resolution leading to a veto or non-compliance would complicate possible UN role in future mediation. We must beware of language in the Security Council that would conflict with our position over the Falklands.

UK ROLE

2 We can best help by working in the margins with the Ten to support constructive efforts by regional states and encouraging existing mediation attempts (Islamic Conference, UN Secretary General's Special Representatives and Non-Aligned Movement). The real need is for the Arabs themselves to take the initiative. The Ten adopted a statement on 24 May (attached) which pleased the Iraqis but was received coolly by Iran.

JORDANIAN INITIATIVE

3 Jordan sought UK support for its request for a Special Security Council meeting on 31 May. The request was ill considered: neither Iraq nor Iran were then ready to discuss the issue.

/US INITIATIVE

US INITIATIVE

4 Mr Haig's recent remarks indicate US desire to undertake initiative to bring about the end of the war, using certain states eg Spain, Morocco, Oman, to act as intermediaries . (US have approached Ten to be associated with the initiative). Unlikely to bring a settlement nearer.

IRAQI APPROACH TO JAPAN

5 Iraq has asked Japan to sponsor a Security Council resolution. Japan have told us confidentially that they intend to suggest unilateral Iraqi withdrawal from occupied territory to make room for mediation. Japanese will be looking for Western advice and support.

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

6 Iraqi and Iranian Foreign Ministers and the Secretary General's Special Representative, Mr Cordovez, attended NAM Committee meeting in Havana to prepare for September Summit in Baghdad. Both will be looking for allies. Outcome will affect the decision to go to the Security Council.

[redacted]

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2073 OF 24 MAY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TEHRAN PRIORITY BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN
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INFO SAVING STRASBOURG

M I P T: DECLARATION OF THE TEN ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

1) THE TEN EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN AT THE CONTINUATION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN WHICH HAS NOW LASTED TWO YEARS AND CLAIMED VERY NUMEROUS VICTIMS, LED TO CONSIDERABLE MATERIAL DESTRUCTION, CREATED GRAVE SUFFERING FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, AND HAS DIVERTED SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES WHICH THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD WISHED TO DEVOTE TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

2) WHILE REAFFIRMING THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE SOVERIGNTY OF STATES AND OF NON INTERFERENCE IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE TEN EXPRESS THE GRAVE CONCERN WHICH THE CONTINUATION OF THE FIGHTING CAUSES THEM. THEY DEPLORE THIS THE MORE BECAUSE THEY HAVE LONG STANDING AND CLOSE LINKS WITH EACH OF THE TWO BELLIGERENTS AS WELL AS WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. THEY RECALL THAT SINCE 23 SEPTEMBER 1980 THEY HAVE TAKEN A POSITION IN SUPPORT OF AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

3) THE TEN PAY TRIBUTE TO THE PERSISTENT EFFORTS MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

/4.

4) THE TEN, FOR THEIR OWN PART, EARNESTLY DESIRE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES RECOGNISED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, SUCH AS THOSE DEFINED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS RESOLUTION NO 479 OF THE 28 OF SEPTEMBER 1980. THEY FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A JUST AND LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ASSURING THE SECURITY OF THE TWO STATES IN RESPECT FOR THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THEIR POLITICAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITY, IS MORE THAN EVER URGENT AND NECESSARY, IN ORDER TO PERMIT THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TO WHICH THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION ASPIRE.

5) THE TEN ARE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN EVERY EFFORT DIRECTED TOWARDS PEACE, TO THE EXTENT THAT EACH OF THE TWO PARTIES REQUEST THEM TO DO SO, AS WELL AS TO CONSIDER, WHEN HOSTILITIES HAVE CEASED, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATING IN THE RECONSUTRUCTION OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

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IRAQ/IRAN

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: 15-16 JUNE

GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS

Points to Make

1. We are committed to an early launch of Global Negotiations on conditions which all can accept.

2. Vital however that independence of existing specialised bodies, notably the IMF, World Bank and GATT, should not be prejudiced by GNs.

3. As confirmed by participants at Versailles Summit, the latest (Bedjaoui) text serves as an acceptable basis for further consultations; hope these can be finished quickly.

4. Meanwhile, important that other urgent North/South issues should not be obscured.

5. In the interests of all to maintain and strengthen existing international arrangements for co-operation for trade and finance issues.

Background

1. In March the Algerians produced a text for launching GNs which they claimed to have the backing of the G77. With the exception of the Americans all countries regarded the text as an acceptable basis for negotiation. Within the Community all but ourselves and the Germans were prepared to accept it unchanged. We however wanted changes to remove the ambiguity over the link between the GNs and the Specialised Agencies.

2. At the Versailles Summit American officials seemed ready to accept the Bedjaoui text with small amendments; but these were not considered at Ministerial level. President Reagan agreed to positive language on Global Negotiations to the effect that the latest text was helpful and would serve as a basis for consultations with the countries concerned.

Economic Relations Department

9 June 1982

WASHINGTON BRIEFS

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 June 1982

Dear Peter,

Prime Minister's Visit to Washington: 23 June

I attach briefing for the Prime Minister's visit to Washington on:

(a) Existing Contracts (John Brown)

(b) US Steel Measures

(c) Middle East.

Briefing on the Falklands follows separately.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosures (a) and (b) to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Trade, the Secretary of State for Industry, and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

11 JUN 1982

EXISTING CONTRACTS (JOHN BROWN)

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Your extension rather than mitigation of sanctions against the Soviet Union is a hard blow for John Brown. Several hundred jobs are now in danger.

2. I am also apprehensive about reactions in Western Europe. Will do my best to head off open argument as only the Russians would benefit from this. But I may find it difficult. Will reconciliation in Poland really be helped?

3. Result in medium term could be that European companies will withdraw from licensing arrangements with your companies and develop substitute European technologies. Is this really what you want?

4. Meanwhile, we are considering urgently what action we can take to protect the interests of John Brown.

EXISTING CONTRACTS (JOHN BROWN)

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Prime Minister sought release from American licensing and relicensing requirements of General Electric rotors for John Brown's contracts for Siberian pipeline in messages of 29 January and 5 April to President Reagan (copies attached). She raised question personally with him at Versailles and in London on 9 June. John Brown due to begin turbine deliveries on 2 July.

2. President Reagan announced on 18 June that existing sanctions against Soviet Union would be extended to cover equipment produced by US subsidiaries and licensees (text of statement attached). Aim is to prevent a French licensee of General Electric (Alsthom) from supplying rotors to replace blocked American ones. John Brown is not directly affected by the extension but its contract remains blocked. US action is both retrospective and extraterritorial.

3. Announcement is bound to worsen transatlantic relations. Officials in London are studying the possibility of invoking the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980. John Brown told the Department of Trade on 21 June that they are not prepared to proceed with deliveries without assurances that they will not be blacklisted by the American Administration. Officials are considering the matter urgently. Discussion with other European countries affected will take place in near future.

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UK policy

John Brown

page 3

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D E D I P
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DESK BY 300100Z TO JAKARTA
FM FCO 291850 JAN 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 154 OF 29 JANUARY 1982.
AND TO IMMEDIATE JAKARTA (PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)
M I P T
DEAR RON

1. I WAS MOST GRATEFUL TO AL HAIG FOR REARRANGING HIS PLANS AT SHORT NOTICE TO CALL HERE TODAY. IT GAVE US AN INVALUABLE OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR FROM HIM HOW HE HAD GOT ON IN GENEVA AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AND WE WERE ABLE TO HAVE A GOOD DISCUSSION OF THE POLISH SITUATION.

2. I KNOW THAT AL WILL GIVE YOU A FULL ACCOUNT OF OUR TALK BUT I THOUGHT NEVERTHELESS THAT I SHOULD SEND YOU THIS PERSONAL MESSAGE, TO UNDERLINE MY DEEP CONCERN AT THE DANGER THAT THE UNITY OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE COULD BE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED BY THE CURRENT DIFFERENCES OVER HOW TO REACT TO THE REPRESSION IN POLAND.

3. WE MUST AT ALL COSTS AVOID A DEMONSTRATION OF DISUNITY IN THE ALLIANCE WHICH WOULD GIVE MOSCOW A FIRST CLASS PROPAGANDA VICTORY AND IMPAIR OUR EFFORTS TO CHECK FURTHER ADVENTURISM ON THEIR PART IN THE FUTURE. WE MUST ALSO AVOID MEASURES WHICH WOULD DO MORE HARM TO THE WEST THAN TO THE SOVIET UNION.

4. I HAVE TAKEN A CLOSE INTEREST IN THE PREPARATION OF A PACKAGE OF BRITISH MEASURES BOTH TOWARDS POLAND AND TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAVE ALREADY SAID IN NATO THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE A NUMBER OF MEASURES AS PART OF AN ALLIED REACTION TO COMPLEMENT YOUR OWN RESOLUTE STAND, PROVIDED THAT WE CAN ALL AGREE ABOUT NOT UNDERMINING EACH OTHER'S MEASURES.

5. THE MEASURES WHICH THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS TAKEN, OR WOULD IN PRINCIPLE BE WILLING TO TAKE, INCLUDE:
TOWARDS POLAND: RESTRICTIONS ON POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS:

/INCREASED)

INCREASED BROADCASTS, ALREADY BEGUN, TO POLAND: SUSPENSION OF COMMERCIAL CREDIT EXCEPT FOR CONTRACTS ALREADY CONCLUDED: THE PLACING IN SUSPENSE OF NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT DEBT RESCHEDULING FOR 1982: THE SUSPENSION WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF FOOD EXPORTS AT SPECIALLY SUBSIDISED PRICES: AND INCREASED HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE POLISH PEOPLE. TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION: SIGNIFICANT NEW RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET DIPLOMATS: REDUCED ACTIVITY UNDER TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS: CLEAR EXPOSURE IN THE MADRID REVIEW CONFERENCE OF SOVIET COMPLICITY IN THE REPRESSION IN POLAND: READINESS TO MOVE WITH OUR EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PARTNERS TO INCREASE THE INTEREST RATES ON EXPORT CREDIT AND TO RESTRICT CERTAIN IMPORTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION: TERMINATION, IN CONCERT WITH OTHERS, OF OUR BILATERAL MARITIME AGREEMENT: AND NEW RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET FACTORY SHIPS.

6. I AM SURE THAT OUR JOINT OBJECTIVE NOW SHOULD BE A CREDIBLE AND UNITED ALLIED POSITION, TO DEMONSTRATE OUR REJECTION OF MARTIAL LAW AND OF THE SOVIET HAND IN IT. WE MUST NOT ALLOW THE SOVIET CRISIS IN POLAND TO BRING ABOUT A CRISIS IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE WHICH WOULD SUIT ONLY SOVIET PURPOSES.

7. I KNOW YOU AGREE WITH THIS AIM. THE QUESTION IS HOW TO ATTAIN IT. I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND WHY SOME OF YOUR PEOPLE MAY BE GROWING IMPATIENT AND THINKING OF A SECOND SET OF AMERICAN MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. MY FEAR IS THAT FURTHER MEASURES TAKEN UNILATERALLY WOULD NOT CARRY THE ALLIES WITH THEM BUT WOULD GREATLY DEEPEN AND EXPOSE THE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THAT COULD ADVANCE SOVIET INTERESTS MORE THAN YOUR NEW MEASURES WOULD SET THEM BACK. I HOPE THEREFORE THAT YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO HOLD BACK ON FURTHER MEASURES UNTIL WE HAVE THOROUGHLY EXPLORED THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNITED ALLIED POSITION.

8. I UNDERSTAND THAT NEW MEASURES UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON MAY INCLUDE STEPS SUCH AS DENUNCIATION OF THE 1981 AGREEMENT ON RESCHEDULING POLISH DEBT, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A POLISH DEFAULT. BUT THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THAT WOULD BE THAT THE POLES WOULD GIVE UP THEIR PRESENT EFFORTS TO MAKE SUCH

/PAYMENTS

PAYMENTS AS THEY CAN UNDER THE RESCHEDULING ARRANGEMENTS, EITHER TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS OR TO WESTERN BANKS. THAT IN TURN WOULD TAKE PRESSURE OFF THE SOVIET UNION TO HELP THEM. ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE EFFECTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM WOULD BE UNPREDICTABLE, AND PROBABLY VERY SEVERE, PARTICULARLY IF OTHER DEFAULTS FOLLOWED. THESE EFFECTS WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE CONFINED TO EUROPE. THE DAMAGE TO THE WEST COULD BE AT LEAST AS GREAT AS THE DAMAGE TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE HEALTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM IS A WESTERN, NOT A SOVIET INTEREST. THEY HAVE EVERY REASON TO REJOICE IF IT IS IMPAIRED.

9. WHAT WE NEED NOW IS A REASONABLE SET OF MEASURES, JOINTLY AGREED. THIS IS THE DIRECTION IN WHICH WE SHOULD ALL BE WORKING. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT THE MOST PROMISING BASIS FOR AGREEMENT WOULD BE AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY THE EUROPEAN ALLIES TOOK MEASURES COMPARABLE TO YOURS, BOTH IN THEIR EFFECTS ON THE SOVIET UNION AND IN THEIR DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS, AND TOOK POSITIVE ACTION TO MEET THEIR COMMITMENTS NOT TO UNDERMINE YOUR MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE CONTRACTS, WHILE EXISTING EUROPEAN CONTRACTS WOULD GO AHEAD. I REALISE THAT THIS LAST CONSIDERATION IS A DIFFICULT ONE FOR YOU. BUT THE FRENCH, GERMANS AND ITALIANS CANNOT AND WILL NOT GIVE UP THE GAS PIPELINE PROJECT, WHATEVER ONE MAY THINK OF ITS MERITS. WE TOO HAVE IMPORTANT CONTRACTS AT STAKE, NOTABLY ONE HELD BY JOHN BROWN ENGINEERING, THE CANCELLATION OF WHICH WOULD CAUSE ADDITIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT. AN ACCOMMODATION ON EXISTING CONTRACTS IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO ALLIED UNITY OVER POLAND.

10. YOUR MEASURES OF 29 DECEMBER SENT A CLEAR SIGNAL TO THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT SERIOUSLY COMPROMISING YOUR OWN INTERESTS. WE SHOULD ALL BE FOLLOWING SUIT. ALTHOUGH THE NATO DISCUSSIONS HAVE SO FAR BEEN FRUSTRATINGLY SLOW, IT SHOULD SURELY BE POSSIBLE, IF YOU COULD MOVE ON EXISTING CONTRACTS, FOR THE REST OF US TO REACH AGREEME ON MEASURES COMPARABLE TO YOURS. WE SHOULD LOOK RESOLUTE AND UNITED: AND WE SHOULD STILL HAVE SOME SHOTS LEFT IN OUR LOCKERS.

11. I SUGGESTED TO AL HAIG THAT THE BEST APPROACH NOW WOULD BE FOR THE US TO ARRANGE SECRET CONSULTATIONS IN THE VERY NEAR /FUTURE

FUTURE BETWEEN SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM THE ALLIED COUNTRIES MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED - YOU, US, THE FRENCH, THE GERMANS, AND I THINK IN THIS CASE THE ITALIANS. THIS SHOULD ENABLE US TO MAKE PROGRESS AT THE NATO MEETING ON 3 FEBRUARY. BUT I THINK THAT A FURTHER NATO MEETING MAY WELL BE NEEDED A FEW DAYS AFTER THAT.

12. IT WILL ALSO BE IMPORTANT TO CARRY THE JAPANESE AND OTHERS IN OUR PLANS. IT WOULD NOT BE TOLERABLE TO ASK OUR OWN INDUSTRIES TO FORGO OPPORTUNITIES ONLY TO SEE THEM SEIZED BY JAPAN.

13. WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW THE SOVIET UNION A FIRM UNITED FRONT. WHAT WE CAN ACHIEVE TOGETHER IN THIS CAN GIVE A LASTING BOOST TO ALLIED UNITY AND A SETBACK TO SOVIET AMBITIONS. WE HAVE EMBARKED ON THIS COURSE AND SHOULD MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO CARRY IT THROUGH TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. THE CRISIS IN POLAND LOOKS LIKE BEING A PROLONGED ONE. WE RISK LOSING THE PRIZE IF WE ACT HASTILY OR OUT OF STEP.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS

MARGARET

CARRINGTON

LIMITED

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/EESD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

LORD BRIDGES

MR GOODISON

MR EVANS

MR URE

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 652 OF 6 APRIL,
INFO PRIORITY BONN, ROME, PARIS, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO,
TOKYO, OTTAWA AND BRUSSELS.
MY TEL: 630 - BUCKLEY MISSION

John Brown
Page 2

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER DATED 5 APRIL FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN (TOP COPY BY NEXT BAG). PLEASE ARRANGE DELIVERY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 8 MARCH ABOUT THE VISIT TO EUROPE OF UNDER-SECRETARY BUCKLEY.

AS YOU WILL HAVE HEARD, MR BUCKLEY AND HIS TEAM SPENT 17 MARCH IN LONDON. THEY MET PETER CARRINGTON AND HAD TALKS WITH A TEAM OF BRITISH OFFICIALS WHICH FILLED MOST OF THE DAY. I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY GAVE A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE GRANTING OF WESTERN CREDIT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND MADE A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS ABOUT HOW THESE MIGHT BE MET. WE HAVE SINCE BEEN STUDYING THESE SUGGESTIONS AND PETER CARRINGTON IS WRITING TO AL HAIG TO GIVE OUR VIEWS ABOUT SOME OF THEM.

I SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE MANNER IN WHICH WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND BANKS HAVE BUILT UP INCREASING CREDIT EXPOSURE IN THE SOVIET UNION. THERE IS A PROBLEM HERE THAT WE MUST CONSIDER CAREFULLY. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING IT WITH YOU PERSONALLY DURING YOUR VISIT TO LONDON IN JUNE.

FOR FUTURE WORK ON THIS SUBJECT I THINK WE MUST FIND A FRAMEWORK WHICH WILL ALLOW THE NECESSARY ANALYTICAL WORK TO BE DONE AND WHICH WILL ALSO LINK ACTION WITH THE OUTSTANDING ACTION ON EAST/WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS WHICH WAS COMMISSIONED IN THE NORTH/ATLANTIC COUNCIL DECLARATION OF 11 JANUARY. OPERATIONALLY, WE MUST ENSURE THAT ALL THE COUNTRIES WHICH MATTER IN TERMS OF GRANTING CREDIT TO THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING JAPAN, ARE

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CONFIDENTIAL

ASSOCIATED WITH THE WORK. WE ALSO NEED TO AVOID ACTION WHICH MAY CAUSE GREATER DAMAGE TO THE WEST COLLECTIVELY THAN TO THE SOVIET UNION OR DISPROPORTIONATE DIFFICULTIES FOR PARTICULAR WESTERN COUNTRIES.

I ALSO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE SUBJECT RAISED IN MY MESSAGE OF 29 JANUARY - THAT OF EXISTING CONTRACTS BETWEEN BRITISH COMPANIES AND SOVIET IMPORTERS AFFECTED BY THE MEASURES WHICH YOU ANNOUNCED ON 29 DECEMBER. IT IS NOW MORE URGENT, AS THE COMPANIES CONCERNED WILL SOON HAVE TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THEIR MANUFACTURING PROGRAMMES IN RELATION TO THESE CONTRACTS. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THE COMPANIES CONCERNED, JOHN BROWN ENGINEERING, HAS HELD DECISIONS IN SUSPENSE FOR THREE MONTHS, BUT TIME IS NOW RUNNING SHORT FOR THEM. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE MOST HELPFUL TO KNOW WHETHER YOU CAN ACCEPT THE ARRANGEMENT ABOUT RECIPROCAL COMMITMENTS WHICH I SUGGESTED IN MY MESSAGE.

ENDS

PYM

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MR BULLARD
LORD BRIDGES
MR EVANS
MR GOODISON
MR HANNAY
MR GILLMORE

GR 12C
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 190900Z
FM WASHINGTON 182259Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2194 OF 18 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PARIS AND BONN

MY TELNO 2193: SIBERIAN PIPELINE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT.
BEGINS:-
I HAVE REVIEWED THE SANCTIONS AND THE EXPORT OF OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT TO THE SOVIET UNION IMPOSED ON DECEMBER 30 1981 AND HAVE DECIDED TO EXTEND THESE SANCTIONS THROUGH ADOPTION OF NEW REGULATIONS TO INCLUDE EQUIPMENT PRODUCED BY SUBSIDIARIES OF US COMPANIES ABROAD AS WELL AS EQUIPMENT PRODUCED ABROAD UNDER LICENSES ISSUED BY US COMPANIES.
THE OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES IN IMPOSING THE SANCTIONS HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE TO ADVANCE RECONCILIATION IN POLAND. SINCE DECEMBER 30 1981 LITTLE HAS CHANGED CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN POLAND: THERE HAS BEEN NO MOVEMENT THAT WOULD ENABLE US TO UNDERTAKE POSITIVE RECIPROCAL MEASURES.
THE DECISION TAKEN TODAY WILL, WE BELIEVE, ADVANCE OUR OBJECTIVES OF RECONCILIATION IN POLAND. ENDS.

RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE INFORM BRIDGES AND GOWLLAND (TRED)

FCO PLEASE PASS ADVANCE COPIES TO CORLEY (DOT) AND HAVELOCK (DOI)

HENDERSON

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LORD BRIDGES
MR EVANS
MR GOODISON

COPIES TO
MR CORLEY DOT
MR HAVELOCK DOI

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN : 23 JUNE

US ACTION AGAINST STEEL IMPORTS FROM EUROPE

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Deeply concerned about recent US Department of Commerce decision to impose countervailing (ie anti-subsidy) duties on steel imports from EC.

2. Particularly regret treatment of BSC (40% duty), which is now effectively shut out from a large part of its traditional market in US. US action difficult to reconcile with support expressed in the past for tremendous effort being made in UK to reduce steel-making capacity and manpower, notwithstanding economic and social costs. Puts at risk objective of returning Corporation to enduring profitability.

3. UK continues to support negotiated settlement [if appropriate: understand EC Foreign Affairs Council agreed on 22 June that Commission should renew efforts to secure one]. But this is needed very urgently if trade disruption is to be minimised. And terms must be fair to both sides, otherwise real risk of trade war.

4. Not just a technical problem. Look to President Reagan personally to ensure political importance fully taken into account by US Administration.

5. (If it is argued that US investigation procedure will ensure fair outcome) Serious reservations in Europe about definitions of subsidy that have been used so far. Procedures lengthy; meanwhile duties payable so high and uncertainty so great as to pose near insuperable barrier to trade. Political requirement is for an early and mutually satisfactory settlement.

BACKGROUND

EC steel exports to US face disruption as a result of decision by US Department of Commerce on 11 June to impose provisional anti-subsidy ('countervailing') duties which range from 40% for BSC down to around 1% or less for Dutch, Luxembourg and German companies (also for UK private sector). Latter group should be able to continue to sell to US because, pending final determination of subsidy due on 24 August, they can afford to deposit the low provisional duties to which they are subject. But companies in other Member States (France, Italy, Belgium) facing duties in range 20% to 30%. As for BSC, this implies too great a financial risk to allow sales of products subject to duty to continue.

On 18 June Secretary of State for Trade handed US Ambassador aide memoire (text attached) emphasising HMG's concern at impact on BSC. In 1981 BSC exports to US of products concerned were 200,000 tonnes plus, worth over £50 million (out of total UK steel exports to US of 574,000 tonnes).

EC response to be discussed by Foreign Affairs Council on afternoon of 22 June (reporting telegram will be repeated to UKMIS New York and Washington). Agreement likely at Council on:

(a) a statement rejecting method adopted by US for calculating subsidies and underlining potentially serious consequences and

(b) a study of possible EC countermeasures.

We hope Council will also endorse at least principle of continued effort to secure negotiated settlement. A previous attempt by

Davignon at the beginning of June failed because US insisted on smaller EC market share and wider product coverage than was generally acceptable in the Community. Nonetheless US Commerce Secretary Baldrige has said that he too would prefer a negotiated arrangement to resolve the problem. But to secure terms acceptable to European producers the US Administration will need to exert greater pressure on their industry than they have been prepared to so far.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

21 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL [FRAME EXTERNAL FRAME INDUSTRIAL]
FM F C O 181642Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1207 OF 18 JUNE 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS.

MY 2 IPT'S.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AIDE MEMOIRE.

UK STEEL EXPORTS TO THE USA: PRELIMINARY DETERMINATIONS OF SUBSIDY BY THE US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ON 11 JUNE OF A PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION OF SUBSIDY TO THE EXTENT OF SOME 40 PERCENT IN RESPECT OF EXPORTS OF STRUCTURALS, PLATE AND HOT-ROLLED CARBON BAR, BY THE BRITISH STEEL CORPORATION (BSC).

2. BRITISH OFFICIALS, TOGETHER WITH THEIR EUROPEAN COMMISSION COLLEAGUES, ARE STILL STUDYING THE DETAILS OF THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT'S FINDINGS.
THESE FINDINGS APPEAR TO IGNORE THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF BSC, AND THE METHODOLOGY INVOLVED IS OPEN TO SERIOUS CHALLENGE. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WILL BE CONSIDERING THE MATTER FURTHER AT THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL IN LUXEMBOURG ON 22 JUNE.

3. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WISH TO DRAW ATTENTION YET AGAIN TO THEIR DETERMINATION THAT BSC SHOULD OPERATE AS A COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE AND REACH ENDURING PROFITABILITY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. TO THIS END, A STRATEGY WAS ADOPTED IN DECEMBER 1979 TO REDUCE MANNED CAPACITY TO 15 MILLION TONNES THROUGH PLANT CLOSURES AND THROUGH LARGE-SCALE JOB LOSSES. BETWEEN MARCH 1979 AND MARCH 1981, THE WORKFORCE WAS REDUCED FROM 186,000 TO 121,000. THE CORPORATE PLAN FOR 1981/82 INVOLVED A FURTHER CUT IN MANNED CAPACITY (TO 14.4 MILLION TONNES) AND FURTHER JOB LOSSES TO IMPROVE PRODUCTIVITY. NUMBERS EMPLOYED IN MARCH 1982 STOOD AT 104,000 WITH FURTHER REDUCTIONS LIKELY, THUS VIRTUALLY HALVING THE WORKFORCE IN 3 YEARS.

4. THIS RESTRUCTURING OF THE UK STEEL INDUSTRY IS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE MUCH NEEDED REDUCTION OF WORLD STEEL MAKING OVER-CAPACITY . THE ELIMINATION OFOVER CAPACITY
WILL BRING BENEFITS TO STEEL MAKERS IN ALL
COUNTRIES, NOT LEAST THE USA, AND THE ACTION TAKEN IN THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY APPLAUDED BY THE US ADMINISTARTION.
THE ECONOMIC, AND ESPECIALLY SOCIAL, COSTS OF SUCH A MAJOR REDUCTION IN UK CAPACITY ARE ENORMOUS AND HAVE NECESSARILY HAD TO BE FINANCED BY GOVERNMENT. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT FIND

IT PARTICULARLY DISTURBING THAT THE COSTS OF THIS RESTRUCTURING HAVE BEEN PRELIMINARILY DEEMED BY THE US COMMERCE DEPARTMENT TO BE A SUBSIDY ELIGIBLE FOR COUNTERVAILING DUTIES.
THE CONSEQUENCE OF THESE DUTIES IS LIKELY TO BE THAT BSC LOSE A LARGE PART OF WHAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A TRADITIONAL MARKET IN THE USA AND THAT THE RESTRUCTURING PLAN WILL BE PLACED IN JEOPARDY.
IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE BSC HAS SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED THE TRIGGER PRICE MECHANISM IN ITS EXPORTS TO THE U.S. MARKET.

5. EARLIER THIS WEEK THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON MADE A FORMAL DEMARCHE TO THE US ADMINISTRATION. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES FULLY WITH THAT ACTION.

6. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT APPEAL TO THE US ADMINISTRATION TO USE THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL GIVE STABILITY TO THE STEEL TRADE AND SERVE TO DEFUSE TRADE TENSION.

PYM

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN: 23 JUNE

MIDDLE EAST

Points to Make

1. We share hope that the Israeli invasion may have created a situation in which a better future can be found for Lebanon, freed from the worst of the Syrian and Palestinian pressures. But before such a deal can be struck Lebanon must be freed from Israeli pressure too. Any arrangement negotiated while Israeli troops are there will be bitterly opposed inside and outside Lebanon and cannot last.

2. Glad your message acknowledges the importance of the Palestinian question. In this respect Israeli action is misguided, if the purpose is as Israel has stated to destroy the structure of terrorism. If they attack Beirut and destroy the PLO leadership there, the result will be despair throughout the Palestinian Diaspora, and probably the return to terrorism as their only option. Destroy Arafat and Qaddumi: what is left but Habash and Abu Nidal? Your people are concentrating on trying to make autonomy work, but even if they succeed autonomy is unfortunately irrelevant to the majority of Palestinians who remain outside the territories in which it would apply.

3. Must at all costs prevent the appalling bloodshed of an attack on Beirut. No one in the Middle East will believe that you have not got the leverage to stop it. Urge you to declare publicly before the event that, whatever the position up to now, this use of US arms could not be described as self-defence.

4. Glad you can accept that we should have official discussions on all this. Look forward to seeing your people in London as soon as possible.

Essential Facts

1. The latest Israel/PLO ceasefire has broken down again. With help from the Christian/Phalangist forces, Israeli forces have strengthened their hold around West Beirut. They deny publicly any intention of going into the city to deal with the estimated 6-7000 PLO still holding out, but have left the Americans in no doubt that they will do so unless the Americans somehow deliver the PLO leaders.

2. A six-man National Council of Salvation representing the main Lebanese factions finally met on 21 June. Reassertion of Lebanese government authority over the PLO might provide one way out of the present impasse, but the Council has so far been unable to order the Lebanese army into West Beirut. Another proposal, put forward by the Israelis, is that the US should guarantee safe-conduct for the remaining PLO forces out of Lebanon (presumably to Syria). Habib is still in Beirut.

3. The text of the Prime Minister's message of 15 June to President Reagan and the President's reply of 18 June are attached. The reply suggests that the Americans are continuing to look at the problem in the narrow focus of the ceasefire, and are paying little attention to the wider implications, particularly the Palestinian dimension. It also makes no specific reference to the need for Israeli withdrawal in accordance with Security Council Resolution 509 (text attached).

4. The Americans claim to have put pressure on the Israelis not to enter West Beirut. But their track record in restraining the Israelis in this crisis has not been good. At each stage of their operation, the Israelis have misled all, apparently including the Americans, as to their objectives. These objectives have steadily increased. In recent days, Mr Sharon has warned the Syrians that Israeli guns are now in range of Damascus, and that the Israelis are in a position to move onto the Beirut/Damascus road, so cutting off the Syrian contingent in Beirut and endangering the rear of

/Syrian

Syrian positions in the Beqaa. There is an urgent need for the Americans to spell out that there are limits to what they can tolerate. As the Prime Minister's message to the President made clear, there is widespread bitterness in the Arab world at US failure to prevent the Lebanese tragedy. Our (admittedly limited) information on Habib's current mission suggests that the US have left the initiative entirely in Israeli hands: Habib has been conveying Israeli demands to the Arabs.

5. UNIFIL's mandate was extended by the Security Council on 18 June for two months. The Americans, Israelis and others have aired the idea of a non-UN 'multinational' force on the Sinai pattern. But the two situations are not parallel. The Syrians would be unlikely to cooperate with a force which would inevitably be seen by the Arab world (with Russian encouragement) as a US creature. It would be better to try the UN option first. If the Russians vetoed (as with Sinai), the multinational option would remain, and would be easier to defence.

Iran/Iraq

6. Saddam Hussein's announcement on 20 June of complete withdrawal of remaining Iraqi forces from Iranian territory will create position of equilibrium between Iraqi and Iranian forces. Meets one of Iran's pre-conditions for ceasefire and negotiated settlement.

7. Depending on Iranian reaction to this latest Iraqi move, moment may be ripe for regional states, rather than West, to take initiative in promoting an even-handed resolution in the UN Security Council. One which led to veto or non-compliance could exacerbate the situation. Could lead to further hardening of attitudes in Tehran among radicals. Timing and language important if end to hostilities and negotiated settlement is to be achieved.

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 151345Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 1173 OF 15 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA

ARAB ISRAEL

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THE HOT LINE.

DEAR RON,

PRINCE SAUD, THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER, CALLED ON ME IN LONDON 11 JUNE. I KNOW YOU SAW HIM YOURSELF WHILE IN EUROPE, BUT NEVERTHELESS I WOULD LIKE TO PASS ON TO YOU THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT POINTS WHICH HE MADE DURING OUR DISCUSSION.

I) THE ISRAELIS WERE GOING BEYOND A JUSTIFIABLE CONCERN FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY, AND WERE USING THEIR MILITARY INTERVENTION TO CHANGE THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF LEBANON AND TO ACHIEVE OTHER POLITICAL OBJECTIVES SUCH AS THE REMOVAL OF SYRIAN INFLUENCE. THIS WAS A DANGEROUS PROCESS AND NO ONE COULD TELL WHERE IT MIGHT LEAD:

II) THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO BOLSTER THE POSITION OF MAJOR HADDAD IN THE SOUTH AND OPEN UP A CHANNEL TO THE CHRISTIANS IN THE NORTH. THIS WOULD BE THE END OF THE STRUCTURE OF LEBANON AS WE KNEW IT AND WOULD LEAD TO THE CATASTROPHE OF RELIGIOUS WAR IN A SIMILAR WAY TO THE RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR:

III) WE SHOULD WORK TO STRENGTHEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, HELP IT TO EXTEND ITS MILITARY CONTROL OVER THE SOUTH AND FOSTER NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECONCILATION WITH THE PALESTINIANS:

IV) IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE US SHOULD PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION IN THE ARAB WORLD. IF THE IMPRESSION OF ISRAEL/US COLLUSION GAINED GROUND THIS WOULD MAKE GRAVE PROBLEMS FOR THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS WHO ARE FRIENDLY TOWARDS THE US:

V) THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO POLARISE THE MIDDLE EAST, PRESENTING THESELVES AS THE SOLE PROTECTORS OF WESTERN INTERESTS. THIS WOULD DRIVE THE ARABS INTO THE ARMS OF THE RUSSIANS. THE GULF WAR ALSO PRESENTED GRAVE DANGERS. RELIGION WAS BEING MADE INTO A MESSAGE OF CONFLICT NOT RECONCILIATION. THE ISRAELIS WERE EXPLOITING THIS BECAUSE THEY WANTED THE ARABS TO FIGHT EACH OTHER:

VI) FIRM US ACTION COULD QUICKLY INFLUENCE ISRAELI POLICIES.

THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, MR KAMAL HASSAN ALI, WAS ALSO IN LONDON ON 11 JUNE AND TOLD FRANCIS PYM THAT HE BELIEVED THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN PLANNING THE INVASION OF SOUTH LEBANON FOR THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS. LIKE PRINCE SAUD, HE THOUGHT THAT THE

UN. Disarmament - Briefing Pack 1983

ISRAELI OBJECTIVE WAS NOTHING LESS THAN A MAJOR REALIGNMENT IN THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SITUATION. HE ADDED THAT THE INVASION PUT EGYPT IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION AND WOULD SEVERELY DAMAGE PROSPECTS FOR A LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN WHICH EGYPT HAD INVESTED SO MUCH.

KING HUSSEIN HAS ALSO JUST MADE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS TO ME ABOUT THE SITUATION.

YOU AND I DISCUSSED LAST WEEK THE TRAGEDY WHICH HAS OVERTAKEN THE LEBANON. WE MUST NOW TRY NOT ONLY TO DEAL WITH THE PRESENT CRISIS BUT ALSO TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY. THE LATEST FIGHTING HAS ONCE AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THE URGENT NEED FOR A BALANCED POLICY TOWARDS THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT. BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND THE PALESTINIANS HAVE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN WORKING FOR A LASTING PEACE. UNLIMITED SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL CAN ONLY LEAD TO GROWING POLARISATION AND DESPAIR IN THE ARAB WORLD. I HAVE TO TELL YOU FROM OUR ARAB CONTACTS THAT ARAB OPINION IS RUNNING VIOLENTLY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE IMPRESSION HAS BEEN GIVEN, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, THAT YOU CONDONE RATHER THAN CONDEMN THE RECENT ISRAELI ACTION. THE LOSS OF LIFE AND DESTRUCTION HAVE BEEN HORRIFYING AND I FEAR THAT THE ARABS, INCLUDING SOME OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, WILL LOOK INCREASINGLY TO THE SOVIET UNION UNLESS THEY SEE SOME MOVE SOON IN THEIR DIRECTION. ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT, ALTHOUGH URGENT, ARE NOT ENOUGH. WE MUST TACKLE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE WHICH LIES AT THE HEART OF THE DISPUTE: UNLESS WE DO THIS WE SHALL NEVER ACHIEVE A LASTING PEACE.

OUR POLICY TAKES AS ITS POINT OF DEPARTURE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 509, WHICH CALLS FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. IT WILL CLEARLY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO RECREATE THE STATUS QUO THAT EXISTED BEFORE THE INVASION: NOR WOULD THIS BE SATISFACTORY. BUT IT IS NOT FOR ISRAEL TO DICTATE THE FUTURE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL APPLY IN THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF LEBANON. MOREOVER, IN OUR VIEW ISRAEL'S APPARENT INTENTION OF REMOVING THE PALESTINIANS AND THE PLO AS AN ELEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST EQUATION JUST WILL NOT WORK.

I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF OUR OFFICIALS COULD GET TOGETHER TO DISCUSS WHAT THE NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE IN BUILDING A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BOTH IN LEBANON AND THE REGION. OUR PEOPLE HAD ALREADY BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH BEFORE THE LATEST CRISIS ERUPTED. I SUGGEST THAT THIS DIALOGUE SHOULD NOW BE RESUMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

WITH MY WARM BEST WISHES

MARGARET.

PYM

LIMITED
NENAD
MED
UND
PS
PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY

Following is text of President Reagan's reply to Mrs Thatcher, sent by the hot line on 18 June.

''Dear Margaret:

I appreciate your message about Lebanon. We have been hearing the same strong concerns from our Arab friends that you describe. In addition to the meeting with Foreign Minister Saud in Bonn, King Hussein has twice written me about Lebanon and the subject has been a central concern during Mr Hassan Ali's talks here this week.

There is no question that we must try to deal effectively with the Lebanon tragedy. We have been making every effort to consolidate a cease-fire as a first step. That has been Ambassador Habib's first priority. We are particularly concerned how to avoid further fighting in and around Beirut, which will cost additional innocent lives if it continues or escalates. We are also doing everything possible to help alleviate the human suffering caused by this tragic war. I have asked Congress for special funds for relief, and we are working to provide a twenty-five million dollar package to finance at least some portion of what we hope will be a broadly supported international effort.

Beyond the cease-fire and relief, however, we too believe that the present tragedy offers the opportunity to create a better future for Lebanon. That country's independence and unity must be preserved and its government's authority must be strengthened.

Phil Habib is presently in Beirut. He has met with President Sarkis and has had good talks. I believe there is a hope that the Lebanese themselves are working toward reconciliation and that they understand the need to work together. It is also clear they share the desire for a future without outside military forces in their country. These are also our objectives. We hope others will also encourage and support Lebanon's national leaders as they work toward a new national consensus.

We are aware that it is vital to create conditions in which the Lebanese government can act within its constitutional procedures and without intimidation from any quarter. I am concerned about the presence of Israeli forces around Beirut and the problems that can create for Lebanon's leaders. Phil Habib is making every effort to gain Israeli cooperation in steps which will permit Lebanon's leaders to act freely.

I agree that we need to stay in close contact regarding this and other developments in the Middle East. I fully endorse the idea that our people should consult closely in the near future about how we can cooperate in achieving a solution to the Lebanon crisis and to the broader issues, including the Palestinian question. We will have to be closely in touch concerning humanitarian relief and a formula for peacekeeping forces which will be essential to ensure rapid Israeli withdrawal.

Sincerely, Ron''

TOP COPY

GRS 215

UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 070800Z (FCO)
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 070301Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 951 OF 6 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV DAMASCUS AMMAN | WASHINGTON,
MODUK,
PRIORITY CAIRO BAGHDAD PARIS AND JEDDA.

MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION 509.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 425 (1978) OF 19 MARCH 1978 AND 508 (1982) OF 5 JUNE 1982,
GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION AS DESCRIBED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING THE NEED FOR STRICT RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY SOVEREIGNTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES,
1. DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAW ALL ITS MILITARY FORCES FORTHWITH AND UNCONDITIONALLY TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES OF LEBANON:
2. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES OBSERVE STRICTLY THE TERMS OF PARAGRAPH 1 OF RESOLUTION 508 (1982) WHICH CALLED ON THEM TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER.
3. CALLS ON ALL PARTIES TO COMMUNICATE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION WITHIN 24 HOURS:
4. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE QUESTION.

ENDS

PARSONS

STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON
FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. The Secretary-General and President Reagan are likely to be concerned about:

i. our immediate intentions with regard to the remaining prisoners of war and economic sanctions, the total exclusion zone and the 12-mile limit;

ii. our longer term intentions for the future of the Islands;

iii. relations with Latin America.

Immediate Intentions

2. Our aim since the fall of Port Stanley has been to secure an assurance from the Argentines that they regard hostilities in the South Atlantic as at an end. None has been forthcoming. The Argentine Note of 18 June to the UN Secretary-General, which talks of a 'de facto cessation of hostilities', is not at all the same thing. In these circumstances we must put first the safety of the Islanders and of our forces, and it would be wrong at this stage to lift the TEZ or the 12-mile limit. At the same time we shall not be maintaining our full strength on the Islands. About 4,000 troops are expected to return home shortly. We shall also be sending out sappers to help get the Islands running properly again.

3. Our European partners have decided that their economic measures against Argentina should be lifted since 'it is possible to hope that hostilities are now definitely at an end', but the Ten stressed that if this expectation was not fulfilled, a new situation would arise to which the Ten would have to react immediately. The Ten also agreed that

/decisions

decisions to stop arms supplies to Argentina would remain in force. We for our part will maintain for the time being economic measures against Argentina. We hope that the non-EC countries which have undertaken sanctions will do the same. It is especially important that an arms embargo be maintained.

4. As for prisoners of war, the Geneva Convention obliges us to return POWs after the cessation of active hostilities. We are not satisfied that this stage has yet been reached. We shall need to see what happens once the political situation in Buenos Aires has become clearer. But we have continued our humanitarian policy of returning POWs quickly, and nearly 11,000 have been taken back to Argentina in the last few days - for the most part in better condition than when they surrendered.

The Future of the Islands

5. Our first tasks have been humanitarian: to return as soon as possible the great majority of the prisoners of war, including all the wounded, and to clear up the mess on the Islands so that the Islanders can resume their way of life. This latter task is more difficult than we had expected and will consume much of our energies in the near future. Indiscriminately laid mines have to be cleared, and much of the Islands' infrastructure must be repaired.

6. We are not wedded to the exact status quo on the Islands. As life returns to normal we shall be able to give attention to the future, in consultation with the Islanders. In accordance with the principle of self-determination one way forward would be for the Islanders' elected representatives to have an expanded role in the government of the Islands. Our aim will be to allow them to live secure and prosperous lives on the basis of friendly relations with neighbouring countries. But we cannot rush into decisions on how this can best be done. It is in any

/case

case totally unrealistic to expect that after all the traumas the Islanders have been through, and the British lives lost, we should now sit down and negotiate with Argentina on her sovereignty claim.

Relations with Latin America

7. We recognise the need to restore relations of confidence with the region. While damage done to Western/ Latin American relations should not be exaggerated, we will be moving to mend fences with tact and urgency, both bilaterally and with our European partners. We should like the Falkland Islands to be able to live in peace and harmony with the region.

8. We recognise also the difficulties which US support for us had caused for their relations with Latin America and we understand that they will wish to move quickly to repair the damage. In the longer term, we see advantage in involving countries of the region in the Falklands' security and economic development. We also wish to build relations of friendship and confidence with the countries of Latin America.

The Role of the UN

9. The Secretary-General may ask the Prime Minister what role we see for the UN and perhaps for the Secretary-General himself in the future. Perez de Cuellar has told Sir Anthony Parsons that he will have to tell the Prime Minister that he cannot ignore his 'mandate', and that he will ask her how long she thinks it will be before we can contemplate any kind of negotiation. (The Secretary-General presumably has in mind SCR 505 which requested him to undertake a renewed mission of good offices, and urged Britain and Argentina to cooperate with him 'with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands').

/10.

10. We are grateful to the Secretary-General for his tremendous efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis - which failed through Argentine intransigence and not through any fault of his - but we do not want him to launch any new initiatives. What is needed now is a pause for rehabilitation and reflection. In these changed circumstances we do not see a role at present for the UN.

The Role of the US

11. We are grateful to President Reagan for his message of congratulations as well as for US support, especially military supplies, during the crisis. We agree that a just war requires a just peace; but it is the Islanders who have suffered injustice. President Reagan may wish to expand the three elements relating to the future of his message:

i. enhancement of the long-term security of the South Atlantic. We agree with the need for this. We would welcome American ideas on, and participation in, arrangements which could guarantee the security of the Falkland Islands. (If President Reagan asks about the implications of maintaining forces in the South Atlantic for our defence commitment to NATO, the Prime Minister might say that there will need to be adjustments in our defence posture but that these will be within the framework of last year's defence policy review.)

ii. mitigation of Argentine hostility. We too want this, and have not ourselves sought a quarrel. But the initiative must surely be with Argentina.

iii. improvement in the relations of both UK and US with Argentina. We too are keen to achieve this. Have the Americans any plans for a programme of

/economic

economic assistance to Argentina as a stabilising and confidence-building measure? Any other American ideas?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
21 June 1982

PRIME MINISTER

Possible Visit to Washington, Wednesday 23 June

In my earlier note to you I stated that I had asked the FCO to consider how the visit to Washington could be fitted into the existing programme without delaying your return to the UK. Working back from an arrival time of 0730 hours in the UK on Thursday 24 it would be possible to have talks with President Reagan for 1½ hours between 1645 and 1815 on Wednesday 23. This would allow you to keep the luncheon engagement with the Secretary General although this would mean curtailing it by 30 minutes or so (leaving 1¼ hours). This would (1) also involve rescheduling your meeting with Mr. Street although our New York Mission advise me that the Australians are happy to fit in with whatever we wish, and (2) may result in losing one or both interviews (at New York Times and CBS TV) - although it may be possible to reschedule them. This can be worked out on Monday.

I attach a possible programme from which you will see that this will unfortunately result in a crowded and hectic day on Wednesday. Agree to send a message to our Ambassador in Washington stating that you would like to have talks with President Reagan provisionally at 1645 on Wednesday 23 June?

Yes - if he can manage it. I will understand if he can't.
MT.

ALAN LOGAN
Duty Clerk

19 June 1982

We could arrive about 1 - 1½ hours later on Thursday morning if we could come into London by helicopter.

POSSIBLE REVISED PROGRAMME FOR WEDNESDAY 23 JUNE

0800	Hairdresser
0945	Call on Secretary General
1030	Call on President of General Assembly
1100	Prime Minister to address Special Session
1130	Accept congratulations
1140 or before 0945	Mr. Street, Australian Foreign Minister
1200	On record Press Conference at UN
1240	BBC Radio, BBC TV, ITN, IRN interviews
1315	Lunch with Secretary General
1445/1500	Depart by helicopter to Kennedy Airport
~~1500~~ 1515	Depart Kennedy Airport
~~1615~~ 1630	Arrive Andrew's Airport, Washington
~~1640~~ 1655	Arrive White House by helicopter
~~1645-1815~~ 1700 - 1800/1815	Talks with President Reagan
1815-1840	Press Conference
1840	Depart White House by helicopter
1905	Depart Andrew's Airport, Washington
0730 Thursday 24	Arrive UK

This has now been overtaken by my late minute to PM

PRIME MINISTER

Washington Tel. 2199, 19 June attached, Flag A.

President Reagan extends a formal invitation to you to visit Washington as part of your trip to New York.

I have asked the FCO to consider how this can be fitted in to the present programme without delaying your return to the UK. This will obviously mean cancelling some of the scheduled meetings (see copy of present programme attached - Flag B).

Do you accept President Reagan's invitation?

If it is possible - we should have to cancel the media & go straight to Washington

Alan Logan
Duty Clerk
19 June 1982

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FCO

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

WOJNFO 017/19

WONNY 002/19
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GR 130

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 190102Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2199 OF 19 JUNE
AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK

HAIG HAS TELEPHONED FROM NEW YORK AFTER FIVE ROUGH AND UNPRODUCTIVE HOURS WITH GROMYKO.
HE SAYS THAT HE HAS SPOKEN TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE PM'S VISIT TO NEW YORK. THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO INVITE THE PRIME MINISTER TO COME ON DOWN TO WASHINGTON FOR A TALK. HE REALIZES THE PRESSURE ON HER TIME AND WOULD QUITE UNDERSTAND IF SHE COULD ONLY COME TO WASHINGTON FOR A VERY SHORT STAY.
I DO NOT SUPPOSE YOU WANT ANY ADVICE FROM ME. BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT THE WARMTH OF THE RECEPTION SHE WOULD RECEIVE HERE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SURRENDER.

HENDERSON

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Head PCD
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PS (6)
PS/Mr Rutherford
PS/PUS
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B

Provisional Draft Programme: 22/23

(All times local)

22 June

1800 Depart Heathrow by RAF VC10 (to be confirmed)

2040 Arrive Kennedy (to be confirmed)

23 June

0945 Call on the Secretary-General

1030 Call on the President of the General Assembly (may have to be rescheduled)

1115 Address the General Assembly

1200 Possible Press Conference (may have to be rescheduled)

1315 Lunch with the Secretary-General (to be confirmed)

pm Possible bilateral meeting with Mr Street

1940 Depart Kennedy by RAF VC10 (to be confirmed)

24 June

0730 Arrive Heathrow (to be confirmed)

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WOJNFO 017/19

WONNY 002/19
OO F C O

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

18 JUN 1982

GR 130



CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 190102Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2199 OF 19 JUNE
AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

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I DO NOT SUPPOSE YOU WANT ANY ADVICE FROM ME. BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT THE WARMTH OF THE RECEPTION SHE WOULD RECEIVE HERE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SURRENDER.

HENDERSON

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 June, 1982

Prime Minister's Visit to UNSSD II

Thank you for your letter of 17 June. The Prime Minister is content with the proposed arrangements, including the bilateral meeting with the Australian Foreign Minister.

A. J. COLES

F. N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Content with these arrangements including meeting with Australian Foreign Minister?

Yes ms

17 June 1982

A J C. 17/6.

Dear John,

Prime Minister's Visit to UNSSD II

Following the Prime Minister's decision to postpone her visit to New York until next week, the delegation in New York have proposed a programme for Wednesday 23 June. I enclose a copy. The programme includes a call on and probably lunch with the Secretary-General and a call on Kittani, the President of the General Assembly, as previously agreed.

I suggest that your press people continue to pursue media arrangements with New York direct. The latter hope it will be possible simply to put back the previous arrangements by one week.

The delegation have suggested that the Prime Minister should have a bilateral meeting with Mr Street, the Australian Foreign Minister. We endorse that recommendation. Such a meeting would inter alia enable the Prime Minister to reiterate her personal thanks for Australia's strong support during the Falklands crisis.

I should be grateful to know soon if these arrangements are acceptable to the Prime Minister.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Provisional Draft Programme: 22/23

(All times local)

22 June

1800 Depart Heathrow by RAF VC10 (to be confirmed)

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24 June

0730 Arrive Heathrow (to be confirmed)

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 17 June 1982

UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

I enclose the latest draft of the speech which the Prime Minister will make in New York next week. I am also sending a copy to David Omand.

The Prime Minister will be working further on this draft tomorrow. Should you or David Omand have any comments, I should be grateful to receive these as soon as possible and at latest by close of play on Friday.

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B/F

A. J. COLES

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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ANNEX A

Mr. President,

This is the first time I have spoken in the General Assembly. It is a privilege to do so, and to do so under your Presidency.

But what makes the occasion most special for me is the underlying subject of our meeting - the subject of peace. The leaders who come here carry a special duty - not just to our own countries but to the common interest of all, in the most vital matters of all. We are the trustees of mankind in our generation. It is in that spirit that I intend to speak today.

I want to begin by talking briefly about our fundamental aims, and where arms control and disarmament must fit in. I shall then offer some views upon the broad issues which nuclear and non-nuclear weapons set before us all, and upon the use of force. And I shall address particular tasks for arms control and disarmament in the context of these wider aims and issues.

I can state my view of basic aims very simply. I want peace for everyone; but not peace at any price. It must be peace with freedom and justice. A great American President once said that he would sooner die on his feet than live on his knees. I agree with that. I want my own country, and every other country - large or small, developed or developing, all have the same rights - to live at peace, in liberty, in its own way within its own established borders. And I tell the Assembly frankly that I assess measures of arms control and disarmament purely as possible instruments to that central aim. If they serve it, if they help

/us to attain

us to attain it more surely or at less cost, I am in favour of them. If they are irrelevant to it, I am not interested in them. If they damage it, I am against them.

I come now to the means of war. Our generation faces a very special responsibility, because of what the march of modern technology has done to the weapons of war. We are all aware of that most keenly in respect of nuclear weapons. Mankind now has the knowledge of how to destroy itself. We cannot cancel or forget that knowledge. We have to live with it as an irreversible fact; and Governments which possess nuclear weapons have the burden of managing the consequences.

In their own terrible way, however, these weapons also bring a special opportunity. For part of what they mean is that starting a war among the nuclear powers is simply not a rational option. Given what nuclear weapons can do, recourse to arms between these powers can never be a sane way of dealing with our differences. The past 37 years show a deepening recognition of that. In circumstances often tense and difficult, deterrence has worked. Nuclear weapons have kept the peace between East and West. That is an achievement beyond price. We must not abandon or endanger it.

I am sure that we can continue that vast achievement at much reduced levels of these armouries if there is the will and the good sense to do so. I shall have more to say later on the way towards this. But we must have the wisdom and the honesty

/ to recognise

to recognise that in today's world to attempt or pretend to dismantle the deterrent system would be a course of reckless danger, and danger for the whole world. We must never let the launching of world war seem again in any way a rational option.

I am not taking nuclear deterrence for granted for the rest of human history. We must of course look for a better system of security. But to suggest that there is one within reach now would be a pretence, and a perilous pretence. There is not; and to act as though pious rhetoric were the same as reality could destroy the peace and freedom of us all. For our time, the task within reach is to harness the existence of nuclear weapons, as we have done for half a lifetime now, to the service of peace. In that task the nuclear powers' duty is to show restraint and responsibility. The distinctive role of the non-nuclear countries, I suggest, is to recognise that proliferation cannot be the way to a safer world.

I have spoken so far of nuclear weapons. These were a major concern of the 1978 Special Session; and they must remain so for us. But I am uneasy that they may be allowed to mask the facts about what we sometimes call, too comfortably, conventional weapons and conventional war. I earnestly hope that this Session will focus new and sharper concern upon these. Let us consider just a few facts. Since the disaster of Nagasaki nuclear weapons have not been used at all. But there have been something like 140 non-nuclear conflicts, in which up to ten million people have died. We have just been watching the tragedy in the Lebanon; and I have vividly in my own mind the many hundreds of men - brave

young men from my country and from Argentina - cut down in the South Atlantic by the impersonal killing-power of modern armaments. Nuclear war is indeed a terrible threat; but conventional war is a terrible reality. We must do more about its dangers and its burdens. Those burdens are far greater than those of nuclear weapons. If we deplore, as I do, the amount of military spending in a world where so many go hungry and so much else needs to be done, our criticism and our action should turn above all to conventional forces which absorb far the greatest proportion - around 90 per cent - of military spending world-wide.

We are all involved in this - virtually all of us have conventional forces. I am convinced that we need a deeper and wider effort throughout the non-nuclear field, looking at weapons and manpower and deployments, to see what we can do together to lighten the risks and the burdens and the fears. I would particularly welcome new action over arms transfers, especially if this came through agreement among the states of a region to which others could subscribe, and not by having the big suppliers impose their own limitations and preferences from outside.

But in a crucial sense, Mr. President, I have still not reached the root of the matter. For the fundamental risk to peace is not the existence of weapons of particular types or in particular numbers or places. It is, above all, the existence of political willingness to initiate their use. This is where we need action and protection. And our key need is not for promises against first use of this or that kind of military weapon - such promises

/ can never

can never be dependable amid the stresses of war. We need guarantees against first use of any kinds of military weapons; guarantees against starting military action at all. The leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance have just given a solemn collective undertaking to precisely that effect.

Let us face the reality. The springs of war lie in the readiness to resort to force against other nations, and not in "arms races", whether real or imaginary. Aggressors do not start wars because an adversary has built up his own strength. They start wars because their calculations predict a profitable result. I mentioned a moment ago 140 conflicts since 1945. Few if any of them can be traced to an arms race. No historian can imagine that the World War of 1939 to 1945 was caused by any kind of arms race. On the contrary, it sprang from the belief of a tyrant that his neighbours lacked the means or the will to resist him effectively. A formidable countryman of that tyrant, 70 years earlier, is quoted as saying "Do I want war? Of course not - I want victory". Hitler believed he could have victory without war, or with not very much or very difficult war. The cost to humanity of disproving that belief was immense; the cost of preventing him from forming it in the first place would have been infinitely less. The lesson is that disarmament and good intentions on their own do not ensure peace; they may even damage it.

I am totally opposed to massive arms build-ups. I am saddened to read in Andrei Sakharov's writings about the militarisation of his country's economy and the unchecked power of its military-industrial complex.

But I am not prepared merely to wring my hands about such things I would much prefer to see arms build-ups prevented, by good sense or persuasion or agreement. But if that does not work, then the owners of these vast armouries must not be allowed to imagine that they could safely be used, either to blackmail or to coerce. And that cannot be achieved just by words. I am not prepared to entrust the security of my country and its friends to speeches and hopes and virtuous example. It can be ensured only by deterrence, by adequate strength.

Mr. President, I have explained why in general I do not believe that weapons cause wars. It is not merely a mistaken analysis but an evasion of responsibility to imagine that we can deal with the problem of war primarily by focussing upon its instruments. These are often more symptoms than causes. But I have said all this not to decry arms control and disarmament but to give them their real value, to set them in their true context. It has in my view been a frequent and serious disservice to these useful techniques to raise unreal expectations about what they can do for us. Excessive claims and demands for disarmament have too often been not an aid to practical action but a paper substitute for it. Disarmament measures cannot, in any realistic framework, remove the possibility of war. But the limitation and reduction of armaments can still help greatly in the right circumstances. It can reduce the cost of legitimate self-defence. It may ease fear and political friction. It can help to make conflict a

/ little less

little less inhumane, as the work on the laws of war seeks to do. It can sometimes seal off or limit the military use of advancing science and technology, as in outer space or with anti-ballistic missile deployments. To do such things, and to do them in a way that is balanced, visible and dependable, is to do a great deal.

Critics too often play down what has already been achieved in arms control agreements, whether formal or informal - outer space, the sea bed, Antarctica, nuclear-free Latin America, banning nuclear tests above ground, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the various Geneva accords over the years, the SALT agreements, the banning of biological and radiological weapons. Much of this is perhaps imperfect or incomplete, and relatively little of it is actual disarmament. We can all wish that the achievement were much greater. But to suggest that what has been done so far is merely trivial is both inaccurate and unhelpful to further progress. We have a useful foundation to build on. What we have to do is to seize every opportunity, and indeed to make new opportunities, for further building. I want now to turn to some specific issues in that direction.

In the nuclear field, the hopes of the world lie above all with direct talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, which have

/ by

by far the largest arsenals. As I said earlier, I believe that these arsenals could both be greatly reduced without any danger to peace. Decisive action is needed here, not just declarations or freezes. I welcome the radical proposals made by the United States for completely eliminating whole classes of intermediate-range systems and for substantially cutting the strategic armouries. The negotiations must surely have the urgent support of us all.

/I hope

I hope moreover that action on nuclear armouries will thereafter go wider still. In Europe, East and West each deploy thousands of nuclear warheads for medium and short-range delivery systems. No doubt some weapons in this category are needed to keep deterrence credible and sure. But I believe that if we think clearly we will recognise that far fewer would be enough. The United States showed the way during 1980 by unilaterally withdrawing a thousand warheads without replacement. We should make this an important area for further action, by both the great alliances.

I am deeply concerned about chemical weapons. When the world community decided in 1972 to ban biological weapons - a matter in which Britain played a leading role - we all looked forward to action next on chemical weapons. It has not happened. There is even ground for unease about whether everyone is truly observing the agreed ban on biological weapons; and many of us have been further disquieted by well-documented reports, which urgently need investigation, that chemical weapons and toxins have actually been used. The Committee on Disarmament needs to give renewed and determined impetus to agreeing a convention banning development and possession of such weapons. Britain has sought recently to contribute further to this.

I spoke earlier about the huge weight of conventional forces. The biggest concentration and confrontation of such forces anywhere in the world lies in Europe, my own continent. We need to reduce the frictions and burdens of this without causing imbalance or insecurity. This must be possible if both sides sincerely want

/it

it, and the Western participants in the overlong negotiations in Vienna are making an important fresh proposal. Britain would also like to see a special effort made to agree quickly on new mandatory confidence-building and security-building measures in Europe. This would be a valuable complement to action at Vienna on force levels.

Through all these subjects there runs a vital thread - verification. It is frankly absurd to expect that in these matters where national security is at stake countries should take the observance of agreements by others simply on trust, especially when some states are so deeply secretive. Agreements which are not backed by proper verification can be worse than useless - they can be a new source of danger, fear and mistrust. Verification is not an optional extra item in disarmament and arms control. It is at the heart of the matter, and we must always tackle it in that light.

There are in progress several further endeavours to which Britain gives its backing, like the Secretary-General's project for much greater openness about military spending. We will this year table the full range of information asked for. I shall not go right through the list of other efforts; my country will demonstrate its support by the quality of our practical participation.

I believe that Britain's record over the years in work on disarmament and arms control stands up well to any comparison. But I cannot be complacent; Britain and everyone else needs to

/do

do more. And the way in which we need, all of us, to do it is not by ringing speeches, still less by propaganda postures, but by patient, realistic, relevant work, step by step in difficult and complex matters. Frankly, I am not very interested in broad disarmament theory or rhetoric; I am interested in specific, sensible disarmament action in the practical service of security. This is a long business, and an unspectacular one; but there is no short cut and no sensible alternative.

Mr. President, let me summarise what I have said. The central aim is peace in freedom for every country to live according to its own choices. The test of all our efforts in this Special Session must be whether they help that aim. We cannot abolish nuclear weapons, and we must not endanger the massive contribution which they make, however paradoxically, to peace; but we can surely preserve this with far fewer of them. We should tackle much more vigorously than hitherto the problems of non-nuclear armaments, with which all recent wars have been fought and which absorb the vast bulk of military spending. And we should recognise that wars are caused not by armaments but by aggressors; that what tempts aggressors/is the prospect of easy advantage; and that the best safeguard of peace is to deny them that prospect. Within the context of these realities measures of agreed arms control and disarmament can make an important contribution if we use them sensibly, without cant or illusion. I hope this Session will help to enhance that contribution. I pledge my own country to play its part.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

H M Treasury

Parliament Street London SW1P 3AG

Switchboard 01-233 3000
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M E Quinlan CB
Deputy Secretary, Industry

J Cole Esq
No 10 Downing Street
London SW1

15 June 1982

Dear John,

SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

Herewith a very rough first shot. I shall be meditating on it further (not least because it is, I fancy, as yet a bit on the short side) but you may like to see it in case you have any marked views on whether or not it is anywhere near the board.

I am sending a copy to David Gillmore on the same basis; he has told me how matters stand (as of half-past-three this afternoon) on the matter of timing.

Yours ever,
Michael

M E QUINLAN

DRAFT

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr President:

1. This is the first time that I have had the opportunity to address the General Assembly. I account it a privilege to do so, and to do so under your Presidency.

2. But what makes the occasion most special to me is the subject - the subject of peace. The leaders who have come here, as I have, carry in this matter an especial duty; not just to our own countries' interest but to the common interest of all, in the most vital matter of all. We are collectively the trustees of our generation. I shall try to speak now in that spirit; ~~and not~~ I shall not be concerned to score national debating points.

3. Our generation faces a very special responsibility, because of what the march of modern technology has done to the weapons of war. We are all conscious of that most vividly in respect of nuclear weapons. Mankind now has - and can never lose, never forget - the knowledge of how to blow itself up; and we have to live, as our forebears did not, with that irreversible fact, and to manage its implications.

4. In its own terrible way, however, that fact also carries a special opportunity. For part of what it means is that the initiation of war among the major nuclear powers is simply not a rational option. Given what these ghastly armouries can do, recourse to arms between these powers can never be a sane way of setting about the regulating or resolution of differences. The history of the past thirty-seven years displays a deepening recognition of that by every participant. In circumstances often tense and difficult, deterrence has been stable; it has kept the peace between East and West; and that is an achievement beyond price, one which we must not for the future relinquish or endanger.

5. I believe nevertheless that we can sustain that vast achievement at much lower levels of these awful armouries and at much lower costs, if we have the will, the vision and the flexibility to agree to do so. These are major goals, and I shall have more to say later on the ways towards them. But let us throughout have the wisdom and the honesty to recognise that to attempt or ~~to~~ pretend to dismantle the deterrent system wholesale - above all to do so one-sidedly - might be a course of reckless danger, and danger for the whole world. I do not want to make world war ~~appear~~ seem a rational option again; it cannot be, and it must not for a moment ~~seem to be~~ be allowed to appear so.

6. I have spoken so far of nuclear weapons. These were a special concern of the 1978 Special Session; they must manifestly remain so for us. But I am uneasy that they may sometimes mask the appalling facts about what we sometimes call, in the over-cosy jargon of the strategic theorists, vonventional weapons and conventional war; and I venture to hope that this Session may focus renewed and sharper concern upon these. Let us consider just a few facts. Since the disaster of Nagasaki nuclear weapons have not been used at all. But there have been something like one hundred and forty non-nuclear armed conflicts, and in those conflicts perhaps up to ten million people have died. This very week we watch the tragedy in the Lebanon; and I naturally have vividly in my own mind the many hundreds of men - brave young men from my country and from Argentina - cut down in the South Atlantic by the impersonal killing-power of modern armaments. Nuclear war is indeed a terrible threat; but conventional war is ~~just~~ a terrible reality. We must - all of us, for virtually all of us wield conventional forces - seek to do something about the dangers of conventional war, and its burdens. Those burdens, let us remember, are far greater than those of nuclear weapons. If we deplore, as I certainly do, the amount spent on military preparations in a world where so many go hungry and so much else needs to be done, our criticism and our action should turn above all to conventional forces, which absorb far the greatest proportion - over ninety per cent - of military spending world-wide.

7. We are all of us involved in this - virtually all of us have conventional forces. I am personally convinced that we need a deeper and wider effort throughout the non-nuclear field, looking at weapons and manpower and deployments, to see what we can do together to lighten the risks and the burdens and the fears.

8. But in a sense Mr President, I have still not come to the root of the matter. For the fundamental risk to peace is not the existence of weapons, whether nuclear or other, of particular types or in particular numbers or places. It is, above all, the existence of political willingness to initiate recourse to force, to the use of arms. It is here, and not in "arms races", whether real or imaginary, that the springs of war lie. I mentioned a moment ago a hundred and forty conflicts since 1945. Few if any of those can plausibly be traced to an arms race. No informed historian can imagine that the World War of 1939 to 1945 was caused by any kind of arms race. On the contrary, it sprang most clearly and tellingly from the belief of a tyrant that his neighbours lacked the means or the will to resist him effectively - from weakness in deterrence. A formidable countryman of that tyrant,

seventy years earlier, is quoted as saying "Do I want war? Of course not - I want victory". Hitler believed he could have victory without war, or with not very much or very difficult war. The cost of disproving that belief was immense; the cost of preventing him from forming it in the first place would have been infinitely less. The lesson is that disarmament and good intentions on their own do not guarantee peace; they may even destroy it. ~~It may therefore~~

19.

it can be not merely a mistake of analysis but an evasion of responsibility to suppose that we deal with the problem of war, and the duty of peace, primarily by focussing upon weapons. These are often more symptoms than causes.

9. We are entitled, every one of us, to live in peace with our own values and way of life; not to have the doctrines, the institutions or the control of others countries forced upon us, not to be compelled to choose between peace and freedom. We are entitled to be protected from external aggression - if necessary through our own efforts, if possible ~~(~~and preferably~~)~~ through a just international system. The efforts of political leaders for peace, both through this great organisation and in other ways, need to be directed first and foremost to removing the conditions that lead to conflict - injustice between and within nations, mistrust and secrecy, the denial of human rights - and to strengthening the methods and mechanisms for resolving conflict without war. ~~[My country for its part was always ready, and would be ready still, even after the events of the past three months, to submit the matter of the Falkland Islands to the judgement of the International Court at The Hague.]~~ We have to work at this urgently; but we must also do it realistically, without cant and without illusion

10. Mr President, I have explained ~~that~~ why in general I do not believe that armaments cause wars or that action on them alone will prevent wars. But I have said all this not in any way to decry disarmament and arms control but to give them their real value, to set them in their true context. It has in my view been a frequent and serious disservice to their cause to attribute to them potentialities which they cannot make good; excessive claims and demands have too often been not an aid to ~~more modest but realistic~~ practical action but a substitute for it. Disarmament measures cannot, in any realistic ~~sense~~ framework, remove the possibility of war. But the limitation and reduction of armaments can still do a great deal. It can reduce the economic burden of military preparation, ~~and sometimes~~ ease ~~its~~ political friction and the fears this may heighten; it can ~~in some degree~~ moderate the scale or inhumanity of conflict the. To do these things, and to do them in a way that is balanced, visible and dependable, is to do a very great deal; and we must seize every opportunity, and indeed make new opportunities. ~~and~~ I should like now to turn briefly to some specific issues in this direction.

legitimate for self-defence

11. In the nuclear field, the hopes of the world lie above all with the direct dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, which have

; it can sometimes seal off or limit the destructive exploitation of ~~not~~ advancing science and technology];

by far the largest arsenals. As I implied earlier, I believe that provided reasonable balance is not lost these arsenals could both be greatly reduced without any danger to peace. This is where decisive action, not just deceleration or standstill, is needed; and I therefore welcome the radical proposals made by the United States for eliminating intermediate-range systems and substantially cutting the strategic armouries. The negotiations must surely have the urgent support and goodwill of us all.

12. I am deeply worried about chemical weapons. When the world community in 1972 decided to ban biological weapons - a matter in which I am proud that Britain played a major initiating role - we all looked forward to successful action on chemical weapons. It has not happened; indeed, many of us have been greatly disquieted by persistent reports that these ~~obscure~~ obscene weapons have actually been used. The Committee on Disarmament needs to give renewed and special impetus - and Britain has sought recently to contribute to this - to arriving at a convention banning development and possession; and the reports I have just referred to underline how vital it is that such a ban should be truly verifiable if it is not to be simply a source of danger, instability and suspicion.

13. I spoke earlier about the huge weight of conventional forces. The biggest concentration and confrontation of such forces anywhere in the world lies in Europe, my own continent. ~~and~~ Something needs to be done about this, to reduce the burden without creating imbalance or insecurity. This must be possible if both sides truly want it, and the Western participants in the long negotiations at in Vienna have recently made an important ~~new~~ fresh proposal. Britain would also like to see a new conference take place soon to agree quickly on new mandatory confidence-building and security-building measures in Europe. This would be a powerful complement to ~~the necessary~~ action on numbers, at Vienna.

14. There are several other efforts in progress to which Britain gives its full support, like the valuable project under the Secretary-General's auspices for much greater openness about military spending, and the work on the relationship between disarmament and development. I shall not catalogue all this work in detail now; my country will ~~show~~ demonstrate its support by the breadth and quality of our practical participation.

I have no reason to be ashamed of Britain's record over the years

15. ~~I am moderately proud of our record~~ in the disarmament and arms control field - I believe it stands up well to comparison. But I cannot be complacent; Britain and everyone else needs to do more. And the way in which we need, all of us, to do it is not by ringing speeches, still less by propaganda postures, but by patient, realistic, relevant work, step by step in difficult and complex matters. Frankly, I am not very interested in disarmament theory or rhetoric; I am interested in disarmament action, because that is what people want. It may be a long business, and an unspectacular one; but there is no ~~alternative~~ short cut and no sensible alternative.

16. I should like to finish what I have to say, Mr President, by reverting to my central theme of peace. There is, I believe, a real prospect that we can keep the notion of all-out global war, of nuclear war, simply obsolete and unreal; and I believe we can do it at less cost than today if we have the wisdom to agree on the measures to that end. We cannot yet, I fear, make all sorts of war obsolete; ~~in candour,~~ I doubt whether our generation can realistically expect to achieve in full the goal which Pope John Paul proposed during a visit to my country only last month, when he said "War should belong to the tragic past, to history; it should find no place on humanity's agenda for the future". But we can less and less afford to regard that objective as wholly unattainable, or just a pious theoretical aspiration. We have to make it a ~~genuine~~ central political goal genuinely shared by all, to be pursued by concrete practical action directed to removing real causes and risks. All of us can help, in large ways or small; ~~and I hope and expect that this Session will make a distinctive contribution.~~ Disarmament and arms control are important among the instruments available to us. I hope and expect that this Session will make a distinctive contribution to exploiting them more fully. I pledge my own country to play its part.

RESTRICTED

Ace AN
UN

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

15 June 1982

Dear Francis,

You wrote to John Coles on 14 June 1982 about the Prime Minister's visit to the UN Special Session on Disarmament.

The Prime Minister is perfectly content to call on the President of the General Assembly whenever her visit takes place. But in view of all the uncertainty about when she will go to New York, she feels that there is no point in trying to arrange a meeting with the Foreign Minister of Nigeria. She sees no reason why she should see General Ershad of Bangladesh in New York, as she will have met him in London later today.

Yours ever,

Clive Whitmore.

Francis Richards Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 June 1982

Dear John,

Prime Minister's Speech

Thank you for Clive Whitmore's letter of today (but dated 10 June), to which you attached a copy of Hugh Thomas' draft of the Prime Minister's speech at the UNSSD this week.

I attach at Annex our suggested amendments. These have already been telephoned to you by David Gillmore.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

UNSSD: PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH

SECTION II: BRITAIN AND ARMS CONTROL

1. If it was thought necessary to reduce the length of this speech, it might be preferable to omit all of the first sentence of the first paragraph of this section and the first sentence of the second paragraph.

2. Amend last sentence of second paragraph to read: ''We have also been prominent at all the discussions . . .''.

3. Last paragraph, last sentence, amend to read: ''. . . we came to know all too well the destructiveness of modern weapons.''

SECTION III: THE NEED FOR CAUTION

1. Amend end of last sentence of first paragraph to read: ''many questions about which a large number of people are content to suspend judgement altogether.''

2. Paragraph 4, first line, delete 'morals'; insert 'lessons'.

3. Paragraph 8 line 4, insert the word 'orderly' before 'commerce'.

SECTION IV: THE NEED TO GO AHEAD

1. Amend first sentence to read ''Despite all these cautionary tales, we know that the limitation and reduction of armaments are essential.''

2. Amend paragraph 3 to read: ''We must thus be ready to sit down at negotiating tables even with governments whose policies, we know, threaten the peace in freedom we hold so dear.''

3. Paragraph 5, last sentence, amend to read: ''The fire raids of the Second World War, even if nominally conventional, were destructive on a massive scale.''

4. Paragraph 6, amend to read: ''. . . the dark shadow cast over the West by Soviet conventional forces which have kept the East of the continent in subjection for so long.''

5. Paragraph 7, amend to read: ''The First Sepcial Session of this Assembly very properly thought that there should be regional consultations about the trade in conventional armaments. We should not exclude from consideration during this Session the accumulation of conventional weapons through production as well as through transfer.''

6. Paragraph 9, delete 'unfortunately' from the second line.

7. Paragraph 10, at the end of first sentence delete 'soothe the fears' and insert 'reduce mistrust'.

8. Paragraph 10, amend last sentence to read: ''The progress made in SALT and the agreement to begin the START talks between such very different nations as the US and the USSR are further indications of what can be done.''

SECTION V: GUIDELINES

1. Amend beginning of paragraph 4 to read: "Our ambition in negotiations should be . . .'' (ie remove reference to 'these discussions').

2. Paragraph 7, delete last sentence beginning ''These Governments which have military rulers . . .''.

3. Delete last paragraph (paragraph 11). The point here is that it is difficult to sustain an argument about economy of force in relation to nuclear weapons.

SECTION VI: PRACTICAL STEPS

1. Paragraph 2, amend to read: ''I hope that the Special Session will endorse the proposals made by President Reagan both for large cuts in the systems of strategic nuclear delivery and for the elimination of the most threatening nuclear forces in Europe.''

2. Amend paragraph 3 to read: ''Once this has been achieved, the way will be open for negotiations on other intermediate systems. My strong hope is that we could in due course achieve substantial reductions in so-called battlefield nuclear weapons. Many of these systems are of doubtful military value and they constitute a potential source of serious instability.''

3. Paragraph 4: amend last sentence in parenthesis: ''I here reaffirm our formal assurance given to the non-nuclear weapon States at the First Special Session about the non-use of nuclear weapons.''

4. Paragraph 5. Amend to read: ''Bearing in mind that we have ourselves abolished our stock of chemical weapons, Britain urges the Special Session to devote attention to eliminating them all from all stockpiles. We are disturbed by well-documented reports that chemical weapons, perhaps including toxins, have recently been used in several countries in South East Asia. Those reports must be minutely investigated.''

5. Paragraph 6, amend last sentence to read: ''The West is making an important new proposal on this.''

6. Paragraph 7, amend to read: ''We are also interested in the ideas originated by France for a European Disarmament Conference (CDE). I hope that when the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe resumes in Madrid in the autumn, we can reach agreement to sit down to negotiations on confidence and security-building measures in Europe. Such measures would increase trust between the two sides in Europe and thereby reduce the risk of war in Europe's heartland.''

7. Paragraph 8. Delete third sentence (the Soviet Union is the biggest arms dealer only according to SIPRI and then only in the Institute's figures for the last year; previously it had been the United States). Amend end of last sentence to read: ''limitations to which all their different suppliers may be able to subscribe.''

8. Paragraph 9, amend opening to read: ''Britain supports, and will participate this year in, the Secretary General's scheme . . .''.

9. Paragraph 10, amend to read: ''We have also welcomed the work begun on the relationship between arms spending and development.''

SECTION VII: CONCLUSIONS

a. Falklands

1. Paragraph 2, amend third sentence to read: ''The State with whom we are in dispute drew erroneous conclusions from the patient restraint with which we had conducted our policy in that area.''

b. Priniciples

2. Amend opening of first paragraph to read: ''My second point in conclusion is this: the resources which we in Britain devote to arms are, we believe, the minimum needed . . .''.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 60 OF 14 JUNE.
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

Head ACSD
Head PCD
Head NAD.
Head Mbus.
PS
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/Mr. Rifkind
PS/PUS
Mr Wright
Mr Gillmore
RC

MIPT: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO UNSSD II.

TUESDAY, 15 JUNE

20.40	ETA JFK (VC10). MET BY SIR A PARSONS AND MR SUMMERHAYES MR NIXON (BIS) WILL ALSO BE PRESENT.
21.30	ARRIVE HOTEL - UN PLAZA.

WEDNESDAY, 16 JUNE

10.00	CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: ACCOMPANIED BY SIR A PARSONS, MR SUMMERHAYES, MR WHITMORE. THEREAFTER TO HOTEL UN PLAZA.
11.15	CBS EVENING NEWS: UN PLAZA (MR INGHAM'S SUITE).
11.45	ABC: BARBARA WALTERS: UN PLAZA (MR INGHAM'S SUITE).
12.15 (FOR 30 MINUTES)	NEW YORK TIMES: UN PLAZA (PM'S SUITE).
13.15	LUNCH WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL: 3 SUTTON PLACE - GUEST LIST ATTACHED: PERSONALITY NOTES WILL BE PROVIDED.
15.00	CALL ON PRESIDENT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 38TH FLOOR.
15.15	PM TO ADDRESS SPECIAL SESSION. STAY TO HEAR NEPAL OR UNTIL 16.30.
16.30	ON THE RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE AT UN.
17.15	MEET BRITISH MEDIA (BBC, ITV, IRN) AT UN.
17.45	RETURN TO HOTEL UN PLAZA.
18.45	LEAVE HOTEL FOR JFK.
19.40	ETD JFK.

GUEST LIST FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH ON WEDNESDAY, 16 JUNE AT 13.15 HOURS.

SECRETARY-GENERAL
PRIME MINISTER
MR. ISMET KITTANI

PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SECRETARY-GENERAL
PRIME MINISTER
MR. ISMET KITTANI
M LUC DE LA BARRE DE NANTEUIL
MISS EDMONDE DEVER
MR AND MRS BRIAN URQUHART

MRS BROOKE ASTOR
MR DAVID ROCKEFELLER
MR DOUGLAS DILLON

SIR ANTHONY PARSONS
MR AND MRS DAVID SUMMERHAYES
MR AND MRS HAM WHYTE
MR C A WHITMORE

SUMMERHAYES

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PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
BELGIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR SPECIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM

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Head ACDS
Head UNS
Head PCS
Head News D.
PS/Mr Luce
PS/Mr Kirkbride
PS/PUS
Mr Wright
Mr Gillmore
Lord Gore-Booth
Mr Adams
RC

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 59 OF 14 JUNE.
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO'S 54 - 56: AND TELECON NIXON (BIS)/ COLVER (NO 10 PRESS OFFICE): PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO UNSSD II.

1. MIFT CONTAINS A DRAFT OUTLINE PROGRAMME FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT AND A GUEST LIST FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S LUNCH. IF THE PRIME MINISTERS DECIDES TO TRAVEL BY CONCORDE, ARRIVING 09.30 LOCAL ON 16 JUNE, THE ONLY PROBLEM WILL BE THE CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR 10.00. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PRIME MINISTER COULD TRAVEL DIRECT TO THE UN BUT COULD NOT EXPECT TO ARRIVE BEFORE 10.15. THIS SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BUT HE WILL FEEL OBLIGED TO BE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY 10.45 FOR THE FIRST SPEAKER, THE VICE PRESIDENT OF CUBA.

MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS (MY TEL NO 56).
2. IT HAS NOT PROVED POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FOR PRESS FACILITIES ON THE TARMAC WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER ARRIVES. PARA 2 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE IS THEREFORE REDUNDANT.
3. WHEN HE ACCEPTED OUR OFFER OF A 30-MINUTE INTERVIEW WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 16 JUNE THE FOREIGN EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES AT FIRST AGREED THAT THE INTERVIEW WOULD BE CONDUCTED BY ANOTHER SENIOR CORRESPONDENT, PROBABLY BERNARD GWERTZMAN, CHIEF STATE DEPARTMENT CORRESPONDENT, AS WELL AS BERNARD NOSSITER, UN CORRESPONDENT. WE ENCOURAGED THIS AND STRESSED OUR HOPE THAT THE INTERVIEW WOULD RANGE BEYOND UN AND DISARMAMENT TOPICS.
4. THE NEW YORK TIMES HAVE NOW COME BACK TO US TO SAY THAT NOSSITER ALONE WILL CONDUCT THE INTERVIEW. THIS IS A PITY BECAUSE SOME OF NOSSITER'S REPORTING ON THE FALKLANDS' NEGOTIATIONS AT THE UN HAS BEEN INACCURATE AND UNHELPFUL TO BRITAIN AND HE IS UNSYMPATHETIC TO OUR NORTHERN IRELAND POLICIES. HOWEVER HE IS AN EXPERIENCED AND DISTINGUISHED CORRESPONDENT WITH AS DEEP A KNOWLEDGE OF

AND DISTINGUISHED CORRESPONDENT WITH AS DEEP A KNOWLEDGE OF BRITISH AFFAIRS AS ANYONE FROM HIS TIME AS WASHINGTON POST CORRESPONDENT IN LONDON (1971-79).

5. WE CAN HARDLY OBJECT TO THE TIMES' OWN CHOICE OF INTERVIEWER THOUGH WE HAVE, AS INSTRUCTED, ALREADY WARNED THE FOREIGN EDITOR THAT THERE IS A RISK THAT THE INTERVIEW MAY HAVE TO BE DROPPED BECAUSE OF PRESSURE OF TIME. I ASSUME THAT YOU WOULD STILL LIKE THE INTERVIEW TO GO AHEAD IF POSSIBLE.

BILATERALS.

6. THE BANGLADESH MISSION ARE CONTINUING TO PRESS FOR A BRIEF MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND GENERAL ERSHAD SOME TIME ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 JUNE, IN ADDITION TO HIS PLANNED CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON 15 JUNE IN LONDON. THERE HAVE BEEN NO OTHER REQUESTS FOR BILATERALS.

SPEAKERS' LIST FOR 16 JUNE.

7. THE SPEAKERS' LIST FOR THE DAY OF 16 JUNE IS NOW AS FOLLOWS:

MORNING: CUBA (V. PRESIDENT), CZECHOSLOVAKIA (FM), SPAIN, CAMEROON TURKEY (FM).

AFTERNOON: UK, NEPAL, SENEGAL (FM), NICARAGUA, SURINAME, DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, MONGOLIA (FM), IAEA.

8. SEE MIFT.

SUMMARHAYES

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Hd. NENAD.
Hd. MED.
Hd. S. Am. D.
Hd. News D.
Hd. Em. U.
PS
PS/Mr. Hurd
PS/Mr. RIFKIND
PS/PUS.
Mr. Wright
Mr. Gillmore
Lord N. G-Lennox
Mr. Adams.
No 10. D.S.

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FROM UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK 101318Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 56 DATED 10 JUNE 82
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

MIPT: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO UNSSD II: MEDIA ENGAGEMENTS

1. DESPITE THE PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVIEWS TODAY WITH US COMMERCIAL TV NETWORKS (WHICH WERE USED ON ALL 3 BREAKFAST PROGRAMMES) MEDIA INTEREST IN HER VISIT IS LIKELY TO BE INTENSE BECUASE OF THE FALKLANDS. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH UKMIS, THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON AND BIS, THE FOLLOWING IN ORDER OF PRIORITY ARE OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MEDIA ENGAGEMENTS ON 16 JUNE:

A) ON THE RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE. THIS SHOULD BE AFTER THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH TO UNSSD AND COULD BE HELD IN THE UN AT 1630.

B) SHORT SEPARATE INTERVIEWS WITH BBC RADIO AND TV, ITN AND IRN. THESE COULD BE FITTED IN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1715 IN THE UN PLAZA, ALTHOUGH AN EARLIER TIME WITH AN EMBARGO OF 2000Z WOULD IF POSSIBLE BE PREFERABLE SO AS TO CATCH THE EVENING NEWS PROGRAMMES IN BRITAIN.

C) LIVE INTERVIEWS AT THE UN PLAZA HOTEL OF 5-10 MINUTES ON ONE OR POSSIBLE TWO OF THE INFLUENTIAL BREAKFAST TV PROGRAMMES: THESE COULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN 0710 AND 0750.

D) A SHORT TV INTERVIEW FOR USE ON AN EVENING NEWS PROGRAMME AND A LONGER INTERVIEW FOR THE MCNEIL/LEHRER PROGRAMME ON THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING NETWORK TO BE TAPED DURING THE MORNING. ALTHOUGH THIS PROGRAMME HAS LOST SOME OF ITS LUSTRE SINCE THE PRIME MINISTER APPEARED ON IT IN FEBRUARY 1981 IT IS STILL ONE OF THE BEST OUTLETS FOR AN EXTENDED INTERVIEW.

E) AN INTERVIEW ON THE RECORD WITH THE NEW YORK TIMES DURING THE MORNING.

2. THE PRESS WILL WISH TO COVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S ARRIVAL AT JFK ON 15 JUNE AND WILL HOPE TO OBTAIN A STATEMENT FROM HER. I RECOMMEND THAT WE ARRANGE PHOTO FACILITIES ONLY AND THAT BECAUSE THE VISIT IS NOT BILATERAL IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR HER TO MAKE A STATEMENT. I DO NOT RECOMMEND ANY PRESS FACILITIES FOR THE DEPARTURE ON 16 JUNE

SUMMERHAYES

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FROM UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK 101316Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 55 DATED 10 JUNE 82
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

M.I.P.T.: UNSSD II : PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: 15/16 JUNE

1. FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED DRAFT PROGRAMME

TUESDAY 15 JUNE

2040 HRS ETA KENNEDY AIRPORT. MET BY SIR A PARSONS AND MR SUMMERHAYES

2130 HRS ARRIVE HOTEL UN PLAZA

WEDNESDAY 16 JUNE
0730 HAIRDRESSER

x18

Hd/ACD
Hd/Defence D
Hd/UND
Hd/PCD
Hd/NAD
Hd/NENAD
Hd/MED
Hd/SAmD
Hd/News D
Hd/Emig
PS
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/Mr Rifkind
PS/PUS
Mr. Wright
Mr. Gillmore
Lord N. Gordon-Lennox
Mr. Adams
No 10 D.S.

1000	CALL ON SECRETARY-GENERAL
1315	LUNCH WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL
1500	CALL ON PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (KITTANI)
1515	ADDRESS SPECIAL SESSION. WE IMAGINE THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WISH TO REMAIN IN THE ASSEMBLY TO LISTEN TO NEPAL, THE NEXT SPEAKER.
1630	PRESS CONFERENCE AT UN (SEE MIFT)
1845	LEAVE HOTEL FOR AIRPORT
1940	DEPART KENNEDY AIRPORT

2. SEE MIFT

SUMMERHAYES

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Hd NENAD < Hd. SAmD.
Hd MED < Hd. News D.
Hd. Em. U.
PS
PS/Mr. Hurd.
PS/Mr. Rifkind.
PS/PUS
Mr. Wright
Mr. Gillmore
Lord N. Gordon Lennox.
Mr. Adams.
No. 10 D.S.

NYFO 002/10

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CONFIDENTIAL
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FROM UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK 101314Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 54 DATED 10 JUNE 82
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 479 TO UKMIS: UNSSD II: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: 15/16 JUNE

1. IN HIS LETTER OF 4 JUNE, CHICK (ACDD) ASKED FOR MY VIEWS ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROGRAMME. THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS THE COMBINED ADVICE OF SIR A PARSONS AND MYSELF.

2. UNLESS THERE ARE UNTOWARD DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FALKLANDS OR ELSEWHERE WHICH WE CANNOT AT THIS STAGE FORESEE, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD COME AS PLANNED. THE FALKLANDS

ELSEWHERE WHICH WE CANNOT AT THIS STAGE FORESEE, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD COME AS PLANNED. THE FALKLANDS ISSUE HAS BECOME DORMANT AT THE UN. IT WILL BE REFERRED TO IN THE LATINS'S PEECHES IN THE GENERAL DEBATE. BUT PASSIONS HAVE COOLED AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A SERIOUS RISK OF A MASS LATIN WALK-OUT OR ANY OTHER DISCOURTESY TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

3. MY TWO IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS CONTAIN A DRAFT PROGRAMME AND SUGGESTIONS ON POSSIBLE MEDIA ENGAGEMENTS.

4. ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH, AND FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE WORKING DINNER SHE PLANS FOR 11 JUNE, I WOULD SIMPLY ADD THAT WE ARE VERY HAPPY WITH THE CHANGE OF EMPHASIS WHICH I NOTE FROM THE RECORD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING OF 28 MAY (LETTER WHITMORE/FALL OF 28 MAY). THE TONE OF THE GENERAL DEBATE SO FAR HAS BEEN ALL TOO PREDICTABLE. THE MAJORITY OF SPEAKERS HAVE MADE TRADITIONAL STATEMENTS WITH THE USUAL TEDIOUS EMPHASIS ON THE IMMINENCE OF NUCLEAR WAR WHILE LARGELY IGNORING THE VICIOUS CONFLICTS THAT ARE RAGING IN SEVERAL PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE ISRAELI INVASION OF SOUTH LEBANON, WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE OPENING OF THE SESSION, HAS SO FAR HAD LITTLE IMPACT ON THEIR RHETORIC. ALTHOUGH OUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE FALKLANDS IS AN INHIBITING FACTOR, SIR A PARSONS AND I HOPE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL REMIND THE ASSEMBLY THAT A REAL WORLD EXISTS OUTSIDE ITS WALLS AND THAT IT IS CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS NOT THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT, WHICH HAS CAUSED MILLIONS OF CASUALTIES, ALMOST ALL OF THEM IN THE THIRD WORLD, SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

5. THE PROGRAMME IN MIFT MAKES NO REFERENCE TO BILATERALS. TO DATE WE HAVE BEEN APPROACHED ONLY BY BANGLADESH. GENERAL ERSHAD WILL BE IN NEW YORK FOR UNSSD II FROM AROUND MID-DAY ON 16 JUNE AND WOULD LIKE A BRIEF MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE TOO WILL BE STAYING AT THE UN PLAZA HOTEL AND I HOPE THE PRIME MINISTER CAN AGREE TO SEE HIM. THE ONLY OTHER BILATERAL WHICH WE WOULD WANT TO SUGGEST AT THIS STAGE WOULD INVOLVE A MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AUDU OF NIGERIA. WE HAVE NOT PUT THIS TO THE NIGERIAN MISSION AS YET BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT AUDU WILL REMAIN IN NEW YORK FOR A FEW DAYS AFTER HE HAS SPOKEN ON 15 JUNE.

6. SEE MIFT

SUMMERHAYES

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FM FCO 071100Z JUN 82
TO PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 OF 7 JUNE 1982
SECOND UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (UNSSD II)

1. UNSSD II WILL TAKE PLACE FROM 7 JUNE TO 9 JULY IN NEW YORK. MANY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ARE EXPECTED TO ATTEND. UP TO 150 BRITISH NGOS WILL BE REPRESENTED, AND MR FRANK JUDD, DIRECTOR OF VSO, HAS AGREED TO ACT AS INDEPENDENT ADVISER TO THE UK DELEGATION IN LIAISON WITH NGOS. REPRESENTATIVES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY JAPAN, ARE EXPECTED IN EVEN GREATER NUMBERS AND THE SESSION IS LIKELY TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY NUMEROUS PROTESTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER PLANS TO ADDRESS THE ASSEMBLY ON 16 JUNE. COPIES OF HER SPEECH WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE IN THE VERBATIM SERIES.

LINE TO TAKE (MAY BE DRAWN ON FREELY)

3. THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO THE PURSUIT OF DISARMAMENT THROUGH THE NEGOTIATION OF SPECIFIC, BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS IN WHICH THE SECURITY OF STATES IS ASSURED AT ALL STAGES.

4. THE MAIN TASK OF THE SESSION WILL BE TO REVIEW PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT SINCE UNSSD I IN 1978. THIS HAS BEEN SLOWER THAN WE SHOULD HAVE WISHED. INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, IN PARTICULAR THE DELIBERATE DISREGARD OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES FOR THE UN CHARTER, HAVE NOT HELPED TO INSPIRE THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE. BUT THERE ARE NOW FIRM SIGNS THAT THINGS ARE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. TALKS HAVE OPENED BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS ABOUT INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) AND WILL SHORTLY OPEN ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS (START). LIKE OTHER NATO COUNTRIES, THE UK SUPPORTS THE AMERICAN AIM OF ACHIEVING MAJOR REDUCTIONS IN BOTH TYPES OF WEAPON. MOREOVER, THE WEST WILL SOON MAKE NEW PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO UNBLOCK THE MBFR TALKS ON CONVENTIONAL

/FORCES

FORCES IN VIENNA. IN THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA CONVENTIONS BANNING CHEMICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE UNDER DISCUSSION AND THERE IS AGREEMENT TO BEGIN LOOKING AT VERIFICATION ASPECTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN.

5. THE FIRST REQUIREMENT IS PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SUCCESS OF WHICH WOULD POINT THE WAY TO THE FUTURE. WE HOPE THAT UNSSD II WILL ENDORSE THIS VIEW. IT IS ILLUSORY TO SUPPOSE THAT THERE IS ANY DRAMATIC SHORT CUT TO GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT. THE WAY LIES THROUGH CAREFUL AND PATIENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH REALISM, UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND VERIFICATION WILL BE THE WATCH WORDS.

6. AS A DELIBERATIVE BODY, WHOSE DECISIONS TAKE THE FORM OF RECOMMENDATIONS RATHER THAN OBLIGATIONS, UNSSD II CANNOT ITSELF NEGOTIATE TREATIES. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO EXPECT TOO MUCH OF IT. WE HOPE THAT THROUGH REALISTIC DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, UNSSD II WILL GIVE AN IMPETUS TO THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE ELSEWHERE, IE INF, MBFR, ETC.

7. WE BELIEVE THAT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MUST PROCEED IN PARALLEL WITH NON-NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SINCE THE SECURITY OF THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES DEPENDS ON THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES IN WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE INSEPARABLY BOUND UP. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE ARE MOVING TOWARDS NUCLEAR WAR: DETERRENCE IS CONTINUING TO WORK. BUT OUR COMMITMENT TO DETERRENCE DOES NOT MEAN ANY SLACKENING OF OUR RESOLVE TO HELP PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO AREAS WHERE THEY ARE NOT YET A FACTOR IN THE SECURITY BALANCE.

8. WE HOPE THAT UNSSD II MAY AGREE A REALISTIC AND FLEXIBLE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT AS A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES. BUT THE VALUE OF UNSSD II SHOULD NOT BE JUDGED BY ITS SUCCESS IN FULFILLING WHAT MAY PROVE TO BE TOO AMBITIOUS OR TOO UNWORKABLE AN ENTERPRISE. PIECES OF PAPER ALONE DO NOT HELP THE CAUSE OF REAL DISARMAMENT. WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT UNREALISTIC COMMITMENTS, EG TO IMMEDIATE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, TO A TIMETABLE FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS OR TO A PROGRAMME WHICH REQUIRES A BINDING COMMITMENT BY STATES.

/9. WE

9. WE SEE NO NECESSITY FOR MAJOR CHANGES TO THE UN DISARMAMENT MACHINERY AND INSTITUTIONS. WE SHOULD WELCOME A STRENGTHENING OF THE CO-ORDINATION ROLE OF THE CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF EFFORT IN THE VARIOUS UN BODIES.

FOR USE WITH TRUSTED CONTACTS

10. WE INTEND TO TAKE A ROBUST LINE AT UNSSD II IN RESISTING NON-ALIGNED PRESSURE FOR BLANKET COMMITMENTS TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT WHICH DO NOT ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLES ABOVE.

11. WE SHALL WORK FOR A REALISTIC OUTCOME. WE BELIEVE THAT THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF UNSSD I RAISED EXPECTATIONS UNJUSTIFIABLY THROUGH ITS RHETORICAL, IDEALISTIC TONE.

12. ON MACHINERY, WE WOULD PREFER THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TO STAY THE SIZE IT IS (40) FOR REASONS OF EFFICIENCY, BUT IF THERE IS WIDESPREAD AGREEMENT ON AN INCREASE WE WILL SUPPORT THE CANDIDATURE OF OUR PARTNERS AND ALLIES IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

13. WE HAVE GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE MERITS OF A UN-SPONSORED WORLD DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN. THERE IS A CASE FOR EDUCATING PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT DISARMAMENT, BUT THE FACT IS THAT INFORMATION ONLY FLOWS FREELY IN DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF PAYING FOR A CAMPAIGN WHICH WOULD IN EFFECT BE DIRECTED AGAINST WESTERN GOVERNMENTS ONLY.

BACKGROUND (FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION)

14. A DECISION WAS TAKEN AT THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DISARMAMENT, HELD IN 1978, TO HOLD A SECOND SPECIAL SESSION IN 1982. THE MAIN ITEMS ON ITS AGENDA ARE A REVIEW OF PROGRESS SINCE UNSSD I, CONSIDERATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT, AND A REVIEW OF UN DISARMAMENT MACHINERY.

15. UNSSD II WILL BE DOMINATED BY THE STRENGTH OF FEELING AMONGST THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES (NNA) OVER THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND NOTABLY ON NUCLEAR QUESTIONS, TO WHICH THEY ATTACH OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE. THE NUCLEAR POWERS, AND PARTICULARLY THE US, WILL COME UNDER HEAVY CRITICISM FOR THE SLOW PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE RISK OF PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST MAY BE A THEME TO WHICH THE ARABS WILL RETURN FOLLOWING

/THE ISRAELI

THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR LAST YEAR.

16. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL TOPICS AT UNSSD II WILL BE THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT (CPD), COMMISSIONED BY UNSSD I, WHICH HAS BEEN UNDER NEGOTIATION IN THE CD. DISCUSSIONS IN THE CD SHOWED A WIDE GULF BETWEEN THE NNA, WHO DEMAND A LEGALLY BINDING PROGRAMME WITH A STRICT TIME FRAME WHICH LAYS EMPHASIS ON ACHIEVING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE EARLY STAGES, AND THE WEST, WHICH IS AIMING FOR A MORE REALISTIC PROGRAMME WITH NO ARTIFICIAL TIME CONSTRAINTS. THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES FAVOUR A VAGUE, DECLARATORY APPROACH. NO REAL PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE CD AND DIFFERENCES WILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED OR CIRCUMVENTED AT UNSSD II ITSELF.

17. IT IS EXPECTED THAT A NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO GIVE IMPETUS TO THE STALEMATED MBFR TALKS WILL BE ANNOUNCED AT THE BONN SUMMIT (9/10 JUNE) AND TABLED IN VIENNA SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

PYM

BY TELEGRAPH

ANKARA	THE HAGUE	UKDIS GENEVA
ATHENS	LISBON	MADRID
BONN	LUXEMBOURG	UKDEL VIENNA
BRUSSELS	OSLO	BIS NEW YORK
UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS	PARIS	WASHINGTON
COPENHAGEN	ROME	OTTAWA
	[PRIORITY]	
UKMIS GENEVA	SOFIA	ISLAMABAD
BELGRADE	WARSAW	PEKING
BUCHAREST	EAST BERLIN	TOKYO
BUDAPEST	MEXICO CITY	CANBERRA
MOSCOW	BRASILIA	WELLINGTON
PRAGUE		NEW DELHI
	[ROUTINE]	

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MR COLES

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Points to get across

1. The Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (7 June - 9 July) will be an important event. It will stimulate action within the UN framework and outside it. We hope that the Session will agree a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament setting flexible and realistic guidelines for the future. We have put forward our ideas on this to the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Senior representatives of NATO and other government will attend the Special Session and lend their authority to its proceedings. The Prime Minister's intention to speak to the Session is a mark of the importance which the Government attach to it.

3. We are working for specific measures of disarmament which will assure our security at lower levels of armament and risk. We can only achieve this through the negotiation of balanced, equitable and verifiable agreements.

4. The search for arms control and disarmament measures is wider than people realise. Resolutions, petitions and speeches are no substitute for patient negotiation of the detailed issues between the governments actually concerned. Several such negotiations are going on or are in prospect. On intermediate range nuclear weapons we support President Reagan's zero option, ie. the elimination of long-range land-based nuclear missiles from Europe. This is much the most radical proposal in the field. Mr Brezhnev is talking of steps which would leave the Russians with a substantial superiority in this field. We are preparing to do away with such missiles altogether. We welcome President Reagan's commitment to achieving substantial reductions in strategic weapons and we look forward to the opening of negotiations between the USA and USSR.

/5.

POINTS ON WHICH THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE PRESSED

Trident and Non-Proliferation

1. There is no provision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 which denies a state the right to maintain and modernise its nuclear deterrent. The obligations in Article VI of the Treaty are met by virtue of the INF talks in Geneva for a reduction in nuclear weapons, and the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva for a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Trident and Arms Control

2. As a strategic deterrent, the Trident force is irrelevant to the INF negotiations in Geneva since these talks are concerned with sub-strategic, land-based forces. Nor will the British nuclear deterrent be considered in the forthcoming START talks, the objective of which must be to bring about reductions to a level of parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. (If pressed)
If circumstances were to change significantly, we would of course be prepared to review our position in regard to arms control. But that point would appear to be a long way off.

Size of Trident Force

3. As with Polaris, the Trident force will be of the minimum size compatible with ensuring effective deterrence. The number of missiles will still represent only a very small proportion of the nuclear arsenals of either the Soviet Union or the United States.

4. Trident D5 will not involve any significant change in the planned total number of warheads associated with our strategic deterrent force in comparison with the original intentions for a force based on the C4 missile system.

/A freeze

A freeze on the deployment of Cruise Missiles in Britain

5. We share the concern for a reduction of nuclear weapons. But the NATO decision of 1979 to modernise with the Cruise and Pershing missiles was taken as a means of bringing the Russians to the negotiating table. In that we have succeeded, we should not now remove the incentive to the Russians to negotiate for the elimination of long-range land-based nuclear weapons in Europe.

Date of NATO Summit (10 June)

6. The determing factor in the choice of date was the need to find a day when the fifteen Heads of State and Government could be gathered in one place (Bonn). There is plenty of time for NATO leaders to attend both the NATO Summit and UNSSD II.

Conflict on purpose between NATO Summit and UNSSD II

7. We see no conflict. NATO is a defensive alliance which has long been active in arms control eg the talks on Mutually Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna.

Coincidence of UNSSD II and British Army Equipment Exhibition (21-25 June)

8. The Government is fully committed to the pursuit of arms control and disarmament through the negotiation of equitable, balanced and verifiable agreements. While such negotiations continue, sovereign states have an unquestionable right to self-defence; we claim this right for ourselves and it would be inconsistent to deny it to others. Industrialised countries like the UK are recognised as traditional sources of supply by those states which are unable to meet their own security needs. There is no inconsistency in the coincidence of the two events.

Addition to Defensive Points

9. Will the Government put forth proposals to the Special Session as their predecessors did in 1978?

We will put ideas to the Special Session for better progress in the negotiation of specific measures . While the Session cannot itself negotiate measures we hope it will act as a spur to the negotiators.

AJLE RDJ

MR RICKETT

The Prime Minister wishes to hold a dinner party on Friday, 11 June to discuss her disarmament speech. Hugh Thomas will be invited and is at present contacting Michael Howard and Hugh Trevor Roper to see if they are available as well. He may also ask Peter Wiles. The other guests will be Douglas Hurd and myself.

Hugh Thomas will tell me this evening what progress he has made. We can then send out invitations.

A.J. COLES

1 June, 1982

NYFO 003/28

Miss Charlotte Stevens UN

GR 600
RESTRICTED
TELELETTER
FROM : MRS V E M HARTLES JAO NEW YORK
FILE REF: ADM 018/2/2 DATED 27 MAY 1982
FOLLOWING FOR MISS M M GOLDSMITH MBE, PCD F.C.O.

UNSSOD: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 19 MAY. IT IS USEFUL TO LOOK AT ALL THE DETAILS.

2. TRAVEL
WE NOW HAVE THE REVISED TIME OF ARRIVAL (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 461 OF 25 MAY). THE SECRET SERVICE SUGGEST THAT IF SUPERINTENDENT CAWTHORNE COULD BE HERE ON THE MORNING OF SUNDAY 13 JUNE IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR THEM TO SHOW HIM THE PLACES THE PRIME MINISTER WILL VISIT. OF COURSE IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE THEY WILL DO THEIR BEST ON 14 JUNE. HE HAS BEEN BOOKED AT THE BEVERLY HOTEL, 50TH ST AND LEXINGTON, TELEPHONE (212) 753 2700 FOR THE NIGHTS OF 13 AND 14 JUNE. THIS IS VERY CLOSE TO THE OFFICE AND THE SECRET SERVICE HEADQUARTERS FOR THE OVERATION.

3. WORKING ACCOMMODATION
THE PRIVATE OFFICE WILL BE SET UP AS USUAL. THERE WILL BE NO DIFFICULTY ABOUT USING OUR OFFICE AT THE UN WHILE THE PRIME MINISTER IS MAKING HER SPEECH. THERE ARE TYPEWRITERS THERE AND EXTENSIONS FROM OUR SWITCHBOARD. THE ROOM IS NOT SECURE.

4. COMMUNICATIONS
A) TELEPHONE NUMBERS
UN PLAZA HOTEL (212) 355 3400
MISSION OFFICE AT THE UN EXTENSIONS 235, 236, 237 OFF THE MISSION SWITCHBOARD (212) 752 8586
SIR ANTHONY PARSONS' RESIDENCE (212) 688 5508
ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF STAFF CAN OF COURSE BE REACHED THROUGH THE MISSION SWITCHBOARD.
B) BOTH ROOMS OF THE PRIVATE OFFICE WILL HAVE THREE TELPHONES FROM THE MISSION SWITCHBOARD, EXTENSIONS 296, 297 AND 298. A PHONE ON EXT 298 WILL BE IN THE BEDROOM OF THE PRIVATE SECRETARY, TO WHICH ALL CALLS WILL BE DIRECTED IN THE SILENT HOURS.

ON EXT 290 WILL BE IN THE BEDROOM OF THE PRIVATE SECRETARY, TO WHOM ALL CALLS WILL BE DIRECTED IN THE SILENT HOURS.

5. SECURITY

WE HAVE A SUITE OF SAFE HAND BOXES (THREE) WHICH SHOULD SUFFICE UNLESS NO 10 PREFER TO SEND THEIR OWN. OUR SECURITY OFFICERS ARE UNDERSTAFFED AT PRESENT AND WE COULD NOT SPARE ONE TO GUARD THE PAPERS OVERNIGHT. THE SAFE HAND BOX RUN WILL CONTINUE UNTIL STOOD DOWN AND IF NECESSARY COULD BE REACTIVATED DURING THE NIGHT. OTHERWISE WE WOULD ANTICIPATE FIRST DELIVERY ABOUT 7 AM.

6. SUBSISTENCE

WE SHALL OPERATE CONFERENCE TERMS. THIS MEANS THAT WE WILL PAY FOR THE COST OF SUITES/ROOMS AND FOR OFFICIAL ENTERTAINMENT INCURRED IN THEM. INDIVIDUALS WILL BE EXPECTED TO SETTLE ANY INCIDENTAL CHARGES THEY INCUR. WE WOULD EXPECT ALL OFFICIAL TELEPHONE CALLS TO BE MADE THROUGH OUR SWITCHBOARD. RESIDUAL ALLOWANCES ARE:
A1 (PRIME MINISTER) US DOLLARS 62.38
CLASS A US DOLLARS 54.25
CLASS B US DOLLARS 46.12 BUT IT APPEARS FROM YOUR LETTER THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE PARTY EXCEPT THE PRIME MINISTER ARE TO RECEIVE ''A''. IS THIS CORRECT?

7. HAIR APPOINTMENT

WE SHALL MAKE THIS APPOINTMENT AS REQUESTED.

8. NEWSPAPERS

IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO BUY BRITISH NEWSPAPERS ON THE DAY OF ISSUE IN NEW YORK. NOR IS IT POSSIBLE FOR THE COI TO GET THEM TO US BY THEIR NORMAL METHODS. THE ONLY WAY I CAN SUGGEST IS BY HAND OF PILOT OF CONCORDE BA 193. THEY SHOULD BE COVERED AS AN OFFICIAL BAG TO AVOID CUSTOMS DELAYS AND WE WILL ARRANGE TO HAVE THEM COLLECTED. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF THIS IS BEING DONE.

9. TRANSPORT

I WILL SEND YOU THE DETAILS OF CARS NEARER THE TIME. THERE IS A REINFORCED CAR AVAILABLE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER: THE SECRET SERVICE WILL INSIST ON ONE OF THEIR AGENTS RIDING IN IT. IF MEMBERS OF THE PRESS ARRIVE ON THE VC10 WE WOULD NEED TO HIRE A BUS OR LIMOUSINE DEPENDING ON NUMBERS. BOTH COST ABOUT US DOLLARS 30 AN HOUR. WE SHALL HOPE TO AVOID ANY OTHER HIRING.

PM DUTY FREE LIQUOR

10. WE COULD ADD CIGARETTES TO THE TAKE-HOME ORDERS IF REQUIRED.

SIGNED V E M HARTLES

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 May 1982

J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear John.

PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT SECOND UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (UNSSD II)

I attached in my letter of 4 May a suggested outline for the Prime Minister's speech at the second Special Session on Disarmament. It has not proved possible in the meantime to arrange a meeting for the Prime Minister to discuss the outline with Ministers. I am nevertheless forwarding a draft so that the Prime Minister may have it, as requested, before the Whitsun holiday. Mr Hurd has seen the draft. He thinks it covers broadly the right ground, but will need to be turned into Prime Ministerial language.

2. The Falklands crisis has obliged us to place square brackets around paragraph 4 of the draft which refers to the obligations of members of the United Nations to settle disputes by peaceful means.

Yours ever,

S M J Lamport
Private Secretary to Mr Hurd

DRAFT PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT SECOND SPECIAL SESSION

[COURTESY REMARKS ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT]

1. Leaders of countries in every corner of the globe come to this Special Session, as I from Britain, in search of surer ways of preserving peace. Ways that match the reality of the world in which we live. Ways that will keep pace with the rate of change which we are witnessing. We carry into this Chamber the aspirations of men and women, wherever they may be, that governments will respond to the challenge they face today, that they will foster and defend conditions in which our peoples may live in peace and justice and follow the way of life of their choice. In taking up this challenge I begin with a tribute - to the values and wisdom of those who decided, in 1945, that the principles under which governments should conduct their relations with one another be written into the Charter of this Organisations.

2. Too many countries, of varying power and in different areas, are bent on imposing change on others by resorting to force. They acquire arms to prepare for such a possibility. Their neighbours or opponents then acquire arms to match the potential aggressor's. And so the accumulation mounts within regions and world wide. Tension, in other words, breeds arms, and arms in turn feed tension. We must find a way of breaking this vicious circle and curbing the resources spent on arms.

3. One part of this Herculean task is to try to deal with the very sources of tension - the disputes and rivalries between states. That is a broad subject. It requires efforts to make progress on

/the

the various regional problems that create tension. Britain attaches the highest priority to this task. It is one in which we have played our part and to which we will continue to dedicate our energies. We are active with four other countries in efforts to bring Namibia to independence in peace. That would help to reduce tension in Southern Africa, as the independence of Zimbabwe did in 1980. Britain has been co-operating with the other members of the European Community in helping to find ways of making progress and easing tension in the Middle East. We have also made proposals for a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan.

[4. If tension is to be reduced, there must also be strict adherence to international law. Britain stands today at the centre of a serious conflict arising from action taken by another State in defiance of its obligations under the Charter to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force. That State's action also demonstrated its determination to set aside the Charter principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and it has persisted in its illegal military action in defiance of its obligations under the Charter to carry out the decisions of the Security Council. Faced with such total contempt for the purposes and principles of this Organisation, we have had to take recourse to the right of self-defence which the Charter recognises as inherent.]

5. None of us should underestimate the importance of this Second Special Session. It brings under examination matters of vital concern to all of us. It will probe into the reasons why earlier

/hopes

hopes of more rapid progress have been disappointed. It will search for new and practical steps to lower the risk of war, to reduce arsenals and to restrain the development of new weapons. It is essential that our examination of the problems should be thorough and that we should find practical means of resolving urgent problems.

6. The British Government has given its commitment to the aims set out in the Final Document of the First Special Session. It has shown its practical support for these aims by playing a constructive part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. It has continued the active role played by Britain in all the discussion and negotiations on multilateral disarmament questions that have taken place under United Nations and other auspices both before and since the Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. My Government is disappointed that the negotiations in the UN-inspired bodies have not achieved the positive results that were looked for, with so much hope, four years ago.

7. Perhaps this is because we have lost sight of the real objective. Throughout the Final Document of the First Special Session there are repeated references to the essential principles of disarmament. I should like to offer a simple definition of disarmament. It is this: the balanced and verifiable reduction of armaments in a manner which enhances peace and security.

8. There can be no argument about the need to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. Some believe that nuclear conflict is imminent. I do not share that view. I find in the experience of more than three decades convincing proof of stability - a stability born of

/the

the recognition that there would be no victor in a nuclear exchange. [The report of the Palme Commission to this Session, reflecting the opinion of leading statesmen from all regions of the world, and the 1981-82 survey by the independent International Institute for Strategic Studies support the contention that our efforts to keep the peace in Europe have been and will continue to be effective.] Deterrence has played a vital role in this.

9. But we cannot afford to be complacent. Without adequate controls the endless accumulation of weapons will jeopardise security. Equally, measures of arms control and disarmament can only achieve lasting results and help the cause of peace if they enhance security. Realisable prospects of achieving substantial reductions of nuclear weapons are now offered by the direct path of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two countries which have the largest nuclear arsenals. These negotiations, of concern to the world at large, are of vital interest to Europe, where the concentration of nuclear weapons is greatest. We fully support the radical proposals which have been made by the United States for the elimination of intermediate-range weapons and for substantial reductions in the strategic field. These go to the heart of the matter, as moratoria, freezes and declarations do not.

10. We share the widespread international concern about the dangers of chemical warfare. Our concerns are heightened by reports that these hideous weapons may recently have been used in defiance of accepted legal and moral standards. As part of a determined effort to eliminate chemical warfare once and for all, we have given a new impetus in the Committee on Disarmament to the search

/for

for a properly verifiable convention banning the development and possession of chemical weapons. This is a matter to which my Government attaches great importance.

11. Negotiations on nuclear and chemical weapons have to be complemented by further multilateral efforts directed at the central question of conventional arms and forces. There is a heavy concentration of conventional forces in Europe and we shall continue to explore in the Vienna talks for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions every possible avenue for reductions which sustain - indeed improve - the security of all. The Western participants in these talks have recently made an important new proposal designed to facilitate agreement. Britain also favours a conference which will reach agreement on new mandatory confidence and security building measures which will increase trust about the military intentions of either side and thereby reduce the risk of conflict in Europe.

12. All will recognise the need for resolution in face of the threats to security and peace that confront us now and which will do so in the future. In the case of the British Government we will draw strength from our experience in the pursuit of peace which stretches back over many years. In the span of the 37 years which have elapsed since the end of the Second World War, successive British Governments have played a constructive and central role in the achievement of specific measures. These are measures which we value today for the constraints they place on the use of force. Quick to run down our forces at the end of World War II, we proceeded to abolish compulsory military service. We were protagonists of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of

/1968.

1968. We then destroyed our stocks of chemical weapons and were proud to take the initiatives which led to the conclusion of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972 and the Inhumane Weapons Convention in 1980. Let there be no doubt about our intention to continue in this creative role.

13. We cannot regard it as legitimate that the ideas of one people should be imposed on another by force of arms, at the cost of the latter's sovereignty and in defiance of agreements governing the respect for human rights. Nor, for all that we are told to the contrary, can we regard the apparently endless build-up of forces, both conventional and nuclear, by the Soviet Union, as anything but an indication of a wish to extend its influence and control. The Soviet leaders have repeatedly declared their wish for peace, for restraints to be placed on the development of weapons. I share those objectives and appeal to them to consider further how they might best be attained. Declarations are not enough. They have to be matched by deeds.

14. With regard to our strategic deterrent I wish to emphasise that the force stands at the minimum credible level. If circumstances were to change significantly - if, for example, Soviet military capabilities were to be reduced substantially - we would of course be prepared to review our position in relation to arms control, for the goal we all share is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the world. But we should be honest and realistic enough to recognise that this is still a long way off. In the meantime our nuclear weapons pose no threat to any country unless it commits aggression against us. Their sole purpose is the prevention of war.

/15. Britain

15. Britain supports the regime established by the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 as a valuable instrument for limiting the possibilities of nuclear conflict. I reaffirm the formal assurance given to Non Nuclear Weapon States at the First Special Session about the use and threat of use of our nuclear weapons.

16. The fact of the matter is that the majority of states are not threatened by nuclear weapons. 'Security is assured in the first instance by conventional forces. It is outside Europe that the problems of keeping the peace have arisen in the sharpest form. The problems are manifest in regional conflicts and in ever increasing expenditure on defence. We cannot ignore the fact that 140 conflicts with conventional weapons have taken place since 1945. These have cost at least 10 million lives. I am glad that the Secretary-General is appointing a group of experts to examine the question of conventional disarmament. We hope that careful thought will be given to measures which could increase confidence between groups of states and reduce the demand for weapons.

17. Greater confidence between nations is essential: to achieve this we need openness in the publication of military expenditure. It has long been our practice in the UK to publish this information. I am happy to announce that the British Government will participate in the Secretary-General's scheme for the reporting of military expenditures by supplying information in matrix form for inclusion in the United Nations' work for the Reduction of Military Budgets.

18. I express our support for the studies that have been undertaken at the United Nations about the relationship between disarmament and

/development.

development. We would all like to spend less on defence, while maintaining security. But it is really too simple to suggest that a pound saved on armaments will always be a pound added to the aid programme. Outside the OECD, there are too many industrialised countries which order their priorities differently. They spend a lot on arms and only a little in aid. On their own admission they will never become major aid donors. By contrast, Britain's aid programme is the fifth largest among OECD members. Our assistance is concentrated on the poorest countries. The total flows of finance from the United Kingdom to developing countries are amongst the highest in the world.

19. I have stressed the priority we attach to specific measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament, the need for greater openness and confidence. Current negotiations are engaged which could carry us further towards these goals. The first requirement then is to press for progress in those negotiations. They fall within a wider scheme of action, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. We believe that any such programme should be practical and flexible, reflecting the problems of today, capable of adjusting to those of tomorrow. Legal language, time-frames, and attempts to pre-determine the path of negotiation are inappropriate. We should shape our ambitions to match reality.

20. Only thus will the legitimate concern of our people be satisfied. Public opinion is not however a universal instrument. It cannot flourish in states where there is no parliamentary opposition, no free press, no independent non-governmental organisations. If

/public

public opinion is to be effective, it must be able to apply pressure on governments to negotiate. I pay tribute to the constructive role played in Britain by the many non-governmental organisations active in the disarmament field and welcome their participation in this Session. They continue an honourable tradition. The UK was actually the first country to have an independent World Disarmament Campaign. When the United Nations Centre for Disarmament formulates its own proposals, we shall look particularly for ideas which may ensure a freer flow of information about the issues in debate to those parts of the world at present denied that information.

21. Mr President, measures of arms control and disarmament, if they are to be successful, must improve the prospects of peace and security for all. These are no less than the fundamental aims of the United Nations. The need for disarmament has never been stronger. The opportunities have never been greater. It is up to us to grasp those opportunities. We must turn the proposals now under negotiation into firm and binding disarmament agreements. The United Kingdom gives highest priority to the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces, substantial reductions in the strategic arms of the major nuclear powers, conventional force reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, confidence building measures in the European continent, and a complete ban on chemical weapons. The British Government and our Delegation at this Special Session will spare no effort to achieve agreement on a plan for a safer world in which our children can grow up in peace.

GRS 45

RESTRICTED
FM FCO 251400Z MAY 1982
TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 461 OF 25 MAY.

FROM CONFERENCE SECTION
UNSSOD: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT. OUR TEL NO 404 REFERS.

1. ARRIVAL TIME ON 15 JUNE IS NOW 2040 HOURS LOCAL TIME. DEPARTURE TIME ON 16 JUNE REMAINS UNCHANGED.

PYM

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DIST

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PCD	NAD
ACDD	MR GILLMORE

10 DOWNING STREET

25 May 1982

UNSSOD: DUTY FREE LIST

We spoke. I have included Ian Kydd's and Rosemary Meadowcroft's requirements in case they come.

PM	Whisky	Cigarettes
Mr. Whitmore	"	"
Mr. Ingham	"	"
Mr. Kydd	"	"
Miss Brown	"	"
Mrs. Meadowcroft	"	"
Miss Stevens	"	"
Supt. Cawthorne	"	"
Sgt. Strevens	Gin	"

Charlotte Stevens

Miss Mignon Goldsmith,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

John - I have told Mignon this is fine. Charlotte 25/5

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233 5414

A J Coles Esq
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date
24 May 1982

Dear John,

UNSSOD: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK

Travel

1. Further to my letter of 2 April, and your acceptance of an RAF VC10 to transport the Prime Minister and party to the above meeting, the RAF have now informed me that due to prevailing winds the outward leg will take seven hours 40 minutes as opposed to the eight hours quoted. The revised timings are therefore as follows:

15 June

ETD LHR 1800 local time
ETA New York 2040 local time

Flying time seven hours 40 minutes.

16 June

ETD New York 1940 local time

17 June

ETA LHR 0730 local time

Flying time 6 hours 50 minutes.

New York = GMT - 4 UK = GMT + 1 (=BST)

Unless I hear from you to the contrary, I will authorise the RAF to go ahead on the above timings.

Yours sincerely,

M M Goldsmith (Miss)
Conference and Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department

cc: Miss Boots, ACDD
Wing Commander Ball, RAF

RESTRICTED

PA UN Second Session file

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-

Mrs V E M Hartles MBE
JAO NEW YORK

Your reference

Our reference
TXW 408/304/1
Date
19 May 1982

Dear Valerie,

UNSSOD: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

1. Although I am sure you have the administrative arrangements for the above visit well in hand, I thought a round up letter covering the various requirements might be useful.

2. TRAVEL

As you know the party will travel on an RAF VC10, timings as given in my telegram number 404 of 13 May. Superintendent Cawthorne will make his own way to his hotel on Sunday 13 June and will present himself at the Mission early on 14 June ready to fulfill his engagements. All members of the party will return on the VC10.

3. LIVING ACCOMMODATION

You will have seen my telegram confirming No 10's agreement to the UN Plaza .

4. WORKING ACCOMMODATION: Private Office

One room of the Duplex suite referred to in your teleletter should be furnished with two desks for the Private Secretaries plus some additional chairs.The second room should be furnished with two desks for the Duty Clerk and Personal Assistant (three desks if there are two PAs). Electric typewriter, with manual back up, photocopying machine and the usual stationery requirements.

The Duty Clerk and or Personal Assistants may wish to be installed in our office at the UN during the time the Prime Minister is making her speech. I should be grateful for your confirmation that this would present no difficulties.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

(a) Telegrams

A 24 hour watch will need to be maintained during the Prime Minister's visit. The COI summary will be transmitted during the early hours of 16 June by the FCO Signals Office. This should of course be delivered to the Private Secretary, Press Secretary and Private Office with the first safehand run.

(b) Telephones

The UKMIS switchboard will need to be manned on a 24 hour basis during the visit. Your telegram states that the telephone lines at the UN Plaza may be hooked up to the UKMIS switchboard. The minimum requirement would be for telephones in the Private Offices to be extensions from the UKMIS switchboard; in addition it should be possible for the telephone in the Private Office to be switched through to the bedroom of the Private Secretary at night. I should be grateful for your confirmation that this will be done.

Please telegraph, when known, a list of useful telephone numbers, ie UN Plaza, our office at the UN etc.

6. SECURITY

Regular safehand runs between the Mission and the Private Office will be needed throughout the visit. Do you need a suite of safehand boxes? If so, they could be sent out on the VC10. Can you spare a Security Officer to guard the papers in the Private Office over night? If not all papers will need to be transferred to the Chancery at night and returned to the Private Office early the following morning.

7. FINANCE

(a) Subsistence

All members of the party will be on Conference Terms. Can you confirm that the suites/rooms will be paid for direct by the Mission, and that individuals concerned will receive a residual allowance, ie:-

Class A 1 (Prime Minister) $49, and all other members of the party, excluding detectives Class A 11 $42.60, to cover all meals including breakfast.

The detectives will provide their own subsistence.

(b) No 10 and common service costs will be borne by the Management and Personnel Office (now that the CSD has been dismantled). The exceptions to this will be the expenses of the air crew (MOD) and the detectives (Metropolitan Police).

8. HAIR APPOINTMENT

I should be grateful if you would arrange a hair appointment for the Prime Minister in her suite on the morning of 16 June at approximately 7.30 or 8.00 am (time to be confirmed). This will be a Carmen Roller session, duration 45 minutes. Please confirm that it will be possible for the hairdresser to provide Carmen Rollers as the Prime Minister does not wish to take her own.

9. NEWSPAPERS

Three sets of newspapers covering the editions of 16 June should be purchased locally. If these will not be available before the Prime Minister's departure, please let me know and I will make arrangements for them to be sent out from here.

10. TRANSPORT

Please send me, when known, by telegram, the car allocation from the airport on arrival. If the Mission are unable to supply all the cars needed for the visit, you have authority to hire, in which case I should be grateful if you would let me know the charges involved. In arranging the car allocation during the course of the visit, please ensure that the Press Secretary is allocated a car for his exclusive use. Is a reinforced car available for the Prime Minister? A van will be needed at the airport to transport boxes, luggage etc.

If members of the press travel on the VC10 (not yet decided) the charge we make for their air ticket includes transport to and from the airport, but their transport charges during the course of the visit are their own responsibility.

11. DUTY FREE LIQUOR

Three bottles each of Scotch and Gin should be placed in the Press Suite for official entertainment. Mixes can be ordered from the hotel, the bill to be sent direct to the Mission.

Please also place one bottle each of Gin and Scotch (not Bourbon) in the Prime Minister's suite, plus mixes. Can you also ensure that there is a supply of Perrier water (or similar) available in the suite.

Members of the party would be grateful if they could purchase some duty free liquor to take home. In order to facilitate this chore the Duty Clerk from No 10 will let me know in advance what everyone would like. (I have restricted the list to Scotch and Gin).

Yours Sincerely,

Margaret.

M M Goldsmith (Miss)
Conference and Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department

cc: Mrs Boots, ACDD
Miss Charlotte Stevens, No 10 Downing Street.

CS 19

Note for file.

45 mins for
Carmen Rollers
arranged for
16.6.82

PRIME MINISTER

UN Second Special Session on Disarmament:
Your Speech

We had arranged a meeting with Douglas Hurd and Peter Blaker tomorrow evening to discuss the attached outline. You will clearly not wish to hold this meeting when your mind will be on your speech for the debate on Thursday.

However, we must if we can stick to the agreed plan to give you a full draft text before the Whitsun Recess - you will have no time afterwards given the crowded calendar of the first half of June.

The attached paper sets out the objectives for your speech and, on a separate page, provides an outline. If you are content with these, the FCO and MOD will work up the outline into a full speech.

Agree?

18 May 1982

LN

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-

Miss Charlotte Stevens
Duty Clerk
No 10 Downing Street
SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date

13 May 1982

Dear Charlotte, UNSSOD:

As promised I attach herewith a copy of the teleletter from New York giving details of the suggested accommodation for the Prime Minister and party. I should be grateful to know if the arrangements outlined are acceptable to the Prime Minister. For ease of reference I also attach a copy of my original teleletter of 29 April.

Yours sincerely,

M M Goldsmith (Miss)
Conference and Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department

14/5 Told MG that CAW
and he need to RM.
Otherwise arrangements OK.

V

WKF0016/11

300

RESTRICTED
TELELETTER
FROM MRS V E M HARTLES, NEW YORK
FILE REFERENCE ADM 018/2/2 DATED 6 MAY 1982
FOLLOWING FOR MISS M M GOLDSMITH, PCD, F C O.

UNSSOD: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 29 APRIL. WE SHALL AWAIT CONFIRMATION OF TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS.

2. AS THE VISIT WILL BE UN ORIENTATED I RECOMMEND THE UN PLAZA HOTEL WHICH IS USED BY SECRETARIES OF STATE WHEN HERE FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. ITS SITUATION IS CONVENIENT AND IT HAS THE FACILITIES WE REQUIRE, FOR INSTANCE TELEPHONE LINES ARE IN PLACE WHICH CAN EASILY BE HOOKED UP TO OUR SWITCHBOARD. IN ANTICIPATION WE HAVE FOR SOME TIME BEEN HOLDING A PROVISIONAL BOOKING AS FOLLOWS:

Hotline?

CAW TWO BEDROOM DUPLEX SUITE - FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND DETECTIVE BUT SEE PARA 3 BELOW.

ADJOINING ONE BEDROOM DUPLEX SUITE - PRIVATE OFFICE

A ONE BEDROOM SUITE ON ANOTHER FLOOR - FOR THE PRESS SECRETARY

NINE SINGLE ROOMS

3. THE SUITE HELD FOR THE PRIME MINISTER IS THE ONE USUALLY OCCUPIED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE. THE SECOND BEDROOM HAS ITS OWN BATHROOM AND SEPARATE ENTRANCE AND IS NORMALLY OCCUPIED BY A DETECTIVE. WOULD THIS ARRANGEMENT BE SUITABLE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER?

4. NATURALLY IF MORE THAN NINE SINGLE ROOMS ARE LIKELY TO BE REQUIRED, WE WOULD NEED TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

SIGNED V E M HARTLES

NNNN

TELELETTER TO NEW YORK
GRS 165
RESTRICTED

TELELETTER
FROM MISS M M GOLDSMITH, PCD, FCO
FILE NO TXW 408/304/1 DATED 29 APRIL 1982
FOLLOWING FOR MRS V E M HARTLES, MBE, JAO, NEW YORK
UNSSOD: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

1. I AM AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS FROM NO 10 REGARDING THE PRIME MINISTER'S TRAVEL REQUIREMENTS BUT HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT SHE SHOULD TRAVEL ON RAF VC10. A DEPARTURE FROM LONDON AT 1800 HRS LOCAL TIME (AFTER QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE) WOULD GIVE AN ARRIVAL TIME IN NEW YORK ON 15 JUNE OF 2100 HRS. THE DEPARTURE TIME ON 16 JUNE WOULD OF COURSE DEPEND ON HER PROGRAMME BUT THE SUGGESTED DEPARTURE IS 1940 HRS LOCAL TIME GIVING AN ARRIVAL AT LONDON HEATHROW OF 0730 HOURS ON 17 JUNE.

2. THE PARTY IS EXPECTED TO BE RELATIVELY SMALL I.E. 8/10 PEOPLE FROM NO 10, AND ONE OR TWO OFFICIALS FROM THE FCO. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING ACCOMMODATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND PARTY. A PRIVATE OFFICE WILL HAVE TO BE INSTALLED WHEREVER THE PRIME MINISTER IS STAYING. THE PRESS SECRETARY WILL NEED A SUITE.

PYM

R M

U.N.

13 April, 1982

UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

Thank you for your letter of 6 April. The Prime Minister is content that Mr Frank Judd should be invited to join the United Kingdom Delegation as an 'independent adviser in liaison with British non-governmental organisations'.

I am copying this letter to Peter Graine (Ministry of Defence).

F N Richards, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CC BI

Prime Minister (4)

Content that Mr. Judd should do this? MR 7/4.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 April 1982

Dear John,

UN Special Session on Disarmament

The Prime Minister may wish to know that we are proposing to ask Frank Judd, the Director of Voluntary Service Overseas, to join the UK Delegation to the UN Special Session as an 'independent adviser in liaison with British non-governmental organisations'. An announcement would be made in Parliament as soon as Mr Judd had formally accepted the invitation.

We have been under some pressure from various NGOs to attach one of their representatives to the UK Delegation, on the precedent of Lord Noel-Baker's attendance at the first Special Session in 1978. The names suggested by the NGOs were of people who would be completely opposed to Government policy and who had no knowledge of international negotiations. We obviously wished to find someone of sensible ideas who would be acceptable to the NGOs. Mr Pym agrees that Mr Judd would be the best man for the job. His experience as a Minister in MOD, ODA and FCO would be particularly valuable. I should be grateful if you could confirm that the Prime Minister would not object to our offering this post to Mr Judd.

I am copying this letter to Peter Graine in Mr Blaker's office in the Ministry of Defence.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

United Nations

Caroline

Thank you.

MR. COLES

UN Second Special Session on Disarmament

I spoke to Douglas Hurd's office and the first meeting for the above speech is at 1030 on Tuesday 4 May. Mr. Hurd then goes on honeymoon. The next meeting is on Wednesday 19 May at 1800. Mr. Blaker has been invited to both meetings.

C.S.

2 April 1982

John
Kendall
- noted : doing to the timetable at
Caroline
cl.
x O.K. from your point of view :
A.J.C. 15/4

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-233 5414

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
SW1

Your reference

Our reference
TXW 408/304/1
Date
2 April 1982

Dear John,

UN SECOND SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

1. At your request, I have made enquiries regarding the cost of chartering Concorde for the Prime Minister's use on the above visit. Mr Kendall, the Concorde Marketing Manager, explained that it would be necessary to take a Concorde out of commercial service and the total cost for the flight both ways would be £106,000. This covers one hundred seats and does not allow for any re-fit to suit the Prime Minister's needs.

2. The timing of the outward flight to New York by Concorde would be beneficial in that a departure time at 1800 hours would give an arrival time in New York of 1700 hours. The Concorde does not normally make a return flight New York/London Heathrow in the evening; if the Prime Minister were to depart on the morning of 17 June at 0830 hours, the arrival time at London Heathrow would be 1715 hours.

3. The cost of travel by RAF VC10 would total £40,000; this includes a fit of the aircraft to the Prime Minister's needs.

4. Suggested timings would be as follows:-

15 June - ETD London Heathrow 1800 hours
ETA New York 2100 hours.

Flying time 8 hours.

K.

16 June - ETD New York 1940 hours

17 June - ETA London Heathrow 0730 hours

Flying time 6 hours 50 minutes.

/5.

5. I recommend that the RAF VC10 would be more convenient both from the point of view of the Prime Minister's comfort and the cost involved. I should be grateful for your instructions.

6. I must apologise for the delay in giving you this information.

Yours Sincerely,

Margaret Goldsmith

M M Goldsmith (Miss)
Conference and Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 March 1982

Dear Francis,

UN Second Special Session on Disarmament

Thank you for your letter of 25 March. The Prime Minister agrees to speak in New York on Wednesday 16 June and therefore to leave London after Questions on Tuesday 15 June.

Mrs Thatcher has also confirmed that she would like her speech to the Special Session to be prepared well in advance. With that in mind, she would be grateful if an outline could be produced which would serve as a basis for discussion early in May. We shall arrange a meeting in due course. The Prime Minister would be grateful if Mr. Hurd and Mr. Blaker, plus one or two officials, could attend. The objective thereafter will be to produce a draft in final form for the Prime Minister to consider during the Whitsun recess.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Lamport in Mr. Hurd's Office and Peter Craine in Mr. Blaker's Office.

A. J. COLES

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

UN Second Special Session on Disarmament

As you requested, I have investigated alternative times for your speech in New York.

You will see from the FCO letter attached that Sir A. Parsons recommends that you leave London after Questions on 15 June in order to be able to speak in New York on Wednesday, 16 June.

You were concerned at the limited time available for the preparation of your speech, given the very busy first part of June which included Versailles, President Reagan's visit and the NATO Summit.

This new proposal would give you a little more time after your return from Bonn on 10 June. But I think we should aim to get your speech in as near to possible final form well before that. If you agree, I should like to arrange for Mr. Hurd and Mr. Blaker plus one or two officials to discuss an outline for the speech fairly early in May with a view to getting a full draft to you before the Whitsun recess.

We need to make a firm reservation of your place in the list of speakers at New York. May we go firm on Wednesday, 16 June?

Agree that we should proceed with the preparation of your speech as recommended above?

A.J.C.

25 March 1982

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 March 1982

Dear John.

UN Second Special Session on Disarmament

Thank you for your letter of 16 March about the timing of the Prime Minister's speech at the Special Session.

We have consulted UKMis New York who say it would be possible for the Prime Minister to leave London after Questions on 15 June and speak in New York on Wednesday 16 June. She could speak first that afternoon and would be followed by speakers from Nepal, Nicaragua, Mali and Niger. Alternatively, it would be possible for the Prime Minister to address the Assembly on the afternoon of Friday 18 June; she would again speak first, followed by Kenya, Qatar and Libya.

Of the two options, Sir A Parsons recommends the first, as does our Disarmament Delegation in Geneva which will shortly move to New York in preparation for the Special Session. We agree with this advice. There would clearly be disadvantages in the Prime Minister speaking near the end of the week when her audience and the press coverage will be smaller.

We note your remarks about the procedure and timetable for the preparation of the Prime Minister's speech and will set work in hand with these in mind.

Yours ever.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

united nations

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 March 1982

AJC has seen.

Dear John,

Arms Control and Disarmament

/ I attach as requested in your letter of 21 March, notes for the Prime Minister's use under two headings:

(a) The points which the Government might attempt to get across on these matters.

(b) The points on which the Government might be pressed and the response which it should make.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Points to get across

1. The Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (7 June - 9 July) will be an important event. It will stimulate action within the UN framework and outside it. We hope that the Session will agree a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament setting flexible and realistic guidelines for the future. We have put forward our ideas on this to the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Senior representatives of NATO and other government will attend the Special Session and lend their authority to its proceedings. The Prime Minister's intention to speak to the Session is a mark of the importance which the Government attach to it.

3. We are working for specific measures of disarmament which will assure our security at lower levels of armament and risk. We can only achieve this through the negotiation of balanced, equitable and verifiable agreements.

4. The search for arms control and disarmament measures is wider than people realise. Resolutions, petitions and speeches are no substitute for patient negotiation of the detailed issues between the governments actually concerned. Several such negotiations are going on or are in prospect. On intermediate range nuclear weapons we support President Reagan's zero option, ie. the elimination of long-range land-based nuclear missiles from Europe. This is much the most radical proposal in the field. Mr Brezhnev is talking of steps which would leave the Russians with a substantial superiority in this field. We are preparing to do away with such missiles altogether. We welcome President Reagan's commitment to achieving substantial reductions in strategic weapons and we look forward to the opening of negotiations between the USA and USSR.

/5.

POINTS ON WHICH THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE PRESSED

Trident and Non-Proliferation

1. There is no provision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 which denies a state the right to maintain and modernise its nuclear deterrent. The obligations in Article VI of the Treaty are met by virtue of the INF talks in Geneva for a reduction in nuclear weapons, and the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva for a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Trident and Arms Control

2. As a strategic deterrent, the Trident force is irrelevant to the INF negotiations in Geneva since these talks are concerned with sub-strategic, land-based forces. Nor will the British nuclear deterrent be considered in the forthcoming START talks, the objective of which must be to bring about reductions to a level of parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. (If pressed) If circumstances were to change significantly, we would of course be prepared to review our position in regard to arms control. But that point would appear to be a long way off.

Size of Trident Force

3. As with Polaris, the Trident force will be of the minimum size compatible with ensuring effective deterrence. The number of missiles will still represent only a very small proportion of the nuclear arsenals of either the Soviet Union or the United States.

4. Trident D5 will not involve any significant change in the planned total number of warheads associated with our strategic deterrent force in comparison with the original intentions for a force based on the C4 missile system.

/A freeze

A freeze on the deployment of Cruise Missiles in Britain

5. We share the concern for a reduction of nuclear weapons. But the NATO decision of 1979 to modernise with the Cruise and Pershing missiles was taken as a means of bringing the Russians to the negotiating table. In that we have succeeded, We should not now remove the incentive to the Russians to negotiate for the elimination of long-range land-based nuclear weapons in Europe.

Date of NATO Summit (10 June)

6. The determing factor in the choice of date was the need to find a day when the fifteen Heads of State and Government could be gathered in one place (Bonn). There is plenty of time for NATO leaders to attend both the NATO Summit and UNSSD II.

Conflict on purpose between NATO Summit and UNSSD II

7. We see no conflict. NATO is a defensive alliance which has long been active in arms control eg the talks on Mutually Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna.

Coincidence of UNSSD II and British Army Equipment Exhibition (21-25 June)

8. The Government is fully committed to the pursuit of arms control and disarmament through the negotiation of equitable, balanced and verifiable agreements. While such negotiations continue, sovereign states have an unquestionable right to self-defence; we claim this right for ourselves and it would be inconsistent to deny it to others. Industrialised countries like the UK are recognised as traditional sources of supply by those states which are unable to meet their own security needs. There is no inconsistency in the coincidence of the two events.

Addition to Defensive Points

9. Will the Government put forth proposals to the Special Session as their predecessors did in 1978?

We will put ideas to the Special Session for better progress in the negotiation of specific measures . While the Session cannot itself negotiate measures we hope it will act as a spur to the negotiators.

cc Mr. Ingham
Mr. Pattison

PRIME MINISTER

The Disarmament Campaign

You will remember that Mr. Foot pressed you on disarmament questions at Question time last week. I think there will be an increasing need for you to deal with the disarmament arguments, both at Question time and in other public comment. The range of possible questions is wide and it will never be easy to guess precisely which aspect will be emphasised by the Opposition.

I therefore asked the FCO to prepare the attached note which falls into two parts:

(a) Points we should try to get across;

(b) Points on which the Government might be pressed, together with suggested answers.

You may like to retain this as a standard brief for Question time.

A.J. COLES

24 March 1982

United Nations DS

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 March 1982

Dear R. Silkin.

Thank you for your letter of 12 March, about the United Nations General Assembly Second Special Session on Disarmament, to be held in New York in June.

As I said in the House last week, I hope to speak for the United Kingdom at the Plenary stage of the Session.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Rt. Hon. John Silkin, M.P.

HH

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 March 1982

Arms Control and Disarmament

You may have observed that during Prime Minister's Question Time last Thursday the Leader of the Opposition pressed the Prime Minister on the attitude which the Government would be taking towards the UN Special Session on Disarmament. It seems likely that in the coming weeks there will be an increasing need for the Prime Minister to deal, at Question Time and on other public occasions, with this and other disarmament issues. I should be grateful if you could provide by Wednesday, 24 March a succinct statement, couched in language for public use, of:

a) The points which the Government might attempt to get across on these matters.

b) The points on which the Government might be pressed and the response which it should make.

It would be helpful if the whole could be expressed in clear language which can be virtually read out at Parliamentary Question Time.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Francis Richards Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 March 1982

U.N. Second Special Session on Disarmament

Would you please refer to my letter of 3 March.

The Prime Minister has decided to attend the Special Session to deliver the UK speech. She so informed Parliament this afternoon in an oral answer.

We now need to reach early agreement on a date and time for the Prime Minister's speech. You said earlier that a provisional speaking slot had been reserved for the afternoon of Tuesday, 15 June. I should be grateful if possible alternatives could be examined. For example, would it be possible for the Prime Minister to leave London after Questions on 15 June and speak in New York on Wednesday 16 June before returning to London on the night of 16/17 June? Could you also establish whether there would be any possibility of the Prime Minister speaking on Friday, 18 June (though you may think it is not advisable for Mrs Thatcher to address the Assembly at the end of the week). In the light of your views, the Prime Minister would take a final decision on the date of her speech.

It may be helpful if I point out now that the Prime Minister's visit to New York will be preceded by an extremely busy two weeks on the foreign affairs front and that she will therefore have much less time than usual to work on a major speech. I therefore think we should aim to produce a draft for the Prime Minister's consideration before the Whitsun recess. The Prime Minister may wish to have a word about the contents with an FCO Minister before the drafting work is put in hand.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(1).

PRIME MINISTER

c. Mr. Pattison

UN SECOND SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

You asked (see attached minute) what your diary looked like for the period covering the opening of this meeting.

The Disarmament Session runs from 7 June to 9 July.

You will have President Reagan here from 7 - 9 June and will be at the NATO Summit on 10 June.

I don't think we can There will have been no time for speech prep and I would be home somewhat

Lord Carrington's proposal is that you should address the Disarmament Session on the afternoon of 15 June. This is not strictly the "Opening of the Session" but it falls within the period when Heads of Government will be visiting New York and speaking. The Belgian Prime Minister will be delivering the EC statement on 8 June and will be followed later that week by Chancellor Schmidt and the US representative. So Western representation in the first week is good. What we need is good representation in the second week as well.

Mr. Ken Marks, M.P. has a Parliamentary Question for you tomorrow "to ask the Prime Minister if she will seek to address the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in June". If you are now disposed to go, there would be advantage in saying so orally in reply to a Conservative M.P. at Questions tomorrow (Mr. Marks' Question will not be reached).

No response because I should like Questions

May I remind you that you are missing Question Time on Thursday, 10 June because of the NATO Summit. If you did not wish to miss Questions again on Tuesday, 15 June we could see whether we could find another speaking slot early that week.

Agree to announce in reply to an Oral Question tomorrow that you will visit New York to speak to the Disarmament Session?

If a suitable date can be found

Agree that we should look for a speaking slot which will enable you to attend Questions on 15 June but that failing that we should maintain our present provisional arrangement for you

/to speak

to speak on the afternoon of 15 June?

A. J. C.

There is far too much on
Foreign Affairs in my programme.
It just won't work out like. We have got
to cut down

15 March 1982

(1).

PRIME MINISTER

UN second Special Session on Disarmament

I attach a letter from John Silkin, M.P. seeking your assurance that you will be present at New York for the opening of this Session.

I know that when you last looked at the papers you were reluctant to commit yourself. But there is obviously some danger of a campaign building up. You will not want a decision on your part to appear to be a response to Opposition pressure. There may also be advantage in announcing your decision some time before the House of Commons debates Trident.

My own view is that it would be wise to go to New York. Otherwise the Opposition and the disarmers will try to make capital out of your absence throughout the summer. I also now think that it would be advantageous to announce that you are going. If you agree, we could arrange an announcement this week. And after a suitable delay you could then reply to John Silkin.

May I have a look at this thing? From memory it is just not possible to be there for the opening session.

A.S.C.

12 March 1982

THE RT. HON. JOHN E. SILKIN, M.P.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

12 March, 1982

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

Dear Prime Minister,

You were present in the House when during my reply to John Nott's statement on Trident I asked whether you would be attending the opening of the U.N. Second Special Session on Disarmament in New York on 7 June. I received no reply from John Nott so I am writing to you instead.

I know you will be aware of the urgency of this Session and the need for heads of government from the N.A.T.O. powers and the Warsaw Pact to demonstrate that they really do believe in global disarmament. I will be glad to receive your assurance that you will be present at New York for the opening.

Yours sincerely,

John Silkin

12 MAR 1962

JR

UN
ce dépêche
C

3 March 1982

SECOND UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

Your letter of 24 February and Francis Richards' letters of 16 and 19 February refer.

The Prime Minister has taken a preliminary look at these papers and has commented that she is reluctant to commit herself yet to the idea of attending the Special Session.

I shall now submit to the Prime Minister the draft letters enclosed with your letter of 24 February.

JC

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

Am reluctant to commit myself yet not.

f.a. 3/3.

SECOND UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

You will recall that Lord Carrington (see letter at Flag A) has recommended that you should visit New York on or about 15 June to address this meeting. You asked for more precise information about the intentions of the German Chancellor and the French President. We now know that Schmidt will definitely go and speak on 11 June. Mitterrand's position is not clear but the French are saying that he will probably go - we must expect that he will.

May I remind you of the arguments.

Arguments against going

(a) You have a very busy "foreign affairs" programme during June:
4-6 June: Economic Summit
7-9 June: President Reagan
10 June: NATO Summit
28/29 June: European Council

(b) You will certainly miss Questions on Thursday 10 June. It is still possible that if the current programme for President Reagan's visit is changed, you will wish to consider missing Questions on Tuesday 8 June. The new proposal would involve you being abroad on Tuesday 15 June as well (though if you decided to go to New York we might be able to arrange for a different speaking time which would avoid you missing Questions).

(c) Any UK speech at the Disarmament Session is bound to disappoint the disarmament lobby in this country since their expectations of the Session are unrealistic. The speech will have to defend our reliance on the deterrent and on the search for balanced and verifiable disarmament agreements against the UN majority's call for nuclear disarmament as a first priority.

/ Arguments

Arguments for going

(a) Lord Carrington and Douglas Hurd believe that a decision on your part not to go will be exploited by the Opposition, will be criticised hotly and at length by the disarmament lobby in this country and will make the Goverment's current campaign to defuse the disarmament issue less effective.

(b) There is already quite a head of steam building up. You have received a number of letters from the UN Association, the World Disarmament Campaign and Women for World Disarmament urging that you go. The Churches are likely to join in soon.

(c) As stated above, Schmidt will go; Mitterrand is likely to. The Japanese, Belgian and Irish Prime Ministers seem certain to go. It remains to be seen whether Brezhnev will. We do not know what the US will do, though it is possible that Vice-President Bush will go.

If you are reluctant to accept the Foreign Secretary's recommendation, you may think it wise to have a talk with him, and perhaps with the Secretary of State for Defence as well, so that you can go over the arguments. It is possible that you could defer a decision for a while, though there would be advantage in pre-empting the campaign which is building up. You will not want a decision to appear to have been forced upon you by the Opposition and the disarmament lobby.

It would in any case be helpful to have at least a preliminary reaction now so that we can judge how to deal with the various letters.

A. J. C.

26 February 1982

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 February 1982

Dear John,

Letters to the Prime Minister on the NATO Summit and the Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSD II)

Francis Richards wrote to you on 18 February about the intentions of President Mitterrand and Chancellor Schmidt over attendance at the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament. There remain the letters addressed to the Prime Minister by the General Secretary of the World Disarmament Campaign (5 February) and the Director of the United Nations Association (8 February) about the decision to hold the NATO Summit at the same time as the Special Session.

The Prime Minister may prefer to answer the letters in advance of taking a decision on her own attendance at the // Special Session. I enclose drafts which might issue whichever decision she takes.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 February 1982

Dear John,

Second UN Special Session on Disarmament

Thank you for your letter of 18 February asking for further information about the intentions of Chancellor Schmidt and President Mitterrand.

We have today received confirmation from our Embassy in Bonn that Chancellor Schmidt will definitely attend UNSSD II and will speak on 11 June. As you know the French are not so open about these matters but the French Ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva gave our Ambassador a 'firm indication' that President Mitterrand would go to New York. Our Embassy in Paris have today reported that the French are saying that, while a decision has yet to be taken, it is 'probable' that the President will go to the Special Session.

You may recall that the World Disarmament Campaign and the United Nations Association have written to the Prime Minister (copies of letters attached) accusing her of not giving sufficient priority to disarmament. A positive response from the Prime Minister would be helpful in dealing effectively with such criticism.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

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19 FEB 1982



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18 February 1982

Second UN Special Session on Disarmament

Thank you for your letter of 16 February.

Before taking a decision on this matter the Prime Minister would be grateful if more precise information could be obtained about the intentions of Chancellor Schmidt and President Mitterrand. Can you enlarge on your statement that they "seem certain to go"?

A J COLES

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

f.a. AR 22

Second UN Special Session on Disarmament

Please see the attached advice from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

Lord Carrington recommends that you should visit New York to address this session on 15 June. It is a difficult decision. I know that in offering this advice FCO Ministers have had much in mind the fact that the Opposition will try to make capital out of anything they can portray as inadequate UK representation. If other Western leaders attend, and you do not, their task will be much easier. Criticism will come from other quarters as well. We have already received letters arguing that it is wrong to hold the NATO Summit at a time when the Disarmament Session is beginning in New York.

On the other hand, you will wish to have in mind that you are already committed to a very extensive "Foreign Affairs" programme during June:-

4	-	6	June	:	Economic Summit
7	-	9	June	:	President Reagan
		10	June	:	NATO Summit

You will certainly miss Questions on Thursday, 10 June. If our current plans for President Reagan's visit are upset, you may want to consider missing Questions on Tuesday, 8 June. This new proposal would involve you being abroad on Tuesday, 15 June as well.

If you are disposed to go to the Disarmament Session, there is something to be said for taking an early decision to do so. Otherwise any decision might appear to be in response to the criticism which may build up here. On the other hand, if by any chance the German Chancellor and French President decided not to go, you would be less exposed if you also decided to send someone else. Would you like us to try to get more precise information about the intentions of Schmidt and Mitterrand before taking a final decision yourself?

Yes

17 February, 1982

A. J. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 February 1982

Dear John,

Second UN Special Session on Disarmament
(UNSSD II)

The Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (UNSSD II) will be held in New York from 7 June to 9 July this year, four years after the first, where Mr Callaghan spoke.

It is a deliberative body of the whole UN membership and has no negotiating role. It provides a framework in which arms control negotiations, both inside and outside the UN machinery, can be reviewed. The First Special Session adopted by consensus a lengthy Final Document covering all aspects of disarmament. UNSSD II has been tasked to agree a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

There will be widespread interest in this country in the debate at UNSSD II, among bodies interested in disarmament, including churches. A mass lobby of Parliament focussed on the Special Session will take place on April 27. Those concerned are deliberately directing attention to the Special Session, as the similar aid lobby directed attention last year to the Cancun Summit. They will mount quite a head of steam. They have high expectations of what the Session might activate. These hopes are unrealistic. But in the context of the public debate about nuclear weapons and unilateral disarmament we need to be seen to take this multilateral forum seriously. Our statement to UNSSD II is bound to some extent to disappoint the disarmament community in this country, since we will wish to discourage these unrealistic expectations. We will need to defend our reliance on the deterrent and on the patient search for balanced and verifiable disarmament agreements against the majority at the UN of the neutral and non-aligned, who call for nuclear disarmament as a first priority. We plan no major disarmament initiative, but our approach is defensible in any forum.

A number of our friends and allies, some of whom the Prime Minister will be meeting in the previous weeks at the Economic and NATO Summits, plan to be represented at the level of Head of Government or Head of State. Chancellor Schmidt and President Mitterrand seem certain to go, as do the Japanese, Belgian and Irish Prime Ministers. If they go, the Prime Minister's absence

/would

would be much commented on and criticised in this country. By contrast if she went she would have an opportunity to disarm criticism by a robust but reasoned and constructive account of our policies. Here again there is a close parallel with Cancun, though the Special Session will have quite a different flavour.

Given the importance of the issues in the domestic debate and the trend among our partners towards representation at Head of Government level the Secretary of State believes it would be best for the UK to be represented by the Prime Minister. This would also enable her to rebut personally any attempt by the Soviet Union to claim that the NATO Summit the previous week demonstrated that the Alliance was more interested in building up than in controlling arms.

As to timing, the Belgian Presidency will deliver a statement on behalf of the EC on the first day of the general debate (8 June), followed later in the week by Chancellor Schmidt and the US (possibly Vice-President Bush). Because of this good level of Western representation in the first week, and the timing of the NATO Summit (9-10 June) we have provisionally inscribed the UK to speak early in the second week, on the afternoon of 15 June. I understand that while the Prime Minister's diary is full there are moveable items in that week. If she wished to attend, but was unable to do so on that date, we would try to inscribe the UK on another date.

Yours ever.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

16 FEB 1982

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Iraq / Syria Relations

Threat to oil Supplies from the Gulf

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IRAQ

Pt 1 : April '80

Pt 3 : 3 June '82

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
1.3.84 CLOSED.							

PREM 19/1283

HMSO Dd8953031 6/88 C60 GP2265 CCN13412 (3932)

PART 3 ends:-

Algiers Tel 40 29.2.84

PART 4 begins:-

FCO to Algs 1.3.84

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(84) 7th Meeting, item 2	23/02/1984
OD(EM)(84) 2nd Meeting, only item	21/02/1984
CC(84) 6th Meeting, item 3	16/02/1984
OD(EM)(84) 1st Meeting	26/01/1984
OD(EM)(84) 1	25/01/1984
CC(83) 38th Meeting, item 1	22/12/1983
CC(84) 37th Meeting, item 2	15/12/1983
OD(EM) 4	16/12/1983
OD(83) 17	25/11/1983
CC(82) 43rd Meeting, item 2	14/10/1982
CC(82) 40th Meeting, item 2	27/07/1982
CC(82) 39th Meeting, item 2	22/07/1982

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray Date 10/9/2013

PREM Records Team

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SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
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HD/DEFENCE D

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FM ALGIERS 290915Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 40 OF 29 FEBRUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN,
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, STOCKHOLM, PARIS, GULF POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MIPT

ALGERIAN MEDIATION IN IRAN/IRAQ WAR

1. DECISION TO ISSUE THIS PUBLIC APPEAL WHILE FOREIGN MINISTER AND ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL ARE STILL ABSENT IN ADDIS CONFIRMS ALGERIA'S REAL SENSE OF CONCERN AND READINESS TO STEP UP EFFORTS AT RENEWED MEDIATION. DEVICE OF A PUBLIC APPEAL AFFORDS A WAY OF GETTING MESSAGE ACROSS TO IRANIAN AUTHORITIES WITH WHOM ALGERIANS HAVE RECENTLY FOUND COMMUNICATION DIFFICULT, WHILE HELPING KEEP ALGERIA ON SIDE WITH ARAB STATES. YOU WILL NOTE ALGERIANS HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO SET APPEAL IN AN ISLAMIC CONTEXT.

2. YOU MAY WISH ME TO PASS BRIEF WORD OF ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT TO MFA.

3. LOCAL BBC CORRESPONDENT, KIRBY, IS LIKELY TO REPORT THE APPEAL. YOU MAY LIKE TO CHECK WHETHER BBC OVERSEAS HAVE RECEIVED TEXT. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW WHETHER IT IS REPORTED IN THE BBC'S RESPECTIVE VERNACULAR BROADCASTS, PARTICULARLY FARSI.

MUNRO

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UNCLASSIFIED
FM ALGIERS 290835Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 39 OF 29 FEBRUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN,
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON , STOCKHOLM, PARIS, GULF POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 37 AND MY LETTER OF 28 FEBRUARY TO HASKELL MED: IRAN/IRAQ.
1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF APPEAL TO THE BELLIGERENTS ISSUED BY MFA SPOKESMAN YESTERDAY.

BEGINS

ALGERIA IS FOLLOWING WITH CONCERN AND DISMAY THE SERIOUS DEVELOPMENTS TAKING PLACE AT THE MOMENT IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FRATERNAL COUNTRIES OF IRAQ AND IRAN. IN THIS CONFLICT IRREPLACEABLE HUMAN POTENTIALITIES ARE BEING LOST. PRECIOUS MATERIAL RESOURCES AND THROUGH THEM ALL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE HIGH ASPIRATIONS OF THE TWO PEOPLE ARE BEING SEVERELY COMPROMISED.

THE NEW DIMENSIONS WHICH THE CONFLICT IS TAKING ON REPRESENT AN ESCALATION WHICH SERIOUSLY COMPROMISES THE STRUGGLE WHICH UNITES THE MUSLIM WORLD IN A RELATIONSHIP OF SOLIDARITY OF INTERESTS AND ASPIRATIONS.

IT IS THEREFORE TRAGIC THAT A WAR SHOULD CONTINUE IN WHICH ALL OUR FUNDAMENTAL MEANS, POTENTIALITIES AND STRENGTHS ARE USED

~~IT IS THEREFORE TRAGIC THAT A WAR SHOULD CONTINUE IN WHICH~~ ALL OUR FUNDAMENTAL MEANS, POTENTIALITIES, AND STRENGTHS ARE USED AGAINST OURSELVES.

IT IS HIGH TIME THAT THE DESTRUCTION AND BLOODSHED SHOULD BE REPLACED BY A DIALOGUE TO REESTABLISH PEACE AND HARMONY, AND THAT EVERYTHING SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO ACHIEVE A JUST POLITICAL SOLUTION, BOTH IN THE HIGHER INTERESTS OF THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI PEOPLES AND THOSE OF THE ENTIRE MUSLIM COMMUNITY.

IT IS THIS CONSTANT CONCERN, AND THIS ALONE,WHICH DETERMINES THE ATTITUDE AND THE EFFORTS OF ALGERIA.

THAT IS THE REASON WHY ALGERIA APPEALS WITH ALL ITS HEART THAT DIALOGUE IN FAVOUR OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND PEACE SHOULD PREVAIL.

AND THAT IS ALSO WHY ALGERIA CALLS WITH THE SAME ARDOUR FOR THE ESSENTIAL OPENING OF TRUE AND HONEST NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH REMAIN THE ONLY WAY TO A REAL SOLUTION. ENDS.

2. SEE MIFT.

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28th February 1984

NOTE FOR THE RECORD OF A MEETING WITH THE US DEFENCE SECRETARY. MR WEINBERGER, AT 0815 ON TUESDAY 28TH FEBRUARY 1984 AT ADMIRALTY HOUSE

Those present:

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP
Secretary of State for Defence

Field Marshal Sir Edwin Bramall
Chief of the Defence Staff

Mr J N H Blelloch
DUS(P)

Mr Knapp
DG Marketing

Mr R C Mottram
Private Secretary of the
Secretary of State

Mr Weinberger
US Defence Secretary

Ambassador Charles H Price II

Mr Richard Perle

Mr Lauder

Mr Burch

Major General C Powell

Mr Cassidy

2. Mr Weinberger referred to the importance of making contingency plans in advance against a possible closure of the Straits of Hormuz. Should the Iranians close the Straits, he saw the need for very prompt action because, if we delayed, resolving the situation would become that much more difficult. The Americans were in touch with other countries in the region who were as concerned as they were about the implications of the possible export of Shi'ite fundamentalism. They were, however, reluctant to commit themselves about any action in public. The Secretary of State commented that few things were more likely to encourage Shi'ite fundamentalism than a substantial US military presence in the Middle East. Such a reaction would also offer the Soviet Union the best chance to exploit the problem. Mr Weinberger commented that it was not a US presence which would stir up fundamentalist opinion since this was already inflamed.

3. The Secretary of State suggested that the Iranians would close the Straits only if their own capacity to export oil had been cut off. Perhaps in those circumstances we should look at ways in which we might help to get their oil flowing again. Mr Weinberger said that he doubted whether the Iranians would be interested in being placated in this way. They were not seeking a sensible outcome in the war itself: they were essentially demanding that the Iraqis should shoot their President and pay huge reparations. While they had not started the war, they showed no interest in stopping it. He emphasised that he was not advocating an invasion of Iran; but what was required was proper planning so that we could react quickly to events. The Secretary of State said that he accepted the need for this. He was just apprehensive about the response in the area should a significant US force be deployed there. The Americans would provide a focus for criticism. It would be better if the problem could be sorted out by the countries involved.

4. CDS referred to the alternative scenario that the war went against Iraq which then collapsed with a breakthrough of Shi'ite fundamentalism towards Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Mr Weinberger agreed that this was a Jordanian nightmare. Such a development might suit the Soviet Union whose presence in Syria would then take on a different significance. He confirmed that the Americans were trying to step up their military assistance to Jordan with whom their relations had been fitful in the past. They also hoped to do more with Oman and Saudi Arabia. The Secretary of State said that a breakout of fundamentalism in this way would not necessarily suit the Soviet Union which with its large Muslim population had as much to fear from this movement as anyone else. Mr Weinberger said that the Russian Government could deal with this problem so much more easily than those which had to depend upon popular support. The Secretary of State asked whether the Americans would intend to make contact with the Soviet Union prior to any military operation in the Straits to make clear its limited nature and Mr Weinberger confirmed that this would indeed be their intention.

5. Ambassador Price asked the Secretary of State about the British Government's attitude towards the problem. The Secretary of State said that he very much agreed with Mr Weinberger's view that critical Western interests were at stake in this area. If the Straits were to be closed he would want to take a cool look at the best way of re-opening them rather than immediately moving to a military solution. He would have in mind two crucial questions: would military action make things better or worse in the region and, if we intervened, where might we find ourselves in three months time. Our experience over the deployment of the MNF to the Lebanon showed the importance of looking carefully at where events might lead us. He said this as someone who had supported the MNF deployment at the time and still believed the effort in the Lebanon had been worth trying. He would also have it in mind that it was not in the Soviet interest, at least in the short term, to exploit a crisis. DUS(P) pointed out that it was important to be clear on the objective of any Western action.

It would be much easier to justify action designed to keep open international waters than an attempt to reverse the spread of Shi'ite fundamentalism. Mr Weinberger agreed that the latter objective could not in any case be achieved by military action. The Secretary of State reverted to the importance of seeking to persuade Iraq not to take action in the first place which would prompt an Iranian attempt to close the Straits.

6. The meeting ended at 0930 hours.

Ministry of Defence

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FM ALGIERS 271530Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 37 OF 27 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, STOCKHOLM, PARIS, GULF POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 35 OF 24 FEBRUARY

POSSIBLE ALGERIAN MEDIATION IN IRAN/IRAQ WAR

SUMMARY

1. ALGERIANS CLAIM TO BE CONTINUING TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH BOTH SIDES. THEY ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN FRESH MEDIATION IF AN OPPORTUNITY EMERGES. EARLY MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WITH BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN ARE IN VIEW. THEY DOUBT WHETHER IRANIANS IN PRESENT MOOD ARE PREPARED TO SHOW RESTRAINT, AND SEE THIS AS IN PART DUE TO DIVISIONS WITHIN KHOMEINI REGIME. MFA WELCOMED OUR CONTACT ON ISSUE AND OFFER OF SUPPORT.

DETAIL

2. AS MINISTER AND SENIOR MFA OFFICIALS ARE AWAY ATTENDING OAU CONFERENCE IN ADDIS I SPOKE TODAY TO BENKOBI, DIRECTOR (UNDER SECRETARY) ARAB AFFAIRS.

3. HE SAID ALGERIANS FULLY SHARED CONCERN AT LATEST INTENSE FIGHTING AND ITS BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR REGION. DESPITE THE TRAGIC SET-BACK TO THEIR EARLIER MEDIATION EFFORTS WITH THE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT IN 1982 THEY HAD CONTINUED DISCREET EFFORTS WITH BOTH SIDES TO LOOK FOR A SOLUTION. ALGERIA'S SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY IN IRAQ/IRAN RELATIONS STEMMED FROM THEIR SUCCESSFUL ROLE AS SPONSORS OF 1975 ALGIERS TREATY BETWEEN IRAQIS AND THE SHAH. SINCE SADDAM'S ACTION IN ABROGATING THIS BY HIS ATTACK ON IRAN, (A MAJOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL MISCALCULATION), ALGERIA HAD SOUGHT TO RESTORE STABILITY TO THE AREA WHILE CAREFULLY AVOIDING TAKING SIDES. THIS AT FIRST BROUGHT ACCUSATIONS OF PARTIALITY FROM THE IRANSIANS, AND IN THE LATEST ROUND, WITH IRAN OCCUPYING IRAQI TERRITORY, MEANT ALGERIA WAS NOW BEING ACCUSED BY IRAQIS OF FORESAKING ARAB CAUSE. BY 1982 ALGERIA THOUGHT SHE HAD COME CLOSE TO ACHIEVING BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT AS (A) KHOMEINI HAD APPEARED READY TO DROP INSISTENCE ON REMOVAL OF SADDAM SEMI COLON (B) IRAQ HAD AGREED TO INDEMNIFY THE IRANIAN EXPELLEES AND (C) ARABIAN STATES HAD AGREED TO PAY SUBSTANTIAL COMPENSATION TO IRAN ON IRAQ'S BEHALF INVOLVING INITIAL PAYMENT OF US DOLLARS 50,000M. BUT IRANIAN POSITION HAD THEN HARDENED, OWING TO INTERNAL STRAINS WITHIN ITS LEADERSHIP BEING DIVERTED BY THE LATEST CAMPAIGN. HE THOUGHT IMMEDIATE IRANIAN MILITARY AIM WAS TO SEVER BAGHDAD'S ROAD ARTERY TO BASRA AND KUWAIT.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. BENKOBI SAID THAT IN THEIR MOST RECENT CONTACTS WITH IRANIANS THE ALGERIANS HAD FOUND NO READINESS TO LISTEN TO REASON OR CONSIDER MODERATION. NOR WERE SYRIANS ANY HELP SEMI COLON THEY HAD THEIR OWN SCORES TO SETTLE WITH BAGHDAD. ALGERIANS WERE HOPING HOWEVER TO RECEIVE A VISIT DUE IN ABOUT A FORTNIGHT BY IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER. SO FAR THERE WAS NO SIGN OF IRAN CALLING THIS OFF. VISIT FORMED PART OF A REGULAR PATTERN OF CONSULTATIONS BUT OBVIOUSLY HAD PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE NOW. ALGERIAN LABOUR MINISTER, NABI, WAS ALSO DUE TO VISIT IRAQ EARLY NEXT MONTH SEMI COLON THIS WOULD GIVE A CHANCE FOR CONSULTATION ON THAT FRONT. ALGERIANS HOPED THEY COULD EXERT SOME INFLUENCE THROUGH THESE TWO VISITS. THEY WERE ACTIVELY CONSIDERING WHAT ELSE THEY MIGHT DO BUT IMMEDIATE OUTLOOK WAS DIFFICULT. PERHAPS A CLIMATE COULD BE CREATED TO PERMIT UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS OR ISLAMIC MEDIATION TO RESUME.

5. BENKOBI WELCOMED OUR CONTACT AND WAS GRATEFUL FOR EXPRESSION OF OUR SUPPORT FOR ANYTHING THEY COULD DO. HE WOULD LIKE TO KEEP IN TOUCH. ALGERIA RECOGNISED WE HAD CLOSE RELATIONS WITH GULF STATES WHO WERE FEELING UNDERSTANDABLY NERVOUS AT PRESENT. HE ALSO REMARKED TENSION WAS NOT HELPED BY RUMOURS OF EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGION. DRAWING ON MY TELECON WITH HASKELL I ASSURED HIM THERE WAS NO ROYAL NAVAL PRESENCE IN VICINITY OF GULF AREA AT THIS TIME.

6. BENKOBI SAID ALGERIA NEEDED TO AVOID PUBLICITY IN HER MEDIATION EFFORTS, NOT ONLY FOR SAKE OF EXERCISE ITSELF, BUT ALSO BECAUSE SINCE THE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT THERE REMAINED A LATENT RESENTMENT TOWARDS IRAN IN A NUMBER OF CIRCLES HERE WHICH WAS SOMETIMES DIFFICULT TO CONTROL.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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MR EGERTON
MR J THOMAS
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IRAN/IRAQ

file

27 February 1984

IRAN/IRAQ

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend your letter of 23 February, together with the JIC Reports referred to in your second paragraph.

A.J.COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

File

DSG

MR. GOODALL
CABINET OFFICE

ESCALATION OF THE WAR IN THE GULF

The Prime Minister read over the weekend your minute of 24 February and the attached JIC Note on the implications of an Iranian victory in the Gulf War.

27 February 1984

FLE

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 February, 1984

IRAN/IRAQ

In your letter of 24 February you recommended that the Prime Minister should send messages to Mrs. Gandhi and President Zia encouraging them to mediate in the Iran/Iraq conflict.

The Prime Minister has considered this idea but has decided not to send the two messages. She very much doubts whether they would lead either party to mediate effectively and believes that they could create difficulties in our relations with both India and Pakistan.

M.D. COLES

P. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CT.

OO UKMIS NEW YORK
GRS 398
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 241600Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 081 OF 24 FEB 84
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, PARIS, STOCKHOLM, UKMIS GENVA, AMMAN, CAIRO, THE HAGUE, UKDEL NATO, GULF POSTS,
YOUR TELNO 182:IRAN/IRAQ:MEDIATION

1. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERALS PROPOSAL FOR A TWO-PRONGED MISSION SEEMS AGAIN TO HAVE RUN INTO THE SAND, THOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR THIS. WE NEVERTHELESS, HOPE THAT HE AND CORDOVEZ WILL CONTINUE EXPLORING ALL AVAILABLE POSSIBILITIES OF FULFILLING HIS MEDIATORY ROLE. AS SEEN FROM HERE GENUINE PROGRESS ON MEDIATION IS IMPOSSIBLE, EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF ACTIVITY IS BETTER THAN NOTHING, IF ONLY BECAUSE IT MAY HELP TO PUT OFF THE MOMENT WHEN THE IRAQIS COME TO BELIEVE THAT THE HIGH-RISK STRATEGY OF GOADING THE IRANIANS INTO ESCALATING THE CONFLICT AND THUS INVOLVING OTHER STATES, IS THE ONLY ONE LEFT OPEN TO THEM.

2. PLEASE THEREFORE, SPEAK TO CORDOVEZ AGAIN AND FLOAT THE FOLLOWING IDEAS FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONSIDER.

(A) RENEWING PRESSURE ON THE IRAQIS TO ACCEPT A MISSION CHARGED ONLY WITH EXAMINING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, IN THE HOPE THAT THIS MIGHT NEVERTHELESS FACILITATE MORE WIDESPREAD CONTACTS WITH IRAN.

(B) SENDING A REPRESENTATIVE TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN WITH NO STATED PURPOSE OR TERMS OF REFERENCE, BUT MERELY TO CONDUCT INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH THE LEADERSHIP IN BOTH CAPITALS.

(C) SENDING A TWO-PRONGED MISSION TO BAGHDAD ONLY, IN THE HOPE THAT THIS WOULD FORCE THE IRANIANS ALSO TO ACCEPT IT (WE ACCEPT THAT THEY WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO REMAIN INTRANSIGENT, AND RENEW THEIR ACCUSATIONS OF UN BIAS).

(D) ORGANISING A COLLECTIVE PUBLIC APPEAL FOR RESTRAINT BY THE

SECRETARY-GENERALS OR PRESIDENTS OF THE UN, ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, ICRC AND ANY OTHER SUFFICIENTLY PRESTIGIOUS INTERNATIONAL BODY WHICH THE IRANIANS COULD NOT REASONABLY CONDEMN AS BEING PARTI PRIS.

3. YOU KNOW OF THE ICRC APPEAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER, TO WHICH WE HAVE STILL TO REPLY. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, WE ARE TRYING TO WORK FOR A HELPFUL DECLARATION BY THE TEN (EITHER ON IRAN/IRAQ ALONE OR ON THE MIDDDLE EAST AS A WHOLE), WHICH MIGHT ISSUE AFTER THE POLITICAL COMMITTEES MEETING ON 27 FEBRUARY. WE ARE ALSO EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF PERSONAL MESSAGES TO PRESIDENT ZIA AND MRS GANDHI AND AN APPROACH TO THE ALGERIANS, ASKING THEM TO RESUME THEIR MEDIATORY ACTIVITIES.

RECIPIENTS OF THIS TELEGRAM WOULD BE WELCOME.

HOWE

IRAN/IRAQ

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IRAN/IRAQ

OO ALGIERS
GRS 344
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 241230Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE ALGIERS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 035 OF 24 FEB 84
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, STOCKHOLM,
PARIS, GULF POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK
INITIATIVE TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER MEDIATION IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR

1. WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING WAYS TO ENCOURAGE EFFORTS AT MEDIATION IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, NOW THAT ATTEMPTS BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO SEND A MISSION TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN HAVE, FOR THE MOMENT, COME TO NOTHING.

2. AS YOU KNOW, THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT WERE AT ONE TIME ACTIVE IN ATTEMPTING TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT TO THE WAR, FOLLOWING THEIR SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE US EMBASSY HOSTAGES. WE UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WERE IN THE END REBUFFED BY THE IRANIANS WHO CONFIRMED TO A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE UK MISSION TO THE UN IN 1983 THAT THE ALGERIANS NOW REGARDED THEIR MEDIATION EFFORTS AS ENDED.

3. PLEASE DISCUSS THE WAR AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL WITH THE ALGERIANS. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST BE CONCERNED AT THE RECENT UPSURGE IN FIGHTING AND AT THE DANGERS OF ESCALATION. THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS FULLY SUPPORTED EFFORTS MADE BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO MEDIATE IN THE WAR, AND WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT HIS LATEST PROPOSAL TO SEND A MISSION TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN HAS BEEN POSTPONED. WE ARE NEVERTHELESS CONCERNED TO FIND A MEANS OF ENDING A WAR WHICH HAS BROUGHT MUCH SUFFERING AND LOSS OF LIFE. WE KNOW THAT THE ALGERIANS ARE WELL RESPECTED BY BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ, AND THEIR PART IN THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE US HOSTAGES WAS MUCH ADMIRED. THE FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER AND MANY OF HIS TOP STAFF LOST THEIR

LIVES AN A GOOD OFFICES MISSIONS TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN IN 1982.
WOULD THE ALGERIANS BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A FURTHER INITIATIVE, GIVEN THE LATEST SERIOUS OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING? IF THEY FELT ABLE TO MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT, THEY COULD BE ASSURED OF
THE FULLEST SUPPORT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.
WE WOULD EQUALLY UNDERSTAND IF THEY FELT THEY COULD NOT YET DO SO, BUT WOULD HOPE THEY COULD KEEP THE POSSIBILITY IN RESERVE, GIVEN THEIR SKILL AND EXPERIENCE.

HOWE

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD

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IRAN/IRAQ

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

Shia.

Work is being done urgently on the questions & put to the JIC earlier this week.

But you may like to be reminded of the work done earlier by the J.I.C. See the attached paper and especially the passage entitled "Outlook" at flag A.

A.J.C. 24/2

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Prime Minister.

I find the idea of inviting both India and Pakistan to mediate rather strange.

The F.C.O. argue that if we choose one the other will be offended — and that it is anyway unlikely that both will accept. The alternative would be just to invite Pakistan.

Agree to messages?

A.J.C. 24/2.

I don't like this much - I believe it can only cause trouble

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 February 1984

Dear John,

Iran/Iraq

with ASE (CPM)

In my letter of 23 January I undertook to write to you further about diplomatic activity we could encourage in an effort to promote mediation between Iran and Iraq. What follows should be seen as complementary to the review of Gulf contingency planning to be conducted by the Cabinet Office.

The UN Secretary General remains the best hope, but his more recent attempt to send a Mission to Baghdad and Tehran has collapsed because Iran refused to engage in any political discusison. We are instructing UKMis New York to urge the Secretary General to continue his efforts. We have also considered which other countries could be encouraged to mediate.

Japan has recently attempted to negotiate a partial ceasefire involving oil and economic facilities. This has not succeeded and the effort has damaged Japan's standing, probably with both protagonists. We do not think it would be worth urging Japan to make any fresh moves at present. The Algerians followed up their successful management of negotiations for the release of the US hostages by mediation efforts. In the end, they were rebuffed by Iran. We are, however, instructing Mr Munro to seek the Algerian Government's views on the chance of their re-entering the field.

The two countries currently best placed to mediate in the war, if anyone can, are probably India and Pakistan. In 1981, the Non-Aligned Movement formed a committee under the chairmanship of Mrs Gandhi to investigate the possibility of mediation. These efforts achieved little. Mrs Gandhi's mandate was renewed in March 1983 when India took on the Presidency of the NAM: but India, which obtains oil from both Iran and Iraq, has hiterhto tried to avoid becoming embroiled in the dispute. A message from the Prime Minister might, however, remind Mrs Gandhi of her moral obligation to keep on trying.

/Pakistan

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Pakistan is one of Iran's few remaining friends in the international community. Iran is keen to resurrect the Regional Council for Development, made up of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey; Iran/Pakistan trade is now ten teimes the pre-revolutionary level. Pakistan was a member of the mediation committee appointed by the 1981 Islamic Conference which made no more progress than its NAM counterpart. It was hoped that the Islamic Summit Meeting in Casablanca in January might have provided an opportunity for a fresh initiative. Iran, however, refused to attend the Summit because it was held in Morocco, and a resolution was eventually passed in favour of Iraq. Nonetheless, a message from the Prime Minister to President Zia might encourage him to seek again to mediate on behalf of the Islamic Conference.

/ I attach draft messages from the Prime Minister to Mrs Gandhi and President Zia.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: ~~XXXX~~/letter/te~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ **TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
The Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:
Mrs Gandhi

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

I am sorry that we did not have the opportunity for a ~~proper~~ fee conversation in Moscow ~~last week~~. I hope we can find another opportunity to meet soon.

I am sure you are as concerned as I am about the recent resumption ~~of~~ fighting in the Iran/Iraq war. This has serious implications for the international community as a whole. We have made every effort to encourage Iran and Iraq to find an early settlement to the conflict and have urged both sides to avoid any step that might lead to escalation.

The UN Secretary General, with our full support, has recently attempted to send a Mission to both sides. We are greatly disappointed that this has now been postponed.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I am convinced that the recent escalation in the fighting makes it more urgent than ever to find a peaceful settlement. I therefore wonder if there is any possibility of your resuming your role as a mediator on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement? I know that India /and

56-ST Dd8303048 2/82 APL

and you personally are respected by both Iran and Iraq. ~~Both~~ These two countries have suffered terrible losses in the latest fighting in southern Iraq, ~~and~~ they might conceivably be prepared to accept another offer of good offices (I know that the Iranians have a historic dislike of the concept of mediation). I am sure that any such initiative on your part would ~~have~~ be widely supported ~~the full support~~ not only by the Non Aligned Movement, but ~~of~~ by the international community as a whole. I would be very ready to support you in any way that I can.

DSR 11 (Revised)

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: ~~letter/telegram/despatch~~ | TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
The Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

President Zia

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

I was delighted to see you in Moscow last week on the occasion of Mr Andropov's funeral, and glad that we had the opportunity for such a full discussion.

I am sure you are as concerned as I am about the recent resumption of fighting in the Iran/Iraq war. This has increasingly serious implications for the international community as a whole. We have repeatedly ~~made every effort~~ tried to encourage Iran and Iraq to find an early settlement to the conflict and have urged both sides to avoid any step that might lead to escalation.

The UN Secretary General, with our full support, has recently attempted to send a Mission to both sides. We are greatly disappointed that this has now been postponed.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I am convinced that the recent escalation in the fighting makes it more urgent than ever that we should find a peaceful solution. Is there any possibility of Pakistan resuming its role as a mediator on behalf of the Islamic Conference? I know that your views are highly respected/

56-ST Dd8303048 2/82 APL

respected by both Iran and Iraq, and they might be prepared to respond to a request by you to explore means of bringing the war to an early end, the more so as both sides have suffered terrible losses in the latest clashes in Southern Iraq. Any such initiative on your part would have ~~the full~~ wide support not only ~~of~~ from the Islamic Conference but ~~of~~ from the international community as a whole. I should be very ready to support you in any way that I can.

IRAQ: Int. Sit: Pt 3

Prime Minister (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

MR TURNBULL

24 February 1984

IRAN/IRAQ - REACTIONS OF THE MARKETS

Despite the increased military activity in the Gulf War, the two most directly affected markets - oil and shipping - have not responded to any significant extent.

Oil Market

Spot oil prices are still 30-50 ¢ /bbl below official prices.

Middle East crude prices have not moved during the last week. Although North Sea prices have firmed a little, there are no signs of panic in the market.

Similarly there is no evidence of increased stockbuilding nor of emergency moves by the companies. Contingency plans were drawn up many months ago and recent events have not led to any significant revisions. Oil shares have not moved significantly.

The general view appears to be that closure of the Straits of Hormuz is either unlikely or would last for a very short period. There is plenty of oil in stock and, although closure would bring an increase in price, there is no volume risk for at least a month.

The market has been reassured by the statements from President Reagan and the Prime Minister and is comforted by the 50 million barrels of oil which Saudi Arabia has in floating storage.

Shipping Market

The shipping market is strongly influenced by the oil market and has remained calm.

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There has been a small increase in charter rates for large tankers during the last week from World Scale 20 to World Scale 22. For Kharg loadings rates have moved from World Scale 21 to World Scale 24. These changes are not particularly significant and also indicate that Iranian loadings do not carry a high premium. Although generally quiet, there have in fact been more loadings at Kharg Island in the last two weeks then previously.

Equally significant is the fact that insurance rates have not risen in recent week although Iranian rates (0.75% of total value) are higher than for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc (0.37% of total value). These rates would cover war damage.

Conclusion

Although the situation in the Gulf is fragile, it is significant that neither the oil nor shipping markets are showing any signs of nervousness or of panic.

The markets consider that Iran needs to continue oil liftings to provide revenue for the war efforts and that closure of the Straits would be counter-productive.

Today's statement by the Iranian President, Ali Khamenei, that Iran would not block the Straits unless it is denied the right of traffic through the waterway, is regarded as generally helpful.

This coupled with the US and UK statements has led to a general state of calm in the markets.

DLP.

DAVID PASCALL

28

SECRET
UK EYES A

B.06981

PRIME MINISTER

Escalation of the War in the Gulf

1. The meeting of OD(EM) on 21 February instructed the Secretary of the Cabinet to arrange for a report to be prepared, in consultation with Departments concerned, on the diplomatic, military and economic contingency planning that had been, and might be, undertaken in the event of a collapse of Iraqi resistance to Iranian attacks and of a consequent spread of Shi'a fundamentalist supremacy to the Gulf and the Middle East generally. Work on this is in hand and Sir Robert hopes to let you have the report by the end of next week.

Flag A.

2. Meanwhile, the attached Note on "Iranian Foreign Policy: Implications of an Iranian Victory in the Gulf War" has been prepared by the JIC as an interim answer to some of the concerns expressed at OD(EM), as well as to the specific questions posed in Mr Coles's letter to Mr Ricketts of 20 February. In the short term, the JIC doubts whether Iran will be able to achieve a decisive military success: and whether, even if Iran succeeded in overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein, she would thereafter embark on armed attack on her Gulf neighbours (other than Kuwait, which is militarily weak and vulnerable geographically, and which might be attacked in view of past help to Iraq). The JIC believe that Iran would be more likely then to seek to export its revolution by so-called 'peaceful' means - indirect pressure, subversion and propaganda - albeit from a position of greatly enhanced prestige. Nevertheless, the specifically Iranian and Shi'a character of the Iranian revolution should work against its acceptance in predominantly Sunni Arab countries where the regimes could be expected to move quickly to limit the damage. As to the

Soviet attitude, the JIC takes the view that the Soviet Union does not at present regard itself as threatened in its Muslim areas by Shi'a fundamentalism although it would view with concern the possibility of an Iranian victory, both because it would not wish to see Iran's ability to spread its revolution to neighbouring countries strengthened and because it would fear that instability in the Gulf region would provide an opportunity for the United States to increase its influence in the region.

3. The JIC note does not attempt to deal with the question of oil supplies and reserves, which will be covered in the full report to be submitted to you next week. That report will also examine the worst case scenario that could develop if the JIC analysis turns out to be over-optimistic; and it will include some indication of the likely attitude of the Americans in such a scenario, and how we should seek to influence them. Sir John Leahy has been talking to the Americans in Washington this week about the Gulf, and the report will take account of his impressions.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to those Ministers who took part in the OD(EM) discussion on 21 February, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

David Goodall

A D S Goodall

24 February 1984

GRS 1000 CONFIDENTIAL

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FM WASHINGTON 231836Z FEB 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 617 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, GULF POSTS

Read in full.

BAGHDAD TELNO 98 TO YOU: IRAQ/IRAN

SUMMARY

1. U S ASSESSMENT THAT MAJOR IRANIAN OFFENSIVE YET TO COME. SUCCESS UNLIKELY BUT COULD PROVOKE IRAQI ESCALATION. BOTH SIDES HAVE REASONS TO SEEK AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. NEED TO KEEP THE UN INITIATIVE ALIVE. CLOSE US/UK POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSULTATION TO CONTINUE: NEXT ROUND OF MILITARY TALKS TO BE ACCELERATED. U S NOT KEEN TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIANS AT PRESENT.

DETAIL

2. THE U S ASSESSMENT GIVEN TO LEAHY ON 22 FEBRUARY WAS THAT THE IRANIANS HAD YET TO LAUNCH THEIR MAJOR OFFENSIVE. THIS MIGHT FOLLOW IN A WEEK OR SO: MEANWHILE, FURTHER PROBING ATTACKS WERE LIKELY. HISTORY SUGGESTED THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD NOT BREAK THROUGH. THEY WERE STILL PLAGUED BY COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS. BUT IF THEY MADE SIGNIFICANT GAINS THE IRAQIS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE NO COMPUNCTION ABOUT ESCALATING THE AIR WAR. THEY HAD ALREADY CLAIMED THAT THE IRANIANS HAD RESUMED ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN TARGETS AND THEY HAD NOW PUBLICLY THREATENED THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

3. BOTH SIDES HAD STRATEGIC REASONS FOR SEEKING AN EARLY RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. THE IRANIANS, WITH LITTLE MORE THAN MECHANISED INFANTRY, SAW THEIR ENEMIES IMPROVING THEIR EQUIPMENT AND COMING TO TERMS WITH THEIR ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. THE TIME WAS THUS RIGHT FOR A MAJOR PUSH, RATHER THAN CONTINUED ATTRITION, MOST PROBABLY ON THE CENTRAL FRONT. THE BAGHDAD-BASRA ROAD, ONLY 35KM AWAY AT ITS MOST ACCESSIBLE POINT, WAS A POSSIBLE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE. BUT THE IRANIANS HAD NEVER BEFORE ACHIEVED SUCH PENETRATION AND AN OBVIOUS FAILURE COULD BACKFIRE. THE IRAQIS FOR THEIR PART WERE GROWING INCREASINGLY WAR-WEARY, ALTHOUGH THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITIES WERE IMPROVING. THE AMERICANS, WHO CONSIDERED THE IRANIANS UNLIKELY TO TRY TO CLOSE THE STRAITS UNLESS THEIR OIL EXPORTS WERE CUT OFF, CONTINUED TO URGE RESTRAINT ON BAGHDAD. THE IRAQIS HAD INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD ACT ACCORDINGLY AS LONG AS THERE WAS SOME SIGN OF MOVEMENT TOWARDS A SOLUTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4.

4. IN THE U S VIEW THIS UNDERSCORED THE NEED TO KEEP THE UN INITIATIVE ALIVE. THEY WONDERED WHETHER DIFFERENT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE PROPOSED VISIT TO EACH COUNTRY MIGHT OFFER A WAY FORWARD. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE U S AND UK SHOULD CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE IRAQIS TO BE FLEXIBLE. THE AFTERMATH OF THE IRANIAN OFFENSIVE, IF IT CAME, MIGHT PROVIDE THE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR A CEASEFIRE. MEANWHILE, THE AMERICANS WOULD PRESS FOR RESTRAINT, ENCOURAGE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR IRAQ FROM THE GULF AND HELP WITH THE PROPOSED PIPELINE ACROSS JORDAN. THEY HAD TALKED TO THE ISRAELIS AT SEVERAL LEVELS ABOUT THE SECURITY OF SUCH A PIPELINE AND HAD RECEIVED AS GOOD AN ANSWER AS COULD BE EXPECTED: (SEE ALSO PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY TELNO 618): VISIBLE U S INVOLVEMENT WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT. LEAHY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT GOING TO SEE THE IRAQIS GO UNDER BUT OBSERVED THAT THERE COULD BE A FINE LINE BETWEEN OFFERING THEM COMFORT AND GIVING THEM ACTUAL ENCOURAGEMENT.

5. LEAHY STRESSED TO BOTH PLACKE (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS) AND HOWE (DIRECTOR, POL-MIL) OUR INTEREST IN CONTINUED CLOSE CONSULTATION IN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FIELDS. THE AMERICANS AGREED IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN TOUCH AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPED. THERE WAS NOTHING TO SUBSTANTIATE PRESS REPORTS OF JOINT US/UK NAVAL EXERCISES, BUT SUCH SUGGESTIONS COULD BE DISTURBING TO THE IRANIANS. (KEMP (NSC), MURPHY (ASSISTANT SECRETARY) AND RAPHEL (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY) ALL DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT MOVES BY THE U S FLEET TOWARDS THE GULF OF OMAN). LEAHY EMPHASISED THE NEED TO KEEP PURSUING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK EVEN IF MILITARY ACTION BECAME INEVITABLE AND TO SEND THE RIGHT SIGNALS. HOWE CONCURRED, BUT COMMENTED THAT EG SHIP MOVEMENTS COULD ALSO SEND POLITICAL SIGNALS. IF MILITARY ACTION HAD TO BE TAKEN, SPEED AND PRECISION WOULD BE ESSENTIAL. THERE WAS ROOM FOR MORE COORDINATION AND MORE CONTINGENCY PLANNING. LEAHY AGREED THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF MILITARY TALKS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

6. LEAHY ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS HAD GIVEN THOUGHT TO HOW THEY MIGHT AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE RUSSIANS IN THE REGION. PLACKE SAID THAT THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN TOUCHED ON IN MOSCOW ABOUT SIX WEEKS AGO. IN BROAD TERMS, THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO SEE THEIR INTERESTS IN LARGELY THE SAME LIGHT: MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES. THE AMERICANS DID NOT WANT SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS AT THIS STAGE: THESE MIGHT GIVE THE RUSSIANS DIPLOMATIC LEVERAGE IN THE AREA. BUT IF THE SITUATION AROSE THEY WOULD QUOTE TRY VERY HARD UNQUOTE TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENT.

COMMENT

THERE WAS NOTHING REPEAT NOTHING IN ANY OF THESE DISCUSSIONS TO SUGGEST THAT THE AMERICANS WERE IN A MOOD TO CONTEMPLATE PRECIPITATE ACTION IN THE GULF TO COMPENSATE FOR THE FAILURE OF U S POLICY IN THE LEBANON. RATHER THE REVERSE. THERE WAS, ON THE CONTRARY, SOME DEGREE OF OPTIMISM THAT THE STRATEGIC SHIFT DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 3 MIGHT CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH A NEW MOVE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. IF THIS OPPORTUNITY WERE MISSED, THE FEELING WAS THAT IT WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO RECUR FOR A LONG TIME.

WRIGHT

IRAN/IRAQ

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IRAN/IRAQ

cc K

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 February 1984

Dear John,

Iran/Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 20 February about this subject, which was further discussed at OD(EM) on 21 February.

A good deal of work has been done on the questions raised in (a) to (g) of your second paragraph. Three JIC papers in particular are relevant: JIC(82)(N)94 of 23 September 1982 on Iran's Foreign Relations, JIC(82)13 dated 1 November 1982 on the Islamic Revival and Extremist Muslim Movements in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and JIC(83)(N)81 of 10 June 1983 on Islamic Sectarianism in the Gulf. I understand that the Assessments Staff will be taking a fresh look at the range of subjects raised by the Prime Minister, and will consider urgently what additional work is necessary to provide a full and up-to-date answer to the questions you raised. We shall of course be contributing.

A good deal of work has similarly been done on various aspects of Gulf contingency planning, including both action to contain any threat of disruption to world oil supplies, and the wider question of the circumstances under which some military involvement in the area might become necessary. OD(EM) considered this latter aspect at meetings on 21 December 1983 and 26 January, on the basis of memoranda put forward jointly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary (OD(EM)(83)4 of 16 December 1983 and OD(EM)(84)1 of 25 January 1984). These were in addition to a number of minutes from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary. Since possible contingency measures directly involve a number of other Departments, the Cabinet Office will urgently review the state of our contingency planning in all areas. This would be a separate exercise from that being undertaken by the Assessments Staff.

On the diplomatic front, we continue to be among the forefront of those encouraging the UN Secretary-General to resume his mediatory activities, despite the relatively discouraging circumstances. You will see from UKMIS New York telegram No 182 of 21 February (copy enclosed) that

/there

there seems to be no prospect of a UN Mission being despatched to Tehran and Baghdad for the time being. We are therefore exploring other possible avenues of activity, including demarches to leading members of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. We are considering whether to propose that the Prime Minister send messages in this connection to President Zia and Mrs Gandhi. I shall write again very soon with advice on this point.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7822~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/9/4/2

22nd February 1984

~~Hine~~

I.a.

AR 23/2.

Dear John,

You asked about the deployment of our ships in the Gulf area. Current positions of RN/RFA in the Indian Ocean are on the attached chart as requested. Also USS MIDWAY group.

Future programmes:

a. HMS INVINCIBLE - transit Suez Canal 6th March

b. HMS GLAMORGAN AND RFA BLUE ROVER -

20th - 25th February	Cochin
28th February - 13th March	Gulf Patrol (off Oman)

c. HMS BRAZEN -

22nd February	Sails from Colombo
25th - 27th February	Diego Garcia (to embark weapon enhancements)
5th - 13th March	Gulf Patrol (off Oman)

d. HMS AURORA AND HMS ROTHESAY are in the Hong Kong area.

yours ever

Wendy

(W ANDERTON) (MISS)

A J Coles Esq

GULF OF 'OMAN

'OMĀN BASIN

MURRAY RIDGE

ARABIAN SEA

ARABIAN BASIN

OWEN FRACTURE ZONE

CARLSBERG RIDGE

INDIA

BAY OF BENGAL

BENGAL BASIN

LAKSHADWEEP (LACCADIVE IS)

MALDIVES

SRI LANKA

Dubayy

Masqat

Ras al Hadd

Masirah I

Gulf of Masirah

Ras al Madraka

Saugara Bay

Kuria Muria Is

Salalah

Ras Asir

Ras Radressa

Socotra

Error Seamount

Pasni

Gwadar

Ormara

Ras Muari

Karachi

Aero RC

Indus Delta

Kandla

Okha

Dwarka Point

Porbandar

Bhavnagar

Veraval

Diu Head

Gulf of Khambhat (Cambay)

Bombay

Khanderi I

Ratnagiri

Vengurla Rks

Aguada

Marmagao

Karwar

Bhatkal

Cora Divh

Sesostris Bank

Bassas de Pedro

Cherbaniani Rf

Byramgore Rf

Tree I

Chetlat I

Kiltan I

Amini I

Agatti I

Kavaratti I

Androth I

Suheli Par

Kalpeni I

Aero RC Mangalore

Telicherry

Calicut

Kadalur Pt

Cochin

Nine Degree Channel

Minicoy I

Eight Degree Channel

Ihavandiffulu Atoll

Miladummadulu Atoll

Malosmadulu Atolls

Faadiffolu Atoll

Male Atolls

MALE

Kardiva Chan

Ari Atoll

Felidu Atoll

Mulaku Atoll

Nilandu Atolls

Koiumadulu Atoll

Haddummati Atoll

One and Half Degree Channel

Trivandrum Aero RC

Tuticorin

Cape Comorin

Gulf of Mannar

Palk Str

Jaffna Aero RC

Pt Calimere

Nagappattinam

Pondicherry

Madras Aero RC

Mahabalipuram

Aero RC Jiwani

Calcutta

Haldia

Ganga Delta

Sagar I

Hiran Pt

Pussur R

Chandbali

Paradip

False Pt

Gopalpur

Vishakhapatnam Aero RC

Kakinada

Sacramento

Machilipatnam

Aero RC Colombo

Galle

Great Basses Rf

Dondra Head

Trincomalee

Foul Pt

BANGLADESH

MIDWAY (USN)

H.M.S. GLAMORGAN

BLUE ROVER (RFA)

HMS BRAZEN

INVINCIBLE

220800Z

1°W (nearly stationary)

2°W (nearly stationary)

3°W (nearly stationary)

4°W (nearly stationary)

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FM BAGHDAD 221220Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 98 OF 22 FEB 84
INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN
INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, AMMAN, DAMASCUS.

IRAQ/IRAN.

SUMMARY.

1. THE IRAQIS CLAIM THAT A MAJOR NEW IRANIAN OFFENSIVE HAS STARTED. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT CALLS ON SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS TO CONDEMN IRANIAN AGRESSIONS.

DETAILS

2. I WAS SUMMONED THIS MORNING TO THE MFA TO SEE SAHHAF, WHO WAS IN A SOMBRE MOOD. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT AND THAT A SIMILAR APPROACH WOULD BE MADE TO OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND INDEED ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. ACCORDING TO SAHHAF THE IRANIANS HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT ANNOUNCING A NEW ATTACK, WHICH HAD BEGUN AT MIDNIGHT LAST NIGHT. THE IRAQIS WOULD RESIST THIS NEW AGREESSION WITH ALL THE MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL TO STRIKE AT THE LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF IRANIAN TROOPS WHCXCEVER THEY WERE TO BE FOUND. SAHHAF DREW MY ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT OF THE IRAQI SPOKESMAN REPORTED IN TODAY'S LOCAL PRESS (NIPT).

3. SAHHAF SAID HIS GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT THE TIME HAD COME WHEN ALL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD MAKE THEIR POSITION CLEAR IN CONDEMNATION OF THE CONTINUING IRANIAN AGGRESSION. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO ASK ME TO CONVEY A REQUEST TO THIS EFFECT TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF

HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO ASK ME TO CONVEY A REQUEST TO THIS EFFECT TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF THIS KIND WOULD PROVIDE A VALUABLE DEMONSTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY IN RESISTING IRAN'S EXPANSIONIST DESIGNS.

4. SAHHAF COULD NOT TELL ME PRECISELY WHERE THE NEW IRANIAN PUSH WAS TAKING PLACE (THOUGH WE HAVE SINCE HEARD FROM THE FRENCH EMBASSY THAT THERE MAY BE TWO PRONGS IN THE IRAQI 4TH CORPS SECTOR, ONE NEAR BUSTAN, AND THE OTHER ABOUT ONE HUNDRED KILOMETRES TO THE NORTH OPPOSITE THE IRAQI TOWN OF ALI AL GHARBI). NOR COULD HE GIVE ME ANY NEWS

F THE SITUATION AT THE FRONT.
HE WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER THIS LATEST ATTACK ANNOUNCED BY THE IRANIANS WAS THE LONG-HERALDED IRANIAN MAIN THRUST OR WHETHER IT WAS A FURTHER DIVERSIONARY ATTACK.

5. I CONFIRMED TO SAHHAF THAT I WOULD REPORT HIS REPRESENTATIONS IMMEDIATELY AND ADDED THAT I KNEW THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT ANY ESCALATION OF THE WAR. SAHHAF COMMENTED THAT THE IRANIANS WERE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS.

COMMENT.

6. DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS THE IRAQIS HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY TALKING UP THE SIZE AND PROBABLE SEVERITY OF THE EXPECTED IRANIAN MAIN ATTACK. THERE APPEARS TO BE A GENUINELY HEIGHTENED LEVEL OF CONCERN ON THIS OCCASION THOUGH THE RHETORIC MAY ALSO BE DESIGNED TO GIVE ADDED CREDIBILITY TO IRAQI VICTORY CLAIMS IN THE EVENT THAT THE IRANIAN ATTACKS PETER OUT AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS.

MOBERLY

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 182 OF 21 FEBRUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN
INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, PARIS, STOCKHOLM, AMMAN
MOSCOW, CAIRO, UKDEL NATO, THE HAGUE, MODUK (DI4).

MY TELNO 179 AND TELECON EGERTON/GORE-BOOTH: IRAN / IRAQ.

1. THE HEAD OF CHANCERY TOUCHED BASE WITH UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL CORDOVEZ THIS EVENING TO SEE WHETHER HE THOUGHT THERE WAS ANYTHING TO BE SALVAGED FROM THE COLLAPSE OF HIS PROPOSED MISSION TO TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD.

2. CORDOVEZ WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC. HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS NOTHING FURTHER THAT THE UN WOULD BE ABLE TO DO FOR THE MOMENT UNLESS EITHER THE IRAQIS DROPPED THEIR INSISTENCE ON A TWO-PRONGED MISSION AND SETTLED FOR A MISSION TO INSPECT CIVILIAN DAMAGE ONLY OR A CHANGE FOR THE WORSE IN THEIR SITUATION ON THE GROUND PERSUADED THE IRANIAN TO ACCEPT A POLITICAL PRONG. PUBLICLY HE IS TAKING THE LINE THAT THE MISSION HAS BEEN POSTPONED BUT PRIVATELY HE BELIEVES THAT THERE IS NO EARLY CHANCE OF RESUSCITATING IT. HE QUOTED KING FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA AS TELLING MR PALME IN CANNES RECENTLY THAT ''NOW IS NOT THE TIME'' (CF CHATTI'S COMMENTS REPORTED IN JEDDA TELNO 95)

3. ALTHOUGH HE RECOGNISES THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE NOW LOST THE GROUND THEY WON WITH THEIR FIRST LETTER CORDOVEZ FEELS THAT THE IRAQIS DID NOT PLAY THEIR HAND VERY WELL. IN PARTICULAR HE THINKS THEY WERE MISTAKEN IN MENTIONING THE ''SEVEN POINTS'' IN THEIR REPLY AND THEN INSISTING THAT IT BE MADE PUBLIC. THE MENTION OF AN AGENDA WAS BOUND TO BE RED RAG TO THE IRANIAN BULL.

MARGETSON

IRAN/IRAQ

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SIR J LEAHY

MR EGERTON

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 588 OF 20 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TEL 337 : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. WE WENT OVER THE GROUND WITH PLACKE (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT) OUTLING THE IMPRESSION GIVEN BY THE UK MEDIA AND THE POSSIBLE THRUST OF QUESTIONS TO THE PM.

2. THE AMERICAN VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND AND THEIR IMMEDIATE INTENTIONS ARE COVERED IN OUR TEL 586. AS REGARDS THE

AND THE POSSIBLE THRUST OF QUESTIONS TO THE FM.

2. THE AMERICAN VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND AND THEIR IMMEDIATE INTENTIONS ARE COVERED IN OUR TEL 526. AS REGARDS THE SOVIET UNION, PLACKE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION REGARDED IT AS NEITHER FEASIBLE NOR DESIRABLE TO SEEK NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED IN ADVANCE AN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE GULF. THE SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE GULF WAS FAR SMALLER THAN THE AMERICAN. THE US HAD NO DESIRE TO PROVIDE AN OPENING FOR THE RUSSIANS TO INCREASE THEIR NAVAL PRESENCE NOR THEIR DIPLOMATIC POSITION GENERALLY. THEY WERE NOT ACTIVELY TRYING TO EXCLUDE THE RUSSIANS BUT WERE CERTAINLY NOT ANXIOUS TO ENCOURAGE THEM PARTICULARLY WHEN IT WAS SO UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD GET ANYTHING USEFUL IN RETURN.

3. IF THE THREAT OF ESCALATION WERE TO BECOME REAL THE US WOULD, AS A FIRST STEP, CONSULT WITH ALLIES AND WITH THE STATES IN THE AREA. THEY WOULD ALSO CONSIDER ACTION IN THE UN WHICH WOULD AUTOMATICALLY BRING IN THE SOVIET UNION. WHETHER IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE ALSO TO INITIATE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WAS SOMETHING TO BE JUDGED AT THE TIME.

4. MORE GENERALLY, THE AMERICANS HAVE HAD OCCASIONAL DISCUSSIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST WITH THE RUSSIANS. THEY HAVE FOUND THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF THE GULF WAR BROADLY SIMILAR. BOTH AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO BRING IT TO AN END WITHOUT EITHER SIDE PREVAILING. US INTERVENTION WOULD BE A QUITE DIFFERENT MATTER OF WHICH THE RUSSIANS COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE SHARPLY CRITICAL.

5. AS REGARDS THE LINE SUGGESTED IN PARA 3 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, PLACKE IS UNAWARE THAT WE HAVE EVER SUGGESTED TO THE US THAT THEY SHOULD COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SOVIET UNION NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED IN ADVANCE ABOUT POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE GULF.

6. IN THE LIGHT OF THE POSITION OUTLINED ABOVE, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE NOT TO MAKE A PUBLIC SUGGESTION IN QUITE THESE TERMS WITHOUT FULLER DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS FOR WHICH THERE WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY DURING LEAHY'S VISIT ON 22 FEBRUARY. COULD WE NOT SAY THAT WE BELIEVE THAT EARLY CONTACTS BETWEEN THE US ITS ALLIES AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE ESSENTIAL IF THERE WAS TO BE SERIOUS ESCALATION IN THE GULF: THE US ARE AWARE OF OUR VIEWS ON THIS POINT.

7. FCO PLEASE PASS TO NO.10 AND CABINET OFFICE.

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PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Escalation of the War in the Gulf - OD(EM)

BACKGROUND

Flag A

At Cabinet on 16 February (CC(84)6th Conclusions - Minute 3) the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was invited to review the range of contingencies arising from the Gulf war in consultation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Energy. A record of the meeting held by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to carry out this review was circulated by the Cabinet Office on 17 February.

Flag B

Flag C

2. The conclusion of this meeting was that the war between Iran and Iraq would continue but it was doubtful whether the Iranian armed forces had the capability to advance far. The Iranians' immediate objectives were not clear but in the longer term they wished to wear down Iraq's willingness to resist and to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. If the Iranians achieved a substantial breakthrough, Iraq might become desperate and escalate its attacks on Iran, although it was doubtful whether Iraqi forces had the military skills necessary to halt Iranian oil production by missile attacks. Equally, it was unlikely that the Iranians would be able to sustain a closure of the Straits of Hormuz for long, even if they attempted to do so.

3. Against this background, the meeting took the view that no additional measures of military preparedness were required on the part of the United Kingdom at this stage, having regard to the action that had already been taken with the Gulf States in offering assistance to develop

their own military capability. The reaction of the United States to any interruption in oil supplies would be crucial and great uncertainty was expressed on how the US Administration might react to the latest Iranian offensive in the aftermath of US experiences in the Lebanon. Ministers present agreed that there was a need to keep in the closest possible touch with all US Departments and Agencies concerned with Gulf contingency planning, including plans on oil supplies and stocks, in order to dissuade the US Administration from precipitate action which might cause further de-stabilisation in the area. The United Kingdom should seek to obtain acceptance of its view that, if the Iranians took steps to try to close the Straits of Hormuz, the first priority would be diplomatic action to attempt to de-escalate the crisis with any military response being limited to protective measures such as convoying and mine-clearing operations.

4. It was agreed that an immediate approach should be made by the UK Ambassador in Washington to go over the ground with the Americans again and to use the opportunity of meetings between Ministers and senior officials for influencing the US approach to the various aspects of Gulf contingency planning. These would include Sir John Leahy's visit to Washington this week, the meeting between Mr Heseltine and Mr Weinberger at the end of February and between Mr Walker and Mr Hodel in early March. These occasions should be used to the full for consultation with the Americans on all aspects of Gulf contingency planning, including action in the event of disruption to oil supplies, and for feeding in UK ideas.

5. The immediate US response has been helpful. They have fully endorsed the need to keep closely in touch with United Kingdom thinking and have welcomed the opportunity

given by Sir John Leahy's visit for further consultation. They have said that they consider that reports in the media of the Iranian offensive have been exaggerated, and have confirmed that the State Department has urged restraint upon the Iraqis.

6. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is unable to attend or to be represented because of pressure of Budget business. The Secretary of State for Energy, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Chief of the Defence Staff have been invited to attend. An immediate assessment, concentrating on latest developments in the war, is being prepared by the JIC and will be circulated before the meeting.

HANDLING

7. You should invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce the discussion. The Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff might then be invited to comment on the military situation, and the Secretary of State for Energy on the implications for oil supplies. Points to establish in discussion are:

(a) As regards military contingency action, is it still agreed that the deployment of British forces to the Gulf should only be countenanced as a last resort and if United Kingdom interests are threatened?

(b) Have all possible contingency measures now been taken to offer assistance to the Gulf States in building up their own defence capabilities?

(c) As regards diplomatic action, should any additional steps be taken to impress our views on the Americans or to consult them about contingency measures to assure the continuation of adequate oil supplies to the West in the event of the Straits of Hormuz being closed?

(d) Are there further possibilities for diplomatic action either through the Super Powers or our other Allies to bring restraining influence to bear on either the Iranians or the Iraqis?

CONCLUSION

8. Subject to the points made in discussion, you could guide the Sub-Committee to approve the action which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has in hand to concert our contingency plans for diplomatic and other action with the Americans, aimed at reducing the effects of any continuing escalation of the Gulf war.

David Goodall

A D S Goodall

20 February 1984

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

N.S.D.R. 20 February 1984

A.J.C. 21/2

Dear John,

Iran/Iraq: Appeal from the President of the ICRC

I enclose a self-explanatory message from the President of the International Red Cross to the Prime Minister, which we have just received from our Mission at Geneva. We shall let you have advice shortly on how the Prime Minister might respond.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Iraq/Iran 83

LE PRÉSIDENT

Geneva, 14 February 1984

Madam,

For the second time in less than a year, the International Committee of the Red Cross is obliged to appeal to the States parties to the Geneva Conventions in the context of the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
10, Downing Street

LONDON S.W. 1

17, AVENUE DE LA PAIX, CH-1211 GENÈVE - TÉL. 022/34 60 01

...

As you may gather from the enclosed appeal, the violations listed by the ICRC are serious and by their nature affect the very spirit of international humanitarian law.

I am taking the liberty of approaching your Government through you directly because I am convinced that you will understand the importance of the step the ICRC is taking today. This demarche aims not only to protect the tens of thousands of victims affected by the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq, but also to preserve the credibility of international humanitarian law in future conflicts.

Indeed, international humanitarian law, which the States created of their own volition, is based on a principle of universality that could not be flouted anywhere in the world without setting a dangerous precedent.

I am aware of the complexity of relations between States - especially when one of those States is at war - but I cannot keep from believing that humanitarian causes should receive the attention and priority that is their due.

This is especially true in view of the fact that international humanitarian law is a branch of the international law adopted by States. It would be intolerable for any part of that law to become obsolete for it is indeed worthy of the human being it aims to protect.

I would be pleased if you would agree to transmit - and indeed plead in favour of - the cry of alarm sent out today by the ICRC and I sincerely hope that you will do all in your power to see that the States concerned put an end to the violations with which they are charged.

Accept, Madam, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Alexandre Hay

COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE

CONFLIT IRAN/IRAQ

Second mémorandum du Comité international
de la Croix-Rouge aux Etats Parties
aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949

Genève, le 10 février 1984

17, AVENUE DE LA PAIX - CH-1211 GENÈVE - TÉLÉPHONE: (022) 34 60 01 - TÉLÉGRAMME: INTERCROIXROUGE - TÉLEX: 22 269 - CHÈQUES POSTAUX: 12-5527

Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge était contraint d'adresser, le 7 mai 1983, un Appel à l'ensemble des Etats Parties aux Conventions de Genève. En vertu de l'engagement solennel contracté par ces Etats de respecter mais aussi de faire respecter ces Conventions, le CICR leur demandait de déployer tous les efforts utiles afin que le droit international humanitaire soit mieux appliqué par les deux belligérants, la République islamique d'Iran d'une part, et la République d'Iraq de l'autre, et pour que le CICR puisse accomplir efficacement ses tâches humanitaires auprès des victimes innombrables, civiles et militaires, de ce conflit.

Constatant, neuf mois après son premier Appel, que les résultats espérés n'ont été que très partiellement atteints, le CICR se doit d'informer les Etats Parties aux Conventions de Genève de la situation humanitaire prévalant en République islamique d'Iran et en République d'Iraq.

Le CICR souligne que les violations du droit établies et décrites dans ses deux mémorandums revêtent un caractère fondamental, qu'elles mettent non seulement en péril la vie et la liberté des dizaines de milliers de victimes du présent conflit mais qu'elles attentent à l'essence et aux principes du droit international humanitaire. Elles risquent de conduire, à terme, au discrédit des règles de droit et des principes universels par lesquels les Etats ont entendu accorder à la personne humaine une meilleure défense contre les rigueurs de la guerre.

Le CICR sait d'autre part que la persistance et la multiplication des violations du droit international humanitaire ont toujours constitué des obstacles supplémentaires, parfois difficilement surmontables, à l'heure où prévaut la volonté de rétablir la paix. Des conflits récents ont été inutilement prolongés parce que le sort des prisonniers de guerre ne pouvait plus être réglé. Le CICR enjoint donc les Etats qui oeuvrent au rétablissement de la paix dans la région à considérer avec la plus grande attention les problèmes qui surgiront inévitablement en raison de la violation des Conventions de Genève par les belligérants.

Le CICR désire, en particulier, que les Etats abordent, dans le cadre de leurs relations respectives avec chacun des deux Etats belligérants, le dossier humanitaire qui leur est soumis. Il demande, d'autre part, à ces Etats d'apporter leur soutien actif aux efforts qu'il déploie dans l'intérêt exclusif des victimes et dans le cadre strict du mandat humanitaire qui lui a été confié par les Conventions de Genève. Il espère, enfin, que des consultations appropriées permettront de désigner des Puissances protectrices prêtes à prendre en charge les tâches assignées par les Conventions de Genève à de telles Puissances, avec lesquelles le CICR aspire à collaborer étroitement.

Le CICR a la conviction que les Etats, conscients des enjeux véritables de cette démarche, auront le désir et la volonté de traduire en des actes concrets l'engagement qu'ils ont voulu et accepté en adoptant l'article premier commun aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949.

*

* *

REPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D'IRAN

A. Prisonniers de guerre iraqiens internés en République islamique d'Iran

1. Les activités du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge en faveur des prisonniers iraqiens sont à nouveau interrompues depuis le 27 juillet 1983. Le CICR estime d'une manière générale que, depuis bientôt deux années, il n'exerce plus son mandat selon les exigences de la IIIe Convention de Genève relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre.

A l'heure actuelle, quelque 50.000 prisonniers se trouvent ainsi au pouvoir de la Puissance qui les détient sans la protection internationale à laquelle ils ont droit de par leur statut.

Le CICR n'est notamment plus en mesure :

- d'établir avec précision l'effectif total et la répartition par lieux d'internement des prisonniers de guerre;
- de connaître l'identité et l'état de santé des prisonniers de guerre afin d'en notifier dans les plus brefs délais leurs familles et leur Puissance d'origine;
- de contrôler les conditions matérielles, psychologiques et disciplinaires de l'internement par des visites régulières dans les camps et des entretiens privés avec les prisonniers;
- d'établir les listes de prisonniers de guerre qui doivent, en raison des blessures et des maladies graves dont ils sont atteints, être rapatriés rapidement;
- de contrôler efficacement les distributions de messages Croix-Rouge entre les familles et les prisonniers.

Toutes ces tâches de contrôle sont impérativement commandées par la Convention et constituent les préalables indispensables à l'exercice d'une protection efficace des prisonniers par les délégués du CICR.

2. De nombreux faits et indices concordants inquiètent le CICR sur le sort que connaissent ces prisonniers et sur les motifs réels pour lesquels les autorités l'ont empêché d'exercer ses activités; le CICR note en particulier que :

- des catégories spécifiques de prisonniers, tels les officiers supérieurs, lui ont été systématiquement soustraites;

- des condamnations graves ont été prononcées à l'encontre de certains prisonniers; malgré ses demandes répétées, le CICR n'a jamais reçu à ce sujet les notifications et explications qui auraient dû, en droit, lui être transmises;

- certains camps ont été le théâtre d'événements graves; le CICR a d'ailleurs reçu, avec beaucoup de retard et sans commentaire aucun, des actes de décès de militaires ennemis déclarés "morts sur le front" alors que ces personnes, en réalité internées depuis des années en République islamique d'Iran, avaient été enregistrées et vues à plusieurs reprises par les délégués du CICR;

- d'une manière générale, des pressions idéologiques et politiques, un processus d'intimidation et de "rééducation", des atteintes à l'honneur et à la dignité demeurent constants et semblent même s'intensifier du fait de l'activité déployée par des personnes étrangères au fonctionnement normal et réglementaire des camps de prisonniers de guerre : les représentants d'un département de "l'éducation politique et idéologique", les membres de mouvements d'opposition iraqiens réfugiés en République islamique d'Iran, la presse officielle, tendent à monter les prisonniers contre leur gouvernement. Le CICR est intervenu à de très nombreuses reprises, de façon détaillée et argumentée, auprès des plus Hautes Autorités de la République islamique d'Iran pour qu'elles mettent un terme à ces pratiques que les Etats ont entendu bannir lors de l'élaboration de la IIIe Convention de Genève. Le CICR a surbordonné la reprise de ses activités à l'abandon de ces pratiques, l'exercice de son mandat étant incompatible et inconciliable avec les efforts entrepris pour conditionner politiquement et idéologiquement les prisonniers. Le CICR n'a, à ce jour, pas reçu de réponse satisfaisante aux représentations, écrites et orales, entreprises à ce sujet auprès du Gouvernement de la République islamique d'Iran.

B. Civils iraqiens réfugiés en République islamique d'Iran

Les tentatives du CICR pour apporter des secours à ces populations, composées notamment de Kurdes iraqiens ayant fui leur contrée d'origine et actuellement hébergées dans des camps sis en République islamique d'Iran, ont échoué. Le CICR sait que ces populations connaissent des besoins, tant alimentaires que médicaux. De par leur statut de ressortissants d'une Puissance ennemie, ces personnes tombent sous l'empire de la IVe Convention de Genève relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre et devraient, à ce titre, être mises au bénéfice de l'aide que peut leur apporter une organisation telle que le CICR.

*
* *

REPUBLIQUE D'IRAQ

A. Prisonniers de guerre iraniens internés en République d'Iraq

1. Chaque mois, sans discontinuer depuis octobre 1980, les délégués du CICR ont visité les prisonniers de guerre iraniens, actuellement au nombre de 7.300, répartis dans six camps d'internement. Ces visites se déroulent conformément aux modalités prévues par l'article 126 de la IIIe Convention de Genève, qui précise notamment que les délégués pourront s'entretenir librement et sans témoin avec les prisonniers de leur choix.

   D'une manière générale, les prisonniers de guerre nouvellement capturés sont enregistrés par le CICR dans des délais raisonnables.

   La transmission des messages Croix-Rouge entre les prisonniers et leurs familles fonctionne dans l'ensemble, bien que des retards parfois importants soient encore causés par la censure iraqienne.

2. Dans les camps eux-mêmes, le CICR a noté certaines améliorations sensibles des conditions matérielles de l'internement. D'autre part, des mesures ont été prises par les autorités responsables pour mettre fin aux pratiques brutales et arbitraires qui avaient été relevées, à de nombreuses reprises, par le CICR : une amélioration du traitement disciplinaire a pu être constatée depuis l'automne 1983.

3. En date du 29 janvier 1984, 190 prisonniers iraniens, dont 87 grands blessés et malades, ont été remis à Ankara par les autorités iraqiennes au CICR en vue de leur rapatriement en République islamique d'Iran.

4. Le CICR note avec inquiétude qu'un nombre important de militaires ennemis, soldats et officiers, capturés parfois dès le début du conflit par les forces armées iraqiennes, sont encore à ce jour incarcérés dans des centres de détention auxquels le CICR n'a pas accès. Des listes nominatives, établissant l'existence de plusieurs centaines de ces prisonniers de guerre, ont été régulièrement remises par le CICR aux autorités militaires et gouvernementales de la République d'Iraq.

   Le CICR note avec satisfaction que plusieurs dizaines de ces prisonniers, capturés au début du conflit, ont pu être enregistrés par le CICR à fin 83 et intégrés dans les camps d'internement que visite le CICR.

   Le CICR a tout lieu d'être inquiet pour ces prisonniers maintenus au secret, privés de leurs droits les plus essentiels et qui connaîtraient, selon des informations multiples et concordantes, des conditions de détention non conformes aux exigences du droit humanitaire.

B. <u>Civils iraniens déportés ou réfugiés en République d'Iraq</u>

1. Plusieurs dizaines de milliers de civils iraniens, originaires des régions frontalières du Khouzistan et du Kurdistan, ont été déplacés, au cours du conflit, en territoire iraqien.

   Les autorités iraqiennes ont désormais accepté le principe d'une présence régulière du CICR auprès de ces civils et des efforts importants ont été récemment consentis en vue d'améliorer leurs conditions d'existence là où cela était jugé nécessaire.

2. Par ailleurs, le CICR a enregistré, dès le début du conflit, plus d'un millier de civils, dans les camps de prisonniers de guerre, dont des vieillards et des femmes, arrêtés dans les territoires occupés par les rorces armées iraqiennes. Bien que des rapatriements successifs aient permis de libérer plusieurs centaines de ces personnes, une solution d'ensemble reste à trouver.

C. Bombardements de zones civiles par les forces armées iraqiennes

Les forces armées iraqiennes ont poursuivi leurs bombardements indiscriminés et systématiques d'agglomérations ıraniennes situées, parfois, à plus de 200 km de la ligne de front. Des pertes humaines, parfois en grand nombre, et des destructions considérables de biens strictement civils ont été ainsi causées. Ces attaques délibérées de personnes et biens civils, annoncées parfois comme représailles, violent les lois et coutumes de la guerre, notamment le principe essentiel de la distinction à faire entre les objectifs militaires et les personnes et biens civils.

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COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE

Original: French

Second Memorandum from the International Committee of the Red Cross to the States Parties to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 concerning the conflict between Islamic Republic of Iran and Republic of Iraq

Geneva, 10 February 1984

17, AVENUE DE LA PAIX - CH-1211 GENÈVE - TÉLÉPHONE: (022) 34 60 01 - TÉLÉGRAMME: INTERCROIXROUGE - TÉLEX: 22 269 - CHÈQUES POSTAUX: 12-5527

On 7 May 1983, the International Committee of the Red Cross was compelled to address an appeal to all the States Parties to the Geneva Conventions. With reference to the solemn undertaking of these States to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions at all times, the ICRC asked them to make every effort to ensure the rigorous application of International Humanitarian Law by the two belligerent states i.e. the Islamic Republic of Iran on the one hand and the Republic of Iraq on the other, and to enable the ICRC to effectively perform its humanitarian task of helping the great number of civilian and military victims of this conflict.

Nine months after making its first Appeal, the ICRC notes that the results hoped for have been achieved only to a very limited degree, and it feels that the States Parties to the Conventions should be informed of the lack of respect for the principles of Humanitarian Law in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq.

The ICRC wishes to stress that its two memoranda concern serious infringements of International Humanitarian Law which are known to have occurred and which endanger the lives and liberty of the tens of thousands of people caught up in this conflict, and which flout the very spirit and principles of that law. These infringements, if unchecked, may, in time, bring into discredit those rules of law and universal principles which the States Parties to the Conventions laid down to provide human beings with a better defence against the evils of war.

From its experience the ICRC is conscious that increasingly numerous violations of International Humanitarian Law have invariably placed insurmountable obstacles in the way of peace negotiations, even when all belligerents wished to end the conflict. For example, recent conflicts have been needlessly prolonged because no agreement was reached on arrangements concerning prisoners of war. The ICRC thus calls upon the States working towards the restoration of peace in the region to consider most carefully the problems which will inevitably arise because of the infringements of the Geneva Conventions by the belligerents.

In particular, the ICRC would ask States, in the course of their dealings with each of the two parties to the conflict, to broach the humanitarian questions which are hereby submitted to them. The States are also urged to lend their active support to the ICRC's efforts to help the victims of the conflict which is strictly within the terms of the humanitarian mandate assigned to the ICRC through the Geneva Conventions. Finally, the ICRC hopes that discussions will be held to designate Protecting Powers willing to undertake the tasks encumbent on such states by the Geneva Conventions. Naturally, the ICRC would wish to work closely with the Protecting Powers.

The ICRC is convinced that the States Parties to the Conventions are aware of what is truly at stake in the steps proposed, and that it will be their desire and intention to translate into action the commitment which they undertook in adopting Article 1 common to the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

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ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

A. Iraqi prisoners of war interned in the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. The activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross in favour of the Iraqi prisoners were again suspended on 27 July 1983. The ICRC considers that, in general terms, it has not been able to discharge its mandate as prescribed by the Third Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war for almost two years.

At present, some 50,000 prisoners are without the international protection to which they are entitled by virtue of their status.

In this connection, the ICRC is no longer able to perform the following tasks:

- To ascertain the precise number of prisoners of war and to ascertain how they are distributed among various places of internment.

- To obtain information on the identity and state of health of each prisoner of war in order to notify his family and the Iraqi Government.

- To monitor the material, psychological and disciplinary conditions of internment by means of regular visits to the camps and interviews without witness with the prisoners.

- To draw up lists of prisoners of war who should quickly be repatriated because of severe wounds or illness.

- To maintain effective surveillance of the flow of Red Cross messages between the prisoners and their families.

These tasks of surveillance are all categorically stipulated in the Convention and constitute indispensable requirements for the effective protection of prisoners by ICRC delegates.

2. Numerous facts and indications, when considered together, arouse great concern on the part of the ICRC with regard to the fate of the prisoners and the authorities' real reasons for preventing the ICRC from carrying out its activities. The ICRC has noted the following specific points:

- The ICRC has constantly been denied access to certain categories of prisoners such as high-ranking officers.

- Severe sentences have been passed on a number of prisoners. Despite repeated demands, the ICRC has received neither notifications nor explanations which should, by law, have been submitted to it.

- Serious incidents have occurred in certain camps. Furthermore, among the death certificates issued by the Iranian authorities for members of the enemy armed forces "killed in action", the ICRC has received a number which were despatched very tardily and without any comment in relations to persons who were known to have been interned in the Islamic Republic of Iran for many years, since they had been registered and visited on several occasions by ICRC delegates.

- Ideological and political pressure, intimidation, systematic "re-education" and attacks on the honour and dignity of the prisoners have remained a constant feature of life in the camps, and even seem to increase as a result of the activities of certain persons having no connection with the normal running of the camps. Representatives of a "department of political and ideological education", members of Iraqi opposition groups who have fled to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the official press all attempt to incite the prisoners against their government. On many occasions, the ICRC has submitted to the highest authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran detailed and clearly reasoned requests that a stop should be put to these practices which States, in drawing up the Third Geneva Convention, agreed to ban. The ICRC has made the abolition of these practices a condition for the resumption of its activities, since the discharge of its mandate is incompatible and irreconcilable with attempts at political and ideological conditioning of prisoners. To date, the ICRC has received no satisfactory reply to the written and oral representations which it has made on the subject to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

B. Iraqi civilian refugees in the Islamic Republic of Iran

The ICRC has failed in its attempts to bring aid to these groups, consisting mainly of Iraqi Kurds who have fled from their home territory and are now living in camps in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The ICRC knows that these groups are in great need of food and medicine. By virtue of their status as refugees from an enemy power, these people come under the aegis of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilians in time of war. They should therefore be allowed to receive the aid which an organization such as the ICRC could provide.

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REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

A. Iranian prisoners of war held in the Republic of Iraq

1. Every month without fail since October 1980, ICRC delegates have visited Iranian prisoners of war, who currently number 7,300 and are held in six internment camps. The visits take place in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 126 of the Third Geneva Convention, a main stipulation of which is that the delegates should be able to talk freely and without witnesses with prisoners of their choice.

   As a rule, prisoners of war are registered by the ICRC within a reasonably short time of being captured.

   On the whole, the exchange of Red Cross messages between the prisoners and their families works well, though delays which may sometimes be quite long are still caused by the Iraqi censorship procedure.

2. In the camps themselves, the ICRC has observed a number of significant improvements in the material conditions of internment. Moreover, the authorities have taken steps to put an end to the random acts of brutality to which the ICRC drew their attention on many previous occasions. Furthermore, an improvement in disciplinary measures has been apparent since autumn 1983.

3. On 29 January 1984, 190 Iranian prisoners, 87 of whom were severely wounded or sick, were handed over by the Iraqi authorities to the ICRC in Ankara for repatriation.

4. The ICRC is concerned by the fact that a large number of members of the enemy armed forces, both officers and other ranks, some of whom were taken prisoner by the Iraqi armed forces at the beginning of the conflict, are still being held in detention centres to which the ICRC is denied access. The ICRC has regularly submitted to the government and military authorities of Iraq lists of names showing that several hundred such prisoners of war exist. The ICRC mentions with satisfaction that at the end of 1983 it was allowed to register several dozens of these prisoners, who had been captured at the start of the conflict and have now been placed in camps visited by the ICRC.

   The ICRC has good grounds to be concerned about the prisoners held in places to which it does not have access. These prisoners are deprived of their most basic rights and, according to many mutually corroborating sources of information, are held in conditions which do not meet the requirements of humanitarian law.

B. <u>Iranian civilians who have been deported to or taken refuge in the Republic of Iraq</u>

1. During the conflict, several tens of thousands of Iranian civilians have been displaced from their homes in the frontier areas of Khuzestan and Kurdistan to Iraqi territory.

   The Iraqi authorities have accepted that in principle the ICRC should be present from now on among these civilians, and considerable efforts have recently been made to improve the living conditions of these civilians when it was necessary.

2. Since the start of the conflict, the ICRC has registered more than a thousand civilians in the prisoner-of-war camps, including women and elderly men arrested in the territories occupied by the Iraqi armed forces. Although it has been possible to repatriate several hundred of these people, an overall solution to the problem still has to be found.

C. Bombing of civilian areas by the Iraqi armed forces

The Iraqi air force has continued to carry out regular indiscriminate bombing of Iranian built-up areas, sometimes more than 200 km from the front. The result has been loss of life, sometimes on a large scale, and considerable destruction of purely civilian property. These deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian property are sometimes designated as reprisals; they contravene the laws and customs of war, in particular with regard to the basic principle that a distinction must be made between military objectives and civilian persons and property.

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 337 OF 20 FEBRUARY
AND TO MOSCOW
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, UKMIS NEW YORK
IRAN/IRAQ

1. YESTERDAY'S AND TODAY'S UK NEWSPAPERS CARRY PROMINENT REPORTS THAT IRANIAN FORCES HAVE BEEN PUT ON MAXIMUM ALERT TO PREVENT THE PASSAGE OF HOSTILE FORCES THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, AND THAT THE US NAVAL TASK FORCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN HAS MOVED INTO THE GULF OF OMAN. WE HAVE NO (NO) INDICATIONS OF ANY ABNORMAL ACTIVITY BY THE IRANIANS, AND NOTE THAT THE AMERICANS SHARE OUR ASSESSMENT THAT REPORTS OF THE IRANIAN LAND OFFENSIVE HAVE BEEN EXAGGERATED (YOUR TELNO 586 - NOT TO ALL). WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THE DISPOSITION OF THE US TASK FORCE IS UNCHANGED.

2. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MAY BE PRESSED IN THE HOUSE ON US INTENTIONS AND ON WHETHER THE US HAVE COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE RUSSIANS ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE GULF. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, DENIS HEALEY HAS RAISED THIS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT SHOULD LET THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT KNOW THAT IF WESTERN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE GULF BECAME NECESSARY IT WOULD BE STRICTLY LIMITED AND CONSTITUTE NO THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE SHALL NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS IN BRIEFING THE PRIME MINISTER FOR QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE TOMORROW.

3. WE IMAGINE THAT THERE MAY WELL HAVE BEEN SOME EXCHANGES BET-

WEEN THE AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS ON THIS PROBLEM ON THE DOBRYNIN CHANNEL FOLLOWING FROM THE CARTER STATEMENT OF 1980. UNLESS YOU ALREADY KNOW HOW MATTERS STAND BETWEEN THEM ON THIS SUBJECT, GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD GO OVER THE GROUND WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT. MINISTERS WILL WISH TO BE ABLE TO SAY IN THE HOUSE IF ASKED THAT THE US ARE AWARE OF OUR VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR SOME CONTACT BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS IN THIS SUBJECT. GRATEFUL THEREFORE FOR REPORT DESKBY 210900Z.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Report overleaf.

20 February 1984

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P.a.

Dear John,

Thank you for your letter of 15 February about Mr Healey's concern at the situation in the Gulf, and his view that the Americans should make clear to the Soviet Government that if any Western intervention became necessary, it would be strictly limited and would not constitute a threat to them.

We agreed that Sir Oliver Wright should be instructed to discuss this subject with the Americans. In advance of the meeting of OD(EM) tomorrow, you might wish to have the enclosed copy of our telegram of instructions. As you will see, we have asked for a report from Washington to be available before OD(EM).

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
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2015 00Z / 1530Z
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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO
AND TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, UKMIS NEW YORK
IRAN/IRAQ

1. Yesterday's and today's UK newspapers carry prominent reports that Iranian forces have been put on maximum alert to prevent the passage of hostile forces through the Straits of Hormuz, and that the US naval task force in the Indian Ocean has moved into the Gulf of Oman. We have no (no) indications of any abnormal activity by the Iranians, and note that the Americans share our assessment that reports of the Iranian land offensive have been exaggerated (your telno 586 - not to all). We also understand that the disposition of the US task force is unchanged.

2. You should know that the Prime Minister may be pressed in the House on US intentions and on whether the US have come to an understanding with the Russians about military

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Drafted by (Block capitals): P F RICKETTS		
Telephone number: 233-4641		
Authorised for despatch: P F Ricketts		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

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activity in the Gulf. For your own information, Denis Healey has raised this with the Prime Minister and has suggested that the US Government should let the Soviet Government know that if Western military intervention in the Gulf became necessary it would be strictly limited and constitute no threat to the Soviet Union. We shall need to take account of this in briefing the Prime Minister for questions in the House tomorrow.

3. We imagine that there may well have been some exchanges between the Americans and Russians (on this problem) on the Dobrynin channel following from the Carter statement of ~~1979~~ 1980. Unless you already know how matters stand between them on this subject, grateful if you could go over the ground with the State Department. Ministers will wish to be able to say in the House if asked that the US are aware of our views on the need for some contact between the US and Soviet Governments in this ~~area~~ subject. Grateful therefore for report DESKBY 210900Z.

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Iraq: Internal Situation pt 3



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 February 1984

Dear Peter,

Iran/Iraq

Following the escalation of fighting in the Gulf in the last few days, the Prime Minister has asked me to seek answers to various questions. I appreciate that your answers cannot be made available in time for OD(EM) tomorrow. And it may be that it would be more appropriate for the work to be done by the Joint Intelligence Committee. In any event, I should be grateful if answers to the questions below could be made available in the next few days.

The points in which the Prime Minister is particularly interested are as follows:

(a) How widespread in the Middle East is the appeal of the Iranian revolution? To what extent do Shi'a communities in the Middle East look to Khomeini for leadership?

(b) To what extent would these Shi'a communities act as fifth columns if Iranian forces moved beyond Iraq to other Gulf states and further afield?

(c) Which Arab Governments support Khomeini and which would continue to do so if he overcame Iraqi resistance and moved on to other points in the Middle East?

(d) What is our current assessment of Khomeini's ability to achieve military victory over Iraq and bring about the fall of Saddam Hussain?

(e) Has Khomeini created sufficient links with Iraqi dissidents so that, if Saddam Hussain fell, he could install himself in Baghdad, Basra and a few major towns without committing his main forces?

(f) If the Iranians broke through on the central front, is it likely that the Baghdad regime would fall in a matter of days? And if so, would the US Rapid Deployment Force and fleet be in any position to take effective countermeasures?

(g) What help in resisting the Iranian advance could be expected from:

(i) Egypt (It has been suggested to the Prime Minister that Egyptian public opinion is pro-Khomeini and that Egypt lacks fighting units of any merit.)

(ii) Pakistan (To what extent is that country attracted by Moslem fundamentalism?)

(iii) Turkey (Is it likely that the Turks would be prepared to offer military resistance to an Iranian advance?)

(iv) France (Are French forces in Djibouti capable of moving to the Gulf in a short time and would the French Government be likely to contemplate military action against the Iranians?)

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Charles.

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 February 1984

Escalation of the War in the Gulf

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend the Cabinet Office record of 17 February about the meeting held that day under the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's chairmanship to consider the situation in the Gulf.

You told me on Friday that Sir Oliver Wright is being instructed to discuss with the State Department the desirability of US/Soviet contacts on the Gulf.

The Prime Minister has commented that she wishes to discuss the situation in the Gulf, with the Ministers concerned, very early this week. She believes that we need to develop further our contingency plans, together with the Americans, with regard to diplomatic activity.

A meeting of OD(EM) is being arranged.

I am copying this letter to Michael Reidy (Department of Energy), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TO PRIORITY F C O
TELNO 91 OF 19 FEB 84,
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, AND ROUTINE PARIS, STOCKHOLM, GULF POSTS, AMMAN, CAIRO, UKDEL NATO, THE HAGUE.

MY TELEGRAM NO 87 : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. KITTANI BRIEFED REPRESENTATIVES OF CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL YESTERDAY EXPLAINING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS MINISTER TO CLARIFY, IN THE LIGHT OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND DISTORTIONS IN NEW YORK, IRAQ'S RESPONSE TO THE UN MISSION. CALLAN ATTENDED IN MY ABSENCE.

2. KITTANI SAID THAT HIS TASK WAS RENDERED STRAIGHTFORWARD BY THE SECOND IRANIAN REPLY (OF 17 FEBRUARY) WHICH HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IRAN EXCLUDED ANY POLITICAL DIMENSION TO THE MISSION. KITTANI REGRETTED THAT AN IMPRESSION HAD SOMEHOW BEEN CREATED THAT IRAQ HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT IT. EVEN A QUICK READING OF THEIR REPLY WOULD HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY WELCOMED IT PROVIDED THAT ITS MANDATE PERMITTED CONSIDERATION OF THE CONFLICT AS A WHOLE, INCLUDING CIVILIAN DAMAGE. KITTANI EMPHASISED THAT IRAQ DID NOT OBJECT TO THE INCLUSION OF CIVILIAN DAMAGE: INDEED IT WOULD BE ESPECIALLY WELCOME NOW GIVEN THE LARGE AMOUNT OF CIVILIAN DAMAGE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER. IRAQ HAD BEEN, AND STILL REMAINED, ANXIOUS TO CO-OPERATE IN ANY CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END. THIS WAS IN STARK CONTRAST TO IRAN'S VILIFICATION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. KITTANI MADE IT CLEAR THAT IRAQ FELT COMPLETELY JUSTIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS IN HAVING ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE MISSION'S MANDATE. HE CRITICISED THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL FOR ITS LACK OF CLARITY AND COMMENTED UNFAVOURABLY ON THE FACT THAT IRAQ'S REPLY HAD BEEN CIRCULATED AFTER THE IRANIAN ONE.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 112 OF 19 FEBRUARY
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DI4), BAGHDAD, GULF POSTS, ANKARA, ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, UKDEL NATO AND MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 109: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. IRANIAN AIRCRAFT REPORTEDLY ATTACKED FURTHER TARGETS INSIDE IRAQ, NOTABLY AT AL-I GHARBI BETWEEN KUT AND AMARA, ON 17 FEBRUARY. AN IRAQI AIRCRAFT BROKE THE SOUND BARRIER OVER TEHRAN AT 2245 LOCAL TIME ON 17 FEBRUARY.

2. ON 18 FEBRUARY IRAN ANNOUNCED THAT SHE WAS STOPPING HER RETALIATORY ATTACKS AGAINST IRAQI TOWNS IN ORDER TO SEE HOW SINCERE IRAQ WAS ABOUT HER ANNOUNCED CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENT OF IRANIAN TOWNS. HOWEVER IRAN WOULD RENEW HER RETALIATION IF IRAQ ATTACKED CIVILIAN TARGETS AGAIN.

3. THE FIRST PHASE OF VAL FAJR 5 APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A FAIRLY SMALL OPERATION AND TO HAVE ENDED. IT EVIDENTLY INVOLVED RECAPTURING OR CAPTURING ABOUT 60 SQ KM OF TERRITORY WEST OF CHANGULEH, INCLUDING SOME HEIGHTS WHICH OVERLOOK THE IRAQI PLAIN. THE RELATIVELY SMALL SCALE OF THE OPERATION CAN BE JUDGED BY THE IRANIAN CLAIM OF 2,200 IRAQI CASUALTIES.

4. THE IRANIAN DECISION TO STOP BOMBARDING TARGETS INSIDE IRAQ COULD BE RELATED IN PART TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE UN. IT MIGHT CONCEIVABLY HELP REOPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A MISSION VISITING THE AREA.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 586 OF 18 FEBRUARY 1984

YOUR TELNO 334 AND OUR JICTEL NO 040: POSSIBLE ESCALATION OF THE GULF WAR.

1. WE PUT THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF FIRST TUR TO PLACKE (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT).

2. PLACKE SAID THAT THE CONSENSUS OF US ANALYSTS WAS THAT MEDIA REPORTS OF THE IRANIAN OFFENSIVE HAD BEEN MUCH EXAGGERATED. THE IRANIANS HAD MOUNTED TWO RELATIVELY SMALL CROSS-BORDER PROBES, ONE IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR AND ONE SOME EIGHTY MILES FURTHER SOUTH. THE IRANIANS TERMED IT THE OPENING OF VAL FAGR V AND IT DID NOT SEEM TO BE MORE THAN THAT, ALTHOUGH IT COULD TURN OUT TO BE A PRELIMINARY TO AN OFFENSIVE ON A LARGER SCALE. IT HAD PERHAPS BEEN ACCELERATED BY IRAQI STATEMENTS AND PROVOCATION. PLACKE NOTED THAT IRANIAN ARTILLERY BARRAGES WERE CONTINUING, BUT THAT THE IRAQIS HAD SO FAR HONOURED THEIR UNILATERAL UNDERTAKING, ANNOUNCED ON 14 FEBRUARY, TO HALT ATTACKS ON IRANIAN CITIES FOR A PERIOD OF ONE WEEK.

3. PLACKE CONFIRMED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD SPOKEN TO THE HEAD OF THE IRAQI INTERESTS SECTION TO URGE RESTRAINT. EAGLETON WOULD BE TAKING PARALLEL ACTION IN BAGHDAD ON 18 FEBRUARY. THE AMERICANS WERE SEEKING TO PERSUADE OTHERS TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTION IN BOTH BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN.

4. AS TO IRAQI ABILITY TO WITHSTAND AN IRANIAN OFFENSIVE, PLACKE NOTED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD HELD FIRM FOR SOME TWO YEARS. IRANIAN TACTICTS HAD NOT IMPROVED. THE IRAQIS HAD CONSTRUCTED EXTENSIVE DEFENSIVE WORKS AND THE DISPARITY IN THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE TWO SIDES HAD INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY IN THEIR FAVOUR. THEY SHOULD IN THEORY BY ABLE TO HOLD OFF THE IRANIANS. BUT THERE REMAINED QUESTION-MARKS OVER THEIR MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND MORALE.

5. PLACKE THOUGHT THAT IRAQI AIR STRIKES FURTHER DOWN THE GULF WERE POSSIBLE BUT NOT IMMINENT. THE RECENT PROPENSITY OF BOTH SIDES TO ATTACK CIVILIAN TARGETS WAS DISTURBING. THE IRAQI ATTACK ON THE BANDAR KHOMEINI PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX WAS IN PART A REFLECTION OF THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH UNSUCCESSFUL JAPANESE EFFORTS AT MEDIATION. THIS COULD EXTEND TO ATTACKS ON OIL SUPPLIES. BUT PLACKE THOUGHT THAT ANY SUCH IRAQI ESCALATION WAS LIKELY TO BE GRADUAL, BOTH FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON THE IRANIANS AND TO MINIMISE ADVERSE INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS.

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6. PLACKE FULLY ENDORSED THE NEED FOR US TO KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH AND IS LOOKING FORWARD TO SIR J LEAHY'S VISIT. IN ADDITION TO TALKS WITH MURPHY AND EAGLEBURGER, WE HAVE ARRANGED FOR SIR J LEAHY TO HAVE SEPARATE MEETINGS ON THE GULF WITH PLACKE, FAIRBANKS, ADMIRAL HOWE AND KEMP (NSC). TEICHER (NSC STAFF), TO WHOM WE SPOKE BEFORE RECEIVING YOUR TUR, SAID THAT THE NSC STAFF HAD BEEN GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO WHETHER THE JUNE ECONOMIC SUMMIT SHOULD BE INVITED TO ADDRESS THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FURTHER RESTRICTION OF OIL SUPPLIES. THIS MIGHT USEFULLY HELP TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE SITUATION IN THE GULF. THIS MAY BE RAISED WITH SIR J LEAHY ON 22 FEBRUARY.

7. WE HAVE SPOKEN ALSO TO KEMP (NSC). HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO DISCUSS CONTINGENCIES IN THE GULF WITH LEAHY. THE AMERICANS DID NOT YET HAVE ENOUGH INTELLIGENCE FULLY TO ESTIMATE THE SCOPE OF THE IRANIAN OFFENSIVE, BUT THE EARLY REPORTS HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED. THE AMERICANS WOULD GO ON URGING RESTRAINT ON THE IRAQIS AND HOPED THAT OTHERS WOULD DO SO. WHAT WAS RESTRAINING THEM SO FAR, HOWEVER, WAS NOT DIPLOMATIC DEMARCHES BUT FEARS THAT THEIR AIR FORCE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY SOUTH OF BANDAR KHOMEINI. THE IRAQIS SEEMED TO BE TRYING TO PLAN SOME SORT OF LAND COUNTER-OFFENSIVE WHICH THE AMERICANS THOUGHT PRETTY ILL ADVISED.

8. IF IRAQI ATTACKS IN THE GULF DID INTENSIVY, THE IRANIAN RESPONSE WAS LIKLEY TO B FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM IN SOME OF THE GULF STATES. THE AMERICANS DID NOT INTEND TO RUSH IN. SUCH ACTS WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH PRIMARILY BY STIFFENING THE RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. IF THE STRAITS WERE CLOSED THAT WOULD BE A DIFFERANT MATTER, AND THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF REQUESTS FROM THE STATES IN THE REGION.

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 334 OF 17 FEBRUARY
POSSIBLE ESCALATION OF THE GULF WAR

1. AT A MEETING OF MINISTERS ON 17 FEBRUARY GREAT UNCERTAINTY WAS EXPRESSED ON HOW THE U S ADMINISTRATION MIGHT REACT TO THE LATEST IRANIAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST IRAQ, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THEIR EXPERIENCES IN LEBANON. IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO KEEP IN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE TOUCH WITH ALL U S DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES CONCERNED WITH GULF CONTINGENCY PLANNING (INCLUDING PLANS ON OIL SUPPLIES AND STOCKS), SO AS TO DISSUADE THE ADMINISTRATION FROM PRECIPITATE ACTION WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE RISK OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST DESTABILISATION OF MODERATE GULF REGIMES. IT WAS ACCEPTED THAT IF THE IRANIANS TOOK STEPS E G TO TRY TO CLOSE THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, THE FIRST PRIORITY WOULD BE DIPLOMATIC ACTION TO ATTEMPT TO DE-ESCALATE THE CRISIS, E G HIGH-LEVEL APPROACHES TO URGE RESTRAINT ON THE IRAQIS. WE SHOULD STRESS TO THE U S THAT ANY MILITARY RESPONSE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO PROTECTIVE MEASURES, E G CONVOYING AND MINE-CLEARING OPERATIONS. THOUGH THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN COVERED (E G DURING RAPHEL'S VISIT TO LONDON IN DECEMBER), IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT WE SHOULD QO OVER THE GROUND AGAIN WITH THE AMERICANS ON DIOLOMATIC STEPS TO BE TAKEN BEFORE, OR IN PARALLEL WITH, MILITARY INTERVENTION AFTER ANY IRANIAN MILITARY ACTION.

2. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE VISIT OF SIR J LEAHY TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK, AND THE MEETINGS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE AND MR WEINBERGER (ABOUT 26 FEBRUARY) AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY WITH MR HODEL (ABOUT 6 MARCH), WOULD BE SUITABLE OCCASIONS FOR FURTHER TAKING OF THE US PULSE ON THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF GULF CONTINQENCY PLANNING (INCLUDING THE IEA EMERGENCY SHARING SCHEME), AND FOR FEEDINQ IN OUR OWN IDEAS.

3. SINCE THE MINISTERIAL MEETING MENTIONED ABOVE TOOK PLACE, US EMBASSY HAVE TOLD US THAT THEIR INTERESTS SECTION IN BAGHDAD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO URGE RESTRAINT ON THE IRAQIS AND PRESS THEM TO CEASE ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN TARGETS. THIS IS WELCOME NEWS, SO FAR AS IT QOES.

4. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD NOW COMPARE NOTES AT AN AOPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND NSC ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(I) HOW DO THEY SEE THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND FOLLOWING THE LAUNCHING OF THE VAL FAJR V ATTACK ON 16 FEBRUARY AND THE IRAQI COUNTER-ATTACK? DO THEY BELIEVE THAT THE IRAQIS CAN HOLD THE IRANIANS IN THIS SECTOR?

(II) DO THEY THINK THAT DIVERSIONARY IRAQI AIR STRIKES FURTHER DOWN THE GULF THAN BANDAR KHOMEINI ARE IMMINENT?

(III) WE WELCOME THE ACTION THEY HAVE ALREADY TAKEN IN URGING THE IRAQIS TO CEASE ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN TARGETS. AS AND WHEN THEY FORESEE DANGER TO WESTERN SHIOPING IN THE GULF OUTSIDE THE IRAQI MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE, WE TRUST THEY WILL CONTINUE TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE IN BAGHDAD TO URGE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT.

(IV) WE BELIEVE THERE IS GREATER NEED THAN EVER TO KEEP VERY CLOSE IN OUR CONSULTATIONS ON GULF CONTINGENCY PLANNING, WHICH HAVE GONE WELL SO FAR. THIS WILL BE A PRIME AIM OF SIR J LEAHY'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK (HE WILL AIM TO CALL AT N S C AS WELL AS ON STATE DEPARTMENT).

(V) AS IRANIAN REACTIONS TO ANY IRAQI RAIDS ON KHARG WHICH ARE LESS THAN 100 PER CENT SUCCESSFUL MAY FALL WELL SHORT OF ATTEMPTS TO BLOCK THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, WE BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AGAIN ON THE RANGE OF DIPOLMATIC STEPS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO DEFUSE A CRISIS BEFORE IT ESCALATED TO THE POINT OF IRANIAN MILITARY ACTION TO BLOCK THE STRAITS. LEAHY WILL BRING WITH HIM SOME IDEAS ON THIS ASPECT.

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SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON

COPIES TO
PS/CHANCELLOR OF EXCHEQUER.
PS/MR PETER WALKER
PS/MR HESELTINE.
MR JAGO, CAB OFF.
MR ONEILL JIC
MR COLES, NO 10.

SECRET

C

Prime Minister 22A

Sir Oliver Wright is being instructed to discuss with Mr. Eagleburger the desirability of US/Soviet contacts on the Gulf.

A J.C. 17/2

ESCALATION OF THE WAR IN THE GULF

RECORD of a Meeting held in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office at 10.30 am on FRIDAY 17 FEBRUARY 1984

We must discuss this again very early next week. We must have more underlying plans with the Americans & necessary diplomatic activity, pls

PRESENT

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP	Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (in the Chair)
The Rt Hon Peter Walker MP	Secretary of State for Energy
The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP	Secretary of State for Defence
Mr Ian Stewart MP	Economic Secretary, Treasury
Mr S L Egerton	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Mr I P Wilson	Treasury
Mr S Robson	Treasury
Mr J Wiggins	Department of Energy
Air Marshal D P Hall	Ministry of Defence
Mr J M Legge	Ministry of Defence
Mr R J O'Neill	Cabinet Office
Mr D E J Jago	Cabinet Office
Mr D Brennan	Cabinet Office

The meeting considered the escalation of the war in the Gulf. They had before them an immediate assessment (JIC(84)(IA)5) describing developments in the war.

MR O'NEILL said that the situation in the war between Iran and Iraq had not changed greatly from that described in the immediate assessment. The fighting was continuing, and was confined to Iranian territory. It was doubtful that the Iranian armed forces had the capability to advance far. The Iranians had sustained damage from Iraqi missile attacks, to which they could not respond in kind. The Iranians' immediate objectives were not clear, but they might be aiming to cut the road between Baghdad and Basra. In the longer term, they wished to wear down Iraq's willingness to resist, and to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. If the Iranians achieved a substantial breakthrough, Iraq might become desperate and escalate its attacks upon Iran.

SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENDRGY said that a number of oil companies expected an increase in hostilities in the Gulf in the next few weeks. Some nine million barrels per day (mbd) of oil were exported from the Gulf area. If the Straits of Hormuz were blocked, only one and a half mbd would be exported making a shortfall of seven and a half mbd. If other oil producing nations increased their output, the shortfall might be reduced to four mbd, which was 9% of the world's supplies. If there were no increase in output, because other oil producing countries preferred to see the price of oil rise, the shortfall would be 16% of the world's supplies. In the circumstances of a shortfall, it would be important to implement the International Energy Agency's (IEA) emergency allocation scheme, and to persuade the United States to release as much as possible of their strategic reserve of oil. Action within the European Community should be avoided, since the United Kingdom would be looked to for assistance in providing oil to other members. The United States administration had earlier said that they would co-operate in IEA action in the event of disruption to oil supplies, but it was possible that they might instead decide to allow market forces to effect the necessary redistribution of supplies. This could lead to a sharp rise in the price of oil, which would be damaging to the prospects for world economic recovery.

In discussion the following points were made -

(a) The Iranians had stated publicly that they would close the Straits of Hormuz if they were themselves struck in such a way as to halt their oil exports. It was unlikely, however, that they would be able to sustain a closure for long. They were unlikely to mine the Straits, but might mount attacks on neutral shipping, which would make shipping reluctant to pass through the Straits.

(b) The reaction of the United States to an interruption in oil supplies would be crucial. Every attempt should be made to steer them away from taking precipitate military action, which would greatly increase tension in the area, and could provoke a response by the Soviet Union. It would be desirable for the American element of any Western response to the closure of the Straits to be as unobtrusive as possible in order that the Iranians should not be provoked into taking wholesale action against Western interests. The United States might be asked to

not what a separate JIC assessment says. AR 17.2

exercise a restraining influence upon Iraq, with whom her relations were improving.

(c) Diplomatic action to try to bring an end to hostilities in the Gulf was continuing, but the prospects for success were not good.

(d) The present escalation of hostilities might result in an increase in the price of oil. If the situation worsened, and oil supplies were interrupted, larger increases in oil prices could be expected, particularly if the United States did not release their reserves. Short-term fluctuations in oil prices would probably be manageable, and prices in the range of $35 to $40 a barrel were tolerable.

(e) The Director of Military Assistance Overseas, Major General Dennis, had recently concluded a tour of the Gulf States. As previously agreed by Ministers, he had concentrated on offering those States British assistance in developing their indigenous defensive capabilities against the possibility that they might come under attack from Iran. Defence Ministers of the Gulf Co-ordination Council were meeting on 25 February, and were expected then to reach conclusions as to the sorts of assistance they might require. The Omanis had declined the offer to bring to a greater state of readiness the mine counter-measures force which might be deployed to the Gulf, since this would have involved them in paying for a ship to be taken up from trade. More generally, the intention should be that the Gulf States would meet the cost of any assistance provided to them.

(f) Although the Iraqis had in theory the military capability to respond to Iranian attacks by sharply escalating hostilities, it was unlikely that they would be competent to organise concerted and effective military action on a greater scale than they had so far achieved.

THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY, summing up the discussion, said that it seemed clear that the war between Iran and Iraq would continue. The meeting were agreed that no measures of military preparedness by the United Kingdom to respond to a further escalation in hostilities were required at this stage. Every effort should be made to monitor the United States' thinking on the situation in the war and to dissuade

them from taking precipitate military action in the event that Iran attempted to enforce a blockade of the Straits of Hormuz. In the light of the United States' recent actions in the Lebanon, however, it seemed unlikely that any coherent policy towards the war in the Gulf had yet been orchestrated in Washington. The United States should also be left in no doubt that if a blockade were to be enforced, they would be expected to make available their stockpile of oil for the IEA emergency allocation scheme. Ministers should continue to meet from time to time to take stock of the situation in the war between Iran and Iraq.

The meeting -

Took note, with approval, of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's summing up of their discussion.

Cabinet Office

17 February 1984

Circulated to: Members of the Cabinet
Those present
Sir Robert Armstrong
Mr Gregson
Mr Goodall
Mr Williamson

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INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN
PRIORITY GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, PARIS, STOCKHOLM, AMMAN, MOSCWO, CAIRO, UKDEL NATO, THE HAGUE, MODUK (DI4).

MY TELSNOS 167 AND 168: IRAN/IRAQ

SUMMARY

1. CORDOVEZ MISSION TO IRAN AND IRAQ ANNOUNCED ONLY TO BE ABORTED SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED AT HIS REGULAR DAILY PRESS CONFERENCE THIS MORNING THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS INFORMING THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAN AND IRAQ THAT HE WAS READY TO DESPATCH A MISSION TO THE AREA AS SOON AS ASSURANCES FOR THE SAFETY OF THE MISSION HAD BEEN RECEIVED. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS GIULIANI SAID THAT THE MISSION WOULD BE HEADED BY UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL CORDOVEZ AND WOULD LEAVE NEW YORK IN THE SECOND HALF OF NEXT WEEK.

3. HARDLY HAD THIS NEWS BECOME PUBLIC THAN RUMOUR SPREAD THAT THE MISSION HAD BEEN ABORTED. HEAD OF CHANCERY CHECKED THE POSITION WITH CORDOVEZ. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE MISSION HAD INDEED BEEN CALLED OFF. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE MISSION FOLLOWING THE VARIOUS IRAQI ASSURANCES THAT THEIR RESPONSE HAD BEEN INTENDED TO BE POSITIVE RATHER THAN NEGATIVE. CORDOVEZ INFORMED THE IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THIS LATE ON 16 FEBRUARY AND AL-DAYS RAISED NO OBJECTION. HOWEVER

~~SEEN CALLED OFF. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD DECIDED TO GO AHEAD~~ WITH THE MISSION FOLLOWING THE VARIOUS IRAQI ASSURANCES THAT THEIR RESPONSE HAD BEEN INTENDED TO BE POSITIVE RATHER THAN NEGATIVE. CORDOVEZ INFORMED THE IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THIS LATE ON 16 FEBRUARY AND AL-QAYSI RAISED NO OBJECTION. HOWEVER THIS AFTERNOON, FOLLOWING THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MISSION, THE IRANIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE CALLED ON CORDOVEZ WITH A FURTHER IRANIAN LETTER. THIS SAID THAT IN VIEW OF THE NEW CRIMINAL ATTACKS LAUNCHED BY IRAQ AND THE CALLOUSNESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IRANIAN FORCES HAD DECIDED TO RESPOND TO IRAQ'S ''INSANE ADVENTURES''. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS THEY REQUESTED THAT THE FACT-FINDING MISSION SHOULD ENGAGE IN NO POLITICAL DISCUSSION.

4. CORDOVEZ TOLD US THAT HE HAD POINTED OUT TO RAJAIE-KHORASSANI THAT THE IRANIANS HAD SCORED A FANTASTIC POINT IN AGREEING TO THE MISSION IN THE FIRST PLACE. THEY WOULD LOSE THIS ADVANTAGE IF THEY NOW REFUSED IT. RAJAIE SAID THAT THE IMAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN WAS MORE IMPORTANT (THAN THE POLITICAL PRONG OF THE MISSION).

5. CORDOVEZ COMMENTED THAT THE UN COULD ONLY ACT IN THIS SITUATION IF THERE WAS A MINIMUM OF WILLINGNESS ON BOTH SIDES. CLEARLY THIS MINIMUM DID NOT EXIST.

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IRAN/IRAQ WAR: APPEAL BY INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC).

1. ICRC HAVE HANDED US AN URGENT APPEAL ADDRESSED TO STATES PARTIES TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS ABOUT THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. (THIS FOLLOWS THE SIMILAR APPEAL OF LAST MAY). THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTIONS BY BOTH PARTIES, AND ALSO THAT SUCH ABUSES MAY UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN FUTURE CONFLICTS. REMINDING GOVERNMENTS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ENSURING RESPECT FOR THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, THEY ASK THEM TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE THAT IRAQ AND IRAN PUT AN END TO THE VIOLATIONS, AND PARTICULARLY:

(A) TO CONSIDER EXPRESSING CONCERN TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.,

~~(B) TO SUPPORT THE ICRC'S EFFORTS TO HELP THE VICTIMS.,~~

(B) TO SUPPORT THE ICRS'S EFFORTS TO HELP THE VICTIMS.,

(C) TO CONSIDER WHETHER THEY CAN ACT OR ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO ACT AS PROTECTING POWERS UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS.

2. ICRC HAVE AGAIN EMPHASISED HOW EXCEPTIONAL IT IS FOR THEM TO APPEAL TO GOVERNMENTS FOR SUPPORT AN PUBLICISE ABUSES IN THIS FASHION (REPORTS OF THE APPEAL HAVE ALREADY APPEARED IN THE LOCAL PRESS). THIS WAS NOT SIMPLY A HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM. IF VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTIONS CONTINUED, RISKS OF ESCALATION MOUNTEDM. ICRC EXPECTED IRAN TO MOUNT MAJOR ATTACKS ON IRAQ AND TO RETALIATE ''IN OTHER WAYS'' AGAINST FURTHER IRAQI BOMBING OF CIVILIAN CENTRES. CLEARLY, THEY FEEL IN NEED OF POLITICAL SUPPORT IN A SITUATION BEYOND THEIR SCOPE.

3. APPEAL FROM ICRC IS ADDRESSED TO YOU. IN VIEW OF PRIME MINISTER'S CLOSE INTEREST INICRC'S ACTIVITIES, PRESIDENT OF ICRC HAS SENT HER A SET TOO. (DOCUMENTS BY TODAY'S BAG UNDER COVER OF A LETTER FROM MOSS TO HASKELL (MED).)

4. ICRC HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED HOPE THAT EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WILL COORDINATE ACTION ON THIS MATTER. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE HAS REPORTED THIS, TOGETHER WITH URGENT REQUEST BY ICRC PRESIDENT TO MEET M. CHEYSSON (PRESUMABLY BECAUSE OF FRENCH INFLUENCE WITH IRAQ).

WARBURTON

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 February 1984

When travelling on the Prime Minister's aircraft on the return flight from Moscow yesterday Mr. Denis Healey told the Prime Minister that he was particularly concerned at present about the situation in the Gulf and the dangers of an escalation of tension, possibly leading to American intervention.

His main point was that the United States ought to discuss the problem with the Soviet Union with the aim of ensuring that, if Western military intervention became necessary, the Soviet Government realised that the intervention would be strictly limited and would not constitute a threat to the Soviet Union. Mr. Healey feared that if this were not done - and the US decided for example to take some kind of military action on the territory of Iran, the possibilities of a clash between the two super powers would be greatly heightened. Mr. Healey has already expressed his concern in public and I think we should be ready to deal with the point if he does so again.

The Prime Minister made no commitment to contact Mr. Healey again and I do not think we need do so. But I should be grateful for advice on the proposition he advances.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

22

Ref. A084/363

PRIME MINISTER

At the meeting of OD(EM) on 26 January (OD(EM)(84) 1st Meeting), the Sub-Committee concluded that deployment of British ground forces and/or air defence aircraft to the Gulf area should be countenanced only as a measure of last resort if British interests were directly threatened; and that final decisions on any such deployment must rest with the British Government. I was instructed to arrange for officials to examine whether this conclusion was consistent with the various assurances about potential British assistance which had already been given to certain Gulf States. The following examination of the question has been agreed by officials of the Treasury, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence.

2. No formal treaty commitments exist which would oblige the United Kingdom to come to the defence of the Gulf States in time of need. Informal assurances have, however, been given to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and to Oman, as follows:

(a) UAE

In October 1980 Mr Moberly (Assistant Under Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) called on Shaikh Zaid with a personal message from Lord Carrington saying that, in the spirit of our very long-standing friendship, we stood ready in principle to provide military assistance if asked. Such assistance would be defensive in nature.

(b) Oman

On 2 December 1981 Mr Hurd (the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) told Sultan Qaboos that the United Kingdom intended to maintain its close defence relationship with Oman. It had been decided to keep in being certain forces that could be used outside the NATO area either with an ally (for example the United States) or alone. The elements that could be made available could include a

naval escort task group, mine clearance units, some combat aircraft, and one or two infantry battalions or commandos with support for land or amphibious operations. Subsequently, you wrote to Sultan Qaboos on 15 July 1982 to assure him "that we are fully committed to the security of Oman". You will however see from the attached copy of your letter that this assurance was directly linked to the use of British Loan Service Personnel in time of internal or regional conflict.

3. In the case of the UAE, the assurance given is in general terms and does not commit us to any specific form of assistance. It is therefore consistent with OD(EM)'s conclusion that deployments of British ground forces and/or air defence aircraft to the Gulf should be countenanced only as a measure of last resort if British interests are threatened, and that final decisions on deployment must rest with the British Government.

4. In the case of Oman, the list of military resources mentioned by Mr Hurd was purely illustrative, and in no sense constituted a commitment to make any particular one of them available if requested. The guidelines for Loan Service Personnel are, as agreed by OD(EM), now being reviewed.

5. We therefore conclude that there is nothing in the assurances already given to the Gulf States which is inconsistent with the conclusions that British ground forces and/or air defence aircraft should be deployed to the Gulf only if British interests are directly threatened. Nor is either assurance inconsistent with the conclusion that final decisions on the deployment of forces to the Gulf must remain with the British Government.

6. I was further instructed to arrange for officials to examine whether the language of the proposed message to Sultan Qaboos about the possible deployment of British mine countermeasures vessels was consistent with the assurances which had been given to the Omanis. The formula now proposed is as follow:

> The mine countermeasures force would be deployed to the Gulf in response to an Omani request, subject only to Her Majesty's Government's overriding national requirements,

to agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the Omani Government, and to the availability of adequate defence arrangements for the force on arrival in Gulf waters.

Given that no specific commitment to deploy a mine countermeasures force to the Gulf area has been made in the past, this formulation would be in keeping with the assurances that have already been given. It is also explicitly consistent with OD(EM)'s conclusion that final decisions on deployment of the force must rest with the British Government. Her Majesty's Ambassador at Muscat and the Chief of the Omani Defence Staff believe that the proposed formula should be acceptable to Sultan Qaboos. The Ambassador would like authority to pass the message to the Sultan as quickly as possible; I should be grateful to know whether you are content for him to proceed.

7. Finally, I was instructed to have the proposed message to Shaikh Zaid recast in order to ensure that it was consistent with undertakings already given to the United Arab Emirates, preserved the British Government's right to take a final decision on the deployment of British forces to assist them, and was as forthcoming as possible. A revised text of the proposed message is at Annex; I should be grateful for your approval to its terms. I recommend that the message be transmitted on your behalf by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Abu Dhabi. It should also be made clear to Shaikh Zaid that the UAE would be expected to meet the cost of any assistance provided to them; and the Ambassador should therefore be instructed to make this point clear at an appropriate stage.

8. I am sending copies of this minute to the other members of OD(EM).

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

1 February 1984

ANNEX

DRAFT MESSAGE TO SHAIKH ZAID

When you kindly received Mr Richard Luce on 18 December, you told him of your concern that an escalation of the conflict between Iran and Iraq might put the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in danger of an Iranian attack. You asked him to indicate whether and in what way the United Kingdom would be prepared to help the UAE defend itself against such an attack. Your request has been given very careful and detailed consideration by Her Majesty's Government, and I am now able to provide a reply.

You will recall that when hostilities first began between Iran and Iraq in 1980, and fears were expressed that they might spread to other parts of the Gulf, Mr Moberly visited you to convey a personal assurance from Lord Carrington that in the spirit of our very long-standing friendship we stood ready in principle to provide military assistance of a defensive nature if asked. Mr Luce told you in December that we stood by this commitment, which I am happy to reaffirm.

In considering the United Kingdom's own defence needs, we have been guided by the belief that the best defence is collective self-defence. That is why we have been substantially increasing our own defence expenditure in real terms. In the same way, we welcome the development of increased co-operation on defence issues between the member countries of the Gulf

Co-operation Council (GCC), including their first joint military exercises last autumn. As hitherto, we are anxious to provide all the assistance in our power, by way of training and advice in the United Kingdom and locally, and through meeting the GCC's defence equipment needs, to help the UAE and its partners to continue building up their capabilities for self-defence. General Dennis has just visited the UAE with a mandate to ascertain what more we can do to help you in these areas. If you believe that the UAE has specific needs which are being overlooked, I should be grateful if you could let me know immediately.

I also understand, however, that in the short term you are concerned that the UAE's own resources might not be wholly adequate to counter an Iranian threat, and have asked what forces the United Kingdom might be able to make available if the UAE called for our assistance. Although the United Kingdom's primary defence responsibilities will continue to be in the NATO area, one lesson of the Falklands crisis is that we need to retain and enhance our capacity to act outside that area. We therefore possess a number of defensive military capabilities, including naval mine counter-measures and escort vessels, tactical air defence, maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and air defence missiles and radar, that could in principle be made available to support such action; it would be imprudent to decide at this stage that particular forces would be allocated to specific areas or tasks, in the event of

an escalation of the Iran/Iraq war, since we should need to deploy them where the need was greatest, taking due account of the capabilities of other friendly nations. Chief among these is of course the United States, with whom we are in close touch about the measures that might need to be taken if there were any escalation.

I cannot emphasise too strongly that the continued safety and security of the UAE is a matter of great importance to us. As I have said, if the UAE has specific defence needs which are not at present being met, I should be grateful if you would let me know. I should in any case like to keep in the closest possible contact with you until we are agreed that the threat of Iranian action against the UAE has passed.

FEB 1984

SECRET

B.06951

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Consequences of an Escalation of the Iran/Iraq War
(OD(EM)(84) 1)

BACKGROUND

1. The Sub-Committee last considered the Iran/Iraq war on 21 December 1983 (OD(EM)(83) 9th Meeting). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was invited, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Defence, to continue to explore the possibility of further diplomatic action to reduce the risk of escalation in the Iran/Iraq war, and to consider possible responses to requests for military assistance from the Gulf States in the event of an escalation in the war. In his minute of 6 January to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary reported the outcome of recent mediation efforts, which were not encouraging, and noted that the Iranians had been somewhat more active in the Gulf area, but that there had been no further signs of escalation in the war. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary further invited the Secretary of State for Defence to consider various responses which might be made to requests from the Gulf States. In particular, he invited immediate agreement to the Omani request that our mine counter-measures force should be brought to a greater state of readiness; this was given by colleagues on the Sub-Committee.

FLAG A.

2. The joint memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary (OD(EM)(84) 1) presents the results of further consideration of possible assistance to the Gulf States. Actual deployment of British forces to the area would carry penalties to other operational

FLAG B.

tasks, and could expose the forces to risk. The preference is therefore to concentrate for as long as possible upon forms of assistance which improve indigenous military capabilities in the Gulf States. Possibilities are being explored by the Director of Military Assistance Overseas in his current tours of local states (the Defence Secretary's minute to you of 13 January refers), and are likely to include advice and training on air defence, mine counter-measures and counter-terrorism.

3. One request from a Gulf State requires an immediate decision. Shaikh Zaid of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has asked for a blanket assurance of British military assistance in the event of an Iranian attack, or for a precise indication of the areas in which we can provide assistance. A blanket assurance would be a stronger commitment than our already expressed willingness in principle to provide defensive assistance if asked, and would be impossible to provide in advance of an assessment as to the most appropriate deployment of our forces if a crisis occurred. It is therefore recommended that the reply to the Shaikh should reaffirm our willingness to help, seek clarification of his likely needs, and encourage him to take up our offer to help build up UAE's own capabilities. We might also indicate the forces we have available to react to an emergency in the Gulf. A suggested reply to Shaikh Zaid is at Annex B to the memorandum.

4. The memorandum also addresses the guidelines for our Loan Service Personnel (LSP) in the Gulf States. Only those in Oman are at present allowed to take part in defensive operations without the prior consent of the British Government. Given that a crisis might develop rapidly, and that our relations with Gulf States might be adversely affected if British LSP stood aside when these States were subjected to attack, it is suggested that revised

guidelines be drawn up to allow British LSP in any of the Gulf States to continue to perform their functions even under external attack without prior consent when there is not time to obtain it.

5. The Secretary of State for Energy, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Antony Acland have been invited to attend the meeting.

HANDLING

6. You should invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce the discussion. The Defence Secretary might then be invited to comment. Points to establish in discussion are:

(a) Is it agreed that the deployment of British forces to the Gulf should be countenanced only as a last resort and if our interests are threatened?

(b) Is it also agreed that concentrating on developing the Gulf States' own capabilities is the right approach at this stage?

(c) Is the draft reply to Shaikh Zaid satisfactory?

(d) Is the revision of the guidelines to our Loan Service Personnel agreed?

CONCLUSION

7. Subject to the points made in discussion, you could guide the Sub-Committee to approve the recommendations in OD(EM)(84) 1.

David Goodall

A D S Goodall

25 January 1984

010

SECRET UK EYES A

19

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/JS/5/3/11

20 January 1984

Prime Minister.

A.B.C. 20/1.

Dear Richard.

As you know we have discussed the now definite evidence of Iraqi use of chemical weapons in the war against Iran, and the recent Iranian allegations that the UK has been supplying such weapons to Iraq - allegations which have been coupled with the threat that our supposed actions would not go unanswered.

Michael Heseltine and I are most concerned at these developments as I know you are, not only because of the importance of preventing the use of chemical weapons but also because of the very real danger that these Iranian misapprehensions may markedly increase the threat to our people in the Lebanon, the Gulf, and perhaps even in the UK. I am glad to know that the FCO is considering what might be done to put pressure on Iraq, and that prompt and firm action has been taken to rebut the Iranian allegations both with the authorities in Tehran and with the Iranian representative here. I gather, however, that there were some difficulties, at least initially, in ensuring that our refutation had reached the highest levels in Iran, and I think it would be valuable to repeat and reinforce our message to guarantee that it gets to the highest possible level.

On the suggestion that there might be some association between food processing plant originally supplied from Britain and the Iraqi production of chemical agents, I will be in touch with you again when I have further information.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister.

Yours ever.

JOHN STANLEY

Richard Luce Esq MP

SECRET UK EYES A

SECRET

18

MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

Await reply from FCS.

A.J.C. 20/1

D/MIN(AF)/JS/5/3/57

20 January 1984

Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary

CONSEQUENCES OF AN ESCALATION OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR

Thank you for your minute of 6 January to Michael Heseltine to which he has asked me to reply in his absence in the Falklands. He discussed your minute with me before he left. He had also seen the minute of 9 January from No 10, recording the Prime Minister's support, subject to the views of OD(EM) colleagues, for the Omani request that we should bring our Mine Counter Measures (MCM) force to a higher state of readiness at their expense. As Richard Luce has indicated that a response to this request is urgently required, I am replying on this question now. Consideration of the other questions in your minute can be deferred until the forthcoming OD(EM) meeting.

2. There have been no significant new developments in the Gulf to cause us to believe that Iranian mining of the Straits of Hormuz is any more likely than it was last month. Indeed our assessment is that the Iranian mining capability in the water conditions of the Straits is currently very limited indeed. The case for responding positively to the Omani request is therefore a diplomatic rather than a military one.

3. Our understanding is that the Omanis would at present be satisfied if the readiness of the MCM force were reduced to about one month's notice from its present six weeks. A reduction to 32 days' notice can be achieved, without the significant operational penalties of having to deploy outside UK waters, by taking up the necessary command/support ship from trade. Conversion costs of some £20,000 and daily hire costs of some £10-12,000 would be involved, plus any restoration costs on return.

4. There is inevitably a substantial risk that the Omanis will regard the fact of their payment for putting our force at higher readiness as granting them some lien on its deployment. We therefore consider it essential that we should at the outset make it clear to the Omanis in unambiguous terms that the decision over any future deployment would be taken by HMG in the light of the circumstances at the time. But we must also recognise that even this qualification will not prevent them from holding the strong expectation that the force would be deployed if they so request it.

SECRET

5. You will want to consider at what stage we should let the Omanis know that any future deployment of the MCM forcce outside UK waters to meet their needs might be wholly or partly at their expense. Our best estimate at present is that the total charge would be of the order of a little over £4m a quarter calculated on the normal full cost basis for repayment activities. We would also have to consider the need for indemnification to cover the ships and personnel against loss or damage. An alternative would be to put the charge on to an additional cost rather than on to a total cost basis. We estimate that this would bring the charge down to £1.3m a quarter.

6. I must also make it clear that there would also be operational penalties elsewhere if the force were deployed. In particular this would reduce the MCM effort on route surveys (including the Clyde approaches), development trials of new MCM equipment, and participation in NATO and national exercises. The MCM force would also need protection against the threat from the Iranians that would undoubtedly exist if we were to embark on clearing their mines. The operational penalties would, of course, need to be taken into account in considering any proposal to deploy the force to the Gulf.

7. Provided that you and our colleagues are content, I suggest that our response to Oman should therefore be couched in terms which:

a. Indicate that our MCM force of 4 Mine Counter-Measures Vessels could be brought to a rather higher state of notice of one month, rather than 6 weeks as at present;

b. That we would look to them to meet the costs of our doing so;

c. That we would have to reserve to ourselves absolutely any decision to deploy the force to the Gulf, and

d. That if such a decision was taken to meet their own requirements we may look to them for a contribution to the costs.

8. I am copying this minute to our colleagues in OD(EM).

JS

JOHN STANLEY

Iraq : relations Iran/Iraq pt. 3.

20 MAY 1984

SECRET HL

17

19 January 1984

Iran/Iraq War: DMAO visit to Gulf States

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 13 January and has noted the purpose of Major General Dennis's visit to the Gulf States between 18 January and early February.

JOHN COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

SECRET

MO 3/9/4/2

C

Prime Minister. 16

To note.

A.J.C. 17.1

PRIME MINISTER

IRAN/IRAQ WAR: DMAO VISIT TO GULF STATES

You will recall that during OD(EM) discussion of the Iran/Iraq war, on 21st December, I mentioned that I had agreed to a tour of the Gulf States by the Director of Military Assistance Overseas (DMAO), Major General Dennis.

2. Major General Dennis is due to visit Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Doha and Dubai between 18th and 27th January, then Jedda and Kuwait with me from 29th January to 2nd February, and finally Muscat (subject to confirmation) immediately afterwards. The principal purpose of his visits will be to encourage the Gulf States to identify particular British military assistance enhancements, in the form of advice, training and Loan Service Personnel (LSP), which would help them to build up their indigenous capabilities and thereby reduce the likelihood of the possible need for more direct British military involvement in the future. I believe this is in line with our discussion before Christmas, which saw scope for a reasonably forthcoming attitude towards requests for such forms of assistance. Major General Dennis will, of course, only be taking exploratory soundings of the Gulf States; any firm commitments will only be made after subsequent consideration of his report. In particular he will avoid being drawn into discussion of possible deployment of British combat forces in a crisis; we shall need to consider our policy on this further at the next meeting of OD(EM). I would expect any further military assistance which we may provide as a result of Major General Dennis's visit to be made available on a repayment basis.

3. Although it would be premature to anticipate the sort of requests he is likely to receive, it is possible they may include assistance with the protection of key points, bomb disposal and maritime counter-terrorist training; measures to improve the safety of shipping such as advice on mine counter-measures and control of shipping; and air defence improvements such as better coordination of existing assets and possible additional LSP for Rapier units employed in the region. All these are areas in which, in principle, we should be able to help, although our overall resources are, of course, limited.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to our OD(EM) colleagues and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
13th January 1984

Iraq Relations with Iran Pt 3

SECRET

VC

c. LPO
HMT
MOD
CO

15

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 January 1984

Consequences of an Escalation of the Iran/Iraq War

The Prime Minister has seen the minute of 6 January from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence.

In the light of the need for further work before the next meeting of OD(EM), the Prime Minister agrees that the meeting which had been arranged for today should be postponed but has said that the discussion should take place not later than 2 weeks from now. I should be grateful if Richard Hatfield, to whom I am copying this letter, could make arrangements accordingly.

As regards the Omani request for our Mine Counter Measures force to be brought to a higher state of readiness by hiring a civilian support ship at Omani expense, the Prime Minister considers, subject to any views which her OD(EM) colleagues may have to offer, that this request should be met.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of members of OD(EM) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

Agree to endorse
Omani request
at X. Do not
delay OD(EM)
more than 2
weeks

Prime Minister 14

FCS/84/7

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Consequences of an escalation of the Iran/Iraq War

1. When OD(EM) met on 21 December, we agreed that we should continue to explore:

(i) the possibility for further diplomatic action to prevent the Iran/Iraq war escalating; and

(ii) the military requirements for response to public requests for help from the Gulf States.

2. On the first point, developments on the diplomatic front have not been encouraging. I enclose at Annex A a summary of recent mediation efforts which colleagues may find of interest. Despite the very considerable efforts which have been made, there has been no real progress. Perhaps the most hopeful prospect continues to be the mediatory role given to the UN Secretary-General by Security Council Resolution 540. We shall continue to explore, particularly with the Americans and French, every other possible means towards a diplomatic solution.

3. The situation on the ground has changed little since we met on 21 December. The Iranians have been somewhat more active in the Gulf area, but there has been no further signs of escalation of the war.

4. As regards the second point, we need now to be clear about what assistance we can give to the Gulf States if they publicly seek it. Annex C of our earlier joint memorandum contained a useful statement of the total resources available to us. But

/a number

a number of specific decisions are now required. First, the Omanis have urgently asked for our Mine Counter Measures (MCM) force to be brought to a higher state of readiness by hiring a civilian support ship at Omani expense. I consider we should agree, both because there would be military advantage in being better prepared to counter Iranian mine-laying in the Straits of Hormuz, and also because it would demonstrate our sympathy and support for the Gulf States generally.

5. Second, we need to reach decisions on the scale of response we envisage to requests from Gulf States, in particular:

(i) would we in practice envisage despatching any of the ground force elements and RAF air defence aircraft listed in Annex C of the earlier memorandum even in response to a direct request? To do so would involve adopting a higher profile than, for instance, assisting with ground-based air defence;

(ii) a number of Gulf rulers, especially Shaikh Zayid of the UAE, have asked us for specific offers of help in specific areas. In view of Shaikh Zayid's strong representations to Richard Luce, I think there is a good case for being prepared to be reasonably specific in the case of the UAE, for instance on air defence units on the ground. We shall need to consider how far we go in telling Shaikh Zayid of what we conclude;

(iii) it is quite possible that in the event of an escalation in the war, Qatar and Kuwait, in addition to Oman and the UAE would look to us rather than to the US for assistance. In that case how should we allocate our scarce resources between the various states?

Our planned responses to these three questions will need to provide for various alternatives depending on the nature of the threat or threats and to the request or requests received.

/I thought

I thought it would be useful as background to set out the specific commitments we have made to Gulf States: these are at Annex B.

6. I know that our officials have been working closely together in addressing these issues. But I believe that it would be useful to have further comments from you as a basis for decisions in OD(EM) or, as I am sure colleagues would wish, proposals which could be agreed between us. I have, therefore, suggested that the meeting of OD(EM) fixed for 9 January should be postponed and that we should aim to have a further meeting in about two weeks which would have available your comments on the questions set out above. In the meantime, Richard Luce or I would be happy to have a word with you if that would be useful. In view of the urgency of the Omani request for our MCM force to be brought to greater readiness, I would, however, welcome your and our colleagues' agreement as soon as possible that we should endorse this proposal.

7. I am copying this minute to our colleagues in OD(EM).

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
6 January 1984

ANNEX A

Iran/Iraq: Mediation Efforts

Security Council Resolutions

1. Mediation efforts within the UN framework have so far come to nothing. Successive Security Council Resolutions calling for a ceasefire or peaceful settlement have been ignored (SCR 479 - September 1980, SCR 514 - July 1982, SCR 522 - October 1982). A fourth SCR (SCR 540), in the drafting of which the UK played a leading role, was passed on 31 October 1983. This called on the UN Secretary-General to continue his mediation efforts, and on both participants to cease military operations against civilian targets, to respect free navigation in the Gulf and to end all hostilities in the Gulf area. Iraq welcomed the Resolution on 1 November, but warned that she would only stand by it if it were implemented by Iran in all its parts. The eventual Iranian reaction on 12 December disassociated Iran from SCR 540, but stopped short of ruling out action by the Secretary-General. However, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Dr Velayati, has since written to the UN Secretary General denouncing the Resolution in strong terms, and saying that there is no current role for the Secretary-General.

UN Secretary-General's Special Representative

2. Following SCR 479 in September 1980, the UN Secretary-General appointed Mr Palme of Sweden as his Special Representative. In this capacity, Mr Palme made a number of visits to the area, the last of which was in 1981. His failure to achieve any progress then, and the increased calls on his time since being reappointed Prime Minister of Sweden, have made him disinclined to be active, at least until both sides show some signs of wishing to make progress. After the passing of SCR 540 in October 1983, the Secretary-General sent a member of his staff to discuss the situation with Mr Palme in Stockholm, but, despite strong encouragement from the UK and other interested neutral countries, nothing concrete has emerged from this meeting.

/3.

Missions of Enquiry into Civilian Casualties

3. A UN Mission of Experts visited the war areas in May 1983 to investigage claims and counter-claims about the sufferings of the civilian populations. Their report made it plain that Iraq was more to blame than Iran in inflicting civilian casualties and damage to non-military targets. The Iranians have recently pressed for a second such Mission, to investigage renewed Iraqi attacks on Iranian towns, and also allegations that Iraq has used chemical weapons on the battlefront, but the Iraqis have refused to agree. UK efforts at the UN to trade withdrawal of Iraqi objections to this second Mission for reciprocal withdrawal of Iranian objections to a visit by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, have not so far borne fruit.

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

4. In 1981, the Non-Aligned Movement formed a committee under the chairmanship of Mrs Gandhi to investigate the possibility of mediation. It made little progress. There was a temporary revival of interest in the idea after the 1983 NAM Summit meeting, but this appears to have subsided. Mrs Gandhi proved unreceptive to our suggestion, at the time of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in November, that she should again interest herself in this issue.

Islamic Conference

5. A similar mediation committee, including Pakistan and Turkey, was appointed by the Islamic Conference in 1981. It made no more progress than its NAM counterpart. In December, the UN Secretary-General suggested that the forthcoming Islamic Summit meeting in Casablanca from 16-18 January might provide an opportunity to get Iran and Iraq together. This hope has now been torpedoed by the Iranian announcement that they intend to boycott the Conference, which they have accused of showing partiality towards Iraq.

/6.

GCC Countries

6. In the autumn of 1983, the GCC countries became interested in the possibility of mediation and the Foreign Ministers of Kuwait and the UAE visited both Baghdad and Tehran. Premature and over-enthusiastic publicity for this visit led to Iranian rejection of any future mediatory role for the GCC. However, two further mediatory visits to Damascus were made by the President of the UAE, Shaikh Zayid and other GCC representatives, in the hope of persuading Syria to reopen the Iraqi oil pipeline, which would help to ease the economic pressure on Iraq. These efforts were unsuccessful.

Algeria

7. The Algerians gained considerable kudos from their successful management of the negotiation for the release of the US Embassy hostages from Tehran at the end of 1980. Encouraged by this, they for some time pursued the possibility of mediating in the Iran/Iraq war. In the end, however, they were rebuffed by the Iranians, who confirmed to a senior member of the UK Mission to the UN in December 1983 that the Algerians now regarded their mediation efforts as ended.

Japan

8. The Japanese Foreign Minister visited both Tehran and Baghdad in August/September 1983, and the Deputy Foreign Minister was subsequently due to visit both countries in November. After he had already visited Baghdad, the Iranians asked for his visit to Tehran to be postponed, and no new date has yet been set. We were in close contact with the Japanese over these visits, which we greatly welcome. However, Japanese willingness to be active in pursuit of mediation has probably been sapped by the recent General Election results, in which the ruling

/Liberal

Liberal Democratic Party lost considerable ground, partly because of reaction to Mr Nakasone's more active stance on foreign affairs.

Direct UK Representations

9. We take every opportunity that arises of urging restraint on both parties. These conversations are too numerous to list in detail, but we made strong representations at Deputy Minister level in both Baghdad and Tehran in December, and spoke also to their diplomatic representatives in London and New York.

ANNEX B

UK Commitments to Gulf States

1. Following the abrogation in 1971 of the treaties by which the UK took responsibilities for the defence and foreign relations of the lower Gulf States (the 7 Emirates of the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar) no formal treaty commitments exist which oblige us to come to their defence in time of need. The treaties of friendship which we have signed with these countries contain no such provisions. However, some oral commitments have been made by British Ministers to the UAE and Oman.

UAE

2. In October 1980, Mr Moberly (AUSS at the FCO) called on Shaikh Zaid with a personal message from Lord Carrington that in the spirit of our very long-standing friendship, we stood ready in principle to provide military assistance if asked. Such assistance would be defensive in nature.

Oman

3. Mr Hurd (Minister of State at the FCO) told Sultan Qaboos on 2 December 1981 that we intended to maintain our close defence relationship with Oman. We had decided to keep in being certain forces that could be used outside the NATO area either with an ally (for example the US) or alone. The elements we could make available could include a naval escort task group, mine clearance units, some combat aircraft, one or two infantry batallions or commandos with support for land or amphibious operations. Subsequently, the Prime Minister wrote to Sultan Qaboos on 15 July 1982 to assure him "that we are fully committed to the security of Oman". (This, however,

/referred

referred primarily to use of British Loan Service Personnel in time of internal or regional conflict).

Other Gulf States

4. No such commitments have been made to other Gulf States, though at various times they have been told informally that we would be inclined to look favourably on any request from them for assistance and would, depending on circumstances and on our commitments elsewhere, do whatever we could to help.

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Consequences of an Escalation of the Iran/Iraq War

As you know, this subject was discussed at OD(EM) yesterday.

The Prime Minister has since said that she would welcome an assessment of likely Soviet moves should we be brought to the point where Western countries have to consider military intervention in the Gulf. It would be helpful if this could be made available early in the New Year and in any case before any further discussion in OD(EM) of this subject.

I am copying this minute to Mr. Fall and Mr. Mottram.

A. J. COLES

22 December 1983

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

I find nowhere in these papers any comment on what the Soviet Union might do if the West intervenes in the Gulf. Should we not assess that before finally deciding to commit ourselves militarily?

A.J.C. 20/12.

Yes - I agree. Perhaps Whitehall could put it on record ready for our next meeting on

Ref: B06926

12

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Consequences of an Escalation of the Iran-Iraq War
(OD(EM)(83) 4)

Flag A

BACKGROUND

Flag B
Flag C

Having seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 25 October to the Defence Secretary and Mr Heseltine's reply of 23 November, you asked that OD should discuss before Christmas the possibility of an escalation of the Iran-Iraq war and the extent to which we should contemplate military involvement by the United Kingdom should Western military action be thought necessary.

2. The meeting has been arranged as an OD(EM), with the addition of the Secretary of State for Energy and the Chief of the Defence Staff. The Lord President of the Council may be unable to be present since he is chairing a meeting of the Home Affairs Committee at 4 pm.

3. There is a joint paper before the Sub-Committee by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary. It begins with an assessment of possible military action by Iraq and Iran and goes on to judge that British interests in the Gulf are sufficiently important for the United Kingdom to be prepared to consider responding to requests from the Gulf States for military assistance. Diplomatic action would also be required; and the draft of a possible Security Council resolution has already been prepared (at Annex B to the paper).

4. Military possibilities are then discussed. The paper concludes that the best approach to a Western military intervention would be one based on the closest possible consultation with other participating allies but with

responsibilities for helping particular countries or for particular military requirements allocated on a national basis. In other words, there should be no multinational force under a single command (which in the circumstances would mean American command). The two Secretaries of State recommend detailed follow-up discussions with the United States at the military level to develop a more thorough appreciation of each other's military capabilities for operations in the area.

5. The military forces which the United Kingdom might make available are mentioned at paragraph 6 and in more detail at Annex C. It should be noted that, were the Gulf to be mined, it would take 42 days to get a mine counter-measures force into the area unless advance precautionary action were taken: in particular it would be necessary to hire a support ship from trade.

6. An intelligence assessement on the Gulf war was circulated in the Joint Intelligence Committee Weekly Survey of Intelligence on 16 December. The reports from American sources of a likely immediate use of the Iraqi Super Etendard aircraft armed with Exocet missiles against the Iranian oil terminal at Kharg Island seem to have been an exaggeration.

HANDLING

7. You will wish to invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce the paper and to give his assessment of the likelihood of the Gulf war escalating in the near future. Points to be established in the subsequent discussion are -

a. Does the Sub-Committee accept that the principles set out in paragraph 5 of the paper should be those which apply to any British action; in particular that military action should take place only at the request of one or more Gulf States?

b. Does the Sub-Committee agree that we should not take part in a fully integrated force under a single command, but should co-ordinate our action in full consultation with other Western countries?

c. Should any action be taken now to increase the level of readiness of British forces?

d. Does the Sub-Committee agree that the Armilla patrol should normally remain within 5 days' steaming time of the Gulf area?

e. If there are signs of impending Iranian naval action against third parties, should we then increase the readiness of our mine counter-measures force by hiring a support ship from trade and possibly by pre-positioning the ships initially at Gibraltar or later at Cyprus?

f. Is there any form of military action which we would wish to rule out completely, such as the use of ground forces? There is no sign that the Iran-Iraq war is likely to be over soon: indeed the Americans appear to be determined not to let the weaker country, Iraq, lose it. Therefore we have to face the possibility that any military force sent to the Gulf might have to remain for a considerable period. You will wish to ask the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff for their views on the possible consequences for our military commitments elsewhere.

g. Where will the costs of any military assistance fall? The normal rules would appear to require the Ministry of Defence to bear the costs; but this will need to be confirmed.

CONCLUSION

8. Subject to the discussion, the Sub-Committee might be invited to -

1. Endorse the conclusions set out in paragraph 10 of OD(EM)(83) 4.

2. Rule out, in principle, the provision of ground forces, confining help to naval, maritime or air defence forces, and then only at the request of one or more of the Gulf States.

3. Agree that any immediate decisions needed over the holiday period should be taken by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary jointly, consulting you before any overt action to deploy forces to the area or increase their readiness were taken.

David Goodall

20 December 1983

A D S GOODALL

Mentioned orally to the Prime Minister last night.

A. J. C. 15/12

J. a.

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Copy of Cabinet brief on Iran/Iraq as promised.

Rickett

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

IRAN/IRAQ - BRIEF FOR CABINET

POINTS TO MAKE

1. US Ambassador has suggested that a major Iraqi attack on Khar Island may be imminent, and that this heightens the risk of an escalation of the Gulf war.

2. Believe the US concern may be exaggerated, but see a clear need to press on with contingency planning as fast as possible. Essential that we are in a position to move promptly and effectivel if necessary.

3. Intending to circulate a joint FCO/MOD memorandum for consideration by OD(EM) on 21 December. At official level, useful UK/US talks on possible sharing of tasks held in London on 9 Decemb Further meeting to agree assessment of the threat in Washington on 19th.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

A 1. The US Ambassador's call is reported in FCO telegram No. 745 to Baghdad. We have checked with the Cabinet Office Assessments Staff, who can trace no recent indications of Iraqi preparations to attack Kharg Island or Iranian tanker traffic. The Iraqi information media have called for reprisals against Iran for the recent bomb explosions in Kuwait, but it appears from today's news reports that these have taken the form of further ground-to-ground missile attacks against Iranian towns.

B 2. FCO telegram No.2070 to Washington records the UK/US discussion on contingency planning in London on 9 December. A further meeting, to assess the threat of escalation more accurately, will be held in Washington on 19 December. Our draft OD paper on this subject has already been submitted separately to the Secretary of State, and will be circulated as soon as it has been approved by him and the Defence Secretary.

Classification and Caveats | Precedence

CONFIDENTIAL | IMMEDIATE

F

	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 141700Z December
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	RFI IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, GULF
	10	POSTS,
	11	RFI PRIORITY AMMAN, BONN, ROME, STOCKHOLM, ISLAMABAD, CAIRO,
	12	TEL AVIV, UKDEL NATO
	13	RFI SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, BERNE, BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, LISBON,
	14	MADRID, SEOUL, SINGAPORE
	15	My telno 745 to Baghdad (not to all): Possible escalation
	16	of the Iran/Iraq war.
	17	1, After the meeting recorded in my TUR, Hooper (US Embassy)
	18	telephoned Haskell with some further background on the report
	19	from Eagleton in Baghdad. He apparently envisaged an Iraqi
	20	attack on Kharg using bombing aircraft and Scud B missiles
	21	(both of which they have already employed ineffectively against
///	22	this target in the past) and not repeat not Super Etendard/
//	23	Exocet attacks on tanker traffic, although this might follow at a
/	24	later stage. Hooper pointed out that the Iraqi information
	25	media are now calling for reprisals against Iran for the bomb

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword: explosions
File number	Dept: MED	Distribution: Standard; Iran/Iraq; Additional dist: Iran/Iraq
Drafted by (Block capitals): DK Haskell		
Telephone number: 233 5877		
Authorised for despatch: [signature]		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

XX 45

<<<<

explosions in Kuwait.

2. In our view, this somewhat reduces the impact of Price's original approach, though it clearly makes it all the more necessary to agree an assessment of the threat with the State Department. As discussed with Goulty, Haskell (Head of MED), Legge (Head of DS11 MOD) and Commodore Heaslip (Defence Commitments Staff) will be arriving on 18 December for a meeting with Raphel's team on the 19th. We still intend to telegraph before the weekend a paper outlining our own thinking for you to hand over in advance.

3. On a separate but related issue, Hooper, speaking on instructions which the Ambassador would have carried out personally if he had received them in time, said that the US Government would like HMG urgently to consider stopping any traffic in military equipment of whatever origin to Iran, at least until a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq was in place. They further hoped it would be possible to extend the reach of UK law to the activities of UK citizens in third countries and to third country manufacturers of UK licensed equipment. They also hoped it would be possible to retard or reduce the flow of any equipment transiting the UK for either of the belligerents.

4. Hooper said that the telegram of instructions commented that the US had so far had some notable success in stopping the export to Iran of items of military significance. They were considering banning also some non-munitions items on the US export control list. However, these additional efforts would not be effective unless partners and allies co-operated. As well as with ourselves, similar US action is being taken in Athens, Berne, Bonn, Brasilia, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Islamabad, Lisbon, Madrid, Rome, Seoul, Singapore and Tel Aviv.

5. Rumsfeld is apparently visiting Baghdad today to tell

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the Iraqis of the US demarche and stress the need to take no precipitate action at this time. He will say that in the opinion of the US, the international community as a whole will hold Iraq responsible for any escalation of the war and consequent disruption of oil supplies from the Gulf area.
Comment
6. We shall need to consider carefully the implications of the US request and are in no hurry to come back to them. In the meantime, we hope they will keep their approach to us confidential. There are obvious limitations on the extent of our response. Moreover, we have already told the Americans of our concern that their indications of support for Iraq may make the latter more rather than less difficult to deal with, while not softening Iranian intransigence. The Americans may thus get the worst of both worlds. However, your views and those of other addressees would be welcome.

HOWE
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MO 26/17/1

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

A & C. 12/12
L.a.

OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF

I have seen your Memorandum of 25th November on this subject (OD(83)17). I concur with the underlying assessment of the risks to oil supplies from the Gulf and I agree the conclusions in the paper by officials, including the proposal for preliminary low key discussions with the other main industrial countries concerned.

2. Copies of this minute go to other OD members and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
12th December 1983

IRAQ : Iran/Iraq Pt 3

12 DEC 1983

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Iraq 81-83

2 CNO



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

6 December 1983

The Rt Hon Peter Walker MBE MP
Secretary of State for Energy
Department of Energy
Thames House South
Millbank

N.S.I.R.
A.F.C. 7/12

OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF

I have read your paper OD(83)17, and Geoffrey Howe's minute of 1 December.

The paper by officials which you attached deals with a crisis lasting perhaps 3 months. It is at least arguable that, given such a temporary oil shortage, the UK's interest as a net oil exporter lies in maximising the resource and financial advantage offered by higher oil prices.

I am, however, inclined instead to agree with the paper's conclusions, and your own views. For a rapid price rise would be likely to be followed by a longer period of price instability, which could have an adverse impact on industrial and financial markets.

In discussions with other countries, and with the EC and IEA, we must however make quite plain that our support for the IEA Emergency Scheme is dependent on all the parties - including the United States - participating fully, and on the scheme working in practice as was envisaged when it was originally drawn up, after the crisis of 1973-74. We must emphasise that, if either of these conditions were not met, or seemed unlikely to be met, our support for, and participation in, the Scheme would lapse.

I do not object to Geoffrey Howe's proposal to authorise some low-key diplomatic activity to promote support for the Scheme, but I am sure that we must beware of becoming too closely

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identified with it, and so reducing our ability to act independently if it were to prove less than wholly effective.

Copies of this letter go to the Prime Minister, members of OD, and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours Nigel

NIGEL LAWSON

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET
Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215) 5422
GTN 215)
(Switchboard) 215 7877

JU131
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

6 December 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt Hon Peter Walker MP
Secretary of State for Energy
Department of Energy
Thames House South
Millbank
London SW1

N.B.P.M.

A.J.C. 7/12

M.a.

D Peter,

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE: OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF

I have seen your paper OD(83)17 on this subject and Geoffrey Howe's minute to you of 1 December. I share his view that in an emergency that may arise from the Iraq/Iran conflict the UK interest as both a producer and consumer of oil would be best served by activating the IEA Emergency Allocation Scheme. I therefore agree with your proposal that low key discussions should be initiated with the US, Japan and Germany to get them to accept this conclusion.

I am copying this to members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours Norman

NORMAN TEBBIT

112A9:
Intelligence Relations
Part 3.

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. HATFIELD

CABINET OFFICE

CONSEQUENCES OF AN ESCALATION OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 25 October to the Secretary of State for Defence, and Mr. Heseltine's reply of 23 November.

The Prime Minister considers that OD should discuss before Christmas the possibility of an escalation of the Iran-Iraq war and the extent to which we should contemplate military involvement by the United Kingdom should Western military action be thought necessary. It would be helpful if a paper could be prepared for OD addressing these issues and summarising the contingency preparations which have been made.

I am sending copies of this minute to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

6 December 1983

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cc: HO LPSO VC
LCO CDLO
FCO CO
HMT DTI
MOD LPO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 December 1983

Dear Michael,

Oil Supplies from The Gulf: (OD(83)17)

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's memorandum OD(83)17 about oil supplies from the Gulf. Subject to the views of colleagues she agrees the recommendations in paragraph 2 of that paper.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

David

Michael Reidy, Esq.,
Department of Energy.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET OFFICE.
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AS

Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

2 December 1983

Dear Michael

OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF

The Chancellor of the Duchy has seen your Secretary of State's paper OD(83)17 on this subject and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute to him of 1 December.

Lord Cockfield agrees with the conclusions of the paper and with the Foreign Secretary's suggestion that it be agreed rapidly out of Committee.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Prime Minister and other members of OD and to Richard Hatfield.

Yours sincerely
Sebastian Birch

SEBASTIAN BIRCH

Michael Reidy Esq
PS/Secretary of State for Energy
Thames House South
Millbank
London SW1

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IRAQ: Int Sit: PLZ

2 DEC 1983

MR COLES

2 December 1983

OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF

We recommend that the Prime Minister agrees to Peter Walker's conclusions in OD(83)17. The implementation of the IEA Emergency Scheme is probably our best chance of maintaining demand without significant price rises.

Nevertheless, we consider it extremely unlikely that we shall be able to avoid rapid price rises in the spot market if the situation in the Gulf becomes serious.

Perceptions rather than facts are crucial in the market's response. Even if a substantial share of any shortfall in supplies can be replaced by increased production and by drawing on stocks, it will still be very difficult to convince the market that the situation is under control. In 1978/79 supplies always exceeded demand yet prices still doubled.

The main difference between 1978/79 and 1983 is that we now have around 10 mbd of spare capacity in the world. Unless the oil installations in the Gulf suffer major damage, we should be able to avoid any immediate price rises becoming a permanent feature of the market.

We shall also need to consider very carefully the circumstances which should trigger the IEA Emergency Scheme. The normal trigger would be a 7% loss in free world supplies ie 3 mbd. The normal flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz is 9 mbd although the paper argues that alternative arrangements are likely to reduce the shortfall in supplies to 4 mbd.

However, it is possible that increased tension or limited military escalation could begin to panic the market before a significant loss of supplies occurred. In these circumstances, implementation of the IEA Scheme would also be the best chance of stabilising the situation. But we shall need to exercise very careful judgement if we are to avoid the introduction of the scheme being itself a cause for panic in the market.

The experiences of 1978/79 emphasise the importance of acting

in close consultation with other IEA members. There is a need to prevent Japan taking independent action which could further destabilise the situation. We note that there is also some doubt about the response of the US.

We support, therefore, the recommendation of approaching the USA, Japan and Germany bilaterally to seek their agreement to this approach.

DAVID PASCALL

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE GULF

Please see the attached minute from Tony Parsons.

You have seen correspondence between the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary about contingency planning. I attach
FLAG A again Mr. Heseltine's minute of 23 November and Sir Geoffrey
FLAG B Howe's minute of 25 October.

I quite take Tony Parsons' point that a political decision by you on British participation in military action in the Gulf would concentrate the minds of the bureacracy. But I do not think that you could possibly take such a decision alone - i.e. without consultation with your colleagues. Nor do I think that you can do it without fuller advice than you have in these papers.

Mr. Heseltine's minute attached clearly shows that our capacity to help militarily is being considered.

Would you like me to write to the Foreign Office and MOD saying that you have noted the contingency preparations, that you think it important that these be quickly completed, and that you would like advice from the Foreign and Defence Secretaries on whether or not it would be right to participate in military action in the Gulf should the need arise? I would ask for this advice to come forward within the next ten days. You could then consider whether an OD discussion was necessary - but I am a bit inclined to think that there can be no final decision on military action until we are faced with an actual situation requiring a decision. Agree?

2 December 1983

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8A

MR. COLES

THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE GULF

In my recent paper on the Middle East, I said that I thought we should make contingency plans very quickly against a possible crisis in the Gulf. Although it may not materialise, the problem is that it could be on us at any moment. It only requires the Iraqis to do one thing, eg a determined attack on Kharg Island or sinking an Iranian tanker, for the Iranians to react in some way or another. This would immediately trigger an international crisis.

We know about American contingency planning (Washington tel 3586 - copy attached). The Secretary of State for Energy has circulated a memorandum on the oil supply implications (copy attached). Work is in progress between FCO and MoD on a paper dealing with diplomatic and military contingencies. It may still be some time in gestation.

I believe that Prime Ministerial guidance is needed in order to clear away some of the bureaucratic undergrowth. The diplomatic and technical contingency preparations are arduous but relatively straightforward. The crucial point is a political decision of principle on whether or not we should participate in military action to clear the Straits and/or protect the Arab states of the Gulf if they need it.

I believe that, if it comes to the crunch, we must participate. If we fail to do so, there would be three important negative consequences. The Arab states in the Gulf would lose all faith in us as a residual presence in their area. There would be a serious Anglo/American split. Domestic opinion of the kind which matters would be severely critical. The worst outcome would be for the Americans to do the job themselves, leaving us bleating on the side-lines.

If the Prime Minister feels similarly, and gives the necessary guidance to the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary, contingency planning could be accelerated. The money would have to be found - an important point - and we could decide on the nature of our participation. This need not be extensive. It could be confined eg to the provision of Nimrod, or Rapier, or a minesweeping capability. What would matter would be our willingness to participate.

SECRET

I am putting this on paper as I will not have a chance to see the Prime Minister until late next week. I should add that I am not meant to know as much as I do about the state of planning within the FCO and the MoD.

A.D. PARSONS
1 December 1983

FCS/83/253

N.B. I.R.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Consequences of an Escalation of Iran/Iraq War

1. Thank you for your letter of 23 November, assessing the more likely calls on our resources in the event of an escalation in the Gulf war and outlining our own ability to respond, albeit at the expense of other tasks. This analysis and the more detailed work being undertaken by the Chiefs of Staff are a most useful preparation for the decisions on contingency planning which we may need to make at any time, and for our continuing discussions with the Americans.

2. You asked for an up-to-date assessment of the Gulf States' own perception of the Iranian threat. The following comments are based on reports by our Embassies in Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Doha, Jedda and Kuwait and on Richard Luce's meeting with the Omanis on 29 November.

Kuwait considered it would be in Iran's interest to exercise continued restraint. Iran's capacity to retaliate was in any case limited. Closure of the Straits of Hormuz would damage Iran more than the Gulf States. But Iran remained unpredictable and there was a danger that the Iraqis would continue to see how far they could go in escalating the war without provoking Iranian reaction. If Kuwait became the target of hit-and-run Iranian attacks, there would be little the West could do to counter them.

/Oman

Oman The Omanis believe that Iran is in earnest about its declared intention to disrupt shipping in the Straits of Hormuz if its own oil exports are cut off. Mining,or the threatened use of shore-based artillery or missiles were seen as more likely than a naval blockade. Elsewhere, the Iraq-Turkey pipeline was a more likely target than installations in the Gulf States.

The UAE Recent contacts between the UAE and Iran suggested that Iranians would concentrate any retaliation against Iraq, rather than on targets further afield.. Kuwait, because of its logistical and financial support to Iraq, was more at risk than the UAE.

Qatar The Amir considered Iran to be an irrational force which could attack at any time. He shared the Iraqi view that widening the conflict could lead to a solution. The main direct threat to the Gulf States would be a punitive air strike or interference with shipping.

Bahrain shared the Qatari view that Iran's actions could be highly irrational. Discussion of the Iranian threat at the recent Gulf Summit had been unfocused.

Saudi Arabia The Saudis refused to speculate in detail on the nature of the Iranian threat, but considered a blockade of the Straits would be more likely than attack on individual Gulf States. The main Saudi concern appeared to be a wish to avoid giving any unequivocal assurance that facilities to support Western military intervention would be forthcoming before the crisis was upon them.

3. You will see that there was no unity of view among the Gulf States about the likely threat from Iran, and even those

/countries

countries which had clearly thought most about it, such as Kuwait and Oman, had reached different conclusions. The only common points appear to be that:

(a) despite the indications of greater realism in recent Iranian official statements, it cannot be assumed that their reaction to a successful Iraqi attack on their oil export capability will be a rational one;

(b) the Gulf States believe that any action to clear the Straits of Hormuz must be an international responsibility: by which they mean a Western responsibility, with as much international support as possible;

(c) the Gulf States remain reluctant to be seen engaging in contingency planning with the US, ourselves or other Western countries before a crisis occurs.

I shall be writing further on the question of how to carry forward our own contingency planning in the near future.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for Trade and Industry, Energy and Transport, and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1 December 1983

Iraq : relations with Iran RT 3



FCS/83/251

N.B.D.N.

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

Oil Supplies from the Gulf

1. I was grateful for your paper OD(83)17 on this subject.

2. I endorse the conclusions of the paper, in particular that the UK interest in an emergency would best be served by activating the IEA emergency allocation scheme; and that we should initiate low key moves to persuade the US, Japan and the FRG to accept the conclusions in the paper. I also agree with your emphasis on the importance of public presentation and rapid collective action by IEA members if upward pressure on prices is to be forestalled.

3. It is not easy to assess the likelihood and possible timing of an interruption in Gulf oil supplies. It could take place at any time, and with little notice. It would be sensible for us to speak as soon as possible to the Americans, in advance of the Germans and Japanese; and I hope OD colleagues, to whom I am copying this letter, will feel able to agree the paper rapidly out of committee. I understand that the US Energy Secretary will be in London on 8 December and it might be desirable to mention the topic to him then.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1 December, 1983

- 1 DEC 1983



CONFIDENTIAL

Ref: B06907

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Oil Supplies from the Gulf
(OD(83) 17)

BACKGROUND

Over the past weeks officials have considered various aspects of the Iran/Iraq war, and further contingency work is in progress. The paper by the Secretary of State for Energy covers a report by officials on the effects on the United Kingdom's oil supplies and oil prices if oil from the Gulf were cut off or substantially reduced.

2. The paper concentrates on the possibility of a shortfall of about 4 million barrels per day (mbd) compared with the normal flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz of about 9 mbd and a free world market of 44 mbd. It concludes that provided panic buying could be avoided, there would be a good chance that United Kingdom demand could be met at prices close to current levels. Provided that international agreement could be secured, the United Kingdom's interest would be better served by activating the International Energy Agency emergency allocation scheme than by relying on alternative "sub-crisis" measures; and it recommends that action in response to a temporary interruption of supply should focus on mobilisation of stocks rather than on measures of demand restraint.

3. The Committee is invited to endorse these conclusions and agree that we should initiate preliminary low key discussions with the other main industrial countries affected, ie the United States, Japan and Germany.

4. Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials are advising the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to support this recommendation and to suggest that it would be helpful if preliminary discussions were opened with the Americans before the visit to London of the United States Secretary of Energy on 8th December.

HANDLING

5. The situation in the Gulf clearly has to be closely watched from day to day. Despite the recent Iraqi Exocet attack on a Greek ship, the Straits of Hormuz remain open and oil is still flowing. The oil markets remain reasonably calm. It is important not to talk the market into a crisis, which premature moves might risk doing. At the same time it would seem a sensible precaution to ensure that the other principal oil consuming countries share our assessment of the supply prospects and

support our analysis of the action which should be taken as soon as the market began to react to the prospect of a significant shortage of oil supplies from the Gulf.

6. I recommend accordingly that you should agree with the recommendations of the Secretary of State for Energy, subject to the agreement of the other members of OD. There would seem to be no need for the paper to be discussed by the Committee: and it would in fact be difficult to arrange a meeting in the near future because of pressure on Ministers' diaries and the absences of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary from London.

David Goodall

30th November 1983

A D S GOODALL

GPS 1500

SECRET

SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON 292115Z NOV 83.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3586 OF 29 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN,

PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, ROME, TOKYO,

CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 422 TO JEDDA (NOT TO ALL): THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE GULF.

1. RAPHEL BRIEFED MINISTER TODAY ON DECISIONS TAKEN BY PRESIDENT REAGAN ON US POLICY TOWARDS THE GULF.

2. HE STRESSED THAT THESE WERE TO BE SEEN NOT AS A NEW US INITIATIVE BUT AS PART OF A CONTINUING EFFORT TO DETER ESCALATION OF THE GULF WAR ABOUT WHICH WE HAD BEEN CONSULTING CLOSELY OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS. THE PRESIDENT HAD IN MANY CASES REAFFIRMED DECISIONS PREVIOUSLY TAKEN IN 1980 AND 1981. RAPHEL REPEATED THAT THE US SAW DIPLOMATIC ACTION AS THE FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO DETER AND IF NECESSARY CONTAIN ESCALATION OF THE WAR. IF DIPLOMATIC ACTION FAILED AND IF POLITICO/MILITARY MEASURES WERE REQUIRED, THE US WOULD WANT THESE TO BE MULTILATERAL, INVOLVING THEIR ALLIES AND REGIONAL STATES. ONLY IF MULTILATERAL ACTION COULD NOT BE AGREED WOULD THE US CONSIDER UNILATERAL MEASURES, HAVING REGARD TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PLEDGE TO KEEP OPEN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

3. RAPHEL SAID THAT US DIPLOMATIC ACTION MIGHT INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:-

(A) ENCOURAGING THOSE WITH INFLUENCE WITH THE PARTIES TO URGE THEM TO OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE TO ACCORDANCE WITH SCR 540:

(B) SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO SHORE UP IRAQ FINANCIALLY, TO REDUCE THE TEMPTATION TO THE IRAQIS TO TAKE RASH ACTION IN THE HOPE OF WESTERN INTERVENTION TO END THE WAR. THIS WOULD REQUIRE THE CONTINUATION OF ARAB ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ AT AT LEAST THE PRESENT LEVEL:

(C) CONTINUING TO ENCOURAGE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO LOOK FOR WAYS TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE AND PREVENT ESCALATION (SPEAKING PERSONALLY, RAPHEL ADMITTED THAT THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS WERE EXTREMELY SLENDER):

(D) A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CAMPAIGN TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE NEED TO ENSURE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION (BOTH SEA AND AIR) IN THE GULF REGION. RAPHEL NOTED THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID UNSETTLING THE OIL MARKET. RECENT GCC STATEMENTS HAD BEEN HELPFUL.

SECRET

(E) IF ESCALATION OF THE WAR APPEARED LIKELY, ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE HOPE OF FORESTALLING IT:

(F) ACTION WITH THE ALLIES TO DISCOURAGE THE SALE OF CRITICAL ARMS AND COMPONENTS TO IRAN. THE US WERE LOOKING AT THIS NOW AND WOULD BE CONSULTING ALLIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AN OBVIOUS DIFFICULTY WAS THAT IRAN'S MAIN SUPPLIERS, SUCH AS LIBYA AND NORTH KOREA, WOULD NOT BE AMENABLE TO WESTERN INFLUENCE.

4. RAPHEL REITERATED THAT, IF DIPLOMATIC ACTION FAILED AND MILITARY MEASURES BECAME NECESSARY, THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG PREFERENCE WAS FOR THESE TO BE TAKEN MULTILATERALLY AND WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE GULF STATES. IN ADDITION TO OURSELVES, THE FRENCH, ITALIANS, GERMANS, JAPANESE, AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS WERE BEING BRIEFED IN WASHINGTON. HE WOULD BE LEAVING WITH A SMALL STATE DEPARTMENT/DOD TEAM LATER TODAY FOR TALKS IN SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN, BAHRAIN, UAE AND PERHAPS QATAR AND KUWAIT. THE HURRY TO BE OFF WAS DUE TO THE NEED TO TALK TO PRINCE SULTAN BEFORE HE LEFT FOR A VACATION IN PAKISTAN. THE TEAM HAD THREE MAIN OBJECTIVES - TO DISCUSS CONCERTED DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICO/MILITARY ACTION, TO SHARE ASSESSMENTS OF IRAQI AND IRANIAN INTENTIONS, AND, IN VERY LOW KEY, TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR POSSIBLE FURTHER POLITICO/MILITARY TALKS ON MILITARY CONTINGENCIES. RAPHEL STRESSED THAT THIS ASPECT WOULD BE VERY MUCH UNDERPLAYED.

5. RAPHEL SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD APPROVED THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS:-

(A) THAT IN THE EVENT OF INDICATIONS OF AN ESCALATION OF THE GULF WAR AND IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FROM THE GULF STATES, THE US SHOULD INCREASE ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA, OFFER TO INCREASE INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH THE GULF STATES, BEGIN PLANNING MULTILATERAL ACTION TO PROTECT SHIPPING IN THE GULF AND TAKE ACTION TO INCREASE THE AIR DEFENCE READINESS OF THE GULF STATES:

(B) THAT IF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WERE MINED, THE US SHOULD CONDUCT CLEARANCE OPERATIONS, PREFERABLY WITH MULTINATIONAL PARTICIPATION AND THE SUPPORT OF THE GULF STATES:

(C) THAT IF THE TERRITORY OR OIL FACILITIES OF A NON-BELLIGERENT WERE ATTACKED, THE US SHOULD HELP WITH ITS DEFENCE:

(D) THAT THE US SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS TO HELP DETER ATTACKS ON NON-BELLIGERENT SHIPPING.

RAPHEL ADDED THAT THE US DID NOT REGARD AN ATTEMPT TO CLOSE THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AS VERY LIKELY.

6. RAPHEL WAS BRIEFING US FIRST, IN RESPONSE TO OUR STRONGLY EXPRESSED INTEREST. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD ALSO BE BRIEFING THE FRENCH, ITALIAN AND GERMAN EMBASSIES, AS HIS ALLIES WITH THE MOST DIRECT INTERESTS. IN ADDITION THEY WOULD BE BRIEFING THE JAPANESE, AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS. RAPHEL UNDERTOOK TO BRIEF US AGAIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS RETURN FROM THE GULF. ONE OF THE ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED WITH US AND OTHER ALLIES MIGHT BE INTENSIFICATION AND POSSIBLE UP-GRADING OF NAVY TO NAVY TALKS WHICH MIGHT COVER COORDINATION OF DEPLOYMENTS, JOINT EXERCISES IN THE REGION AND POSSIBLY CONTINGENCY PLANNING. SHULTZ WOULD WANT TO TOUCH ON THE GULF DURING THE DISCUSSION OF OUT OF AREA ISSUES AT THE NAC. THERE WOULD ALSO NO DOUBT BE OPPORTUNITIES IN THE MARGINS OF THAT MEETING FOR MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION. RAPHEL ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THOMAS'S SUGGESTION THAT HE SHOULD CALL IN LONDON ON HIS WAY BACK FROM THE GULF, PROBABLY OVER THE WEEKEND OF 10/11 DECEMBER, AND UNDERTOOK TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE DEPARTMENT ABOUT THIS VIA EITHER THE US EMBASSY IN LONDON OR ONE OF OUR POSTS IN THE GULF.

7. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS RAPHEL SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS TEAM'S VISIT. IF ASKED ABOUT IT THE AMERICANS WOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT IT REFLECTED LONG STANDING US POLICY OF KEEPING CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH ITS FRIENDS IN THE AREA ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF, AND THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WERE KEPT OPEN.

8. THOMAS SUGGESTED THAT THE MEASURES RAPHEL HAD OUTLINED, IN PARTICULAR US SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO SHORE UP IRAQ FINANCIALLY AND TO SQUEEZE IRAN'S ARMS SUPPLIES, GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF A US TILT TOWARDS IRAQ. RAPHEL SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN US POLICY. THEY DID NOT WANT EITHER SIDE TO SUFFER AN IGNOMINIOUS DEFEAT. WHILE THE WAR SEEMED EVENLY BALANCED, A POLICY OF STRICT NEUTRALITY WAS THEREFORE APPROPRIATE. NOW THAT IRAN WAS DOING RATHER BETTER A SLIGHT ADJUSTMENT WAS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO ''RIGHT THE BALANCE''. THE US WERE HOWEVER DOING WHAT THEY COULD TO DISCOURAGE THE IRAQIS FROM THINKING THAT WESTERN INTERVENTION WAS GOING TO RESCUE THEM FROM THEIR PRESENT DIFFICULTIES.

9. ASKED ABOUT LIKELY IRANIAN REACTIONS, RAPHEL SAID THAT HIS VISIT WOULD BE TAKING PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF A GREATER WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE GULF STATES TO TALK ABOUT MEASURES TO MAINTAIN FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF. IT WAS THEREFORE UNLIKELY TO SURPRISE THE IRANIANS OR PROVOKE A SERIOUS ADVERSE REACTION: INDEED IT MIGHT HAVE SOME DETERRENT EFFECT, THOUGH THAT WAS NOT ITS PURPOSE. IN REPLY TO A DIRECT QUESTION, RAPHEL SAID THAT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN ON WHETHER MEASURES TO DEFEND THE GULF STATES (PARA 5 (C) ABOVE) SHOULD INCLUDE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST IRAN: THAT WAS THE SORT OF DECISION WHICH CHOULD BE TAKEN ONLY IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME.

10. WE DREW ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR PRIOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN REGARD TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO. 1444), IN ORDER TO COORDINATE WESTERN ACTION AND TO PRE-EMPT UNHELPFUL MOVES BY THE RUSSIANS OR OTHERS. THIS WAS EVIDENTLY A NEW THOUGHT AND RAPHEL AGREED THAT ADVANCE PLANNING WOULD BE USEFUL. THERE WAS A DANGER THAT OTHERS MIGHT SEEK TO USE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DELAY OR DETER NECESSARY MILITARY ACTION. WE NEEDED TO BE ON OUR GUARD AGAINST THAT. HE ADDED THAT THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO PURSUE THE POSSIBILITY OF A FURTHER UN MISSION TO BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN INSTITUATIONS. THE TIME WAS NOT RIPE FOR A FURTHER INITIATIVE AT THE LEVEL OF PALME OR CORDOVES.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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asked FCO to copy this telegram to PM's party in Delhi 28/11/83 1500hrs

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FM KUWAIT 271438Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 304 OF 27 NOVEMBER 1983
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BAHRAIN, JEDDA, ABU DHABI, DOHA, MUSCAT
INFO PRIORITY DUBAI, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK

VWASHINGTON TELNO 3256: THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE GULF

1. US CHARGE D'AFFAIRE'S INFORMATION ON POSSIBILITY OF JOINT STATE/DOD MISSION TO GULF STATES, WHICH PRE-DATES THANKSGIVING WEEKEND, IS THAT MISSION IS UNLIKELY TO COME TO KUWAIT. GRIFFIN HAD BEEN WARNED EARLIER OF POSSIBILITY OF VISIT BUT HE HAS NO NEW TELEGRAMS AT PRESENT.

2. HE THEN TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE RESPECT) THAT HE IS TRYING TO SEE THE UNDER SECRETARY AT THE MFA TOMORROW TO INFORM HIM IN ADVANCE OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON TUESDAY, 29 NOVEMBER THAT US CENTRAL COMMAND WILL BE SETTING UP A SMALL FORWARD HQ CO-LOCATED AFLOAT WITH COMIDEAST FOR. THIS WILL COMPRISE SOME TWENTY MEN AND WILL BE EXPLAINED AS A NECESSARY PLANNING DEVELOPMENT TO MAKE CENTCOMS' ROLE IN THE GULF AREA MORE REALISTIC. GRIFFIN SAYS BAHRAINIS HAVE BEEN CONSULTED AND HAVE AGREED.

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1) Mr Butler
2) Mr Coles

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Seen by Prime Minister

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FM WASHINGTON 24ØØ2ØZ NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3546 OF 24 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI (FOLLOWING FOR P.S./SECRETARY OF STATE)

MY TELNO 3526: THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE GULF

1. RAPHEL BRIEFED US TODAY ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN PUT TO THE NSC, BUT NOT YET APPROVED BY MCFARLANE OR THE PRESIDENT. HE AGAIN ASKED THAT HIS ACCOUNT SHOULD BE HELD VERY CLOSE AND REPEATED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN PUT TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

2. RAPHEL SIAD THAT US POLICY WOULD CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT THAT THE GULF WAS AN AREA OF VITAL US INTERESTS WHICH THE US WOULD USE ANY MEANS NECESSARY, INCLUDING FORCE, TO SAFEGUARD, AND BY PRESIDENT REAGAN'S COMMITMENT TO KEEP OPEN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

3. IT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:-
(A) THE FIRST RECOURSE SHOULD BE TO DIPLOMATIC MEASURES
(B) THE APPROVAL OF THE GULF STATES SHOULD BE SOUGHT BEFORE ANY MILITARY ACTION WAS TAKEN
(C) MILITARY ACTION SHOULD IF POSSIBLE BE MULTILATERAL AND
(D) ONLY IF MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT WAS NOT POSSIBLE WOULD UNILATERAL US ACTION BE CONSIDERED.

4. THE NSC PAPER SOUGHT THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL OF US RESPONSES IN A NUMBER OF CONTINGENCIES. RAPHEL STRESSED THAT THE EMPHASIS ON MILITARY ACTION SHOULD NOT BE TAKENAS RULING OUT DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY TO SOLVE A CRISIS: IT WAS SIMPLY THAT THERE WAS INTERDEPARTMENTAL AGREEMENT IN WASHINGTON ON DIPLOMATIC MOVES BUT THAT POSSIBLE MILITARY RESPONSES HAD BEEN MORE DIFFICULT TO WORK OUT. THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS WERE THEREFORE SUBJECT IN ALL CASES TO PRIOR RECOURSE TO DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AND MULTILATERAL ACTION.

5. IT WAS PROPOSED THAT:
(A) IN THE EVENT OF INDICATIONS OF AN ESCALATION OF THE GULF WAR, THE US SHOULD RESPOND TO ANY REQUEST FROM THE GULF STATES FOR AN INCREASED US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA TO ACT AS A DETERRENT, OFFER TO INCREASE THE SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH THE GULF STATES, BEGIN PLANNING WITH THE GULF STATES AND THE ALLIES MEASURES TO PROTECT SHIPPING IN THE GULF, AND OFFER TO ASSIST THE GULF STATES IN INCREASING THEIR AIR DEFENCE READINESS (RAPHEL NOTED THAT SOME OF THIS WAS ALREADY IN HAND):
(B) IN THE EVENT OF MINE-LAYING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS OR IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF A NON-BELLIGERENT, THE US SHOULD INTERVENE TO COUNTER IT AND TO CONDUCT MINE-CLEARING OPERATIONS:
(C) IF A NON-BELLIGERENT ASKED FOR HELP TO DEFEND ITS TERRITORY OR OILFIELDS IN THE FACE OF ATTACKS, THE US SHOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY:
(D) IF THE US WERE ASKED TO HELP PROTECT NEUTRAL SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ OR INTERNATIONAL WATERS IT SHOULD DO SO.

6. RAPHEL CONFIRMED THAT AS SOON AS THESE PROPOSALS HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD CONSULT EUROPEAN ALLIES

AS WELL AS THE JAPANESE, AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS IN WASHINGTON US AIMS WOULD BE TO COORDINATE A DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO DETER ESCALATION OF THE WAR, TO INFORM THE ALLIES OF THE STEPS THEY WERE TAKING AND PROSPOSING TO THE GULF STATES, AND TO SEEK POLITICAL AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO PROCEED TO MILITARY PLANNING AND COOPERATION ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS. THE US WOULD WANT TO TALK ABOUT POSSIBLE NEW DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES, WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE A RENEWED MEDIATION EFFORT BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO FOLLOW UP SCR 540, NEW EFFORTS TO DISCOURAGE THE SUPPLY OF CRITICAL ARMS TO IRAN (RAPHEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS APPLIED ONLY TO IRAN) AND SOME MORE FORMAL EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. THE US WOULD ALSO WANT TO TALK ABOUT MEASURES TO DETER ESCALATION OF THE WAR AND WHAT THE ALLIES MIGHT BE WILLING TO DO TO HELP EG BY PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL FORCES AND MILITARY ADVISERS: THEY WOULD SEEK AGREEMENT TO THE HOLDING OF MILITARY PLANNING TALKS.

7. RAPHEL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PROPOSED BRIEFINGS IN WASHINGTON WOULD DO NO MORE THAN INTIATE THE PROCESS OF CONSULATION. WE URGED THAT HE SHOULD STOP OVER IN LONDON FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION BEFORE HE SPOKE THE GULF STATES AND MENTIONED THE VISIT TO LONDO OF CREASEY AND ALAWI NEXT WEEK (TELECON MINISTER/HASKELL). RAPHEL TOOK NOTE BUT AGAIN WARNED THAT EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT APPROVED THE NSC PAPER THIS WEEK TIMING WAS VERY TIGHT: RAPHEL HAS TO BE BACK IN WASHINGTON BY 6 DECEMBER. HIS PRESENT INTENTION WAS TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA, BAHRAIN, THE UAE AND OMAN (HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE OMANIS WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH A MEETING IN LONDON): VISITS TO QATAR AND KUWAIT WOULD DEPEND ON ADVICE FROM THE RESPECTIVE US EMBASSIES. IN ADDITION TO OUTLINING THE ABOVE PROPOSALS HE WOULD AIM TO SHARE ASSESSMENTS OF THE WAR AND DISCUSS WAYS IN WHICH THE GRADUAL DETERIORATION OF THE IRAQI POSITION MIGHT BE HALTED. THESE TALKS MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS ON THE MILITARY NET. HE WOULD OF COURSE BRIEF THE ALLIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS DISCUSSIONS IN THE GULF.

8. RAPHEL EMPHASISED THAT FIFTEEN YEARS EXPERIENCE OF DEALING WITH THESE PROBLEMS HAD MADE HIM FULLY AWARE OF LOCAL CONCERNS AND SENSITIVITIES ABOUT DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES WITH THE US. BUT HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDES OF THE GULF STATES OVER THE PAST MONTH. AT THE REQUEST OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS THE COMMANDER OF MIDEASTFOR HAD FOR THE FIRST TIME GIVEN PRESS INTERVIEWS IN KUWAIT AND THE UAE, HIS OWN VISIT TO OMAN AND BAHRAIN HAD GONE WELL, THE UAE HAD ASKED FOR THE FIRST TIME WHAT THE US COULD DO TO HELP IF THINGS WENT WRONG AND THE SAUDIS HAD OVER THE LAST FORTNIGHT BEEN UNPRECDENTEDLY FORTHCOMING. PRESSED ON THIS POINT, RAPHEL SAID THAT THE SAUDIS WERE NOW WILLING TO ENGAGE IN REAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING. ALL THIS REVEALED A NEW ATTITUDE BY THE GULF STATES, NO DOUBT REFLECTING THEIR REAL CONCERN OVER THE COURSE OF THE WAR. THE TIME THEREFORE SEEMED RIGHT TO SEEK ENHANCED COOPERATION WITH THEM. THIS WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO BE TACKLED DISCREETLY AND HE WOULD TAILOR HIS APPROACH TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PARTICULAR VIEWS OF EACH STATE.

9. RAPHEL SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO ESTABLISH A SMALL FORWARD HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT OF CENTCOM IN THE GULF CO-LOCATED AFLOAT WITH MIDEASTFOR. IT WOULD CONSIST OF FEWER THAN 20 PERSONS COMMANDED BY A BRIGADIER WHO WOULD REPORT DIRECTLY TO GENERAL KINGSTON. AT THE REQUEST OF THE BAHRAINIS THERE WOULD BE NO SUGGESTION THAT CENTCOM PERSONNEL WERE BASED IN BAHRAIN (RAPHEL REPEATED THAT THEY WOULD REMAIN AFLOAT). THE US WOULD PLAY THIS DEVELOPMENT IN VERY LOW KEY: IT WAS LIKELY TO BE MADE PUBLIC AT CENTCOM HEADQUARTERS IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT WEEK.

10. RAPHEL WAS NOT AUTHORISED TO GIVE US THIS ADVANCE BRIEFING: HIS CONFIDENCE MUST, PLEASE, BE PROTECTED.

WRIGHT

MO 3/9/4/2

Prime Minister

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

CONSEQUENCES OF AN ESCALATION OF IRAN/IRAQ WAR

Thank you for your minute of 25th October on the consequences of an escalation of the Iran/Iraq war.

2. I am in general agreement with your analysis of the possible Iranian retaliatory actions in the event of intensified Iraqi attacks. Our view of the Super Etendards is that their psychological impact has been greater than is justified by their real military value. If they are used against Iranian shipping in the Gulf, Iranian retaliation against Gulf State installations would seem to be more likely than direct disruption of international shipping or attempted closure of the Straits of Hormuz, not least because Iran's own oil exports would be adversely affected. This of course presupposes that the Iranians will act rationally and that the Iraqis will not be able significantly to reduce the flow of Iranian oil exports; if they did so the Iranians would no longer have any self-interest in keeping the Straits open. Neither of these assumptions is certain and I accept that we must keep under review the ways in which we might be able to respond to requests for British military assistance which might arise as a result of the whole range of possible Iranian actions.

3. So far as military assistance is concerned, in the case of the threat of an Iranian attack on Gulf State installations (such as desalination plants, power stations or off-shore loading terminals) the most likely request is for air defence assistance, either for ground based systems such as Rapier or for air defence aircraft plus associated air defence radars where there is no local capability. These could be provided, but only at the expense of other tasks,

and you will be aware that national and NATO commitments are already depleted by the presence of Rapier units in the Falkland Islands and Belize and of Phantom Squadrons in the Falkland Islands and Cyprus (in support of BRITFORLEB). Nevertheless a request would have to be considered carefully in view of our national, economic and defence sales interests in the area.

4. Against the threat of Iranian interception or air attack on international shipping the Armilla patrol already provides a limited British presence (within 7 days of the area). It would require reinforcement, taking 14-17 days, to operate effectively as an escort task group and would also involve diversion of resources declared to NATO. Air support would also be essential and could be provided if necessary (and again at the expense of other commitments), either by an appropriate combination of Buccaneers, Nimrods and Phantoms or by deployment of a CVS. In the event of mining of the Straits of Hormuz, assistance would almost certainly be sought by Oman which has negligible mine-sweeping capabilities. A Royal Navy mine counter-measures force consisting of 4 MCMVs and a support ship is already on call in the UK for this purpose and could be deployed to the Gulf in 6 weeks to clear the main shipping lines in the Straits. The RN could also provide MCM advisers in much shorter time if needed.

5. I agree with you that we must maintain close liaison with the Americans and that the indications from the recent UK/US politico-military talks are welcome. This is particularly relevant to the question of British assistance because it is difficult to conceive of British action to maintain freedom of navigation, for example, other than in conjunction at least with the US and possibly also with other major Western Allies.

6. As to the way forward I agree that it would be sensible for the situation to be kept under review. The Chiefs of Staff will be assessing the detailed implications of the possible options for


British assistance (in the light of which my officials will write to yours on the more detailed points raised in the attachment to your letter). I believe that it would also be helpful if we could have, from your own sources, an up-dated assessment on the Gulf States own perception of the Iranian threat. This, of course, will in the event influence the likelihood or nature of any request for British assistance.

7. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for Trade and Industry, Energy and Transport and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
23rd November 1983

Iran/Iraq

Pt 3



OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE DESKBY 2330Z

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TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	
	10	FOLLOWING FOR PS TO PRIME MINISTER; FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY; AND
	11	FOR PUS
	12	Situation Report 21/22 November
	13	Gulf War
	14	1. Fighting continues in the northern sector with the Iranians
	15	on the offensive but suffering heavy casualties. Iraq claims to
	16	have destroyed seven ships and one aircraft near Bandar Khomeini
	17	at the head of the Gulf. The Iranians have admitted that two
	18	cargo ships were damaged.
	19	Lebanon
	20	2. HMS Glamorgan and HMS Brazen are due to arrive off Beirut
	21	today (22 November) to provide temporary cover until HMS Fearless
///	22	takes up station as additional logistical support for BRITFORLEB
//	23	(28 November).
/	24	3. At today's EC Foreign Minister's meeting the Ten are
	25	discussing a UK outline draft of principles of a settlement of

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File number	Dept PLANNING	Distribution LIMITED
Drafted by (Block capitals) A J COLQUHOUN		Private Secretary PS/Mr Luce PS/Mr Rifkind PS/Lady Young PS/Mr Whitney PS/PUS Planning Staff No 10 Downing Street
Telephone number 233 7888		
Authorised for despatch		
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the Lebanese crisis to issue at the end of the European Council, 4-6 December. This would define the Ten's position within the wider Arab/Israel context. The Americans have seen our first draft in confidence and expressed some reservations which have been taken into account in redrafting. In introducing our draft Mr Rifkind will also make orally the points important to the Americans, notably the need to refrain from publicly torpedoing the unratified Lebanon/Israel account of 17 May 1983. The result after the Ten's deliberations is likely to be further changes, and may not please Washington. But by then it will not be a purely British draft.

4. Arafat's loyalists have again lost access to Baddawi Camp in Tripoli. The port and Zahrieh district (Arafat's HQ) are under heavy bombardment from Syrian-backed rebels, who have apparently entered the town. The local Lebanese Militias may be drawn in. Over half the civilian population are now estimated to have fled the city. Arafat remains adamant that he will not leave without guarantees of safety for his men. Diplomatic attempts to arrange a ceasefire continue. A non-aligned delegation composed of the Foreign Ministers of India, Cuba, Senegal and Yugoslavia is due in Damascus by the weekend, ostensibly to mediate between the Palestinian factions but actually to plead with Khaddam to allow for a ceasefire at Tripoli. By then Arafat's position may be desperate.

Grenada

5. The Governor-General has asked Montgomery for assistance with the prison service. He said that there was an immediate need for an experienced prison administrator plus two or three prison officers in a supervisory grade.

Cyprus

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6. Apart from the messages which the Secretary of State is sending his Greek and Turkish colleagues, main developments are (i) the Turkish Defence Minister is touring certain Islamic countries to drum up support for the Turkish position on UDI; and

		Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL		Page 3

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(ii) Perez de Cuellar has told Sir J Thomson that he does not intend to appoint a successor to Gobbi. We are urging him to do so to prevent the appearance of lack of interest in Cyprus by the UN at this crucial time.

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TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 403 OF 14 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, DOHA, KUWAIT AND MUSCAT
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, DUBAI, PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK
THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE GULF

1. US EMBASSY TOLD US TODAY THAT THEIR CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN JEDDA WAS SUMMONED ON 12 NOVEMBER. HE WAS INFORMED THAT THE GCC SUMMIT HAD TAKEN A FORMAL DECISION THAT IF THERE WERE ANY DISRUPTION OF SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, OUTSIDE HELP WOULD BE SOUGHT TO KEEP THEM OPEN. THE GCC COUNTRIES HOPED THAT ANY ENSUING ACTION WOULD BE 'LEGITIMATE', I.E. COVERED BY AN APPROPRIATE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. SCR 540 MIGHT BE ENOUGH, IF THERE WERE NO TIME TO SECURE A NEW RESOLUTION.

2. THE SAUDIS SAID THAT YOU AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WOULD BE SUMMONED TO RECEIVE THE SAME MESSAGE, AND THAT ACTION WOULD PROBABLY BE TAKEN BY THE OTHER GCC COUNTRIES WITH AMBASSADORS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S PERMANENT MEMBERS. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO THE US EMBASSY HERE OR TO US WHETHER SUCH ACTION WOULD BE CONFINED TO THE US, FRANCE AND UK, OR WHETHER E.G. KUWAIT WOULD BE SPEAKING TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR.

3. GRATEFUL FOR COMMENTS.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, TEHRAN, PARIS,
PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MODUK.

MY TELEGRAM NO 700: IRAN/IRAQ

I WAS CALLED TO THE MFA THIS EVENING BY SAHHAF, WHO SAID HE WAS SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTION FROM HIS GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE LATEST IRANIAN ATTACK. THIS SHOWED A CLEAR INTENTION ON THE PART OF IRAN TO VIOLATE IRAQS' FRONTIERS AND TO ATTACK IRAQI TERRITORY. THIS WAS THE MORE REGRETTABLE IN THAT THIS NEW BLOODY ATTACK CAME SO SOON AFTER THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD EXPRESSED THEIR CLEAR VIEWS IN FAVOUR OF PEACE AND NEGOTIATIONS IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO. 540. IRAQ STOOD BY ITS STATEMENT ACCEPTING THAT RESOLUTION AND DREW ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO THE PASSAGE UNDER WHICH IN THE EVENT OF IRANIAN REJECTION OF THE RESOLUTION IRAQ RESERVED THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST IRAN'S AGRESSION BY ALL POSSIBLE MEANS. SAHHAF STRESSED THAT IRAQ RESERVED THE RIGHT TO ATTACK IRANIAN TARGETS WHATEVER THEY MIGHT BE.

2. SAHHAF SAID THIS FRESH ATTACK AND ITS TIMING REPRESENTED AN OPEN DEFIANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF THE WISHES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY APART FROM IRAN. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, THEREFORE, REQUESTED THE FRIENDLY BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO MAKE PUBLIC THEIR CONDEMNATION OF THIS LATEST IRANIAN ATTACK IN WHATEVER WAY THEY SAW FIT. SAHHAF ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD MAKE KNOWN AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE THEIR VIEWS ABOUT THIS UNACCEPTABLE IRANIAN ESCALATION OF THE WAR.

3. I SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD CONSISTENTLY MADE CLEAR THEIR CONCERN TO SEE EARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND I UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY TO YOU THE IRAQI GOVERNMENTS REQUEST WITHOUT DELAY.

CONFIDENTIAL

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COMMENT.

4. THE GRAVITY WITH WHICH SAHHAF SPOKE SUGGESTS THAT THE IRAQIS MAY BE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE ABILITY THE IRANIANS HAVE SHOWN TO SUSTAIN THEIR CURRENT OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE PENJWIN AREA FOR A GOOD DEAL LONGER THAN OTHER ATTACKS IN RECENT MONTHS. THIS IRANIAN PRESSURE MUST INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE IRAQIS TRYING TO BREAK OUT OF THE WAR OF ATTRITION TO WHICH THEY ARE MORE VULNERABLE THAN THE IRANIANS, BY DRASTIC MEASURES SUCH AS USING THE SUPER ETENDARDS OR OTHER WEAPONRY TO INHIBIT IRAN'S OIL EXPORTS. THE REFERENCE TO THE IRAQI STATEMENT ON RESOLUTION 540 SEEMS DESIGNED TO JUSTIFY SOME MOVE OF THIS KIND.

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INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS,
MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MODUK.

IRAQ/IRAN

1. AN IRAQI MILITARY SPOKESMAN SAID AT 12 NOON TODAY, 3 NOVEMBER THAT A FURTHER IRANIAN ATTACK HAD BEGUN LAST NIGHT IN THE PENJWIN SECTOR. THIS WAS BEING MET BY FIRM IRAQI RESISTANCE. NO FURTHER DETAILS WERE GIVEN. WE HAVE SEEN A REUTERS REPORT FROM TEHRAN ANNOUNCING THAT THIS WAS THE THIRD PHASE OF THE VAL FAJR 4 OFFENSIVE.

2. A LEADING ARTICLE IN TODAY'S AL THAWRA NEWSPAPER CONTAINS A WARNING THAT IN THE LIGHT OF IRAN'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH THE CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE IN THE GULF AREA CONTAINED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 540, IRAQ WILL NO LONGER ALLOW IRAN TO ENJOY FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF WHICH ENABLES IRAN TO PURSUE HER HOSTILITIES AGAINST IRAQ, WHILE THIS FREEDOM IS DENIED TO IRAQ. IT CAN HARDLY BE COINCIDENCE THAT THIS THREAT, FOLLOWS SO CLOSELY UPON THE REVELATION BY TARIQ AZIZ TO FRENCH JOURNALISTS, SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED BY A FRENCH MINISTER, THAT THE SUPER ETENDARD HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO IRAQ IN OCTOBER.

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INFO PRIORITY MODUK, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
ROUTINE JEDDA, KUWAIT, CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS,
INFO SAVING ABU DHABI, DOHA, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, DUBAI.

IRAN/IRAQ.

SUMMARY.

1. THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE FRENCH PRESS HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE SUPER ETENDARDS ARE IN IRAQ. FRENCH POLICY IS NOW AIMED AT MINIMISING THE CONSEQUENCES.

DETAIL.

2. AN EXULTANT TARIQ AZIZ TOLD LE MATIN (PRO-GOVERNMENT DAILY) THAT FRANCE HAD DELIVERED THE AIRCRAFT SOME TIME IN OCTOBER. HE PRAISED FRANCE FOR NOT BACKING DOWN IN THE FACE OF A CAMPAIGN ORIGINATING ''IN THE US, THE UK AND ISRAEL, COUNTRIES WHICH IN VARIOUS WAYS SUPPLY IRAN WITH ARMS OR FACILITIES AND WHICH HAVE NO RIGHT TO LECTURE ANYBODY''. THE US HAD FORTUNATELY AT LENGTH SEEN THROUGH THE IRANIAN BLUFF. THE AFFAIR HAD BROUGHT NUMEROUS ARAB COUNTRIES (SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, EGYPT AND JORDAN) RALLYING BEHIND IRAQ.

3. IRAQ WAS READY TO ABIDE BY THE UN RESOLUTION WHICH REFLECTED IRAQ'S OWN EARLIER PEACE PROPOSALS. THE IRANIANS, HOWEVER, SEEMED TO WANT TO FIGHT ON. IF THEY DID, IRAQ WOULD REPLY ''MASSIVELY'' AND NO-ONE COULD BLAME HER.

4. IRAQ'S MAIN PROBLEM WAS FINANCIAL OWING TO SYRIA'S TREACHEROUS CLOSURE OF THE PIPELINE. TARIQ AZIZ'S APPROACH TO KHADDAM IN NEW YORK HAD FAILED, THOUGH THAT HAD AT LEAST SHOWN THE SAUDI AND KUWAITI MEDIATORS WHO WAS AT FAULT. 1983 HAD BEEN A DIFFICULT YEAR FINANCIALLY BUT NEXT YEAR THE SITUATION SHOULD IMPROVE THROUGH THE DOG-LEG TO BE BUILT LINKING IRAQ WITH THE SAUDI PIPELINE AND IN THE LONGER-TERM THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW PIPELINE ACROSS SAUDI TERRITORY.

5. CHEYSSON HAD SAID ON 1 NOVEMBER AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN ROME THAT THE SUPER ETENDARDS HAD BEEN ''PUT AT IRAQ'S DISPOSITION''. ONE PAPER CLAIMS THEY WERE DELIVERED VIA EGYPT.

6. THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FOLLOWING YESTERDAY'S FRENCH CABINET MEETING ALLUDED TO THE UN RESOLUTION AND REAFFIRMED FRANCE'S KEENNESS TO SEE A GENERAL CEASEFIRE. IT ALSO CALLED FOR THE OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS INSPIRED BY RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ''THE DIGNITY AND HONOUR OF TWO GREAT PEOPLES''

.

7. FRENCH PRESS BRIEFING HAS DEVELOPED THE THEMES OF FRANCE'S PEACE-LOVING INTENTIONS, THE SUCCESS FOR FRANCE WHICH THE UN RESOLUTION REPRESENTS, AND THE SCANT IMPORTANCE OF THE AIRCRAFT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR AS A WHOLE. A FURTHER THEME IS THAT THE AIRCRAFT ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE FOR THE TIME BEING TO BE USED AS A DETERRENT WHICH IRAQ WOULD ONLY UNLEASH IF PROVOKED. ON THE WHOLE THE PRESS HAS EITHER RELAYED ALL THIS FAITHFULLY OR REPORTED NEUTRALLY, WITH ONLY THE ODD GROUSE ABOUT THE ELABORATE SMOKESCREEN.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

FRETWELL

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

IRAN/IRAQ

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Prime Minister

You should be aware of the thinking about how we should respond to request from the Gulf States for assistance if the war escalates.

A.J.C. 25/10

FCS/83/212

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Consequences of an Escalation of the Iran/Iraq War

1. There has been much speculation about the possibility that the Iraqis may use their new Super Etendard aircraft to disrupt Iranian oil exports from the Gulf. In that event, the Iranians might seek to retaliate in one or more of the following ways:

(i) attacks on the Iraqi/Turkey pipeline:

(ii) attacks on Gulf state ports and oil installations;

(iii) blockade of Gulf state oil export terminals;

(iv) attacks on tankers going to or from Gulf state oil terminals;

(v) attempted closure of the Straits of Hormuz, which could involve:

(a) a declaration that the Gulf was closed to shipping;

(b) mining or blockage of the Straits;

(c) attacks on shipping.

2. I do not wish to be alarmist about these possibilities. It is not yet certain that the Iraqis will use the Super Etendards in the way that has been feared. Iranian naval and air capabilities are limited, and could not, for example, sustain a blockade of the Straits for long. The latest indications from Tehran are of greater caution, and a retreat from the exaggerated threats of the past few weeks. Recent

/activity

activity at the United Nations has led to the preparation by the Western four members of the Security Council of a resolution calling inter alia for an immediate ceasefire in the Gulf area. Though the Iranians are suspicious of most UN activity, they may be unwilling to reject this out of hand.

3. Nevertheless we cannot assume that Iranian reactions to the use by Iraq of Super Etendard/EXOCET against economic targets will be rational. We may be faced at short notice by requests for air or naval assistance, either from an Arab Gulf state which is threatened by attack or from the Americans, who are, like us, concerned to maintain freedom of navigation throughout the Straits of Hormuz. UK/US politico-military talks in Washington on 18/19 October provided an opportunity to compare notes on the extent of the threat, and established that the Americans have no clearly defined policy as yet for responding to the potential crisis; that their ideas for possible military action are to date modest; and that they would wish to act cautiosly, and preferably only in response to a direct request for help from one of the Gulf states. This is reassuring, but there is a continuing need to keep very closely in touch with the Americans, in order to influence their thinking as it develops.

4. I also believe we should clear our own minds about the range of British military support which could be made available in any of the contingencies outlined above, if we decided that the urgency of the Gulf situation required us to divert some part of our forces from their existing commitments. To set the ball rolling, I attach a short self-explanatory paper illustrating some of the questions which might need to be answered if the Iranians exercised any of the options listed above. Your own experts will be best placed to take this further. I should be grateful for your comments on this paper and on the other points I have raised.

/5.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for Trade and Industry, Energy and Transport and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
25 October 1983

IRANIAN RESPONSES TO IRAQI INTERFERENCE WITH IRANIAN OIL EXPORTS

Iranian Action	Possible UK Assistance with Counter-Measures	Comments	Points for Clarification
. Attacks on Iraq - Turkey pipeline (a) by aircraft (b) by commando squads	none	An unlikely option. Except perhaps for pumping stations, pipe-line would seem a difficult target for air attack. Iraq also has adequate SAM capability. Distance from Iranian territory almost certainly rules out commando attack.	none
. Attacks on ports, oil installations, desalination ports etc. in Gulf States	General: provision of additional air defence capability: e.g. Rapier or Blowpipe SAMs, Phantom air defence aircraft, Buccaneer or Jaguar ground attack aircraft (to hit back at Iranian shipping). Or, operational/maintenance help with Gulf States' existing capabilities.	Any UK assistance would have to be integrated with Gulf States' existing capabilities and help given by US. If requests were numerous, political decisions would be needed on which should be met and which refused.	See detailed questions below.
(a) Kuwait	See above (General)	The US believe Kuwait will turn to UK for help if needed. Kuwait is also the likeliest first target for Iranian attack. Kuwait has US and French interceptor aircraft: US and Soviet SAMs: no British defence equipment.	Would equipment supplied from UK fit in with Kuwait's existing resources?
(b) Saudi Arabia	Assistance to Saudi Arabia's Lightning squadrons.	Saudi Arabia has already sought and received assurances of US support. A separate requirement for UK is unlikely	Would Saudi Arabia be likely to ask for emergency assistance with Lightnings, and could we respond?

Iranian Action	Possible UK Assistance with Counter-Measures	Comments	Points for Clarification
(c) Bahrain	see above (General)	If Iranian attacks are directed primarily against oil exports, Bahrain is an unlikely target. Bahrain has already sought and received assurances of US support but may approach UK as well. Bahrain currently has no air defence capability except short-range RBS 70 SAMs.	Could we meet a commitment to set up virtually a complete system?
(d) Qatar	see above (General) Qatar operates Rapier SAMs, and might ask for additional missiles and operational/maintenance help.	US might be reluctant to respond to a request from Qatar. However as only a minor oil exporter, Qatar is not a prime Iranian target.	What assistance could we provide particularly over Rapier?
(e) UAE	see above (General and Qatar). The UK has a specific commitment to respond to a request for consultations in emergencies.	The US might similarly prefer the UK to respond to a request from the UAE. See also (g) (Offshore installations).	As for Qatar
(f) Oman	see above (General). The UK has a specific commitment to respond to a request for consultations in emergencies. Oman operates Jaguar aircraft and Rapier SAMs.	Oman has already sought and received assurances of US support but is likely to approach UK as well. Heavy existing UK involvement in supply, training and manning Omani forces. Oman is also of particular significance over convoying (3 and 5 below).	What specific requests would we expect the Omanis to make and how could we meet them?
(g) Offshore	Provision of air defence capability or anti-sabotage measures for offshore oil installations.	Most such are UAE. Offshore oil installations would be particularly vulnerable to air attack, but there might be scope for reducing their vulnerability to sabotage or small-scale commando raids.	Could any assistance be provided by Comachio Company, Royal Marines?

Iranian Action	Possible UK Assistance with Counter-Measures	Comments	Points for Clarification
3. Blockade of Gulf state oil export terminals	Convoying tankers which are prepared to challenge the blockade	Convoying implies that UK warships would return fire if attacked by Iranian ships or aircraft. Air cover would also be needed.	How much of the requirement could be met from Gulf States' own resources? Could requirement be significantly reduced by concentrating on keeping Ras Tanura open, and not worrying about blockade elsewhere? What would be the role of the Armilla Patrol?
4. Attacks on tankers going to or from Gulf state oil terminals.	As for 3	As for 3	As for 3
5. Attempted closure of the Straits of Hormuz by (a) declaration of an MEZ (b) mining or blockage (c) attacks on shipping	As for 3. US are not confident of their ability to cope with a mine-sweeping requirement and might urgently seek help in this area.	Blockage is physically impossible. Mining may be unlikely because it would go directly against the Iranians' own interests: i.e. to keep the Straits open unless their own shipping is severely disrupted by Iraq.	As for 3. Could we help to cover any mine-sweeping requirement? Where Gulf of Oman would requirement end?

NB. There are other Iranian options, such as stopping ships specifically to search for arms destined for Iraq, or ferrying crude oil in their own tankers from Kharg Island to Sirri, to be picked up by international shipping beyond Super Etendard range, which would not be likely to create a requirement for UK military assistance.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 688 OF 23 OCT 83

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK DI4.

INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN, AMMAN, WASHINGTON, PARIS, THE HAGUE AND GULF POSTS.

MY TEL NO 667 AND FCO TELNO 648 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN

1. MY TUR REPORTED THE IRAQI ANNOUNCEMENT OF A NEW IRANIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE PENJWIN AREA OF THE NORTHERN SECTOR WHICH BEGAN AT MIDNIGHT ON 19/20 OCTOBER. SUBSEQUENTLY IRAQI MILITARY COMMUNIQUES HAVE SAID THAT HEAVY FIGHTING HAS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 21 AND 22 OCTOBER. THE IRAQIS ARE CLAIMING TO HAVE KILLED OVER 3,200 IRANIANS ON THOSE TWO DAYS. HEAVY USE HAS BEEN MADE OF SUPPORTING AIR STRIKES WITH 485 SORTIES REPORTEDLY BEING FLOWN OVER THE BATTLEFIELD BY IRAQI JETS AND HELICOPTERS.

2. IT IS DIFFICULT FROM THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO FORM A CLEAR VIEW ON HOW THE FIGHTING IS PROGRESSING. IRAQI CLAIMS OF IRANIAN CASUALTIES ARE LIKELY TO BE OVER-STATED, BUT THE US INTERESTS SECTION ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE IRANIAN CLAIM ON 21 OCTOBER THAT THEIR FORCES HAD ADVANCED INTO IRAQI TERRITORY TO WITHIN ONE KILOMETRE OF PENJWIN ARE LIKELY TO BE EXAGGERATED. THEY BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE IRANIANS SCORED SUCCESSES IN THE INITIAL FIGHTING, BREAKING THROUGH THE FORWARD LINES OF IRAQI DEFENCE AND INFLICTING CONSIDERABLE CASUALTIES UPON THE IRAQIS. IT APPARENTLY FELL TO THE 29 BRIGADE OF THE SPECIAL FORCES TO STOP THE IRANIAN ADVANCE. ON 22 OCTOBER SADDAM HUSSAIN TOOK THE UNUSUAL STEP OF SENDING AN OPEN TELEGRAM TO THE COMMANDER OF 29 BRIGADE, THE TEXT OF WHICH WAS WIDELY BROADCAST, IN WHICH HE CONGRATULATED HIM ON HIS TROOPS COURAGEOUS AND SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE. THE COMMANDER, KARMIL SARJIT, WAS PUBLICLY NAMED (IT IS RARE FOR SENIOR OFFICERS TO BE NAMED PUBLICLY IN IRAQ) AND WAS DECORATED FOR BRAVERY. IN HIS TELEGRAM SADDAM SPOKE PARTICULARLY OF THE ''SUCCESSFUL ADMINISTRATION'' OF THE BATTLE ON THE IRAQI SIDE, A RATHER AMBIGUOUS FORMULATION.

3. ON 22 OCTOBER A MILITARY COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCED THAT THE APPROACHES TO BANDAR KHOMEINI PORT HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY MINED BY THE IRAQIS. IF CORRECT, THIS ACTION BY IRAQ APPEARS TO BE A DELIBERATE PIECE OF PROVOCATION OF IRAN WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO ENHANCE THE POSSIBILITIES OF ACHIEVING A RESOLUTION OF A CEASEFIRE IN THE GULF ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND SEEMS TO BE DELIBERATELY INVITING IRANIAN

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RETALIATION. THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY IN TURN OFFER IRAQ A SUITABLE PRETEXT FOR USE OF THE SUPER ETENDARD. NONE OF THE ATTACHES HERE, NOR THE US INTERESTS SECTION, IS ABLE TO CORROBORATE THIS REPORT YET, (FCO TUR.) INFORMATION ON THIS SORT OF MILITARY OPERATION IS PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN IN BAGHDAD. IT MAY BE THAT THERE IS A LARGE ELEMENT OF BLUFF IN THE IRAQI CLAIM. WE BELIEVE THAT THEIR MINE-LAYING CAPACITY IS LIMITED. MY DEFENCE ATTACHE WILL BE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY TO MODUK D14 ON THE TECHNICAL SIDE OF THIS QUESTION.

4. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS ON THE IRAQI SIDE OF THE SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILE ATTACKS AGAINST MASJAD SULAIMAN AND DEZFUL WHICH WERE REPORTED ON RADIO TEHRAN. THERE HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN REPORTS OF SHEELING OF IRAQI CIVILIAN TARGETS BY THE IRANIANS IN MANDALI, KANAQIN, PENJWIN AND OTHER BORDER TOWNS. THE NUMBERS OF CLAIMED CIVILIAN DEAD, HOWEVER, ARE VERY LOW.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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FM WASHINGTON 202005Z OCT 1983
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3034 OF 19 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, PARIS,
ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, GULF POSTS, AMMAN, JEDDA.

POL/MIL/ TALKS: IRAN/IRAQ

1. THIS ITEM DOMINATED TALKS ON MORNING OF 18 OCTOBER. CIA PROVIDED A DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE WAR AND ITS FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTH BELLIGERENTS. THE IRAQIS WERE IN SERIOUS TROUBLE: THE CIA ESTIMATED THAT THEIR RESERVES WERE DOWN TO US DOLLARS 4 BILLION AND FALLING, AND THAT THE CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT (US DOLLARS 15 BILLION) WOULD GET WORSE, IN SPITE OF GULF SUBVENTIONS, OBLIGING THE IRAQIS TO CUT BACK ON FOOD IMPORTS NEXT YEAR. THE IRAQIS HAD RECENTLY ENDED COMBAT PAY FOR THEIR TROOPS AND HAD BEEN SECRETLY SELLING GOLD. THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT KUWAIT AND SAUDI OIL-SWAP ARRANGEMENTS AMOUNTED

OF OUR SUBVENTIONS, OBLIGING THE IRAQIS TO CUT BACK ON FOOD IMPORTS NEXT YEAR. THE IRAQIS HAD RECENTLY ENDED COMBAT PAY FOR THEIR TROOPS AND HAD BEEN SECRETLY SELLING GOLD. THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT KUWAITI AND SAUDI OIL-SWAP ARRANGEMENTS AMOUNTED TO SOME 400,000 BPD SOLD ON IRAQ'S ACCOUNT PRIMARILY TO INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. IRANIAN RESERVES WERE ESTIMATED AT US DOLLARS 13 BILLION, SUFFICIENT TO COVER ONE YEAR'S IMPORTS.

2. THE AMERICAN ANALYSIS OF THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE DELIVERY OF SUPER ETENDARD AIRCRAFT (WHICH THEY THOUGHT HAD NOW ARRIVED IN IRAQ) WAS NOT WIDELY DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN. THEY THOUGHT THE IRAQIS WOULD SEEK TO EXPLOIT THESE WEAPONS IN A SERIES OF GRADUATED STEPS PROCEEDING FROM THREAT TO USE THROUGH SYMBOLIC USE OF SINGLE ATTACK (S) IN THE MEZ, ATTACK (S) AGAINST TANKER TRAFFIC TO KHARG, TO A FULL SCALE AIR ASSAULT ON KHARG ISLAND IN THE LAST RESORT. THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THE FRENCH HAD AGREED TO SUPPLY AT LEAST 100 EXOCETS WITH THE AIRCRAFT. IRANIAN REACTIONS MIGHT ALSO BE GRADUATED, INITIALLY PERHAPS LIMITED TO ATTACKS ON THE IRAQ-TURKEY PIPELINE OR KUWAITI OIL FACILITIES. THEY DID NOT WANT TO ATTRACT WESTERN INTERVENTION THOUGH AS A LAST RESORT THEY WERE PREPARED TO TRY TO CLOSE THE GULF TO SHIPPING.

3. THE AMERICANS ACCEPTED THE BASIC PRINCIPLES PROPOSED BY THE UK SIDE AND READILY AGREED TO THE NEED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION AT EVERY STAGE. IT WAS AGREED THAT DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE SHOULD BE DELEGATED TO A SEPARATE MEETING OF MIDDLE EAST EXPERTS. NIFT CONTAINS A SUMMARY OF THE MAIN POINTS TO EMERGE FROM THIS EXCHANGE.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 921 OF 14 OCTOBER

IRAN/IRAQ

1. GORENFLOS, THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY COVERING THE THIRD WORLD AT THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT, RANG US YESTERDAY EVENING TO SAY THAT THE GERMANS HAD INFORMATION FROM AN EXCEPTIONALLY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT IRAN PLANNED TO BLOCKADE THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ ON 23 OCTOBER. GORENFLOS COULD NOT SAY MORE ABOUT THE SOURCE. HE COMMENTED THAT THE GERMANS KNEW THAT IRAN HAD BEEN CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF BLOCKADING THE STRAITS, BUT HAD NO COLLATERAL ABOUT A SPECIFIC IRANIAN DECISION. GERMAN OFFICIALS WERE THEREFORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE NEW REPORT. THEY WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR BRITISH COMMENTS. THEY WERE ALSO CONTACTING THE FRENCH, AMERICANS AND ITALIANS.

2. FOLLOWING MALLABY'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH HASKELL (MED), WE TOLD GORENFLOS THAT THE UK HAD NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT AN IRANIAN DECISION, THAT IRAN'S CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN A BLOCKADE OF THE STRAITS WAS VERY QUESTIONABLE AND THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S FIRST REACTION TO THE NEW REPORT WAS ONE OF CONSIDERABLE RESERVE. WE ASKED GORENFLOS TO LET US KNOW IF THE FRENCH, US OR ITALIAN REACTION WAS DIFFERENT.

3. GRATEFUL IN DUE COURSE FOR ANYTHING MORE WE SHOULD SAY TO THE GERMANS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2976 OF 14 OCTOBER
INFO PRIORITY PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 2964: IRAN/IRAQ

1. ADMIRAL HOWE ASKED MINISTER TO CALL THIS MORNING TO GO OVER THE OUTLINE OF THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING THE AMERICANS WERE DOING ON THE THREAT OF ESCALATION IN THE GULF, IN PREPARATION FOR THE POLITICO-MILITARY DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK. RAPHEL AND SOKOLSKY WERE PRESENT.

2. HOWE WAS HIS USUAL DISCREET SELF AND NOT MUCH IN PRACTICE WAS ADDED TO WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED (MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND EARLIER TELEGRAMS IN THIS SERIES). HOWE SAID THAT THE INTER-AGENCY WORK ON THIS QUESTION HAD STILL NOT BEEN COMPLETED. IT WAS BASED ON THE HYPOTHESIS THAT IRAQI ATTACKS ON IRANIAN OIL EXPORTS COULD LEAD TO THE FOLLOWING IRANIAN ESCALATORY RESPONSES:

(I) ATTACKS ON THE IRAQI/TURKEY PIPELINE:
(II) ATTACKS ON GULF STATE PORTS AND OIL INSTALLATIONS:
(III) BLOCKADE OF GULF STATE OIL EXPORT TERMINALS:
(IV) ATTACKS ON TANKERS GOING TO OR FROM GULF STATE OIL TERMINALS:
(V) ATTEMPTED CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, WHICH COULD INVOLVE:
(A) A DECLARATION THAT THE PERSIAN GULF WAS CLOSED TO SHIPPING:
(B) MINING OR BLOCKADE OF THE STRAIT:
(C) ATTACKS ON SHIPPING.

YOU WILL SEE THAT THESE SCENARIOS ARE BASICALLY THE SAME AS THOSE COVERED IN THE NON-PAPER WHICH THE US EMBASSY IN LONDON HANDED OVER IN AUGUST, BUT WITH THE ADDITION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ATTACK ON THE IRAQ/TURKEY PIPELINE. THE AMERICANS DO NOT THINK THIS LIKELY BUT HAVE INCLUDED IT FOR COMPLETENESS.

3. HOWE SAID THAT THEY WERE STILL TRYING TO THINK THEIR WAY THROUGH THESE VARIOUS SCENARIOS. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE EARLY POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO ANY OF THEM WERE CONFINED TO DIPLOMATIC AND PRECAUTIONARY MOVES DESIGNED TO DISCOURAGE ANY FURTHER ESCALATION. THEY WOULD BE KEEN, AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT, TO DISCUSS WITH OURSELVES AND WITH OTHERS WHAT MUTUALLY REINFORCING ACTION WE COULD EACH TAKE. HE SAW THE PRESENT EXERCISE IN THE UN AS FITTING INTO THIS KIND OF APPROACH. UNILATERAL OR COLLECTIVE STATEMENTS ABOUT QUOTE VITAL INTERESTS UNQUOTE MIGHT BE ANOTHER. HE REGARDED THE DEPLOYMENT OF USS RANGER TO THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE PASSAGE OF THE INVINCIBLE TASK FORCE THROUGH THE INDIAN OCEAN AS BEING SIGNALS OF A DIFFERENT KIND BUT ALSO HELPFUL IN GIVING WARNING ABOUT THE DANGERS OF ESCALATION. THESE WERE PART OF WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A VISIBLE BUT NOT PROVOCATIVE DISPLAY OF FORCE.

4. HOWE SAID THAT ON PRESENT PLANS THIS WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT A MEETING OF THE NSC NEXT WEEK. HE SEEMED AT FIRST TO BE SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE AMERICANS TO GO INTO MUCH DETAIL WITH US UNTIL THAT DISCUSSION HAD TAKEN PLACE. THOMAS ARGUED THE CASE FOR HAVING SUBSTANTIVE EVEN IF NON-COMMITTAL DISCUSSION WITH US ABOUT THE OPTIONS BEFORE RATHER THAN AFTER THE NSC DISCUSSION. HE PRESUMED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE THEN TO FACTOR BRITISH VIEWS INTO AMERICAN THINKING BEFORE FINAL DECISIONS WERE TAKEN. HOWE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS (RAPHEL CERTAINLY DID) AND IT WAS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD AIM NEXT WEEK AT THE MOST FRANK AND OPEN DISCUSSION POSSIBLE, ALBEIT WITHOUT COMMITMENT AT THIS STAGE ON EITHER SIDE.

5. THOMAS MADE THE POINT TO HOWE (AND RUBBED IT IN SUBSEQUENTLY IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH RAPHEL) THAT IT WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT NOT TO SPRING SURPRISES ON THE ALLIES. THE MORE THE AMERICANS COULD SHARE THEIR THOUGHTS WITH US THE BETTER. IT WAS ONLY BY THIS MEANS THAT THEY WOULD GET A SENSE OF WHERE THEY COULD LOOK TO US FOR SUPPORT AND WHERE NOT.

6. THE AMERICANS ARE IN TWO MINDS ABOUT THE IDEA OF MULTI-LATERAL DISCUSSION OF THESE QUESTIONS. THEY FEEL FOR EXAMPLE THAT TO BRING IN THE FRENCH MAY BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE: THEY GET A GOOD DEAL FROM THE FRENCH IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN NAVIES, BUT THE RESULTS GET PROGRESSIVELY WEAKER THE MORE THE QUAI D'ORSAY GETS DRAWN INTO IT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY RECOGNISE THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO FIND SOME WAY OF MULTI-LATERALISING RESPONSES TO PARTICULAR CONTINGENCIES THAT MIGHT ARISE AND THEY RECOGNISE THE DESIRABILITY OF WORKING FOR THIS IN ADVANCE. ONE OF THE THINGS THEY WILL HOPE TO DISCUSS WITH US NEXT WEEK IS HOW THIS MIGHT BEST BE DONE.

7. RAPHEL MENTIONED THE IDEA THAT WE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN GULF USERS. WHAT DID WE HAVE IN MIND? THE AMERICANS SAW NO LIKELIHOOD OF GETTING THE IRANIANS AND IRAQIS TOGETHER ROUND A TABLE IF THAT WAS WHAT WE WERE THINKING OF. AT THE SAME TIME RAPHEL RECOGNISED THAT IT MIGHT SEEM CONFRONTATIONAL TO HAVE A MEETING OF GULF USERS THAT EXCLUDED THE IRANIANS AND IRAQIS. THOMAS SAID THAT IF WE WERE THINKING OF SOMETHING ON THESE LINES IT WOULD NO DOUBT COME UP IN THE DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK.

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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

IRAN/IRAQ : RELEASE OF SUPER ENTENDARDS

ATHENS TELNO 1 TO WASHINGTON

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOLD CHEYSSON IN THE MARGINS OF THE SPECIAL COUNCIL TODAY OF OUR CONCERN THAT DELIVERY OF SUPER ETENDARD TO IRAQ MIGHT SERIOUSLY ALARM THE IRANIANS AND RISK ENCOURAGING RETALIATION IN A WAY INIMICAL TO WESTERN INTEREST. CHEYSSON AVOIDED CONFIRMATION THAT DELIVERY HAD TAKEN PLACE, BUT CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT IT EITHER HAD OR WAS ABOUT TO DO SO. HE SAID THAT OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, HAD TOLD THEM NOT TO BE BLACKMAILED INTO NOT DELIVERING. THE FACT WAS THAT THE ETENDARD WOULD BE ONLY A SMALL COMPONENT OF IRAQI FIRE POWER, FOR USE PRINCIPALLY AGAINST SHIPPING. IRAQ IN ANY CASE ALREADY HAD A

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2. (FOR PARIS). THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD FOLLOW UP AS APPROPRIATE WITH THE QUAI IN THE LIGHT OF THIS CONVERSATION, AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO KEEP US IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THEIR THINKING.

R H O D E S

NNNN

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 October 1983

Credit for Iraq

The Prime Minister took a meeting today attended by your Secretary of State, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister for Trade. The meeting considered whether the Iraqi delegation should be offered an enlarged credit facility of £250 million for five years against the existing offer of £100 million for three years.

It was argued that the original offer was conditional and that the conditions had not been fulfilled. Delays in repayment were mounting. The problem was not that Iraq could not pay, but that it preferred to delay in order to increase finance for its war effort. The aim should be to increase exports where these were being paid for. Accordingly, no offer of credit should be made.

In support of a larger offer, it was argued that the Iraqi market was potentially a very strong one and that it was important to keep a foothold in it. The current arrears of repayment were small in relation to total trade.

Summing up, the Prime Minister said that in view of the longer term potential of the Iraqi market and the need to maintain contact with it, an enlarged offer of up to £250 million for five years could be made. But it was important to attach stringent conditions to this. Past arrears should be cleared up; there should be a firm undertaking not to allow new arrears to accumulate; the Iraqis should accept the standard terms of ECGD contracts; and the repayment period should be five years rather than 8½ years as provided for in the OECD consensus.

It was also agreed that at their various meetings with the Iraqis, the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and your Secretary of State would all press for the early release of Mr. Smith and would make it clear that agreement on credit would be dependent upon this.

/ I am copying

CONFIDENTIAL

I am copying this letter to John Kerr (H.M. Treasury), Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Jonathan Rees (Minister of State's Office, Department of Trade and Industry) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

ANDREW TURNBULL

Jonathan Spencer, Esq.,
Department of Trade and Industry.

PRIME MINISTER

cc: Mr. Coles

IRAQI CREDIT

Mr. Channon has asked to attend this meeting. This seems sensible as he will be chairing the meeting of the Anglo-Iraqi Joint Commission which will take place in the afternoon. But I think we should ask him to be a non-speaking member in order that DTI do not appear to have two votes.

So far there has been no protest from the Iraqi officials who have arrived, but they may be interpreting our failure to make an offer as a desire to hold back the prize for the Ministerial meetings.

Sir Anthony Parsons has commented that in view of the underlying strength of the Iraqi economy, it is worth offering just enough credit to maintain a favourable relationship. He would favour at least maintaining the existing offer of £100 m.

AT

4 October 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

Meeting 1100 on 5/10

M Flesher
Can you get together a meeting asap?
RT
3/10

PRIME MINISTER

CREDIT FOR IRAQ

The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister arrives on Wednesday, 5 October and meets you on Thursday, 6 October. Improved credit facilities are an important objective of his.

Iraq has been offered, conditionally, £100 million for three years.

i. The commercial case for going beyond this is weak - ECGD losses are large and mounting;

ii. but it is argued that Iraqi long-term prospects are good; that it is a good market for UK firms; and that the political arguments are strongly in favour.

DTI (Flag A) and FCO (Flag B) both argue that if the Iraqis are not given an advance indication of an improved offer there is a risk that Ramadhan will cancel his visit. Both suggest offering £250 million for five years subject to improved performance on existing debts.

The Treasury (Flag C) argue that we should not offer the Iraqis new medium term credit, i.e. that the original offer should be withdrawn since the conditions have not been met.

There are two further considerations:

i. this is an early test of the conclusion of the Chequers meeting that "we should conduct a major drive to sell less to countries who were unable to pay for our exports";

ii. should we allow ourselves to be pressurised by a threat to cancel the forthcoming visit?

/The choices

CONFIDENTIAL

The choices are:

i. to offer no new medium term credit;

ii. to confirm the original offer of £100 million;

iii. to offer £250 million over five years.

Or you may wish to hold a short meeting

A meeting - Yes/No. AT

30 September 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

C

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

30 September 1983

The Rt. Hon. Cecil Parkinson MP
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

Dear Cecil

CREDIT FOR IRAQ

Your letter of 29 September asked for urgent comments on a proposal that the Iraqi team visiting the UK next week should be offered £250 million of medium term credit over 5 years.

I am very reluctant to agree to this. As your letter makes clear to do so would be incompatible with our recent decision to adopt a more rigorous approach to country underwriting and would put us in the position of offering significantly more generous credit terms than other Western credit insurers. You suggest that we should nevertheless depart from normal principles for commercial and political reasons. As I understand it the commercial case is that the underlying position of the Iraqi economy is sound and it will therefore be a major market once oil exports resume and the war is over. I agree that in the longer term Iraq has much to offer as a market but in the meantime the country's resources are being channeled into the war effort, there are no signs of the war ending - indeed it may escalate - and the bulk of the repayment of the credits you propose will fall due during the next 5 years ie in advance of the time when you believe they may be in a position to pay their debts. These are all factors which should lead us to look with extreme scepticism on any case for extending credit.

You also suggest that the need to meet the Iraqi expectation for an offer of credit amounts to a political imperative because failure to meet such an expectation would be seen as an act of bad face. But the Iraqis latest demands are clearly unrealistic. The original very much smaller offer was made in conditional terms. Since then their economy has deteriorated and the conditions have not yet been met. There seems no point in securing a political, and perhaps commercial success in the short term if the only result is exports which are not paid for or which are paid for only after considerable delay. As you know this is very much the line which we are taking in other cases where we are under pressure to extend new credit.

My conclusion therefore is that we should not offer the Iraqis new medium term credit at this time.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours ever

NIGEL LAWSON

FCS/83/187

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

Credit for Iraq

1. I have now seen Cecil Parkinson's letter of 29 September and your reply of 30 September. There are, as you say, good arguments for taking a very sceptical view of the case for more credit. On the other hand, there are strong political arguments for doing as Cecil Parkinson has proposed, not least because of the imminence of Ramadhan's visit. Iraq remains a major market for us and the financial difficulties which result from the war are likely to continue to be offset at least to some extent by support from other Arab countries. The balance is not an easy one to strike, but I think that Cecil Parkinson has got it right and I hope that you will be able to agree that the political and commercial arguments should be allowed to prevail.

2. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, to other members of E(X) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
30 September 1983

A

CC/AP

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET
TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-215 5422
SWITCHBOARD 01-215 7877

JU564

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

29 September 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt Hon Nigel Lawson MP
Chancellor of the Exchequer
HM Treasury
Treasury Chambers
Whitehall SW1

Dear Nigel,

CREDIT FOR IRAQ

As you will know, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Ramadhan, with the Trade and Oil Ministers and a large official party, arrive as guests of the Prime Minister on 5 October. The Anglo/Iraqi Joint Commission will take place concurrently. The Iraqis have recently made clear that they regard credit as by far the main issue and would judge the visit accordingly.

2 On instructions from EGC, the Ambassador in Baghdad wrote to the Governor of the Central Bank in February about the re-financing of existing major contracts - the Iraqis' top priority at the time; the letter stated that when the refinancing process was complete, we would consider extending £100m, minimum 3 year credit for new business at consensus rates. The Iraqis are now reported to be taking this offer for granted and have just given us a draft financial protocol for £1.35 billion of new credit! At present ECGD, like other credit insurers, offer only 1 year against letters of credit.

3 Clearly none of us like the idea of leading a move to convert a cash to a credit market. I set out below the arguments for and against doing so in this case.

4 Against extending credit

Iraq's economic situation has deteriorated since February and their economic prospects for the next 2/3 years (during which period the bulk of repayments would fall due) also look appreciably worse. There is no sign of the war ending and whilst Iran appears able to sustain a war of attrition it is increasingly having a serious effect on Iraq. ECGD's experience has also been deteriorating with claims up to £15 million either paid or under examination and a further £30 million potential losses reported. In addition some contracts have been arbitrarily cancelled by the Iraqis where the contractor has been

unable to provide financing facilities. No Western credit insurer (except possibly Austria) is currently prepared to offer support for medium credits to Iraq (indeed many are off cover even for cash business). Finally to grant credit would be incompatible with our decision to adopt a more rigorous ECGD approach to country under-writing, and would lead to criticism from other countries forced to follow the UK lead.

5 In favour of extending credit

a Commercial

Though the Iraqi economy has deteriorated since EGC authorised the February offer, the basic commercial case remains valid. Iraq is a striking example of a wealthy country with a serious, albeit temporary, cash flow problem, arising from the war, and closure of its Gulf oil outlet. Its oil reserves are the second largest in the Middle East. It has no accumulated debt, so extending credit is not a question of bailing out the banks. Iraq is a major market for our goods. In 1982 Iraq took £875m of UK exports - more than Japan and Korea combined. Once its oil exports resume, it will again be a major market. Although payments problems are likely to persist for 2 to 3 years, and there is considerable uncertainty about the state of Iraqi reserves, they should be in a position to pay debts in 5 years time, whether through the end of the war or through the development of alternative oil outlets, such as the Red Sea pipeline. The only current oil outlet, through Turkey, will in any case be expanded by 50% next spring to produce a revenue flow of $10 bn annually. Saudi aid continues at about $1 bn per month. Although there is still no hard evidence of other major credit insurers offering medium term cover, Austria is known to be considering it; (Mr Ramadhan will come here from Vienna).

b Political

The political arguments seem even more compelling. Commercil decision-taking in Iraq is more centralised and more subjec to political considerations, than in almost any other Arab country. Mr Ramadhan ranks effectively as Prime Minister in the Iraqi hierarchy, and is the formal overlord of the entire economy. He has a powerful voice in Defence Sales matters, in the DSO's best recent market. His visit will be quite the most important meeting between British and Iraqi Governments for several years, and "success" or "failure" will have repercussions on our political and commercial relations for years to come. To appear in Iraqi eyes to renege on the undertaking implicit in the February letter would be seen as an act of bad faith with damaging long-term effects across the whole range of Anglo/Iraqi relations.

6 I conclude that the commercial case supports what is in effect a political imperative, to extend credit. Furthermore, if we are to move into medium-term credit at all, there is a good case for doing it boldly - not in such a half-hearted way that our competitors would at once more than match us, and our people would face an impossible task of choosing the lucky few from the several good contracts now in prospect. It would give us the worst of both worlds to start the race in such a way as to ensure we were soon running behind the pack. Thus the minimum we can do politically (£100m) - is commercially too small an amount. £250m for 5 years (a more sensible period, since in 5 years the underlying strength of the Iraqi economy should have been re-established) would enable us to cover serious business now in prospect, with a small margin. In my view it is both politically and commercially about the minimum realistic figure. We would naturally limit it to British capital goods, with some minimum contract value.

7 I am not, of course, suggesting that any offer should be unconditional. We shall wish to ensure in negotiation of the details that the Iraqis meet our interests, for instance over prompt payment of 1983 and 1984 maturities from the earlier refinancing exercise. On past form, these negotiations would take some considerable time to complete, before credit was actually made available. All we can sign next week with Mr Ramadhan will be an agreement in principle, subject to satisfactory negotiation.

8 Red Sea pipeline

Of all the civil projects in Iraq in which British firms are interested, this is unique both in scale, (the larger version would have £500m UK content, the smaller £200m), and more importantly in its role as a revenue-earner rather than spender for Iraq. Even if the war drags on indefinitely, this project offers Iraq a return to a positive cash-flow within 3 years of starting work. The Oil Minister and his officials will wish to discuss it again next week with the British-led international consortium and with my Department. To keep these discussions going I propose that my officials should tell the Iraqis that we are prepared to support this project, subject to satisfactory security in the form of either a Saudi guarantee of last resort or acceptable equivalent arrangements.

9 Iran

Although it is not strictly relevant to this letter, I should mention my concern that, if we do reach agreement with the Iraqis, we should consider some gesture, for instance in the defence sales field, to moderate Iranian dissatisfaction. Officials should, in my view, pursue this separately.

10 I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, other members of E(X), and to Sir Robert Armstrong. I fear there is considerable urgency about taking a decision, in that if we cannot at least give the Iraqi officials arriving for the Joint Commission meeting some kind of positive indication by 1 October, there is a real danger that Ramadhan will cancel the visit at the last moment, rather than risk a rebuff. I would therefore welcome your most urgent comments.

The 1 October deadline is no longer thought pressing

Yours ever,

Tim.

Iraq: visit by Ranadhaw

CREDIT FOR IRAQ

As you will know, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Ramadhan, with the Trade and Oil Ministers and a large official party, arrive as guests of the Prime Minister on 5 October. The Anglo-Iraqi Joint Commission will take place concurrently. The Iraqis have recently made clear that they regard credit as by far the main issue and would judge the visit accordingly.

On instructions from EGC the Ambassador in Baghdad wrote to the Governor of the Central Bank in February about the re-financing of existing major contracts the Iraqis took priority at the time. The latter stated that when the re-financing process was complete, we would consider extending 1 million pounds, minimum three-year credit for new business at consensus rates. The Iraqis are now reported to be taking this offer for granted and have just given us a draft financial protocol for pounds 1.35 billion of new credit! At present, ECGD, like other credit insurers, offer only 1 year against letters of credit.

Clearly none of us like the idea of leading a move to convert a cash to a credit market. I set out below the arguments for and against doing so in this case.

Against Extending Credit

Iraq's economic situation has deteriorated since February and their economic prospects for the next 2 - 3 years (during which period the bulk of repayments would fall) also look appreciably worse. There is no sign of the war ending and whilst Iran appears able to sustain a war of attrition it is increasingly having a serious effect on Iraq. ECGD's exports have also been deteriorating with claims up to pounds 15 million either paid or under examination and a further pounds 30 million potential losses reported. In addition, some contracts have been attributably

/cancelled

cancelled by the Iraqis where the contractor has been unable to provide financing facilities. No Western credit insurer (except possibly Austria) is currently prepared to offer support for medium credits to Iraq (indeed many are off-cover even for cash business). Finally, to grant credit would be incompatible with our decision to adopt a more rigorous ECGD approach to country underwriting, and would lead to criticism from other countries forced to follow the UK lead.

In Favour of Extending Credit

Commercial

a. Though the Iraqi economy has deteriorated since EGC authorised the February offer, their basic commercial case remains valid. Iraq is a striking example of a wealthy country with a serious albeit temporary cash flow problem arising from the war and closure of its Gulf oil outlet. Its oil reserves are the second largest in the Middle East. It has no accummulating debt so expanding credit is not a question of bailing out the banks. Iraq is a major market for our goods. In 1982 Iraq took pounds 875 million of UK exports more than Japan and Korea combined. Once its oil exports resume it will again be a major market although payments problems are likely to persist for two to three years and there is considerable uncertainty about the state of Iraqi reserves. They should be in a position to pay debts in 5 years time whether through the end of the war or through the development of alternative oil outlets such as the Red Sea pipeline. The only current oil outlet through Turkey will in any case be expanded by 50% next spring to produce a revenue of $10 billion annually. Saudi aid continues at about $1 billion per month. Although there is still no hard evidence of other major credit insurers offering medium term cover. Austria is known to be considering it (Mr. Ramadhan will come here from Vienna.

/b.

b. Political

The political arguments seem even more compelling, commercial decision-taking in Iraq is more centralised and more subject to political considerations, than in almost any other Arab country. Mr. Ramadhan ranks effectively as Prime Minister in the Iraqi hierarchy, and is the formal overlord of the entire country. He has a powerful voice in defence sales matters, in the DSO's best recent market. His visit will be quite the most important meeting between British and Iraqi governments for several years, and success or failure will have repercussions on our political and commercial relations for years to come. To appear in Iraqi eyes to renegade on the undertaking implicit in the February letter would be seen as an act of bad faith with damaging long term effects across the whole range of Anglo-Iraqi relations.

I conclude that the commercial case supports what is in effect a political imperative, to extend credit. Furthermore, if we are to move into medium term credit at all, there is a good case for doing it boldly not in such a half-hearted way that our competitors would at once more than match us, and our people would face an impossible task of choosing the lucky few from the several good contracts now in prospect. It would give us the worst of both worlds to start the race in such a way as to ensure we were seen running behind the pack. Thus the minimum we could do politically (pounds 100 million) is commercially too small an amount. Pounds 250 million for five years (a small period, since in five years the underlying strength of the Iraqi economy should have been re-established) would enable us to cover serious business now in prospect,

/with a

with a small margin. In my view it is both politically and commercially about the minimum realistic figure. We would naturally limit it to British capital goods, with some minimum contract value.

I am not, of course, suggesting that an offer should be unconditional. We shall wish to ensure on negotiation of the details that the Iraqis meet our interests, for instance over prompt payment of 1983/84 maturities from the earlier re-financing exercise. On best form these negotiations would take some considerable time to complete before credit was actually made available. All we can sign next week with Mr. Ramadhan will be an agreement in principle subject to satisfactory negotiation.

Red Sea Pipeline

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/Saudi

Saudi guarantee of last resort or acceptable equivalent arrangements.

Iran

Although it is not strikingly relevant to this letter I should mention my concern that if we do reach agreement with the Iraqis we should consider some gesture for instance in the defence sales field to moderate Iranian dissatisfaction. Officials should in my view, pursue this separately. I feel there is considerable urgency about taking a decision, in that if we cannot at least give the Iraqi officials arriving for the joint commercial meeting some kind of positive indication by 1 October, there is a real danger that Mr. Ramadhan will cancel the visit at the last moment rather than risk a rebuff. I would, therefore, welcome your urgent comments.

From Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to Chancellor of the Exchequer

FCO OFFICIAL WILL ADVISE THE FOREIGN SECRETARY THE FOLLOWING

1. The deadline is a real one. Iraqi officials arrive on 1 October and will be looking for indication of credit being offered.

2. There is a genuine risk that if one is unsatisfactory they may may suggest cancellation.

/therefore,

therefore,

3. Support pounds 250 million for five years. The Foreign Secretary will not see his officials' advice until tomorrow. Treasury officials are likely to advise the Chancellor not to go beyond pounds 100 million.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister 9/8

The answer to the question you asked about the Gulf States to which we have given informal assurances is:-

Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
U.A.E.

In each case our commitment is to "consult" if they are threatened.

FERB

All save Kuwait-! 2.8.

Thanks on me.

covering SECRET

From the Secretary of the Cabinet

Mr Coles

The Prime Minister will wish to see the attached note by the Chairman of the JIC.

RCA

28. iii

(Yes. There is little we can do about (3) save watch and)

SECRET

Prime Minister

CABINET OFFICE
A 6661
28 JUL
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

29/7

Jf O665

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

cc Mr Goodall
Mr Wright (FCO)
DGI

JIC ASSESSMENTS

1. I think I should draw your attention to two assessments issued by the JIC today.

Armenian Terrorism

2. Warnings about the increased danger from Armenian terrorists were of course issued as soon as Bedros was convicted on 23 July. The JIC assessment, however, is intended to emphasise that there is a real threat of attack on British targets by a terrorist organisation which has shewn itself to be, on the whole, more ruthless and more effective than any other - except perhaps the PIRA.

The Threat to Shipping in the Persian Gulf

3. After considerable discussion we have reached the uncomfortable conclusions that:

(a) the danger of Iraqi attacks on international shipping in the Gulf has increased;

(b) there is some danger that Iran might take military action against individual targets in other Gulf States (to certain of which the UK has given informal defence assurances) — which? Bahrain Oman Qatar UAE

(c) Iran might seek to threaten shipping in the Straits of Hormuz - although it could not effectively close the Straits; and the United States have already implicitly recognised the threat by their statement yesterday that they would act to preserve the freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

4. You may wish to send a copy of this to Mr Coles.

Antony Duff

ANTONY DUFF

28 July 1983.

SECRET

28 JUL 1983

GRS 250 **CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TEHRAN 201230Z JUN

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 342 OF 20 JUNE 83

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MODUK (FOR DI4)

SAVING TO GULF POSTS, ANKARA, ISLAMABAD, DAMASCUS, ALGIERS.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. FOLLOWING THE ARREST OF MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY OF THE LATE AYATOLLAH HAKIM IN IRAQ LAST MONTH (RUNDLES TELELETTER 050/1 OF 24 MAY) IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED HERE THAT THREE OF HIS SONS AND THREE OF HIS GRANDSONS HAVE BEEN EXECUTED. THIS WAS ANNOUNCED BY BAQER HAKIM, ANOTHER OF HIS SONS, WHO IS THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE SUPREME ASSEMBLY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF IRAQ. HE SAID THAT THE NEWS OF THE EXECUTIONS HAD BEEN CONVEYED BY AYATOLLAH MOHAMMAD HOSSEIN HAKIM, WHO WITNESSED THEM AND BEEN SENT TO IRAN WITH A LETTER STATING THAT IF THE IRAQI MOJAHEDIN DID NOT STOP THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST SADDAM THE IRAQI REGIME WOULD TAKE FURTHER ACTION AGAINST MUSLIMS IN IRAQ.

2. ALTHOUGH WE ARE AWARE OF NO REPORTS ON THE BBC OR IN THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA, THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE EXECUTIONS TOOK PLACE, AS THERE HAVE BEEN MOURNING CEREMONIES HERE. THE NEWS HAS CAUSED A FURORE, AND A SPATE OF MESSAGES OF CONDOLENCE FROM TOP CLERGYMEN INCLUDING KHOMEINI HIMSELF. IN HIS MESSAGE HE LIKENED THE BA'ATH PARTY TO A PREDATORY BRUTE AND SAID THAT SADDAM WAS A MURDERER AND SO MAD THAT HE WOULD NOT STOP AT ANY LIMIT OR HONOUR ANY AGREEMENT. THE IRANIAN NATION WOULD NEVER YIELD TO THE DISHONOUR OF MAKING PEACE WITH HIM.

3. THIS EPISODE WILL ~~HELP~~ SET BACK ANY CHANCES OF LESSENING KHOMEINI'S OBDURACY OVER CONTINUING THE WAR.

FCO PASS SAVING GULF POSTS, ANKARA, ISLAMABAD, DAMASCUS, ALGIERS.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

BARRINGTON

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD

MED
NENAD
NAD
UND
EESD
ECD
MAED
ESSD
ERD
ESID
CONS D
CONS EM UNIT
MR EGERTON
MR THOMAS
MR HAYES
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

IRAN/IRAQ

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 June, 1983

I have been asked by the Prime Minister to acknowledge receipt of the letter received via your Embassy from Shaikh Ali Kashif Al-Ghitah, President of the Popular Islamic Conference, about the Iraq/Iran war. I have drawn its contents to the attention of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Her Majesty's Government remain ready to do all they can to bring a peaceful end to the war.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Dr. Wahbi Abdul-Razaq Fattah Al-Qaraghuli

RESTRICTED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 June 1983

Type letter pl.

Dear John,

Tim Flesher wrote to Roger Bone on 2 June enclosing a letter to the Prime Minister from Shaikh Ali Kashif Al-Ghitah, President of the Popular Islamic Conference on the Iraq/Iran war.

The Popular Islamic Conference was held in Baghdad on 14-17 April and resulted in resolutions and other measures calling for an end to the war. It was more an Iraqi propaganda exercise than a serious attempt to end the war, and the letter from Shaikh Ali (a pro-Baathist Shi'a Mullah based on Najaf) was no doubt written with the knowledge and encouragement of the Iraqi Government (it was on Iraqi Embassy writing paper).

In the circumstances it would not be appropriate for the Prime Minister to reply. It might be easiest for you to send an acknowledgement through the Iraqi Embassy. I enclose a draft.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

DSR[illegible] (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Private Secretary (No 10)

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO: His Excellency
Dr Wahbi al-Qaraghuli
Ambassador of Iraq
Embassy of the Republic of Iraq
21 Queen's Gate
LONDON SW7 5JG

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

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the Minister P

~~This~~ government remain ready to do all they can to bring a peaceful end to the war.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

IRMP

Iraqi/Iran Relations.

Pt. 3

10 JUIN 1983

2 June 1983

We spoke about the attached message which the Prime Minister has received from Sheikh Ali Kashif Al-Ghatah, President of the Popular Islamic Conference. I should be grateful for a draft reply in due course.

TIM FLESHER

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT
& MASTER
OPS

01-584 7141-6

EMBASSY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
21, QUEEN'S GATE,
LONDON SW7 5JG

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T75A/83

THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER, MP

PRIME MINISTER, FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY AND MINISTER FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE ,

I WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT MY COMPLIMENTS TO YOU PERSONALLY , AND ALSO EXPRESS MY BEST WISHES FOR YOUR GREAT COUNTRY.

AS ALL HUMAN COMMUNITIES AND RELIGIONS SHOULD ADOPT THE VALUES OF GOOD, LOVE, AND PEACE; THOSE WHO POSSESS THE MEANS AND POWER ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR CHECKING EVIL WHEN IT PREVAILS.

THEREFORE, I AM CALLING UPON YOU IN MY CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE POPULAR ISLAMIC CONFERENCE HELD IN BAGHDAD, IRAQ, WHICH IN TURN REPRESENTS THE WILL OF ALL MUSLIMS, TO ASSUME THAT RESPONSIBILITY AND USE THE AUTHORITY OF YOUR COUNTRY AS MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH A VIEW TO PUTTING AN END TO THE BLOODY IRAQI-IRANIAN CONFLICT, AND AVOID THE EFFECT SUCH A WAR WOULD HAVE ON OVERALL WORLD PEACE.

I WOULD LIKE TO LET YOU KNOW THAT THE POPULAR ISLAMIC CONFERENCE HAS NOT SPARED AN EFFORT IN ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE THE IRANIAN SIDE OF RESORTING TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND REFERRING TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, OR BENDING AN EAR TO THE VOICE OF MAN'S CONSCIENCE AND THE DICTATES OF HEAVEN AS TO THE RELATION THAT BINDS MAN TO MAN AND ONE SOCIETY TO ANOTHER.

01-584 7141-6

EMBASSY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
21, QUEEN'S GATE,
LONDON SW7 5JG

HOWEVER, EVERY PEACE EFFORT MADE HAS REGRETTABLY FAILED BECAUSE OF IRAN'S INSISTANCE TO REJECT GOOD OFFICES AIMING TO END THE GULF WAR.

THE POPULAR ISLAMIC CONFERENCE HAS REACHED A CONCLUSION TO THE EFFECT THAT IN ORDER TO SECURE PEACE AND DECLARE AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE BETWEEN THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES OF IRAQ AND IRAN, YOUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SUPER POWERS THAT ARE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL , TO ADOPT MANDATORY RESOLUTIONS FOR STOPPING THE IRAQI-IRANIAN WAR, INSTEAD OF THE UNBINDING RECOMMENDATIONS UNANIMOUSLY ISSUED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE, ACCORDING TO ARTICLES (41) AND (42) OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

YOU WOULD APPRECIATE THAT BY SO DOING YOU WOULD PERFORM A GLOBAL AS WELL AS A HUMAN DUTY. YOU WOULD ALSO PROMOTE THE VALUES OF LOVE AND PEACE, AND ENHANCE THE AUTHORITY AND RANK OF THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH WAS SET UP ORIGINALLY TO DEAL WITH SUCH MATTERS AND CONSOLIDATE PEACE.

WITH THE ASSURANCE OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

SHEIKH ALI KASHIF AL-GHATAH
PRESIDENT OF THE POPLULAR ISLAMIC CONFERENCE
IRAQ - HOLY NAJAF

Akd 3-6

01-584 7141-6

EMBASSY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
21, QUEEN'S GATE,
LONDON SW7 5JG

27th May, 1983.

Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London S.W.1.

FZ/6

Dear Mr. Private Secretary,

I should be grateful if you would convey the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister.

With best regards,

Yours Sincerely,

Wahbi Al-Qaraguli
Ambassador

DD JEDDA (DESKBY 011500Z)
DD RIYADH (DESKBY 011500Z)
OO KUWAIT
OO ABU DHABI
OO BAHRAIN
OO DOHA
OO BAGHDAD
OO TEHRAN
GRS 395
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 011500Z (JEDDA, RIYADH
FM D O T 011327Z MAY 83
TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA
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AND TO RIYADH,
INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT ABU DHABI BAHRAIN DOHA BAGHDAD TEHRAN.

SCST
3 0 APR 1983

FROM MARTIN OT5.
YOUR TEL NO 205: HMG HELP WITH OIL SLICK.
1. I HAVE CONSULTED REAR ADMIRAL STACEY, AND WE CAN CONFIRM THAT HMG FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE AT ONCE ON A NON-COMMERCIAL BASIS TO ASSIST SAUDIS IN RESPECT OF FOLLOWING ITEMS:
A) LABORATORY TESTING.
B) ACCESS TO WARREN SPRING FACILITIES (IN PRACTICE (A) AND (B) ARE PROBABLY THE SAME).
C) ADVICE FROM FISHERY RESEARCH STATIONS.
D) ADVICE ON DISPOSAL OF OIL RECOVERED.
E) INFORMATION AND ADVICE FROM DOT MPCU.

2. ON OTHER POINTS IN SHOPPING LIST:
(A) WE HAVE NO (NO) AIRCRAFT YET WITH SIDE-LOOKING RADAR. ONLY REMOTE SENSING AVAILABLE IN UK IS INFRA-RED FROM BRITISH AEROSPACE.
(B) SAUDIS ARE MORE EXPERT THAN WE AT QUICK AIRLIFTING OF EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI. THIS REQUEST NOT UNDERTOOD.
(C) WE HAVE STOCKPILES OF VARIOUS PUMPS FOR VARIOUS OIL/WATER

MIXTURES (AS DO BP ETC), AND WILL GLADLY CONSIDER RELEASING SOME ONCE PROBLEM HAS BEEN DEFINED AND EXACT REQUIREMENT IS KNOWN. BUT WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THEY CANNOT OBTAIN THIS EQUIPMENT, PLUS ANY OTHER, IN A CONCERTED MANNER FROM ONE OF THE NUMEROUS COMMERCIAL SOURCES.

(FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION).

3. MORE GENERALLY WE ARE SURPRISED AT THIS SUDDEN APPROACH TO HMG. WE ASSUME IT OWES AT LEAST AS MUCH TO A LLOYD FAMLY AS TO A SAUDI GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE. GIVEN RECENT HISTORY OF BP'S OFFER OF HELP ON A SOUND COMMERCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL BASIS, WE ARE UNIMPRESSED BY SAUDI CLAIM TO BE DISGUSTED BY WESTERN COMPANIES' COMMERCIALISM. GIVEN LONG LEAD TIME, CORMACK VISIT, AND CONTACTS WITH BP, WE ARE PUZZLED BY SUDDEN APPARENT URGENCY. AND OUR EXPERTS, FROM BOTH BP AND MPCU FIND THE DIMENSIONS, LOCATION, NATURE AND INDEED ALMOST EXISTENCE OF SLICK INCREASINGLY MYSTIFYING. WE NOTE THAT DUTCH GOVERNMENT TEAM RETURNED HOME LAST THURSDAY, BAFFLED AND EMPTY-HANDED. BUT WITHOUT OVER REACTING, WE ARE OF COURSE HAPPY TO EARN GOODWILL MEANWHILE WITH OFFER OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION AS ABOVE.

4. PLEASE DRAW ON PARA'S 1 AND 2 ABOVE AS APPROPRIATE WHEN SPEAKING TO THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT. YOU MAY ALSO BE ABLE TO DISCOVER FROM THEM DIRECT WHAT THEY WANT FROM US.

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. IAN LLOYD, M.P. - SATURDAY 30 APRIL, 1983, 1545 HOURS

PM: Hello Ian.

IL: Prime Minister its very good of you to ring. I now have the information which I think is essential for looking at this problem. If you've got a pen perhaps you'd jot this down. There are two production platforms with several wells discharging large quantities of oil into the Gulf - between 6 and 10 thousand barrells a day.

PM: Two production platforms?

IL: They were fired by rockets and the structures are now completely melted down. The well has not been capped and is not likely to be in the near future. The second is your own question what other governments have been involved. My information is Holland, France, Germany and Norway through their governments have all offered some kind of help, but all on a joint commercial basis. That is the governments would be supplying the equipment via the companies and negotiations have all been about what it is going to cost. In addition this morning a United States company has made an offer, which might conceivably involve the US Coastguard. They consider that a maximum of £10 million worth of equipment could conceivably be required. The British Ambassador has not at the time of my telephoning this morning so far been in touch with the government about this matter. The prevailing weather is presently off the Saudi shores but a change at any moment would affect them

very seriously because it would affect all their desalination plants. Now their specific requests for help are as follows. They would like if possible access to the Department of Trade stockpiles of equipment, particularly very large capacity pumps, capable of pumping large quantities of sea water and heavily emulsified crude oil. They would be most appreciative of any offers to airlift equipment.

PM: I'll tell you what my information is. It makes me very surprised about this but go on.

IL: They would like if possible any help with aerial surveillance light aircraft.

PM: This is the Saudis?

IL: The Saudi Arabian Government. With a particular type of radar which is known as side-looking airborne radar. They would like if possible to have access to the expertise of our fisheries research stations at Burnham-on-Crouch and Torrey, Aberdeen. They would like similar access to the Warren Springs Laboratory at Stevenage.

PM: Warren Springs, is that ours?

IL: Yes it is. They would like if possible assistance by the Government laboratories in the testing of oil samples. They would like someone to authorise and have direct contract with the Department of Trade's Marine Pollution Control Unit under Admiral Stacey.

/PM:

PM: I find this astonishing, because my information is that an expert from the Department of Trade spent two weeks in the Gulf in April to give technical advice to officials of Gulf countries on the oil slick.

IL: Really.

PM: Yes. And his impression was the Gulf States at that time were not very interested in the numerous offers of assistance which they had received and I have a list of British companies but go on . . .

IL: And all they want is telephone contact so they can get advice.

PM: Under Admiral Stacey?

IL: Yes and finally and hardly worth stating, they would like whatever diplomatic pressure can be brought to bear on Iran and Iraq to allow people to go in and cap the wells.

PM: Well that I think is the real problem.

IL: Yes of course.

PM: That's the real problem. I've got the Foreign Office onto the Embassy who in fact advise that one of the offical secretariats told us that the real problem was political rather than technical. The one that you've just been dealing with. I've got a whole list of British companies that are right to the

/fore

fore in trying to do something. Insofar as they want help from us they can have it. Also incidentally I understand that our Embassy are now in touch with your son Mark. And Nigel Lawson arrives in Riyadh on 2 May and so we obviously can take advantage of that to give any offer of help but in the meantime its very very useful to have this because there's nothing to stop them having access to all of this. We'd be delighted to let them have access to everything we know but I gather the real problem is to get Iran and Iraq to agree to cease fire long enough so the thing can be capped.

IL: Yes I quite agree Prime Minister and until they do so the pollution will continue and will cause grave devastation throughout the Gulf.

PM: Well I'll let Nigel know and the Department of Trade know just exactly what they want Ian, but I think you'll find our Embassy are now in touch with Mark.

IL: Yes, his chap (Mr. ?).

PM: Is your chap secretary to the President of the Saudi Ports Authority?

IL: Yes. And he is the man who has been charged by the King with full authority dealing with the slick and that really is why he's come on to me. And I can only repeat what he said.

PM: Well indeed it might be good to let him know the extent to which we have been making offers but what we didn't know

/is what

is what they wanted.

IL: Well I asked him to define the requirements . . .

PM: That's very helpful Ian. Enormously helpful. Now I've got something to bite on.

IL: Thank you very much Prime Minister.

PM: Thank you Ian. Bye.

PRIME MINISTER

The Resident Clerk at the Foreign Office telephoned with the following message about your conversation with Mr. Ian Lloyd, M.P.

H.M. Embassy, Jedda, have advised that the Gulf Co-ordination Council Secretariat have confirmed to them three days ago that the problem was political rather than technical. The Iranians want guarantees that the Iraqis will not attack while repairs are being made and refuse to make any linkage between this issue and the wider one of the ceasefire.. The wells are in Iranian waters and Iran is confident that it can manage technically either through its own resources or by hiring. The Iraqis will not give an undertaking to stop attacking the Iranian oil fields without some assurance that Iran will refrain from attacks on other ports of Iraq. Iraq has offered a safe conduct on condition that Iran submit to UN supervision for the period of the repair - a condition which Iraq knows Iran will reject.

The Gulf Co-ordination Council Secretariat have told the Embassy that the problem of stopping the spillage and clearing it up can only be tackled once there is a political agreement. If such an agreement is reached the countries concerned will be able to choose among a number of technical offers, and the Embassy advise that there is little doubt that they would be prepared to pay for assistance received. British companies are well to the fore. BP/Powell-Dufferin have been trying to set up a pollution control contract with the Saudis, and BP independently have representatives in Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Qatar who can offer help if facilities are threatened (a small BP team has been sent to Qatar to talk to officials and have indicated their ability to mount a much larger offer to protect Qatari facilities if necessary). Other British companies have also offered help.

An expert from the Department of Trade spent two weeks in the Gulf in April as part of UN Environment Programme/International Maritime team to give technical advice to officials from Gulf countries on the oil slick. His impression was that the Gulf States were at that time not very interested in the numerous offers of assistance that they had received.

/ The Secretary

The Secretary of State for Energy arrives in Riyadh on 2 May, for talks with the Saudi Minister of Petroleum, Sheik Yamani, and will no doubt be able to take a further opportunity of mentioning the British offers of assistance with the clean-up. Michael Scholar is contacting the Secretary of State's Private Office to make sure that Mr. Lawson knows about this and will raise it as he judges appropriate in Riyadh.

The Embassy are in touch with Mark Lloyd who is Private Secretary to the President of the Saudi Ports Authority.

Hilary
30 April 1983

Michael Scholar rang to say that he has been in touch with the FCO and with John Coles and they think this is the best way to handle the problem as Mr. Lawson will be going to Riyadh next week.

GR 250
RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED DOWNING STREET. (2COPIES).

FM TEHRAN 210930Z APR
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 227 OF 21 APRIL 1983
AND TO GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD.

MY TELNO 215 : IRAN/IRAQ/THE GULF.

1. UNCONFIRMED STORIES ARE CIRCULATING IN TEHRAN THAT THE OIL SLICK COULD PROVE MORE OF A DISASTER IN THE GULF FOR IRAN THAN ANYONE WILL SO FAR ADMIT, IN PARTICULAR THAT IRANIAN NAVAL VESSELS, AND TANKERS HOPING TO TAKE OIL OFF FROM KHARG ISLAND, MAY BE RELUCTANT TO GO INTO HEAVILY OIL-POLLUTED WATERS.

2. IN THE MEANTIME THER E SEEMS LITTLE IMMEDIATE HOPE OF POSITIVE PROGRESS IN COMBATING THE OIL LEAKAGE. EBRAHIMI, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE IRANIAN COMPANY RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATING THE OFF-SHORE OIL WELLS, SAID ON 21 APRIL THAT ABOUT 10,000 BARRELS OF OIL A DAY WERE LEAKING INTO THE GULF WATERS, AND THIS COULD INCREASE. SO FAR THE DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE NOWRUZ, ABUZAR AND SORUSH OIL WELLS WAS ESTIMATED TO BE 700 TO 800 MILLION DOLLARS. THIS INCLUDED DAMAGES TO INSTALLATIONS.

3. HE SAID ARAB COUNTRIES HAD EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PAY COSTS OF DAMAGE FROM THE OIL SLIXQCK. IRAN WOULD DECIDE IN FUTURE WHETHER IT WOULD RECEIVE COMPENSATION FROM THE IRAQI REGIME AS WAR REPARATIONS OR IN ANOTHER FORM.

4. EBRAHIMI SAID THAT IRANIAN ENGINEERS WERE CAPABLE OF SOLVING THE OIL SLICK PROBLEM PROVIDED IRAQ WOULD NOT THREATEN THEIR SECURITY. THIS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY ALL OTHER MEMBERS ATTENDING THE MEETINGS IN KUWAIT EXCEPT THE IRAQIS. IRAQI INSISTANCE THAT THEIR OWN REPRESENDATIVES SHOULD ACCOMPANY THE IRANIANS MENDING THE LEAKS WAS ABSURD. IRAN OWNED SOME FOUR HUNDRED OIL WELLS IN THE PERSIAN GULF WATERS AND HAD APPROPRIATE EXPERIENCE SEMICOLON IRAQ HAD NONE.

BARRINGTON

IRAN/IRAQ
STANDARD

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MR EGERTON
MR THOMAS
MR HAYES
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IRAN/IRAQ

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 April 1983

Iran/Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 20 April.

I enclose letters, signed by the Prime Minister, to the King of Saudi Arabia, the Emir of Kuwait and the Emir of Qatar. I should be grateful if you would arrange for their delivery.

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T 51/83

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 April 1983

Your Highness.

I am grateful for your letter about the dangers presented by the war between Iran and Iraq and the need to find a way to end the conflict.

We are very conscious of the enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population and the material destruction caused by the conflict. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause. We are deeply concerned at the continuation of the fighting, and are anxious to see an early end to this distressing conflict.

To this end we have been in close touch with others, including other permanent members of the Security Council, in recent weeks to exchange views and explore ways of encouraging new mediation efforts. It is unfortunate that the various attempts to reach a settlement, including those initiated by the United Nations, have so far proved unsuccessful. For our part we remain ready to support any realistic attempts aimed at ending the war.

In your letter you suggested that it is now time for stronger action by the Security Council under the terms of the United Nations Charter. We have considered this carefully

/and discussed

and discussed it with others but have concluded that fresh moves by the Security Council at this stage would be unlikely to lead to serious negotiations to end the war, and indeed might have the opposite effect. In our view it is essential that any new initiative by the Security Council must be properly prepared in advance if it is to stand any chance of realising its objective. Iran as well as Iraq must indicate some willingness to respond positively to a call by the Security Council. Action by the Security Council which is ignored by either party to the conflict will do nothing to enhance the Organisation's credibility, and could possibly prejudice its ability to play a constructive and effective role in any future mediation efforts.

We shall remain in close touch with our friends, and with the UN Secretariat, in the days ahead to ensure that any new opportunities likely to contribute to progress are carefully considered. In the meantime, our representative at the United Nations has encouraged the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring the two sides together to deal with the oil slick from the Nowruz field. This grave threat to the environment must be brought under control very soon and we are hopeful that the involvement of the Secretary-General in this limited field, as a first step, will enhance his prospects for mediating the wider conflict.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Highness Shaikh Khalifa Bin Hamad Al-Thani

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. JS2/83

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 April 1983

SUBJECT

cc Ops
Mates

Dear Minister,

Thank you for your recent letter about the need to take steps to secure an early end to the conflict between Iran and Iraq.

We are deeply concerned at the enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population and the material destruction caused by this conflict, We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause. In 1982 we supported the two Security Council Resolutions calling on both sides to initiate a ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers. It is tragic that these, and the various other attempts to reach a settlement, have so far proved unsuccessful.

As I am sure Mr. Hurd made clear during his recent visit to Kuwait, we are anxious to do all we can to bring this distressing conflict to an end. We are ready to support any new ideas which seem likely to contribute to progress towards a settlement. However, we have some doubts that action by the Security Council will prove effective. Until it is clear that both sides are willing to enter into serious negotiations, I fear that action by the Security Council would serve only to

/prejudice

prejudice that body's ability to play a constructive role in any future peace-making effort. Similarly, we believe that precipitate action by the UN Secretary-General could jeopardise his future acceptability to both parties, and that it would be unwise to initiate such a move in advance of clear signals from Iran as well as Iraq that mediation efforts by him would be accepted. We have been in close touch with others about this in recent weeks, including other permanent members of the Security Council, and have found no significant dissent from this view.

Nonetheless, we agree that the Secretary-General could have a useful role to play in finding a solution, providing that, in his judgment, the time was right to take an initiative.

We are ready to play our part in any new UN-based initiative at the appropriate time, and we remain in close touch with the UN Secretariat to ensure that they take advantage of any new opportunity which might arise. We shall also continue to talk to our friends and allies about how we can best help. In the meantime we have encouraged the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring the two sides together to deal with the oil slick from the Nowruz field, which presents a growing threat to the environment of the Gulf. It is our earnest hope that the involvement of the Secretary-General in this limited field, as a first step, will enhance his prospects of mediating in the wider conflict.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Highness Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad al Sabah GCMG

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T50/83

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 April 1983

SUBJECT

cc Master
cps

Your Majesty,

I am grateful for your letter about the need to take urgent steps to bring about an early end to the Iran/Iraq war. I know that Mr. Pym was able to discuss this with His Royal Highness Prince Saud al-Faisal during his recent visit to Saudi Arabia. He has told me of the great warmth of his reception in your country. I am sure that his visit has further enhanced the excellent relations between our two countries.

I too am deeply concerned at the continuation of the distressing conflict between Iran and Iraq. The enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population, and the material destruction already caused by the war are constantly in our minds. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause.

I also share Your Majesty's concern at the lack of progress towards a settlement. It is tragic that the various attempts at mediation have so far proved unsuccessful. For our part we remain ready to support any realistic moves aimed at achieving peace. In 1982 we supported the two Security Council Resolutions calling on both sides to initiate a ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers. I know that Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council have also striven to find a solution.

/In

In your letter Your Majesty mentioned that previous Security Council resolutions had failed because they lacked any means of applying pressure on the belligerents, and that any future resolution should indicate the possibility of sanctions against whichever party fails to respond to a ceasefire call. We have considered this very carefully but have come to the conclusion that not only would a Security Council initiative at this stage be unwise but that the additional threat of sanctions would not necessarily have the desired effect.

In our view, the timing of any new initiative by the Security Council will be crucial to its success. We are ready to act when the time is right, but it is essential that before such an initiative is launched there are sound reasons to believe that both sides may be willing to respond positively to a call to observe a ceasefire and begin negotiations. Premature moves by the Council will do nothing to enhance the standing of the United Nations with both parties, and could possibly jeopardise the Organisation's ability to play a constructive and effective role in any future mediation efforts.

In the meantime we are in close touch with the UN Secretariat to encourage them to take advantage of any opportunity that might arise. We have encouraged the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring the two sides together to deal with the oil slick from the Nowruz field in the hope that his involvement in this limited sphere, as a first step, may enhance his position to mediate the wider conflict.

Please accept, Your Majesty, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Majesty King Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz of
Saudi Arabia

CONFIDENTIAL

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 April 1983

Type letter please.

A.J.C. 21/4.

Dear John,

Iran/Iraq

I enclose draft replies from the Prime Minister to the letters from the Amir of Kuwait, the Amir of Qatar and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia about the Iran/Iraq war. I also enclose the original letters from Qatar and Saudi Arabia (the latter was enclosed with your letter of 13 April), a copy of the letter from the Amir of Kuwait (the original of this was sent to you with my letter of 8 April) and copies of the letter from the Amir of Bahrain and the Prime Minister's reply to it.

The latest messages are along the same lines as that from the Amir of Bahrain, urging action by permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to end the Iran/Iraq war.

Our views on the possibility of a fresh initiative by the Security Council have not changed since the reply was sent to the Amir of Bahrain. We have talked since at different levels to the Americans, Russians and French about this. All share our reluctance to initiate fresh action in the Security Council at this stage. And contacts with the Iranians have shown the strength of their likely reaction to any new UN action. We have also sought guidance from UKMis New York on how we might use the UN Machinery; in particular whether a Security Council Resolution was realistic. The reply from New York confirmed our view that further action by the Security Council at this stage would be unlikely to lead to serious negotiations. Our draft replies take account of this guidance, while reminding addressees that we have been in touch with other permanent members, as well as encouraging the Secretary-General to bring the two sides together to deal with the environmental threat caused by the oil slick. When the Iranian offensive of 10 April peters out, this may still prove the most practical first step.

I should be grateful if the replies, once approved by the Prime Minister, could be sent back to me to arrange onward transmission.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: LETTER minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
THE PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

His Highness Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad
Al-Sabah GCMG
Amir of Kuwait

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your recent letter about the need to take steps to secure an early end to the conflict between Iran and Iraq.

We are deeply concerned at the enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population and the material destruction caused by this conflict. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause. In 1982 we supported the two Security Council Resolutions calling on both sides to initiate a ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers. It is tragic that these, and the various other attempts to reach a settlement, have so far proved unsuccessful.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

As I am sure Mr Hurd made clear during his recent visit to Kuwait, we are anxious to do all we can to bring this distressing conflict to an end. We are ready

to support any new ideas which seem likely to contribute to progress towards a settlement. However, we have some doubts that action by the Security Council will prove effective. Until it is clear that both sides are willing to enter into serious negotiations, I fear that action by the Security Council would serve only to prejudice that body's ability to play a constructive role in any future peace-making effort. Similarly, we believe that precipitate action by the UN Secretary-General could jeopardise his future acceptability to both parties, and that it would be unwise to initiate such a move in advance of clear signals from Iran as well as Iraq that mediation efforts by him would be accepted. We have been in close touch with others about this in recent weeks, including other permanent members of the Security Council, and have found no significant dissent from this view.

Nonetheless, we agree that the Secretary-General could have a useful role to play in finding a solution, providing that, in his judgment, the time was right to take an initiative.

We ~~remain~~ we ready to play our part in any new UN-based initiative ~~when the time is right~~ at the appropriate time, and we remain in close touch with the UN Secretariat to ensure that they take advantage of any new opportunity which might arise. We shall also continue to talk to our friends and allies about how we can best help. In the meantime we have encouraged the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring the two sides together to deal with the oil slick from the Nowruz field,

which presents a growing threat to the environment of the Gulf. It is our earnest hope that the involvement of the Secretary-General in this limited field, as a first step, will enhance his prospects of mediating in the wider conflict.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

20/4

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: LETTER minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

THE PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

His Highness
Shaikh Khalifa Bin Hamad Al Thani GCMG
Amir of Qatar

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

I am grateful ~~to you~~ for your letter about the dangers presented by the war between Iran and Iraq and the need to find a way to end the conflict.

We are very conscious of the enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population and the material destruction caused by the conflict. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause. We are deeply concerned at the continuation of the fighting, and are anxious to see an early end to this distressing conflict.

To this end we have been in close touch with others, including other permanent members of the Security Council, in recent weeks to exchange views and explore ways of encouraging new mediation efforts. It is unfortunate that the various attempts to reach a settlement, including those initiated by the United Nations, have so far proved

Enclosures—flag(s).....

unsuccessful. For our part we remain ready to support any realistic attempts aimed at ending the war.

In your letter you suggested that it is now time for stronger action by the Security Council under the terms of the United Nations Charter. We have considered this carefully and discussed it with others but have concluded that fresh moves by the Security Council at this stage would be unlikely to lead to serious negotiations to end the war, and indeed might have the opposite effect. In our view it is essential that any new initiative by the Security Council must be properly prepared in advance if it is to stand any chance of realising its objective. Iran as well as Iraq must indicate some willingness to respond positively to a call by the Security Council. Action by the Security Council which is ignored by either party to the conflict will do nothing to enhance the Organisation's credibility, and could possibly prejudice its ability to play a constructive and effective role in any future mediation efforts.

We shall remain in close touch with our friends, and with the UN Secretariat, in the days ahead to ensure tnat any new opportunities likely to contribute to progress are carefully considered. In the meantime, our representative at the United Nations has encouraged the Secretary-Genral in his efforts to bring the two sides together to deal with the oil slick from the Nowruz field. This grave threat to the environment must be brought under control very soon and we are hopeful that the involvement of the Secretary-General in this limited field, as a

first step, will enhance his prospects for mediating the wider conflict.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO: His Majesty King Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

SUBJECT:

I am grateful ~~to you~~ for your letter about the need to take urgent steps to bring about an early end to the Iran/Iraq war. I know that Mr Pym was able to discuss this with His Royal Highness Prince Saud al-Faisal during his recent visit to Saudi Arabia. He has ~~incidentally~~ told me of the great warmth of his reception in your country. I ~~hope that you will share my view that the~~ visit has further enhanced the excellent relations between our two countries.

I too am deeply concerned at the continuation of ~~this~~ distressing conflict between Iran and Iraq. The enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population, and the material destruction already caused by the war are constantly in our minds. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause.

I also share ~~your~~ concern at the lack of progress towards a settlement. It is tragic that the various attempts at mediation have so far proved unsuccessful. For our part we remain ready to support any realistic

/moves

moves aimed at achieving peace. In 1982 we supported the two Security Council Resolutions calling on both sides to initiate a ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers. I know that Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have also striven to find a solution, ~~but these efforts too have met with no success yet.~~

In your letter Your Majesty mentioned that previous Security Council resolutions had failed because they lacked any means of applying pressure on the belligerents, and that any future resolution should indicate the possibility of sanctions against whichever party fails to respond to a ceasefire call. We have considered this very carefully but have come to the conclusion that not only would a Security Council initiative at this stage be unwise but that the additional threat of sanctions would not necessarily have the desired effect.

In our view, the timing of any new initiative by the Security Council will be crucial to its success. We are ready to act when the time is right, but it is essential that before such an initiative is launched there are sound reasons to believe that both sides may be willing to respond positively to a call to observe a ceasefire and begin negotiations. Premature moves by the Council will do nothing to enhance the standing of the United Nations with both parties, and could possibly jeopardise the Organisation's ability to play a constructive and effective role in any

/future

future mediation efforts.

In the meantime we are in close touch with the UN Secretariat to encourage them to take advantage of any opportunity that might arise. We have encouraged the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring the two sides together to deal with the oil slick from the Nowruz field in the hope that his involvement in this limited sphere, as a first step, may enhance his position to mediate the wider conflict.

Please accept, Your Majesty, the assurances of my highest consideration.

AR 21/4

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

16 DESKBY 1315002

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND

HD/... ... ...

HD/CONSULAR DEPT

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PUSD (2)
NEWS D
~~PRESIDENT CLERK~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE D10

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

RR DOHA (ACTIONED)

RR MUSCAT

RR DUBAI (ACTIONED)

GRS 150
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM ABU DHABI 131021Z APRIL 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 1315002
TELEGRAM NUMBER 106 OF 13 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT, TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK.
INFO ROUTINE BAHRAIN, DOHA, MUSCAT, DUBAI.

GULF OIL SPILL.

1. THE UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE MFA HAS TELEPHONED TO INFORM US THAT IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT THE UAE SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PLUGGING THE IRANIAN OIL LEAK, WHICH IT PROPOSES TO DO BY DESPATCHING TWO VESSELS CARRYING THE NECESSARY EXPERTS. HE SAID THAT THE UAE HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO TAKE THE JOB ON, FOR FEAR THAT THE GUARANTEES OF SECURITY PROVIDED BY IRAQ AND IRAN WOULD BREAK DOWN, BUT HAD AGREED TO DO IT WHEN AN EARLIER PROPOSAL INVOLVING SAUDI ARABIA HAD FOUNDERED ON IRANIAN OBJECTIONS.

2. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS ABDUL RAHMAN AL JARWAN SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BY DIRECT CONSULTATIONS, NOT THROUGH THE MECHANISM OF THE UN, AND THAT THE GUARANTEES OF SECURITY WOULD CONSIST OF SIGNED UNDERTAKINGS BY IRAN AND IRAQ NOT TO INDULGE IN WARLIKE ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA IN QUESTION.

WALKER

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. THSA/83

Subject on Saudi Arabia: visit of Saudi Ambassador
cc Matter Ops

سفارة المملكة العربية السعودية
لندن
SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
LONDON

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, PC, MP,
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

I present to you my greetings and sincere compliments and it gives me great pleasure to address this letter to you in view of the belief and eagerness of all of us to co-operate in preserving world security and peace as an undivided whole, which cannot be separated into individual areas. This mutual concept dictates that stability in the Gulf area is the concern of the international community as much as it is the concern of the states of that region, where their common interests converge. It is our belief that such interests cannot conceivably continue and develop while security and stability are not being enjoyed in our area.

We are, Your Excellency, together with the other leaders of the Council for Co-operation of the Arab Gulf States, watching with grave anxiety the present developments in our area caused by the continuation of the war between Iraq and Iran which is increasingly worsening the state of

peace/.....

peace and security in this area and which requires an all out international effort to put an end to this war which has already lasted nearly three years without any indication of any imminent solution, but becoming rather more ferocious day by day. It is now not only endangering the states of the area, but in fact posing a direct threat to world peace which is violating the principles of the United Nations Organisation and its charter.

Since the outbreak of that war, we have made unceasing efforts together with the other leaders of the Council for Gulf Co-operation in supporting the good offices carried out by the Islamic Conference Organisation, the non-aligned states movement and the United Nations as well as bilateral contacts made by friendly nations in their search for a way out leading to the ending of this war. However, all these efforts have failed up till now to produce a result which would enable the two parties concerned to cease fire and to start negotiations for a settlement of the conflict by peaceful means. This necessitates making united efforts and resorting to more effective means than

have/.....

have been applied previously. Undoubtedly, you share with us our appreciation of the gravity of the implications which might possibly lead to the extension of the area of conflict. Since the outcome of the prevailing situation cannot be predicted, we are confident that Your Excellency shares our view that the dangers of this situation now necessitate more than ever before that member states of the Security Council should carry out their special responsibility specified by the charter to preserve international peace and security, to put an end to this ruinous war and to ensure the execution of previous resolutions adopted by the Security Council which asked both parties to cease fire and to enter into peaceful negotiations aimed at arriving at a satisfactory solution which would secure the interests of both parties within a framework of international guarantees.

The said resolutions adopted by the Security Council were never implemented because they lacked any means of pressure upon the two beligerent states. Therefore, you may consider that the present developments require that the next Security Council resolution to be expected on this issue should contain some weight which would induce the

two/.....

two warring parties to end hostilities such as a stipulation in that resolution to impose - or at least a threat to impose - sanctions against the party which does not respond to the cease fire call and does not observe the terms of other resolutions.

In this connection, we are confident that the efforts made by your country under your wise leadership will have great significance in expediting the end of this catastrophic war, because of our conviction that you share our view that the continuation of the war and the extension of its threat would result in great damage not only to the states of the area but also, going beyond that, would affect the interests of your own country.

We greatly appreciate the important role now being played by your country as a permanent member of the Security Council and the international weight and prestige carried by your country which impose on you grave responsibilities towards world peace. Therefore, we are confident that your sincere efforts would find their way towards success in achieving that peace.

We/.....

سفارة المملكة العربية السعودية
لندن
SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
LONDON

We look forward to hearing in the near future from Your Excellency the results of such efforts, and trust that our good relations will continue to progress and prosper.

(Signed)

Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz
King of Saudi Arabia.

12th April, 1983.



سفارة المملكة العربية السعودية
لندن
SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
LONDON

١٩٨٣/٤/١٢م

صاحبة الدولة السيدة مارجريت تاتشر

رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة

اطيب تحياتي مع اصدق التمنيات .

وبعد يطيب لي ان اتوجه اليكم برسالتي هذة انطلاقا من ايماننا وحرصنا على التعاون من اجل الحفاظ على الامن والسلم الدوليين باعتبارهما كل لا يتجزء ولا يمكن فصلهما من منطقة الى اخرى ،وانطلاقا من هذا المفهوم المشترك فان استقرار منطقة الخليج يهم دول المنطقة بقدر ما يهم الاسرة الدولية من حيث التقاء المصالح المشتركة بينها، تلك المصالح التى لا يمكن تصور استمرارها ونموها حسب اعتقادنا دون ان تنعم منطقتنا بالامن والاستقرار .

اننا يا صاحبة الدولة . نراقب بقلق بالغ مع قادة مجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية التطورات الراهنة فى منطقتنا بسبب استمرار الحرب الدائرة بين العراق وايران التى تشكل مزيدا من تدهور الامن والسلام فى هذة المنطقة الامر الذى يتطلب تضافر الجهود الدولية لوضع حد لهذة الحرب التى مضى عليها قرابة ثلاثة اعوام . دون ظهور اى دلائل تشير الى قرب ايجاد حل لها وهى تزداد حدة يوما بعد يوم وباتت تهدد ليس دول المنطقة فحسب بل تشكل تهديدا مباشرا للسلام العالمي وبما يتنافى مع ميثاق ومبادىء الامم المتحدة .

يا صاحبة الدولة ،

اننا ومنذ اندلاع تلك الحرب لم تتوقف جهودنا مع قادة مجلس التعاون الخليجي فى دعم المساعي الحميدة التى تقوم بها منظمة المؤتمر الاسلامي ودول حركة عدم الانحياز والامم المتحدة وكذلك دعم الاتصالات الثنائية التى تقوم بها الدول الصديقة للبحث عن مخرج لانهاء هذة الحرب ،غير ان هذة الجهود لم تتوصل لحد الان الى نتيجة تمكن الطرفين من وقف اطلاق النار وبدء المفاوضات لحل النزاع بالطرق السلمية ،مما يستتبع بالضرورة - تكاتف الجهود واللجوء الى وسائل اكثر فاعلية وتاثيرا مما اتبع فى السابق خصوصا

سفارة المملكة العربية السعودية
لندن
SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
LONDON

وانتم تدركون معنا خطورة المضاعفات التى تترتب على احتمال اتساع رقعة النزاع طالما ان الموقف السائد فى الوقت الحاضر لا يمكن التكهن به ولذلك فاننا على ثقة من ان دولتكم تشاركوننا الراى بان مخاطر هذا الوضع اصبحت تتطلب اكثر من اى وقت مضى . ضرورة اضطلاع الدول الاعضاء فى مجلس الامن بمسوءلياتها الخاصة بموجب الميثاق تجاه صيانة وحفظ السلام والامن الدوليين ،وممارسة كافة الوسائل التى كفلها لها الميثاق من اجل وضع حد لهذة الحرب المدمرة وتنفيذ قرارات مجلس الامن التى طالبت طرفي النزاع بوقف اطلاق النار والدخول فى مفاوضات سلمية والوصول الى الحل الذى يكفل مصالح الطرفين فى اطار التعهدات الدولية .

ان تلك القرارات التى صدرت عن مجلس الامن لم توضع موضع التنفيذ لانها جاءت خالية من اى شكل من اشكال الضغط على الدولتين المتحاربتين ،ومن ثم فقد ترون ان تطور الامور يقتضي ان يتضمن القرار المنتظر صدوره من مجلس الامن فى هذا الصدد ثقلا يوءدى الى تجاوب طرفى الحرب لوقف الاعمال العدائية وذلك من خلال النص فى القرار على فرض عقوبات او التهديد بفرضها على الاقل على الطرف الذى لا يستجيب لايقاف اطلاق النار وتنفيذ بنود القرارات الاخرى .

وفى هذا المجال فاننا على يقين بان الجهود التى ستبذل من قبل بلدكم بقيادتكم الحكيمة ستكون لها اهميتها البالغة فى المساعدة على التعجيل فى وضع حد لهذة الحرب المدمرة ، انطلاقا من قناعتنا بانكم تشاركوننا الراى بان استمرار هذة الحرب واتساع دائرة مخاطرها سوف يعودان بالضرر البالغ ليس على دول المنطقة فحسب وانما ستتعدى ذلك للمساس بمصلحة بلادكم . اننا نقدر الدور الكبير الذى يلعبه بلدكم بصفته عضوا فى مجلس الامن ،وبما لبلدكم من ثقل دولي ووزن عالمي تقع على عاتقه مسوءليات جسام تجاه السلام العالمي ،فاننا لعلى ثقة بان جهودكم المخلصة سوف تجد طريقها للنجاح تجاه تحقيق السلام ،متطلعا الى ان اسمع من فخامتكم نتائج هذة الجهود فى المستقبل القريب .

راجيا لعلاقاتنا الطيبة اضطراد التقدم والازدهار

فهد بن عبد العزيز

ملك المملكة العربية السعودية

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

To note Emir of Kuwait's message, pending further advice from Mr. Pym.

A.J.C. 11/4.

8 April 1983

Dear Bob.

Iran/Iraq: Message from the Amir of Kuwait

I enclose a message from Sahikh Jabir al Ahmed al Sabah, the Amir of Kuwait, which has been delivered to us by Mr Rashid al Rashid, PUS at the Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for onward transmission to the Prime Minister.

Copies of this message (which is similar to those already received from the Amirs of Bahrain and Qatar) are being sent to the five Permanent Members of the Security Council.

In handing over the message, Mr Rashid al Rashid said that Kuwait envisaged a new initiative by the UN Secretary General under Article 99 of the Charter, the ground having been carefully prepared in advance with the Permanent Members. He would visit Tehran and Baghdad and report back to the Security Council. It would then be up to the Permanent Members to ensure that progress was made.

Mr Pym will be discussing what more we can do to try to end the Iran/Iraq war during his visit to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and we shall submit a draft reply to the Amir's message after his return.

Yours ever

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T43A/83

cc H.Sec

From Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah

To Her Excellency Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Min ister of the United Kingdom.

Your Excellency,

It is doubtless that your excellency share with us the realization of the continued and devastating tragedy caused by the continuation of the bleeding armed conflict between Iran and Iraq for these two neighbouring countries and their peoples. The serious menace and harm created by the breakout and continuation of this conflict, not only for the states of this vital area of the world, but also for the maintenance of international peace and security, are too evident to be elaborated.

While joining the whole world in its deep regret for the lack of success of any of the several efforts made so far by various states and international bodies to put an end to this dangerous conflict and find a just solution to all pending questions between the two combating countries, we believe that the international community, represented by the U.N., should not cease for a single moment its efforts to terminate this tragedy which is daily causing great numbers of victims from both peoples. Indeed if the U.N. failed in this domain, it would thus fail to fulfil the essence of its existence and the justification for its continuation, namely the preservation of peace and the promulgation of mutual understanding and cooperation amongst brothers in humanity.

To be more specific, we in Kuwait do not believe that the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, have exhausted all available ways and means in their attempt to find an appropriate solution to stop this destructive war. The efforts made by the U.N. including the Security Council resolutions and the Secretary

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

General's mediation efforts are highly appreciated. But speaking with frankness made imperative by our deep feelings of, and immediate proximity to, this problem, nevertheless, we believe that these efforts are not sufficient and there is more to be done by the Security Council which bears special responsibility for the mainteance of international peace and security as stipulated by the charter.

Accordingly, your excellency, we call upon the Security Council to intensify its efforts and to commence without any delay its direct and continuous tackling of this conflict with the aim of reaching ~~the~~ an adequate formula to end it. In this endeavour the Security Council should spare none of the practical measures that are within the mandate vested in it by the charter. In this respect we refer to the special responsibilities shouldered by the permenant members of the Security Council. In our opinion the situation in this area no longer requires further resolutions that are merely contant with appeals and the display of good will. It is high time to move into what is more positive and effective. Only this we believe would preserve for the U.N. its dignity and justifies the confidence in its viability by all peoples.

Finally, your excellency, we are certain that the entire world will share with Kuwait the due expression of appreciation for the special attention given by the permanent members of the Security Council and for the urgent measures they undertake towards this matter.

Please accept, your excellency, our most sincere wishes coupled with our highest esteem and consideration.

(Sgd.)

Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah
Amir of Kuwait

30th. March,1983

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

من جابر الاحمد الصباح

الى سعادة السيدة مرغريت ثاتشر رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة ٠

يا صاحبة السعادة ،

مما لا شك فيه انكم تشاركوننا الادراك بما يمثله استمرار الصراع المسلح الدامي بين ايران والعراق من مأساة مستمرة ومدمرة بالنسبة للبلدين الجارين وشعبيهما ٠ وانه لغني عن البيان ما سببه نشوب واستمرار هذا الصراع من تهديد وضرر خطيرين لا بالنسبة لدول هذه المنطقة الحيوية من العالم فحسب بل وبالنسبة لاستتباب الامن والسلام الدوليين ٠

وفي الوقت الذى نشارك فيه العالم اجمع الاسف الشديد لعدم نجاح اى من المساعي المتعددة التي بذلت حتى الان من قبل مختلف الدول والمنظمات الدولية من اجل وضع حد لهذا الصراع الخطير وايجاد حل عادل للمشاكل العالقة بين البلدين المتحاربين فاننا نعتقد ان على المجتمع الدولي ، ممثلا بمنظمة الامم المتحدة ، ان لا يتوقف للحظة واحدة عن مواصلة العمل لايقاف هذه المأساة الدامية التي تذهب ضحيتها اعداد كبيرة من ابناء الشعبين كل يوم٠ فاذا ما فشلت الامم المتحدة في هذا المجال فانها تكون بذلك قد عجزت عن القيام بجوهر وجودها ومبرر استمرارها وهو الحفاظ على السلام واشاعة التفاهم والتعاون بين الاخوة في الانسانية٠

وبشكل اكثر تحديدا فاننا في الكويت لا نعتقد بان الامم المتحدة وبالذات مجلس الامن الدولي قد استنفذت كل سبلها ووسائلها في السعي لايجاد الحل المناسب لايقاف هذه الحرب المدمرة٠ فمع تقديرنا للجهود التي بذلتها الامم المتحدة بما فيها القرارات التي صدرت حتى الان عن مجلس الامن وجهود الوساطة التي بذلت من قبل الامين العام للمنظمة فاننا ، وبصراحة يحتمها احساسنا العميق وملامستنا المباشرة لهذه المشكلة ، نرى بان ما بذل حتى الان ليس بكاف وان هناك المزيد مما يمكن عمله من قبل مجلس الامن الذى حمله ميثاق المنظمة المسؤولية المباشرة في الحفاظ

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

على الامن والسلام الدوليين. ولذا فاننا نناشد مجلس الامن ان يكثف من جهوده وان يباشر دون اى ابطاء بمجابهة هذا الصراع والعمل بشكل متواصل من اجل التوصل الى الصيغة المناسبة لايقافه مهما تطلب ذلك من اجراءات تدخل ضمن الصلاحيات التي اوكلها الميثاق للمجلس. ونشير هنا الى المسؤوليات الخاصة التي تتحملها الدول ذات المقاعد الدائمة في المجلس في هذا المجال. ونحن نرى بان الموقف في هذه المنطقة لم يعد بحاجة الى المزيد من القرارات التي تكتفي بمجرد المناشدة وابراز حسن النوايا، بل ان الوقت قد اصبح مناسبا للانتقال الى ما هو اكثر ايجابية وفاعلية، الامر الذى من شأنه ان يحفظ للامم المتحدة كرامتها ويبرر الثقة بجدواها من قبل جميع الشعوب.

وانه لمن المؤكد ان العالم اجمع سيشارك الكويت في ابداء التقدير لما توليه الدول ذات المقاعد الدائمة في مجلس الامن من اهتمام خاص وما تتخذه من اجراءات عاجلة تجاه موضوع هذه الرسالة.

وتقبلي يا صاحبة السعادة، اخلص تمنياتنا مقرونة بفائق التقدير.

جابر الاحمد الصباح

امير الكويت

الكويت في : ١٥ جمادى الاخرة ١٤٠٣ هـ

الموافق : ٣٠ مارس ١٩٨٣ م

Prime minister

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 210
CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 062205Z APR 83
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 225 OF 6 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN
INFO PARIS, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, AMMAN, JEDDA, BAHRAIN, DOHA,
ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT.

MY TELNO 219: IRAN/IRAQ

1. AS REPORTED IN TELECON HUMFREY/HENDERSON, CORDOVEZ HAS BEEN SUFFICIENTLY ENCOURAGED BY THE RESPONSE FROM THE TWO PARTIES TO FLY TO KUWAIT TO SEE IF HE CAN NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT ON DEALING WITH THE OIL SPILL.

2. ACCORDING TO THE SECRETARIAT THE IRANIANS TOLD CORDOVEZ THAT THEY DID NOT WANT A FORMAL CEASEFIRE, BUT WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SOME ARRANGEMENT (PRESUMABLY INVOLVING A DE FACTO LOCAL CEASEFIRE) THAT WOULD MAKE THE OPERATION POSSIBLE. TWO PROBLEMS WHICH CORDOVEZ STILL NEEDED TO TACKLE WERE THE SUPERVISON OF ANY AGREEMENT AND THE FORM WHICH THE AGREEMENT MIGHT TAKE. THE IRAQIS WERE PRESSING FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL INVOLVEMENT BUT THIS WAS ANATHEMA TO IRAN. (ACCORDING TO THE US MISSION, WHEN THE KUWAITIS FIRST ASKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INTERVENE THEY ASKED HIM TO DO SO WITHOUT RECOURSE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BECAUSE OF THE LIKELY IRANIAN REACTION.)

3. WHEN HE LEFT CORDOVEZ WAS PLANNING TO STAY IN KUWAIT FOR ONLY 24 HOURS BEFORE GOING ON TO GENEVA (FOR HIS NEXT ROUND OF TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN).

THOMSON

IRAN/IRAQ
STANDARD

MED	ERD
NENAD	ESID
NAD	CONS D
UND	CONS EM UNIT
EESD	MR EGERTON
ECD	MR THOMAS
MAED	MR HAYES
ES&SD	CABINET OFFICE

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MR EGERTON

HD/MED

HD/NENAD

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HD/CONS.D

HD/CONS EM UNIT

HD/NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK



GR130
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FM JEDDAH 051035Z APR 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 175 OF 5TH APRIL.
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, DOT (OT5), PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 219: IRAN/IRAQ (NOT TO D.O.T.).

1. THE BRITISH COMPANY WHICH CORDOVEZ MENTIONED AS A CANDIDATE TO WORK ON THE OIL SLICK IS PROBABLY THE BP/POWELL DUFFRYN CONSORTIUM. THIS HAS BEEN NEGOTIATING FOR SOME TIME WITH THE SAUDIS FOR A PERMANENT CONTRACT FOR ANTI-POLLUTION WORK, AND THINKS IT IS LIKELY TO WIN THE CONTRACT. IT HAS RECENTLY SUBMITTED AN OFFER TO DEAL WITH THE PRESENT SLICK AND I HAVE, AT ITS REQUEST, SENT A LETTER TO THE MINISTER RESPONSIBLE (PRINCE SULTAN, MINISTER OF DEFENCE, CURIOUSLY ENOUGH) SUPPORTING THE BID.

2. GETTING THE PRESENT JOB WOULD NO DOUBT HELP TOWARDS WINNING THE PERMANENT CONTRACT. THERE IS, I UNDERSTAND, AMERICAN COMPETITION. ANYTHING UKMIS NY COULD DO TO PROMOTE THE CONSORTIUM'S INTEREST WOULD BE WELNXME. D.O.T. (OT5) HAVE THE DETAILS.

CRAIG

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Mr. Jackling

Prime Minister.

MR. COLES

IRAN/IRAQ

One of the many troubles in dealing with Arabs is that they are never satisfied. Having expressed their pleasure at our reception of the Arab League Delegation and the subsequent passage on the Middle East in the Brussels communique, they are now bringing pressure to bear on us to take an initiative in the Security Council on the Iran/Iraq war. Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait are leading the field: the Iraqis have joined in, and I feel that it is only a matter of time before the Saudis and others enter the act - the Foreign Secretary's forthcoming visit to the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia will provide the opportunity.

It is ironical that it was the Arabs, led by Iraq, who blocked the Security Council from meeting for several days following the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980. Now that Iraq is feeling the weight of military pressure, the Arabs have had a change of heart about the Council - provided that someone else takes the initiative.

Admittedly, the Gulf Arabs have every reason to feel apprehensive. First, they face the reality of having to shore up Iraq with money in order to enable her to continue to fight the war. Secondly, they face the spectre of an Iraqi defeat leading to the establishment in Baghdad of an Iraqi Shi'a regime. This would cause major convulsions all down the Gulf.

Obviously, it would be in our interests for the war to end with neither side having defeated the other. The trouble is that there is absolutely nothing that we or anyone else can do to influence Iran. They know that they are in no danger of defeat and will carry on the war for as long as it suits them. They are impervious to outside pressure.

Hence, if we were to take an initiative, it would be to please the Arabs, not in any hope of achieving results. Against this background, I am against our exposing ourselves too much. The French may well do so since they have come out more or less openly on the Iraqi side. If they or others in the Security Council decided to take an initiative, we could probably go along, provided that the wording of

/any resolution

CONFIDENTIAL

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any resolution was right. But we still have important interests in Iran and we should not lose sight of the fact that any initiative in the Security Council will be seen by the Iranians as a hostile act. Choosing sides between Arabs and Persians, traditionally deadly enemies, has been a tricky business for centuries.

My advice, therefore, is that we should continue to avoid making this choice. We should keep a reasonably low profile, while maintaining an attitude of friendly concern in our talks with the Arabs. Not very heroic perhaps, but the best course for British interests.

CLOSED UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT 2000

A.D. PARSONS
30 March 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

Prime Minister

MR. COLES A.S.C. 25/3

THE SHIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF

If the Prime Minister has any time to read anything over the Easter Recess, she might be interested in the attached paper. It has been written by a close friend of mine who is a considerable expert on the Eastern Arab world and in particular on the Shia Sect. He prepared it for the Board of a Bank for which he works. It is one of the most lucid background papers which I have seen on the position of the Shia in Iraq and the Persian Gulf. I entirely agree with his conclusions.

A.D. PARSONS
23 March 1983

Strictly Confidential

Copy no. 3 of 7

The Shi'a and the Persian Gulf

THE VICTIMS OF INJUSTICE

Unlike "orthodox" or Sunnite Islam, Shi'ism was born in adversity and defeat. It has its hierarchy of martyrs, and the historical defeat has become a theological triumph through suffering. In this and in other respects, as several Western observers have noted, it bears a certain resemblance to Christianity. In Iraq during the Second World War I was allowed to visit the Shi'ite Holy Cities, Kerbala and Najaf, and to take part in Shi'ite ceremonial there ; and I was often impressed by the element of atonement in popular Shi'ite belief, an element which is quite foreign to orthodox Islam. To the Shi'a of Iraq Hussein, the martyr of Kerbala, "died to save us all."

2. Equally, I have no doubt that there is a special connection, within the Islamic context, between Shi'ism and radical, indeed revolutionary thought. Those set in authority over the Shi'a have certainly taken this view : they have almost always employed the instruments of oppression, or at least practised discrimination against them, with the result that the Shi'a have come to see themselves as permanent victims of tyranny and injustice. This feature is so marked that one often feels that it has become part of their faith, that they are only happy when they are wronged, and that if they are not suffering from real injustice, they will feel the need to parade their historic wrongs or to invent new ones. However, they do not often have cause to exercise their imagination : the injustice or discrimination is usually real enough, for it is the standard conviction of Sunnite rulers that the proper medicine for Shi'ite turbulence and mendacity is repression. Thus we have the vicious circle of discrimination and disaffection. (It should be added that "normal" - i.e. not extreme - Shi'ite political theory does not admit the possibility of anything beyond interim or provisional government until what in Western terms might be described as the Second Coming).

DISTRIBUTION

3. Shi'ite minorities are to be found all over the Muslim world - there have been several cases of trouble recently in Pakistan for example. The deprived and long-suffering inhabitants of South Lebanon are mainly Shi'a ; some of the troubles of eastern Turkey are Shi'ite in origin ; and in Syria an extreme minority sect of Shi'ites holds precarious and violent sway over a Sunnite majority. But it is in the Persian Gulf in particular that the Shi'a constitute a political problem and may one day cause political upset.

4. In Iran the majority are Shi'a and Shi'ism has been the "official" religion since the sixteenth century. At present it is in a revolutionary phase, and this is exciting Shi'ites elsewhere in the region. Iraq has a Shi'ite majority (a large one if the Kurds are excluded from the reckoning), contains four Shi'ite holy cities or shrines, and in the southern parts adjacent to the Gulf is exclusively Shi'a. But it is (as it almost always has been) ruled by a Sunnite minority. The eastern province of Saudi Arabia was originally mainly Shi'ite ; but many of the Shi'a were slaughtered or expelled by waves of Wahhabi incursion, beginning at the end of the eighteenth century. There is now a minority of perhaps 250,000 who (despite some recent spending in the area) suffer total discrimination, economic, political and religious. Kuwait has at least 25% Shi'a, of various origins (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Bahrain), and Bahrain has a Shi'ite majority (?55%), the "original" inhabitants of the country for the most part (some are Persians), with a Sunnite Ruling Family and a Sunnite merchant élite. There are Shi'ite communities (chiefly of Persian origin) in the UAE, Oman and Qatar ; but only in Dubai, and Sharjah (where many are Hyderabadis), are they to be found in significant numbers.

BAHRAIN - THE TEST TUBE

5. It is in Bahrain that the problem can be studied most conveniently, for the state is small, and all the elements of the predicament are clearly present. The ᶜUtbi Arabs, led by the present Ruling Family (or rather tribe, they are now so numerous) of Al Khalifa, invaded the island in 1783. The people they found there, and who are still the majority of the population, were Arab or Arabic-speaking Shi'ites. There has since been some immigration from

Iran, both Sunnite and Shi'a. The Iranians laid claim to the island until 1970.

6. The Al Khalifa and their followers naturally acquired all the land and the Shi'ite inhabitants remained the underdogs. Towards the end of the period of British protection (1971) the traditional overt discrimination had become milder ; and even now the rule of Al Khalifa is more humane than anywhere else I know. But in recent years the effective discrimination and the disaffection seem to have been growing : although there are Shi'ites in the government, they do not hold key positions of power, nor do they find it possible to join the Army or the operational branches of the Police (the Government say they do not try). The Shi'a get less than their share of Government handouts ; they are under-represented in educational missions abroad ; and efforts have been made to get foreign concerns to discriminate against them in those areas of skilled employment in which the Shi'a predominate. They protest, usually ineffectively, and are accused of subversion : the only way to deal with them, it is said, is to keep them down. And it has to be said that this policy ha worked so far. An efficient security service has uncovered successfully the conspiracies hatched in revolutionary Shi'ite Iran, and on the surface all is peaceful in what most westerners find the most congenial Arab country.

THE CATALYST

7. Yet the rulers of Bahrain are nervous. They talk of propaganda and subversion from Shi'ite Iran, and that is the danger on which public attention - rightly at present - is focussed. An Iranian religious leader spent three years in Bahrain in the late seventies and must be presumed to have done much to intensify Shi'ite opposition to the ruling Al Khalifa ; and it was in Iran, and with Iranian support, that planning and training for the attempted coup of December 1981 took place. But in Bahrain, and I suspect in Saudi Arabia also, the deep fears of the authorities lie elsewhere : their nightmare is a Shi'ite Iraq, for it is with the Arab Shi'a of Iraq that their potential dissidents could most easily make common cause. What are the chances of Shi'ite government in Iraq, and what would be the consequences?

8. Under the four centuries of Ottoman rule which ended with the First World War Iraq was badly governed and made little social or economic progress. Those who wanted education sought it in Istanbul, and very few of them were Shi'ites ; so that when Iraq achieved independence in 1932 nearly all the educated administrators and politicians were Sunnite, though the majority of the Arab population was Shi'a. The Shi'ite tribes of the south were deeply divided (Ottoman rule had exploited their natural divisions) and it was as easy for the Sunnite rulers of Baghdad to exploit them as it had been for their predecessors in Istanbul. Moreover, the more obvious forms of discrimination were removed : in theory at least the Shi'a enjoyed equal opportunities in education, in the Army and the police, and in the ownership of land and water. Twice after the Second World War there was a Shi'ite Prime Minister. Yet the impression that they were being manoeuvred by the old Sunnite elite persisted at any rate up to the revolution of 1958, when the connection between Shi'ism and radical thought (see paragraph 2 above) became immediately apparent.

9. The Iraqi revolution did not long maintain its original direction (if indeed it had one). After some false starts it was taken over by the Ba'ath Party in 1968. The Ba'ath have a secular ideology, but it so happens that all the leading people in the Iraqi Ba'ath are Sunnite. It was widely thought in the early years of the Ba'ath Government that Shi'ite turbulence would overthrow it, particularly since the then Shah of Iran disliked the Ba'ath and had many agents among the Persian Shi'ite residents in the Iraqi holy cities. But this did not happen : the Ba'ath security apparatus was more efficient than the Shah's Savak, the Shi'ite Arabs turned out to be Arabs first and Shi'ites second, and many of them may indeed have thought that the Iraqi Ba'ath were less oppressive, and indeed less "anti-religious", than the Shah himself. The situation was further confused by the Kurdish problem and by the 1975 agreement between the Shah and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq.

10. The Iranian revolution changed all that. The Baghdad Government could no longer feel secure against militant Shi'ism ; and one of the motives of the Iraqi invasion of Iran in autumn 1970 must have been to be rid of that danger. During the Iraq/Iran war it has often looked as though Iraq has backed nationalism (south-western Iran is or was inhabited by Arabs) and Iran has backed religious sectarianism. So far both gambles have failed : the (mainly Shi'ite) Iraqi army has not, it seems, deserted en masse to the enemy, any more than the Arab masses of Khuzistan welcomed their Iraqi liberators.

11. But the war cannot go on for ever. Iraq cannot win it : Iran may. An Iranian victory would have grave consequences for the whole of the Gulf, and I need not discuss those here. But there is a serious political danger which might well arise even if the Iranians do not achieve a military victory. One way in which the war might end is in the fall of one of the two régimes ; and the more brittle is probably the Iraqi. What people in the Gulf fear (or hope for) is the overthrow of President Saddam Hussein and his replacement by a régime dominated by the Shi'a and allied to Khomeini's Iran and perhaps also to Assad's Syria. This would be very dangerous whilst it lasted (I do not think it would last long); this would be the catalyst for subversion in Bahrain (and perhaps also in Kuwait) ; and this would bring Saudi intervention in Bahrain. The fat would be in the fire.

12. Saddam Hussein has lasted well. Arab friends of mine who have met him have been favourably impressed despite themselves. He is not without Shi'ite support, and his security still seems unusually efficient. But I have noticed recently that his Gulf friends are no longer confident of his survival. It would be prudent to assume that the conspiracies against him will succeed before too long. What then?

13. I do not know enough about Iraq these days to guess where the power would lie if Saddam were overthrown. A still secular Ba'ath which would make peace at least with Syria and if possible Iran? An Arab nationalist military régime? Perhaps, and perhaps best so. But I cannot suppose that the Iraqi Shi'a have changed. They hate the Tekritis (whence most of the present Ba'ath), they despise the Gulf Arabs, and above all they hate the Saudis ("son of a dog" was the normal Shi'ite description of King Abdul Aziz). Like the Irish, they have long memories : in 1801/2 the Wahhabis plundered the Holy City of Kerbala. The Shi'ites think (and so do I) that they would do it again if they could. So the chances are that an Iraqi régime which had come to terms with Iran would turn to mischief in the Gulf.

14. At all events a Shi'ite régime in Iraq would immediately lift the morale of the Shi'a of the Gulf. Even in Dubai (where I write this) there would be some excitement. The resentment is strong, just under the surface. It could break through as minority resentment did in Northern Ireland nearly fifteen years ago. The Sunnites might however console themselves with the thought that there is something politically enervating in Shi'ism, that the very history and mythology of the Shi'a would be, I am tempted to say, tarnished by success. We may find that a factor something like this will operate eventually in Iran.

15. The parallel with Northern Ireland should not be pushed too far. Apart from other differences, the Shi'a of the Gulf would not find much "liberal" sympathy among the ruling Sunnites. It is difficult to predict the likelihood and extent of the danger : my purpose in writing this short paper is simply to note that the danger is real and that we may be in for a rough ride in the Gulf during the next few years.

1 March 1983.

SUBJECT

cc FCO

JR.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T33/83

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 March 1983

Your Highness.

I am grateful for your letter about the urgent need to take steps to secure an early end to the war between Iran and Iraq.

We are very conscious of the enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population, and the material destruction caused by this conflict. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause. In 1982 we supported the two Security Council Resolutions calling on both sides to initiate a ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers.

It is very unfortunate that the various attempts to reach a settlement have so far proved unsuccessful. I am not sure how much influence we can realistically bring to bear, but we are willing to support any effort, including through the Security Council, which offers hope of bringing an early and negotiated settlement to the conflict. During his brief visit to your country on 23 March, Mr. Pym will be happy to

/ explore

HL

explore in detail how in practice the international community might work to end the present conflict.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Highness Shaikh Isa Bin Sulman Al Khalifah, GCMG

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQ

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 March 1983

Type letter pl.

A.J.C. 17/3.

Dear John,

I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to the Amir of Bahrain's letter of 28 February about the Iran/Iraq war, which was enclosed with my own letter of 15 March.

The Gulf States, including Bahrain, floated a proposal at the 7 - 10 March Non-Aligned Summit calling for a ceasefire, a pull-back to pre-war boundaries, a UN peace-keeping force and a possible ban on arms supplies to any state which rejected the ceasefire. The Iraqis added further elaboration by suggesting the establishment of a Non-Aligned Movement Committee to make recommendations about ending the war and sanctions against any belligerent which flouted its recommendations. Neither proposal was acceptable to Iran, which wants a clear condemnation of Iraq as the aggressor and down-payment of US$50 billion before agreeing to a ceasefire.

There is little we can do to end the war, but we need to be responsive to Bahrain's concerns. We already help the Bahrainis with their internal security arrangements, which proved effective in suppressing an attempted coup in December 1981 by Iranian-trained dissidents. If mediation does work, it will be because Iran recognises she has more to gain from a negotiated settlement than by continuation of the war. The Algerians are still active and other channels are available. Public pressure from the United Nations will merely cause Iran to dig in its heels. The draft reply is an attempt to preserve our even-handed approach to the problem while showing suitable concern over Bahrain's anxieties. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be able to expand on this during his planned two-hour stopover in Bahrain on 23 March on his way to the EC/ASEAN meeting in Bangkok.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/telegram/despatch/note~~ | **TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

HH Isa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa
Amir of the State of Bahrain

Your Reference

Copies to:

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.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Your Highness,

I am grateful for your letter about the urgent need to take steps to secure an early end to the war between Iran and Iraq.

We are very conscious of the enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population, and the material destruction caused by this conflict. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause. In 1982 we supported the two Security Council Resolutions calling on both sides to initiate a ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers.

It is very unfortunate that ~~Unfortunately,~~ the various attempts to reach a settlement have, so far, proved unsuccessful. I am not sure how much influence we can realistically bring to bear, but we are willing to support any effort, including through the Security Council, which offers hope of bringing an

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/early and

CONT'D

early and negotiated settlement to the conflict. During his brief visit to your country on 23 March, Mr Pym will be happy to explore in detail how in practice the international community might work to end the present conflict.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

17.
3



(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 March 1983

Prime Minister

To note message from the Amir of Bahrain. We shall let you have a reply.

A.J.C. 15/3.

Dear John,

Iran/Iraq: Message from the Amir of Bahrain

I enclose a message from Shaikh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifah, the Amir of Bahrain, which has been delivered to us by the Bahraini Ambassador for onward transmission to the Prime Minister.

The Ambassador said that similar messages have been sent to the Americans and the French, although he did not know whether the message had been sent to the Russians or Chinese.

The Ambassador implied that the message had the support of the other members of the GCC. When asked, he said that he did not know whether the message related to anything said at the Non-Aligned Summit in New Delhi.

I will write again with any further comments, together with a draft reply, shortly.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 224/83
cc MASTER
OPS

28th February 1983

H E the Hon Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1
England
United Kingdom

Madam Prime Minister

We feel sure that Your Excellency will agree with us that the international peace and security of the world is entirely integrated and that one region cannot be isolated from another in this respect. Security, as you are certainly aware, is indivisible. Accordingly, the stability of the Gulf region is as important to the other States of the world as it is to the States of that region by virtue of the many important mutual interests involved. Such mutual interests cannot be preserved and developed unless the States of the region are able to enjoy peace and security, and this peace and security has become seriously threatened by the continuation for approximately the last three years of the war between Iraq and Iran.

Peace cannot be maintained in the Gulf unless an end is put to this war. Hostilities have recently intensified and it has become the urgent duty of all States to discover a more effective means to secure peace than those previously sought by the United Nations, in particular through the Security Council, the Organisation of Islamic Countries and the Organisation of Non-Aligned Countries, and by certain friendly States.

The continuation of the war between Iraq and Iran will generate serious instability in the Gulf region. As long as the current situation remains unpredictable this war will jeopardise both the regional and individual safety of the States of the region and the freedom of navigation in the Gulf. Moreover, it will prejudice international peace and security contrary to the terms of the United Nations Charter.

Your Excellency, it is not unknown to you that the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council have made considerable efforts to find a means to end the Iraq-Iran war, and to arrest the consequent wastage and drain of human and financial resources. We have however, been unable to date to find a way to ensure that the two parties will cease hostilities and will enter into negotiations to solve their dispute by peaceful means.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم



The States which comprise the United Nations Security Council bear a special responsibility under the United Nations Charter to maintain international peace and security. The Charter prescribes the measures to be taken whenever such international peace and security is threatened. We consider that the States of the Security Council have not yet done their utmost to secure an end to the war between Iraq and Iran.

We write to urge you to give further consideration to the possibility of applying the measures contained in the United Nations Charter, in the strongly held belief that the application of such measures will bring an end to a war which has exhausted both countries, destroyed their economic structures and undermined the stability of the entire Gulf region.

We look forward to learning of your views in this connection, and remain confident that you will take the necessary measures to ensure the maintenance of peace in the Gulf region.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of our highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Isa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa
Amir of the State of Bahrain

CONFIDENTIAL

Iraq

SIR ANTHONY PARSONS

In your minute of 10 March to the Prime Minister about last week's JIC business, you referred to a Ministry of Defence estimate that the Iraqis have suffered about 200,000 casualties (killed, wounded and taken prisoner) in the war with Iran. You will see from the Prime Minister's marginal comment on your minute (attached) that she believes that we should query this estimate. You may like to provide a further comment.

14 March 1983

A. S. Wiles.

I queried the estimate vigorously at the meeting. We discussed it for about ¼ hour. All the agencies, including DIS stuck to their guns. I will get them to look again but doubt whether they will change it.

15/3

Mr Coles 15.
A.S.C.J.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

SUBJECT

cc MoD
OPS

TRANSLATION

Amir
State of Qatar

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T29A/83

Madam Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Britain and Northern Ireland,
London.

Madam Prime Minister,

As we all know, it is an established fact that world peace and security are integral, and that their disturbance in any part of the world affects all other areas. In view of the fact that nations of the world are linked in common major interests to the states of the Gulf region, peace and security in this particular region are of concern not only to its countries but to all countries. It is not possible for these interests to be maintained and developed except by preserving peace and security in this region which is threatened by the gravest dangers of the continuing Iran/Iraq war, now in its third year.

The United Nations, particularly the Security Council, the Islamic Conference Organisation, the Non-Aligned countries and some friendly states have all tried to end this war. These attempts have not only been inconclusive, but the war has intensified.

Your Excellency are aware that the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have, in turn, devoted great efforts to find a way out of this war and to put an end to its consequent horrible bloodshed and destruction of huge material and human resources. The outcome of those attempts, likewise, has not brought us nearer to a ceasefire or possible negotiations between the two parties concerned to settle their conflict by peaceful means.

In the face of this serious situation, it has become the duty of all of us to seek means other than those already probed, in order to preserve stability and guarantee freedom of navigation in the Gulf and safeguard the security of its states to which world peace and security are strongly linked.

It is my firm belief that Your Excellency would agree with me that the continuation of this war, and the possible expansion of

.....P/2

its scope, threaten with a world war that would expose mankind to annihilation. The U.N. Charter has placed a special responsibility on the five permanent member countries of the Security Council regarding maintaining world peace and security. Frankness requires me to convey to you that we feel, as far as the Iran/Iraq war is concerned, the five countries have not made all the efforts that conform with that responsibility. It is our view that the time has come to launch greater efforts based on mandatory effective means which are provided for in the U.N. Charter when world peace and security are endangered.

Madam Prime Minister,

We are confident that you fully realize the gravity of the situation resulting from the Iran/Iraq war. In fact, if continued, this war would lead to the most disastrous consequencies not only for the two belligerent parties or the whole region but for the world at large. It is, therefore,our greatest hope that the possible application of the means prescribed by the U.N. Charter for such circumstances would receive your careful consideration. However, I am confident that you will do your utmost, under the Charter, to help bring peace in our region.

While looking forward to receiving your views in this respect, please accept, Madam Prime Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

KHALIFA BIN HAMAD AL-THANI
AMIR OF THE STATE OF QATAR

Doha on Saturday 12th March 1983
(27th Jamad Awwal 1403 Hijri).

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

صاحبة الفخامة السيدة مارجرت تاتشر
رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة وشمال أيرلندا
لندن

صاحبة الفخامة ،

من المسلمات ، كما نعلم جميعا ، أن السلام والأمن الدوليين كل لا يتجزأ ، وأن اضطرابهما في منطقة ما في العالم تتأثر به سائر المناطق الأخرى . ونظرا لارتباط دول العالم بمصالح كبرى مشتركة مع دول منطقة الخليج ، فان السلام والأمن في هذه المنطقة ، بوجه خاص ، لا يهمان دولها فحسب ، بل يهمان دول العالم كافة . وليس في الامكان الحفاظ على هذه المصالح وتنميتها الا بصون السلام والأمن في هذه المنطقة التي أصبحت تتهددها أجسم الأخطار بسبب استمرار الحرب الدائرة بين العراق وايران منذ ثلاث سنوات تقريبا .

لقد بذلت الأمم المتحدة وبخاصة مجلس الأمن ، ومنظمة المؤتمر الاسلامي ، ودول عدم الانحياز ، وبعض الدول الصديقة ، بذل كل من هؤلاء جهودا من أجل انهاء هذه الحرب . ولكن هذه الجهود لم تؤد الى أي نتيجة ، بل أن الحرب ازدادت حدتها .

وتعلمين فخامتك أن دول مجلس التعاون العربية في الخليج ، بدورها ، كرست جهدا كبيرا للبحث عن مخرج لانهاء هذه الحرب ولوضع حد لما تؤدي اليه من نزيف دموي مروع واهدار لطاقات مادية وبشرية ضخمة ، الا أن ذلك الجهد ، هو الآخر ، لم يؤد حتى الآن الى أي نتيجة من شأنها أن تؤدي الى وقف اطلاق النار وامكان بدء المفاوضات بين الطرفين لحل خلافهما بالطرق السلمية .

وازاء هذا الوضع الخطير ، أصبح لزاما علينا جميعا أن نبحث عن وسائل وأساليب غير تلك التي سبق اتباعها ، صونا للاستقرار في الخليج ، وضمانا لحرية الملاحة فيه ، وحفاظا على سلامة وأمن دوله ، اللذين يرتهن بهما السلام والأمن الدوليان .

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

ويقيني أن فخامتك تتفقين معي على أن استمرار هذه الحرب ، وما يمكن أن يستتبعه من اتساع نطاقها ، يهدد باشتعال حرب عالمية تعرض البشرية للفناء . ولقد وضع ميثاق الأمم المتحدة على عاتق الدول الخمس الأعضاء الدائمين في مجلس الأمن مسئولية خاصة بشأن الحفاظ على الأمن والسلم الدوليين . ويقتضيني واجب الصراحة أن أفضي اليك بأننا نشعر بأن الدول الخمس لم تبذل كل الجهد الذي يتفق وهذه المسئولية من أجل وضع حد للحرب بين العراق وايران . واننا لنرى أن الوقت قد آن لبذل جهد أكبر يقوم على ما يقرره ميثاق الأمم المتحدة من وسائل فعالة واجبة الاتباع عندما يهدد الخطر الأمن والسلام العالميين .

صاحبة الفخامة

اننا لعلى ثقة من أنك تقدرين كل التقدير خطورة الموقف الناجم عن الحرب العراقية الايرانية ، تلك الحرب التي دفعت بالمنطقة الى وضع يؤدي استمراره الى أوخم العواقب بالنسبة للطرفين المتحاربين ، والمنطقة بأسرها ، بل والعالم أجمع . ولذلك فأكبر الرجاء أن تولي النظر في موضوع تطبيق الوسائل التي يقررها ميثاق الأمم المتحدة في مثل هذه الظروف كل ما يستحقه من اعتبار واهتمام . وعلى أي حال ، فيقيني أنك ستبذلين قصارى جهدك من أجل استتباب السلام في منطقتنا ، وفقا للميثاق .

وانني اذ أتطلع لتلقي رد منك أقف منه على رأيك في هذا الصدد ، أرجو أن تقبلي ، ياصاحبة الفخامة ، فائق التقدير والاحترام .

خليفة بن حمد آل ثاني

أمير دولة قطر

الدوحة ، في يوم السبت ١٢ مارس ١٩٨٣ م

الموافق ٢٧ جمادى الأولى ١٤٠٣هـ

Prime Minister.
cc Zimbabwe
S Africa
Belize

TOP SECRET

cc Mr. Jackling

3

MR. COLES

JIC BUSINESS

There was a heavy agenda at today's JIC. The following are subjects of particular interest:-

i. Zimbabwe

The paper in front of the JIC was overtaken by the news of Nkomo's flight to Botswana. A fresh paper is being prepared which will be circulated separately from the Red Book on 11 March. It will reveal amongst other things that the 5th Brigade has been more or less out of control in Matabeleland and that civilian casualties have been higher than originally estimated. However, Mugabe is now making efforts to restrain 5th Brigade. The paper will also deal with the probable effect of Nkomo's departure from the country on the internal political situation. The general feeling of the Committee was that it would make things easier for Mugabe; that a number of Nkomo's followers might now try to do a deal with ZANU; and that his departure would probably accelerate Zimbabwe's slide towards being a one party African state on the classical model.

ii. Iraq

I do not suggest that the Prime Minister need read in full the longish and quite useful piece about the internal situation in Iraq. What struck me most forcibly was the Ministry of Defence estimate that the Iraqis have suffered about 200,000 casualties (killed, wounded and taken prisoner) in the war with Iran. This represents about 10% of the adult male population - the equivalent of well over a million casualties in Britain. It is remarkable that this has not already had a greater effect on civilian and military morale in Iraq.

I think we should query the estimate

iii. South Africa

The Red Book will contain a brief and watered-down summary of a paper which is being circulated separately about South African destabilisation of neighbouring African countries. This is stark evidence of the divergence

/between

between South African and Western interests. As the South Africans see it, if your neighbours are implacably opposed to your system of government and cannot be won round, it is better to render them economically weak and politically helpless. As I see it, this policy simply leads to opening the door to extremism and eventual Russian/Cuban penetration.

iv. Belize/Guatemala

The JIC have done a useful piece on warning time for Guatemalan incursions or even a Guatemalan invasion of Belize. There is no need to study the paper in detail, but the Prime Minister should be aware that this piece of contingency planning has been done.

A.D. PARSONS
10 March 1983

SUBJECT

COPY.

T 22a/83

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 22A/83

cc master
APS

28th February 1983

H E the Hon Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1
England
United Kingdom

Madam Prime Minister

We feel sure that Your Excellency will agree with us that the international peace and security of the world is entirely integrated and that one region cannot be isolated from another in this respect. Security, as you are certainly aware, is indivisible. Accordingly, the stability of the Gulf region is as important to the other States of the world as it is to the States of that region by virtue of the many important mutual interests involved. Such mutual interests cannot be preserved and developed unless the States of the region are able to enjoy peace and security, and this peace and security has become seriously threatened by the continuation for approximately the last three years of the war between Iraq and Iran.

Peace cannot be maintained in the Gulf unless an end is put to this war. Hostilities have recently intensified and it has become the urgent duty of all States to discover a more effective means to secure peace than those previously sought by the United Nations, in particular through the Security Council, the Organisation of Islamic Countries and the Organisation of Non-Aligned Countries, and by certain friendly States.

The continuation of the war between Iraq and Iran will generate serious instability in the Gulf region. As long as the current situation remains unpredictable this war will jeopardise both the regional and individual safety of the States of the region and the freedom of navigation in the Gulf. Moreover, it will prejudice international peace and security contrary to the terms of the United Nations Charter.

Your Excellency, it is not unknown to you that the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council have made considerable efforts to find a means to end the Iraq-Iran war, and to arrest the consequent wastage and drain of human and financial resources. We have however, been unable to date to find a way to ensure that the two parties will cease hostilities and will enter into negotiations to solve their dispute by peaceful means.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم



The States which comprise the United Nations Security Council bear a special responsibility under the United Nations Charter to maintain international peace and security. The Charter prescribes the measures to be taken whenever such international peace and security is threatened. We consider that the States of the Security Council have not yet done their utmost to secure an end to the war between Iraq and Iran.

We write to urge you to give further consideration to the possibility of applying the measures contained in the United Nations Charter, in the strongly held belief that the application of such measures will bring an end to a war which has exhausted both countries, destroyed their economic structures and undermined the stability of the entire Gulf region.

We look forward to learning of your views in this connection, and remain confident that you will take the necessary measures to ensure the maintenance of peace in the Gulf region.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of our highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Isa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa
Amir of the State of Bahrain

Iraq 2

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FM FCO 081850Z FEBRUARY 1983
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 87 OF 8 FEBRUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN UKMIS NEW YORK
PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS

YOUR TEL 92: IRAN/IRAQ WAR.

1. STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN BACKGROUND LATEST REPORTS ON THE MILITARY SITUATION CONFIRM THAT IRANIANS HAVE RECAPTURED 260 SQUARE KILOMETRES OF IRANIAN TERRITORY PREVIOUSLY HELD BY IRAQ AND TWO IRAQI BORDER POSTS (TEHRAN TELNO 75 REFERS). THIS REPRESENTS AN ADVANCE OF APPROXIMATELY 10 KILOMETRES ALONG A 30 KILOMETRE FRONT. AN IRAQI BATTALION (APPROXIMATELY 800 MEN) HAS BEEN COMPLETELY OVERRUN, WHICH SUGGESTS A QUICK IRANIAN ADVANCE.

2. THE ADVANCE HAS NOW STOPPED, EITHER FOR REGROUPING OR BECAUSE OF RESISTANCE BY THE IRAQIS. THE MAIN IRANIAN FORCES NORTH OF FAKEH HAVE NOT YET BEEN COMMITTED BUT HAVE RECENTLY BEEN REINFORCED. ALTHOUGH THE MAIN BATTLE HAS YET TO COME, THE RECAPTURE OF IRAQI-HELD TERRITORY IS ALREADY A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL GAIN FOR THE IRANIANS. ALL FIGHTING SO FAR IN THIS

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ROUND HAS BEEN ON IRANIAN TERRITORY.

3. YOU SHOULD NOT SEEK ANOTHER CONVERSATION WITH KITTANI EARLIER THAN NECESSARY. WE SHOULD PREFER TO SEE HOW THE FIGHTING DEVELOPS BEFORE REPLYING AND TO FRAME OUR REPLY IN THE LIGHT OF ANY VIEWS EXPRESSED BY ALLIES (THERE WILL BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSULTATION, E.G. AT THE MIDDLE EAST WORKING GROUP, LATER THIS WEEK). IN THE MEANTIME IF IRAQIS RETURN TO THE CHARGE YOU SHOULD SAY THAT IF AND WHEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERS THE LATEST ROUND OF FIGHTING WE WOULD HOPE TO SUPPORT A RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF PREVIOUS DRAFTS (I.E. CALLING FOR A JUST AND HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT AS WELL AS AN END TO HOSTILITIES). YOU COULD ADD AT YOUR DISCRETION THAT THE IRAQIS WILL PRESUMABLY NOT WISH ANY ACTION AT THE UN SO LONG AS THE MAIN IRANIAN GAINS SEEM TO BE RECOVERY OF THEIR OWN TERRITORY. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT ANY ACTION BY THE UN SHOULD NOT BE INEFFECTIVE AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS AND LIKELY MERELY TO DIMINISH THE ORGANISATION'S STANDING.

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Prime Minister

(2)

I do not think you had time to read the brief which was supplied for Question Time today.

2. My impression is that the latest Iranian attack could be more significant than anything we have seen for a long time.

A.J.C. 8/2.

BACKGROUND

State of War

Both sides have about 100,000 troops each deployed to the West of Dezful. At 9 p.m. local time on 6 February, 7 brigades of Revolutionary Guards (15,000 men), plus one regular Iranian infantry brigade, attacked Iraqi positions situated almost 35 miles due east of Al Amara. By end of 7 January, Iranians had recaptured 260 square kilometres of Iranian territory previously held by Iraq, and two Iraqi border posts. This represents an advance of approximately 10 kilometres along a 30 kilometre front.

The advance has now stopped either for regrouping or because of resistance by Iraqis. The main Iranian force of 8 regular brigades, plus Revolutionary Guards (70,000 men) north of Fakeh, has not yet been committed. They have recently been reinforced by one air-borne brigade from the Basra region.

Iraq has claimed to have killed 7,000 Iranians. A captured Iranian doctor confirmed over 50% casualties in his unit, but we have no firm evidence. One Iraqi batallion and an artillery unit (800 men) have been completely overrun which suggests a quick Iranian advance.

Comment: the main battle has yet to come, although recapture of Iraqi-held territory is already a significant political gain for the Iranians.

Advice to British citizens

When the British community working in Basra might have been at risk from earlier Iranian offensives, we have encouraged them to leave the area temporarily for either Baghdad or Kuwait. But we have not yet seen a need to offer similar advice on this occasion. We are monitoring the situation carefully.

LINE TO TAKE AT PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTION TIME ON 8 FEBURARY

IRAN/IRAQ WAR

Have Iranians Attacked?

1. We understand that the Iranians launched an offensive on 6 February towards Iraqi positions at the southern end of the central sector.

Is there any threat to the British Community?

2. There are about 125 British citizens in the Basra and Amara areas. Our Embassy in Baghdad is in close touch with the British community in the war area about what action they should take if their safety is threatened.

Arms Supplies to the Combatants

3. We are neutral in the war and we have not supplied lethal equipment to either side. [If pressed: Sales of defence equipment are subject to customary licensing procedures. Applications are considered on their merits in the light of all relevant circumstances, including our relations with the countries involved and, in this case, our neutrality during the present hostilities. Our over-riding interest is to encourage an early and negotiated settlement]

Conflict as a threat to World Peace

4. The war has been fought largely in the area around the border between Iran and Iraq. We hope that the conflict can be contained.. We would view very seriously any threat to the security of a third country or freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

Assistance to our Friends in the Gulf

5. We are in close touch with our friends in the Gulf and with other Arab leaders about developments in the war.

/Mediation

Mediation

6. We have consistently supported attempts by the United Nations and others to secure an end to this conflict. We shall continue to support all efforts aimed at a just and honourable settlement.

West's Role in Mediation

7. We do not see any direct role for eg the Ten to play. We do not have adequate leverage with the main parties.

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FM TEHRAN 071130Z FEB 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 75 OF 7 FEBRUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR D14)
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, GULF POSTS, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ANKARA, ISLAMABAD.

MY TELNO 73 : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. ACCORDING TO FURTHER COMMUNIQUES AND REPORTS, THE MAIN ACTION HAS TAKEN PLACE TO THE SOUTH OF FAKKEH. THE IRANIANS CLAIM TO HAVE LIBERATED 250 SQUARE KILOMETRES OF TERRITORY AND TO HAVE ROUTED ONE BRIGADE OF THE IRAQI 14TH DIVISION. THE IRANIAN BORDER POSTS OF SUBALEH, SAFARIEH AND RASHIDEH HAVE BEEN LIBERATED AND THE IRAQI BORDER POSTS OF HAB AND KARAMEH TAKEN. THE SHIB-RASHID ROAD INSIDE IRAQ HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN TAKEN.

2. RAFSANJANI HAS SAID IN THE MAJLES THAT THE IRANIAN TROOPS SHOULD TRY TO CONTINUE THE OFFENSIVE AND FINISH THE WAR AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HE ALSO WARNED FOREIGN STATES NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE WAR WAS AGAIN PROLONGED.

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FM BAGHDAD 071130Z FEB 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 86 OF 07 FEB 83
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INFO PRIORITY ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS AMMAN BAHRAIN BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS DOHA DUBAI JEDDA JERUSALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT MUSCAT RABAT SANAA'S TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIS WASHINGTON PARIS UKDEL NATO UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW BONN ANKARA MODUK CINC FLEET STOCKHOLM

TEHRAN TELNO 73:
IRAQ/IRAN

1. RADIO BAGHDAD ANNOUNCED THIS MORNING (7 FEBRUARY) THAT A ''HUGE'' IRANIAN OFFENSIVE HAD BEEN LAUNCHED IN THE EARLY HOURS OF THE MORNING AGAINST IRAQI FORCES IN THE MEISAN SECTOR. THE MAIN THRUST OF THE ATTACK IS THOUGHT TO BE TOWARDS TID, THE BORDER VILLAGE SITUATED TO THE EAST AND SLIGHTLY TO THE SOUTH OF AMARA.

2. THERE IS NO RELIABLE INDICATION YET AS TO THE COURSE OF THE FIGHTING. THE IRANIAN ATTACK WAS GENERALLY EXPECTED HERE TO COINCIDE WITH THE IRAQI NATIONAL HOLIDAY 8 FEBRUARY. ON PAST EVIDENCE, ITS LAUNCHING ONE DAY EARLIER MAY HAVE TAKEN THE IRAQIS A LITTLE BY SURPRISE, ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN LONG AWAITED. IN ITS LATER BROADCASTS, RADIO BAGHDAD HAS CLAIMED THAT SEVERAL SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICERS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED, MOST OF THEM SERIOUSLY WOUNDED, AND THAT IRAQI FORCES HAVE NOT YIELDED NOE INCH OF LAND.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 38 OF 24 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, MODUK
INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, ALGIERS,
INFO ROUTINE CAIRO, BEIRUT, ANKARA, ISLAMABAD.

IRAN/IRAQ.

1. DURING THE LAST THREE DAYS THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS BY PROMINENT IRANIAN PERSONALITIES WHICH, TOGETHER WITH THE PRESS COVERAGE THEY HAVE RECEIVED, SUGGEST THAT A MAJOR OFFENSIVE MAY BE IMMINENT.

2. ALREADY LAST WEEK RAFSANJANI AND OTHERS WERE HINTING THAT A PERIOD OF INACTIVITY BY THE ARMED FORCES MIGHT SOON BE OVER AND THAT THEY WOULD NEED THE GOOD WISHES OF GOD AND THE NATION. ON 22 JANUARY THE PAPERS HEADLINED RAFSANJANI'S FRIDAY PRAYER SPEECH THE PREVIOUS DAY AS AN ULTIMATUM TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT: THEY SHOULD ACCEPT IRANIAN CONDITIONS FOR ENDING THE WAR OR FACE THE CONSEQUENCES. THERE WERE A VARIETY OF REPORTS ABOUT THE INSECURITY OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S POSITION BASED ON HIS PANICKY-LOOKING VISITS TO OTHER ARAB LEADERS, AND A REITERATION OF WARNINGS TO THE GULF STATES NOT TO TEST IRAN'S PATIENCE BY SUPPORTING THE TOTTERING IRAQI REGIME. THERE WERE ALSO SHARP WORDS FOR THE FRENCH AND RUSSIANS FOR STEPPING UP ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAQ. ALL THIS COULD BE A CALCULATED BLUFF BUT IN THE PAST THIS SORT OF BUILD-UP HAS USUALLY PRECEDED AN IRANIAN ATTACK.

3. A CORROBORATORY SIGN IS THE RECENT DESPATCH OF MANY COMMITTED YOUNGSTERS TO THE VIRTUALLY UNTRAINED BASIJ (UNDERLINED) UNITS AT THE FRONT, WHERE SOME OF THEIR PARENTS AT LEAST FEAR THEY MAY BE USED FOR CANNON FODDER. THE IRANIAN PUBLIC BELIEVE THAT ANOTHER OFFENSIVE IS LIKELY.

/4.

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4. MEANWHILE MEDIATION PROSPECTS HAVE BEEN GETTING NOWHERE. THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER DENIED GRATUITOUSLY LAST WEEK THAT ALGERIA WAS MEDIATING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. IRAN'S CONCEPT OF THEIR ROLE IS TO IMPRESS ON OTHERS THE FORCE OF IRANIAN ARGUMENTS. THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR HERE TOLD US ON 20 JANUARY THAT HE WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES OF MEDIATION, AT ANY RATE FOR SIME TIME TO COME.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 772 OF 25 NOVEMBER 82

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DI4), BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

INFO AMMAN, JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI

INFO SAVING ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO, NEW DELHI, PARIS.

MY TELNO 760 AND MODUK SIGNAL SIC U2G OF 23 NOVEMBER (NOT TO ALL :

IRAQ ATTACK ON IRANIAN SHIPPING

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED FURTHER CONFIRMATION THAT AN IRANIAN TANKER AND THE HOTEL SHIP RAFFAELO WERE BADLY DAMAGED. THERE IS SOME CONFUSION HERE AS I GATHER THE SHIRVAN WAS THE TANKER REFERRED TO OR IS A CARGO SHIP. IT HAD SOME WEST GERMAN OFFICERS, ONE OF WHOM MAY HAVE BEEN INJURED. THE RAFFAELO WAS ONE OF TWO PRIZE ITALIAN TOURIST LINERS SOLD TO THE SHAH IN 1978 AS FLOATING HOTELS. IT WAS THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN EQUIPPED AS A HOSPITAL SHIP AND NORMALLY KEPT IN BUSHEHR PORT. WE ARE TOLD IT WAS CARRYING FEW OR NO PASSENGERS AT THE TIME IT WAS HIT. AN INDIAN CARGO SHIP WAS HIT BUT ONLY SLIGHTLY DAMAGED, AND WENT ON TO DUBAI. THE GERMANS HAVE A REPORT THAT A FOURTH SHIP WAS ALSO HIT.

2. AT A MEETING OF EC HEADS OF MISSION ON 24 NOVEMBER THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR AND FRENCH CHARGE BOTH THOUGHT THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN USING EXOCETS FROM GAZELLE HELICOPTERS. THE FRENCHMAN SAID THAT ABOUT 25 IRAQI HELICOPTERS HAD ALREADY BEEN SHOT DOWN AROUND KHARG, WHERE THE DEFENCES WERE QUITE STRONG.

3. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR SAID THERE WERE NOW 10 TANKERS WAITING AT SIRRI AND FIVE HAD JUST BEEN CALLED FORWARD, ONE OF WHICH WAS ITALIAN. HE HAD REFUSED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS SAFETY, ALTHOUGH SHIPS APPROACHING KHARG ITSELF HAD NOT SO FAR SUFFERED ATTACK. ALTHOUGH SOME COLLEAGUES EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE IRAQIS HAD SO FAR DELIBERATELY REFRAINED FROM ATTACKING TANKERS GOING DIRECT INTO KHARG, THE GENERAL CONSENSUS WAS THAT THEY MIGHT WELL NOW HAVE A GO. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT BE TRYING TO FULFIL THE REQUIREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT A NAVAL EXCLUSION ZONE, ONCE CLAIMED, SHOULD BE PROPERLY CONTROLLED.

4. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PAST PRACTICE, THERE HAS BEEN NO MENTION OF THE LATEST ATTACKS IN THE IRANIAN MEDIA.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

BARRINGTON

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RPTD ROUTINE TO KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, JEDDA, ALGIERS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND MOSCOW.

KUWAIT TELEGRAM NO 319 TO FCO: IRAN/IRAQ

1. AT THE UK/OMAN JOINT COMMITTEE TALKS TODAY, MR HURD ASKED YUSUF ALAWI WHETHER THE GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL SUMMIT HAD MANDATED KUWAIT TO LOOK FOR A NEW SOLUTION TO THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR.

2. YUSUF ALAWI SAID THAT THE GCC HEADS OF STATE HAD AGREED THAT THE BEST HOPE OF BRINGING ABOUT PEACE LAY AT PRESENT WITH THE ALGERIANS. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT KING FAHD SHOULD GO TO ALGERIA ON 21 NOVEMBER AND ENCOURAGE THE ALGERIANS TO MAKE A FURTHER INTENSIVE EFFORT WITH THE IRANIANS, USING THE 1973 ALGIERS AGREEMENT AS A BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT.

3. THIS SUGGESTS, DESPITE THE LINE TAKEN BY THE LOCAL PRESS (PARAGRAPH 5 OF KUWAIT TUR) THAT THE IDEA OF A UN FORCE IS AN ENTIRELY KUWAITI INITIATIVE.

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Prime Minister

Important. The Iranians are having significant military success.

A.J.C. 10/11.

GRS 237
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DESKBY 010800Z
FROM FCO 091745Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 301 OF 9 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, BIS TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK(DI4)
ROUTINE JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, ALGIERS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS.
SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT: IRAN/IRAQ WAR

1. FOLLOWING IS AN UPDATE ON THE STATE OF THE WAR: IRANIAN OFFENSIVE CODENAMED MOHARRAM, WHICH BEGAN ON 1 NOVEMBER, IN THE MUSIAN REGION IS DEVELOPING INTO A SERIOUS CLASH. IRANIAN TROOPS HAVE NOW CROSSED THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER TO A DEPTH OF BETWEEN 7 AND 9 KMS OVER A FRONT WHICH IS NOW BETWEEN 25 AND 30 KMS BROAD. THIS IS THE WIDEST IRANIAN PENETRATION INTO IRAQ SINCE THE WAR BEGAN. THE IRANIANS HAVE BADLY MAULED 2-3 IRAQI BRIGADES AND WE ARE INCLINED TO ACCEPT THEIR CLAIMS OF HAVING TAKEN 3,400 POWS. THE IRAQIS ARE NOT REPEAT NOT WITHDRAWING IN GOOD ORDER.
2. ON 8 NOVEMBER THE IRANIANS BEGAN MOVING TOWARDS FAKKEH, WEST OF BOSTAN. IF THE IRAQIS CONTINUE TO FALL BACK FROM THE MUSIAN FRONT THERE IS A DANGER THAT THE TACTICAL GAINS WHICH THE IRANIANS HAVE MADE COULD DEVELOP INTO SOMETHING MORE SERIOUS. THE SITUATION IS FLUID AND IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO BE CERTAIN ABOUT THE MAGNITUDE OF THE REVERSE INFLICTED ON THE IRAQIS. THE IRAQIS HAVE THE MEN AND EQUIPMENT TO HOLD THE IRANIANS BUT THE BREACHING OF THEIR SECOND LINE OF DEFENCE COULD BADLY AFFECT THEIR MORALE.
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IRAQ/IRAN

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FM BAGHDAD 021115Z OCT 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 635 OF 2 OCTOBER, 1982
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN DAMASCUA JEDDA CAIRO
KUWAIT WASHINGTON MOSCOW TEHRAN MODUK (FOR DI4)
INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO

OUR TELNO 631 (NOW BEING REPEATED TO TEHRAN) AND UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1564 TO FCO (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN

1. IN THE EVENT THE IRAQIS DID NOT HAVE MUCH LONGER TO WAIT. THE FOREIGN MINISTER, HAMMADI, SUMMONED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL LATE LAST NOGHT TO CONFIRM, AS ALREADY REPORTED ON THE BBC WORLD SERVICE, THAT THE IRANIANS HAD ATTACKED IRAQI FORCES IN THE AREA OF MANDALI AT 0100 ON 1 OCTOBER AND THAT FIGHTING WAS STILL CONTINUING. HE SAID THAT IT WAS IRAQ'S INTENTION TO CALL FOR AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ASKED FOR SUPPORT. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION HAMMADI SAID THAT THE IRAQIS BELIEVE THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS LATEST IRANIAN ATTACK WOULD BE TO SEIZE AND HOLD IRAQI TERRITORY. THEY ALSO EXPECT THAT THE ATTACK IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR WILL BE COORDINATED WITH A RENEWED OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH, TOWARDS BASRA OR AMARA.

2. BAGHDAD IS OUTWARDLY CALM BUT AN UNDERCURRENT OF NERVOUSNESS IS DETECTABLE, EVEN IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE. MANDALI IS ONLY SOME 112 KMS FROM BAGHDAD AND THIS THE NEAREST THE FIGHTING HAS COME TO THE CAPITAL IN OVER TWO YEARS OF WAR. INITIAL BAGHDAD RADIO CLAIMS THAT THE IRANIAN ATTACK HAD BEEN DEFEATED WERE CONTRADICTED BY SUBSEQUENT BROADCASTS WHICH CONFIRMED THAT FIGHTING WAS STILL IN PROGRESS. AT 11.00 AM LOCAL THIS MORNING, 2 OCTOBER, BAGHDAD RADIO ADMITTED THAT THE IRANIANS HAD NOW ENTERED IRAQI TERRITORY. IF CORRECT THIS MEANS THAT THEY WILL HAVE SUCCEEDED IN DEFEATING SOME IRAQI FORCES REMAINING IN IRANIAN ENCLAVES.

3. IRANIAN FORCES FACING THE IRAQIS IN CENTRAL SECTOR ARE UNDERSTOOD TO CONSIST OF FOUR DIVISIONS PLUS TWO INDEPENDENT BRIGADES AND A BRIGADE OF PARATROOPS SUPPORTED BY TWO LIGHT DIVISIONS OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS. THE IRANIAN DIVISIONS CONCERNED ARE THOUGHT TO BE 81 AND 16 ARMOURED DIVISIONS, 21 INFANTRY DIVISION AND 28 MECHANISED DIVISION.

4. WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO ATTEMPT AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION. THIS LATEST ATTACK COULD BE A FEINT. BUT THE AXIS OF THE ATTACK APPEARS INITIALLY TO HAVE TAKEN THE IRAQIS AND SOME OBSERVERS BY SURPRISE SINCE ANY IRANIAN THRUST IN THE IRANIAN SECTOR WAS EXPECTED TO BE ALONG THE AXIS KHANAQIN-BAQUBA. IN ANTICIPATION OF THIS THE IRAQIS HAVE PREPARED FOUR STRONG DEFENSIVE LINES ACROSS THAT AXIS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE CHOSEN TO APPROACH BAQUBA THROUGH MANDALI IN ORDER TO BYPASS THOSE DEFENCES. AN ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF THAT ROUTE IS THAT IT OFFERS BETTER GOING FOR ARMOUR.

5. THERE HAS BEEN NO IRANIAN AIR ACTIVITY OVER BAGHDAD SO FAR AND THE BRITISH COMMUNITY REMAINS CALM. THERE ARE ONLY EIGHT BRITISH SUBJECTS AT BAQUBA, ALL OF WHOM ARE THOUGHT TO BE EMPLOYEES OF TAYLOR WOODROW. WE HAVE ADVISED THE COMPANY'S BAGHDAD OFFICE THAT THEY SHOULD, IF POSSIBLE, BE WITHDRAWN TO BAGHDAD ON SOME DEFENSIBLE PRETEXT UNTIL THE MILITARY SITUATION CLEARS. BAGHDAD ITSELF DOES NOT (NOT) APPEAR TO BE THREATENED. I INTEND TO HOLD A MEETING OF COMMUNITY WARDENS AT 5.00 PM LOCAL TOMORROW, 3 OCTOBER. A COMMON FACTOR OF ALL PREVIOUS IRANIAN OFFENCES EG THE CROSSING OF THE KARUN RIVER, IS THAT THEY APPEAR TO HAVE CONTINUED FOR NO MORE THAN THREE OR AT THE MOST FOUR DAYS BEFORE LOGISTIC AND OTHER PRESSURES NECESSITATE REGROUPING AND CONSOLIDATION. THE PATTERN MAY REPEAT ITSELF IN THIS INSTANCE.

FCO PASS SAVING UKDEL NATO

RAMSAY

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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FM WASHINGTON 0800492 SEP 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 2966 OF 7 SEPT 82
INFO BAGHDAD TEHRAN AMMAN DAMASCUS BEIRUT CAIRO
TEL AVIV TUNIS UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW GULF POSTS.

IRAN/IRAQ

1. VELIOTES COMMENTED TO LEAHY TODAY THAT THE CURRENT STALEMATE IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR MIGHT IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR A POSITIVE ARAB, ESPECIALLY JORDANIAN, RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE. THE IRANIANS APPEARED TO BE PREPARING A NEW OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR, BUT THE IRAQI DEFENCES, AIDED BY THE TERRAIN, WERE STRONG AND VELIOTES EXPECTED THEM TO HOLD. THE AMERICANS HAD NO EVIDENCE OF ANY EXTENSIVE IRANIAN REDEPLOYMENT NORTHWARDS, AND DID NOT EXPECT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS THERE.

2. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE WORRIED AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE IRANIANS, WHO HAD STATIONED F14S AT BUSHIRE, MIGHT RETALIATE FOR RECENT IRAQI AIR RAIDS BY ATTACKING OTHER GULF STATES. THEIR PARTICULAR CONCERN WAS THE OIL INSTALLATIONS IN

~~STATES. THEIR PARTICULAR CONCERN WAS THE OIL INSTALLATIONS IN~~
SAUDI ARABIA.

3. LEAHY DESCRIBED THE RECENT IRANIAN INTEREST IN SETTLING OUT-STANDING CIVIL AND MILITARY CLAIMS, MAKING CLEAR THAT THIS RAISED DIFFICULT ISSUES FOR US AND THAT ANY AGREEMENT WAS STILL SOME WAY OFF. HE MENTIONED THE IRANIANS' INTEREST IN ACQUIRING WEAPONS. VELIOTES DID NOT REACT SPECIFICALLY TO THIS POINT, BUT WELCOMED THE IRANAIN MOVE WHICH HE THOUGHT MIGHT INDICATE THAT THEY WERE LOOKING TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AFTER THE WAR. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO STRENGTHEN THE WEST'S ABILITY TO COUNTER SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAN, VELIOTES AGREED THAT THE RUSSIANS FACED PROBLEMS IN DECIDING HOW TO DEAL WITH THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT, AND HAD SO FAR MADE LITTLE HEADWAY IN IRAN.

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FM ANKARA 031200Z AUGUST 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 208 OF AUGUST.

REPEATED FOR INFO TO PRIORITY: BAGHDAD, BIS TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEWYORK, UKDEL NATO, ALGIERS.

SAVING TO ALL OTHER M.E. POSTS.

ANKARA TELNO 203: IRAN/IRAQ

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY CALLED TODAY 3 AUGUST ON OKYAYUZ, WHO HAS TAKEN OVER AS HEAD OF MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT AT MFA. HE ASKED ABOUT THE REPLY TO GEN. EVREN'S MESSAGE WHICH HAD BEEN DELIVERED BY THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER (BAGHDAD TELNO 502).

2. OKYAYUZ SAID THAT THIS HAD STATED THE IRAQI POSITION IN FAMILIAR TERMS, I.E. THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER ANY CEASE-FIRE FORMULA WHICH PRESERVED IRAQI HONOUR (AND HENCE, OKYAYUZ COMMENTED, THE SADDAM HUSSAIN REGIME).

2. THE TURKS REGARD THIS AND THE IRANIAN RESPONSE TO EVREN'S MESSAGES AS ENCOURAGING ENOUGH FOR THEM TO TAKE THE TEXT STEP, WHICH WILL BE A VISIT BY THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER TO TEHRAN, STARTING ON 5 AUGUST. ULUSU WILL NOT (NOT) TAKE ANY PROPOSALS WITH HIM, BUT HIS PURPOSE WILL BE TO ASK THE IRIANIANS, FRANKLY AND AS A BROTHER AND NEIGHBOUR, WHAT THEIR REAL NEGOTIATING DEMANDS ARE. IN PARTICULAR, HE WILL SEEK TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THE IRANIANS WILL REDUCE THEIR DEMAND FOR REPARATIONS. HE DOES NOT EXPECT TO SEE KHOMEINI.

3. THE TURKS WILL DECIDE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE IRANIAN RESPONSE, WHETHER TO PROCEED WITH A MEDIATION EFFORT. OKYAYUZ STRESSED THAT THEY ARE DETERMINED NOT TO GET THEIR FINGERS BURNT: THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE ISLAMIC GOOD OFFICERS COMMITTEE HAD ALREADY TAUGHT THEM SOME LESSONS, PARTICULARLY ABOUT EXTREME IRANIAN SENSITIVITY TO MEDIATION EFFORTS. ULUSU'S VISIT WILL BE PURELY BILATERAL, ALTHOUGH THE TURKS ARE CONTENT (FOR COVER PURPOSES) FOR THE PRESS TO HINT THAT IT WILL BE IN THE GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE CONTEXT. THEY BELIEVE THE COMMITTEE WILL MEET IN JEDDA IN ABOUT TWO WEEK'S TIME, BUT DO NOT EXPECT MUCH FROM THAT.

4. SHORT ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY DIRECT RELATION BETWEEN TURKISH AND ALGERIAN ACTIVITIES. OKYAYUZ SAID NOT. THE ALGERIANS WERE WELL PLACED TO MEDIATE, HAVING SCORED SUCCESSES WITH THE 1975 AGREEMENT AND THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES, BUT THE IRANIANS WERE ACUTELY AWARE THAT THEY WERE SHIITE AND THE ALGERIANS SUNNI. SO WERE THE TURKS, BUT THEY WERE AT LEAST SECULAR AND NON-ARAB.

5. THE TURKS THINK THAT NOW MIGHT BE AS GOOD A TIME AS ANY TO TRY FOR A CEASE-FIRE, SINCE SOME FORM OF MILITARY BALANCE HAS BEEN STRUCK. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE IRANIAN GENERAL STAFF MAY BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THEIR POLITICAL MASTERS TO TAKE A REALISTIC VIEW OF THE SLIM PROSPECTS OF DECISIVELY DEFEATING THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES.

6. THE US EMBASSY HAVE TOLD US THAT, SHORTLY BEFORE IRAN INVADED IRAQ, THEIR AMBASSADOR HAD ON INSTRUCTIONS URGED EVREN TO INTERVENE TO TRY TO FORESTALL THIS. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES TO EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE ON TURKEY. WE CANNOT GAUGE THE EFFECT OF THE AMERICAN INTERVENTION, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE TURKS HAVE CHANGED COURSE. THEY SEE THAT THERE MAY JUST BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE A CEASE-FIRE AND/OR SETTLEMENT, AND IF THERE IS, THEY WILL TAKE IT. BUT THEY WILL TREAD WITH EXTREME CAUTION AND DISCRETION. IN PARTICULAR, PLEASE PROTECT WHAT OKYAYUZ SAID ABOUT ULUSU'S VISIT TO TEHRAN.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 441 OF 11 JULY, 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
PRIORITY TEHRAN AMMAN JEDDA MOSCOW WASHINGTON PARIS CAIRO

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1108 AND MY TELNO 433: IRAQ/IRAN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. I TRUST WE CAN COME OFF THE FENCE IN GOOD TIME BEFORE ANY VOTE ON A RESOLUTION SIMILAR TO THAT SET OUT IN UKMIS TELNO 1107. TO ABSTAIN WILL BE TANTAMOUNT, IN IRAQI AND MODERATE ARAB EYES, TO A VOTE AGAINST, AND WOULD DO OUR INTERESTS HERE GREAT HARM. I NOTE THAT BOTH THE FRENCH AND THE US DELEGATIONS SAID THEY COULD GO ALONG WITH THE WORDING AS OF 9 JULY. DR HAMMADI LEFT HERE FOR NEW YORK ON 10 JULY.

2. THE REASONS WHY MR WHYTE'S INSTRUCTIONS, IN YOUR TELNO 607 TO NEW YORK, NEED URGENT MODIFICATION AS WE APPROACH A VOTE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

(A) IRAN, WHICH COULD HAVE ACHIEVED SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN [redacted] DRAFT RESOLUTION IF IT HAD DEIGNED TO PARTICIPATE, SEEMS TO BE PREPARING INSTEAD TO TURN ITS BACK ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS IS A MOST DANGEROUS PRECEDENT, AS NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) APTLY POINTED OUT (PARA 5 OF UKMIS TUR). ''NO MEMBER STATE HAD THE RIGHT TO TELL THE COUNCIL IT HAD NO BUSINESS TO TRY AND STOP A WAR.''

(B) FURTHERMORE IRAN HAS NOW MADE SPECIFIC THREATS OF INVASION OF IRAQ (TEHRAN TELNO 418). IF THAT IS ITS ATTITUDE, IT PRESUMABLY DOES NOT (NOT) WORRY ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCE OF ITS DISDAIN OF THE COUNCIL AND ITS LEGITIMATE PROCEEDINGS, IN THIS CASE A DISTASTEFUL RESOLUTION.

(C) SINCE THE FALL OF KHORRAMSHAHR ON 25 MAY, IRAQ HAS REPEATEDLY AND PUBLICLY HUMILIATED ITSELF TO OBTAIN A CEASEFIRE. WITNESS ITS OFFER OF CEASEFIRE PLUS WITHDRAWAL PLUS ARBITRATION ON 10 JUNE (MY TELNO 360) SEMICOLON ITS UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OFFER OF 20 JUNE (MY TELNO 392) SEMICOLON ITS VIRTUALLY COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF WITHDRAWAL TO THE 1975 BOUNDARIES BY 29 JUNE (MY TELNO 413) SEMICOLON AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT BOTH UN OBSERVERS TO CHECK THAT WITHDRAWAL HAS TAKEN PLACE (30 JUNE), AND OF A COMMISSION TO DETERMINE WHO WAS THE AGGRESSOR (APRIL). IT IS CLEAR ALSO, AS DR HAMMADI LET FALL WHILE IN DELHI (PARA 4 OF WETHERELL'S TELELETTER TO FINLAYSON OF 7 JULY) THAT IRAQ IS NOW PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY REASONABLE PROPOSAL FOR THE PAYMENT OF REPARATIONS, IN CONCERT OF COURSE WITH ITS ARAB GULF BANK-ROLLERS.

(D) IRAQ HAS, ARGUABLY, ONLY HELD OUT AGAINST IRANIAN PRECONDITIONS WHICH IMPINGE DIRECTLY ON ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, IE WHO RULES IRAQ. THIS MUST BE FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE TO DECIDE, AT LEAST WHEN WE DEBATE THINGS IN AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM.

(E) NO SINGLE ELEMENT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION CIRCULATED BY PRESIDENT SINCLAIR OF GUYANA (UKMIS TELNO 1107) IS PER SE UNREASONABLE OR UNACCEPTABLE TO US, EXCEPT POSSIBLY THE PHRASE AT THE END OF PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 2 (PARA 3 OF YOUR TELNO 607 TO UKMIS), WHICH NO DOUBT WOULD BE DROPPED IF MR WHYTE INSISTED. FURTHERMORE, SIR A PARSONS IS ON RECORD AS HAVING TOLD SAHHAF THAT THE SORT OF TEXT THE IRAQIS CONTEMPLATED WOULD CAUSE US NO (NO) PROBLEMS, THOUGH THE IRANIANS WOULD OF COURSE NOT (NOT) ACCEPT IT (PARA 3 OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1049). HIS REMARKS WILL HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY NOTED. WHY THEREFORE SHOULD WE NOW FIND

(PARA 3 OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1049). HIS REMARKS WILL HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY NOTED. WHY THEREFORE SHOULD WE NOW FIND DIFFICULTY WITH SINCLAIR'S DRAFT AS A WHOLE ?

3. ALL THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS WILL APPLY WITH REDOUBLED FORCE IF IRAN ACTUALLY INVADES IRAQ, AS NOW SEEMS LIKELY. THE CONFRONTATION THEN WILL NO LONGER BE IRAQ VERSUS IRAN BUT THE SEVEN AGAINST THEBES (GULF MODERATES PLUS JORDAN PLUS EGYPT VERSUS IRAN). THE WAR WILL HAVE ENTERED A NEW AND MUCH MORE SERIOUS PHASE.

4. IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I HOPE YOU WILL RECONSIDER THE INSTRUCTIONS SENT TO MR WHYTE IN YOUR TELNO 607 (ESPECIALLY ITS PARA 4) TO UKMIS NEW YORK. AS SIR A PARSONS PREDICTED, VIRTUALLY ANY TEXT WILL BE REJECTED BY IRAN. THAT SHOULD NOT (NOT) BE OUR CRITERION. ANY CHANCE OF BEING ON PUBLIC RECORD IN FAVOUR OF A CEASEFIRE AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME SHOULD SURELY BE SEIZED.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 490 OF 28/07/82
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DI4) AND PRIORITY WASHINGTON: KUWAIT: TEHRAN.

SIC U2G

OUR TEL NO 470

IRAQ/IRAN.

1. THE US INTERESTS SECTION HERE SAY THEY HAVE EVIDENCE THAT THE IRANIANS ARE PREPARING TO LAUNCH ANOTHER ATTACK IN CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH TOWARDS BASRA. ONE ASSESSMENT, DATED 27 JULY, STATES THAT THE ATTACK CAN BE EXPECTED WITHIN FORTY EIGHT HOURS.

2. THOUGH IT IS PROBABLY AN EXAGGERATION TO SAY THAT THE IRANIANS SEEM TO BE PREPARING TO THROW EVERYTHING THEY HAVE GOT INTO THE ATTACK, THE US INTERESTS SECTION CLAIM THAT REINFORCEMENTS ARE ARRIVING IN CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS THE PLANNED DURATION OF THE ATTACK IS SAID TO BE FIVE DAYS. IT IS NOT (NOT) POSSIBLE TO SAY WHETHER IT WILL BE ALONG THE SAME AXIS AS PREVIOUS ATTACKS SINCE 13 JULY. AS INDICATED IN PARA 3 OF TUR, THE IRANIANS MAY CHOOSE TO STRIKE SLIGHTLY FURTHER NORTH, ROUGHLY LEVEL WITH AL QURNA, BEFORE TURNING SOUTH TOWARDS BASRA. THERE ARE APPARENTLY NO (NO) SIGNS OF ANY IRANIAN DEPLOYMENTS WHICH MIGHT PRESENT A THREAT OF A DIVERSIONARY ATTACK ELSEWHERE EG IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR. INDEED, IF THE US ASSESSMENT IS CORRECT, MOST OF THE IRANIAN UNITS HITHERTO DEPLOYED IN THAT SECTOR HAVE BEEN MOVED SOUTH.

3. THE IRAQIS DO NOT (NOT) APPEAR TO HAVE MADE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE DISPOSITION OF THEIR FORCES, SO FAR.

4. I SHALL BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHETHER WE HAVE ANY COLLATERAL FROM OUR OWN SOURCES FOR THE ABOVE INFORMATION. HM VICE CONSUL RETURNS THIS EVENING FROM A TWO DAY VISIT TO BASRA AND I SHALL TELEGRAPH DETAILS OF HIS VISIT, INCLUDING A NUMERICAL UPDATE OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY, AS SOON AS WE HAVE DEBRIEFED HIM.

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FM BAGHDAD 210815Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 478 OF 21 JULY, 1982
AND TO IMMEDIATE DISTRESS FCO
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DI4 AND RMT2)
PRIORITY DOT (OT5) TEHRAN AMMAN KUWAIT DAMASCUS CAIRO JEDDA
UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON MOSCOW UKDEL NATO NEW DELHI BELGRADE
HAVANA
SAVING STICKHOLM PARIS BONN ALL OTHER ME POSTS (EXCEPT BEIRUT)

IRAQ/IRAN: AIR RAID ON BAGHDAD

1. AT 0629 LOCAL THIS MORNING, 21 JULY, BAGHDAD EXPERIENCED ITS FIRST AIR RAID SINCE OCTOBER 1980. TWO IRANIAN AIRCRAFT MADE A LOW LEVEL RUN OVER THE CITY ALONG A LINE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT - PRESIDENTIAL PALACE - RASHID CAMP. THERE WERE TWO OR THREE LOUD DETONATIONS BUT THERE HAVE BEEN NO (NO) REPORTS OF ANY

PRESIDENTIAL PALACE - RASHID CAMP. THERE WERE TWO OR THREE LOUD DETONATIONS BUT THERE HAVE BEEN NO (NO) REPORTS OF ANY DAMAGE SO FAR.

2. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE WAS HEAVY, THOUGH IT APPEARED BELATED, AND THE AIRCRAFT APPEAR TO HAVE SUCCEEDED IN PENETRATING THE CITY'S OUTER DEFENCES. ONE AIRCRAFT IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN SHOT DOWN, FLATTENING TWO HOUSES AS IT CRASHED.. THE NAVIGATOR IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN PICKED UP BY THE IRAQIS. THE FACT THAT ONE AIRCRAFT HAD A TWO MAN CREW INDICATES THAT IT WAS A PHANTOM.

3. THIS DOES NOT (NOT) APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN A HIT AND RUN RAID. THE FLIGHT PATH..CHOSEN TOOK THE AIRCRAFT OVER BAGHDAD'S MOST SENSITIVE AREAS, AND PASSED VERY CLOSE TO THE BRAND NEW NAM FONFERENCE COMPLEX. AT FIRST SIGHT THE ATTACK APPEARS TO HAVE HAD THE OBJECTIVES OF:

(A) DEMONSTRATING THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE THE CAPACITY TO RETALIATE FOR THE RECENT PUNITIVE IRAQI RAIDS ON EG HAMADAN (CF. TEHRAN TELNO 449) SEMICOLON AND

(B) EXPOSING TO NAM LEADERS BAGHDAD'S CONTINUING VULNERABILITY TO AIR ATTACK.

IN THE LATTER RESPECT ONE MUST NOW CONCLUDE THAT THE IRANIAN CAMPAIGN TO ABORT THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT HAS BEGUN IN EARNEST.

4. THR BRITISH COMMUNITY, WITH WHOM I AM IN CONSTANT CONTACT, REMAINS CALM. SEE MY IFT NOT TO ALL ON ADVICE TO TRAVELLERS, BRITISH AIRWAYS FLIGHT PLANS, ETC.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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FM AMMAN 201000Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 317 OF 20 JUL
INFO GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TEHRAN, TUNIS, UKMIS NEW YROK, WASHINGTON

SAVING INFO TO ADEN, ALGIERS, ANKARA, EC POSTS, ISLAMABAD, KHARTOUM, MOSCOW, RABAT, SANAA, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLO

YOUR TELNO 199 TO JEDDA: IRAN/IRAQ

1. I WAS ABLE TO SEE KING HUSSEIN YESTERDAY EVENING, 19 JULY, AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. IN DESCRIBING THE LINE WE WERE TAKING IN OUR DISCUSSIONS IN THE GULF, I FIRMLY INCLUDED POINT 2(B) OF YOUR TUR ABOUT THE DANGERS OF THE WAR SPREADING BUT JUDGED IT BEST NOT TO USE THE OPTIONAL POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 6. THE JORDANIANS DO NOT, FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST, APPEAR TO BE CONTEMPLATING MILITARY INTERVENTION (MY TELNO 313) BUT I AM SURE THAT KING HUSSEIN WILL HAVE TAKEN THIS PARTICULAR POINT ON BOARD, EVEN THOUGH I MADE IT IN THE MORE GENERALISED CONTEXT OF THE GULF REGION AS A WHOLE.
2. ON THE LATEST STATE OF PLAY IN THE GULF WAR, THE KING SAID HE WAS MUCH REASSURED BY IRAQI SUCCESSES. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE

2. ON THE LATEST STATE OF PLAY IN THE GULF WAR, THE KING SAID HE WAS MUCH REASSURED BY IRAQI SUCCESSES. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE IRAQI FORCES WERE NOW PERFORMING IN A MUCH MORE CONFIDENT WAY AND THAT IRAQI MORALE WAS HIGH. HE HAD NOTED THAT THE IRAQIS WERE NOW TRYING TO TAKE OUT THE IRANIAN OIL INSTALLATIONS AT KHARG ISLAND. HE COMMENTED THAT HE HAD NEVER UNDERSTOOD WHY THE IRAQIS MADE SO LITTLE ATTEMPT TO DO THIS EARLIER IN THE WAR SEMICLN HAD HE HIMSELF BEEN IN CHARGE OF THE WAR THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN ONE OF HIS FIRST PRIORITIES. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE HAD FREQUENTLY BEEN CONCERNEAK EARLIER ABOUT THE IRAQIS' INABILITY TO MOTIVATE THEIR TROOPS PROPERLY WHEN THEY WERE OCCUPYING IRANIAN TERRITORY. BUT NOW THAT THE IRAQIS WERE FIGHTING TO DEFEND THEIR OWN SOIL THIS QUESTION OF MOTIVATION SEEMED NO LONGER TO BE A PROBLEM.

3. WHEN, LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, I MADE REFERENCE TO THE DANGERS OF POLARISATION OF THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR, KING HUSSEIN COMMENTED IMMEDIATELY THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING ON WHICH HE HELD STRONG VIEWS. HE SAID THAT, IN HIS VIEW, IRAN HAD ALREADY FALLEN INTO THE GRASP OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND REITERATED THAT HE HAD BEEN CONFIRMED IN THIS VIEW DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION. KING HUSSEIN THEN SPOKE TO ME IN IDENTICAL TERMS TO
THOSE HE HAD USED EARLIER WITH ALAN URWICK DURING THEIR CONVERSATION AT THE END OF JUNE (AMMAN TELNO 278 PARAS 4 AND 5). THE KING ADDED THAT HE SAW IT AS THE DUTY OF THE WEST TO HELP PRESERVE IRAQ AS A SHIELD AGAINST IRANIAN AND SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO URGE THIS VIEW, IN PARTICULAR, ON THE AMERICANS BUT, AS USUAL, THEY FAILED TO UNDERSTAND THE TRUE NATURE OF THE THREAT. NOT ONLY WERE THEY REFUSING TO HELP IRAQ THEMSELVES, BUT THEY WERE USING END-USER CLAUSES IN EARLIER ARMS SALES CONTRACTS TO PREVENT COUNTRIES SUCH AS SOUTH KOREA OR BELGIUM SELLING MUCH-NEEDED MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ.

4. KING HUSSEIN ALSO TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, SAYING HE COULD SEE NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL. HE HAD SEEN WALID JUMBLATT (WHO HAS BEEN IN AMMAN VISITING HIS WIFE) ON 18 JULY AND HAD FOUND BOTH DEPRESSED AND UNABLE TO POINT TO ANY EARLY AND SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HIS OVERRIDING CONCERN CONTINUED TO BE THAT WHATEVER EMERGED FROM THE LEBANESE WITUATION SHOULD BE DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM, IE THE ESSENTIAL NEED TO FIND SOME WAY OF SATISFYING PALESTINIAN NEEDS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION AND A HOME OF THEIR OWN.

5. KING HUSSEIN, WHO SEEMED REMARKABLY CHEERFUL CONSIDERING HIS REAL CONCERNS OVER BOTH THE GULF WAR AND LEBANON, CONCLUDED BY SAYING HOW MUCH HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING ALL THESE ISSUES MORE FULLY DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO BRITAIN LATER THIS WEEK. HE SAID THAT HE WAS DELIGHTED BOTH BY THE PROGRAMME BEING ARRANGED FOR

FULLY DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO BRITAIN LATER THIS WEEK. HE SAID THAT HE WAS DELIGHTED BOTH BY THE PROGRAMME BEING ARRANGED FOR HIM AND BY THE PROSPECT OF GETTING AWAY FROM AMMAN AND HAVING A TOTAL CHANGE OF ATMOSPHERE.

6. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO POSTS LISTED ABOVE.

SINDALL

CCN PARA 4 LINE 7 FOR 'WITUATION' PSE READ ''SITUATION''

NNNN

Iraq

FILE

RM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 July, 1982

IRAN/IRAQ

Thank you for your letter of 16 July. The Prime Minister has noted the action we are taking.

A. J. COLES

B J P Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

IRAN/IRAQ

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 449 OF 19 JULY 82
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, AMMAN, JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, ALGIERS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS.

ADVANCE COPY

MY TELNO 441 : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. EXCEPT FOR THE SOUND OF AMBULANCES BRINGING WOUNDED TO THE HOSPITALS, TEHRAN REMAINS SURPRISINGLY NORMAL. THE STREET LIGHTS SOY ON AT NIGHTS AND THERE ARE NO BURSTS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE TO KEEP PEOPLE ON THEIR TOES.

2. IN FACT PEOPLE ARE LETHARGIC. THERE IS NO SIGN OF ANY ENTHUSIASM FOR THE FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH AND PRIVATELY MANY IRANIANS EXPRESS CONCERN TO US ABOUT THIS EXTENSION OF THE WAR.

IRANIANS EXPRESS CONCERN TO US ABOUT THIS EXTENSION OF THE WAR.

3. THE PRESS DESCRIBES CONTINUED HEAVY FIGHTING AT THE FRONT WITHOUT BEING TOO SPECIFIC. IT IS REPORTED THAT 800 IRAQIS HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRISONER AND ONE OF THEM, A COLONEL ABDULLAH, COMMANDER OF THE 3RD BATTALIAN OF THE 504 DIVISION, HAS GIVEN AN INTERVIEW CRITICISING HIS OWN SIDE. THERE ARE REPORTS OF INCREASED (AND OBSCURE) ACTIVITY IN KURDISTAN, AND DESULTORY ACTION ON THE OTHER FRONTS. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS OF WHAT IS CALLED SAVAGE BOMBING OF CIVILIANS AND TOWNS IN WESTERN IRAN, PARTICULARLY HAMADAN WHERE 100 PEOPLE WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN KILLED AND 600 WOUNDED IN A RAID SEVERAL DAYS AGO.

4. THE COMMANDER OF THE GROUND FORCES, COLONEL SHIRAZI, IN AN INTERVIEW ON 18 JULY, SAID ONLY THAT THE OPERATIONS HAD PROGRESSED ''RELATIVELY WELL''. HE MENTIONED THE EXTREME HOT WEATHER AND THE LOW MORALE OF THE ENEMY, WHO WOULD RECEIVE ''A STRONGER BLOW IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS''. SHIRAZI, WHO IS CLEARLY NOW A LEADING HAWK, SAID THAT THE IRANIAN TARGET WAS THE OVERTHROW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OVERLAND ROUTE TO JERUSALEM. THE IRANIAN FORCES MIGHT NOT ONLY HAVE TO BESIEGE BASRA BUT TO MOVE TOWARDS BAGHDAD. NO POWER COULD STOP THEM.

5. OTHER IRANIAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN MORE RESTRAINED. PRIME MINISTER MOUSSAVI, WHEN STOPPING OVER IN ANKARA ON 17 JULY ON HIS WAY TO ALGERIA, SENT AN UNUSUALLY FRIENDLY MESSAGE TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. IN TURKEY AND IN ALGERIA MOUSSAVI STRESSED THAT IRANIAN ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN ONLY FOR DEFENCE OF THEIR COUNTRY AND SECURITY OF THE REGION. MOUSSAVI SAID THAT HE HAD GONE TO ALGERIA TO DISCUSS BILATERAL RELATIONS (HE TOOK WITH HIM THE MINISTERS OF ENERGY AND SCIENCE AND THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, AZIZI) AND THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE DENIED THAT HIS VISIT WAS DUE TO ALGERIAN MEDIATION. AT THE SAME TIME HE SAID THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THE EFFORTS OF THE ALGERIAN PRESIDENT, BUT THERE WERE REALITIES ABOUT THE SITUATION WHICH NEEDED TO BE DISCUSSED. IT SEEMS, THEREFORE, THAT HE HAS BEEN UNDER SOME PRESSURE FROM THE ALGERIANS.

6. MEANWHILE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, ARDEBILI, SAID IN A SPEECH IN THE PRIVINCES THAT THE IRANIANS HAD ACHIEVED NOTHING IF SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE BA'ATH PARTY REMAINED IN POWER. FOREIGN MINISTER VELAYATI, RETURNING FROM THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING IN CYPRUS, SAID HE HAD EXPLAINED IRAN'S DEFENSIVE ACTION. HE SEEMED

CYPRUS, SAID HE HAD EXPLAINED IRAN'S DEFENSIVE ACTION. HE SEEMED TO BE CONCERNED TO COUNTER CRITICISM THAT IRAN SHOULD BOYCOTT INTERNATIONAL GATHERINGS BECAUSE HE SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR IRAN TO BE PRESENT AT SUCH MEETINGS AND TO PUT THEIR CASE.

7. THE NERVOUSNESS OF THE GULF COUNTRIES HAS EVIDENTLY GOT THROUGH TO THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP. PRIME MINISTER MOUSSAVI, INTERVIEWED BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR ALGERIA, SAID THAT IRAN DID NOT COVET THE LAND OF THE SMALL PERSIAN GULF STATES AND POSED NO THREAT TO THEM. IT WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF THESE STATES, HOWEVER, NOT TO BE SO DEPENDENT ON THE UNITED STATES. THEIR INTEREST WAS TO LIVE SIDE BY SIDE WITH A REVOLUTIONARY, POWERFUL AND ISLAMIC COUNTRY WHICH DID NOT COVET THEIR TERRITORY.

8. THE SPEAKER OF THE MAJLES, RAFSANJANI, IN A STATEMENT ON 18 JULY, REPEATED THAT IRAN HAD NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS AND THE GULF COUNTRIES NEED NOT FEAR THIS. HOWEVER, HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF TRUCK-LOADS OF ARMS CONTINUED TO GO TO IRAQ, IRAN WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE.

9. RAFSANJANI ALSO ARGUED THAT IRAN'S OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAQ WERE PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE. BUT ANOTHER AIM WAS TO OPEN AN EASTERN FRONT AGAINST ISRAEL, AND THE DESTINY OF THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ WAS IMPORTANT FOR IRAN. RAFSANJANI SAID IT WAS NO SECREY THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AIMED TO EXPORT THEIR REVOLUTION, BUT THEY WOULD NOT DO THIS BY ARMED FORCE UNLESS AGGRESSION WAS COMMITTED AGAINST THEM.

10. MENAWHILE NOTHING HAS BEEN HEARD MORE FROM KHOMEINI, EXCEPT A LONG RAMBLING SPEECH ON JERUSALEM DAY URGING THE PALESTINIANS TO FIGHT RATHER THAN NEGOTIATE AND THE MOSLEM PEOPLES, IF NECESSARY, TO DISAVOW THEIR GOBERNMENTS AND FIGHT ALONGSIDE IRAN AGAINST THE ISRAELIS. HE PRAYED FOR THE TRIUMPH OF THE WORLD'S MOSLEMS AND OPPRESSED AND THE VICTORY OF IRANIAN FORCES OVER THE MEN OF SADDAM HUSSEIN.

11. I HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE RADIO RUN BY THE RUSSIANS AND THE TUDEH PARTY FROM BAKU HAS CRITICISED THE INVASION OF IRAQ. SUCH ACTION, RESULTING IN MUCH BLOODSHED, WAS SAID TO BE NOT NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

BARRINGTON

GRS 320 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAHRAIN 180940Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 155 OF 18 JULY

INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS AMMAN BAGHDAD CAIRO DAMASCUS TEHRAN TUNIS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING ADEN ALGIERS ANKARA EC POSTS ISLAMABAD KHARTOUM MOSCOW RABAT SANAA TEL AVIV TRIPOLI UKDEL NATO MODUK (FOR DS11 AND DMAO)

YOUR TELNO 199 TO JEDDA: IRAN / IRAQ

1. I CALLED ON MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THIS MORNING AND SPOKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.

2. SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN MUBARAK EXPRESSED THANKS FOR OUR OFFER OF HELP. HE WOULD SPEAK TO BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE AMIR LATER TODAY AND LET ME KNOW IF THERE WERE ANY PARTICULAR REQUESTS. HE WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME A QUOTE CLEAR CUT STATEMENT UNQUOTE FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONDEMNING IRAN'S INVASION AND CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. HE HOPED WE WOULD NOT SLACKEN IN OUR EFFORTS TO PURSUE THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS AND BY OTHER DIPLOMATIC MEANS A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT CRISIS. HE SAW ADVANTAGE IN A REVIVAL OF THE PALME MISSION (FCO TELNO 620 TO UKMIS NEW YORK). PRESENT IRANIAN ATTITUDES PRECLUDED ANY FORESEEABLE PROGRESS BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE'S GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE.

3. IRAQ MUST, SHAIKH MOHAMMED CONTENDED, BE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE WEST BOTH QUOTE MILITARILY AND LOGISTICALLY UNQUOTE. HE DID NOT EXPAND FURTHER ON THIS POINT BUT REMINDED ME THAT KHOMEINI HAD MADE PLAIN HIS AIM TO ESTABLISH A SECOND ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IN IRAQ AND THAT THE CREATION OF AN IRAN/IRAQ/SYRIA AXIS WOULD MEAN DISASTER FOR THE AREA AND WESTERN INTERESTS IN IT.

4. ON KUWAIT'S POSITION, HE THOUGHT THAT ALTHOUGH OUTWARD APPEARANCES THERE WERE CALM THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT WERE IN FACT MUCH CONCERNED. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TOLD HIM YESTERDAY HOW PLEASED HE HAD BEEN TO RECEIVE OUR REACTIONS TO THE SITUATION. BRITISH WILLINGNESS TO STRENGTHEN THE KUWAIT ARMY WAS MOST WELCOME. SHAIKH MOHAMMED HOPED ANYTHING WE COULD DO IN THIS REGARD COULD BE DONE SPEEDILY. HE VOLUNTEERED NOTHING ABOUT POSSIBLE GCC HELP FOR KUWAIT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ADEN ALGIERS ANKARA EC POSTS ISLAMABAD KHARTOUM MOSCOW RABAT SANAA TEL AVIV TRIPOLI UKDEL NATO MODUK (FOR DS11 AND DMAO)

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 301 OF 17 JULY
REPEATED IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, KUWAIT, DOHA, DUBAI, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT. PRIORITY BAGHDAD, CAIRO , DAMASCUS, TUNIS, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, MODUK (DS11), MOD TEAM RIYADH (DMAO), TEHRAN, AMMAN, ALL EC POSTS.
SAVING TO KHARTOUM, ADEN, RABAT.

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TELNO 199: IRAN/IRAQ

1. I SAW THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER (POLITICS) TODAY AND SPOKE ACCORDINGLY. I GAVE HIM A COPY OF MY SPEAKING NOTE.

2. MANSOURI THANKED ME FOR OUR WILLINGNESS TO HELP. HE WOULD TRY TO CONVEY YOUR MESSAGE TO PRINCE SAUD (WHO IS PROBABLY LEAVING FOR WASHINGTON TOMORROW). IN THE MEANTIME HE DID NOT THINK THERE WERE ANY MEASURES HMG COULD USEFULLY TAKE AT THIS STAGE.

3. THE SAUDIS AGREED WITH US THAT IT WOULD BE WISE FOR THEM TO AVOID SENDING MILITARY HELP TO IRAQ AND TO MAINTAIN CORRECT RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THEY WERE IN TOUCH WITH THE U.S. AND HAD TOLD THEM THEY WERE OPPOSED TO ANY MILITARY MEASURES, SUCH AS THE RDF. HE SHOWED ME A COPY OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT: THOUGH HE MADE NO SPECIFIC COMMENT, HE SEEMED TO APPROVE OF IT.

THE AMB. HE SHOWED HE A COPY OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT: THOUGH HE MADE NO SPECIFIC COMMENT, HE SEEMED TO APPROVE OF IT.

4. THE SAUDIS WERE ALSO IN TOUCH WITH PAKISTAN, ALGERIA AND TURKEY IN THE HOPE THAT THEY COULD INFLUENCE IRAN. THEY SAW LITTLE PROSPECT OF HELP FROM SYRIA WHICH WAS CONCERNED ONLY TO PROMOTE THE DOWNFALL OF SADDAM HUSSAIN.

5. LIKE CHATTI (MY TELNO 298 - NOT TO ALL) MANSOURI WAS WORRIED ABOUT A POSSIBLE SYRIA/IRAQ/IRAN AXIS. THIS COULD BE JOINED BY PDRY, LIBYA AND ETHIOPIA AND RESULT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HAFIZ AL-ASAD AS A NEW NASSER: THE ARBITER OF EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BLACKMAILING THE MODERATE GOVERNMENTS.

6. I ASKED WHETHER THE DEPARTURE OF SADDAM HUSSAIN WOULD DIVERT THE IRANIANS. WERE THE SAUDIS PERHAPS ADVOCATING HIS RESIGNATION? MANSOURI SAID NOT. SADDAM WAS MORE FLEXIBLE THAN HE HAD BEEN, BUT HE WAS READY TO FIGHT TO THE DEATH.

7. ON FINANCIAL HELP TO IRAQ MANSOURI WAS EQUIVOCAL. FINANCE WAS NOT AN IMPORTANT QUESTION AT THE MOMENT. ANY IRAQI REQUESTS WOULD BE CONSIDERED ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL MERITS.

8. HE ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS TO MAKE. I SAID WE SAW LITTLE HOPE OF PERSUADING THE IRANIANS TO DESIST BY ARGUMENT: ONLY IRAQI MILITARY SUCCESS COULD AVAIL. BUT WE WERE URGENTLY CONCERNED TO STOP THE WAR SPREADING TO THE GULF: HENCE OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A STATEMENT OR CONSULTATION OR A VISIT TO THE AREA. MANSOURI SAID HE DID NOT THINK THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT WOULD WANT ANY OF THESE THINGS AT THE MOMENT. BUT HE AGAIN ASKED ME TO CONVEY SAUDI GRATITUDE FOR YOUR OFFER.

9. I AM SURPRISED THAT MANSOURI DID NOT TAKE UP OUR OFFER OF A STATEMENT. WE MAY GET A DIFFERENT ANSWER FROM PRINCE SAUD ON THAT SUBJECT, BUT I DOUBT WHETHER HE WILL WANT ANYTHING THAT SMACKS OF MILITARY COOPERATION UNLESS THE DANGER GETS A GOOD DEAL MORE IMMINENT.

10 ON FINANCIAL AID IT LOOKS AS IF THE SAUDIS HAVE DECIDED THAT SINCE MONEY WILL NOT RESCUE SADDAM THEY HAD BETTER SAVE THEIR RESOURCES FOR A POSSIBLE REPARATIONS FUND. BUT THERE IS NO/NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE BACKING A RIVAL.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO KHARTOUM, ADEN, RABAT.

(ERROR REGRETTED).

CRAIG

BT

IRAN/IRAQ

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FROM KUWAIT 180605Z JULY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 188 OF 17 JULY 82
INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, PARIS, AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TUNIS,
INFO PRIORITY MODUK FOR DS11 AND DMAO,
PNFO SAVING TO TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, RIYADH, KHARTOUM, RABAT, SANA'A, ADEN.

YOUR TELNO 199 TO JEDDA: IRAQ/IRAN

1. ACTION TAKEN. THE KUWAITIS ARE CALM. THEY ARE NOT (NOT) ASKING FOR HELP.

2. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED TO KHALID JA'AFAR, THE HEAD OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT AT THE MFA. SHAIKH SABAH AND RASHID, THE UNDER SECRETARY, WERE OCCUPIED WITH THE VISITING IRANIAN DELEGATION (TEHRAN TELNO 432).

3. KHALID SEEMED GENUINELY APPRECIATIVE OF OUR CONCERN. HE SAID HE WOULD CONSULT SHAIKH SABAH AND COME BACK TO ME IF THE KUWAITIS HAD ANY SPECIFIC REQUESTS. HE DID NOT SEEM AT ALL WORRIED. HE THOUGHT THE IRANIANS MILITARILY INCAPABLE OF OPENING UP A NEW FRONT. IN ANY CASE, KUWAITI RELATIONS WITH IRAN WERE ''GOOD'' AND THE KUWAITIS FELT THEMSELVES UNDER NO (NO) PRESSURE. I ASKED ABOUT THE IRANIAN COMPLAINTS OF KUWAIT'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQ AND THE

THE KUWAITIS FELT THEMSELVES UNDER NO (NO) PRESSURE. I ASKED ABOUT THE IRANIAN COMPLAINTS OF KUWAIT'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQ AND THE TRANSIT OF ARMS. KHALID SAID THERE WERE NO COMPLAINTS AT PRESENT AND ''NOT MUCH'' WAS GOING NORTH IN THE WAY OF ARMAMENTS.

4. HE ENTIRELY AGREED WITH YOUR POINT (B) AND SAID FIRMLY THAT NONE OF THE GULF COUNTRIES WOULD JOIN THE WAR. ABDLATIF AL HAMAD, THE MINISTER OF FINANCE, WHOM I SAW LWTER THIS MORNING TOOK THE SAME VIEW. ''WE COULD NOT JOIN IN EVEN IF WE WANTED TO. WE HAVE NOT THE CAPABILITY. PERIOD.'' I ASKED ABDLATIF ABOUT FINANCIAL HELP. HE SAID THAT ANY KUWAITI AID WOULD BE ABOVE-BOARD AND VISIBLE. NO FRESH PAYMENTS HAD BEEN MADE RECENTLY. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUTSAUDI ARABIA: THEY MIGHT POSSIBLY STILL BE PROVIDING SOME MONEY.

5. AT ONE POINT IN OUR MEETINGPN KHALID SAID REVEALINGLY THAT HE THOUGHT THE AMERICANS ''WOULD NOT ALLOW THE IRANIANS TO MESS AROUND''. I ASKED IF THE KUWAITIS WERE HAPPY WITH YESTRDAY'S PUBLICISED OFFER BY THE U S TO PROVIDE DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO THE GULF ST

TES. KHALID THOUGHT SUCH STATEMENTS USEFUL: THE IRANIANS NEEDED TO BE SHOWN THE ''RED EYE''.
(COMMENT: THIS KUWAITI RELIANCE ON AMERICA TO COME TO THE RESCUE IF THINGS GO WRONG IS NOT SURPRISING. BUT SITS ODDLY WITH THE FACT THAT MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HAS STILL NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET IN TO SEE ANY SENIOR KUWAITI ABOUT THESE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.)

6. THERE HAS BEEN NO MENTION OF GCC HELP FOR KUWAIT (PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE TUR). IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ODD IF THERE HAD, GIVEN THAT KUWAIT HERSELF HAS NOT BOTHERED TO MOBILISE HER OWN RESOURCES. IN MILITARY TERMS, SUCH HELP WOULD BE USELESS. IN POLITICAL TERMS (PACE TWINAM IN WASHINGTON TELNO 2457) IT MAY IRK THE IRANIANS. WHY RISK IT THEREFORE? I AM SURE THIS WOULD BE HOW THE KUWAITIS WOUL SEE IT - AT LEAST UNTIL THE THREAT BECOMES MORE SERIOUS.

7. I HAVE ALSO SPOKEN BRIEFLY WITH SHAIKH SALIM, THE DEFENCE MINISTER, ON THE 'PHONE. HE SOUNDED MORE RELAXED THAN HE WAS ON WEDNESDAY (MY TELNO 185). THERE ARE STILL NO SIGNS OF ANY SPECIAL ACTIVITY AMONG THE DEFENCE FORCES. RASHID LEAVES FOR HIS SUMMER HOLIDAYS TOMORROW. ABDLATIF TOO IS OFF FOR A HTLIDAY IN TUNIS WITH A FEW DAYS IN LONDON ON THE WAY. THE GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THUS OF LIFE GOING ON NORMALLY. THE KUWAITIS MAY BE UNEASY BUT THEY ARE NOT (NOT) ALARMED.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, MASCOW, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, RIYADH.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, MASCOW, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, RIYADH, KHARTOUM, RABAT, SANA'A AND ADEN.

CAMBRIDGE

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(+

PARA 5 LINE 4 WA THE GULF STATES. KHALID ETC

(1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 July 1982

Prime Minister
To note what we are doing.
A.J.C. 19.7

Dear John,

Iran/Iraq

If the Iranians succeed in overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq this will create a menacing situation for our moderate Arab friends particularly in the Gulf. We are keeping in close touch with them.

Kuwait seems the most militarily exposed of the Gulf states. But for the moment the Kuwaitis seem inclined to maintain a low profile and not to ask for Western help in case this should seem provocative to the Iranians.

We are also keeping in close touch with the Americans, in case action may be needed to stop the war spreading. They are not at this stage considering any fresh deployments to the region though they are discussing contingencies with the Saudis and have offered to deploy a squadron of F15s to Saudi Arabia. (The Saudis have not responded to this.) They have also suggested special contacts between the US Navy and the Royal Navy so that we can keep in close touch. On our side, the ships of the Armilla patrol have until recently been at seven days steaming from the Gulf of Oman. But the current intention is that the New Zealand frigate Canterbury (volunteered to us in the Falklands context) should arrive in the Gulf of Oman on 21 July, while HMS Aurora is due to pay a visit to Bahrain from 31 July to 3 August.

None of the Gulf countries has yet asked for our help, and the need may not arise. But FCO and MOD officials are looking on a contingency basis at what we might be able to send to the region - eg for air defence - if or when an emergency developed, so that we shall have the facts at our disposal if we need to talk to the Americans or the Gulf countries.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries of members of OD.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

IRAN/IRAQ

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IMMEDIATE

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~~PS/LPS~~
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 441 OF 15 JULY 82
INFO BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, AMMAN, JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, ALGIERS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.

MY TELNO 439 : IRAN/IRAQ

1. PRESS COVERAGE OF THE WAR HERE SUGGESTS THAT THE IRANIAN FORCES ARE ACHIEVING THEIR OBJECTIVES, TAKING PRISONERS AND CAUSING CASUALTIES, BUT NOT THAT THERE HAS YET BEEN ANY MAJOR VICTORY. THEY ARE REPORTED NOW TO BE 25 KILOMETRES INSIDE IRAQ.

2. THERE HAS BEEN AN INDIRECT PRESS REFERENCE TO AN IRAQI ATTEMPT TO BOMB ONE OF THE SOUTHERN IRANIAN ISLANDS (PRESUMABLY KHARG) IN WHICH OPERATION THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE ARE REPORTED TO HAVE SHOT DOWN FOUR IRAQI PLANES.

3. MEANWHILE THERE ARE RUMOURS HERE OF SEVERE CASUALTIES, WITH THE WOUNDED BEING HELICOPTERED INTO TEHRAN HOSPITALS.

4. THERE ARE THEORIES AMONG THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN TEHRAN THAT THE IRANIANS' MILITARY OBJECTIVE IS TO CUT OFF [illegible] WHETHER MORE LIMITED MILITARY OBJECTIVE

4. THERE ARE THEORIES AMONG THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN TEHRAN THAT THE IRANIANS' MILITARY OBJECTIVE IS TO CUT OFF THE TOWN OF BASRA. WHATEVER MORE LIMITED MILITARY OBJECTIVE MIGHT HAVE BEEN PROCLAIMED OR INTENDED, HOWEVER, KHOMEINI'S APPEAL TO THE IRAQI NATION TO RISE AND OVERTHROW THE BA'ATH PARTY MEANS THAT THE IRANIANS ARE GAMBLING ON THE BIG THROW. KHOMEINI'S TARGET IS NOT JUST SADDAM HUSSEIN BUT THE WHOLE OF THE BA'ATH PARTY WHOM HE CALLS INFIDELS AND ACCUSES OF BEING WORSE THAN THE MONGOLS (EXAGGERATED), OF KILLING AYATOLLAH HAKIM (SURELY HE DIED OF OLD AGE) AND AYATOLLAH SADR AND HIS SISTER (FAIR ENOUGH). KHOMEINI HAS APPEALED TO THE IRAQIS AS THE PATRIOTS AS WELL AS MOSLEMS TO RISE UP AND JOIN THEIR IRANIAN BROTHERS. HE HAS TOLD THE IRANIANS THAT DEFEAT FOR THEM WILL BE A DEFEAT FOR ISLAM AND A DISGRACE ON THE IRANIAN NATION.

5. A WELL INFORMED ARAB COLLEAGUE TOLD ME TODAY THAT NOW THAT KHOMEINI HAD SPOKEN, THE DIRECTION OF THE WAR IN IRAN WOULD GET OUT OF HAND SINCE NO-ONE COULD CONTRADICT THE OLD MAN, WHO WAS VINDICTIVELY DETERMINED TO UPSET THE SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME. THE IRANIANS THOUGHT THEY WERE GODS GIFT TO THE WORLD AND UNDERESTIMATED BASIC HOSTILITY TOWARDS PERSIANS IN IRAQ.

6. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE IRANIANS CAN NOW WITHDRAW FROM THE BATTLEFIELD UNLESS AT LEAST SADDAM HUSSEIN IS OVERTHROWN, IF NOT THE BA'ATH PARTY

7. ONE HOPE MAY BE ALGERIAN MEDIATION. THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN SUMMONED HOME TO ALGIERS, AND IT IS REPORTED THAT THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER MAY GO THERE, PRESUMABLY TO FORESTALL A CRITICAL ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENT.

BARRINGTON

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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES 22

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REPEATED PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, MUSCAT, AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, MOSCOW.

YOUR TELNO 195: IRAN/IRAQ

1. NO WORTHWHILE SAUDIS ARE ACCESSIBLE. NOT ONLY IS IT RAMADAN: PRINCE SAUD AND HIS SENIOR OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN PREOCCUPIED IN TAIF WITH THE GCC SEMI COLON AND FAHD AND HIS STAFF ARE MOSTLY IN MECCA (WHITHER I CANNOT PENETRATE WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE SACRIFICE). I THEREFORE CALLED ON DR CHATTI, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANISATION (ICO) YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. HE HAD SEEN SAUD AND FAHD RECENTLY AND WAS DUE TO SEE FAHD AGAIN LAST NIGHT.

2. HE SAID THE EFFORTS OF THE ICO GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE WERE TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED. IRAQ HAD BEEN CO-OPERATIVE: IT HAD BEEN ON THE COMMITTEE'S ADVICE THAT SADDAM HAD AGREED TO WITHDRAW WITHIN IRAQI FRONTERS. BUT IRAN REMAINED OBDURATE. THE COMMITTEE'S LATEST PROPOSALS HAD BEEN:

(A) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "SOLIDARITY FUND" TO PROVIDE

(A) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A ''SOLIDARITY FUND'' TO PROVIDE ''AID'' WHICH, THOUGH OSTENSIBLY AVAILABLE TO BOTH BELLIGERENTS, WOILD IN PRACTICE BE INTENDED FOR IRAN.

(B) THE REFERENCE OF THE QUESTION OF GUILT TO THE COURT OF ISLAMIC STATES WHICH WAS ABOUT TO BE SET UP UNDER ICO AUSPICES.

3. THE IRANIANS HAD BEEN TOLERABLY INTERESTED IN (A) THOUGH THEY WANTED ''REPARATIONS'', NOT ''AID'' SEMI COLON BUT THEY HAD REJECTED (B). THEY WANTED A SPECIAL TRIBUNAL TO BE ESTABLISHED WHOSE TERMS OF REFERENCE WOULD BE TO CONDEMN SADDAM: NO QUESTION OF A TRIAL - HIS GUILT WAS TO BE ASSUMED FROM THE START. CHATTI BELIEVED THIS RESPONSE WAS DESIGNED TO ''PARALYSE'' MEDIATION. THE IRANIANS WERE CONFIDENT OF THEIR MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND DETERMINED TO IMPOSE A SHI'ITE REGIME ON IRAQ. THIS WOULD BE, IN CHATTI'S VIEW, A DISASTER FOR EVERYBODY, FOR THE ARABS, FOR EUROPE, FOR AMERICA. THERE WOULD BE AN ''AXIS'' OF SYRIA, IRAQ AND IRAN SPREAD RIGHT ACROSS THE MIDDLE EAST.

4. I ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS THEN NO HOPE. CHATTI SAID THERE WAS ONE FAINT CHINK OF LIGHT (BUT HE SOUNDED FAR FROM CONFIDENT): SADDAM HAD SAID HE THOUGHT HE COULD REPEL AN IRANIAN ATTACK AND MAYBE EVEN DESTROY THE IRANIAN ARMY. IF IRAQ COULD RESIST FOR 3 OR 6 MONTHS, CHATTI THOUGHT THE IRANIANS WOULD ACCEPT THE ICO'S PROPOSALS WHICH HE WAS HOPING TO IMPROVE IN THE FOLLOWING WAY.

5. HE HAD SUGGESTED TO PRINCE SAUD THAT THE ''''SOLIDARITY FUND'' SHOULD BE CALLED ''AID'' TO BEGIN WITH SEMI COLON BUT IT MIGHT BE AGREED THAT IT COULD BE RENAMED ''REPARATIONS'' IF THE TRIBUNAL DECIDED THAT IRAN WAS THE VICTIM OF AGGRESSION. MOREOVER THE SUM CONTEMPLATED MIGHT BE RAISED FROM DOLLARS 30 BILLION TO DOLLARS 50 BILLION. SAUD HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE AND CHATTI WAS HOPING TO GET FAHD'S APPROVAL LAST NIGHT, THOUGH OF COURSE THE AGREEMENT OF THE GULF STATES WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY.

6. BUT THESE PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE NO CHANCE IF IRAN PUSHED AHEAD AND OCCUPIED BAGHDAD. THE TROUBLE WAS THAT IRAN HAD RECEIVED HELP ON A LARGE SCALE FROM ISRAEL WITH AMERICAN APPROVAL: NOT ONLY ARMS BUT

PUSHED AHEAD AND OCCUPIED BASRAH. THE TROUBLE WAS THAT IRAN HAD RECEIVED HELP ON A LARGE SCALE FROM ISRAEL, WITH AMERICAN APPROVAL: NOT ONLY ARMS, BUT TECHNICAL TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE. NEVERTHELESS, WHEN I OBJECTED, CHATTI READILY AGREED THAT IRAQ WAS NOT SHORT OF ARMS: HER FAILURE WAS DUE TO POOR MORALE AND BAD LEADERSHIP. JORDAN WOULD HELP IRAQ, AND POSSIBLY EGYPT TOO SEMI COLON BUT HOW COULD THE EGYPTIAN ARMY GET THERE?

7. I ASKED WHETHER THE DEPARTURE OF SADDAM WOULD BUY OFF THE IRANIANS. CHATTIE SAID THAT A YEAR OF 6 MONTHS AGO IT MIGHT HAVE DONE SO. BUT NOW THE IRANIANS NOT ONLY WANTED SADDAM TO GO: THEY WANTED TO CHOOSE HIS SUCCESSOR. WAS SADDAM LIKELY TO BE OVERTHROWN FROM WITHIN IRAQ? CHATTI SAID WITH REFRESHING FRANKNESS THAT THOUGH SADDAM WAS NOT POPULAR WITH THE IRAQI PEOPLE, IN THE THIRD WORLD THE PEOPLE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THE ARMY WAS WHAT CNHNTED AND SADDAM SEEMED TO HAVE CONTROL OVER THE ARMY.

8. I ASKED WHETHER SAUDI AND GULF FINANCIAL AID WAS STILL GOING TO IRAQ. CHATTIE SAID OF COURSE. BUT FINANCE WOULD NOT SAVE THE SITUATION.

9. FINALLY I ASKED WHETHER THE SAUDIS AGREED WITH CHATTI'S ANALYSIS. CHATTI SAID THEY DID - COMPLETELY. I DID NOT THINK IT WISE TO ASK POINT BLANK WHETHER THE SAUDIS HAD WITHDRAWN THEIR SUPPORT FROM SADDAM (AS SUGGESTED IN YOUR TUR) SEMI COLON BUT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE FOREGOING TO SUGGEST THAT THEY HAVE. QUITE THE CONTRARY.

CRAIG

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IRAN/IRAQ

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Prime Minister
I have asked the F.C.O. to circulate a paper to OD saying what they and the MoD are doing about the Iran/Iraq situation.
A.J.C. 16/7

SECRET
FM WASHINGTON 152210Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2443 OF 15 JULY

MY TELNO 2433 AND TELECON RENWICK/MIERS: IRAN/IRAQ

1. I TOLD EAGLEBURGER THIS MORNING OF OUR INTENTION TO CONSULT URGENTLY WITH THE GULF STATES ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE THREAT FROM IRAN, OF THE MOVEMENT OF A FRIGATE AND FLEET AUXILIARY TOWARDS THE GULF OF OMAN, AND OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT TO BAHRAIN BY ANOTHER FRIGATE AT THE END OF THE MONTH (DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THAT TIME)

2. EAGLEBURGER WELCOMED THESE STEPS. THE AMERICANS AT PRESENT HAVE A CARRIER BATTLE GROUP IN THE ARABIAN SEA OFF OMAN AND FOUR SMALL NAVAL SHIPS IN THE GULF. THEY DO NOT AT PRESENT PLAN TO DEPLOY ANY FURTHER VESSELS TO THE GULF. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT WE SHOULD KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH AND PROPOSED TALKS BETWEEN OUR TWO NAVIES. HE HAD SUGGESTED SIMILAR TALKS WITH THE FRENCH WHO WERE CONSIDERING REINFORCING THEIR OWN TWO SHIPS NOW IN THE AREA. EAGLEBURGER CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS DID NOT INTEND TO DEPLOY THE RDF TO THE REGION.

3. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE EVIDENCE SO FAR AVAILABLE SUGGESTED THAT IRANIAN CLAIMS YESTERDAY HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED, THOUGH HE DISCO

3. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE EVIDENCE SO FAR AVAILABLE SUGGESTED THAT IRANIAN CLAIMS YESTERDAY HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED, THOUGH HE DISCOUNTED IRAQI CLAIMS TO HAVE THROWN BACK THE INVADERS. IN CONTRAST TO PREVIOUS IRANIAN OPERATIONS THEY WERE CLAIMING TO HAVE CAPTURED ONLY A VERY SMALL NUMBER OF PRISONERS. THE IRANIAN AIFORCE HAD BEEN ACTIVE AROUND BASRA AND THE IRAQIS HAD ATTACKED KHARG ISLAND, BUT NEITHER AIRFORCE WAS A SERIOUS FACTOR IN THIS WAR. VELIOTES THOUGHT THAT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON IRAQI WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT AND ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE IRAQI SHIA. HE THOUGHT THAT KHOMEINI MIGHT HAVE MADE A STRATEGIC ERROR IN CALLING FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE BA'ATH PARTY FROM POWER- THIS WOULD ENCOURAGE THE ARMED FORCES TO RALLY ROUND SADDAM HUSSAIN, AND THE SUNNI'S TO BURY THEIR RIVALRIES.

4. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE IRANIANS WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO INVADE KUWAIT, BUT WILL TRY TO CUT THE SUPPLY ROUTE FROM KUWAIT TO IRAQ. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE KUWAITIS ARE WORRIED ABOUT POSSIBLE SUBVERSION BY THE SHIA MINORITY AND PALESTINIANS IN KUWAIT, AND THAT THEY WILL BE VERY RELUCTANT TO DO ANYTHING TO UPSET THE IRANIANS. THE AMERICANS DO NOT EXPECT ANY REQUEST FROM THE KUWAITIS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE BUT THAT THE KUWAITIS WILL AS NECESSARY, SEEK TO DEAL WITH IRAN.

5. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE SAUDIS WERE CONCERNED AT KHOMEINI'S CLAIM TO ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP WHICH CHALLENGED THE BASIS OF LEGITIMACY OF THE SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY AND, SECONDLY, AT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBVERSION VIA THE GULF STATES AND THE SHIA COMMUNITY IN EASTERN SAUDI ARABIA. THE AMERICANS DID NOT EXPECT SAUDI REQUESTS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. BUT THE SAUDIS WERE KEEPING THE OPTION OF JOINT EXERCISES OPEN AND WOULD NO DOUBT SWALLOW THEIR PRINCIPLES TO ACCEPT THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN FORCES IF THEY JUDGED THAT NECESSARY. VELIOTES REMINDED ME THAT THE SAUDIS HAD CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED JORDANIAN MILITARY INVOVEMENT IN THE ARAB GULF STATES: THIS WAS A PITY AS THE JORDANIANS HAD THE BEST TRAINED FORCES IN A POSITION TO HELP.

6. VELIOTES ASKED WHETHER WE HAD HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT OMAN PLAYING A LARGER ROLE WITHIN THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL TO PROMOTE THE FORMATION OF A QUICK REACTION FORCE. GRATEFUL FOR ANY INFORMATION ON THIS.

7. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NO INDICATION OF ANY SOVIET MOVES OF ANY SORT RELATED

7. ~~IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NO INDICATION OF ANY SOVIET MOVES OF ANY SORT RELATED~~ TO THE IRANIAN INVASION OF IRAQ. VELIOTES THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD BENEFIT FROM INSTABILITY IN THE GULF. GREATER PROBLEMS FOR THE GULF STATES COULD LEAD THEM TO LOOK FOR REASSURANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION AS THE NEARER SUPER-POWER.

8. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION RAPHEL (DEPTUY DIRECTOR FOR P/M AFFAIRS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT) SAID THAT THE AMERICANS ENVISAGED THE CONTACTS ABOUT NAVAL MOVEMENTS AS BEING NEITHER AS FORMAL OR AS COMPLEX AS IN 1980: AND NOT AS A SUBSITUTE FOR BUT AS COMPLEMENTARY TO THESE EXCHANGES THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. THEY DO NOT SEE WHAT IS PROPOSED AS A JOINT PLANNING GROUP, BUT AS ENABLING THEM TO EXPLAIN US INTENTIONS AND TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US. SUCH CONTACTS COULD BE CONDUCTED EITHER THOUGH THE US NAVAL COMMANDER IN EUROPE IN LONDON: OR THROUGH THE NAVAL ATTACHE, ADMIRAL SYMONS, HERE. THE AMERICANS WOULD ALSO BE. IN TOUCH WITH THE AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS.

9. RAPHEL ADDED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THE SUGGESTION THAT A US TEAM SHOULD VISIT SAUDI ARABIA, WITHOUT PUBLICITY, TO DISCUSS CONTINGENCIES.
THE SAUDIS HAD GIVEN NO RESPONSE AS YET ON THE QUESTION OF A JOINT EXERCISE WITH US F15S AND, RAPHEL MADE CLEAR, NO ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN UNLESS THERE WAS A POSITIVE SAUDI RESPONSE

HENDERSON

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FROM KUWAIT 141015Z JULY 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 185 OF 14/7/82
INFO BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON AND CAIRO.

IRAN/IRAQ

1. ON THE S FACE, KUWAIT SEEMS TO BE REACTING CALMLY TO THE NEWS FROM IRAQ LAST NIGHT THAT IRAN WAS ATTACKING BASRA. WE WERE IN TOUCH WITH THE KUWAITI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE THIS MORNING. THEY SAID THEY HAD NO RECENT NEWS OF THE FIGHTING. LIKE US, THEY HAVE BEEN HAVING DIFFICULTY THIS MORNING WITH A RADIO BLACKOUT. THEY DID NOT SEEM PARTICULARLY WORRIED BY THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.

2. I HAD AN APPOINTMENT LATER THIS MORNING WITH SHAIKH SALIM, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, TO SAY FAREWELL. I FOUND HIM IN A VERY DEPRESSED MOOD. HE TOO HAD NO NEWS OF THE FIGHTING AND ASKED IF WE HAD ANY. I EXPLAINED I HAD NOT, BUT UNDERTOOK TO KEEP HIS PEOPLE INFORMED AS BEST WE COULD.

3. I ASKED HOW WORRIED HE WAS FOR KUWAIT. HE SAID ''VERY'': HE THOUGHT IRAN WOULD DEAL WITH IRAQ FIRST THEN TURN ON KUWAIT. HE THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE BY MEANS OF STEPPING UP POLITICAL PRESSURES AT FIRST, BUT IN THE END THEY WOULD USE FORCE. HE SEEMED TO THINK THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD EXPLOIT THE FACT THAT THE BORDER BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT WAS NOT SETTLED. THEY WOULD MEVE INTO KUWAITI TERRITORY ASVERTING THAT IT WAS IRAQI. THE KUWAITIS WOULD HAVE TO DEFEND WHAT THEY REGARDED AS KUWAIT.

4. I SAID THAT THIS STRUCK ME AS AN EXCESSIVELY GLOOMY SCENARIO. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN TOCCH AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPED. SALIM ASKED WHAT I THOUGHT THVPVMERICANS WOULD DO. I SAID I COULD NOT SAY: WE WOULD NATURALLY BE CONSULTING WITH THEM.

5. COMMENT: SALIM TENDS TO BLOW HOT AND COLD. I DO NOT REGARD HIS ALARMIST VIEWS AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE THINKING OF THE KUWAITI LEADERSHIP. SHAIKH NASSER'S ATTITUDE (MY TELNO 184) IS MORE TYPICAL.
CAMBRIDGE

IRAQ/IRAN

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IRAN/IRAQ

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 435 OF 14 JULY 82
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK,
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, AMMAN, JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN,
MUSCAT, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, ISLAMABAD,
ANKARA, ALGIERS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.

MIPT : IRAN / IRAQ WAR

1. IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS THE CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND THE IRANIAN DECISION TO ATTACK BUT IT LOOKS AS IF THE LEADERSHIP GAVE THE GO-AHEAD TO THE MILITARY AND MEDIA AROUND 7 OR 8 JULY. THEY WILL HAVE OBTAINED A NIHIL OBSTAT FROM KHOMEINI WHO HAS NOW ISSUED A MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE AND ARMED FORCES OF IRAQ TO RAIS UP AND OVERTHROW THE SADDAM REGIME.

2. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE IRANIANS HAVE SET THEMSELVES ANY CLEAR OBJECTIVES AND WHETHER THESE CAN BE REALISED, BUT I HAVE A FEELING THIS ADVENTURE COULD BE THE REGIME'S BIGGEST MISTAKE SO FAR. THEIR EXTREME SUPPORTERS MAY BE PREPARED TO DO WHATEVER THEY ARE TOLD IN THE NAME OF ISLAM BUT THE BROAD MASS OF POPULACE MAY BE MORE WEARY

~~OF ISLAM BUT THE BROAD MASS OF POPULACE MAY BE MORE WEARY~~ OF WAR THAN THEIR LEADERS UNDERSTAND. LIBERATING IRANIAN SOIL IS ONE THING BUT EMBARKING ON A MILITARY ADVENTURE WITH NO CLEAR GOAL IS ANOTHER. WE HAVE HEARD THAT SOME REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS HAVE ALREADY SLIPPED AWAY FROM THE FRONT TO GO HOME.

3. NO DOUBT FRUSTRATION OVER EVENTS IN THE LEBANON HAS STRENGTHENED THE EXTREMISTS HERE AND THE FAILURE OF IRANIAN DIPLOMATS TO HALT THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING IN BAGHDAD WILL HAVE WEAKENED ARGUMENTS THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAY HAVE TRIED TO DEPLOY ABOUT THE DANGER OF ALIENATING INTERNATIONAL OPINION. THE IRANIANS MAY FIND THEMSELVES ONCE AGAIN IN GRIM ISOLATION.

4. THE IRANIAN ECONOMY DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON OIL SALES BUT IS BOUND TO SUFFER FROM RENEWED DIVERSION OF RESOURCES TOWARDS WAR, FROM FURTHER DELAYS IN THE PROSPECT OF REPARATIONS FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND FROM THE GENERAL LOSS OF CONFIDENCE THAT WILL FOLLOW AMONG THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN BUSINESS COMMUNITY. WE SHALL BEAR IN MIND THE POSSIBLE NEED TO REVISE ADVICE FOR VISITING BUSINESSMEN.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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FM WASHINGTON 150100Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2433 OF 14 JULY

MY TELEGRAM NO 1314:
IRAN/IRAQ: US CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. THE IRANIAN ATTACK THIS MORNING HAS BEEN FOLLOWED BY A FLURRY OF ACTIVITY HERE.

2. ADMIRAL HOWE (DIRECTOR FOR POLITICO/MILITARY AFFAIRS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT) ASKED MINISTER TO CALL TO DISCUSS SOME OF THE IMPLICATIONS. HOWE SAID THAT AT PRESENT THE AMERICANS HAD NO MORE IDEA THAN ANYONE ELSE HOW FAR THE IRANIANS WERE INTENDING TO GO. THE US ASSESSMENT OAT PRESENT WAS THAT THEY CERTAINLY HAD AMPLE RESOURCES TO TAKE BASRA BUT IT WAS BY NO MEANS CLEAR WHAT THEY MIGHT DO THEN.

3. HOWE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN DOING SOME CONTINGENCY PLANNING OVER THE LAST MONTH OR SO FOR THIS EVENTUALITY. THEY STILL HAD A CARRIER BATTLE GROUP IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND WOULD BE KEEPING THIS WITHIN REACH. THEY HAD NO INTENTION AT PRESENT OF

3. HOWE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN DOING SOME CONTINGENCY PLANNING OVER THE LAST MONTH OR SO FOR THIS EVENTUALITY. THEY STILL HAD A CARRIER BATTLE GROUP IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND WOULD BE KEEPING THIS WITHIN REACH. THEY HAD NO INTENTION AT PRESENT OF MOVING EITHER OF THE TWO CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. BUT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OTHER THINGS THEY COULD DO TO TRY TO PROVIDE SOME REASSURANCE FOR THE GULF STATES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE AMERICANS WERE AT PRESENT DISCUSSING WITH THE OMANIS THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT NAVAL EXERCISE INVOLVING THE INDIAN OCEAN CARRIER BATTLE GROUP. THE AMERICANS WERE ALSO PLANNING TO EXPLORE VARIOUS KINDS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES SUCH AS PURSUING THE IDEA OF A CONTINGENCY PLANNING GROUP WITH THE SAUDIS. IN THE PAST, THE SAUDIS HAD NOT SHOWN MUCH INTEREST BUT THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THEY MIGHT NOW SHOW MORE. THE PENTAGON HAD A GROUP OF ABOUT HALF A DOZEN COLONELS READY TO GO TO JEDDA AT ANY MOMENT FOR SUCH TALKS IF THE SAUDIS WANTED THEM. IT WAS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THEY MIGHT SEND SOMEONE AT HIGHER LEVEL, SUCH AS GENERAL KINGSTON, IF THE SAUDIS SHOWED AN INTEREST.

4. A FURTHER POSSIBILITY THEY WERE CONSIDERING WAS A BILATERAL AIR DEFENCE EXERCISE WITH THE SAUDIS. THE AMERICANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEND OVER A SQUADRON OR SO OF F15S, WITH THE NECESSARY SUPPORT FACILITIES, FOR THIS PURPOSE. HOWE HINTED THAT THESE AIRCRAFT MIGHT STAY THERE FOR A WHILE, IF THE SAUDIS WISHED. HE RECALLED ALSO THE AMERICAN AWACS AIRCRAFT WHICH WERE STILL IN SAUDI ARABIA AND WOULD REMAIN THERE. (HOWE SEEMED TO THINK, ON THE BASIS OF A REPORT FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY IN LONDON THAT WE ARE PLANNING TO DO SOMETHING TO HELP THE KUWAITIS WITH AIR DEFENCE AND HE WARMLY WELCOMED THIS.)

5. HOWE CONTINUED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO STRENGTHEN THEIR NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE REGION BUT IT WAS NOT AT PRESENT CLEAR HOW THEY COULD DO THIS. THINKING ALOUD, HOWE WONDERED WHETHER THE UK MIGHT BE IN A POSITION TO MOVE A SHIP INTO THE AREA, FOR INSTANCE FROM THE KENYA COAST WHERE HE BELIEVED WE HAD SOMETHING. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WAS NOT A FORMAL SUGGESTION BUT AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE SORT OF THING THAT MIGHT BE WORTH DISCUSSING. WE HAD HAD USEFUL DISCUSSIONS OF THIS KIND IN 1980 AND SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS COULD BE USEFUL AGAIN NOW. THE THREAT WAS DIFFERENT, BUT THE PRINCIPLES WERE THE SAME. BUT HOWE MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WERE NO PLANS AT PRESENT TO ACTIVATE THE R.D.F.

6. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE AMERICANS HAVE YET REACHED ANY FIRM DECISIONS ON DEPLOYMENTS IN THE MEETINGS HELD THIS AFTERNOON IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE PENTAGON. THE SAUDIS HAVE BEEN

6. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE AMERICANS HAVE YET REACHED ANY FIRM DECISIONS ON DEPLOYMENTS IN THE MEETINGS HELD THIS AFTERNOON IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE PENTAGON. THE SAUDIS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSING CONCERN TO THEM ABOUT THEIR AIR DEFENCE: IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE SAUDIS WILL WISH TO HAVE ANY VISIBLE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA IN THIS PERIOD. US INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE DESPATCH OF A SQUADRON OF F15S WILL THEREFORE DEPEND ON WHETHER ANY REQUEST FROM THE SAUDIS IS FORTHCOMING. IT IS LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE AMERICANS WILL TAKE SOME ACTION TO STRENGTHEN THEIR NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. TWINAM (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT) SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CONSIDERING SOME REINFORCEMENT OF THEIR NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE ARABIAN SEA (BUT NOT TO THE GULF ITSELF), PROBABLY FROM UNITS ELSEWHERE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN).

7. THOMAS MADE CLEAR TO ADMIRAL HOWE THAT HE COULD NOT SAY WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WE MIGHT THINK IT RIGHT TO DO IN THAT REGARD, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF OUR COMMITMENTS ELSEWHERE. BUT WE WELCOMED THE KIND OF CONSULTATION THE AMERICANS WERE SEEKING. WE SHOULD MAKE AN EARLY RESPONSE TO HIS APPROACH.

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 141700Z JUL 82
TO FLASH BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 532 OF 14 JULY
INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT
YOUR TEL 453: BRITISH COMMUNITY IN THE BASRA REGION

1. LATEST JIC ASSESSMENT WILL BE TELEGRAPHED TO YOU LATER THIS AFTERNOON.

2. IRANIAN OBJECTIVES MAY BE TO REACH THE EAST BANK OF THE SHATT AL ARAB NORTH OF BASRA, THUS CUTTING OFF IRAQI TROOPS IN THE SOUTH. THE IRANIANS COULD THEN EFFECT FURTHER CROSSINGS TO CUT OFF THE MAIN BASRA/BAGHDAD HIGHWAY.

3. YOU WILL WISH TO TAKE THIS ANALYSIS INTO ACCOUNT IN REACHING A DECISION WHETHER TO ADVISE EVACUATION.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 122319Z JULY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1121 OF 12 JULY
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN.

MIPT: IRAN/IRAQ.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 514 (1982) ADOPTED ON 12 JULY.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
HAVING CONSIDERED AGAIN THE QUESTION ENTITLED ''THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ'',
DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROLONGATION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, RESULTING IN HEAVY LOSSES OF HUMAN LIVES AND CONSIDERABLE MATERIAL DAMAGE, AND ENDANGERING PEACE AND SECURITY,
RECALLING THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION REQUIRES STRICT ADHERENCE TO THESE PROVISIONS,
RECALLING THAT BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 24 OF THE CHARTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,
RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 479 (1980), ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY ON 28 SEPTEMBER 1980, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENT OF ITS PRESIDENT OF 5 NOVEMBER 1980 (S/14244).
TAKING NOTE OF THE EFFORTS OF MEDIATION PURSUED NOTABLY BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND HIS REPRESENTATIVE, AS WELL AS BY THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE,
1. CALLS FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND AN IMMEDIATE END TO ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS,
2. CALLS FURTHER FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES.
3. DECIDES TO DISPATCH A TEAM OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO VERIFY, CONFIRM AND SUPERVISE THE CEASE-FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL, AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT TO THE COUNCIL A REPORT ON THE ARRANGEMENTS REQUIRED FOR THAT PURPOSE.

/4.

4. URGES THAT THE MEDIATION EFFORTS BE CONTINUED IN A CO-ORDINATED MANNER THROUGH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES OF ALL THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES,

5. REQUESTS ALL OTHER STATES TO ABSTAIN FROM ALL ACTIONS WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE CONFLICT AND TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION.

6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN THREE MONTHS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

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FM JEDDA 120655Z JUL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 291 OF 12 JUL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, BIS TEHRAN

IRAN/IRAQ

1. I WAS APPROACHED YESTERDAY BY THE ACTING HEAD OF WESTERN DEPARTMENT IN THE MFA ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEPUTY MINISTER. FAGI SAID THE SAUDIS HAD INFORMATION THAT THE IRANIANS WERE PLANNING TO ATTACK ACROSS THE IRAQI BORDER AND HAD MASSED 80,000 OR 100,000 TROOPS. THE ATTACK WAS EXPECTED TO COME WITHIN A FEW DAYS AND THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT WAS ANXIOUS TO TRY ALL WAYS OF PREVENTING IT. THEY HAD IN MIND ACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND URGED HMG TO LEND THEIR SUPPORT AND HELP TO ORGANISE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON IRAN.

2. I ASKED WHETHER THE SAUDIS HAD ANY PARTICULAR ACTION IN MIND. FAGI SAID HE IMAGINED A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WAS THE BEST WAY FORWARD. I POINTED OUT THAT THE IRANIANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH SUCH A RESOLUTION. FAGI HAD NOTHING TO ADD.

3. FAGI IS ONE OF THE FEW OFFICIALS STILL IN JEDDA AND HAD SUMMONED ME AT 5 MINUTES' NOTICE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE AFTERNOON. I PERSUADED HIM TO GIVE ME HIS MESSAGE OVER THE TELEPHONE AND MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SAUDIS, AS USUAL, HAVE NO CONCRETE IDEAS AND ARE CLUTCHING AT STRAWS WITHOUT ANY GREAT HOPE OF SUCCESS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 424 OF 12 JULY 82
INFO PRIORITY MODUK, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, MOSCOW,
UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO ROUTINE OTHER ME POSTS, STOCKHOLM, UKDEL NATO
INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS.

MY TELNO 418 AND JIC TELS: POSSIBLE IRANIAN INVASION.

1. I FEAR THAT THE IRANIANS MAY AFTER ALL HAVE DECIDED TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK INTO IRAQI TERRITORY. FOR THE LAST FEW DAYS THERE HAS BEEN A STRONG PRESS BUILD-UP TO THIS EFFECT AND AN EVEN STRONGER CAMPAIGN ON THE TELEVISION AND RADIO, APPARENTLY DESIGNED TO CONDITION THE IRANIAN PUBLIC TO THE IDEA OF GOING INTO IRAQ. THIS IS DONE BY SLANTED EDITORIALS, CAPTIONS ON PHOTOGRAPHS (''WITH RECENT OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS THE QUESTION IS NOW WHEN IRANIAN TROOPS (SEE ABOVE) WILL MARCH TO BAGHDAD''), AND INTERVIEWS WITH PRIMED REGIME SUPPORTERS, RATHER THAN THROUGH ANY AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT INTENTIONS. THERE ARE ALSO CONTINUED REPORTS OF IRAQI BOMBARDMENTS AND OVERFLIGHTS, AND POSSIBLE PREPARATIONS TO COUNTERATTACK.

2. AT THE BEST THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED MEDIA ARE DELIBER-

2. AT THE BEST THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED MEDIA ARE DELIBERATELY TRYING TO BRING THE PUBLIC NEAR TO THE BOIL ON THE IRAQ ISSUE. THERE IS TALK AROUND TOWN THAT THE DAY OF THE INVASION MAY EVEN BE TOMORROW, 13 JULY, ONE OF THE SHI'A HOLY DAYS, OR 16 JULY WHICH IS ''INTERNATIONAL JERUSALEM DAY''.

3. MOHAMMAD BAQER HAKIM, ONE OF THE IRAQI RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN IRAN, IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE IRANIAN MILITARY HAD THE RIGHT TO ENTER IRAQI TERRITORY TO DEFEND IRAN AND LIBERATE THE MOSLEM NATION OF IRAQ. THE ENTRY OF IRANIAN FORCES INTO IRAQ WOULD BE JUSTIFIED BY ISLAMIC AND HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES. PUBLICITY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO MODERATELY ATTENDED PARADES BY IRAQIS RESIDING IN TEHRAN, LED BY THEIR CLERGY. THE GROUND FORCES COMMANDER, SHIRAZI, IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT IRANIAN SOLDIERS WERE IMPATIENT TO INFLICT FINAL BLOWS ON THE IRAQI REGIME.

4. A CAREFUL READING OF STATEMENTS BY THE TOP LEADERSHIP REVEALS NO COMMITMENT TO CROSS THE FRONTIER. RAFSANJANI'S SPEECH AT TEHRAN FRIDAY PRAYERS ON 9 JULY DISCUSSED COMPENSATION RATHER THAN MILITARY ACTION. THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN, TAVAKOLI, SAID ONLY THAT SINCE IRAQ CONTINUED TO OCCUPY CERTAIN PIECES OF IRANIAN TERRITORY THE IRANIANS WOULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT THE ENEMY OFF. IN A PRESS INTERVIEW ON 11 JULY THE PRIME MINISTER SAID, ''WE THINK WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO TAKE ANY MEASURE DEEMED NECESSARY IN ORDER TO PROTECT OUR COUNTRY, CREATE REAL SECURITY AND TO OBTAIN REPARATION FOR WAR DAMAGES.'' HARDLY A CLARION CALL FOR ATTACK. MOUSSAVI CRITICISED ONCE AGAIN THE HOLDING OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING IN BAGHDAD. AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI, MEANWHILE, HAS DONE NO MORE THAN TO REPEAT THAT THE WAY TO JERUSALEM LIES THROUGH KERBALA. HE PLANS TO SEND EIGHT ISLAMIC DELEGATIONS TO 24 COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE TO SPREAD THE WORD ON JERUSALEM DAY.

5. WHEN I HAD A TOUR D'HORIZON A WEEK AGO WITH A CONTACT WELL PLACED WITH THE REGIME (AFROUZ), HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THE GOVERNMENT WOULD SEND TROOPS INTO IRAQ. THEY WANTED TO TOPPLE THE SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME, BUT THERE WERE MANY DISADVANTAGES IN SEEKING TO DO THIS BY A MILITARY OPERATION. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, AND WOULD LOSE THE IRANIANS INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. WHAT WAS REALLY IMPORTANT WAS FOR THEM TO SECURE

IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, AND WOULD LOSE THE IRANIANS INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. WHAT WAS REALLY IMPORTANT WAS FOR THEM TO SECURE REPARATIONS TO REBUILD THE ECONOMY. BUT THIS TALK WAS BEFORE THE RECENT INTENSIFIED PRESS BUILD-UP.

6. WHEN I CALLED ON THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR, SHORTLY TO BE TRANSFERRED TO PEKING, ON 8 JULY, HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN WARNING THE IRANIANS FOR SIX MONTHS NOT TO INVADE IRAQ. THEY HAD TOLD THEM FRANKLY THAT JUST AS THEY NOW SUPPORTED IRAN, THEY WOULD SIMILARLY SUPPORT IRAQ IF IRAN WERE TO BE THE AGGRESSOR. I SUGGESTED THAT THE SYRIAN AND LIBYAN GOVERNMENTS MIGHT ALSO BE OF THE SAME OPINION, BUT GHARAIEB DEMURRED. THESE COUNTRIES WERE BOTH EGGING THE IRANIANS ON, BECAUSE THEY WERE SO ANXIOUS TO TOPPLE SADDAM HUSSEIN. GHARAIEB SAID THAT HIS INFORMATION WAS THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN IRANIAN LEADERS, SUCH AS PRESIDENT KHAMENE'I HIMSELF AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO TOOK A LEGALISTIC VIEW ABOUT CROSSING THE FRONTIER AND WERE ADVISING CAUTION. ON THE OTHER SIDE WERE THE HOT-HEADED MILITARY AND RAFSANJANI, WHO SEEMED TO BE WINNING THE ARGUMENT. EVEN THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZI HAD TOLD HIM SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO AVOID SOME ADVANCE INTO IRAQI TERRITORY BECAUSE ONLY WITH THIS BARGAINING COUNTER COULD THE IRANIANS HOPE TO GET AN APPROPRIATE SUM FROM THE ARABS IN REPARATIONS. GHARAIEB WAS NOW DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE IRANIANS WOULD AFTER ALL ADOPT THE PRUDENT COURSE.

7. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THE EVIDENCE OF MILITARY DISPOSITIONS IN THE SOUTH (CF BAGHDAD TELNO U2G OF 8 JULY) APPEARS CONCLUSIVE : WHEREAS THE PRESS CAMPAIGN COULD BE AIMED TO DECEIVE IT LOOKS AS IF THIS BUILD-UP MEANS BUSINESS. I AM TOLD THAT THREE DAYS AGO THERE WAS A CALL-UP FOR FIVE NEW CATEGORIES (THOSE BORN IN THE YEARS 1959 TO 1963 INCLUSIVE), AND PENALTIES FOR EVADING THE DRAFT HAVE BEEN INCREASED.

8. IF THE IRANIANS DO MAKE A MOVE IT WILL PRESUMABLY BE JUSTIFIED OUTWARDLY AS ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT IRAQI SHELLING OF IRANIAN CIVILIANS, AND THEREFORE MAY ONLY INVOLVE OCCUPYING A SLICE OF TERRITORY CONTIGUOUS TO THE FRONTIER. BUT WE KNOW FROM ISRAEL'S POLICY IN THE LEBANON WHERE THIS THEORY CAN LEAD. THE REAL REASON WILL BE THE FEELING THAT IN A SITUATION OF STALEMATE THE IRANIAN POSITION WILL BE ERODED. THE ARMY WILL LOSE MOMENTUM AND MOTIVATION AND THERE WILL BE NO REAL INCENTIVE FOR THE ARABS TO COME UP WITH THE FINANCIAL COMPENSATION THE IRANIANS NEED. THE IRANIANS WILL BE PREPARED TO IGNORE INTER-

LOSE MOMENTUM AND MOTIVATION AND THERE WILL BE NO REAL INCENTIVE FOR THE ARABS TO COME UP WITH THE FINANCIAL COMPENSATION THE IRANIANS NEED. THE IRANIANS WILL BE PREPARED TO IGNORE INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM, PARTICULARLY IF IT IS TRUE THAT THEY WILL HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE SYRIANS (NEEDING A DIVERSION FROM THE LEBANON?) AND LIBYANS. BUT THEY WILL BE AWARE THAT THERE MUST BE MANY UNKNOWN FACTORS SUCH AS THE ATTITUDE OF THE USSR AND WHETHER THE POPULATION OF IRAQ DO INDEED RESPOND IN THE WAY THAT THEY HOPE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKREP BRUSSELS.

CCN...PARA 2 LAST LINE.. WHICH IS ''INTERNATIONAL JERUSALEM DAY''

BARRINGTON

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IRAN/IRAQ

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Prime Minister
To see
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Private Secretary
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FM AMMAN 121130Z JUL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 303 OF 12 JUL
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD; PRIORITY DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, ~~?=?8~~
TEHRAN, WASHINGTON AND UKDEL NATO

BAGHDAD TELNO 433: IRAQ/IRAN

1. KING HUSSEIN'S BRIEF VISIT TO BAGHDAD ON 9 JULY WAS SUBSEQUENTLY MADE PUBLIC IN AMMAN ON 10 JULY IN THE FORM OF A TOTALLY ANODYNE COMMUNIQUE AND TV FILM OF THE KING TALKING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN.

2. THE US AMBASSADOR TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS VISIT WITH KING HUSSEIN ON 10 JULY. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT SADDAM HAD EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN TO HIM OVER IRAQ'S FINANCIAL POSITION. IRAQ HAD RECEIVED NO (NO) FINANCIAL HELP FROM SAUDI ARABIA ORQ THE GULF STATES SINCE APRIL. AS A RESULT, CIVIL DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTS HAD ALREADY BEEN SEVERLY CUT BACK, BUT THE IRAQIS WERE NOW BEGINNING TO FACE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OVER THE ACQUISITION OF ARMS AND OTHER MILITARY SUPPLIES. SADDAM HAD CLAIMED TO KING HUSSEIN THAT FUNDS HAD DRIED UP FOR 3 REASONS. FIRST, THE GULF STATES WERE BEGINNING TO HEDGE THEIR BETS SINCE THEY CALCULATED SADDAM'S POSITION WAS NOW NONE TOO SECURE. SECONDLY, THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN ADVISING THE GULF STATES TO EASE UP ON FINANCIAL HELP TO IRAQ (WHICH DICK VIETS FIRMLY DENIED WAS THE CASE).

TO

AMERICANS HAD BEEN ADVISING THE GULF STATES TO EASE UP ON FINANCIAL HELP TO IRAQ (WHICH DICK VIETS FIRMLY DENIED WAS THE CASE). THIRDLY, THE SAUDIS WERE ALSO CONTEMPLATING WHAT SUCCESSOR TO SADDAM MIGHT EMERGE. VIETS COMMENTED THAT THE SAUDIS DID NOT SEEM TO BE REVIEWING THE IRAQI SUCCESSION BUT HAD ONLY SO FAR COME UP WITH TARIQ AZIZ AS A POSSIBLE.

3. THE US AMBASSADOR ASKED KING HUSSEIN WHETHER HE WAS CONTEMPLATING OFFERING ANY FRESH FORM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ. KING HUSSEIN REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN THINKING FOR SOME WEEKS THAT JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO DO MORE FOR IRAQ AND CLAIMED HE HAD THEREFORE OFFERED SADDAM "ONE OR TWO BRIGAVES." SADDAM HAD REPLIED THAT HE WOULD HAVE WELCOMED SUCH AN OFFER FROM JORDAN SOME MONTHS AGO BUT NOW THAT IRAQ WAS BACK ON HER OWN TERRITORY HE DID NOT (NOT) NEED ANY SUCH HELP FROM JORDAN SEMICLN IRAQ COULD COPE ON HER OWN WITH ANY NEW OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING WITH IRAN.

4. THE JORDANIAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (WHO DID NOT ACCOMPANY KING HUSSEIN TO BAGHDAD AND HAS NOT YET DISCUSSED THE VISIT WITH HIM PERSONALLY) TOLD A MEMBER OF MY STAFF THIS MORNING THAT IT WAS NEVERTHELESS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT SADDAM WAS EXPECTING AN IRANIAN INVASION IN THE SOUTH AND WAS REASONABLY CONFIDENT BOTH OF THE MORALE OF IRAQI FORCES AND OF THEIR ABILITY TO WITHSTAND A MAJOR IRANIAN ASSAULT.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1122 DATED 12 JULY 82
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INFO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, JEDDA, ANKARA, TEHRAN
INFO PRIORITY OTHER GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, CAIRO,
DAMASCUS, ALGIERS, EEC POSTS
INFO SAVING KHARTOUM

MY TWO IPTS: IRAN/IRAQ

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION OF VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 12 JULY:

MR PRESIDENT

MY DELEGATION HAS VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED. WE DID SO BECAUSE WE SHARE THE CONCERN THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE ACTION IN THE GRAVE AND THREATENING SITUATION WHICH NOW EXISTS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. THAT CONFLICT HAS ALREADY LASTED TOO LONG, COST TOO MANY LIVES AND CAUSED TOO MUCH MATERIAL DAMAGE. WE EARNESTLY ENTREAT ALL THOSE CONCERNED TO IMPELEMENT THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED, AS WELL AS RESOLUTION NUMBER 479 OF 1980, IN ORDER TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AN END AND BRING ABOUT A RETURN TO THE PATHS OF PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION.

AT THE SAME TIME, MR PRESDENT, MY DELEGATION, WHILE SUPPORTING THIS RESOLUTION, DOES HAVE SOME DOUBTS ABOUT ITS LIKELY EFFICACY AT THE PRESENT TIME. WE BELIEVE THAT AN IMPORTANT PREREQUISITE FOR EFFECTIVE PEACEMAKING BY THE COUNCIL IS THAT ITS PROPOSALS SHOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF ALL THE PARTIES TO A DISPUTE. THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE IN THE PRESENT CASE THAT ONE OF THE PARTIES WILL BE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED. MY DELEGATION APPLAUDS THE EFFORTS YOU HAVE MADE, MR PRESIDENT, TO PERSUADE THAT PARTY TO ACCEPT THE NEED TO COOPERATE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT IS A MATTER OF REGRET TO MY DELEGATION THAT, IN SPITE OF THE EFFORTS YOU HAVE MADE, THAT COOPERATION IS NOT YET FORTHCOMING. FOR WITHOUT SUCH COOPERATION, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE.

HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE WRONG TO DESPAIR. AS IS RECOGNISED IN THE RESOLUTION WE HAVE JUST ADOPTED, THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HAVE ALREADY BEEN PLAYING AN IMPORTANT PART IN EFFORTS TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE. MY DELEGATION IS SURE THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO AND WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN THE COOPERATION OF BOTH PARTIES SO THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITIONS OF BOTH PARTIES AND, OF COURSE, THE REQUIREMENTS

/OF

OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. WE HOPE IN PARTICULAR THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL CONSIDER URGENTLY THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING A REPRESENTATIVE TO TEHRAN AND TO BAGHDAD, SO THAT HE CAN REPORT TO THE COUNCIL VERY SOON ABOUT WHAT FURTHER ACTION IT MIGHT TAKE.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 437 OF 11/07/82
INFO PRIORITY: BIS TEHRAN, KUWAIT: MODUK (DS4) : WASHINGTON:
AMMAN: DAMASCUS: MOSCOW: UKMIS NEW YORK.
AND ROUTINE: OTHER MED POSTS: STOCKHOLM: UKREP BRUSSELS: UKDEL NATO.

SIC

TEHRAN TEL NO 418 AND MY TEL NO 433 (NOT TO ALL):

IRAN/IRAQ WAR.

1. RECENT IRANIAN STATEMENTS DO NOT (NOT) LOOK LIKE SABRE-RATTLING HERE. THEY HAVE THOROUGHLY ALARMED THE IRAQIS. INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES, INCLUDING MY DA'S TEL NO 080840Z OF 8 JULY TO MOD (NOT TO ALL) INDICATES THAT THE IRANIANS ARE SERIOUSLY PREPARING TO INVADE.

2. I HAVE ACCORDINGLY SENT TELEXES VIA THE LUMMUS THYSSENAEAD OFFICE HERE TO ALERT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AT BASRA AND CLEVELAND BRIDGE AT KHOR AL-ZUBAIR AND, THROUGH THE LOCAL WARDEN SYSTEM,

2. I HAVE ACCORDINGLY SENT TELEXES VIA THE LUMMUS THYSSENAEAD OFFICE HERE TO ALERT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AT BASRA AND CLEVELAND BRIDGE AT KHOR AL-ZUBAIR AND, THROUGH THE LOCAL WARDEN SYSTEM, THE REST OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY. THERE IS NO (NO) NEED FOR MEN TO LEAVE THE BASRA AREA AT PRESENT BUT I HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT WIVES AND CHILDREN SHOULD DO SO.

3. WE HAVE ASKED FOR A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE SMALL BRITISH COMMUNITY OF ELEVEN WORKING FOR A SWISS COMPANY SCHULTZ AT THE AMARA PAPER MILL TO COME TO THE EMBASSY FOR A BRIEFING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. BAGHDAD IS TENSE AND ANXIOUS UNDER A SUPERFICIAL CALM. THERE IS A NOTABLE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ARMED GUARDS AT KEY POINTS. I DO NOT (NOT) INTEND TO BRIEF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN BAGHDAD AT PRESENT BUT WILL DO SO AT THE FIRST SIGN OF IRANIAN MOVES ACROSS ANY BORDER.

EGERTON
BT

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL INWARD TELEGRAM

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Iraq

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FM FCO 281655Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S PARTY)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 168 OF 28 JUNE

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE WAS RECEIVED FROM BIS TEHRAN TELEGRAM NO 381 OF 28 JUNE.

BEGINS

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON,
INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, PARIS, MOSCOW,
INFO SAVING GULF POSTS, UKDEL NATO, STOCKHOLM.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELS TO FCO NOS 1049 AND 1050 :

IRAN/IRAQ: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. I ASSUME WE WILL TRY NOT TO GET INVOLVED IN PRONOUNCING ON WHAT CONDITIONS ARE OR ARE NOT REASONABLE FOR ENDING THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR.

2. THE IRANIANS ARE NOW TELLING WESTERN INTERLOCUTORS THAT THEIR THREE ORIGINAL CONDITIONS ARE SURELY REASONABLE. WITHDRAWAL HAS, OF COURSE, BEEN ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE BY THE IRAQIS AND SO HAS, TO SOME EXTENT, THE IDEA OF A NEURTAL BODY WHICH MIGHT, AMONG OTHER THINGS, LOOK INTO THE CAUSES OF THE WAR, THOUGH I IMAGINE THE IRANIANS WILL BE UNLIKELY TO GER FROM ANY SUCH BODY THE UNEQUIVOCAL CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ AS THE AGGRESSOR THAT THEY WISH.

3. I AM NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS EVER, IN SO MANY WORDS, INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER REPARATIONS, THOUGH IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT SOME OF THE GULF STATES HAVE BEEN IMPLICITLY RECOGNISING THIS. CERTAINLY THE IRANIANS FEEL THAT THEY CAN LEGITIMATELY CLAIM DAMAGES FOR WHAT THEY HAVE SUFFERED. BY ALL ACCOUNTS KHORRAMSHAHR, QASR-E SHIRIN AND OTHER TOWN HAVE BEEN FLATTENED, LEAVING HARDLY ANY HABITABLE BUILDINGS, AND INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE HAVE SUFFERED BADLY IN KHUZISTAN. THE QUESTION IS, OF COURSE, WHAT SUM OF REPARATIONS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. THE ENORMOUS FIGURE OF DOLLARS 150 BILLION WAS CONJURED UP BY THE IRANIANS AS A ROUGH ESTIMATE OF DAMAGE SUFFERED AND THEY HAVE SO FAR BEEN STUCK WITH IT. BUT THEY SHOULD BE OPEN TO NEGOTIATIONS. A BELLIGERENT EDITORIAL HERE THE OTHER DAY SAID THAT ''IRAQ AND OR ITS PATRONS SHOULD BE WARNED TO PAY IN CASH IN A MATTER OF ONE OR TWO DAYS THE SUM WE DECIDE''. INSTALMENTS AND BACK-PAYMENTS WERE OF NO INTEREST AT ALL. BUT SUCH WRITERS DO NOT, OF COURSE, REALISE THE PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF SPENDING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN A SHORT TIME ON RECONSTRUCTION.

IMMEDIATE

PDBU 005729

INWARD TELEGRAM

Iraq

OO BRUSSELS

GRS 700

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 281655Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S PARTY)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 168 OF 28 JUNE

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
PART 2 ends:-

Baghdad tel 361 10/6/82

PART 3 begins:-

FCO tel 168 to Brussels, covering
Tehran tel 381 28/6/82

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Part 4

S 809

Confidential filing

Iraq / Iran Relations - Internal Sit

Iraq / Syria Relations

Threat to oil supplies from the Gulf

IRAQ

Pt 1 : April '80

Pt 4 : March '84.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
31.8.84 CLOSED.							

PREM 19/1284

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TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(84) 27th Meeting, item 2	19/07/1984
CC(84) 26th Meeting, item 2	12/07/1984
CC(84) 25th Meeting, item 2	05/07/1984
CC(84) 24th Meeting, item 2	28/06/1984
CC(84) 23rd Meeting, item 2	21/06/1984
CC(84) 22nd Meeting, item 3	14/06/1984
CC(84) 21st Meeting, item 2	07/06/1984
CC(84) 20th Meeting, item 2	24/05/1984
CC(84) 19th Meeting, item 2	17/05/1984
CC(84) 18th Meeting, item 2	10/05/1984
CC(84) 17th Meeting, item 2	03/05/1984
CC(84) 15th Meeting, item 2	12/04/1984
CC(84) 14th Meeting, item 2	05/04/1984
CC(84) 13th Meeting, item 2	29/03/1984
CC(84) 12th Meeting, item 2	22/03/1984
CC(84) 11th Meeting, item 2	15/03/1984
OD(EM)(84) 3rd Meeting, only item	13/03/1984
CC(84) 10th Meeting, item 2	13/03/1984
CC(84) 9th Meeting, item 3	08/03/1984
CC(84) 8th Meeting, item 2	01/03/1984

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray Date 26/6/2013

PREM Records Team

SUBJECT FILED ON:
JORDAN: Relations
Dec '79

(2)

FROM: THE RT HON. JULIAN AMERY M.P.

112 EATON SQUARE
SW1W 9AA

TEL: 01-235 1543
01-235 7409

Confidential

Prime Minister

You will want to read the letter but probably not the Annexes, though I have underlined the most interesting points. A reply is in hand. Ack 31/8

PMS

Dear Margaret,

31st August, 1984.

I came back last weekend from visits to Jordan (August 14 - 17 and 22-24) as the guest of King Hussein and Crown Prince Hassan (they share a guest house so I am never quite sure who is host) and to Iraq as the guest of President Saddam Hussein (August 17 - 22). Bill McLean came with me and it is largely owing to him that I can give a reasonably comprehensive account of our different talks.

Despite rumours about his health King Hussein seemed to be in excellent form. When I saw him, at the end of my second visit, he was just about to do some helicopter practice before flying down to Aqaba to celebrate Queen Noor's birthday.

I enclose a note of my main talk with the King which I think you should see. He told me he was coming to London in September so may well ask to see you.

The main points emerging from this talk seem to be the following:

1. The King is deeply disillusioned with the U.S. He respects Reagan but has little time for Schultz and , I gather from others, the same applies to Macfarlane.
I tried to suggest to him that things might be different after the Presidential elections. He was sceptical about this, knowing that the Democrats would probably be stronger in the Senate after the elections. He had hoped for a Peres victory in Israel which at least would have created some possibility of manoeuvre but sees little chance of much negotiation with any forseeable Israeli Government. His relations with Arafat and the Saudis appear to be at a low ebb. Syria is hostile; Egypt and Iraq his only friends.

2. The King considers that Iraq cannot now be defeated and that the most serious problem concerning us all will be the consequences inside Iran of Khomeini's failure to win the war. He considers it essential that the West should have a contingency plan so that it anarchy breaks out in Iran we should get in first ahead of the Soviets. He regards a General Azhari (now in London) as the best bet for this purpose but sees some force in the Iraqi view reported in the notes of my talks in Bagdad that we should work to squeeze out the hawks and encourage the doves within the present Islamic regime.

The President of Iraq's invitation was made at the suggestion of King Hussein. I enclose notes of my talks with the President and his Foreign Minister. You may not have time to read these in detail. The main points emerging from them seemed to be:

1. The two Iraqi leaders (and their subordinates in talks outside the meetings) went to unusual lengths to explain

   a) that Iraq had not started the war
   b) why their troops had not gained more success at the beginning of the fighting
   c) that they had no territorial claims whatever on Iran and were not concerned with the nature of the Iranian Government.

2. While confident of their ability to defend themselves they were nevertheless keen that peace should be reestablished within months if possible; otherwise there might be "unpleasant surprises". The President did not elaborate on these but evidently they are anxious to restore peace while their present military ascendancy lasts and before unforeseen developments in the Middle East or elsewhere distort the present situation.

3. The President and the Foreign Minister were both very critical of any European encouragement of the Iranian regime. They were particularly critical of Andreotti's Libyan initiative. Genscher's statements about his visit to Teheran

and our own decision to sell landing craft to Iran. They doubt whether the West could overthrow the Khomeini regime by conspiratorial tactics. Instead they want us to squeeze Teheran by all available economic and political pressures so as to encourage the doves within the regime who seem to want peace and discourage the hawks who don't. They would like us to make any economic or other deals with Teheran conditional on progress towards peace.

There may be some significance between some of the rather anti Soviet remarks made by the Foreign Minister and those of the President which are rather more balanced in favour of Iraq/ Soviet understanding. (I have side-lined both passages). Knowing th Baathist proclivity for committee meetings I suspect that a Committee was called after my meeting with the Foreign Minister and that the President was advised or decided to modify the Foreign Minister's line.

Two ommissions in the talks struck me as significant.

While King Hussein spoke very warmly of President Saddam Hussein, the President did not reciprocate though he had ample opportunity to do so, seeing that I brought him greetings from the King and said how strongly the King supported him. When I mentioned this to the King on my way back through Amman he dismissed it as "Baathist boorishness". I wonder.

The Iraqi President like the Syrian Vice President showed no interest in the Palestinian problem. King Hussein remains, of course, very concerned about it but even in Amman it seems to be, for the time being at least, on the backburner.

I also attach some general notes on our visit to Iraq. I do not expect that they add anything to what is already well-known at the FCO, though the story of our visit to the shrine at Najaf is curious. The Governor was clearly anxious to show that he had the Shiah well under control.

The evening before we left Jordan, Crown Prince Hassan had just had a very encouraging report of an oil strike in Jordan. It was as yet unconfirmed. By way of a corrective, however, he told me that a similar report had reached President Numeiri of the Sudan just as King Khalid was about to sign a large cheque in the Sudan's favour. Numeiri, alas over confident, told him not to bother about the cheque but to bring him a cup of tea instead (a reference to the fact that the Saudis mainly employ Sudanese servants)! Prince Hassan thought what fun it would be to be in a similar position though with better reasons!

I am copying this letter to Geoffrey Howe and to Michael Heseltine.

I am sorry not to come up with some constructive suggestion as to what we should be doing. A successful initiative to end the war would probably be something of a triumph but I can't yet see the key to open that particular door. I wonder if President Zia might provide it.

Yours ever,

Julian.

Julian Amery

The Rt.Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP

SECRET

Note of a talk over lunch at the Royal Palace, Amman with
H.M. King Hussein

Wednesday, 15th August, 1984

H.M. King Hussein bin Talal
General Zeid bin Shaker

The Rt.Hon. Julian Amery, M.P
Colonel Neil McLean

King Hussein began by recalling his cooperation with his two English guests at the time of the Yemen Civil War. He was glad they should be working together again.

Mr. Amery then gave the King an account of his talks with Vice President Rifat Assad in Geneva (reported in Mr. Amery's letter to Sir Geoffrey Howe of 9th August). On this the King commented as follows:

He believed that Rifat remained very close to his brother, the President. Rifat had had troubles with the Army at the time of the President's illness and had been sent to Geneva while the President tried to arrange matters. The King saw no alternative to Rifat as a successor to Hafiz Assad. He understood, too, that the Alawite High Committee had endorsed this succession.

The King commented that Rifat had long "played games" with the Americans and Israelis. He, the King, had supported, perhaps naively, the Syrian entry into Lebanon. The Syrians, including Rifat, had made a lot of money out of Lebanon.

He was well aware of Rifat's hostility to himself. Rifat, however, had recently sent a businessman to him who had assured him that Rifat wanted to renew good relations between them. He - the King - had had a friendly talk with Rifat on the telephone but nothing practical had come of it as yet.

The King regarded Rifat's description of Arafat as a balloon which Syria could inflate or deflate at will as significant. It suggested that the Syrians had more influence over Arafat than was sometimes believed.

The conversation then turned to the Reagan initiative over the West Bank. The King said that the Americans had sabotaged their own plan. They had failed to put pressure on the Israelis to allow moderate Arabs from the West Bank to attend the meeting of the Palestinian National Council. There might then have been a majority in the Council for the plan. They had also failed to put pressure on the Saudis to encourage Arafat to support the plan. On the contrary the Saudis had positively discouraged Arafat from accepting it. Underneath the surface calm, the whole Middle East was seething with discontent and religious fanaticism. There could be an eruption at any moment.

The King then launched into a diatribe against the United States. They had no policy in the Middle East except to follow the lead of Israel which had really become one of the States of the American Union. He respected and liked President Reagan but bitterly resented the Congress' rejection of some of his requests for missiles and other arms. He had been much criticised for a recent speech which had been considered anti-American, among others by the Saudis who had urged him to make pro American statements. Yet all he had done was to say that, since the Americans had refused to supply him with the arms he wanted he would try to get these on the open market including if necessary from Russia.

He also mentioned France and Britain as possible sources of supply. To this Mr. Amery said that he did not think there would be any difficulty from the British side.

The King then spoke of the total failure of American policy in the Lebanon. He had warned them at every stage that if they intervened at all it should be to ensure: "all foreigners out of the Lebanon including Israelis and Syrians".

The conversation then turned to the war between Iraq and Iran. The King said that the Iranians had undoubtedly provoked the Iraqis by their propaganda and guerilla raids; but it was the SAudis who had finally encouraged Iraq to attack Iran. The Saudis hoped that Iran and Iraq would destroy or weaken each other

to their own advantage. The Saudis had, of course, given Iraq considerable support at the beginning when Iraq was in danger. But lately this support had become half-hearted, like Saudi support for Jordan. He had learned recently that King Fahad waa dealing with Iran behind the back of Iraq. He had flown to Jeddah to confront King Fahad with this information and King Fahad had gone "white and yellow" in the face.

The King believed that all the Arab States should back Iraq. If they did so it would lead to greater trust and friendship between them and go a long way to solve the problems of the area. The war against Iran presented a great opportunity to promote Arab unity.

The King went on to praise Saddam Hussein for his success in making the war a national war of Arabs against Persians and avoiding a confrontation between Shias and Sunnis. Saddam Hussein had united the Arabs of Iraq and appeared to be making good progress in his negotiations with the Kurds.

Jordan had a small military mission with the Iraqi forces. He had not himself been invited to visit the Front (this was said a trifle resentfully). He was confident, however, that Iraq could not be defeated. Nevertheless he felt that it might prove difficult for Iraq to maintain a purely defensive position along such an extended front indefinitely. Unless there was peace in the reasonably near future the Iraqis might have to counter attack for reasons of morale. This might have unexpected consequences.

Turning to the situation in the Gulf the King said that he had offered to send a battalion and if necessary a brigade to support the Gulf Council but this couldonly be done if the Gulf States had a plan and a strategy for dealing with the threat of internal subversion. For the time being they seemed to have no plan nor did he think they were likely to devise one. In that case it would be impossible for Jordan to intervene at the last minute. A Jordan military mission, however, was going shortly to the Gulf States to discuss how Jordan could help if at all.

The Saudis he thought were in a difficult position. In the long run the regime could not survive without reforms; but could it reform without destroying itself? The whole area was very vulnerable to subversion. But it would be useless and counter productive to send in American troops.

Mr. Amery then raised the question of whether the Iranian failure to launch their much heralded offensive and defeat Iraq would lead to the fall of the Iranian regime. If so, what would be the consequences? The Soviets with their borders with Iran and their position in Afghanistan were well placed to exploit any disorder inside Iran.

The King said that this was, indeed, the main danger at the present time. He hoped Mr. Amery would discuss it with President Saddam Hussein when he went to Bagdad. He believed that the Iranian regime was already very shaky and that the horrors of fundamentalism were becoming increasingly unbearable. People now looked back on the rule of the Shah as "the good old days". Iran needed a monarchy. They had always had one. He feared, however, that the young Shah, whom he liked very much personally, might pick up some rather old-fashioned ideas about monarchy from King Hassan of Morocco. The young Shah should be encouraged to visit Jordan "to see how we do things here". He should take up King Juan CArlos' invitation to visit him in Spain.

Where the Iranian exiles were concerned, the King thought the best man was General Azhari who was now in London. He had kept apart fromthe other exiles and, in the King's judgement, had better contacts with the Iranian armed forces than anyone else outside. In any case it was essential that the West should have a plan of action ready in case of a collapse of the Iranian regime.

Looking back he was increasingly inclined to believe that the Iranian revolution had been deliberately engineered by certain elements in the U.S. They had mistakenly come to the conclusion that a fundamentalist regime would prove a better barrier to Soviet expansion than the Shah. They had also hoped that

fundamentalism in Iran would encourage dissension among the Moslems in the Soviet Union who, in a few years, would make up a large proportion of the Red Army. He could not see how Khomeini could have come from Najef to Paris and then in a few months returned to Teheran in triumph without support from a great power. There was nothing to suggest that the Russians had been involved in this. But many of the young men around Khomeini had lived in the US and had contacts in Democrat Party circles.

Returning to relations with Iraq, the King said that the proposed pipeline to Aqaba would cost $1 billion and take 1½ years to complete. The Iraqis wanted the US to obtain a guarantee from Israel that they would not attack the pipeline. Mr. Amery commented that as both Mr. Schultz and Mr. Weinberger had been directors of the Bechtel Company which was to build the pipeline they should be strongly placed to secure the necessary guarantee. The King commented wryly that he did not think much of Mr. Schultz.

King Hussein went on to say that he had worked hard to bring Egypt and Iraq together and they were now on very good terms. The King's own relations with President Saddam Hussein remained excellent, though the Iraqis had not paid Jordan's bills for nearly two years.

ASked how he saw the outlook in Israel, the King said he had done his best to make statements which would be helpful to Mr. Peres. He did not see, however, how any Israeli Government emerging fromthe present political impasse would be able to make meaningful concessions. As he saw things the Arab identity of the West Bank was in acute danger largely because of the weakness of the US which had supported the Likud Government on every occasion even at the UN Conference on Population in Mexico. Much of the blame too lay with Arafat wo was not really interested in the Arab people of the West Bank and Gaza. He was really only concerned with the wider Palestinian movement and the subsidies he could extract on its behalf.

At the end of the conversation the King said how glad he was that Mr. Amery and Colonel McLean were going to Bagdad. They

would travel there in his personal plane and he would speak personally to President Saddam Hussein that same evening.

He telephoned towards midnight to say that he had just spoken to the President who welcomed the visit and was looking forward to frank and full discussions.

CONFIDENTIAL

Note of a talk with President Saddam Hussein at
The President's Palace
Bagdad
Tuesday 21st August, 1984 10 - 11.30 a .m.

President Saddam Hussein of Iraq
Mr. Mazin El Jehawi (interpreter)
A Private Secretary

The Rt.Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.
Colonel N. McLean

(The President received Mr. Amery and Colonel McLean in a long audience chamber. He was in Army uniform with a revolver on his hip. A number of guards armed with submachine guns could be seen through a door at the far end of the room but out of earshot.)

The President began by asking his visitors for their impressions of the Front Line visited the day before.

Colonel McLean said that he could only speak for the relatively short sector of the Front which they had visited. But had he been an Iranian officer he would not have liked to attack across the Lake protecting the Iraqi Front line at Majnoon. The country was dry for the time being but he understood that it became a marsh after November. He had been favourably impressed by the reasonably comfortable conditions in which the troops were accommodated and by the quality of the unit commanders he had met.

The President said that since Iraq withdrew its troops from Mohamarah (Khoramshah) in 1982 he had felt safe from any serious Iranian penetration. Iraq was a developing country and though more advanced than many others was still a member of the Third World. An advanced nation, he said, could send its professional forces forward or withdraw them as policy demanded. But this was something Iraqi soldiers could not understand. If it had been the Iraqi aim to liberate Arabistan, the Iraqi troops would have had more heart in the attack. But this had never been the aim; and it was only when the army understood that the objective was "to defend our land" that they really put their hearts into it.

The Iranians had not understood this and had interpreted the Iraqi withdrawal from Mohammarah as a sign of weakness portending Iraq's defeat. Their repeated failures to penetrate the Iraqi lines, moreover, had coincided with increasing problems at home. They were, thus, in a suicidal mood when they launched their offensive in February 1984. Their troops came "like locusts and were destroyed in the same way as a farmer destroys locusts, by digging ditches and burning them as they advanced". He had seen the massacre for himself and would send us tapes to show what happened.

It was becoming increasingly clear that the Iranians could not achieve their original aim of toppling the Iraqi regime by military or other means. After 4 years of war Iraq was a united nation under a popular Government. The Army had been reorganised and was convinced it was fighting a just war. The country's economy was sound and would become stronger with the new pipelines to Aqaba, to Yenbo and Iskanderun. There were still hitches over securing an Israeli guarantee not to attack the Aqaba pipeline but he hoped these would soon be resolved.

Turning to the mines in the Red Sea, the President said that he had no firm evidence as to who had laid them but this must have been an irresponsible state in the area. This could only be Iran and/or Libya. The object of the mining was presumably to increase instability in the area and to threaten Iraq's back doors— namely Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Amery raised the question whether the failure of Iran to win the war would be tantamount to a defeat for the regime. If so what steps should be taken to fill the vacuum that might be created by a collapse of the Khomeini Government? The President said that before replying he would like to put the whole war situation into perspective.

It was not Iraq that had started the war on September 22nd 1980. Long before that Iran had been pursuing aggressive subversion against Iraq. Two ministers had been assassinated. Bombs had been exploded. Radio broadcasts had openly called on

the Iraqi people to overthrow their Government and "liberate the country". The Iranians had shelled oil installations at Basra and interferred with shipping in the Shatt El Arab. They had even overrun various frontier posts.

On 11th September, the Iraqi army had driven the Iranians out of Iraqi territory, and he had sent letters to the Iranian Government to say that all these were acts of war against Iraq. The first two letters were not answered. The third one contained only abuse and was followed by the massing of Iranian troops on the border, the closing of Iranian air space to Iraq, and attacks on 4 ships at Basra as well as the bombing of Iraqi troops inside Iraq.

At this point the President recalled that in the spring of 1979 the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud bin Faisal had called on him in his village where he was resting. Prince Saud had said that although he had sent a letter of congratulations to Khomeini, King Fahad was deeply concerned with the danger which the Khomeini regime represented to the area. He implied that the Saudis had urged him to act against Iran but claimed that he had replied that his only wish was to coexist peacefully with Iran whatever its regime. This was still his opinion and his only wish was to end the war with Iran and to be good neighbours with her, whatever her government.

Iran, he said, had been much weakened since the departure of the Shah. Of course he was apprehensive about the future of Iran. It was in Iraq's interest, and that of the world as a whole, that the war should be brought to an end as soon as possible. Iran must not be given any chance to recover its strength. If it was sufficiently squeezed, moderate elements within the regime would grow stronger and work for peace. But if the war dragged on there could still be unpleasant "surprises" whether in the Gulf or in the international context generally.

If the Soviet Union could build up a friendship with Iran as well as Iraq this would contribute to ending the war. What would be intolerable would be for the superpowers to try and play off

Iraq against Iran or vice versa as part of their own powerplay.

When Mr. Amery asked what chances there were of bringing the Iranian leadership to the negotiating table, the President replied that he did not think negotiations with the present regime were impossible. "Clergymen" he said "are so thirsty for power that they can become more flexible and pragmatic than we politicians". The Iranian regime, after all, had shown considerable flexibility over the release of the American hostages once they had extracted as much advantage from them as they could.

He believed that Iran could be brought to make peace step by step. But Europe had not helped in this. The European countries had payed Iran in cash for oil and the cash had been used for the purchase of arms. Foreign Minister Genscher's visit to Teheran had been a disaster. It had given the Iranian press and media an opportunity to tell their people that they still had friends abroad. He could not understand the proposed sale of British landing craft to Iran. It was ridiculous to think that the Iranians would abide by their commitment not to use them for military purposes. INdeed it was difficult to see what other purpose they could be used for.

He went on to argue that Western policy should be so to squeeze the Iranian regime that the arguments of the moderate elements within it would be strengthened and those of the extremists undermined. The West should not trade or deal with Iran until it was willing to call a truce in the war.

Mr. Amery said that the West would surely have to maintain contact with Teheran if it were to have any influence there. This indeed had veen the view of President Zia Al Haq a very realistic statesman. President Saddam Hussein agreed that it was necessary to maintain contact. Europe need not isolate Iran but should make trade and other positive dealings conditional on progress towards ending the war.

Asked about the importance of the different exiled Iranian groups the President replied that no one group could assert itself successfully but that they could gradually play their parts as the situation changed in favour of the moderate elements within the Teheran regime.

There was clearly a good deal of dissent in Teheran. A regime did not dismiss its Defence Minister in time of war unless there was serious disagreement about the conduct of the war. He could not claim certain information about the exact causes of disagreement, but there was reason to believe that the Iranian military were strongly opposed to launching a major offensive in the absence of adequate air support.

At the end of the conversation Mr. Amery raised the question of the two British prisoners in Iraq - Mr. Donald Hagger and Mr. John Smith and handed the interpreter a note on this drafted by the F.C.O. This was translated to the President who replied that if he were to answer in writing he would use exactly the same words merely substituting the name of an Iraqi prisoner for that of the two British prisoners!

Before leaving Mr. Amery asked if there would be any objection to him and Colonel McLean visitng Najaf and Kerbela. The President replied that, on the contrary,they would be very welcome to visit the Shia strongholds. Indeed they were free to travel anywhere in Iraq that they wished. He hoped that this was only a first visit and that Mr. Amery and Colonel McLean would come to Iraq again. They would be welcome at any time.

Addendum

President Saddam Hussein confirmed that his relations with Jordan and Egypt were excellent. Syria was busy digesting Lebanon. This was a relief to him as, no doubt, also to Israel.

CONFIDENTIAL

Note of a talk with Foreign Minister Tarik Aziz
at the Foreign Ministry, Bagdad

Saturday, 18th August, 1984 12 - 1.30 p.m.

Foreign Minister Tarik Aziz
H.E. Abdul Jaber Hedawi
(Director of the International
Dept. of the Foreign Ministry)
A Private Secretary

The Rt.Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.
Colonel N. McLean

The Foreign Minister (wearing the usual Baathist green uniform and with a pistol on his thigh) began by saying that the war between Iraq and Iran was inevitably influenced by the attitudes of the great powers. Iraq itself could do little to influence those attitudes but was strongly opposed to any confrontation between the great powers in the Middle East. Such confrontation could only lead to trouble for all the Middle Eastern countries.

He was particularly glad to welcome the President's British guests. Britain had long experience of the Middle East and could influence the United States.

Invited to open the discussion, Mr. Amery said that when the war had started many in the West had hoped that it would lead to the overthrow of the Khomeini regime. This hope had been disappointed but it looked as if there was no longer any danger of the defeat of Iraq. This would have been unacceptable to the West and could have had devastating consequences for the Gulf. There was now an apparent stalemate. What was to happen?

The Minister strongly denied that Iraq had gone to war to change things in Iran. Iraq's only aim had been to defend itself against Iranian provocation and subversion. Iraq was a small country and had always been on the defensive. Iran by contrast had always been a potential aggressor. It was Iran which had started the war against Iraq in 1980.

Of course the Iraqis would like to see a different regime in Iran but "there is a difference between wanting something and working for it as an aim of practical policy". Iraq had no expansionist aims and did not seek to influence events in Iran. It only wanted to defend its territorial integrity.

What would the consequences inside Iran be if, as now seemed likely, the Iranians failed to defeat Iraq? The Minister replied that the regime in Iran could not last. It would have to change. "You need effendis (officials) to run a country not Mullahs". The Shah had based his rule on the army and an educated elite but not on the people. He had tried to make Iran a Western type country but he had moved too fast. The people had become frustrated and had seen in Islam a traditional and comforting alternative. Khomeini, however had come to power more as the result of the Shah's mistakes than because of popular support for his particular fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Many of the problems which had brought down the Shah could be described as modern problems flowing from industrialisation. Khomeini was incapable of solving such problems. His policies indeed, made solutions more difficult and the war had aggravated the underlying difficulties which had faced the Shah.

Khomeini had linked the destiny of Islam and the fate of his regime with the outcome of the war. With the failure of the war would come the failure of the Khomeini regime.

Religious crusades, whether Christian or Moslem, were by definition internationalist and expansionist. Iraq by defending herself had saved the whole area from the fundamentalist crusade launched by Iran. It had not only saved the area but it had also defended the interests of the great powers.

It would now be very difficult for the Khomeini regime to make peace and to survive. The Iranians had believed that their counter attack against Iraq would succeed militarily. Even when it failed they had still thought they could defeat Iraq through a "war of attrition". But Iraq had reorganised its armed forces after the withdrawal from Mohammara (Khoramshah) and had adjusted its economy to the new situation. It planned to export oil through the new pipelines to Aqaba, Yenbo and Iskaderun.

Meanwhile the Iraqi airforce was cutting Iran's communications with its markets and suppliers. The Iranians would soon have to realise that they could not continue the war indefinitely. Then Teheran must seek peace.

There had been some hints of this already but these were not yet genuine. The Iraqis knew the Mullah mentality better than the West. They were neighbours and, after all, Khomeini had spent many years in Kerbela. The West should not be fooled into reviving Iran's power. The seeds of discontent still existed throughout the area, and the danger of fundamentalism had not passed. It would be very dangerous to show too much flexibility in dealing with the Mullahs or to take their kind words at face value.

The Minister then turned to the question of the mines in the Red Sea. He guessed that these had been laid by Iran or Libya or both. It had been ridiculous for Signor Andreotti to visit Libya and defend Libya in the European community. Here Mr. Amery said that Britain had had bitter experience of Libya and had also been critical of the Andreotti initiative.

Mr. Amery then raised the question of what would follow a collapse of the Khomeini regime. It was unfortunately the fact that the Soviet Union was much better placed by virtue of its position in Azerbaijan, Turkistan and Afghanistan to exploit disorders inside Iran. Iraq, of course, had good relations with the Soviet Union. But would it want to see a Sovietised "Iranistan"? If not what should be done to prevent this from happening.

The Minister replied that the collapse of the present regime in Iran would inevitably draw in the great powers and might lead to future conflicts. Iraq clearly did not wish to see a communist Iran or a Soviet presence on Iraq's eastern frontier. The longer the Khomeini regime lasted, however, the greater would be the chance of a Soviet takeover. This was because, given time, the Khomeini regime would destroy all the remaining independent sources of power inside Iran. In the end the Iranian people would react against the Mullahs. But they might turn to the Soviet

Soviet Union where, when all was said and done, alcohol and adultery were not forbidden. Therefore the sooner the Khomeini regime was ended the better.

It was quite true that in relation to Iran the Soviets enjoyed strong strategic and geographical advantages over the West. But there were other factors militating against Soviet influence. The Iranian people were Moslems and, to that extent, prejudiced against communism. Most Iranian industries had been Western orientated. Iran's main suppliers and markets were geared to the West. Its armed forces, too, had been equipped and trained in the West.

There was clear evidence of dissent inside the regime. A country at war does not dismiss its defence minister and other ministers unless there are major differences of opinion among its rulers. Such information as was available suggested that there were two main opposition elements within the country. There was a moderate group within the regime represented, to use shorthand terms, by Bazargan and Ayatollah Shariat Madhari. As Iran's failure to win the war became apparent their influence would grow. The other opposition movement was purely secular and represented the growing resentment among the people at the Fundamentalist rule.

Outside Iran there were several significant elements such as the young Shah, Dr. Ali Amini, Admiral Madani, the Mujahadeen Movement in Paris and other groups in London and elsewhere. It was conceivable that the young Shah might ride back to power on a white horse into Iran but unlikely. The best hope for a reasonable solution would be for the West to isolate the Khomeini regime as much as possible by economic and other pressures. The West should not try to overthrow the regime but should squeeze it so that the moderate elements within the regime would gain the ascendancy. They could then work for peace and bring an end to fanaticism.

If the WEst pursued this policy of working for a gradual transition the Soviets would have little choice but to support the

moderate Islamic and secular forces too. They had lost their best chance of dominating Iran by faiing to advance to power under the cover of the Mullahs' turbans. The Soviets might be interested in taking over the whole of Iran but would they really want to take Azerbaijan by itself? It would only add another Afghanistan to their problems.

Shortly after this meeting the Foreign Minister sent a message to say that the President was looking forward to a meeting with Mr. Amery and Colonel McLean but thought that it might be useful if they first visited Basra and the front line zone including the Majnoon sector.

Some impressions of Iraq

1. Military

Basra and the road linking Basra with Bagdad are plainly prime objectives for an Iranian offensive.

The Front Line positions which we visited seemed well defended. An artificial Lake some six miles square had been created at Majnoon by flooding. Half-submerged abandonned Iranian tankers can be seen sticking out of the water which must have been around 6 or 8 feet deep.

There was little visible evidence of defence in depth, though presumably there were forces in reserve on the West side of the road.

Units which appear to be composed of men drawn from many parts of the country spend about 3 weeks at the Front. They seem to be reasonably comfortable with electric fans and televisions. The calibre of unit commanders, some of whom had been on courses in Britain, impressed us favourably. The men seemed to be in good heart and enjoyed joking with us.

2. The Shiah Holy places

After our talk with the President, Colonel McLean and I visited Kerbela and Najaf. The Governor of Kerbela was away but the Deputy Governor took us to visit the mosques of Imam Hassan and his son Abbas. He took us through the gateway into the mosque courtyard, and introduced us to various Moslem dignatories. He lead us round the outside of the mosques but discouraged us from entering the shrines.

The Governor of Najaf, a burly Baathist thug with a revolver on his hip and had a substantial bodygyard, met us in Kerbela and took us to the Mosque where Imam Ali is buried. He spent a good deal of time explaining how much money President Saddam Hussein had spent on restoring the Holy places and, after a moment's hesitation, led us straight into the shrine which is the Holy of

Holies of the Shias. Imam Ali's sarcophagus is enclosed in a kind of silver cage topped with a silken canopy. The Governor ordered the canopy to be lifted so that we could see how President Saddam Hussein had had the whole top portion of the structure gilded. The rest of the cage would be gilded too. The throng of worshippers looked on curiously but there was no evidence of hostility.

President Saddam Hussein has apparently also ordered the demolition of a number of shops and booths that abutted on the precincts of the three mosques. He is also having a special museum of Islamic manuscripts constructed in an annex to the Mosque at Najaf.

King Hussein confirmed to us that the President has indeed spent lavishly on the Holy places in order to win the hearts and minds of the Shias.

The Governor laid on a lunch for us but excused himself from joining us. After lunch we visited Kufa where Imam Ali was assassinated. We were taken to what is alleged to have been Iman Ali's house and to the Great Mosque but, in the Governmor's absence, we were once again discouraged from entering the shrine built where the murder took place.

3. The Personality cult

On our travels to Basra, Najaf and Kerbela we were struck by the crude but vast coloured portraits of the President which have been put up at the entrances to almost every township or village and at other vantage points. These depict him sometimes in Arab clothes, sometimes in uniform, sometimes at prayer, sometimes smoking a cigar, sometimes with a child on his knee or comforting a widow. Similar though smaller reproductions are to be found in almost every public building and ~~area~~ even in ~~teh~~ the mosques.

4. Bagdad

Bagdad seems very normal for a country at war. There are a few checkpoints at the roads and some anti aircraft emplacements round industrial installations. Otherwise the military are very little in evidence. In the Governorate of Basra the military are much more in evidence and many of the buildings in Basra itself are heavily sandbagged, including the entrance to the Sheraton Hotel.

The British charge d'affaires, Mr. CAllan, said that the Embassy had very little social contact with Iraqis. I gained the impression from the Jordan chargé d'affaires that this applied to the Jordanian embassy also.

The international committee of the Baathist movement, headed by Michel Aflaq, live in Bagdad in some state. Though theoretically higher in the hierarchy than President Saddam Hussein, Aflaq seems to enjoy limited influence. The "Baathintern" receive contributions from Baathist movements all over the Arab world but their main finance is provided by the Iraqi Government.

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

23 August 1984

The Rt Hon Peter Walker MBE MP
Secretary of State for Energy
Thames House South
Millbank
LONDON SW1P 4QJ

Dear Secretary of State

OIL EMERGENCIES

I have seen your minute of 31 July to the Prime Minister and agree that this is a satisfactory outcome.

The chances of the new arrangements succeeding in a sub-crisis will, however, depend on whether Congress is persuaded that they will lead to other IEA countries bearing a fair share of the burden of stabilising markets. Only then is Congress likely to be prepared to authorise an early draw-down of the US stockpile. We should have a better idea of its views in a few months' time.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret O'Mara

NIGEL LAWSON

(approved by the Chancellor and signed in his absence)

315.26

23 AUG 1984

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EC2

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 August 1984

OIL EMERGENCIES

The Prime Minister has seen and noted your Secretary of State's minute of 31 July, in which he reported that agreement had been reached in the IEA on new arrangements for handling an oil "sub-crisis". Subject to any comment from colleagues, the Prime Minister is content.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD, and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

David Barclay

John Neilson Esq
Department of Energy

CONFIDENTIAL

OD 2

David,

Charles asked for reactions to Peter Walker's minute to the PM on 31.7.84. Please see notes below - 'no comments' from all concerned.

Sue
15/8/84

CONFIDENTIAL

cepcv hle 881
s/had

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 August 1984

MINES IN THE GULF OF SUEZ AND THE RED SEA

The Prime Minister was grateful for Lady Young's minute of 7 August on the above.

The Prime Minister agrees that we should make clear our willingness to help, and she hopes that this can be done at the earliest possible opportunity. She has further commented that she would see no objection to our responding to an American request rather than an Egyptian one on this occasion. She would be content with either approach.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry), Dinah Nichols (Department of Transport), Michael Reidy (Department of Energy) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

David Barclay

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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cc PE (2)

Prime Minister

CDP 31/7.

Prime Minister

OIL EMERGENCIES

See Pt 3 para

In my memorandum, OD(83)17, of 25 November 1983 on oil supplies from the Gulf I invited OD collegaues to endorse the conclusions of a note by officials circulated therewith. One of the main conclusions was that, if international agreement could be secured, the UK's interest in an oil supply emergency would be better served by activating the International Energy Agency (IEA) emergency allocation scheme than by relying on securing agreement to alternative "sub-crisis" measures, and that action in a temporary supply interruption should focus on mobilisation of stocks rather than measures to restrain demand. A major element in our thinking was that the activation of an existing well-developed scheme was likely to provide a more effective response to the emergency than trying at the time to reach a fresh agreement on altenative measures.

Over the last four months there have been further discussions, under the auspices of the IEA, on the framework for handling a sub-crisis. As a result of this, agreement has been reached in the IEA on new arrangements to facilitate a response to such a crisis.

The main emphasis of the agreement is on co-ordinated stockdraw by leading IEA Members. The arrangements suit our concerns better than the sub-crisis measures previosuly agreed and should prove effective in achieving our objectives in a sub-crisis.

One aspect is of particular benefit. Earlier this year, after an internal review of its policies for an oil emergency, the US Administration announced that it would draw down its 400 million barrel Strategic Petroleum Reserve in substantial quantities at an early stage in a crisis. In an emergency this development will be of great help in calming the oil market and containing price rises, and thus in achieving the objectives we agreed last November. The US has however been looking to its allies

to take "mutually supportive action": without this assurance the US Congress would be unlikely to support arrangements which might give the impression that the US was bearing the whole burden of oil emergency preparedness for the free world. The US Department of Energy has accepted the new IEA agreement as constituting the necessary response by its allies. We are thereby getting what is in effect a free (for this country) insurance policy, and we should therefore be seen to be fully committed to the new agreement.

With the new arrangements now available, the arguments in favour of activating the IEA emergency allocation scheme are now less strong than they were. Though we may of course still wish to argue for early activation of the scheme in a full-scale emergency, in any emergency of the type currently foreseeable our response is likely to be to facilitate the early drawdown of stocks by the leading industrialised countries.

I am copying this minute to members of OD Committee and Robert Armstrong.

Secretary of State for Energy
31 July 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

SLH

C. LCO CDL
FCO DTI
MNLT + below
LPO bcSPC
LPSO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 July, 1984

Dear Richard,

Deployment of Mine Countermeasures Force in the Mediterranean

The Defence Secretary minuted the Prime Minister on 26 July to recommend that the mine countermeasures force in the Mediterranean should be withdrawn to the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister agrees with this recommendation, subject to the views of other OD colleagues. But she wishes the Americans to be informed before a final decision is taken. In the event that they were to express strong opposition to the proposed withdrawal of the force, the Prime Minister would not exclude reviewing the decision.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries of members of OD and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

(8)

CC AC

[redacted] 10 3/9/4/2

Prime Minister
This seems good sense, though it would be friendly to warn the Americans before a final decision.
MTO ← before
Yes but condition a the views of colleagues?
Agree subject to this

PRIME MINISTER

DEPLOYMENT OF THE MINE COUNTERMEASURES FORCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

CDD 27/7

My minute to you of 24th May on the deployment of our mine countermeasures force to the Mediterranean proposed that we should review the future of the force during August. In fact, a decision is needed by 7th August since the support ship Oil Endeavour must leave Italy by that time if she is to be converted back to her normal configuration before her contract expires on 24th September. If the force is required to stay in the Mediterranean, the extra cost of continuing the deployment for a further 6 months would be some £1 million, largely consisting of charter charges for the support vessel.

2. The original decision to send an MCM force to the Mediterranean was of course taken in response to a direct American request. The deployment undoubtedly had a valuable political effect both on the United States and on our friends in the Gulf (in particular the Omanis who had previously expressed interest in such a deployment). But in the light of developments since then I am not convinced that the arguments in favour of a continued deployment are as strong as they were. Since the original decision was taken in March it has become clear that the principal threat to shipping in the Gulf comes from airborne attacks from both belligerents. The threat of mining, always low, appears to have receded further. The Iranians have made it clear that they would only consider mining the Straits of Hormuz if their oil exports from the Gulf were completely cut off and, despite attacks against shipping using the Kharg terminal, there seems to be little prospect of Iraq achieving this.

3. In these circumstances the maintenance of a British MCM force in the Mediterranean looks increasingly irrelevant from the viewpoint of military need. From a political standpoint also, I think that the circumstances have changed. In particular the mood in Washington has hardened against any suggestion of military intervention in the Gulf, no doubt not least in view of the forthcoming election. Also, the Omanis have shown no particular desire for the force to remain in close proximity, and have been satisfied with our recent gesture of support in the form of the temporary deployment of a maritime reconnaissance Nimrod. I would therefore judge that it is not necessary to retain the force for political reasons, and I recommend that it be withdrawn to the United Kingdom.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to colleagues on OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
26th July 1984

IRAQ
PT4

int Set

27 JUL 1994

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GRS 650
CONFIDENTIAL
FM TEHRAN
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 415 OF 25 July 84
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DI4), BAGHDAD, GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO.

10. DOWNING STREET.

MY LETTER OF 3 JUNE TO HASKELL : IRAN/IRAQ.

SUMMARY.

1. SIGNS OF A SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL CHANGE IN THINKING ON THE WAR. THE IRANIANS MAY HAVE REALISED THAT A MAJOR OFFENSIVE WOULD HAVE LITTLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS. THEY ARE SHOWING A MORE CONCILIATORY FACE TO THE GULF STATES. THEY WANT IRAQ TO RENOUNCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ATTACKS ON SHIPPING. BUT THEY ARE STICKING TO THEIR CONDITIONS FOR PEACE.

DETAIL.

2. SINCE MID-JUNE, THERE HAS BEEN MOUNTING EVIDENCE OF WHAT COULD BE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN IRANIAN TACTICAL THINKING ABOUT THE WAR. THE LONG-EXPECTED OFFENSIVE HAS NOT MATERIALISED, SUGGESTING STRONGLY THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE REALISED THAT IT WOULD HAVE LITTLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS. WE HAVE HEARD FROM A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT A DECISION WAS TAKEN BY THE SUPREME DEFENCE COUNCIL IN JUNE TO DELAY THE OFFENSIVE PENDING RE-EQUIPMENT WITH HEAVY WEAPONS. RAFSANJANI'S SPEECH OF 6 JULY, IN WHICH HE SAID THE OFFENSIVE COULD COME NEXT DAY, IN 3 MONTHS OR NEXT YEAR COULD BE INTERPRETED IN A NUMBER OF WAYS, BUT WILL HAVE PREPARED PDULIC OPINION FOR FURTHER DELAY. BY NEVERTHELESS MAINTAINING ITS FORCES ON THE FRONT IN BATTLE READINESS, IRAN SEES HERSELF AS CONTINUING TO PUT PRESSURE ON IRAQ. SHE STILL HAS THE OPTION OF MOUNTING AN OFFENSIVE, BUT OBSERVERS HERE (INCLUDING EC COLLEAGUES) TEND MORE AND MORE TO THE OPINION THAT SHE WILL NOT RISK A MAJOR ONE (CF. BAGHDAD'S SIGNAL 160955Z).

3. AT THE SAME TIME THE THREAT TO IRAN FROM THE IRAQI ATTACKS ON SHIPPING HAS FORCED IRAN TO RE-EVALUATE HER ATTITUDE TO REGIONAL STATES AND THE WIDER WORLD (MY TELNO 408 - NOT TO ALL). WHEREAS THE INITIAL IRANIAN RESPONSE TO THE ATTACKS AND SCR 552 WAS SABRE-RATTLING TOWARDS THE GULF STATES, THE CONTINUED IRAQI ~~ATTACKS~~ AND THE SAUDI SUCCESS IN SHOOTING DOWN AN IRS GC JUNE HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A CHANGE IN TACTICS. THIS IS EVIDENCED IN THE CONCILIATORY EXCHANGES WITH THE SAUDIS AND, IT SEEMS, ALSO THE UAE AND PERHAPS KUWAIT.

4. THE IRANIANS CURRENT AIM IS TO REDUCE TENSION IN THE AREA AND THE THREAT TO THEMSELVES. THEY ARE INSISTING, WITH THE SAME AIM, THAT IRAQ SHOULD RENOUNCE THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE AGAINST SHIPPING IN THE GULF. MEANWHILE THEY ARE DERIVING THE MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA BENEFIT FROM THE IRAQIS FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S APPEAL.

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5. BUT ON THE QUESTION OF PEACE IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE MUCH CHANGE IN THE IRANIAN ATTITUDE. THE IRANIAN LEADERS HAVEKPPEATED THEIR ORIGINAL CONDITIONS FOR ENDING THE WAR, AND HAVE REPEATED ALSO THE ADDED CONDITION THAT SADDAM MUST BE DEPOSED. THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO SIT DOWN WITH THE IRAQIS, AND THEY REACTED STRONGLY AGAINST SUGGESTIONS THAT THE OIC'S PEACE COMMITTEE MIGHT BE EMBARKING ON A NEW INITIATIVE. IT IS POSSIBLE TO SEE IN SOME OF THEIR STATEMENTS SOME FLEXIBILITY ON HOW THEIR CONDITIONS MIGHT BE INTERPRETED, BUT THEY ARE NOT PROVIDING AN EASY OPENING FOR EVEN INDIRECT TALKS.

6. IN SHORT, THE IRANIANS SEEM AT PRESENT TO WANT TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS: A DE-ESCALATION OF THE WAR BUT NO SERIOUS MOVE TOWARDS PEACE. ONE WONDERS IF IRAQ WILL YP PREPARED TO GIVE THEM THE BREATHING SPACE IN THE GULF WHICH THEY ARE SEEKING. IF THE IRANIAN AIM IS A PERIOD OF STALEMATE, NOT A SERIOUS MOVE TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, THE IRAQIS MAY NOT CONSIDER IT TO BE IN THEIR INTEREST TO COOPERATE. LQERE ARE DANGERS FOR THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP TOO IN AN OBVIOUS STALEMATE, SINCE THE ABSENCE OF A NEW OFFENSIVE IS VIRTUALLY A MORAL DEFEAT FOR THEM. IT WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE SURPRISING IF THE IRANIANS TRIED AT LEAST A LIMITED OPERATION EVENTUALLY, PARTICULARLY IF THE IRAQI ATTACKS ON SHIPPING CONTINUE.

7. IT WILL CONTINUE TO BE AGAINST THE IRANIAN INTEREST TO STIR THINGS UP IN THE GULF AREA, BUT THEY WILL BE UNDER PRESSURE TO RETALIATE AGAINST ANY FURTHER IRAQI ATTACKS. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THEREFORE, THE BEST HOPE FOR DE-ESCALATING THE WAR - WHICH IS THE UK'S FIRST PRIORITY - STILL LIES IN GETTING THE IRAQIS TO HALT, OR AT LEAST SCALE DOWN, THEIR ATTACKS ON SHIPPING - WHETHER THROUGH PRESSURE OR PERSUASION.

SIMPSON-ORLEBAR

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

IRAN/IRAQ

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
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DD TEHRAN 140600Z
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OO BAHRAIN
OO DOHA
OO DUBAI
OO KUWAIT
OO JEDDA
GRS 303

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DESK BY 140600Z
FROM FCO 131730Z JULY 84
TO IMMEDIATE BIS TEHRAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 230 OF 13 JULY
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, AMMAN, GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, PRIORITY
UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, HONG KONG (FOR PS/MR LUCE)
YOUR TELNO 388: 'BRITISH RENOWN'

1. BP SAY DAMAGE IS SLIGHT AND READILY REPAIRABLE. THE DUTCH SALVAGE COMPANY WHICH HAD CHARTERED THE 'BRITISH RENOWN' STILL WANT TO USE HER FOR LIGHTENING THE 'TIBURON 1'. LATTER IS NOW BEING TOWED TO THE VICINITY OF SIR ABU NU'AIR (25 12N, 54 13E), WHERE 'BRITISH RENOWN' WOULD ARRIVE ON THE EVENING OF 15 JULY. BP ALSO WISH TO CONTINUE WITH THE TASK, AND THE TANKER'S NEW CREW ARE WILLING.

2. HOWEVER, BP WOULD LIKE AS MUCH ASSURANCE AS POSSIBLE THAT THE ATTACK WILL NOT BE REPEATED. THEY ARE CONTACTING NIOC TO THIS EFFECT, BUT HAVE ASKED US TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS IN SUPPORT.

3. PLEASE THEREFORE SPEAK URGENTLY TO THE MFA, SAYING THAT WHILE WE STILL AWAIT A REPLY TO OUR PROTEST, WE SHOULD LIKE THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES TO BE AWARE THAT THE 'BRITISH RENOWN' IS INTENDING TO CONTINUE HER INTERRUPTED MISSION. WE HAVE ALREADY ASKED FOR A GENERAL ASSURANCE THAT THE ATTACK ON

/10 JULY

Iran/Iraq

with cp

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10 JULY WILL NOT BE REPEATED, BUT IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE IF THE 'BRITISH RENOWN' WERE ATTACKED AGAIN. WE ARE SPEAKING SIMILARLY TO THE IRANIAN EMBASSY HERE.

4. SHOULD THE IRANIANS REVERT TO THE QUESTION OF PROOF OF IRANIAN RESPONSIBILITY (PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR) YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE ABUNDANT EVIDENCE OF THIS, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING:

(A) THE ATTACK CAME IMMEDIATELY AFTER A RECONNAISANCE FLIGHT BY AN IRANIAN AIR FORCE MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT, EXACTLY LIKE ALL THE PREVIOUS IRANIAN ATTACKS. THIS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN COINCIDENTAL.

(B) ALL THE IRAQI AIR ATTACKS HAVE BEEN BY EXOCET MISSILE. WE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT ATTACK ON THE 'BRITISH RENOWN' WAS BY MAVERICK MISSILE WHICH IS IN SERVICE WITH THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE.

HOWE

IRAN/IRAQ

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IRAN/IRAQ

message already recorded

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DD 140600Z MUSCAT
GRS 851
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 140600Z JULY 84
FM FCO 121730Z JULY 84
IMMEDIATE MUSCAT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 229 OF 12 JULY
INFO MOD DS11

YOUR TELNO 226 OF 11 JULY :
PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO SULTAN QABOOS

1. FOLLOWING IS A REVISED TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.

'YOUR MAJESTY,

THANK YOU FOR LETTING ME HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF THE GULF WAR IN YOUR CONVERSATION WITH OUR AMBASSADOR ON 27 JUNE. HE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED ON A REQUEST FROM YOUR GOVERNMENT THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION THE UNITED KINGDOM SHOULD CONSIDER TEMPORARILY DEPLOYING AN AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AIRCRAFT TO OMAN. MY COLLEAGUES HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN ABLE TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES BOTH WITH GENERAL CREASEY AND WITH MR YOUSEF AL-ALAWI. I SHOULD LIKE, IF I MAY, TO COVER BOTH YOUR MESSAGES IN THIS REPLY.

IN THE MESSAGE PASSED TO BRITISH OFFICIALS BY MAJOR GENERAL ALI MAJID AL MA'AMARI, YOU ASKED US TO TRY TO PERSUADE SHAIKH ZAID NOT TO ACCEPT SAUDI ARABIA'S OFFER TO POSITION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. IN THE SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE PASSED TO THE AMBASSADOR BY GENERAL CREASEY YOU EXPRESSED CONCERN AT POSSIBLE AMERICAN PRESSURE ON SAUDI ARABIA TO INVOLVE OMAN MORE ACTIVELY IN PREPARING TO COUNTER IRANIAN INCURSIONS. YOU ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE TO OMAN'S ADVANTAGE TO DEMONSTRATE INDEPENDENCE OF AMERCIAN ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE AVAILABILITY IF NEEDED OF HELP FROM ELSEWHERE.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 July 1984

The Prime Minister's Message to Sultan Qaboos of Oman

Thank you for your letter of 11 July enclosing a revised text of the Prime Minister's message to Sultan Qaboos.

The Prime Minister agrees the additions made to the draft. She has, however, asked for some further changes to be made. I have thus deleted paragraph 2, which is really only padding; also the passage on the risk that deployment of British or other non-Arab forces could be regarded by the Iranians as a provocation, since this sits rather uneasily with our agreement to deploy a Nimrod.

I enclose a retyped version of the message which should now be despatched and delivered as soon as possible.

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject a matter of PS

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T123/84

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO SULTAN QABOOS OF OMAN

Your Majesty,

Thank you for letting me have your views on the present state of the Gulf War in your conversation with our Ambassador on 27 June. He has subsequently passed on a request from your Government that in the light of the present situation the United Kingdom should consider temporarily deploying an airborne early warning aircraft to Oman. My colleagues have subsequently been able to discuss these issues both with General Creasey and with Mr. Yousef al-Alawi. I should like, if I may, to cover both your messages in this reply.

In the message passed to British officials by Major General Ali Majid al Ma'amari, you asked us to try to persuade Shaikh Zaid not to accept Saudi Arabia's offer to position fighter aircraft in the United Arab Emirates. In the subsequent message passed to the Ambassador by General Creasey you expressed concern at possible American pressure on Saudi Arabia to involve Oman more actively in preparing to counter Iranian incursions. You also suggested that it would be to Oman's advantage to demonstrate independence of American assistance through the availability if needed of help from elsewhere.

I should like to assure you that I have studied both messages very carefully and sympathetically. My own conclusion is that stationing Saudi aircraft in the United Arab Emirates is more likely to diminish than to increase the threat of attack on the Emirates or on Oman. Since the shooting down of an Iranian F4 by the Royal Saudi Air Force on 5 June, Iranian aircraft appeared, at least for a while, to be more circumspect in their movements. Most of the attacks which have been made on ships since then, including one on a British ship (about which we have made a strong protest to the Iranians), took place further out in the Gulf than earlier Iranian attacks in an area where there was less chance of interception by the Saudis. To extend Saudi air cover to the Emirates would surely help to put the Iranians still more on the

/ defensive

defensive. We have also noted that the tone of Iranian public statements in recent weeks has been more restrained, and that they have declared themselves willing to stop all attacks on shipping provided that Iraq exercises similar restraint.

I can see that it could be argued that if the UAE's air defences were strengthened, the Iranians might decide to concentrate their attacks on Oman. But surely against this the Iranians would have to calculate that gratuitously to attack a country like Oman, which has been neutral in the conflict, would rouse opinion in the Gulf and in the world at large against them.

The Nimrod early warning aircraft to which you referred will not in fact enter service with the RAF for some considerable time. But in response to your request I want us to to everything we can to help at this time. We have therefore agreed with General Creasey to deploy to Oman next week one aircraft of the maritime reconnaissance version of the Nimrod for joint exercises lasting one week.

I found your views on the possible motivation of the various participants in this question profoundly interesting. We ourselves have had extensive contact with American officials, both diplomatic and military, and have gained the clear impression from them that United States policy is exactly as Vice-President Bush has described it to you. That it to say, they wish to ensure that the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have the means to defend themselves so that the need for any direct US involvement is reduced. They are also being careful to avoid any provocative action of their own in the Gulf area. Recent inaccurate press reports about the movements of American warships stationed at Bahrain have caused the Americans as much concern as they have caused us. While no country can ever answer unreservedly for the policies and attitudes of another, I do not believe our confidence in American motives and intentions is misplaced.

As regards the other members of the Gulf Security Council, I understand and respect your concern that closer military cooperation

/ with

with them should not lead to Omani involvement in the conflict. In general, however, I welcome progress by the members of the Council towards greater cooperation in their own defence, since this again should reduce the risk of external military involvement in the Gulf and hence the danger of escalation. I understand that the meeting of the GCC Foreign Ministers on 12/14 June made some useful progress towards cooperation between the air defence systems of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. In my view, the arguments in favour of greater cooperation at this difficult time, in the common interest, are very persuasive. I hope that my discussions on this subject with His Highness Shaikh Khalifa bin Zaid al-Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, when he visits London next week, will help to substantiate the point.

With my best wishes and greetings for the Eid.

Margaret Thatcher.

Prime Minister ③

TO BE CHECKED AGAINST DELIVERY

CDP 11/7.

STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT BY MR RICHARD LUCE, MP MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, WEDNESDAY 11 JULY 1984 ON:

'BRITISH RENOWN' - IRANIAN ATTACK

With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement on yesterday's attack on a British vessel in the Gulf, north-east of Bahrain.

At approximately 1200 GMT, a British owned and registered tanker, the 'British Renown' was attacked from the air and struck by two missiles, which I am glad to report caused little damage and no casualties among the crew, nearly all of whom were British subjects. The 'British Renown' is now anchored nine miles off Dubai, and a member of the staff of our Consulate General has gone on board to render any assistance that may be needed.

All the available evidence is that the attack was made by aircraft of the Iranian Air Force. Accordingly, in the absence in Tehran of the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires, we have summoned the next most senior member of the Iranian Embassy in order to deliver a strong protest. Her Majesty's Government have made it clear that this deliberate, unprovoked and wholly unjustified attack is totally unacceptable.

My Right Honourable Friend the Secretary of State for Transport has reviewed his advice to British shipping in the Gulf in the light of this incident. While it is for the companies themselves to inform their crews about the risks involved, he has re-emphasised the need for British ship-owners to take this incident into full consideration in deciding whether to enter the Gulf and to exercise all necessary vigilance while there.

/Her Majesty's

Her Majesty's Government deplores this incident, and indeed all attacks on shipping in the Gulf area. They are further proof of the need to see an early end to the continuing conflict between Iran and Iraq. We shall continue to support all serious efforts to bring that conflict to an end, and in the meantime will vigorously uphold the principle of freedom of navigation, which has been reaffirmed by successive Security Council Resolutions.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

PRIME MINISTER.
Agree revised message?

Duty Clerk
11/7/84

11 July 1984

Charles
Have deleted some paras which were just padding
MG

Dear Charles.

The Prime Minister's message to Sultan Qaboos of Oman

With your letter dated 5 July to Roger Bone you enclosed the revised text of the Prime Minister's message to Sultan Qaboos. We telegraphed this to Muscat on 5 July but unfortunately the Sultan has been incommunicado (on his yacht) since then. Mr Slater now has an appointment to see the Sultan on 17 July.

As drafted, the Prime Minister's message has been overtaken by the Defence Secretary's agreement to deploy a Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft to Oman next week, for joint exercises lasting about a week, and to a lesser extent by recent developments in the Gulf. We have concluded, therefore, with regret that we should ask you to put these papers again before the Prime Minister, with a view to updating the message to the Sultan. I enclose a redraft. For ease of reference, the sentences added or altered from the message previously agreed have been underlined.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

MESSAGES FROM SULTAN QABOOS: REDRAFTED REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

Your Majesty,

Thank you for letting me have your views on the present state of the Gulf war in your conversation with our Ambassador on 27 June. He has subsequently passed on a request from your Government that in the light of the present situation the United Kingdom should consider temporarily deploying an airborne early warning aircraft to Oman. My colleagues have subsequently been able to discuss these issues both with General Creasey and with Mr Yousef al-Alawi. I should like, if I may, to cover both your messages in this reply.

As you know, I have repeatedly expressed our hope for the earliest possible end to the conflict between Iran and Iraq, and to the appalling loss of human life and material damage that has resulted from it. All efforts aimed at bringing this about, particularly those of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, have our support. I am encouraged by the response by both sides to the Secretary-General's appeal for an end to attacks on civilian centres of population. Although it is too early to be sure that this restraint will continue, I hope that in time it may provide a foundation on which moves towards a wider ceasefire be based.

In the message passed to British officials by Major General Ali Majid al Ma'amari, you asked us to try to persuade Shaikh Zaid not to accept Saudi Arabia's offer to position fighter aircraft in the United Arab Emirates. In the subsequent message passed to the Ambassador by General Creasey you expressed concern at possible American pressure on Saudi Arabia to involve Oman more actively in preparing to counter Iranian incursions. You also suggested that it would be to Oman's advantage to demonstrate independence of Amer assistance through the availability if needed of help from elsewhere.

I should like to assure you that I have studied both messages very carefully and sympathetically. My own conclusion is that stationing

/Saudi

Saudi aircraft in the United Arab Emirates is more likely to diminish than to increase the threat of attack on the Emirates or on Oman. Since the shooting down of an Iranian F4 by the Royal Saudi Air Force on 5 June, Iranian aircraft appeared, at least for a while, to be more circumspect in their movements. Most of the attacks which have been made on ships since then, including one on a British ship (about which we have made a strong protest to the Iranians), took place further out in the Gulf than earlier Iranian attacks in an area where there was less chance of interception by the Saudis. To extend Saudi air cover to the Emirates would surely help to put the Iranians still more on the defensive. We have also noted that the tone of Iranian public statements in recent weeks has been more restrained, and that they have declared themselves willing to stop all attacks on shipping provided that Iraq exercises similar restaint.

I can see that it could be argued that if the UAE's air defences were strengthened, the Iranians might decide to concentrate their attacks on Oman. But surely against this the Iranians would have to calculate that gratuitously to attack a country like Oman, which has been neutral in the conflict, would rouse opinion in the Gulf and in the world at large against them.

The Nimrod early warning aircraft to which you referred will not in fact enter service with the RAF for some considerable time. ~~We must take account of the risk that the deployment of British or other non-Arab forces to the area at present could be regarded by the Iranians as a provocation and might actually increase the danger of their taking precipitate action.~~ But in response to your request I want us to do everything we can to help at this time. We have therefore agreed with General Creasey to deploy to Oman next week one aircraft of the maritime reconnaissance version of the Nimrod for joint exercises lasting one week.

I found your views on the possible motivation of the various participants in this question profoundly interesting. We ourselves have had extensive contact with American officials, both diplomatic and military, and have gained the clear impression from them that United States policy is exactly as Vice-President Bush has described

/it to

it to you. That is to say, they wish to ensure that the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have the means to defend themselves so that the need for any direct US involvement is reduced. They are also being careful to avoid any provocative action of their own in the Gulf area. Recent inaccurate press reports about the movements of American warships stationed at Bahrain have caused the Americans as much concern as they have caused us. While no country can ever answer unreservedly for the policies and attitudes of another, I do not believe our confidence in American motives and itentions is misplaced.

As regards the other members of the Gulf Security Council, I understand and respect your concern that closer military cooperation with them should not lead to Omani involvement in the conflict. In general, however, I welcome progress by the members of the Council towards greater cooperation in their own defence, since this again should reduce the risk of external military involvement in the Gulf and hence the danger of escalation. I understand that the meeting of the GCC Foreign Ministers on 12/14 June made some useful progress towards cooperation between the air defence systems of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. In my view, the arguments in favour of greater cooperation at this difficult time, in the common interest, are very persuasive. I hope that my discussions on this subject with His Highness Shaikh Khalifa bin Zaid al-Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, when he visits London next week, will help to substantiate the point.

With my best wishes and greetings for the Eid.

Margaret Thatcher.

52 SCPC

NBPM
CDD
11/7.

FCS/84/195

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Merchant Shipping in the Gulf and the Armilla Patrol

1. Thank you for sending me a copy of your note of 25 June, addressed to the Prime Minister, setting out your plans for the Armilla Patrol.

2. Although there has been three further attacks on tankers in the Gulf (two by Iran - including one on a British ship - and one by Iraq) since your note was written, I have no objection to your proposals. In particular, I agree that the Armilla ships should remain within 5 days' sailing of the Gulf, but should not patrol inside the Gulf itself. Visits to the Gulf States by the ships should however be encouraged as a sign of our continuing interest in preserving stability in the area.

3. I am copying this note to the Prime Minister, other members of OD, the Secretary of State for Transport and Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

Iraq : Iran/Iraq war #4

11 JUL 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

da

cc: SPC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 July 1984

Supply of Spares and Ships to Iran

The Prime Minister was informed this afternoon of the attack, thought to be by Iranian aircraft, on a British tanker in the Gulf. She has said that the supply of two Yarrow support ships and of armoured vehicle spare parts to Iran should be frozen, at least until the circumstances of the attack have been clarified.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry), Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

8K

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 95
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 090830Z
FM MUSCAT 090540Z JUL
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 221 OF 9 JULY 84

YOUR TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 218 AND 219: MESSAGE TO THE SULTAN

1. I HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR AN EARLY AUDIENCE WITH THE SULTAN IN ORDER TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. BUT THE SULTAN IS AT SEA ON HIS YACHT AND HIS STAFF HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO GIVE ME AN APPOINTMENT. I REGRET THEREFORE THE I HAVE NOTHING NEW TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DISCUSSIONS WITH CREASEY TODAY.

2. IF MY APPOINTMENT WITH THE SULTAN IS DELAYED MORE THAN ANOTHER DAY IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO ALTER THE MESSAGE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF WHATEVER CONCLUSIONS YOU REACH WITH CREASEY.

SLATER

LIMITED
MED
PUSD
DEF D
PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON

COPIES TO
PS/NO10 D ST
HD/DS11, MOD.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You didn't finish this.

CDP

6/7

Agree reluctantly. I hope it will not affect potential Defence Orders from the Gulf.

Sandy Walker.

Note from low down: must we have them to make further decisions within 3 months? No ammunition — no

SECRET

FCE 84

T 51

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 July, 1984

Reply to Messages from Sultan Qaboos of Oman

Thank you for your letter of 4 July enclosing a revised draft reply to Sultan Qaboos' message about the Saudi offer of military assistance to the United Arab Emirates.

The Prime Minister has approved the draft with some amendments. I enclose a revised version. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its early despatch.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

C. D. POWELL

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

NR.

JR.

SUBJECT.

MESSAGES FROM SULTAN QABOOS: REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T120AM/87

Your Majesty,

Thank you for letting me have your views on the present state of the Gulf war in your conversation with our Ambassador on 27 June. He has subsequently passed on a request from your Government that in the light of the present situation the United Kingdom should consider temporarily deploying an airborne early warning aircraft to Oman. I should like, if I may, to cover both messages in this reply.

As you know, I have repeatedly expressed our hope for the earliest possible end to the conflict between Iran and Iraq, and to the appalling loss of human life and material damage that has resulted from it. All efforts aimed at bringing this about, particularly those of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, have our support. I am encouraged by the response by both sides to the Secretary-General's appeal for an end to attacks on civilian centres of population. Although it is too early to be sure that this restraint will continue, I hope that in time it may provide a foundation on which moves towards a wider ceasefire might be based.

In the message passed to British officials by Major General Ali Majid al Ma'amari, you asked us to try to persuade Shaikh Zaid not to accept Saudi Arabia's offer to position fighter aircraft in the United Arab Emirates. In the subsequent message passed by General Creasey you expressed concern at possible American pressure on Saudi Arabia to involve Oman more actively in preparing to counter Iranian incursions. You also suggested that it would be to Oman's advantage to demonstrate independence of American assistance through the availability if needed of help from elsewhere.

I should like to assure you that I have studied both messages very carefully and sympathetically. My own

/conclusion

conclusion is that stationing Saudi aircraft in the United Arab Emirates is more likely to diminish than to increase the threat of attack on the Emirates or on Oman. Since the shooting down of an Iranian F4 by the Royal Saudi Air Force on 5 June, Iranian aircraft have been more circumspect in their movements. The only attack which has been made on an Arab ship since then took place much further out in the Gulf than earlier Iranian attacks in an area where there was markedly less chance of interception by the Saudis. To extend Saudi air cover to the Emirates would surely put the Iranians still more on the defensive. We have also noted that the tone of Iranian public statements in recent weeks has been more restrained, and that they have declared themselves willing to stop all attacks on shipping provided that Iraq exercises similar restraint.

I can see that it could be argued that if the UAE's air defences were strengthened, the Iranians might decide to concentrate their attacks on Oman. But surely against this the Iranians would have to calculate that gratuitously to attack a country like Oman, which has been neutral in the conflict, would rouse opinion in the Gulf and in the world at large against them.

The Nimrod early warning aircraft to which you referred will not in fact enter service with the RAF for some considerable time. We would still hope to continue deploying the maritime reconnaissance version of the Nimrod to Oman from time to time, as we did earlier this year. But we must take account of the risk that the deployment of British or other non-Arab forces to the area at present could be regarded by the Iranians as a provocation and might actually increase the danger of their taking precipitate action. But I want us to do everything we can to help at this time. We shall pursue the matter with General Creasey when he is in London on 9 July.

/I found your

I found your views on the possible motivation of the various participants in this question profoundly interesting. We ourselves have had extensive contact with American officials, both diplomatic and military, and have gained the clear impression from them that United States policy is exactly as Vice-President Bush has described it to you. That is to say, they wish to ensure that the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have the means to defend themselves so that the need for any direct US involvement is reduced. They are also being careful to avoid any provocative action of their own in the Gulf area. Recent inaccurate press reports about the movements of American warships stationed at Bahrain have caused the Americans as much concern as they have caused us. While no country can ever answer unreservedly for the policies and attitudes of another, I do not believe our confidence in American motives and intentions is misplaced.

As regards the other members of the Gulf Security Council, I understand and respect your concern that closer military cooperation with them should not lead to Omani involvement in the conflict. In general, however, I welcome progress by the members of the Council towards greater cooperation in their own defence, since this again should reduce the risk of external military involvement in the Gulf and hence the danger of escalation. I understand that the meeting of the GCC Foreign Ministers on 12/14 June made some useful progress towards cooperation between the air defence systems of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. In my view, the arguments in favour of greater cooperation at this difficult time, in the common interest, are very persuasive. I hope that my discussions on this subject with His Highness Shaikh Khalifa bin Zaid al-Nahyan, Crown Price of Abu Dhabi, when he visits London in two weeks' time, will help to substantiate the point.

With my best wishes and greetings for the Eid.

Margaret Thatcher

SECRET

50

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
Revised message to
Sultan Qaboos. I have
tried to personalise it
rather more.
Agree message?
C.D.P 4/7.

4 July 1984

See slight amendments. Thanks on. This is a much better one.

Reply to Messages from Sultan Qaboos of Oman

Thank you for your letter of 2 July about the draft reply to Sultan Qaboos's message about the Saudi offer of military assistance to the United Arab Emirates. You will have seen from Muscat telegram numbers 209 and 210 of 2 July, of which I enclose copies for ease of reference, that the Sultan has sent a further message via General Creasey, this time expressing concern about American intentions in the Gulf area, and asking for a gesture of British support: specifically the temporary deployment of an early warning aircraft to Oman. We have discussed this with the Ministry of Defence.

In the light of the Prime Minister's comments on the earlier draft reply to Sultan Qaboos, and of the latest message, we have amended the draft reply to Sultan Qaboos considerably. We continue to believe that his concerns about the Gulf situation and about Saudi and US attitudes are largely unfounded. Even if the deployment of a Nimrod early warning aircraft to the Gulf were possible (they will not be in service with the RAF for some time), we would see difficulty in responding to the Sultan's request, both because of the danger that we might create an expectation of a permanent commitment, and because, at a time of lessening tension in the Gulf, such a visible augmentation of the British military presence could be regarded as provocative. It would in any case run directly counter to the advice we have consistently given to the Americans, that their own military profile in the region should be kept as low as possible. However, the proposed discussions with General Creasey on 9 July may identify some other way in which we can help to meet Omani concerns.

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of the earlier correspondence and also to Richard Mottram (MOD).

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL (Eclipse)

GRS 460
CONFIDENTIAL ECLIPSE
FM MUSCAT 021200Z JULY 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 210 OF 2 JULY 84
INFO MODUK DS 11

MU MIPT: SITUATION IN THE GULF: OMANI ATTITUDES

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE FORMAL COMMUNICATION WHICH I HAVE RECEIVED FROM GENERAL CREASEY:

1) HIS MAJESTY SUMMONED CDS FOR AN AUDIENCE AFTER THE EID CALLS AT SALALAH ON SATURDAY 30 JUNE.

2) HIS MAJESTY DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN THE GULF. HE EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN AT SAUDI ARABIAN AND KUWAITI EFFORTS TO GET OMAN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN BOTH SHIP PROTECTION AND COUNTER IRANIAN AIR OPERATIONS IN THE UPPER GLF. OMAN HAS NO INTENTION OF GETTING SO INVOLVED.

3) HIS MAJESTY BELIEVES THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ARE PRESSING SAUDI ARABIA TO BE MORE POSITIVE IN THEIR REACTION TO IRANIAN INCURSIONS AND THREATS. HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT AMERICA, FOR HER OWN PURPOSES, ARE ALSO PRESSING SAUDI ARABIA TO PUT PRESSURE ON OMAN TO GET HER MORE ACTIVELY INVOLVED.

) HIS MAJESTY BELIEVES THAT BOTH AMERICA AND SAUDI ARABIA WOULD LIKE TO SEE OMAN'S PRESENT INDEPENDENT POSITION, BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL, ERODED. ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE UPPER GULF, WITH THE CONCOMITANT OUTSIDE CONTROL OF OMAN'S FORCES PROBABLY FROM RIYADH, WOULD BE A FIRST BUT IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS THIS.

5) HIS MAJESTY CONSIDERS THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAS SUFFICIENT AIR AND NAVAL FORCES FOR ALL FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE UPPER GULF. HOWEVER HE BELIEVES THAT THERE IS A RISK OF IRAN CARRYING OUT SNEAK AIR ATTACKS AGAINST OMAN (PARTICULARLY AGAINST THE CAPITAL AREA) MOUNTED FROM BANDAR ABBAS OR CHAH BAHAR.

6. OMAN'S WEAKNESS EITHER IN DEFEATING OR DETERRING SUCH ATTACKS IS IN RADAR COVERAGE, PARTICULARLY LOW LEVEL. THIS IS BEING RECTIFIED, BUT IT IS A LONG TERM PROCESS.

7. FOR THE SHORT TERM, CONTINGENCY PLANS WITH THE AMERICANS EXIST AN
D
AND HAVE BEEN PRACTICED. HOWEVER HIS MAJESTY IS VERY CLEAR AND FIRM THAT TODAY SUCH A SOLUTION IS POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

8. AGAIN FOR POLITICAL REASONS, THE SULTAN WISHES TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GAP CAN BE FILLED WITHOUT AMERICAN ASSISTANCE. THE SULTAN DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT AN ATTACK IS PARTICULARLY IMMINENT , BUT HE CONSIDERS IT TO BE MOST IMPORTANT THAT HE DEMONSTRATES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BOTH HIS ABILITY TO DEFEND HIMSELF AND ALSO HIS INDEPENDENCE.

9. HE THEREFORE INSTRUCTED CDS TO REPRESENT HIS VIEWS TO LONDON THROUGH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR. HE REQUESTS THAT HMG BE BRIEFED ACCORDINGLY, AND THEY ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE AVAILABLE AN AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL CAPABILITY TO FILL THE GAP.

10. IT IS HOPED THAT AN EXERCISE DEPLOYMENT OF ONE AIRCRAFT TO SEEB CAN BE MOUNTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS COULD BE FOLLOWED BY A PLANNED SERIES OF SUCH EXERCISES, BACKED BY A CONTINGENCY DEPLOYMENT SCHEME, OR POSSIBLY BY A MORE REGULAR PRESENCE. OMAN WOULD, OF COURSE, CONSIDER MEETING ANY EXTRA COSTS INVOLVED.

11. CDS OMAN WILL BE AVAILABLE IN LONDON ON MONDAY 9 JULY FOR DISCUSSIONSM

Slater

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD(PALACE)
MED
NENAD
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SOV D
ECD(E)
MAED
ESSD
ERD
ESID
CONS D
CONS EM UNIT
DEFENCE D
MR EGERTON
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IRAN/IRAQ

CONFIDENTIAL (Eclipse)

ORS 470

CONFIDENTIAL ECLIPSE

FM MUSCAT 021105Z JULY 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 209 OF 2 JULY

INFO MODUK DS11

MY TELEGRAM NO 203

SITUATION IN THE GULF: OMANI ATTITUDES

1. CREASEY TELLS ME THAT WHEN HE PAID HIS EID CALL ON THE SULTAN IN SALALAH ON 30 JUNE, THE SULTAN ASKED HIM TO STAY ON AFTERWARDS FOR A PRIVATE AUDIENCE, AT WHICH AIR VICE MARSHALL BENNETT WAS ALSO PRESENT. THE SULTAN REPEATED, AS HE HAD TO ME, THAT HE WAS CONCERNED AT THE EXTENSION OF SAUDI INFLUENCE AMONGST THE GCC STATES AND WAS CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WAS URGING THE SAUDIS ON. THE SULTAN THEREFORE CONSIDERED THAT HE NEEDED SOME GESTURE OF BRITISH SUPPORT ON THE MILITARY FIELD.

2. CREASEY HAS GIVEN ME A FORMAL REQUEST (TEXT IN MIFT) FOR BRITAIN TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO OMAN AN AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL CAPABILITY. WHAT IS ENVISACED IS THE DEPLOYMENT OF AWACS AIRCRAFT (CREASEY SUGGESTED A NIMROD) TO OMAN FOR AN EXERCISE LASTING ABOUT A WEEK. THIS WOULD BE A BILATERAL UK/OMAN EXERCISE ON THE LINES OF THE RECENT DEPLOYMENT OF RAF TORNADOS TO THUMRAIT. AS YOU WILL SEE, THE OMAN GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO PAY THE COST OF THE DEPLOYMENT.

3. I COMMENTED TO CREASEY THAT THE SULTAN MUST HAVE BECOME EVEN MORE CONCERNED SINCE HE SAW ME LAST WEDNESDAY, BECAUSE HE HAD MADE NO MENTION OF THIS REQUEST TO ME THEN. CREASEY SAID THAT HE THOUGHT QABOOS HAD CONTINUED TO BROOD ON THE QUESTION AND WAS INCREASINGLY WORRIED THAT OMAN WOULD FIND ITSELF SUCKED INTO

AN AMERICAN-INSPIRED, SAUDI-DOMINATED DEFENCE ARRANGEMENT. HE THEREFORE WANTED SOME GESTURE FROM THE UK TO REASSURE HIMSELF THAT OMAN COULD DEPEND FOR MILITARY SUPPORT ON OTHER FRIENDS BESIDES THE U.S.

4. I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHETHER OUR NIMROD AWACS WERE YET OPERATIONAL: (THE UNDERSTANDING OF MY AIR ATTACHE IS THAT THEY ARE NOT). CREASEY REPLIED THAT THE REQUIREMENT WAS POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY: QABOOS BELIEVED THAT HE NEEDED A GESTURE OF SUPPORT FROM THE UK. CREASEY ADDED THAT, IF NO AWACS NIMRODS ARE AVAILABLE THEN PERHAPS THE DEPLOYMENT OF A MARITIME SURVEILLANCE NIMROD, OR EVEN AN AWACS SHACKLETON WOULD DO.

5. I PUT IT TO CREASEY THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF BRITISH AWACS AIRCRAFT TO OMAN MIGHT ATTRACT IRANIAN HOSTILITY, THE SULTAN HAD GIVEN ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT OMAN WAS TRYING TO AVOID THIS. CREASEY SAID THAT THE SULTAN CONSIDERED THAT THE RISK OF THIS WAS LOW AND WAS, IN ANY CASE, WORTH TAKING. HE THEN REPEATED THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A GESTURE OF SUPPORT BY HMG TO QABOOS.

6. CREASEY IS RETURNING TO THE UK ON FRIDAY 6 JULY AND WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION IN LONDON ON MONDAY 9 JULY. MY DEFENCE ATTACHE IS TELEGRAPHING DETAILS OF CREASEY'S MOVEMENTS DIRECT TO MOD.

7. COMMENT: IT DOES NOT SEEM TO ME THAT THIS REQUEST HAS BEEN WELL THOUGHT OUT. BUT IT HAS BEEN MADE, AND IT CLEARLY REFLECTS A STATE OF GREAT CONCERN ON THE PART OF THE SULTAN. IF WE REFUSE THE REQUEST, QABOOS WILL, I THINK, BE VERY DISAPPOINTED AND MAY CONCLUDE THAT HE HAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO RELY ON THE AMERICANS. I THEREFORE HOPE THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO FIND SOME WAY OF RESPONDING POSITIVELY. EVEN IF THE AWACS NIMRODS ARE NOT YET OPERATIONAL, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO DEPLOY ONE OUT HERE ON A SORT OF PROVING FLIGHT? THIS MIGHT PROVIDE USEFUL EXPERIENCE. ALTERNATIVELY, DO WE HAVE ANY OTHER RADAR CAPABILITY WHICH WE COULD OFFER? I SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD ACCEPT CREASEY'S OFFER OF A MEETING IN LONDON ON 9 JULY, SO AS TO WORK OUT SOME RESPONSE WHICH WILL MEET THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENT.

8. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

Slater

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD(PALACE)

MED
NENAD
NAD
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SOV D
ECD(E)
MAED
ESSD

ERD
ESID
CONS D
CONS EM UNIT
DEFENCE D
MR EGERTON
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IRAN/IRAQ

IRAQ: Int Sit: Rpt

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
SECRET	IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 SECRET
4
5
6 FM FCO 03 Z July
7 TO IMMEDIATE MUSCAT
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 MIPT: MESSAGES FROM SULTAN QABOOS
10 1. Following is text of reply from the Prime Minister:
11 Begins Your Majesty
12 Thank you for letting me have your views on the present
13 state of the Gulf war in your conversation with our Ambassador
14 on 27 June. He has subsequently ~~transmitted~~ passed on a request from ~~the~~ your
15 Government ~~of Oman~~ that in the light of the present situation
16 the United Kingdom should consider temporarily deploying an
17 airborne early warning aircraft to Oman. I should like, if I
18 may, to cover both ~~communications~~ messages in this reply.
19 As you know, ~~the British Government have consistently~~ I have repeatedly expressed our hope
20 ~~expressed the wish to see~~ for the earliest possible end to the ~~tragic~~
21 conflict between Iran and Iraq, and to the appalling loss of human
22 /// life and material damage that has resulted from it. ~~We are~~
23 // ~~ready to support any~~ All efforts aimed at bringing this about,
24 / particularly those of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, I have our support.
25 ~~We are~~ I am encouraged by the response by both sides to the Secretary-

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword: General's
File number	Dept: MED	Distribution: Limited MED Defence Dept PUSD PS PS/Mr Luce PS/PUS Sir J Leahy Mr Egerton cc PS/No.10 Hd/DS11 MOD
Drafted by (Block capitals): DK HASKELL		
Telephone number: 233 5877		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

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General's appeal for an end to attacks on civilian centres of population. Although it is ~~of course much~~ too early to be sure that this restraint will continue, we hope that in time it may provide a foundation on which moves towards a wider ceasefire might be based.

In the message passed to British officials by Major General Ali Majid al Ma'amari, you asked us to try to persuade Shaikh Zaid not to accept Saudi Arabia's offer to position fighter aircraft in the United Arab Emirates. In the subsequent message passed by General Creasey you expressed concern at possible American pressure on Saudi Arabia to involve Oman more actively in preparing to counter Iranian incursions. You also suggested that it would be to Oman's advantage to demonstrate independence of American assistance through the availability if needed of help from elsewhere. I should like to assure you that I have studied both messages ~~have been studied~~ very carefully and sympathetically ~~in London~~.

~~However, there is good reason to think that~~ My own conclusion is that stationing Saudi aircraft in the United Arab Emirates ~~would~~ is more likely to diminish ~~rather~~ than to increase the threat of attack to the Emirates or to Oman. Since the shooting down of an Iranian F4 by the Royal Saudi Air Force on 5 June, Iranian aircraft have been a good deal more circumspect in their ~~behaviour~~ movements. The only attack which has been made on an Arab ship since that date took place much further out in the Gulf than earlier Iranian attacks, in am area where there was ~~much less~~ markedly less chance of interception by the Saudis. To extend Saudi air cover to the Emirates would surely put the Iranians still more on the defensive. ~~It is also noteworthy~~ We have also noted that the tone of Iranian public statements in recent weeks has been much more restrained, and that they have declared themselves willing to stop all attacks on shipping provided that the Iraqis exercises similar restraint.

~~It might be argued, perhaps,~~ I can see that it could be argued that if the UAE's air defences

NNNN ends telegram | BLANK | Catchword: were

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were strengthened, the Iranians might decide to concentrate their attacks on Oman. (But surely) Against this, the Iranians would ~~need~~ have ~~to take into account~~ to calculate that gratuitously to attack a country like Oman which has been ~~scrupulously~~ neutral in the conflict would ~~inflame~~ rouse opinion in the Gulf and in the world at large against them.

~~I also have to tell you that~~ The Nimrod early warning aircraft to which you referred will not in fact enter service with the RAF for some considerable time. We would still hope to continue deploying the maritime reconnaissance version of the Nimrod to Oman from time to time, as we did earlier this year. But we must ~~of course~~ take account of the risk that the deployment of British or other non-Arab forces to the area at present could be regarded by the Iranians as a provocation and might actually increase the danger of their taking precipitate action. ~~I am however naturally concerned to~~ But I want us to do everything ~~do everything~~ we can to help ~~remedy any deficiencies~~ at this time in Oman's ~~own defence arrangements~~. We shall pursue the matter with General Creasey when he is in London on 9 July.

I found your views on the possible motivation of the various participants in this question ~~very~~ profoundly interesting ~~indeed~~. We ourselves have had extensive contact with American officials, both diplomatic and military, and have gained the clear impression from them that United States policy is exactly as Vice-President Bush has described it to you. That is to say, they wish to ensure that the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have the means to defend themselves so that the need for any direct US involvement is reduced ~~rather than enhanced~~. They are also being careful to avoid any provocative action of their own in the Gulf area. Recent ~~exaggerated~~ inaccurate press reports about the movements of American warships stationed at Bahrain /// have caused the Americans as much concern as they have caused us. // While no country can ever answer unreservedly for the policies / and attitudes of another, I do not believe our confidence in American motives and intentions is misplaced.

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	Classification and Caveats		Page
	SECRET		4

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>>>>

As regards the other members of the Gulf Security Council, I understand and respect your concern that closer military cooperation with them should not lead to Omani involvement in the conflict. In general, however, I welcome progress by the members of the Council towards greater cooperation in their own defence, since this again should reduce the risk of external military involvement in the Gulf and hence the danger of escalation. I understand that the meeting of the GCC Foreign Ministers on 12/14 June made some useful progress towards cooperation between the air defence systems of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. In my view, the arguments in favour of greater cooperation at this difficult time, in the common interest, are very persuasive. I hope that my discussions on this subject with His Highness Shaikh Khalifa bin Zaid al-Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, when he visits London in two weeks' time, will help to substantiate the point. ~~Ends~~

With my best wishes and greetings for the Eid. Ends.

HOWE

NNNN

/// //

/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword

49

CD .3/7.

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01- 233 6109

SECRET

Je.0347.

3 July 1984

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRETARY, JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

I refer to the final paragraph of your letter to Mr Bone of 2 July on the Saudi offer of military assistance to the United Arab Emirates.

You will wish to know that Mr Jeffrey James took over from Mr Savage as Secretary, JIC on 2 April 1984. Mr James is on leave until 9 July.

A J MOLESWORTH

Lieutenant Colonel
for Secretary, JIC

SECRET

IRAQ PT 4
Internal Situation



SECRET

file

47

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 July, 1984

SAUDI OFFER OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Peter Ricketts letter of 29 June enclosed a draft message from the Prime Minister to Sultan Qaboos on this subject.

The Prime Minister agrees that she should send a message to Sultan Qaboos. But she finds the draft provided inadequate. In particular she takes the view that we must give more reasons why we reach the conclusion that the presence of Saudi aircraft in the UAE would not increase the threat from Iran either to the UAE or to Oman. The Prime Minister points out that it is possible to arrive at two quite different conclusions following Saudi destruction of an intruding Iranian aircraft on 5 June. Either one can take the view that the Iranians will not dare go anywhere near the UAE if Saudi aircraft are stationed there, and therefore they will keep away also from Oman. Or because they won't go near the UAE, they may go where Saudi aircraft are not to be found, that is they might attack installations in Oman. The Prime Minister feels that we have not succeeded in working out in our own minds which conclusion is justified. If we are convinced that it is the first, then the message should spell out the reasons why more fully and more convincingly.

The Prime Minister also wishes the message to mention Sheikh Khalifa's forthcoming visit and say that she will take the opportunity to discuss these matters with him.

I should be grateful if a revised draft can reach me to show the Prime Minister this evening.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office) and also to Sir Anthony Duff and Bill Savage (Cabinet Office).

CP

R. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CT.

SECRET

SECRET IMMEDIATE

47

FM FCO 291400Z JUNE 84
TO IMMEDIATE MUSCAT
TELEGRAM NUMBER
INFO ABU DHABI, ANMAN, BAHRAIN, JEDDA, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON

MIPT:PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO SULTAN QABOOS

"Your Majesty

Thank you for letting me have your views on the present state of the Gulf war in your conversation with our Ambassador on 27 June. As Mr. Slater has reported your wish to have a further discussion with him in the next few days, I thought this would be an opportune moment to let you know how I see the situation.

As you know, we very much want to see the earliest possible end to the conflict between Iran and Iraq and the appalling loss of human life and material damage that has resulted. For this reason we support all efforts to bring this about, particularly those made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The ready and - so far- fairly effective response by both sides to the Secretary-General's appeal for an end to attacks on civilian centres of population was encouraging. Although it is too early to be sure that this restraint will continue, it could in time provide a foundation on which moves towards a wider ceasefire could be based.

I have studied carefully the messages passed to British officials by Major General Ali Majid al Ma'anari, in which you asked that we try to persuade Shaikh Zaid not to accept Saudi Arabia's offer to position fighter aircraft in the United Arab Emirates.

I well understand your concern that nothing be done to increase the threat of Iranian air attack on your country.

/Saudi

But I do not think that it follows that the stationing of Saudi aircraft in the United Arab Emirates will necessarily increase that threat either to your country or to the Emirates. Indeed such a move could well deter any Iranian plans to extend the conflict to the lower Gulf.

Moreover, while I understand and respect your concern that closer military cooperation with the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council should not lead to involvement in the conflict, progress towards such cooperation between the other countries of the Council in their own defence is generally to be welcomed. I understand that the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the GCC countries on 12-14 June made useful progress towards cooperation between the air defences of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. I believe that the arguments in favour of great cooperation at this difficult time, in the common interest, are very persuasive.

Finally, I am extremely grateful for your views on the possible motivation of the various participants in this question. As you know, we ourselves have had extensive contact with United States officials, both diplomatic and military. It is our clear impression that United States policy is exactly as Vice President Bush has described it to you. United States concern, as we see it, is to avoid any provocative action in the Gulf and to ensure that the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have the means to defend themselves.

With my best wishes, and greetings for the 'Id.

Margaret Thatcher."

SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 June 1984

Dear Charles

Saudi Offer of Military Assistance to the United Arab Emirates (UAE)

Omani officials have told us that Saudi Arabia has offered the UAE military assistance, in the form of F15 aircraft and supporting personnel, to be positioned in the UAE. Sultan Qaboos has asked that the Prime Minister take any action possible to dissuade Shaikh Zaid from accepting the Saudi offer, first because the Sultan believes that such a move would risk extending the war to the lower Gulf, and second because he views the Saudi offer as intended to increase Saudi influence in the region.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

However, when Sultan Qaboos received our Ambassador at Muscat on 27 June, he asked when a reply would be forthcoming. There is consequently no reason why the Prime Minister's reply should not be transmitted by Mr Slater. He is expecting to be summoned by the Sultan again next week, which gives this question a degree of urgency.

In the Foreign Secretary's absence in Oslo, Mr Luce endorses Mr Slater's view that we should not take action with the UAE in the sense the Omanis ask. He doubts whether Shaikh Zaid will wish to jeopardise the UAE's links with Iran (a potential channel of communication which the other Gulf countries would probably wish to keep open). Even if Shaikh Zaid were persuaded to accept Saudi assistance in this or some other form, this would not in itself risk extending the war to the Southern Gulf. Indeed the opposite might be true: following the Saudi destruction of an intruding Iranian aircraft in Northern waters on 5 June the only Iranian attack has been well out of Saudi

/range

range in the Southern Gulf. The Iranian Air Force may well think twice before tangling with the Saudis again. The Omani contention that increasing the threat to Oman - already militarily much stronger - is inherently improbable.

To take action as the Sultan wishes would certainly infuriate the Saudis. Moreover, the Saudi offer of assistance is reported to have been made during a meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council Foreign Ministers on 12-14 June, which seems to have made some progress towards coordination of the air defences of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. If true, this is a welcome development and fully in line with our policy of encouraging greater cooperation between GCC countries. It would run wholly counter to that policy if we were to try to discourage cooperation - however one-sided - between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

It is, however, clearly important to present our views to Sultan Qaboos in a way which will avoid leading him to think that his concerns have been brushed aside. He is clearly expecting a reply from the Prime Minister in person, and this will need to explain in some detail why we are not prepared to act as he wishes. I attach a possible draft in the form of a telegram to Muscat.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield, and also to Sir A Duff and Bill Savage in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

2 I think we should mention Sheikh Khalifa's visit from UAE in mid-July when we can discuss these things with him.

3 N.B. If this does go ahead, it looks as if our chances of selling more Tornados to the Gulf are seriously reduced also.

OUT TELEGRAM

Covering letter in Nat box 29/6

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
SECRET	IMMEDIATE

46

ZCZC 1 ZCZC
GRS 2 GRS
CLASS 3 SECRET
CAVEATS 4
DESKBY 5
FM FCO 6 FM FCO 291400Z JUNE 84
PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE MUSCAT
TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 INFO ABU DHABI, AMMAN, BAHRAIN, JEDDA, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON
10
11 MIPT : PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO SULTAN QABOOS
12 "Your Majesty
13 Thank you for letting me have your views on the present
14 state of the Gulf war in your conversation with our Ambassador
15 on 27 June. As Mr Slater has reported your wish to have a
16 further discussion with him in the next few days, I thought
17 this would be an opportune moment to let you know how I see
18 the situation. // As you know, we ~~have consistently expressed~~ [regularly very much]
19 ~~our hope for~~ [want to see] the earliest possible end to the ~~tragic~~ conflict
20 between Iran and Iraq and the appalling loss of human life and
21 material damage that has resulted. [For this reason] We support ~~any~~ efforts [all]
/// 22 ~~aimed at~~ [to] bringing this about, particularly those [made by] ~~of~~ the
// 23 Secretary-General of the United Nations. ~~We are, therefore,~~
/ 24 ~~greatly encouraged by~~ the ready and - so far - fairly effective
25 response by both sides to the Secretary-General's appeal for an

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword: end
File number	Dept: MED	Distribution: LIMITED MED PS PS/MR LUCE PS/PUS SIR J LEAHY MR EGERTON PUSD CC: PS/NO 10
Drafted by (Block capitals): A HEATH		
Telephone number: 233 3982		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

XY 48

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end to attacks on civilian centres of population. Although it is too early to be sure that this restraint will continue, ~~we hope that~~ it ~~may~~ could in time ~~it may~~ provide a foundation on which moves towards a wider ceasefire ~~might~~ could be based.

~~I should like you to know that~~ I have studied carefully the messages passed to British officials by Major General Ali Majid al Ma'anari, in which you asked ~~us to~~ that we try to persuade Shaikh Zaid not to accept Saudi Arabia's offer to position fighter aircraft in the United Arab Emirates. I well understand your concern that nothing be done to increase the threat ~~to your country~~ of from Iranian air attack on your country. But I do not think that it follows that ~~it does not necessarily follow that~~ However, stationing Saudi aircraft in the United Arab Emirates ~~does not necessarily affect the~~ will increase that necessarily increase that threat of attack either to ~~yourselves~~ country or to the Emirates. ~~It could also be argued that~~ Indeed such a move could ~~significantly~~ well deter any Iranian plans to extend the conflict to the lower Gulf.

Finally I am ~~nevertheless~~ extremely grateful for your views on the possible motivation of the various participants in this question. As you know, we ourselves have had extensive contact with United States officials, both diplomatic and military. It is our clear impression that United States policy is exactly as Vice President Bush has described it to you. United States concern, as we see it, is to avoid any provocative action in the Gulf and to ensure that the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have the means to defend themselves.

Moreover while I understand and respect your concern that closer military cooperation with the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council should not lead to involvement in the conflict, ~~It is our belief, however, that~~ progress towards such cooperation between the other countries of the Council in their own defence is generally to be welcomed. I understand that the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the GCC countries on 12-14 June made useful progress towards cooperation between the air defences

	Classification and Caveats		Page
	SECRET		3

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of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. I believe that the arguments in favour of greater cooperation at this difficult time, in the common interest, are very persuasive.

With my best wishes, and greetings for the 'Id.

Margaret Thatcher."

HOWE

NNNN

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GRS 590
CONFIDENTIAL ECLIPSE
FM MUSCAT 281045Z JUN
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 203 OF 28 JUNE 84
INFO ALL GULF POSTS, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOD

SITUATION IN THE GULF

1. I HAD A LONG TALK WITH THE SULTAN LAST NIGHT ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF.

2. MUCH OF OUR DISCUSSION WAS ON STANDARD LINES, BUT I WAS STRUCK BY THE STRENGTH OF QABOOS' DETERMINATION (MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 201) NOT TO RISK BECOMING INVOLVED IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR THROUGH CLOSER MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE GCC. HE SAID THAT THE OTHER STATES IN THE GCC HAD NOTHING TO OFFER OMAN IN THE DEFENCE FIELD: OMAN WAS CAPABLE OF DEFENDING HERSELF AGAINST IRAN WITHOUT THEIR HELP. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, IRAN WAS A POWERFUL NEIGHBOUR WITH WHOM OMAN HAD TO LIVE. AT THE MOMENT, THE IRANIANS WERE NOT DOING ANYTHING TO THREATEN OMAN AND SO OMAN WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING WHICH THE IRANIANS COULD REGARD AS PROVOCATIVE. (THE SULTAN WI HINTED THAT HE HAD HAD SOME SORT OF ASSURANCE FROM THE IRANIANS THAT, IF OMAN STAYED OUT OF THE CONFLICT , SHE WOULD LEFT ALONE.)

3. QABOOS SAID THAT IT WOULD SUIT THE IRAQIS VERY WELL TO DRAG OTHER GCC STATES INTO THE WAR AND HE THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQIS WERE PUSHING THE SAUDIS TO URGE GREATER GCC MILITARY COOPERATION. EVEN KING HUSSAIN, DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO OMAN, HAD BEEN URGING THS SULTAN TO RALLY TO THE SUPPORT OF IRAQ. BUT QABOOS WAS CONVINCED THAT HIS PEOPLE DID NOT WISH TO BE DRAGGED INTO A WAR WITH IRAN ON BEHALF OF IRAQ AND SO HE WAS DETERMINED TO STAY OUT. THE SULTAN THEN WENT OVER THE STORY OF THE QUOTE KING FAHAD LINE UNQUOTE (PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) AND REPEATED THAT OMAN HAD REFUSED TO AGREE TO ITS EXTENSION INTO THE STRAIGHTS OF HORMUZ.

4. QABOOS WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT SAUDI ACTIVITIES. THE GCC, AS AN INSTITUTION, HAD ALWAYS CARRIED WITH IT THE RISK THAT IT WOULD SERVE AS A VEHICLE FOR SAUDI DOMINATION OF THE OTHER GULF STATES. THIS WAS NOW BEGINNING TO HAPPEN: THE SAUDIS WERE USING THE THREAT OF WAR AS A MEANS OF EXTENDING THEIR OWN INFLUENCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE MILITARY FIELD. THE SAUDIS HAD VETOED A PROPOSAL THAT A JORDANIAN BATTALION SHOULD BE STATIONED IN BAHRAIN AND NOW THEY WERE TRYING TO POSITION SAUDI F.15 AIRCRAFT IN THE UAE. THE SULTAN SPECULATED THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE

BEHIND THIS. DURING HIS RECENT VISIT, VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH HAD ASSURED THE SULTAN THAT THE US INTENDED TO AVOID ANY PROVOCATEVE ACTION IN THE GULF. BUT THERE HAD BEEN ONE OR TWO ODD INCIDENTS, SUCH AS THE US NAVY'S UNSOLICITED CONVOYING OF TANKERS. QABOOS WAS NOW BEGINNING TO WONDER WHETHER THE AMERICANS WERE ALSO QUIETLY URGING ON THE SAUDIS. I SAID THAT OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WERE WELL AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF PROVOCTIVE ACTION IN THE GULF AND WISHED TO AVOID ANY FURTHER EXTENSIONS OF THE CONFLICT. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THE SAUDIS HAD ASKED FOR STINGERS, THE US ADMINISTRATION, IN VIEW OF THEIR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA, HAD FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO REFUSE, BUT THEY SEEMED TO HAVE FOUND THE REQUEST EMBARRASSING. THE SULTAN COMMENTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE TRUE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT, BUT WAS IT ALSO TRUE OF THE US MILITARY?

5. BEFORE TURNING TO ANOTHER SUBJECT QABOOS SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ME AGAIN NEXT WEEK TO RESUME THE DISCUSSION.

SLATER

(Repetition to TRIPOLI
referred for departmental decision.
repeated as requested to other posts.)

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD(PALACE)

MED
NENAD
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ESID
CONS D
CONS EM UNIT
DEFENCE D
MR EGERTON
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IRAN/IRAQ

45 Ltr C (2)

Prime Minister
No changes proposed.
CDP
28/6

MO 3/9/4/2

PRIME MINISTER

MERCHANT SHIPPING IN THE GULF AND THE ARMILLA PATROL

Although the level of Iraqi and Iranian attacks on merchant shipping in the Gulf has reduced in the last fortnight I thought it would be prudent to review the current position and the role of the Armilla patrol. I am not proposing any major change in our stance: we obviously need to continue to steer a careful course between reassuring our merchant shipping and increasing the risk of involvement in the conflict. But I thought that I should share my assessment of the situation with you and our OD colleagues.

The role of the Armilla patrol is to maintain a UK presence in the area and give British shipping reassurance that assistance is nearby if required. I do not see any reason to change that role at present. Although the level of UK shipping in the Gulf has fallen in the last year there is no sign that shipping is being driven out by risks. Whilst insurance rates have risen significantly this is not serving as a deterrent and both the Iranians and the Gulf states are taking steps to compensate shipowners. There is no sign at present of either the shipping industry or the Gulf States asking for any form of protection - indeed there are clear indications that such a step would be seen as an unwelcome escalation.

One area which clearly needs to be kept under review is the adequacy of the advice issued to UK registered shipping of the risks they run in entering the Gulf. I understand that the General Council of British Shipping is about to issue comprehensive and detailed guidance on the situation in the Gulf covering in particular the Iraqi MEZ, the Iranian advice zone, UK Government advice, traffic

zones, positions and methods of attacks on shipping and necessary preparatory and defensive measures. This will be distributed to all members of the GCBS. Unless the situation deteriorates significantly I do not believe there is more we can do to make these risks clear.

The ships of the Armilla patrol are currently at a maximum of 5 days notice for the Gulf although the great majority of the time is spent in the patrol area in the Gulf of Oman or at the entrance to the Gulf. (I recently decided to cancel a visit to Colombo, which although within 5 days sailing, I judged to be too far away given the military situation). The ships would, if possible, assist a British ship under attack or render humanitarian aid to any ship once an attack had ceased. But, under present rules, they may not enter the Gulf itself, except on a prearranged visit or in an emergency, without prior Ministerial authority. Even though most of the UK merchant shipping is in the lower part of the Gulf, this restriction means that the Armilla ships might take a considerable time to reach any ship which had been attacked (in excess of 24 hours in the worst case). Nevertheless I do not propose that we should allow the Armilla ships to patrol inside the Gulf. This would only increase the risk of involvement in the conflict; in the event of an attack we could still not guarantee to be in the right area; and there would almost certainly be other shipping available to render assistance if required.

The present plan is that the Armilla ships will remain in the patrol area until mid-July when they are planned to visit the Seychelles. I shall review that visit nearer the time. I would not at present propose to reduce the formal maximum of 5 days notice since the ships are, in practice, well within this notice period for the bulk of the time and a reduction in notice would severely limit the number of ports where essential maintenance can be carried out. We are already using the facilities available within 5 days to the maximum possible. So far as visits are concerned the ships normally enter the Gulf at least once during a patrol. There are difficulties

in arranging visits to the Gulf states, nearly all of which stem from the sensitivities of the states themselves. However, such visits are a useful low key way of showing our presence without undertaking regular patrols in the Gulf. The next Armilla ships are planned to visit Saudi Arabia and the UAE and I shall try to expand this programme if possible.

I am copying this note to the other members of OD, the Secretary of State for Transport and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
25th June 1984

FOR251003Z

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SECRET

FOFON 001/25

DD 251030Z UKDEL FONTAINEBLEAU
GRS 163
SECRET
DESKBY 251030Z
FM FCO 250923Z JUNE 84
IMMEDIATE UKDEL FONTAINEBLEAU (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 25 JUNE

IRAN/IRAQ : SITREP AT 0900Z 25 JUNE 1984
1. ON 24 JUNE IRAQ CLAIMED TO HAVE HIT 4 NAVAL TARGETS NEAR KHARG ISLAND. ONE HIT HAS SO FAR BEEN CONFIRMED: THE GREEK TANKER 'ALEXANDER THE GREAT' WAS DAMAGED, BUT ABLE TO DEPART LATER FOR DUBAI. THERE WERE NO (NO) CASUALTIES. THE VESSEL WAS ALONGSIDE THE SEA ISLAND SUBSIDIARY OIL TERMINAL WHICH WAS ALSO DAMAGED. THE ATTACK WAS MADE BY IRAQI HELICOPTERS, ARMED WITH EXOCET MISSILES. WE DO NOT (NOT) BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS A DELIBERATE ATTACK ON KHARG ISLAND ITSELF.
2. THE SITUATION ON LAND REMAINS QUIET. IRAN HAS NOW REPORTEDLY ACCEPTED STATIONING OF UN OBSERVERS ON IRANIAN TERRITORY.
3. WE HAVE NOTHING TO SUBSTANTIATE AN IRANIAN CLAIM REPORTED BY THE MEDIA TODAY THAT THEY HAVE EVIDENCE THAT THE US HAS SUPPLIED CHEMICALS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO IRAQ VIA SPAIN.
HOWE

NNNN

SECRET

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Iran / Iraq.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1926 OF 20 JUN
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DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, GULF POSTS,
UKDEL NATO, PARIS,
INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

MIDDLE EAST.

1. MINISTER CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY TODAY TO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN ADVANCE OF YOUR VISIT TO MOSCOW.

THE GULF.

2. MURPHY SAID THAT US INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS WERE NOW PREDICTING THAT THE IRANIAN LAND OFFENSIVE WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE END OF JUNE OR EARLY JULY, THOUGH THEY COULD GIVE NO EXPLANATION FOR THE DELAY. THE IRAQI STRATEGY OF CUTTING OFF OIL EXPORTS FROM KHARG WAS NOT WORKING: IRANIAN OIL EXPORTS HAD RISEN OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS PERHAPS TO AS MUCH AS 1.8 MILLION BPD. HE EXPECTED THE IRAQIS TO RESUME THEIR ATTACKS ON TANKERS. IT WAS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE RECENT SAUDI ACTION WOULD DETER THE IRANIANS FROM RETALIATORY ATTACKS ON SHIPPING USING ARAB GULF PORTS. IF IT DID, THE IRANIANS MIGHT TURN TO SABOTAGE, MOBILISING FOR THIS PURPOSE THE HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN TRAINED IN IRAN AND INFILTRATED INTO THE GULF STATES.

3. KUWAIT WAS A PARTICULARY SOFT TARGET. THE AMERICANS WERE THEREFORE TRYING IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO AVOID GIVING ANY IMPRESSION THAT KUWAIT HAD BEEN ABANDONED BY ITS FRIENDS IN THE WEST. THE KUWAITIS HAD RECENTLY REACTED MORE CALMLY THAN EARLIER TO THE AMERICAN UNWILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY STINGERS AT THIS TIME, TAKING THE LINE THAT THEY DID NOT WANT THIS TO BECOME A CONTINUING CONTENTIOUS ISSUE BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND THE US. NO FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT CONGRESS WOULD NOT APPROVE ANY SUPPLY OF STINGERS TO KUWAIT EVEN THOUGH THE AGITATION ON THE HILL ABOUT THE RECENT SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA HAD NOW SUBSIDED.

4. THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT YET PUT TOGETHER THEIR PROPOSED PACKAGE OF MILTARY ASSISTANCE FOR KUWAIT. MURPHY SAID THAT IT WAS LIKELY TO INCLUDE UPGRADING OF KUWAIT'S HAWK MISSLE BATTERIES, WHICH HAD NOT BEEN WELL MAINTAINED, AND ENHANCEMENT OF THEIR RADAR CAPABILITY. THE REPORT OF THE US MILITARY TEAM WHICH RECENTLY VISITED KUWAIT WAS STILL BEING STUDIED IN THE PENTAGON. MAINTENANCE WAS THE MAIN PROBLEM: THE KUWAITIS HAD ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN TO THE US ABOUT THE POLITICAL RELIABILITY OF THE EXPATRIATES, MAINLY PAKISTANI SHIAS, ENGAGED IN THIS WORK.

5. ON THE SOVIET ANGLE, HANNAY GAVE A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF OUR THINKING DRAWING ON YOUR TELNO 549 TO MOSCOW (NOT TO ALL). MURPHY SAID THAT THIS WAS CLOSELY IN LINE WITH US VIEWS. THOUGH THERE HAD BEEN NO DETAILED DISCUSSION ON THE GULF, THE MESSAGE THEY HAD BEEN TRYING TO GET ACROSS TO THE RUSSIANS WAS THAT WESTERN MILITARY INTERVENTION, IF IT BECAME NECESSARY, WOULD IN NO SENSE BE DIRECTED AGAINST SOVIET INTERESTS. MURPHY THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE READY TO ACCEPT THIS: THEY HAD NO EASY ANSWERS ON THE GULF AS THEY DID ON ARAB-ISRAEL AND NOR HAD THEY BEEN INDULGING IN QUITE THE SAME KIND OF FACILE ANTI-US RHETORIC AS THE FORMER. THE US ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED CONTAINMENT OR, PREFERABLE, WINDING DOWN OF THE WAR, WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM MORE EASILY TO KEEP THEIR FOOT IN THE DOOR IN TEHRAN. SHULTZ HAD TAKEN THE LINE PUBLICLY THAT THE GULF WAR HAD NOT BECOME AN EAST-WEST ISSUE AND THAT THE US AND USSR HAD SOME COMMON INTERESTS IN THE REGION. MURPHY HAD LITTLE INFORMATION ABOUT THE RECENT VISIT OF AN IRANIAN MFA OFFICIAL TO MOSCOW. IT SEEMED THAT VELAYATI MIGHT VISIT MOSCOW LATER IN THE YEAR. BUT THERE WAS NO SIGN OF IRANIAN FLEXIBILITY ON THE ISSUES - AFGHANISTAN AND TREATMENT OF THE TUDEH PARTY - OF MOST INTEREST TO THE RUSSIANS.

ARAB/ISRAEL.

6. MURPHY THOUGHT THERE WAS LITTLE TO BE DONE ON THIS ISSUE BEFORE THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS. A LABOUR-LED GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT INSTITUTE ANY DRAMATIC CHANGE IN POLICY. BUT THERE MIGHT BE A SENSE OF MOMENTUM AND CERTAIN DOORS MIGHT BECOME EASIER TO OPEN. LABOUR HAD ALWAYS BEEN WILLING, FOR EXAMPLE, TO NEGOTIATE A REDIVISION OF THE TERRITORY OF THE WEST BANK. UNDER LABOUR, ISRAELI/EGYPTIAN RELATIONS WERE LIKELY TO IMPROVE AND THIS MIGHT OFFER A FOUNDATION ON WHICH TO BUILD.

7. MURPHY NOTED THAT LABOUR MIGHT HAVE TROUBLE LIVING UP TO THEIR INTENTION TO WITHDRAW THE IDF FROM LEBANON WITHIN 6 MONTHS. THEY WOULD HAVE TO FACE THE SAME PROBLEMS AS LIKUD - WEAKNESS OF THE LAF, LACK OF A DIALOGUE WITH BEIRUT AND THE SYRIANS. SYRIAN OBJECTIVES VIS-A-VIS THE PLO AND LEBANON REMAINED UNCLEAR: THE SYRIANS HELD THE LEBANESE IN CONTEMPT AND HAD NO UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE LEBANON POLITICAL AND SECTARIAN SCENE.

8. THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WAS NOT IMPROVING. THE BRIDGES REMAINED CLOSED AND AGRICULTURE WAS PARALYSED. LAHAD'S FORCE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE CHARGE OF SECURITY FOR AT LEAST TWO YEARS. DESPITE THIS AND THE DECREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ATTACKS ON ISRAELI FORCES MURPHY BELIEVED THAT THE ISRALIS STILL WANTED TO WITHDRAW. HIS HOPE WAS THAT A RECONSTITUTED LAF, LAHAD'S FORCES AND UNIFIL COULD SOMEHOW BE BROUGHT TOGETHER TO ENSURE SECURITY.

9. MURPHY SAID THAT THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD MADE CLEAR TO SHULTZ, FOLLOWING HIS VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST, THAT HE HAD NO TIME FOR THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE BUT THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN FINDING A WAY TO ENGAGE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE HAD NOT, HOWEVER, THOUGHT THROUGH WHAT THE COUNCIL MIGHT DO. KING HUSSEIN WAS IN FAVOUR OF THIS COURSE AND THE ISRAELIS PREDICTABLY OPPOSED, THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN MUCH FRIENDLIER TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN PRIVATE THAN IN PUBLIC. HANNAY SUGGESTED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT OFFER LESS SCOPE FOR THE RUSSIANS THAN THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. MURPHY THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD INEVITABLY PLAY AN UNHELPFUL ROLE.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO ADEN, ALGIERS, JERUSALEM, KHARTOUM, RABAT SANAA, TRIPOLI, TUNIS.

WRIGHT

MIDDLE EAST
STANDARD(PALACE)

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MR EGERTON

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RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No.10 DOWNING ST (2)

CABINET OFFICE D I O

SIC
GRS 1100

SECRET
FROM AMMAN 191530Z JUN 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 549 OF 19 JUN 1984
AND TO INFO ROUTINE MOD (FOR D14),GULF STATES,BAGHDAD,
CAIRO,DAMASCUS,TEL AVIV,UKMIS NEW YORK,WASHINGTON,AND BIS TEHRAN.

ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE

MY TELNO 536: JORDAN GULF STATES AND IRAQ.

1.I SAW KING HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON:HE TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD BE GOING TO BAGHDAD LATER TODAY FOR A BRIEF VISIT, AND WISHED TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON HIS RECENT EXCHANGES WITH THE GULF STATES REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF JORDANIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

2.THE KING WENT OVER ONCE AGAIN THE BACKGROUND TO HIS OFFER TO SEND A JORDANIAN INFANTRY BATTALION TO BAHRAIN (MY TEL NOS 527 AND 530).FOLLOWING HIS OWN VISIT TO BAHRAIN, THE KING HAD SENT ON E OF HIS DIVISIONAL COMMANDERS,WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN CLOSELY INVOLVED WITH THE BAHRAINIS,IN CHARGE OF AN ADVANCE RECCE PARTY.THE KING REMARKED AT THIS POINT THAT IF THE BAHRAINIS HAD STUCK TO THEIR ORIGINAL REQUEST FOR A MECHANISED INFANTRY BATTALION,TRANSPORTING THEM TO BAHRAIN WITH THEIR EQUIPMENT WOULD HAVE REQUIRED 54 C130 FLIGHTS AND THIS IN TURN WOULD HAVE INVOLVED HIS HAVING TO SEEK HELP IN TRANSPORTING THEM FROM SAUDI ARABIA OR ELSEWHERE SEMICOLON HOWEVER,WHEN THE BAHRAINIS HAD SAID THEY WANTED AN ORDINARY INFANTRY BATTALION, THIS HAD GREATLY REDUCED THE AIR TRANSPORT REQUIREMENT WHICH [illegible] OWN RESOURCES.THE RECCE TEAM

THIS HAD GREATLY REDUCED THE AIR TRANSPORT REQUIREMENT WHICH COULD BE MET FROM JORDAN'S OWN RESOURCES.THE RECCE TEAM HAD BEEN ABLE TO COMPLETE ALL THE NECESSARY ADVANCE PLANNING AND IT HAD BEEN HOPED TO SEND THE FORCE TO BAHRAIN AT THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST.

3.HOWEVER ,ON THE NIGHT BEFORE THE JORDANIAN RECCE TEAM WAS DUE TO RETURN TO AMMAN,THE JORDANIAN GENERAL LEADING IT HAD BEEN TOLD THAT PRINCE BANDAR HAD JUST BROUGHT THE BAHRAINIS A MESSAGE FROM KING FAHD TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WOULD BE PRECIPITATE FOR BAHRAIN TO ACCEPT THE PRESENCE OF A JORDANIAN BATTALION AND THAT THE SAUDIS THEMSELVES WOULD SEND ANY TROOPS NEEDED AT THIS JUNCTURE FOR THE DEFENCE OF BAHRAIN.
IF ,HOWEVER,THERE WERE TO BE NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND HELP WERE NEEDED FROM OUTSIDE THE GULF, THE SAUDIS WOULD CALL ON THE JORDANIANS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE KING SAID THAT THE BAHRAINIS HAD FELT THAT THEY HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ACCEPT SAUDI ADVICE, ALTHOUGH THE KING CLAIMED THEY HAD DONE SO SADLY AND RELUCTANTLY.

4. DURING KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO KUWAIT, THE KUWAITIS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THEY TOO MIGHT NEED JORDANIAN ASSISTANCE AND WOULD SEND THEIR AIR FORCE COMMANDER TO AMMAN FOR FURTHER TALKS. HE HAD VISITED AMMAN ON 17 JUNE AND HAD REQUESTED THE JORDANIANS TO HAVE READY 150 TRAINED PERSONNEL TO HANDLE THE MAINTENANCE OF THE KUWAITI MIRAGE F1CS, AND ALSO TO HAVE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE DESPATCH ENGINES, SPARE PARTS AND POSSIBLY SOME RADARS. ACCORDING TO THE KING, THE REASONING BEHIND THIS REQUEST WAS THAT THE KUWAITIS AT PRESENT RELIED MAINLY ON PAKISTANIS AND OTHER FOREIGN EXPERTS TO SERVICE THEIR MIRAGES. SOME OF THESE EXPERTS WERE SHIITES AND THE KUWAITIS DID NOT FEEL THEY COULD RELY ON THEM TO REMAIN IN KUWAIT IN CASE OF AN IRANIAN ATTACK. HENCE THEIR WISH TO HAVE JORDANIAN EXPERTS AVAILABLE IMMEDIATLY IN CASE OF NEED.

5. COMMENTING ON HIS RECENT VISITS TO OMAN, ABU DHABI, AND QATAR, THE KING SAID THAT HE HAD HAD VERY SATISFACTORY TALKS WITH SULTAN QABUS WITH WHOM HE SAW EYE TO EYE ON THE NEED FOR CLOSER CO-ORDINATION AND PLANNING FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE GULF STATES.SULTAN QABUS HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD BEEN APPEALING FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS FOR CLOSER CO-OPERATION IN DEFENCE MATTERS BETWEEN GCC MEMBERS BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY SATISFACTORY RESPONSE.THE OMANIS HAD HOWEVER ALSO STRESSED THAT THEY DID NOT FEEL ABLE TO ACT ON THEIR OWN WITH JORDAN IN THE ABSENCE OF A UNANIMOUS DECISION BY THE GCC.IN BOTH QATAR AND ABU DHABI,THE KING SAID HE HAD FOUND CONSIDERABLE NERVOUSNESS OVER THE IRANIAN THREAT.HE HAD LEARNED THAT IT WOULD BE AT LEAST TWO YEARS BEFORE QATAR RECEIVED THE EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO DEFEND HERSELF AND THAT THERE WAS A CHRONIC LACK OF TRAINED MILITARY MANPOWER.HE HAD PROMISED BOTH QATAR AND ABU DHABI JORDANIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN CASE OF NEED.

6.THE KING THEN SPOKE OF PRINCE BANDAR'S VISIT TO AMMAN ON 13 JUNE.THE KING SAID HE HAD SENT A FIRM MESSAGE TO KING FAHD THROUGH PRINCE BANDAR THAT IF ANYTHING WENT AWRY IN BAHRAIN, SAUDI ARABIA MUST TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY.THE KING HAD ALSO REFERRED IN HIS MESSAGE TO BAHRAINI CONCERN OVER THE

THROUGH PRINCE BANDAR THAT IF ANYTHING WENT AWRY IN BAHRAIN, SAUDI ARABIA MUST TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY.THE KING HAD ALSO REFERRED IN HIS MESSAGE TO BAHRAINI CONCERN OVER THE EXISTENCE OF AN IRANIAN FORCE EQUIPPED WITH HELICOPTERS CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT A RAPID LANDING IN BAHRAIN SEMICOLON IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN AND THEY WERE ABLE TO TAKE THE AIR FIELD,IT WOULD THEN BE TOO LATE FOR JORDAN TO INTERVENE.

7. THE KING ALSO REFERRED IN SPEAKING TO ME TO THE OIL PIPELINE WHICH HE CLAIMED THE IRANIANS WERE ALREADY CONSTRUCTING AND WHICH WOULD AVOID DEPENDENCE ON PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ FOR THEIR OIL EXPORTS:HE REGARDED THIS AS A VERY SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT FOR THE GULF STATES. THE KING SEEMED SADDENED IF NOT ALTOGHER SURPRISED BY THE FAILURE OF HIS ATTEMPTS TO BOLSTER THE GULF STATES IN THE FACE OF THE IRANIAN THREAT AND BY WHAT HE SAW AS THE TOTALLY NEGATIVE AND UNHELPFUL ROLE OF THE SAUDIS.HOWEVER HE READILY AGREED WHEN I SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT THE GULF RULERS WERE PERHAPS GENUINELY TORN BETWEEN THEIR WISH FOR JORDANIAN HELP AND THEIR ANXIETY LEST CALLING IN THE JORDANIANS MIGHT PROVOKE THE IRANIANS INTO ATTACKING THEM.HE ALSO SAID THAT,IN VIEW OF HIS OFFER OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE,THE KUWAITIS MIGHT AGREE TO RESTORE THE RECENT CUT IN THEIR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN.

8.REFERRING TO THE VISIT TO BAGHDAD LATER TODAY,THE KING SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE LONG AWAITED IRANIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH WAS NOW IMMINENT.HE HAD A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS TO DISCUSS WITH THE IRAQIS,INCLUDING THE PROPOSED JORDAN -IRAQ PIPELINE.I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF HIM ON SIR JOHN MOBERLY'S RECENT MEETING WITH THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER TO DELIVER YOUR MESSAGE (BAGHDAD TELNO 328).

URWICK
BT

NNNN

TOP SECRET

Copy no 5 of 5 copies

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 June 1984

Syrian Relations with Iran: Report 3/00/021123-84

The Prime Minister has noted the commentary on this report conveyed in your letter of 11 June to John Coles.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Sir Antony Duff and Mr. Robin O'Neill (Cabinet Office).

C.D. POWELL

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TOP SECRET

cc PC.

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET
5422
Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215)
GTN 215)
(Switchboard) 215 7877

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

15 June 1984

No disagreement
MJ 15/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON
SW1A 2HB

D Michael,

YARROW SHIPS : IRAN

Thank you for copying to me your minute of 1 June. I have also seen Geoffrey Howe's minute of 11 June.

2 The balance between the risks to our trade with Iraq and the Gulf States if we proceed, and to our trade with Iran if we do not, is a fine one. My own feeling is that the overall trade risk is minimised by your intention to delay the process of delivery and completion for as long as possible. I think this is particularly important because I understand that the Kharg, as well as the Yarrow ships, is likely to be ready to sail in August. I very much hope it will prove possible to delay the procedures as long as reasonable, and, if at all possible, ensure that the sailings are phased.

3 In agreeing to your proposal, I also have in mind that ECGD have a direct interest in the release of the Yarrow ships since this will effect a full recovery of the sums paid by them to Yarrow's in respect of this contract.


4 I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, our OD colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours Norman

NORMAN TEBBIT

JH2APO

Iraq: Iran / Iraq Reports Pt 4



CONFIDENTIAL

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

Prime Minister, views already conveyed. No disagreement. CM 14/6.

14 June 1984

Simon Lowe Esq
Private Secretary to the Secretary of State
for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Horseguards Avenue
LONDON SW1

Dear Simon,

YARROW SHIPS: IRAN

The Chancellor has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 1 June to the Foreign Secretary, and the Foreign Secretary's reply of 11 June.

He agrees that we should not block delivery of these ships, but that the process of completion of the contracts should proceed as slowly as possible.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the recipients of your Secretary of State's minute.

Yours sincerely,

Miss J C Simpson
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQ: Iran/Iraq Pt 4



SECRET

cc: LCO CDL
HMT DTI
LPO CO
MOD
LPS

41

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 June 1984

Iran/Iraq: The Gulf War

The Prime Minister has noted the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 12 June on Iran/Iraq: the Gulf War.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 June, 1984.

Yarrow Ships - Iran

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 1 June and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 11 June.

Subject to the views of other OD colleagues, the Prime Minister agrees (albeit somewhat reluctantly) that you should proceed with signature of the oversight agreement for the two Yarrow support ships for Iran, but that you should seek to delay for as long as possible the process of delivery and completion.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A.J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 June, 1984.

Chemicals for use in Chemical Weapons

The Prime Minister has noted Mr. Channon's letter of 11 June to Mr. Luce on this subject.

I am copying this letter to Hayden Warren-Gash (Mr. Luce's Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Michael McCulloch (Mr. Raison's Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

eP

Jonathan Rees, Esq.,
Mr. Channon's Office,
Department of Trade and Industry.

Prime Minister 40.

Prime Minister
Not discussed but you will wish to note.
C D Powell 13/6

Prime Minister
For meeting with Sir Geoffrey Howe on 13 June
C D Powell
12/6.

PM/84/95

PRIME MINISTER

Iran/Iraq: The Gulf War

1. You will recall that at the meeting of OD(EM) on 18 May, it was agreed that we should continue our contacts with the United States on contingency planning, with the aim of influencing American policy towards an intensification of diplomatic activity aimed at limiting the recent attacks on shipping and away from premature military intervention. I reported briefly on these discussions at Cabinet on 7 June, but thought that you and other OD(EM) colleagues would welcome a further account.

2. A team of officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence visited Washington on 22 and 23 May, and their discussions were followed up by my own meetings with Messrs Shultz and Weinberger in the margins of the NATO Ministerial meeting the following week. I met Shultz again in London on 5 June, having previously reviewed the position with the Defence Secretary and agreed on the line to be taken with the Americans. The Gulf situation was also discussed collectively and in various bilateral meetings during the Economic Summit. We now need to draw these threads together.

3. The official level talks in Washington confirmed that the overall US approach to the Gulf situation is essentially the same as our own. The Americans agree that the emphasis must be placed on diplomatic activity; that military action

/must be

must be very much a last resort; and that a clear, public request for help from the Gulf States is a prerequisite for any Western involvement. It is reassuring that this line has been affirmed in public statements, including those by President Reagan himself. I believe that this cautious and pragmatic approach owes a good deal to the series of UK/US talks, in which we have helped the Americans to think through the implications of an escalation of the Iran/Iraq conflict and to assess the disadvantages of precipitate action.

4. In my own meetings with Shultz and Weinberger on 28 and 29 May, I was careful to emphasise, as our officials had previously made clear, that our participation in exchanges on options for possible Western military operations had been entirely without commitment to UK involvement in any joint action. This was accepted by both, though remarks by Shultz about the number of cards which the Americans have on the table, and the likelihood of their being called, suggested that he is still somewhat more ready than the rest of his colleagues to contemplate direct US military involvement in the protection of shipping, and also more inclined to respond promptly to any attempt to close the Straits of Hormuz. But even he agreed that the US wanted to avoid being drawn in, other than by providing the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, with the equipment they need for more effective self-defence. In practice, such US assistance has its limits, as is shown by the US Administration's refusal to sell Stinger missiles to Kuwait, having previously circumvented Congressional opposition to their sale to Saudi Arabia. We are instructing our Ambassador at Kuwait to tell the Kuwaitis that we are ready to sell them Blowpipe without delay and/or Javelin as soon as it is available, to fill this gap. We shall be looking for any other ways in which sales of British defence equipment can improve the Gulf States' own defensive capabilities and

/reduce

reduce the likelihood of an appeal for outside help.

5. Sir John Leahy's visit to Washington on 7 June provided further confirmation of the generally cautious American attitude to possible military involvement in the Gulf. Three or four points from his visit are perhaps worth stressing:

(a) one circumstance in which the Americans would react quickly, and probably without consultation with us or their other allies, would be a direct Iranian attack on US assets in the Gulf area, possibly extending to non-military targets such as US Embassies.

(b) in the unlikely event of a really serious disruption of oil supplies, the Americans might wish to start moving from diplomatic to military action earlier than we and others would wish (though such military action might in the first instance take the form merely of additional precautionary deployments).

(c) the Americans attach great importance to the active association of their allies with any measures to protect shipping (which gives us very considerable leverage with them, should we wish to exert it).

(d) the Americans have not followed up their earlier contacts with the Russians, to reassure them that any Western military action would be designed solely to protect shipping and would convey no threat to the Soviet Union.

Although we have already made the latter point to the Soviet Embassy in London, I shall ask our Ambassador in Moscow to reinforce it.

6. At the Economic Summit, the Gulf situation was in the forefront of all the participants' minds. It would have

/been

been unrealistic to expect that the Summit could achieve a breakthrough over a conflict which has lasted for nearly 4 years, and has defied the best efforts of a dozen or more would-be mediators; though this did not prevent the Governments of Egypt and Iraq appealing for economic measures which would bring pressure on Iran to accept negotiations for a ceasefire. Nevertheless, the Summit did agree on a statement by the chair reaffirming the participants' support for principles that have been threatened by the conflict, including respect for international humanitarian law and for freedom of navigation. It also expressed confidence in the international system's ability to cope with any foreseeable problems in the area of oil supplies.

7. Earlier, on 1 June, the UN Security Council adopted / resolution 552 (I enclose a copy). Though founded on a complaint by the Gulf States about Iranian attacks on their shipping, it avoids specifically condemning Iran. We kept a low profile during negotiations on the text, but made clear our general sympathy and support for the Gulf States. As a result we earned the thanks of most of the latter without appreciably damaging our relations with Iran.

8. In a separate initiative on 8 June the UN Secretary-General appealed to both parties to cease their attacks on civilian population centres in each other's territories. This appeal was promptly accepted by Iran and, somewhat more surprisingly, by Iraq. Similar gestures have been made in the past, without facilitating progress towards a wider ceasefire. But the apparent interest of both countries in UN supervision of the response to the Secretary-General's appeal should be a hopeful sign.

9. Despite these developments at the United Nations, Iraqi attacks on ships going to Kharg Island and Bandar Khomeini have continued, and there has been one further retaliatory attack (which did little damage) by Iran. The shooting down

/of

of at least one Iranian aircraft on 5 June showed, somewhat unexpectedly, that the Saudis were willing to display skill and political determination in their own defence, even though their leaders are now concerned about the possible consequences. However, the exaggerated publicity given to the US supporting role in the provision of AWACs and tanker aircraft, and the equally exaggerated reports about the escorting activities of US Navy ships in the Gulf, may have increased the risk of an incident directly involving US and Iranian ships or aircraft during the next few days, and this could have worrying consequences.

10. Nevertheless, the Iranians now face something of a dilemma, particularly if the Iraqi attacks on their shipping continue. In the face of Saudi readiness firmly to repel their incursions, they may eventually have to choose between

(a) all-out retaliatory air attacks against Saudi Arabia or other Gulf States, with the risk of losing substantial numbers of their remaining aircraft.

(b) continuing their own attacks on Arab ships, even though the Saudi defensive capability will either put their aircraft at risk or compel them to reduce the frequency and effectiveness of the attacks.

(c) resorting to sabotage action against eg Arab offshore oil installations, or to a terrorist campaign within the more vulnerable Gulf States.

(d) accepting that it would be better to cut their losses and concentrate on the land war with Iraq, where the long-postponed Iranian offensive is still awaited.

The Iranian attack on a Kuwaiti tanker on 10 June, much further from the Arab side of the Gulf than previous attacks, may

/indicate

indicate an intention to pursue option (b). Though the situation remains volatile, I do not believe that the likelihood of a serious disruption of shipping movements and oil supplies has become any greater as a result of the past few days' events.

11. However, if the situation should deteriorate and the Americans are presented with, or engineer, a request for Western military help, we shall have a difficult decision to make. As I have said, I believe our involvement in discussions on possible military options with the Americans was both necessary and beneficial, in ensuring that their attitude to the possibility of a major crisis is now realistic and appropriately cautious. But we have always recognised that such involvement would inevitably heighten US expectations that, if a crisis developed, we should be prepared if necessary to participate with them in operations to protect neutral shipping in the Gulf and/or to keep open the Straits of Hormuz. I believe it is vital that we should maintain complete independence to take this decision ourselves. We should continue to be chary of military involvement in any but the most extreme circumstances (we are not a major consumer of oil from the Gulf), and should continue doing everything possible to prevent a crisis reaching the point of military action by Western forces. But if the situation deteriorates, we shall require a very careful calculation of where the national interest lies, balancing the inevitable damage to our relations with the Americans and the Arab States if we stay out, with the military and political costs of embarking upon what could turn out to be a dangerously open-ended commitment. An important additional argument in favour of a very cautious approach, which we need to keep in mind, is our present understanding that any UK forces so involved would operate in cooperation with, but separate from, US forces. This would require the

/commitment

commitment of fairly substantial naval and land-based air assets. For the moment, I do not think any decisions are needed one way or the other. But we must clearly continue to watch the situation closely.

12. I am sending copies of this minute to OD colleagues and to Sir R Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
12 June 1984

MBR022/1
- 5 JUN 1984

GRS 400

UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY FCO 020900Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 020045Z JUNE 84
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 581 OF 1 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TEHRAN WASHINGTON GULF POSTS
INFO PRIORITY BONN PARIS THE HAGUE ISLAMABAD CAIRO NEW DELHI
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW UKDEL NATO

MIPT: SECURITY COUNCIL: ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING.

FOLLOWING IS UN TEXT OF SCR 552 OF 1 JUNE:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTER DATED 21 MAY 1984 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, OMAN, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (S/16574) COMPLAINING AGAINST IRANIAN ATTACKS ON COMMERCIAL SHIPS EN ROUTE TO AND FROM THE PORTS OF KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA,

NOTING THAT MEMBER STATES PLEDGED TO LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE WITH ONE ANOTHER AS GOOD NEIGHBOURS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER,

REAFFIRMING THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBER STATES TO THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER,

REAFFIRMING ALSO THAT ALL MEMBER STATES ARE OBLIGED TO REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE,

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GULF REGION TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND ITS VITAL ROLE TO THE STABILITY OF WORLD ECONOMY,

DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE RECENT ATTACKS ON COMMERICAL SHIPS, EN ROUTE TO AND FROM THE PORTS OF SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT,

CONVINCED THAT THESE ATTACKS CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY AND STABILITY OF THE AREA AND HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

1. CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO RESPECT IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW THE RIGHT OF FREE NAVIGATION,

2. REAFFIRMS THE RIGHT OF FREE NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND SEA LANES FOR SHIPPING EN ROUTE TO AND FROM ALL PORTS AND INSTALLATIONS OF THE LITTORAL STATES THAT ARE NOT PARTY TO THE HOSTILITIES:

/3

3. CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO RESPECT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE STATES THAT ARE NOT PARTY TO THE HOSTILITIES AND TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT WHICH MAY LEAD TO A FURTHER ESCALATION AND WIDENING OF THE CONFLICT:

4. CONDEMNS THESE RECENT ATTACKS ON COMMERICAL SHIPS EN ROUTE TO AND FROM THE PPORTS OF KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA:

5. DEMANDS THAT SUCH ATTACKS SHOULD CEASE FORTHWITH AND THER SHOULD BE NO INTERFERENCE WITH SHIPS EN ROUTE TO AND FROM STATES THAT ARE NOT PARTY TO THE HOSTILITIES:

6. DECIDES, IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION, TO MEET AGAIN TO CONSIDER EFFECTIVE MEASURES THAT ARE COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE AREA:

7. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION:

8. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER."

THOMSON

IRAN/IRAQ

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From the Minister for Trade

Prime Minister

CDP
12/6

Richard Luce Esq MP
Minister of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Whitehall
LONDON
SW1

11 June 1984

Dear Richard.

CHEMICALS FOR USE IN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Since my Private Secretary wrote to yours on 4 May my officials have been in touch with yours about the details of the Export Licensing arrangements for chemicals which could be used to make chemical weapons, following discussions with the British Chemical Industry.

I propose to make an order next week extending to all destinations our controls on exports of the five substances which the ten Member States of the Community agreed in April should be the subject of similar action. Subject to further discussions which my officials expect to have with individual British companies shortly, we plan to introduce licensing arrangements which will avoid the need for individual application for each export to countries where we are satisfied there is no risk of diversion to the combatants in the Gulf war.

I have also considered what action should be taken in respect of the three chemicals which we brought under control to Iran and Iraq in April but which are not on the Common Community List. My initial thought was to control the export of these three to all destinations along with the five on the Community List. But ICI export substantial quantities of one of these - dimethylamine - which is used as a fire retardent for polyurethane foam. We have also now established that this substance is produced and exported by companies in West Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands as well as in the United States and Japan. Yet none of these countries controls the export of dimethylamine, although we have urged them to consider the possibility. ICI have made it clear that they would object strongly to being placed at a competitive disadvantage if the UK alone were to widen its export control measures on this product.

I have therefore concluded that we should leave things as they are so far as the extra three chemicals are concerned: in other words it is only their direct export to Iran and Iraq which should be controlled. I do however firmly support your efforts to persuade our partners in the Community and in other OECD countries to take action to control the export of these other products and I should be very ready, in the context of a general agreement to control the export of dimethylamine, to widen the controls on this substance.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Prime Minister and to Timothy Raison.

Yours,

PAUL CHANNON

IRAQ PT 4

Internal Situation



(2)

Prime Minister. CCK

The Foreign and Defence Secretaries are agreed about the proposition in para. 1 below.

Content, subject to OD colleagues' Robert Armstrong Yes A.J.C. 11/6.

FCS/84/168

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Yarrow Ships - Iran

Thank you for your minute of 1 June, proposing that MOD should go ahead with signature of the oversight agreement for the two Yarrow support ships for Iran, but that we should seek to spin out for as long as we can the process of delivery and completion.

I agree with your proposal. As you note, the main contract has been signed, the Iranians have already paid £17.9 million (the bulk of the sum outstanding for the two ships), and it will be extremely difficult for MOD to delay signature of the oversight agreement any further. The Head of our Interests Section in Tehran has now separately advised that we cannot spin things out any longer without being accused of bad faith by the Iranians. In addition to financial penalties if we fail to go ahead, therefore, there will also be an adverse effect on our general relations (our exports to Iran in 1983 were worth £628 million: our second largest market in the Middle East). We are in any case playing for time by slowing down the issue of visas to the Iranian commissioning crews.

We have explained our position on the Yarrow ships to the Americans and to many of the Arab states, and they seem to have, reluctantly, accepted that we cannot now block delivery of the ships. As the MOD oversight agreement is only an adjunct to the main contract (which may become public at any moment), I therefore also believe that we should proceed with it, although I share your view that we

/should

should spin out the process of delivery and completion for as long as we can.

We shall subsequently need to consider the gradual release of the spares for the armoured vehicles, on the lines suggested in my minute of 10 April to the Prime Minister, although this continues to be an even more difficult case. But I agree that we should be able to leave this in abeyance for a little longer, provided that we can retain the Iranians' confidence by going ahead with the next step on the Yarrow ships.

I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, other OD colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
11 June 1984

IRAQ PT 4

Internal Strategy



NI3180 4 XXX 96

KUWAITI TANKER HIT BY MISSILE
BAHRAIN SUNDAY - A KUWAITI SUPERTANKER WAS HIT TODAY IN AN ATTACK BY AN UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT IN THE LATEST STRIKE AGAINST SHIPPING IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, GULF SHIPPING SOURCES CONFIRMED.
THEY SAID APPARENTLY ONE MISSILE HAD STARTED A FIRE ABOARD THE 163,448-TON TANKER KAZIMAH, BUT THE BLAZE WAS BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL AND THE VESSEL WAS NOW HEADING FOR QATAR.
THE KAZIMAH WAS SAILING IN BALLAST FOR KUWAIT WHEN THE ATTACK OCCURRED, ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL OF THE KUWAIT OIL TANKER COMPANY, WHICH OWNS THE VESSEL.
--

101406 JUN 84

PRIME MINISTER

BBC Radio News reports that leaders on both sides have agreed that the fighting must stop, following a message from Perez de Cuellar. (Text attached).

SC.

Duty Clerk

10 June 1984

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 100100Z JUN 84
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 601 OF 9 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN BAGHDAD GULF POSTS WASHINGTON MODUK (DI4)
INFO PRIORITY PARIS THE HAGUE MOSCOW CAIRO UKDEL NATO.

MIPT: IRAN/IRAQ

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENTS OF IRAN AND IRAQ.

QUOTE

I WAS PROFOUNDLY DISTRESSED ON LEARNING OF THE HEAVY CIVILIAN CASUALTIES CAUSED BY THE AERIAL ATTACK ON THE TOWN OF BANEH ON 5 JUNE 1984, WHICH HAS NOW BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, AND THE RETALIATORY AND COUNTER-RETALIATORY ATTACKS THAT FOLLOWED ON TOWNS IN IRAN AND IRAQ.

DELIBERATE MILITARY ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN AREAS CANNOT BE CONDONED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE INITIATION OF SUCH ATTACKS IN THE PAST, AND THE REPRISALS AND COUNTER-REPRISALS THEY PROVOKE, HAVE RESULTED IN MOUNTING LOSS OF LIFE AND SUFFERING TO INNOCENT AND DEFENCELESS CIVILIAN POPULATIONS. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THIS IMMEDIATELY CEASE.

THEREFORE I CALL UPON THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE RESPUBLIC OF IRAQ AND OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO DECLARE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS THAT EACH UNDERTAKES A SOLEMN COMMITMENT TO END, AND IN THE FUTURE REFRAIN FROM INITIATING, DELIBERATE MILITARY ATTACKS BY AERIAL BOMBARDMENT, MISSILES, SHELLING OR OTHER MEANS, ON PURELY CIVILIAN POPULATION CENTRES. MAY I SUGGEST, WITH RESPECT, THAT THE HOLY MONTH OF RAMADAN IS A PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE TIME FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO UNDERTAKE THIS HUMANITARIAN PLEDGE.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL EXPECTS THAT SUCH SOLEMN COMMITMENTS WILL BE SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED BY BOTH PARTIES. ONCE THE RESPECTIVE DECLARATIONS REQUESTED HAVE BEEN RECEIVED,

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL EXPECTS THAT SUCH SOLEMN COMMITMENTS WILL BE SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED BY BOTH PARTIES. ONCE THE RESPECTIVE DECLARATIONS REQUESTED HAVE BEEN RECEIVED, COMMUNICATED TO THE OTHER PARTY AND ENTERED INTO EFFECT, I WOULD BE PREPARED, IF THIS WERE TO PROVE NECESSARY, TO INITIATE STEPS TO INTRODUCE SUCH MEASURES AS MIGHT BE ESSENTIAL TO VERIFY THAT THE COMMITMENTS ARE ADHERED TO.

I APPEAL, IN THE NAME OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO RESPOND BY 1200 HOURS GMT ON 11 JUNE 1984 BY FURNISHING THE DECLARATIONS I HAVE REQUESTED, TO BE MADE EFFECTIVE AT 0001 HOURS GMT ON 12 JUNE 1984.

UNQUOTE

THOMSON

NNNN

OO WASHINGTON

OO TEHRAN

OO BAGHDAD

OO ABU DHABI

OO BAHRAIN

OO DOHA

OO DUBAI

OO KUWAIT

OO JEDDA

OO MUSCAT

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 June 1984

Prime Minister

Dear John,

Iran/Iraq

In view of the bilateral meetings which the Prime Minister will be having tomorrow, I thought that you might like to have a note on events in the Gulf since the briefing we provided for the Prime Minister's use at yesterday's dinner.

There have been no further attacks on shipping. There is still no confirmation that the Liberian-registered 'Dashaki' was hit by a mine on 6 June: it may have been an engine-room explosion. On the other hand, drifting mines from Iraqi-laid minefields near Bandar Khomeini have been an occasional hazard for some time.

Both sides are continuing to shell civilian targets. The Iranians have shelled the Iraqi port city of Basra where there is a British community of about 75 - there have been no reports of any British casualties. The MOD have no confirmation of press reports that the Iraqis have acquired long-range missiles from the USSR and cluster bombs from Chile. These claims may be intended to build up Iraqi confidence and deter the Iranians from launching their long-awaited major land offensive.

Yesterday evening the Iraqi Ambassador called at the FCO to hand over a copy of his Foreign Minister's appeal to the London Summit for a new initiative to end the war (this message was mentioned in yesterday's briefing).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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GRS 1150
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FROM WASHINGTON 072256Z JUN 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1806 OF 7 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TEHRAN GULF POSTS UKMIS NEW YORK MODUK
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WASHINGTON TELNO. 1778: THE GULF
SUMMARY

1. EXCEPT IN THE EVENT OF A DIRECT IRANIAN ATTACK ON THEM, THE US DO NOT INTEND TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN THE GULF WITHOUT A PUBLIC REQUEST AND SOME ALLIED PARTICIPATION. CONVERGENCE OF US AND UK THINKING BUT US WOULD PREFER A SPEEDIER MILITARY RESPONSE TO CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

2. SAUDI MOOD OF RESTRAINED JUBILATION OVER DOWNING OF IRANIAN PLANE(S). NO MEANS OF INFLUENCING IRAINIAN REGIME. IRANIAN LAND OFFENSIVE STILL EXPECTED. US INTEND TO REJECT KUWAITS REQUEST FOR STINGERS. SIR J LEAHY EXPRESSED ANNOYANCE AT CONTINUED STIMULATION OF PRESS INTERST IN BRITISH MILITARY SUPPLIES TO IRAN.

DETAIL

3. SIR J LEAHY DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN THE GULF TODAY WITH MURPHY, OTHER SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS AND KEMP (NSC STAFF). (NEITHER SIDE HAD RECEIVED AN ACCOUNT OF YOUR TALKS WITH SHULTZ AND THE PRESIDENT IN LONDON EARLIER THIS WEEK).

4. THE AMERICANS REITERATED THAT, EXCEPT IN THE EVENT OF A DIRECT IRANIAN ATTACK ON US FORCES OR FACILITIES, THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF INTERVENING MILITARILY IN THE GULF WITHOUT A PUBLIC REQUEST FROM THE GCC AND SOME ALLIED PARTICIPATION. IF THE IRANIANS WERE

INTERVENING MILITARILY IN THE GULF WITHOUT A PUBLIC REQUEST FROM THE GCC AND SOME ALLIED PARTICIPATION. IF THE IRANIANS WERE TO ATTACK A US SHIP OR, FACILITY THERE MIGHT BE LITTLE TIME FOR CONSULTATION BEFORE RETALIATORY ACTION NEEDED TO BE TAKEN. MURPHY IMPLIED THAT A STRIKE AGAINST A TARGET ON THE IRANIAN MAINLAND WOULD BE THE PREFERRED OPTION. AN IRANIAN TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST A US EMBASSY MIGHT POSE A MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM: THERE WOULD BE PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR RETALIATION BUT IT WOULD BE HARD TO ESTABLISH RESPONSIBLILITY SUFFICIENTLY CLEARLY AND A HOST COUNTRY WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO REQUEST US MILITARY ACTION.

5. MURPHY WELCOMED THE CONVERGENCE OF US AND UK THINKING BUT SHOWED SOME SENSITIVITY TO THE SUGGESTION THAT THE US/UK BILATERAL TALKS MIGHT HAVE LED TO CHANGES IN US POLICY. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOW LESS APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN INTERRUPTION IN GULF OIL SUPPLIES. KEMP, HOWEVER, ARGUED THAT CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS WOULD LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN THE INDEBTNESS OF BRAZIL AND OTHER COUNTRIES AND RISK A CRISIS IN THE WORLD BANKING SYSTEM AND THUS REQUIRE A RAPID RESPONSE.

6. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION THE AMERICANS APPEARED TO ACCEPT THAT AFTER AN INITIAL REACTION IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME FOR THE EFFECTS OF AN INTERRUPTION OF GULF OIL SUPPLIES TO WORK THROUGH ON THE WORLD MARKET. THEY ESTIMATED THAT ONE MILLION BPD MORE OF GULF PRODUCTION COULD BE EXPORTED VIA THE RED SEA PIPELINE AND THAT, ON THE MOST FAVOURABLE ASSUMPTIONS, UP TO A TOTAL OF FIVE MILLION BPD COULD BE PROVIDED BY INCREASED PRODUCTION FROM OTHER SOURCES. THE US WERE PREPARED TO RELEASE UP TO TWO MILLION BPD FROM THE STRATEGIC RESERVE TO MEET DOMESTIC NEEDS. NEVERTHELESS, THE AMERICANS FELT THAT IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS AND EARLY ACTION, AT A MINUMUM THE MOVING OF MCM FORCES NEARER THE SCENE OF ACTION, WOULD BE REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF MINING OF THE STRAITS. THOUGH THEIR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ALLOWED FOR ATTACKS ON FORCES LAYING MINES IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PREVENT ALL IRANIAN MINELAYING OPERATIONS IN THE STRAITS.

7. PRESSED TO SAY AT WHAT POINT THE UK WOULD BE PREPARED TO INTERVENE MILITARILY, LEAHY MADE CLEAR THAT WE WERE NOT COMMITTED TO ANY MILITARY INTERVENTION, WHICH WE SAW VERY MUCH AS A LAST RESORT. THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF OUR AGREEING IN ADVANCE THAT THIS OR THAT CONTINGENCY AUTOMATICALLY TRIGGERED A MILITARY RESPONSE SINCE THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES EVEN OF A CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS WOULD NOT BE CATASTROPHIC, WE DID NOT BELIEVE IT MADE SENSE TO RUSH INTO A MILITARY RESPONSE. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF UN SUPPORT FOR ANY COUNTER MEASURES. THE AMERICANS WERE SCEPTICAL, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT PREFER THIS TO WESTERN ACTION. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, PLACKE THOUGHT THAT THE FRENCH WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE ACTION IF THE NEED AROSE, THOUGH ON THEIR OWN TERMS. THE REGULAR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE US NAVAL COMMANDER IN THE GULF AND THE FRENCH COMMANDER IN DJIBOUTI THOUGH USEFUL HAD SHED NO LIGHT ON FRENCH CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

8 MURPHY SAID THAT THE AMERICANS NOW BELIEVED THAT POSSIBLY ONLY ONE IRANIAN F-4 WAS SHOT DOWN ON 5 JUNE. THE SAUDI AIR FORCE WAS STILL CLAIMING THAT SECOND F-4 HAD BEEN DOWNED BUT THERE WAS NO CONFIRMATION FROM AWACS OR OTHER SOURCES. THE INTERCEPTIONS HAD BEEN AUTHORISED AT A HIGH LEVEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH REVISED

~~CONFIRMATION FROM AWACS OR OTHER SOURCES. THE INTERCEPTIONS HAD BEEN AUTHORISED AT A HIGH LEVEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH REVISED~~ SAUDI RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE DEFENCE MINISTER THE PREVIOUS DAY. THE SAUDI MOOD WAS OF RESTRAINED JUBILATION. BUT THEY WERE NOT KEEN TO PUSH THEIR LUCK AND WERE TRYING BY EVERY POSSIBLE MEANS TO GET THE MESSAGE TO THE IRANIANS THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO TAKE PART IN A SHOOTING WAR IN THE GULF.

9. LEAHY ASKED ABOUT IRANIAN VIEWS OF US INVOLVEMENT IN THIS INCIDENT. MURPHY SAID THAT THE IRANIAN PUBLIC STATEMENT HAD BLAMED IT ON THE US BUT THAT HE HAD NO INDICATION OF THEIR PRIVATE VIEWS. THE AMERICANS DETECTED NO SOFTENING OF IRANIAN INTRANSIGENCE. NO EMISSARY OR INTERMEDIARY OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS HAD SUCCEEDED IN CHANGING THEIR VIEWS AT ALL. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO FIND A WAY OF PUTTING ACROSS US VIEWS IN TEHRAN WITHOUT THEIR BEING MISINTERPRETED. THE WILLINGNESS OF INDIVIDUAL IRANIANS TO LISTEN TO THE US SEEMED TO BE INVERSELY PROPORTIONATE TO THEIR INFLUENCE WITHIN THE REGIME. KHOMEINI AND HIS IMMEDIATE CIRCLE HAD NO INTEREST IN CHANGING THEIR STEREOTYPED VIEWS ON US POLICY.

10. MURPHY CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS STILL EXPECT THE IRANIANS TO LAUNCH THEIR LAND OFFENSIVE WITHIN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE WEEKS. HE DISCOUNTED REPORTS THAT THE DELAY WAS DUE TO DISSENT WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES OVER PROSECUTION OF THE WAR. FLOODING IN THE MARSHES AND THE NEED TO ACQUIRE PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT AGAINST CW SEEMED MORE PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATIONS. THE IRAQI DEFENCES SHOULD HOLD, ALBEIT WITH SOME DIFFICULTY, BUT THERE REMAINED A QUESTION MARK OVER IRAQI MORALE. LEAHY SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS NO LOGICAL REASON FOR THE IRANIANS TO CARRY OUT THEIR OFFENSIVE WITH THE ODDS APPARENTLY STACKED AGAINST THEM. THE AMERICAN ASSESSMENT WAS NEVERTHELESS
THAT PREPARATIONS WERE TOO FAR ADVANCED FOR THE OFFENSIVE TO BE CALLED OFF NOW: KHOMEINI PROBABLY GENUINELY BELIEVED THAT GOD WOULD GIVE HIM VICTORY.

11. MURPHY SAID THAT THE KUWAITI REQUEST FOR STINGERS WAS AWKWARD. THE SUBJECT HAD NOT COME UP DURING THE DEFENCE MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE US IN APRIL, BUT KUWAITI INTEREST HAD PROBABLY BEEN AROUSED BY THE RECENT VISIT OF THE US MILITARY TEAM AND SALE OF STINGER TO SAUDI ARABIA.
THE KUWAITIS WERE, ILL-ADVISEDLY, MAKING THE REQUEST A LITMUS TEST OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP: THE FACT WAS THAT THE US MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA WAS OF MUCH LONGER STANDING AND THERE WAS NO CONFIDENCE IN CONGRESS THAT THE KUWAITIS WOULD BE ABLE TO SAFEGUARD THE TECHNOLOGY INVOLVED AND KEEP THE MISSILES OUT OF PALESTINIAN HANDS. NO FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN, BUT THE CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO THE SALE TO THE SAUDIS MADE A NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO THE KUWAITIS ALMOST CERTAIN. THE AMERICANS WERE LIKELY TO TELL THE KUWAITIS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS THAT THEY COULD NOT SUPPLY STINGER, SOFTENING THIS BLOW BY OFFERING OTHER LESS CONTROVERSIAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND IMPROVED ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHARING AWACS DATA. IT WAS IMPORTANT HOWEVER NOT TO GIVE THE IRANIANS THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WEST DID NOT CARE ABOUT KUWAIT.

12. WE ASKED WHETHER GIVING THE KUWAITIS A NEGATIVE ANSWER

~~WE ASKED WHETHER GIVING THE KUWAITIS A NEGATIVE ANSWER~~ WAS MORE SENSIBLE THAN SIMPLY TEMPORISING. MURPHY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY BUT THOUGHT THAT THE EMERGING CONSENSUS IN WASHINGTON WAS TO GIVE AN EARLY REPLY SO THAT THE KUWAITIS COULD LOOK ELSEWHERE TO MEET THEIR REAL AIR DEFENCE NEEDS (THOUGH THEY ALREADY HELD SA7S). HE ASKED WHETHER WE COULD MAKE JAVELIN AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY. LEAHY THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT: JAVELIN WAS BEING INTRODUCED INTO SERVICE WITH OUR OWN FORCES ONLY LATER THIS YEAR. BUT HE AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE TIMING AND POSSIBILITY OF OUR OFFERING JAVELIN.

13. MURPHY SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD HAD NO RECENT DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF THE GULF WITH THE RUSSIANS. BUT THEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND IN MOSCOW THAT THE US INTEREST IN THE REGION WAS, AS HAD BEEN STATED PUBLICLY, IN FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND THAT THEY WERE DOING NOTHING TO THREATEN SOVIET INTERESTS. THE RUSSIANS HAD NO READY RESPONSE, AS THEY HAD ON ARAB/ISRAEL (AND US AID TO ISRAEL). LEAHY MENTIONED THAT WE HAD IT IN MIND TO DISCUSS THE GULF WITH THE RUSSIANS FAIRLY SOON: MURPHY THOUGHT THAT COULD BE USEFUL.

14. PICKING UP A REFERENCE IN YESTERDAY'S WASHINGTON POST TO BRITISH ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAN WHICH APPEARED TO REFLECT FURTHER OFFICIAL BRIEFING. LEAHY MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WAS GROWING IRRITATION IN LONDON AT THE PUBLIC EMPHASIS ON THE BRITISH ROLE. AS THE AMERICANS KNEW, WE WERE CONTINUING TO SCRUTINISE ALL EXPORT LICENCE APPLICATIONS CAREFULLY AND TO APPLY A VERY RESTRICTED INTERPRETATION OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS. THIS WAS A VERY BAD TIME FOR PUBLIC DISPLAY OF DISHARMONY BETWEEN US OVER ANYTHING RELATING TO THE SITUATION IN THE GULF. ENOUGH WAS ENOUGH. MURPHY TOOK THE POINT. HE AVOIDED A DIRECT ANSWER AS TO WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION INTENDED TO APPROACH THE FRENCH ABOUT THE SUPPLY OF EXOCETS TO IRAQ BUT ACKNOWLEGED THAT THIS QUESTION WAS INCREASINGLY BEING RAISED BY THE PRESS AND CONGRESS.

WRIGHT

NNNN

NI2230 4 XXX 155

DOWNED PLANE BELIEVED TO BE IRANIAN
MANAMA, BAHRAIN, TUESDAY - SAUDI ARABIAN AIR FORCE JETFIGHTERS SHOT DOWN AN UNIDENTIFIED WARPLANE IN A BRIEF DOGFIGHT OVER THE GULF WATERS TODAY, THE SAUDI DEFENCE MINISTRY ANNOUNCED.
THE SAUDI STATE RADIO INTERRUPTED REGULAR PROGRAMMES TO ANNOUNCE THE DOWNING, WHICH IT SID OCCURRED AT 10.33 B.S.T.
THE INTRUDING PLANE WAS BELIEVED TO BE IRANIAN, ACCORDING TO SOURCES REACHED BY TELEPHONE IN THE EASTERN SAUDI ARABIAN PROVINCE.
THE DEFENCE MINISTRY STATEMENT INDICATED THAT U.S.-BUILT ADVANCE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM (AWACS) PLANES DETECTED THE PLANE THE MOMENT IT CAME INTO SAUDI AIRSPACE.
MOMENTS LATER, THE STATEMENT SAID, INTERCEPTING JETFIGHTERS TOOK TO THE AIR, ENGAGED THE PLANE AND SHOT IT DOWN. THE STATEMENT DID NOT IDENTIFY THE PLANE.
THERE ARE FOUR U.S. AWACS JETS IN EASTERN SAUDI ARABIA, PILOTED BY AMERICANS AND SAUDI NAVIGATORS.
--

051600 JUN 84

IRAN/IRAQ ADVANCE COPIES 18

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
HD/CONS. D
HD/CONS. EM UNIT
HD/NEWS D
HD/DEFENCE D

RESIDENT CLERK



PS/No.10 DOWNING ST (2)

CABINET OFFICE D I O

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

Prime Minister.
This would be significant.
F/C.O. are investigating.
A.J.C. 4/6.

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM KUWAIT 041130Z JUN84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 218 OF 04 JUNE 84
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
AND INFORMATION IMMEDIATE GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN.

ATTACKS ON SHIPPING IN THE GULF.

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED CONFIRMATION OF TODAYS KUWAIT PRESS REPORTS THAT US NAVAL VESSELS HAVE BEGUN PROTECTING OIL TANKERS AND COMMERCIAL SHIPS IN THE GULF. KOTC HAVE TOLD US THAT THE TANKER RAS AL JALAI'A WAS ESCORTED BY TWO US NAVAL VESSELS FROM APPROXIMATELY 27 DEGREES NORTH TO JUST OFF BAHRAIN, FROM THERE TWO OTHER IS VESSELS TOOK UP THE TASK ESCORTING THE TANKER TO NEAR ARABI ISLAND, ABOUT 140MILES SOUTH OF KUWAIT. NO RADIO CONTACT WAS MADE AT ANY TIME.

2. ANOTHER KOTC TANKER, THE RAS AL BASHIR, WAS ESCORTED IN THE SAME MANNER, THOUGH THIS TIME THE US NAVAL VESSELS CAME SO CLOSE TO THE TANKER THAT THE SWEDISH MASTER WAS FORCED TO BREAK RADIO SILENCE IN ORDER TO PREVENT A COLLISION. THE MASTER DESCRIBED THE US ATTITUDE AS INSISTENT AND THREATENING.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB

01-212 3434

John Prescott Esq MP
House of Commons
LONDON SW1A OAA

24 May 1984

Dear John

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 21 May to the Foreign Secretary about the dangers facing British seafarers in the Arabian Gulf. I share the concern you express for the safety of seafarers and have looked carefully at the points you made.

The Government views with serious concern the increase in attacks on shipping in the Gulf. We have made urgent protests to both Iraq and Iran to end hostilities as soon as possible and have reiterated our view that, in the meantime, freedom of navigation in the Gulf and through the Straits of Hormuz must be respected. But although the policies of the belligerents in their attacks on shipping are deplorable I do not think they go quite so wide as you describe them. There is always a large number of ships in the Gulf and I do not think it can be said that the belligerents have tried to attack every ship in that area.

The Government does not have the power to issue directions to British shipping not to enter the Gulf. But it has watched the situation there closely ever since the beginning of hostilities in 1980, and has issued advice

and guidance through the General Council of British Shipping on the changing pattern of events: most recently yesterday. This assists owners in their assessment of the risks for both ships and crews involved in trading to the Gulf.

You said seafarers were liable to find themselves serving in the Gulf through no choice of their own. Where there are undoubted risks this would clearly be unsatisfactory. I have therefore been glad to learn that it is the practice of British owners to inform seamen when a voyage is likely to take them into the Gulf, and that they are free to avoid that area if they wish. I also understand that seamen are afforded an opportunity to leave a ship operating in the Gulf before that ship enters the war zone. I am told that, by agreement between the General Council of British Shipping and the seafarers' unions the area covered by the war zone was substantially extended on 17 May: and that it now begins a considerable distance from the area where the majority of attacks have taken place. The effect of this arrangement appears to be that seamen going into the war zone are volunteers, having the option to be replaced without affect to their careers. This is surely right.

My Department will continue to watch critically events in the Gulf and to assess their consequences for British shipping and will issue such further advice and guidance as the situation may demand.

NICHOLAS RIDLEY

Following is the advice issued to shipping by HM Government on 23 May:

"The Iran/Iraq conflict continues to present a threat to shipping. A Panamanian vessel was sunk on 19 May, following an attack which took place near Kharg Island. This obviously underlines the heightened risks involved in operating in the Gulf. These risks are likely to persist. The Government therefore advises Masters and Owners to pay particular attention to this development before deciding to send their vessels into this area."

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB

01-212 3434

J Slater Esq
President
National Union of Seamen
Maritime House
Old Town
Clapham
LONDON SW4 OJP

24 May 1984

Dear Mr Slater

As I have responsibility within Government for shipping matters, the Foreign Secretary has passed to me your telex of 20 May in which you urge that British Masters be instructed not to proceed to the Gulf.

I fully appreciate the concern you express for the safety of your members. We have looked at the points you made very carefully. But the Government does not possess the legal powers to issue an instruction to British shipping of the kind you sought. I understand, however, that you have an agreement with the General Council of British Shipping which ensures that crew members are given the opportunity of leaving vessels before they enter a war risk area. In other words, British seamen are free agents to accept or decline to work on ships going to the zones of potential risk, and there is consequently no possibility of your members having to enter such zones against their will.

Let me assure you that the Government continues to watch very carefully developments in the Iran/Iraq conflict, and we shall continue to issue advice to the shipping industry as appropriate. Some further advice was issued yesterday. I have made arrangements for you to receive a copy.

Given public interest in the subject, I intend to make the contents of this letter public.

Yours sincerely

Nicholas Ridley

NICHOLAS RIDLEY

2F

AW

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Mr Eddie Loyden (Lab - Liverpool, Garston):

To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, what steps he is taking to safeguard the lives of British seamen operating in the Persian Gulf.

MR NICHOLAS RIDLEY

The Government has watched the safety of navigation in the Arabian Gulf closely since the beginning of hostilities between Iraq and Iran in 1980; and has periodically issued guidance through the General Council of British Shipping to British shipowners on the changing pattern of events; most recently on 23 May in the terms set out below. Such advice helps those involved to assess the risks to vessels and their crews in the Gulf.

It is British shipowners' normal practice to inform their crews when a voyage will involve a passage within the Gulf, and afford seamen an opportunity to leave a ship if they wish before it enters the declared war zone.

The Government will continue to watch events in the Gulf critically, to assess their consequences for British shipping, and to issue further advice as the situation demands.

A British seaman will if necessary be able to call on the services of Consular officials in the usual way.

Following is the guidance issued on 23 May:-

"The Iran/Iraq conflict continues to present a threat to shipping. A Panamanian vessel was sunk on 19 May following an attack which took place near Kharg Island. This obviously underlines the heightened risks involved in operating in the Gulf. These risks are likely to persist. The Government therefore advises masters and owners to pay particular attention to this development before deciding to send their vessels into this area."

Iraq. Int Sit Pt 4.



MO 26/9/15

Awaiting views of Foreign Secretary and then D.U.

5/6.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

YARROW SHIPS

I have seen the account of the further discussions with the Americans on the supply of these ships reported in telegram no 1618 of 23rd May. The main contract for supply of the ships has been signed, and this produces a tight limit on the completion of the vessels if financial penalties are to be avoided. We cannot therefore long delay a decision on whether we are to let the contracts run ahead and face the consequences of that politically and internationally or whether we are to suspend them or cancel them and tell the Iranians that this is the inevitable consequence of their attacks on international shipping in the Gulf.

2. The only overt reason we have for delay at present is that MOD have a Farsi version of the agreement under which the RN will exercise oversight of the completion of the vessels on behalf of the Iranians, and are checking it for accuracy. This excuse will become totally transparent within a matter of days. Further delay then can only mean that we have to tell the Iranians that their actions have caused us to reconsider our previous statements that completion of the vessels could go ahead subject to satisfactory renegotiation of the contracts. Such a course of action could bring substantial financial loss starting with the compensation payments which IMS would have to make under the contract for the £17.9M which the Iranians have already paid to IMS and their inevitable consequential claim against MOD for having imposed such a requirement on them. There would be a clear risk of further claims in respect of the value of the rest of the Yarrow contract, the spares contracts and the original tank contracts, together with damage to our wider commercial interests with Iran.

3. On the other hand, simply going ahead with the contracts and signing an agreement for RN oversight would cause obvious presentational problems at the present time. We have, of course, gone to great lengths to persuade the Americans and the Gulf States of the reasons for proceeding with the supply of the vessels: the facts that they would pose no threat to the forces of the Gulf States or Allied navies in a Gulf conflict and that, in any case, they will not be completed for three or four months and are not likely to be in Iranian hands until the end of the year at least. But there is no doubt that it will be difficult to persuade the Gulf States and the Americans that we are justified in completing the agreement with the Iranians and there could, of course, be implications for current sales prospects in the area.

4. The Iranians do not seem to be pressing us at all on the supply of tank spares (your minute of 10th April to the Prime Minister) and I think that this question can be left for the time being as it stands with the Iranians seeming to accept that we are taking a long time to comb through the long lists of spares to decide which are non lethal. On the Yarrow ships however I think that we need to decide very soon on what the next steps are. The news that the main contract has in fact been signed might in any case become known before long. My own instinct would be to proceed, but to spin out the process of delivery and completion for as long as we can. I should be grateful for your views.

5. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, our OD colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
1st June 1984

IRAQ : Int Sit Pt 4

File

CONFIDENTIAL

Andrew.
As discussed, a copy for your personal information and not the PM. We may well put an up to date version on at the weekend.
DP 30/5

MR REDWOOD

30 May 1984

THE OIL MARKET

Press reports of a rapid build-up of stocks by oil companies and a virtual halt to tanker traffic through the Gulf are greatly exaggerated.

Spot Prices

The best indication of the market's lack of panic is given by the spot market. North Sea spot prices are at term levels while the Arabian light OPEC marker crude is trading at 60 cents per barrel below official prices. Although the increased tension in the Gulf has resulted in firmer prices than would otherwise have been the case, the market generally remains calm. Indeed, without the recent events in the Gulf we would be worrying about a potential price collapse.

Although the spot price would undoubtedly increase rapidly if the Straits of Hormuz were closed, there would be very little trading at the higher prices. The prospects for a rapid fall in prices will depend largely upon market perceptions rather than realities. These perceptions will be conditioned by the initial reactions of the UK Government, the IEA, other producing countries and the perceived willingness of consuming countries to draw on stocks. Provided that there are clear immediate statements of intent by all these parties, the market would expect the price to begin to fall and a closure of the Straits for even six months to be manageable.

The general feeling is that the Straits would only be closed for a short period of time. The market is generally reassured by the statements from President Reagan and is comforted by the 55-60 million barrels of oil which Saudi Arabia has in floating storage outside the Gulf.

Stocks

The trade figures for April do indicate a 5% increase in total UK stocks. On a wider scale, stock build-up in the IEA in April amounted to about 1%. However, the overall impression, confirmed by informal discussions with oil companies, is that the general approach is to refrain from reducing stocks further rather than a general policy to build up stocks. The companies have spent the last three years running down stocks in order to produce a better working capital position and they are reluctant to reverse this trend, except in response to events rather than expectations. Closure of the Straits of Hormuz has been

billed many times before. The companies have made their contingency plans and remain generally relaxed.

Nevertheless, they are tending to buy further forward than normal with the emphasis on more secure sources of supply. However, this is only occurring for July oil and no company appears to be buying forward into August or September.

Traffic in the Gulf

There are conflicting reports about the extent to which the flow of tankers through the Gulf has been disrupted by recent events. Despite press reports that traffic is nearly at a standstill, information provided by posts and the companies seems to indicate that at a maximum traffic has been reduced by perhaps 20%. It is quite normal for there to be 30 tankers waiting outside the Gulf and press reports that this indicates an unwillingness to venture into the Gulf are misleading.

However, loadings at Kharg Island are significantly down. Estimates vary widely but the general impression is that between half to one million barrels per day were loaded last week compared with a normal level of 1.6 million barrels per day.

Conflicting information is also being received about loadings at Kuwait. Some posts indicate that these are proceeding normally whereas some company information indicates that loadings are perhaps down by as much as 50%. However, this is blamed more on insurance rates than on the risk of physical attack.

Fuel Oil Supplies

Oil burn is a vital part of the CEGB's endurance strategy. However, we would not expect the closure of the Straits of Hormuz to require a change in strategy. Continued supplies are likely to be a price rather than availability question and provided we are prepared to pay higher spot prices, we should be able to continue with 100% oil burn.

The CEGB are holding maximum oil stocks which amounts to about two weeks of oil burn. They are also buying forward on the spot market. It is important that the CEGB reduce their exposure to the spot market in the critical few weeks following any closure of the Straits.

UK stocks could meet CEGB demand for 20 weeks. There may be some problems in giving the CEGB priority on fuel oil stocks, particularly as they have only recently become a

large purchaser. Nevertheless, this should not present any major difficulties although we may come under international pressure to reduce oil burn. If the situation did become critical, we could always take wide-ranging powers under the Energy Act, 1976 to regulate supplies within the UK.

Conclusions

The oil market remains calm and there are no signs of panic. Spot prices are not above term prices. There is a modest build-up in stocks and an increasing tendency to buy further forward.

Closer examination of the situation in the Gulf supports the generally relaxed attitude being taken by the companies. Traffic through the Gulf appears not to be significantly reduced although loadings at Kharg Island are down.

The market is confident that the Straits would only be closed for a short period. However, it is equally relaxed that closure of up to six months would be manageable.

Although it is possible that the oil companies and the market is complacent, we are generally reassured by the attitude which they are adopting. If the Straits were closed, the immediate reaction of all parties concerned will be crucial in ensuring that price and the supply remains under control. Perceptions rather than realities will be determining. Although the spot price will undoubtedly jump if a crisis occurs, prompt response and reassuring statements by all concerned should ensure that high prices last for only a relatively short time.

DLP.

DAVID PASCALL

DATAAD

MR COLES

MR 30/5.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 May 1984

Dear Peter,

Your Secretary of State had a telephone conversation with the Prime Minister at Chequers during the evening of Sunday 27 May, on his return from Salon de Provence. I gave Len Appleyard an oral account of the conversation immediately afterwards.

The Foreign Secretary raised three points. The first related to Hong Kong, and has been pursued separately. Secondly, there was a discussion about merchant shipping in the Gulf. The Prime Minister asked for a report on the presence of British merchant ships in the area, and this was provided on the following day, Monday 28 May.

The third point to be discussed was the possibility of a UN naval force to help keep the peace in the Gulf. The Foreign Secretary asked whether the Prime Minister thought that this was an idea worth pursuing. The Prime Minister's view was that it was not. She said that such a force would be in an impossible position, without a clear command structure and unable to intervene. She would be most reluctant for the Royal Navy to play any part.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

David

David Barclay

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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GR450
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FM WASHINGTON 300235Z MAY, 1984
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1670 OF 29 MAY
INFO BAGHDAD, JEDDA, KUWAIT, TEHRAN, TOKYO, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (DS 11).

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER: GULF

1. THE SITUATION IN THE GULF WAS THE FIRST SUBJECT DISCUSSED AT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH WEINBERGER AT 0930 ON 29 MAY.

2. WEINBERGER REFERRED TO THE US SUPPLY OF STINGER MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA. WITH THEIR AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY ENHANCED, THE SAUDIS BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD HOLD THEIR OWN. CONTAINING THE SPREAD OF THE WAR WAS IMPORTANT. BUT THE US ADMINISTRATION SAW LITTLE CHANCE OF ITS ENDING SOON. WITH THEIR OVERWHELMING NUMBERS. AND UNCONCERN ABOUT CASUALTIES, THE IRANIANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO PLOUGH ON FOR SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME, AND INDEED PERHAPS UNTIL THERE WAS A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN. FOR STRATEGIC, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REASONS THE US WOULD LIKE TO GET ALONGSIDE THE GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN, BUT JUDGED THAT OVERTURES TO KHOMEINI WOULD BE POINTLESS.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE TOO SAW LITTLE HOPE OF AN EARLY END TO THE WAR: AND DISADVANTAGES FOR THE WEST IN A WIN FOR EITHER SIDE: THE BEST OUTCOME WOULD BE A DRAW. CONCEIVABLY, OF COURSE, THE FAILURE OF ANOTHER OFFENSIVE ON THE GROUND MIGHT CAUSE TEHRAN TO CHANGE ITS TUNE, BUT THE ODDS WERE AGAINST THIS.

4. WEINBERGER STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DRYING UP ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE HAD CLOSED DOWN UK SUPPLIES LONG SINCE: THERE HAD BEEN LESS THAN POUNDS STERLING 20 MILLION OF SALES OF UK-MANUFACTURED EQUIPMENT IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS, AND THAT INCLUDED CIVIL AERO-ENGINES. ARAB LEAGUE SPOKESMEN. HOWEVER, ALLEGED THAT SOME US-MANUFACTURED KIT WAS STILL GETTING THROUGH. WEINBERGER SAID THAT THIS MUST BE EX-VIETNAM SUPPLIES, COMING THROUGH THIRD PARTIES, AND ENQUIRED ABOUT UK-BUILT NAVAL VESSELS FOR IRAN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT BOTH THE KHARG AND THE TWO SMALLER SUPPORT CRAFT WERE VERY LONGSTANDING ORDERS, ON WHICH WE HAD HELD BACK FOR A CONSIDERABLE TIME: THEY HAD NO MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

5. WEINBERGER THEN REFERRED TO US/UK CONTINGENCY PLANNING. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET IN A POSITION WHERE WE COULD BOTH RESPOND POSITIVELY, IF WE SO WISHED, TO A PUBLIC REQUREST, WERE ONE EVENTUALLY FORTHCOMING, FROM THE SAUDIS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION. NATO SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER THE IMPACT ON THE ALLIANCE IF GULF OIL SUPPLIES WERE TO DRY UP. AND THE PRESENT JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE PREPARED TO PLAN MORE ACTIVELY HOW BEST TO RESPOND TO AN INTERRUPTION OF OIL SUPPLIES.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE JAPANESE HAD A GREATER INTEREST IN THE QUESTION THAN DID MOST COUNTRIES. AS FOR THE UK/US TALKS, HE STRESSED THAT THEY HAD BEEN CONDUCTED ENTIRELY WITHOUT COMMITMENT ON OUR SIDE. WEINBERGER SAID THAT THIS WAS UNDERSTOOD. THE TALKS HAD NEVERTHELESS BEEN VALUABLE.

7. FOR DISCUSSION ON NON-GULF SUBJECTS, SEE MIFT: NOT TO ALL.

WRIGHT

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

IRAN/IRAQ

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

From The Minister of State

Richard Luce MP

29 May 1984

The Prime Minister has already agreed.

A.J.C. 30/5

Dear Prime Minister,

DEPLOYMENT OF THE MCM FORCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

In Sir G Howe's absence in Washington I am commenting on the Defence Secretary's minute of 24 May recommending that we approach the Italian Government requesting facilities for our MCM Force at a suitable base in Southern Italy or Sicily.

At a time when the situation in the Gulf is giving cause for considerable concern, the use of facilities in Italy, rather than others somewhat closer in the Eastern Mediterranean, is not ideal. I note, however, that the facilities at Akrotiri in the Sovereign Base Areas are unsuitable, that difficulties attach to other possibilities in the area and that the intention would in any case be for the main elements of the Force to spend much of their time on exercise and visits in the Eastern Meditarranean. In view of these considerations I agree that we should approach the Italians as the Defence Secretary recommends.

Our Ambassador in Rome is aware of this possibility and has stressed the importance of presenting our request carefully to the Italian authorities. He has indicated that he will wish in the first instance to pursue the matter with the Defence Minister, Signor Spadolini. It is important therefore that the first approach to the Italians should be through our Ambassador. FCO and MOD officials are in touch over an appropriate telegram of instructions.

Finally, I agree that the future of the Force might be reviewed at the end of August unless of course events in the Gulf make this necessary before then.

Richard

The Prime Minister
No 10
Downing Street
LONDON SW1

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Copied to:-

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON SW1A 2HB


The Rt Hon Norman Tebbit MP
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
1 Victoria Street
LONDON SW1H 0ET

The Rt Hon Peter Walker MP
Secretary of State for Energy
Department of Energy
Thames House South
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LONDON SW1P 4QJ

The Rt Hon Nicholas Ridley MP
Secretary of State for Transport
Department of Transport
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LONDON SW1P 3EB

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO
Secretary of the Cabinet
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
LONDON SW1A 2AS

IRAQ : Int. Sit : Pt 4



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SIR J BULLARD
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MR EGERTON
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HD/CONS. D
HD/CONS. EM UNIT
HD/NEWS D
HD/DEFENCE D

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PP THE HAGUE

PP UKREP BRUSSELS

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GR 900
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FM WASHINGTON 290345Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1651 OF 28 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S DINNER WITH SHULTZ: GULF

1. DURING HIS BILATERAL DINNER WITH SHULTZ THIS EVENING, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE US/UK BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE ON POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES IN THE GULF HAD BEEN USEFUL. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT OUR APPROACH TO THE BASIC ISSUES WAS NOW VERY SIMILAR. HE REFERRED TO THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN EC FOREIGN MINISTERS OVER THE WEEKEND, WHICH HAD CONCLUDED THAT FROM THE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW IT WAS FORTUNATE THAT THE RECENT ESCALATION IN THE WAR HAD TAKEN PLACE WHEN THE OIL MARKET WAS RELATIVELY CALM. BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END. HIS OWN CONCLUSION WAS THAT WE HAD LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO LET IT RUN ITS COURSE, IN THE MEANTIME TAKING EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO USE AVAILABLE DIPLOMATIC LEVERAGE TO TRY TO KEEP IT IN CHECK.

2. SHULTZ WELCOMED THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WE HAD HAD. HE SHARED THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S JUDGEMENT THAT OUR VIEWS HAD COME CLOSER TOGETHER THAN THEY HAD BEEN AT THE START. THE SITUATION IN THE WAR SEEMED TO BE ONE OF STALEMATE. THE IRANIANS MIGHT TRY TO BREAK THE STALEMATE BUT IF THEY DID HE FEARED THE IRAQIS MIGHT MAKE FURTHER USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THIS WOULD BE A CALAMITY. IT WOULD BE AN EVEN GREATER CALAMITY IF IT SUCCEEDED.

3. SHULTZ WENT ON TO SAY THAT WHAT SEEMED TO BE HAPPENING NOW WAS THAT BOTH THE BELLIGERENTS WERE GOING OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARIES OF THEIR OWN WAR. IRAQ WAS TRYING TO INVOLVE OTHERS. THE US DEPLORED THE ATTACKS THE IRAQIS WERE MAKING ON NEUTRAL SHIPPING BUT IT WAS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD NOT CONTINUE TO RETALIATE.

4. SHULTZ WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE LIKELY EFFECTIVENESS OF A UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. HE SAID WE COULD NOT HIDE FROM THE FACT THAT THE WAR WAS ESCALATING. THE QUESTION WAS WHAT COULD BE DONE ABOUT IT. THERE WAS ALREADY SOME DEGREE OF US INVOLVEMENT. THE AWACS AIRCRAFT WERE CARRYING OUT 24 HOUR MONITORING AND THE SAUDI AIR FORCE HAD ALREADY SCRAMBLED TWICE. THIS EXPOSED THE US TO CONSIDERABLE RISK. THE IRANIANS TREATED ANYONE WHO WAS HELPING THE IRAQIS AS THE ENEMY. THEY WOULD KNOW OF THE AWACS PATROLS OVER SAUDI TERRITORY. THEY WOULD KNOW OF THE PRESENCE OF US SHIPS AND HAD NOTED US STATEMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO ANY ATTEMPTS TO CLOSE THE STRAITS. THE AMERICANS HAD A LOT OF CARDS ON THE TABLE AND SHULTZ FELT THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WOULD GET CALLED. THIS WAS A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION AND IT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD ACT IN CONCERT.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED THAT THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WE HAD HELD WERE VERY MUCH ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS AND THEIR RESULTS WERE SUBJECT TO FURTHER MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION IN LONDON. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BECOMING DRAWN INTO THE CONFLICT NEEDED VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. THE IRANIAN ATTACKS ON SHIPPING WERE ALREADY HAVING SOME EFFECT. SOME OF THAT EFFECT WAS DAMAGING TO IRAN AND THEY MIGHT COME TO RECOGNISE THIS. HE ASKED HOW SHULTZ SAW THE SITUATION IN TEHRAN.

6. SHULTZ REPLIED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE CONFLICTING CURRENTS BUT HE DID NOT YET KNOW WHAT TO MAKE OF THEM. HE HAD RECENTLY DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH YAKOUB KHAN WHO DID NOT CLAIM TO HAVE ANY BETTER UNDERSTANDING.

7. SHULTZ WENT ON THAT WE OUGHT TO DISCUSS WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN THE EVENT THAT THE IRANIANS ATTACK US AIRCRAFT OR SHIPS. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WOULD BE LITTLE TIME TO CONSULT. US COMMANDERS WOULD ACT ON THE BASIS OF THEIR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT WE NEEDED TO BE EXTREMELY CLEAR ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. IN THE LEBANON THERE HAD BEEN DIFFERENCES OVER THIS. HE HAD NOT YET HAD THE CHANCE TO LOOK AT THE RESULTS OF THE US/UK MILITARY/MILITARY TALKS ON THIS. HE SUGGESTED THAT HE AND SHULTZ SHOULD DISCUSS THIS ASPECT FURTHER WHEN THEY MET IN LONDON IN THE MARGINS OF THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT. SHULTZ AGREED, ADDING THAT THE SITUATION WAS SERIOUS AND COULD GET WORSE. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO KEEP COOL HEADS. BUT IF, AFTER AN ATTACK, TOO MUCH TIME WAS ALLOWED TO PASS BEFORE THERE WAS A REACTION, THE MOMENT TO DO SOMETHING EFFECTIVE COULD BE LOST.

8. GRATEFUL IF HASKELL WOULD AUTHORISE FURTHER REPITITIONS AS HE THINKS APPROPRIATE.

WRIGHT

IRAN/IRAQ ADVANCE COPIES 18 (23)

PS (6)
PS/MR LUCE
~~PS/PUS~~
SIR J BULLARD
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PS/No.10 DOWNING ST (2)

CABINET OFFICE D I O

RESIDENT CLERK

GR 330

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 281655Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1648 OF 28 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, JEDDA, GULF POSTS, MODUK (DS11 AND DROW), PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, ROUTINE CAIRO, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT.

MY TELNO 1640: THE GULF: U.S. POLICY.

SUMMARY.

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO SEND 400 STINGER MISSILES AND 200 LAUNCHERS TO SAUDI ARABIA WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. A SMALL US ARMY TEAM WILL TRAIN THE SAUDIS IN THEIR USE. ONE USAF KC-10 TANKER AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN DEPLOYED TO SAUDI ARABIA.

DETAIL.

2. PLACKE AND KANTER (STATE DEPARTMENT) HAVE CONFIRMED TO US THAT, AS IS REPORTED IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES, THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO SEND 400 STINGER MISSILES AND 200 LAUNCHERS TO SAUDI ARABIA WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, USING HIS EMERGENCY POWERS TO WAIVE THE REQUIREMENT THAT CONGRESS SHOULD HAVE 30 DAYS TO CONSIDER SUCH SALES. A FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE ON 29 MAY. A US ARMY TEAM OF 20-30 SPECIALISTS WILL TRAIN THE SAUDIS TO USE THE STINGER.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT THE DECISION TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF STINGERS TO BE DELIVERED IMMEDIATELY WAS TAKEN AFTER A US REASSESSMENT OF SAUDI REQUIRMENTS, NOT IN RESPONSE TO SAUDI PRESSURE. THEY WILL ALSO HAVE WANTED TO ENSURE THAT THE SAUDIS' IMMEDIATE NEEDS WERE MET, WITHOUT THAT BEING DEPENDENT ON CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL: ACCORDING TO THE MEDIA THE ISRAELI CABINET AND LEADING MEMBERS OF THE US/JEWISH LOBBY HAVE EXPRESSED STRONG OPPOSITION TO THIS SALE.

4. KANTER ALSO CONFIRMED THAT, IN RESPONSE TO A SAUDI REQUEST, ONE USAF KC-10 TANKER AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN DEPLOYED TO SAUDI ARABIA. THIS WOULD BE USED AS NECESSARY IN SUPPORT OF THE US AWACS AND THE SAUDI AIR FORCE F-15S.

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Despat 281700Z.

FM FCO 281500Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER
AND INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, GULS POSTS, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, PARIS, BONN, ISLAMABAD, CAIRO, NEW DELHI, STOCKHOLM, ANKARA, AMMAN, TOKYO, SEOUL, UKDEL NATO
FOR SECRETARY OF STATE's PARTY FROM MAED/MED
IRAN/IRAQ: ATTACKS ON SHIPPING SITREP

1. There have been no reports of further attacks on shipping since 25 May when Iraq claimed to have hit six ships near Bandar Khomeini. The level of shipping movements through the Straits of Hormuz has not altered significantly in recent weeks. The London offices of BP and Shell confirm that they are continuing with normal trading, but they are not going to Kharg. Shell say that there is currently a natural downturn in the level of their operation.

2. General Council of British Shipping sources indicate that there are currently ten UK registered ships in the Gulf. These are mainly located in the South, but one OCL cargo ship is reported to be heading for Kuwait. There are reports

of

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Iran/Iraq standard
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PS
PS/Mr Luce
PS/No 10
PS/Mr Heseltine
PS/Mr Walker
S/Chancellor of Exchequer
PS/Mr Tebbit PS/Mr Ridley

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of a few crewmen refusing to proceed North of Ras Tanura, but these have been replaced by volunteers flown out from the UK, apparently attracted by substantial bonuses.
Begin underlining Diplomatic Activity end underlining
3. On the diplomatic front Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have been active over the week end lobbying for UK support for a Security Council resolution which clearly condemns Iran. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the Foreign Minister (Jedda telno 268) has written to the Secretary of State emphasising the need to differentiate between Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi vessels and Iraq's operations in quote the zone of the war unquote. Initial soundings of the non-aligned states suggest that at least some (eg Egypt and Pakistan) will be pressing for a more balanced resolution on the grounds that one-sided condemnation of Iran will achieve nothing. For their part, the Iraqis issued a communique (on 27 May) making it clear that they will strongly resist any attempts to put them on the same footing as Iran in the Security Council discussions. The Iraqis argue that their attacks on shipping are in retaliation for Iran denying them use of their own Gulf ports, and for Iranian insistence on continuing with the land war.
4. The support, or lack of it, for the Arab position will become apparent when the Security Council resumes the debate on 29 May. HM Representative in New York has been told to maintain a low profile, and he has confirmed that no fresh instructions are required for that meeting.

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GRS 160
UNCLASSIFIED
FM TEHRAN
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 301 OF 27 MAY 1984
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DI4), BAGHDAD, GULF POSTS, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, TUNIS, CAIRO, ALGIERS.
L
SAVING TO UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL OECD.

MY TELNO 294 : IRAN/IRAQ - VISIT OF SYRIAN VICE-PRESIDENT TO IRAN.

1. KHADDAM LEFT TEHRAN ON 24 MAY. STATEMENTS BY HIMSELF AND THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER INDICATED AN IDENTITY OF VIEW OVER THE NEED TO PREVENT EXPANSION OF THE CONFLICT BUT MADE CLEAR THAT SYRIA WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO MEDIATE FOR AN END TO THE WAR AS A WHOLE.

2. KHADDAM WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT BAGHDAD'S RECENT ATTACKS AGAINST TANKERS AND OTHER VESSELS HAD AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION IN THE REGION. THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT THE SYRIAN DELEGATION HAD REAFFIRMED SYRIA'S SUPPORT FOR IRAN AND WHAT HE CALLED IRAN'S LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE WAR AGAINST SADDAM'S POLITICAL SYSTEM.

3. RAFSANJANI HAS TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT KHADDAM VISITED IRAN AT THE WRITTEN REQUEST OF PRINCE FAHD, IN ORDER TO INFORM HIMSELF OF IRAN'S ATTITUDE AND WHETHER IRAN INTENDED TO EXPAND THE WAR IN A MANNER TO ENGULF SAUDI ARABIA AS WELL. THE IRANIAN ANSWER HAD BEEN A DEFINITE NO. IRAN WOULD LEAVE SAUDI ARABIA ALONE PROVIDED THAT IT CONDEMNED THE BAGHDAD REGIME IN RELATION TO THE WAR AND REMOVED ITSELF FROM THE SCENE OF ACTION.

4. MY TUR, PARA 3 LINE 3 SHOULD READ ''SOME OF IT AT A DISCOUNT AND SOME FOR FREE, AND THE RE-SCHEDULING .....''

FCO PASS SAVING UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL OECD.

SIMPSON-ORLEBAR

IRAN/IRAQ
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CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IRAN/IRAQ

Note: DTp have now replied, covering this point, so no further action is required.

10 DOWNING STREET

Date 29/5

MR PRESCOTT MP.

Phoned to lodge a protest with No 10 about the situation in the Gulf + the fact that seamen are being pressganged into war. He said ships are soft options for warring parties. He has written to FCS + SS/Tran, but has had no replies yet. He feels British should do the same as Japanese and tell their

Ships not to go near the Gulf

Duty Clerk

26.5.84.

No 10

FOSDL 012/26

OO UKDEL SALON DE PROVINCE

GRS 293
CONFIDENTIAL
FM F C O 261230Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE SALON DE PROVENCE (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 18 OF 26 MAY 84
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, PARIS, BONN, ISLAMABAD, CAIRO, NEW DELHI, STOCKHOLM, ANKARA, AMMAN, TOKYO, SEOUL, UKDEL NATO.
IRAN/IRAQ: ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING: SITREP
1. NO FURTHER REPORTS OF ATTACKS ON SHIPPING IN THE GULF SINCE THE IRAQI CLAIM (STILL UNCONFIRMED) TO HAVE HIT SIX SHIPS NEAR BANDAR KHOMEINI ON 25 MAY.
2. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE HAS BEEN ADJOURNED UNTIL TUESDAY 29 MAY. THE GCC WILL BE CONSIDERING WHAT AMENDMENTS WILL BE NECESSARY TO MAKE THEIR DRAFT ACCEPTABLE TO THE NON-ALIGNED (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNOS, 545 AND 546). UKMIS DO NOT (NOT) REQUIRE FRESH INSTUCTIONS.
3. UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE JAPANESE WILL STOP SENDING THEIR OWN TANKERS TO KUWAIT AND NORTHERN SAUDI PORTS AS WELL AS TO KHARG.
4. LLOYD'S HAVE INCREASED WAR RISK INSURANCE PREMIUMS PAYABLE ON VESSELS TRAVELLING TO KHARG ISLAND AND BUSHIRE FROM 2 PER CENT TO 7 AND A HALF PER CENT. SHAIKH YAMANI SUGGESTED ON 25 MAY THAT LLOYD'S MIGHT EFFECTIVELY CLOSE THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ BY CANCELLING INSURANCE COVER, BUT MR. STEPHEN MERRETT, A LLOYD'S COUNCIL MEMBER, HAS DENIED THIS, SAYING THAT IN PRACTICE THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF INSURANCE NOT BEING AVAILABLE FOR SHIPMENTS TO AND FROM GULF POSTS. THE WAR RISK PREMIUM FOR ARAB POSTS IS STILL AT 0.25 PER CENT OF HULL VALUES. EARLIER IN THE WEEK YAMANI TOLD DAVIGNON IN BRUSSELS THAT THE GULF STATES MIGHT THEMSELVES TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SHIPPING OIL OUT OF THE GULF, EITHER BY ARRANGING FOR THEIR TANKERS TO CARRY OIL AND TRANSFER IT TO OTHER TANKERS OUTSIDE THE GULF OR BY TAKING ON THE INSURANCE COSTS FOR TANKERS FROM PURCHASING COMPANIES.

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FM UKDEL SALON DE PROVENCE 262330Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3 OF 26 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE GULF POSTS (DESKBY FIRST CONTACT)

FOLLOWING FROM UKDEL SALON DE PROVENCE
INFORMAL FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, 25-27 MAY: GULF WAR
1. GENSCHER INTRODUCED DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT, ARGUING THAT ALTHOUGH THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT HAD ENTERED A NEW DIMENSION, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAD TO BE KEPT IN PROPORTION. OIL WAS STILL FLOWING THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ IN SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES, AND SO FAR, THERE HAD ONLY BEEN A NEGLIGIBLE IMPACT ON THE OIL MARKET.
2 THE SITUATION WAS NEVERTHELESS WORRYING. HOW SHOULD THE WEST REACT? THE US APPEARED TO BE MOVING INCREASINGLY TOWARDS WHAT HAIG HAD CALLED A STRATEGIC CONSENSUS, WHICH CHEYSSON INTERPRETED AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF US BASES IN THE GULF. THE GCC STATES WERE NOT KEEN, BELIEVING THAT THE REAL THREAT TO THEIR STABILITY CAME NOT FROM THE IRANIAN MILITARY BUT FROM DOMESTIC POLITICAL UPHEAVAL. INTERNATIONALISING THE CONFLICT TO THE EXTENT OF BRINGING IN FOREIGN WARSHIPS AND AIRCRAFT COULD MAKE MATTERS WORSE NOT BETTER.
3. CHEYSSON OBSERVED THAT THE TWO COMMUNITY COUNTRIES CAPABLE OF TAKING A MILITARY STAND - BRITAIN AND FRANCE - HAD SO FAR ACTED WITH EXTREME CAUTION. HE BELIEVED THAT RESOLUTION 540, WHICH HAD THE MERIT OF BEING SUPPORTED BY BOTH THE U S AND THE SOVIET UNION, COULD YET SERVE A PURPOSE. IT WAS UNREALISTIC OF THE GULF STATES TO SEEK A NEW RESOLUTION DEALING ONLY WITH THEIR SHIPPING INTERESTS, NOT THE WAR ITSELF.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE WEST'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END WITHOUT MAJOR DESTABILISATION - ME TO SEE AN EFFECTIVE DRAW. THE RELATIVE TRANQUILLITY OF THE OIL MARKET MEANT THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR PANIC MEASURES. THE GULF STATES WERE NOT PRESSING FOR FOREIGN INTERVENTION. WHAT WAS NEEDED, THEREFORE , WAS CALM DIPLOMACY IN WHICH PROVOCATION OF EITHER SIDE OR OF THE SOVIET UNION, WAS AVOIDED. THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT OF THE TWO BELLIGERENTS LEFT EUROPE WITH LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO LEAVE THE WAR TO RUN ITS COURSE.
5. CHEYSSON WHOLEHEARTEDLY AGREED. THE IRAQIS HAD COMMITTED AN ACT OF STUPIDITY BY INTRODUCING CHEMICAL WEAPONS INTO THE CONFLICT, THEREBY STRENGTHENING THE IRANIANS' MORAL POSITION. BUT IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD TAKEN THIS STEP TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO GO TO ANY LENGTHS NOT TO LOSE THE WAR.
6. CHEYSSON WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT IRAQ WAS NOW SEEN AS A SYMBOL OF ARAB RESPONSE TO THE LATEST OF A SERIES OF FUNDAMENTALIST REVOLUTIONS WHICH HAD OVER THE CENTURIES THREATENED THE ARAB REGIMES OF THE REGION. MANY ARAB STATES LOATHED SADDAM HASSEIN BUT RECOGNISED THE FORCE OF THIS ARGUMENT.
7. GENSCHER URGED THE UTMOST CAUTION. THE IRANIAN WAR EFFORT WAS AN EXTENSION OF IRAN'S INTERNAL REVOLUTION WHICH, CONTRARY TO IRAQI EXPECTATIONS, HAD NOT WEAKENED BUT STRENGTHENED THE NATIONAL RESOLVE. THERE WAS AN ELEMENT OF IRRATIONALITY IN IRANIAN ATTITUDES. ANY SUGGESTION THAT OUTSIDE COUNTRIES WERE INVOLVING THEMSELVES IN THE CONFLICT COULD PROVOKE FURTHER FANATICAL ACTS SIMILAR TO THE BEIRUT LORRY BOMB.
8. HARALAMBOPOULOS (GREECE) SUGGESTED THAT STOPPING ARMS SALES AND IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON IRAN MIGHT BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE

B. HARALAMBOPOULOS (GREECE) SUGGESTED THAT STOPPING ARMS SALES AND IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON IRAN MIGHT BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF SECURING THE DRAWN RESULT WHICH EUROPE WISHED TO SEE. CHEYSSON DISMISSED THESE ARGUMENTS, CLAIMING THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD ALWAYS FIND THE ARMS THEY NEEDED AND CUSTOMERS FOR THEIR OIL. HE SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONCLUSION THAT THE WAR WOULD HAVE TO RUN ITS COURSE.

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 22

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FM WASHINGTON 252330Z MAY, 1984
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1640 OF 25 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL SALON DE PROVENCE, (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY) BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, JEDDA, OTHER GULF POSTS, PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT.

THE GULF: US POLICY

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER CONFIRMATION THAT THE AMERICANS DO NOT INTEND TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN THE GULF WITHOUT AN EXPLICIT PUBLIC REQUEST FROM THE GULF STATES AND ALLIED SUPPORT. SALE OF STINGERS TO SAUDI ARABIA, INCLUDING THE EARLY DELIVERY OF 200 MISSILES, IS LIKELY TO PROCEED.

DETAIL

2. MINISTER CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY THIS MORNING TO HEAR HIS LATEST THINKING ON THE GULF IN THE LIGHT OF HIS VISIT TO OMAN AND SAUDI ARABIA EARLIER IN THE WEEK. MURPHY EMPHASISED THAT THE US HAD NO INTENTION OF PLUNGING IN. HE DID NOT EXPECT THE GCC TO SEEK THE INTERVENTION OF ANY OUTSIDE POWER. THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG VIEW WAS THAT AMERICAN INTERVENTION WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION IN THE ABSENCE OF A PUBLIC REQUEST AND ALLIED SUPPORT. SPEAKER O'NEILL (WHO IS QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS SAYING BRITISH AND FRENCH PARTICIPATION WOULD BE ESSENTIAL) TOOK THE WIDELY-HELD (BUT ERRONEOUS) VIEW THAT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF WAS THE CONCERN OF THE WESTERN EUROPEANS AND JAPAN RATHER THAN THE US.

STERN EUROPEANS AND JAPAN RATHER THAN THE US.

3. THOMAS ASKED ABOUT US DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH. MURPHY SAID THAT THESE HAD NOT PROGRESSED VERY FAR AND THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING. CONFIDENTIAL TALKS, KNOWLEDGE OF WHICH WAS VERY CLOSELY HELD, HAD HOWEVER TAKEN PLACE OVER THE PAST 4-5 YEARS BETWEEN THE FRENCH COMMANDER IN DJIBOUTI AND THE US NAVAL COMMANDER IN THE GULF. THE AMERICANS ASSUMED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD NOT ACKNOWLEDGE PUBLICLY THAT THEY WERE PARTICIPATING IN ANY COORDINATED OPERATION, BUT THAT THEY WOULD BE THERE IN THE CRUNCH: THEY DID AFTER ALL HAVE THE SECOND LARGEST WESTERN NAVAL FORCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

4. MURPHY AVOIDED A DIRECT ANSWER WHEN THOMAS ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS HAD IT IN MIND TO APPROACH THE FRENCH ABOUT THEIR ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAQ. HE RECALLED THAT THE US HAD INITIALLY OPPOSED ARMS SUPPLIES TO BOTH SIDES, BUT THAT THE EMPHASIS HAD SHIFTED TO CHOKING OFF SUPPLIES TO IRAN IN THE LAST QUARTER OF 1983 WHEN IT HAD BECOME CLEAR THAT THE IRAQIS WERE INTERESTED IN PEACE AND THAT THE IRANIANS WERE RECALCITRANT. HE REITERATED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT SUPPLYING ARMS TO EITHER SIDE AND WERE CONTINUING TO INVESTIGATE CAREFULLY ALLEGATIONS THAT US WEAPONS WERE STILL FINDING THEIR WAY TO IRAN.

5. THOMAS COMMENTED THAT THE NEED TO KEEP OPEN SOME WESTERN LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO IRAN AND TO AN EVENTUAL SUCCESSOR REGIME WAS AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IN OUR THINKING. MURPHY SAID THAT IRAN'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE WAS RECOGNISED IN WASHINGTON: NOBODY WANTED TO LOSE IRAN FOR THE LONG TERM. BUT THERE WAS NO PRESSURE AT PRESENT FOR ANY US OVERTURE TO THE PRESENT IRANIAN LEADERSHIP WHICH WOULD, IN ANY CASE BE UNRECEPTIVE: MEMORIES OF THE HOSTAGE CRISIS WERE STILL TOO STRONG AND THE REGIME'S REPUGNANT EXCESSES.
HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE AFFECTION IN WASHINGTON FOR THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP EITHER.

6. MURPHY HAD BEEN EXASPERATED BY THE LEAKS IN WASHINGTON CONCERNING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE TO KING FAHD. HE DESPAIRED OF PEOPLE (HE IMPLIED IN THE WHITE HOUSE) WHO GOT THEIR KICKS BY DISCLOSURES TO THE PRESS. ON THE SUBSTANCE, THE SAUDIS MAIN REQUEST HAD BEEN FOR THE EARLY DELIVERY OF STINGER TO FILL AN OBVIOUS GAP IN THEIR AIR DEFENCES. THEY WOULD BE USED TO PROTECT ONSHORE INSTALLATIONS AND POSSIBLY ON SAUDI NAVAL VESSELS IF THESE WERE USED ON ESCORT DUTIES. THE ADMINISTRATION WERE RESUBMITTING TO CONGRESS THE PROPOSAL TO SELL 1200 STINGERS, OF WHICH 200 WERE LIKELY TO BE DELIVERED UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S EMERGENCY AUTHORITY BEFORE THE CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION PERIOD HAD ELAPSED. MURPHY RECOGNISED THAT THIS RISKED BRUISING FEELINGS ON THE HILL BUT THOUGHT THIS DANGER OUTWEIGHED BY THE MANIFEST URGENCY OF THE REQUIREMENT. THE ADMINISTRATION'S SOUNDINGS ON THE HILL SUGGESTED THAT MAJORITY OPINION FAVOURED THE SALE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THOUGH THERE WERE STILL THOSE WHO WERE OPPOSED TO ANY ARMS SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND OTHERS WHO WERE CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBLE THREAT TO ISRAEL.

7. MURPHY SAID THAT GENERAL TIXIER WOULD BE GOING TO SAUDI ARABIA THIS WEEKEND TO FOLLOW UP POINDEXTER'S VISIT LAST MONTH. BUT THE IDEA OF CONTINGENCY TALKS WAS ONLY INCHING FORWARD. THE SAUDIS

THREAT TO ISRAEL.

7. MURPHY SAID THAT GENERAL TIXIER WOULD BE GOING TO SAUDI ARABIA THIS WEEKEND TO FOLLOW UP POINDEXTER'S VISIT LAST MONTH. BUT THE IDEA OF CONTINGENCY TALKS WAS ONLY INCHING FORWARD. THE SAUDIS MEANWHILE HAD BEEN TRYING BY ALL POSSIBLE MEANS TO GET THE MESSAGE ACROSS TO THE IRANIANS THAT THEY DID NOT WANT A CONFLICT. WHATEVER THE IRANIANS MIGHT HAVE TOLD THE SYRIANS, MURPHY DID NOT THINK THEY WOULD DISIST FROM RETALIATION IF, AS SEEMED CERTAIN, IRAQI ATTACKS ON SHIPPING CONTINUED.

8. MURPHY COMMENTED THAT THE SAUDI CLAIM TO NON BELLIGERENT STATUS WAS SOMEWHAT SHAKY GIVEN THEIR FINANCIAL AID TO IRAQ AND THE DELIVERY OF IRAQI ARMS SUPPLIES VIA SAUDI PORT. HE SAW NO PROSPECT THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD ATTEMPT TO USE THE LEVERAGE THIS GAVE THEM TO RESTRAIN THE IRAQIS: THEY WERE TOO WORRIED THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE KHOMEINI'S NEXT TARGET IF THE IRANIANS WERE TO BREAK THROUGH IN SOUTHERN IRAQ. THEY WERE INCLINED TO ATTRIBUTE THE PRESENT CRISIS TO KHOMEINI'S MALEVOLENCE AND TO BELIEVE THAT THE SITUATION WOULD BE MUCH IMPROVED ONCE HE DEPARTED FROM THE SCENE. (MURPHY DOUBTED THIS). THE OMANIS HAD TOLD HIM BLUNTLY THAT THEIR GCC PARTNERS WERE SCARED OF THE IRAQIS AND THAT ALL OUTSIDE POWERS SHOULD KEEP OUT OF THE GULF LEAVING IRAN AND IRAQ TO SLUG IT OUT: OUTSIDE INTERVENTION WOULD BE AN UNNECESSARY COMPLICATION. IN A MATTER OF MONTHS THE IRANIANS WOULD HAVE TO LET UP, IF ONLY BECAUSE OF THEIR NEED FOR FUNDS.

9. THOMAS ASKED ABOUT SADDAM'S PUBLIC REFERENCE TO NEW WEAPONS FOR DESTROYING KHARG ISLAND (BAGHDAD TELNO 281). MURPHY THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS A REFERENCE NOT TO THE FRENCH MIRAGES BUT TO NEW SOVIET SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILES. IT WAS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER OR NOT THESE WERE SS21S (AS IS REPORTED IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES) OR SOMETHING ELSE.

10. FOR COMMENT PLEASE SEE MIFT.

WRIGHT

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

01 211 6402

28/5

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Secretary of State for Foreign &
Commonwealth Affairs
Downing Street
London
SW1A 2AL

25 May 1984

Dear Geoffrey

ADVICE TO BRITISH SHIPPING IN THE GULF

Thank you for sending me a copy of your minute to Nicholas Ridley of 22 May, enclosing a copy of your poposed reply to the National Union of Seamen and advice to shipping.

I endorse the approach you propose. It is clearly important that, whilst recognising the seriousness of the situation, we do not contribute to unnecessary alarm. In particular, we should not adopt a posture that would discourage shipping from using the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to recipients of yours.

Yours ever

PETER WALKER

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEX: Iran/Iraq
PT 4

25 MAY 1984

PRIME MINISTER

The Gulf

I understand that Richard Luce is in charge this weekend, and will be holding regular meetings of officials. There will be a daily situation report which the Duty Clerk will ensure that you receive.

On today's events, you will have seen that the Iraqis are claiming to have set on fire six ships. This claim is being investigated. It seems that the attack was carried out at Bandar Khomeini where shipping has been subject to systematic attack for some considerable time.

At the United Nations, things seem to be going reasonably well. I gather that the Iranians are taking an active part in framing the resolution.

The Foreign Office tell me that the oil market is stable.

25 May, 1984.

CONFIDENTIAL

file FCC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

25 May 1984

Deployment of the MCM Force in the Mediterranean

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 24 May (MO 3/9/4/2). Subject to the views of the other Ministers to whom your Secretary of State's minute was copied, the Prime Minister is content with his proposals.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry), Dinah Nichols (Department of Transport) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

F. E. R. BUTLER

Richard Mottram Esq
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

Agree x/ and y/?

FERB

24.5.

MO 3/9/4/2

PRIME MINISTER

DEPLOYMENT OF THE MCM FORCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

When I minuted you about this deployment on 28th March, I suggested that the future movements of the force might be re-considered when the planned NATO exercise was complete. The force is now visiting Cyprus and Taranto and will then move to Cyprus until mid-June.

While the force remains in the Mediterranean it will need base facilities. When the decision to deploy to the Eastern Mediterranean was taken, Cyprus was assumed to be the obvious choice. However, the Royal Navy have since investigated the limited facilities at Akrotiri in the Sovereign Base Areas and it is clear that they would be technically unsuitable. The other options (apart from Gibraltar which is 24 days from the Gulf) therefore depend upon the goodwill of a friendly government. We have assessed the various possibilities in conjunction with the FCO (and where appropriate with posts).

There are political difficulties attaching to all the alternatives in the Eastern Mediterranean - Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Israel and Egypt. This leaves Italy as the most forward option for a base. There is no reason to suppose that the Italians will object. Although Italy is 4 days further from the Gulf than Cyprus the main elements of the force will spend much of their time on exercises and visits in the Eastern Mediterranean (for which no

difficulty is foreseen) and will then be more rapidly available for the Gulf. I therefore propose, subject to colleagues' agreement, that we should approach the Italian Government with a request for facilities for the force at a suitable base in Southern Italy or Sicily.

Looking further ahead a programme for the force has been drawn up until the end of August, when the support ship's charter is due for renewal. Subject to developments in the Gulf, I propose that we review the future of the force at about that time. In deciding whether to renew the contract for the hire of the support ship, we will of course have to consider the option of returning the whole force to the UK.

Copies of this letter go to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Secretary of State for Trade, Secretary of State for Energy, Secretary of State for Transport and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
24th May 1984

IRAN/IRAQ ADVANCE COPIES 18 19

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
HD/MED
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FM WASHINGTON 232250Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1619 OF 23 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS11, DROW), PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, GULF POSTS, JEDDA, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, MOSCOW, CAIRO AND AMMAN

US/UK TALKS ON THE GULF

SUMMARY

1. US/UK OFFICIAL TALKS REVEALED BROAD IDENTITY OF VIEW. FOCUS ON DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. MORE WORK REQUIRED ON PRINCIPLES FOR PROTECTION OF NEUTRAL SHIPPING.

DETAIL

2. THE FCO/MOD TEAM HELD TALKS IN WASHINGTON ON 22/23 MAY. THE U S INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING AND SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WAS REPORTED IN MY JIC TELNO 111 (NOT TO ALL). THIS TELEGRAM SUMMARISES THEIR DISCUSSIONS TODAY WITH STATE DEPARTMENT AND PENTAGON OFFICIALS.

3. WELCOMING THE BRITISH TEAM, ADMIRAL HOWE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THE U S ADMINISTRATION ATTACHED TO THESE TALKS. THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN QUOTE LAID BACK UNQUOTE IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE LAST NIGHT (MY TELNO 1602). IT WAS IMPORTANT PUBLICLY TO OFFER REASSURANCE IN THIS WAY. BUT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SITUATION IN THE GULF, WHICH WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT A WHITE HOUSE MEETING ON 24 MAY. HOWE RECALLED THE BRITISH EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY ACTIVITY AND NOTED

DISCUSSED AT A WHITE HOUSE MEETING ON 24 MAY. HOWE RECALLED THE BRITISH EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY ACTIVITY AND HOPED THAT WE WOULD WELCOME THE ADMINISTRATION'S EMPHASIS ON DIPLOMACY. HASKELL (FCO) SAID THAT OUR MINISTERS TOO VALUED THESE TALKS: WE SAW THE SITUATION IN VERY MUCH THE SAME TERMS AND WELCOMED THE CALMING LINE THE U S WERE TAKING IN PUBLIC.

4. PLACKE (STATE DEPARTMENT) PREDICTED A PROLONGED PERIOD OF INSTABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE GULF WITH WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO LEARN TO LIVE. THE IRAQIS WERE LIKELY TO RESUME THEIR ATTACKS ON TANKERS AND THE IRANIANS TO RETALIATE. THE INCREASES IN INSURANCE AND FREIGHT RATES WERE UNLIKELY TO HAVE MUCH PRACTICAL EFFECT: RELUCTANCE OF SEAMEN TO SERVE IN THE GULF MIGHT BE A MORE IMPORTANT FACTOR. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR KUWAIT NEEDED TO BE WATCHED. IF KUWAITI OIL PRODUCTION FELL MUCH BELOW 500,000 BPD THEY WOULD RUN SHORT OF THE ASSOCIATED GAS ON WHICH THEIR POWER AND DESALINATION PLANTS DEPENDED. LOSS OF KUWAIT AND KHARG OIL EXPORTS WOULD BE MANAGEABLE ON THE WORLD OIL MARKET. SAUDI PRODUCTION COULD PROBABLY BE INCREASED WITHIN A MONTH OR SO TO 8 MILLION BPD TO MAKE UP ANY SHORTFALL.

5. PLACKE NOTED THAT IRANIAN INFORMATION ON GULF SHIPPING WAS MUCH BETTER THAN THE IRAQIS'. THEY MIGHT NOT BE CONTENT SIMPLY TO RESPOND TO AN IRAQI ATTACK ON KHARG TANKER TRAFFIC, BUT TRY TO PUT ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON THE GULF STATES, IN THE HOPE OF PERSUADING AT LEAST THE KUWAITIS TO CUT OFF FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF IRAQ. HASKELL ARGUED THAT THE GULF WAS A SIDE ISSUE FOR THE IRANIANS WHO WERE CONCENTRATING ON THE LAND WAR AGAINST IRAQ, AND MIGHT NOT WANT TO PROVOKE WESTERN INTERVENTION, OR SQUANDER THEIR RELATIVELY LIMITED RESOURCES OF AIRCRAFT AND MUNITIONS IN ACTION AGAINST THIRD COUNTRIES. EVEN A COMPLETE CESSATION OF OIL EXPORTS FROM KHARG WOULD NOT IMMEDIATELY EFFECT IRAN'S ECONOMIC CAPACITY TO CONTINUE THE WAR.

6. GENERAL TIXIER (DOD) SAID THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA. OTHER U S TEAMS WERE IN KUWAIT AND OMAN. THE SAUDIS WERE MAKING CLEAR THAT THEY WANTED TO PROTECT THEIR TERRITORY AND SHIPPING THEMSELVES. THEY WERE PRESSING FOR ARMS DELIVERIES TO BE EXPEDITED AND FOR OTHER REQUESTS, PARTICULARLY STINGER, TO BE MET. THEY HAD ALSO SOUGHT U S ADVICE ON THEIR MILITARY SHORTCOMINGS AND OUTSTANDING EQUIPMENT REQUESTS. TIXIER SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD MEANWHILE OFFERED THE SAUDIS 4 CROTALE BATTERIES WHICH COULD BE DELIVERED WITHIN 6 DAYS. THERE WAS LITTLE MILITARY ACTION THE U S COULD TAKE IN THE ABSENCE OF A SAUDI REQUEST. THE U S WERE NOT PRESSING FOR ACCESS OR FACILITIES BUT NEEDED CONTINGENCY PLANNING TALKS TO DISCOVER WHAT FACILITIES THE SAUDIS WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE. THIS MESSAGE WAS HARD TO GET ACROSS, BUT THE U S WERE MAKING SLOW PROGRESS. TIXIER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SAUDI DOUBTS OF U S RELIABILITY AFTER LEBANON WERE A REAL FACTOR. SAUDI WILLINGNESS TO ABSORB PUNISHMENT SHOULD NOT BE UNDER ESTIMATED: THE U S MIGHT SEE A MILITARY CASE FOR INTERVETION ARISING BEFORE THE SAUDIS REACHED THE STAGE OF ASKING FOR HELP. A FORMAL REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WAS OF COURSE ESSENTIAL AND MULTINATIONAL ACTION MUCH PREFERABLE TO UNILATERAL U S MOVES. THE AMERICANS CLEARLY DOUBT THAT THE FRENCH WILL BE WILLING TO BECOME INVOLVED.

7. IT WAS AGREED THAT WEATHER THE U S WAS THE

~~THE FRENCH WILL BE WILLING TO BECOME INVOLVED.~~

7. IT WAS AGREED THAT NEITHER THE U S NOR THE UK HAD ANY EFFECTIVE LEVERAGE OVER THE IRAQIS. THE AMERICANS DISCOUNTED INDICATIONS THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD DESIST FROM THEIR ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING IF THE U S OFFERED FULL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE AQABA PIPELINE. THEY WERE CONSIDERING AN APPROACH TO THE FRENCH ABOUT THE SUPPLY OF MIRAGE AND, MORE IMPORTANT, EXOCETS. THEY DID NOT WANT THE IRAQIS TO LOSE THE WAR, BUT SOME UNCERTAINTY OVER THEIR RESUPPLY OF EXOCETS COULD BE USEFUL. IT SEEMED PROBABLE, HOWEVER, THAT MANUFACTURING CONSTRAINTS WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE FRENCH TO AGREE TO THE IRAQIS' LATEST REQUEST TO INCREASE THE SUPPLY OF EXOCETS. PLACKE NOTED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD IN THE PAST BEEN WILLING TO FOREGO ESCALATION OF THE WAR TO ALLOW DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TIME TO MAKE PROGRESS. BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT THEY COULD BE OFFERED IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, OR HOW EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE IRANIANS. IT WAS AGREED THAT AN INFORMAL BOYCOTT OF IRANIAN OIL WAS A NON STARTER.

8. PLACKE SAID THAT THE IRAQIS HAD REACTED FIRMLY TO THE LATEST U S DEMARCHE. THE AMERICANS HAD MADE THE POINT THAT FURTHER ATTACKS ON NEUTRAL SHIPPING RISKED BRINGING IN NON REGIONAL POWERS. THE IRAQIS MAINTAINED THAT THEY WERE NOT TRYING TO INTERNATIONALISE THE WAR. THERE WOULD BE FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH TARIQ AZIZ IN NEW YORK AND ON HIS RETURN TO BAGHDAD. THE GULF STATES WERE CLEARLY UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT ANY UNILATERAL U S INTERVENTION, BUT WANTED REASSURANCE THAT U S HELP WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN EXTREMIS. HASKELL DESCRIBED THE EC DEMARCHES IN BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN.

9. KANTER, (STATE DEPARTMENT) DREW ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD ARISE IN THE EVENT OF A REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT NEUTRAL SHIPPING. THE LEGAL POSITION WAS CONFUSED. ANY ACTION RISKED BEING SEEN AS TAKING SIDES IN THE WAR. COULD WE BE SEEN TO ACQUIESCE IN IRAQI ATTACKS ON SHIPPING USING KHARG OR INDEED TO BE OFFERING PROTECTION FOR SUCH SHIPPING? HASKELL NOTED THAT WE HAD PROTESTED TO THE IRAQIS ABOUT THEIR ATTACKS ON A BRITISH SHIP EN ROUTE TO BANDAR KHOMEINI IN MARCH: WE WOULD THEREFORE REGARD ATTACKS ON SHIPPING OF THIRD COUNTRIES USING KHART AS ILLEGAL. PLACKE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD USED THE PHRASE QUOTE NEUTRAL SHIPPING UNQUOTE IN THEIR DEMARCHES BUT HAD NOT DEFINED IT PRECISELY. IRAQI OR IRANIAN SHIPS WERE CLEARLY EXCLUDED: BUT THIRD COUNTRY SHIPS CALLING AT IRAQI OR IRANIAN PORTS PROBABLY CAME WITHIN ITS AMBIT.

10. THE AMERICANS HAD IDENTIFIED A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS WITH THEIR QUOTE GATEHOUSE UNQUOTE CONCEPT, AND WERE NOW THINKING IN TERMS OF A FREE NAVIGATION TRACK, IE A SHIPPING LANE WITHIN WHICH PROTECTION MIGHT BE OFFERED TO NEUTRAL SHIPS. THIS TOO WOULD GIVE RISE TO A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS AND MIGHT BE ABUSED BY TRAFFIC EN ROUTE TO BELLIGERENT PORTS OR CARRYING CONTRABAND. THE U S WOULD WANT TO ACT ONLY IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM THE GCC: THE APPROVAL OF COUNTRIES OF REGISTRATION WOULD ALSO BE REQUIRED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE AMERICANS SIDE WOULD PRODUCE A PAPER ON THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH PROTECTION OF NEUTRAL SHIPPING.

11. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF DEVELOPMENTS AT THE UN (SEE ALSO NY

11. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF DEVELOPMENTS AT THE UN (SEE ALSO MY TELNO 1600) IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE U S REMAINED RELUCTANT TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE BUT WERE HOPING FOR A BALANCED RESOLUTION AVOIDING CONDEMNATION OF IRAN ALONE. THEY WERE ATTRACTED BY HASKELL'S PERSONAL SUGGESTION THAT EXPLICIT MENTION OF IRAN MIGHT BE CONFINED TO THE PREAMBLE AND THAT THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS MIGHT CONDEMN ALL INTERFERENCE WITH THIRD COUNTRIES' SHIPPING. THE AMERICANS WOULD PREFER TO AVOID ANY LANGUAGE CALLING ON OTHER COUNTRIES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, BUT ACCEPT RELUCTANTLY THAT SOME FORMULA WILL BE NECESSARY TO MEET SOVIET INSISTENCE ON THIS POINT. THEY HOPE THAT IT WILL NOT GO BEYONG LANGUAGE PREVIOUSLY USED IN THIS CONTEXT.

12. HASKELL MENTIONED CONCERN IN EUROPE THAT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF SHOULD NOT GIVE RISE TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS, WHO, IN OUR VIEW, HAD CERTAIN COMMON INTERESTS IN THE REGION. PLACKE SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS WORKING ON INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE U S EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE IN SOME DETAIL WITH THE SOVIET MFA. HASKELL WELCOMED THIS.

13. LEGGE (MOD) SAID THAT, IN THE UK VIEW, THE MOD/CENTCOM DISCUSSIONS DID NOT AMOUNT TO JOINT CONTINGENCY PLANNING WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLY MINISTERIAL APPROVAL FOR CERTAIN ACTION. WE HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO SAY PUBLICLY ONLY THAT WE CONTINUED TO BE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS ABOUT THE SITUATION. PLACKE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONCERN WAS DIFFERENT: THEY WANTED TO BE ABLE TO ASSURE CONGRESS AND U S PUBLIC OPINION THAT THE ALLIES WERE PLAYING THEIR PART. IT WAS AGREED THAT THEY COULD REFER FOR THIS PURPOSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS, TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMILLA PATROL AND OUR MCM FORCE, AND TO CLOSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH US ON THE MILITARY AND POL/MIL NETS, BUT THAT MENTION OF JOINT CONTINGENCY PLANNING SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

14. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO HOLD FURTHER TALKS AT SHORT NOTICE IF THIS WERE REQUIRED BEFORE THE POL/MIL TALKS SCHEDULED FOR LATE JUNE.

WRIGHT

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FM WASHINGTON 232244Z MAY, 1984
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1618 OF 23 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, PRIORITY, GULF POSTS
AMMAN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO 964: DEFENCE SALES TO IRAN

SUMMARY

1. IN RESPONSE TO A US REQUEST, HASKELL WENT OVER THE GROUND AGAIN DURING THE BILATERAL TALKS ON THE GULF, STRESSING OUR HOPE THAT FURTHER LEAKS COULD BE AVOIDED. THE AMERICANS NOW UNDERSTAND THE POSITION ON THE THREE SHIPS AND HOPE THAT WE WILL LET THEM KNOW OUR FINAL DECISION ON THE ARMOURED VEHICLES SPARES. THEY ARE REVIEWING THEIR LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS ON TRADE WITH IRAN BUT NO EARLY ACTION IS LIKELY. WE DO NOT RECOMMEND FURTHER ACTION WITH THE AMERICANS AT THIS STAGE.

DETAIL

2. AT TODAY'S POL/MIL TALKS ON THE GULF, THE AMERICANS ASKED AGAIN ABOUT OUR POLICY ON ARMS SALES TO IRAN AND THE NEXT STEPS CONCERNING THE DELIVERY OF THE KHARG AND THE TWO YARROW SUPPORT SHIPS. HASKELL REPEATED THAT WE WERE NOT SUPPLYING LETHAL ITEMS TO EITHER SIDE. OVER THE LAST FOUR YEARS, SALES OF LICENSABLE DEFENCE RELATED EQUIPMENT TO IRAN AMOUNTED TO ONLY POUNDS 10 MILLION, AND INCLUDED CIVIL AIRCRAFT ENGINES, CIVIL RADAR SPARES, DISTRESS FLARES AND SIMILAR EQUIPMENT. THERE WAS ADMITTEDLY A GREY AREA OVER THE DEFINITION OF A LETHAL ITEM: OUR ATTITUDE ON THIS HAD PROGRESSIVELY HARDENED. WE HAD JUST REFUSED TO APPROVE THE SALE OF CHAFF DISPENSING EQUIPMENT WORTH POUNDS 7 MILLION.

3. HASKELL RECALLED THAT DELIVERY OF THE KHARG, HAD BEEN SUSPENDED BECAUSE OF THE HOSTAGE CRISIS BUT THAT THE IRANIANS HAD BEEN TOLD THEREAFTER THAT THEY COULD TAKE IT AWAY. SOME CREW HAD NOW ARRIVED IN THE UK TO PREPARE THE VESSEL FOR SEA. IT WAS UNLIKELY TO BE READY TO LEAVE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS YET. HASKELL STRESSED THAT THE KHARG WAS A DEEP WATER FLEET SUPPORT VESSEL WHICH HAD NO ROLE TO PLAY IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT WITH IRAQ, AND THAT THE IRANIANS HAD GIVEN US AN ASSURANCE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE USED IN THIS WAY.

4. ON THE YARROW SHIPS, HASKELL SAID THAT CANCELLATION OF THE CONTRACT WOULD HAVE INVOLVED HMG IN HEAVY PENALTIES. MINISTERS HAD DECIDED ONLY AFTER THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION THAT DELIVERY SHOULD PROCEED. THE IRANIANS HAD GIVEN AN ASSURANCE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE USED IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT. IT WAS LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD BE READY TO LEAVE AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME AS THE KHARG.

5. HASKELL SAID THAT RELEASE OF THE ARMOURED VEHICLES SPARES, WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN PAID FOR, WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION. EACH CATEGORY OF ITEM WAS BEING CAREFULLY SCRUTINISED TO ENSURE THAT NOTHING LETHAL WOULD BE RELEASED. THE IRANIANS WANTED TO SECURE THEIR RELEASE THROUGH NEGOTIATION RATHER THAN TAKE THE MATTER TO ARBITRATION, AND ACCEPTED THAT LETHAL ITEMS WOULD BE EXCLUDED. HE UNDERTOOK TO LET THE AMERICANS KNOW IN DUE COURSE WHAT WE DECIDED TO DO ABOUT THE SPARES.

6. HASKELL STRESSED THAT NO SIGNIFICANT NEW SUPPLY CONTRACTS WITH IRAN WOULD BE NEGOTIATED UNTIL THE WAR WAS OVER. WE WERE MEANWHILE TRYING TO SLOW DOWN OUR DECISIONS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. WE WOULD BE GLAD TO ANSWER ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS THE US MIGHT HAVE ABOUT OUR POLICY, BUT VERY MUCH HOPED THAT THIS COULD BE DONE PRIVATELY AND WITHOUT PUBLICITY.

7. PLACKE TOOK THE POINT. OUR POSITION ON THE RELEASE OF THE THREE SHIPS WAS WELL UNDERSTOOD AND HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE ARMOURED VEHICLE SPARES. US OFFICIALS WERE CURRENTLY REVIEWING THE LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS ON TRADE WITH IRAN WITH A VIEW TO MAKING ALL ITEMS WITH A POTENTIAL MILITARY APPLICATION SUBJECT TO EXPORT CONTROLS. THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT HAD HOWEVER EXPIRED AND THERE WAS SOME PRESSURE IN CONGRESS TO REDUCE THE ADMINISTRATION'S ABILITY TO IMPOSE CONTROLS ON TRADE. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD THEREFORE BE RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY EARLY ACTION ON TRADE WITH IRAN IN ORDER NOT TO DRAW PUBLIC ATTENTION TO THIS WIDER ISSUE. PLACKE ADDED THAT HE COULD SHED NO LIGHT ON THE ALLEGED SALE OF 200 SIDEWINDERS TO IRAN (YOUR TELNO 905).

COMMENT

8. HASKELL DID NOT MENTION THAT A REVISED CONTRACT FOR THE TWO YARROW SHIPS HAD JUST BEEN SIGNED OR THE IMMINENT ARRIVAL IN BRITAIN OF THEIR IRANIAN CREWS. IN THE LIGHT OF PLACKE'S REACTION THERE IS PERHAPS NO NEED TO SAY ANYTHING FURTHER TO THE AMERICANS ON THIS SUBJECT. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS FULLY WITH HASKELL AND ACCEPT THAT THE YARROW CONTRACT MAY HAVE GONE TOO FAR TO BE STOPPED. THE DELAY IN ISSUING VISAS TO THE IRANIAN NAVAL PERSONNEL IS WELCOME. BUT THE COINCIDENCE OF THE SIGNING OF THE CONTRACT AND THE IRANIAN ATTACKS ON TANKERS IS UNFORTUNATE AND WILL REQUIRE VERY CAREFUL EXPLANATION WHEN THE NEWS LEAKS. WE SHALL BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON THIS ASPECT.

WRIGHT

IRAN/IRAQ

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MR EGERTON
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IRAN/IRAQ

cc P.C.

(2)

Prime Minister.

To be aware.

A.J.C. 23/5.

FCS/84/151

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRANSPORT

1. We spoke yesterday evening about the request from the President of the National Union of Seamen, that the FCO should issue instructions to British vessels not to go into the Gulf. I enclose a copy of his telex and of the interim reply sent to him on 20 May by agreement with your Department. The Government does not of course have the legal power to issue directions to British ships as to where they may or may not trade. Given that responsibility for the shipping industry rests with you, I think it would be right for you to reply to Mr Slater. I enclose a draft.

2. We also need to consider the question of further advice to the General Council of British Shipping. Your Department issued the last bulletin on 16 May. Since then, the Panamanian registered ship, the Felicity, has been sunk. There is no sign of an end to the cycle of incidents in the Gulf. In the light of this, and the interest expressed by the NUS, and others, we agreed that we should now urgently consider laying more emphasis on the risk involved than on the caution which masters should exercise. I enclose a form of words which I believe reflects the points we discussed. If you are content with it, may I leave it you to arrange for copies to be given to the General Council of British shipping and the two Seamens Unions as soon as possible? I think it would also be helpful for the text to be included in Notices to Mariners. For our part we shall ensure that the text is passed to Dependent Territories and the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man to enable ships on those registers to be similarly advised.

3. I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for Defence, Energy, and Employment and Sir R Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

22 May, 1984

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Secretary of State for Transport

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO: J Slater Esq
President
National Union of Seamen

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

As I have responsibility within Government for shipping matters, the Foreign Secretary has passed to me your telex of 20 May in which you urge that British Masters be instructed not to proceed to the Gulf.

I fully appreciate the concern you express for the safety of your members. We have looked at the points you made very carefully. But the Government does not possess the legal powers to issue an instruction to British shipping of the kind you sought. I understand, however, that you have an agreement with the Ship Owners' Association which ensures that crew members are given the opportunity of leaving vessels before they enter a war risk area. In other words, British seamen are free agents to accept or decline to work on ships going to the zones of potential risk and there is consequently no possibility of your members having to enter such zones against their will.

Let me assure you that the Government continues to watch very carefully developments in the Iran/Iraq conflict, and we shall continue to issue advice to the shipping industry as appropriate. I shall make sure that you are sent a copy of any further advice as soon as it

/is

Enclosures—flag(s).....

is issued.

Given public interest in the subject, I intend to make the contents of this letter public.

ADVICE TO SHIPPING

1. The Iran/Iraq conflict continues to present a threat to shipping. A Panamanian vessel was sunk on 19 May, following an attack which took place near Kharg Island. This obviously underlines the heightened risks involved in operating in the Gulf. These risks are likely to persist. The Government therefore advise Masters and Owners to pay particular attention to this development before deciding to send their vessels into this area.

OO TELEX 4191462

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UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO 2013562 MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE JIM SLATER, GEN. SEC. N.U.S. GUERNSEY 4191462
TELEGRAM NUMBER U/N OF 20 MAY
4191462DOR G
FOLLOWING FOR JIM SLATER, GENERAL SECRETARY, NATIONAL UNION OF SEAMEN.
AS YOU MAY KNOW THE FOLLOWING ADVICE WAS GIVEN TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF BRITISH SHIPPING THROUGH THE DEPT. OF TRANSPORT ON 16 MAY:
QUOTE:
ATTACKS ON SHIPPING IN THE UPPER GULF HAVE BECOME MORE INDISCRIMINATE, RE-EMPHASISING THE NEED FOR EXTREME CAUTION TO BE EXERCISED IN THE AREA. RECENT ATTACKS HAVE NOT BEEN CONFINED TO THE IRAQI MEZ PROMULGATED IN AUGUST 1982. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT SOME OF THE ATTACKS HAVE BEEN MOUNTED BY THE IRANIANS. FOR THEIR PART, THE IRAQIS HAVE CONFIRMED THEIR INTENTION TO CONTINUE SUCH ATTACKS AS LONG AS IRAQ IS DENIED USE OF HER GULF PORTS. BRITISH VESSELS INVOLVED IN TRADING TO THE GULF AREA SHOULD TAKE THESE NEW DEVELOPMENTS INTO ACCOUNT WHEN PLANNING THEIR OPERATIONS.
UNQUOTE
SITUATION IS BEING EPT UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW AND FURTHER ADVICE WILL BE ISSUED AS APPROPRIATE.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM NATIONAL UNION OF SEAMEN

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELNO U/N OF 20 MAY

4191452DOR G

EXTREMELY DISTURBED BY SITUATION IN PERSIAN GULF. SIX MERCHANT SHIPS ATTACKED IN SIX DAYS - TWO SUNK THIS WEEKEND.

SEAMENS LIVES CANNOT BE PLACED AT RISK . REQUEST THAT FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE AND GENERAL COUNCIL OF BRITISH SHIPPING INSTRUCT MASTERS NOT TO PROCEED TO PERSIAN GULF UNTIL FREE AND SAFE PASSAGE IS ASSURED.
CONFERENCE DELEGATES HERE MOST CONCERNED. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROPOSAL IS NOW URGENTLY REQUESTED . REPLY SOONEST.

JIM SLATER,
GENERAL SECRETARY,
NATIONAL UNION OF SEAMEN,
BEAU SEJOUR CENTRE,
GUERNESEY,
CHANNEL ISLANDS.

22 MAY 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister.

This — and the telegrams which I have attached will bring you up-to-date. No further immediate action is necessary.

A.J.C. 21/5.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

21 May 1984

Dear John,

Iran/Iraq: Attacks on Shipping in the Gulf

The Foreign Secretary thought you might find it useful to be brought up to date on developments in the Gulf conflict since the OD(EM) meeting on 18 May. Since then there has been one more attack on a merchant ship in the Gulf: the Panamanian bulk carrier, 'Fidelity', which was sunk south of Kharg Island by the Iraqis early on Saturday morning. The Iraqi claims to have sunk two ships on 18 May, which Sir Geoffrey Howe mentioned at the beginning of OD(EM), have not been substantiated.

We have been engaged in intensive diplomatic activity over the weekend with the general objective of bringing as much international pressure as possible to bear on Iran and Iraq to de-escalate the situation in the Gulf. The results so far are as follows:

The Ten

The Ten, acting on our suggestion, have agreed to make demarches in both Tehran and Baghdad about the requirement to preserve freedom of navigation in the Gulf. The demarche in Baghdad was made today, 21 May, by the troika of past, current and future Presidencies (Greece, France and Italy, representing Ireland). The Iraqis, who appeared to have advance knowledge of the text, said they could not accept the EC statement. Their pretext was that Iraq had taken a responsible attitude to peace-seeking throughout, and should not be placed on the same footing as Iran.

Washington

Although they are not optimistic that further attacks on shipping will not occur, the Americans clearly share our objective of acting by diplomatic means. They have received no requests for assistance from the Gulf States

/and

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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and they made no such offers. It is significant that the Americans have now announced that a public request from the Gulf States would be necessary before assistance could be considered. This is exactly the point we have been making to the Americans for some time. The US Ambassador has reported, after speaking to Macfarlane of the NSC, that the Americans intend to concentrate on calming the situation, especially the oil market.

A team of UK FCO and MOD officials flew to Washington today where they will discuss, among other things, action at the UN and contacts with the Russians. They will report by the evening of 23 May, in time for Cabinet on Thursday.

Arab League Meeting in Tunis

An emergency meeting of the Arab League adopted a resolution on 19 May expressing deep concern at Iranian attacks on shipping; calling on Iran to stop such attacks; and calling on the UN Security Council and the international community to act to prevent such aggression.

United Nations

Representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are going to New York later this week to urge the Security Council to take a firm line to prevent further Iranian attacks. The GCC seem intent on a Security Council resolution which would condemn Iran and, if Iran continued its attacks, call for action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The Americans have already told the Kuwaitis that they could not support an unbalanced resolution or language which might lead to sanctions. We are taking the same line with the Omanis, who have asked for our views.

Attitude of Iranians

Statements by Iranian leaders indicate their determination to continue the conflict and to threaten action against countries which intervene in the Gulf. But they have not yet responded to the attack on the 'Fidelity' (para 1 above).

Attitude of Iraqis

The Iraqi press says that Iraq will continue attacking shipping in an effort to 'force' Iran to peace talks.

/Attitude

Attitude of Gulf States

In general there is a widespread reluctance to press Iraq to stop its attacks on shipping. Saudi Arabia has confirmed it will defend itself against any further attacks on its shipping by Iran in Saudi territorial waters. Oman has urged the Americans not to intervene militarily. Bahrain is concerned at developments but they have given no sign so far of making a request for assistance from the Americans or ourselves. The Bahrainis are unlikely to urge caution on Iraq, but hope that Saudi Arabia or Kuwait might do so instead. Similarly the UAE are worried but look to other Gulf States to take the lead. Kuwait is very worried and fears it is now in the front line.

We have urged Turkey, Pakistan, Algeria, India and Japan, who are well placed to talk to Iran, to use their influence to restrain the Iranians. Algeria and Japan have already responded that they are urging restraint, but neither holds out much hope for success.

The National Union of Seamen have been pressing for HMG to instruct British shipping not to enter the Gulf until freedom of navigation can be guaranteed. While we have no legal power to instruct owners in this way, we are in touch with the Department of Transport to agree a strengthening of our general warning on the heightened risk to shipping in the Gulf.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries of the other members of OD(EM).

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

21 MAY 1974

IRAN/IRAQ ADVANCE COPIES 18

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SAVING TO UKDEL OECD.

M I P T : ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING.

1. THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED HEADS OF MISSION ON 20 MAY. HE RECALLED THE LAST SUCH OCCASION ON 29 MARCH WHEN AT THE END OF HIS ADDRESS ON IRAQ'S USE OF CW HE HAD DRAWN ATTENTION TO ITS LATEST ATTACKS ON SHIPPING IN THE GULF. THESE HAD NOW REACHED A MENACINGLY DANGEROUS LEVEL AND IRAN WAS DETERMINED TO PUT AN END TO THE AGGRESSIVE IRAQI REGIME'S ADVENTURISM.

2. VELAYATI MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-
(I) IRAN HAD FIRST HER OWN DIRECT INTERESTS TO THINK OF AND SECONDLY THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE GULF FOR THE STABILISATION AND GROWTH OF THE WORLD ECONOMY,
(II) IRAQ'S REPEATED ATTACKS ON MERCANTILE SHIPPING, ESPECIALLY TANKERS, WERE AIMED AT INTERNATIONALISING THE WAR. COUNTRIES EXTENDING POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT TO IRAQ BORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS ADVENTURISM. FOREIGN FORCES, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF THE SUPERPOWERS, MUST STAY OUT OF THE ESCALATING CONFLICT. IF THEY RESPONDED TO THE IRAQI INVITATION, THEY WOULD BOTH LOSE THEIR INTERESTS IN THE GULF BUT ALSO HAVE TO PAY DEARLY ''IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES, OR ELSEWHERE'', FOR THE HAVOC CAUSED BY THEIR ENCROACHMENT,
(III) THE IRAQI ATTACKS VIOLATED NATIONAL LAWS, JUST AS HAD IRAQ'S USE OF CW AND ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN LAND TARGETS. THERE SHOULD BE NO ATTEMPT TO ENCOURAGE IRAQ BY LINKING THESE VIOLATIONS TO

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 626 OF 21 MAY
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK,
BIS TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT

MY TELNO 618 : SOVIET VIEWS ON THE GULF WAR

1. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS REPORTED THE LATEST ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING (WITHOUT ASCRIBING RESPONSIBILITY TO EITHER SIDE) AND HAS DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE PRESENCE IN THE GULF OF SHIPS FROM THE AMERICAN SEVENTH FLEET AND OF TWO BRITISH WAR SHIPS.

2. PRAVDA'S WEEKLY INTERNATIONAL COLUMN OF 20 MAY DESCRIBED THE US AS FEEDING THE FIRE OF THE GULF CONFLICT: AND A COMMENTARY THE PREVIOUS DAY BY A SENIOR PRAVDA CORRESPONDENT, DEMCHENKO, MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(I) THE US WAS READY TO PLUNGE THE NAVIES OF TWO NATO POWERS INTO MILITARY ADVENTURISM IN THE GULF.

(II) THE OFFICIAL US PRETEXT FOR INTERFERENCE - ENSURING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF - BROUGHT TO MIND WASHINGTON'S ACTIONS IN THE WATERS AROUND NICARAGUA. THERE AMERICAN MINE-LAYING HAD VIOLATED FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING LANES.

(III) WASHINGTON HAD LONG NURSED THE IDEA OF ACTIVE ARMED INTERFERENCE IN THE GULF REGION AND WAS USING THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT AND THE RECENT ATTACKS ON TANKERS AS A PRETEXT.

/(IV)

(IV) THE AMERICANS WERE HOPING THAT ONE OR OTHER OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES IN THE REGION WOULD ASK THE US FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE, THUS GIVING THE US A FREE HAND FOR INTERVENTION AND ALLOWING THEM TO SET UP BASES IN THE REGION. SUCH A REQUEST WAS UNLIKELY: FOLLOWING THE AMERICAN FAILURE IN THE LEBANON, ARAB GOVERNMENTS HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A STRONG ANTI-AMERICAN MOOD IN THEIR COUNTRIES.

(V) ''AMERICAN INTERFERENCE, WHATEVER THE SMOKE-SCREEN ONLY COMPLICATES THE SITUATION IN THIS EXPLOSIVE PART OF THE PLANET AND MAKES MORE DIFFICULT AN ALREADY COMPLICATED SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. THE ACTIONS OF WASHINGTON, AS THE FACTS DEMONSTRATE, FURTHER SELFISH IMPERIAL INTERESTS AND HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH CONCERN FOR FREEDOM OF INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION''.

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From the Private Secretary

21 May 1984

IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT: GUIDELINES FOR LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL

The Prime Minister has seen Nick Evans' letter of 17 May, commenting on an observation which the Prime Minister had made in relation to your Secretary of State's minute of 25 April, and the minute of 14 May by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on the above subject.

The Prime Minister is content that the guidelines attached to Mr. Heseltine's minute of 25 April should be issued to HM Ambassadors in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries of the other members of OD(EM) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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TELNO 274 OF 21 MAY 84
INFO IMMEDIATE GULF POSTS, TEHRAN, AMMAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY EC POSTS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, TOKYO, ANKARA.
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S
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 611 TO PARIS: IRAN/IRAQ: EC DEMARCHE.

SUMMARY.

1. THE TROIKA AMBASSADORS DELIVERED THE EC DEMARCHE AND ACCOMPANYING ORAL MESSAGE TO THE MFA IN BAGHDAD TODAY. THE ACTING HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, WHO APPEARED TO HAV ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE TEXT, RESPONDED FIRMLY, SAYING THAT THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT DID NOT ACCEPT THE STATEMENT. HE SAID THAT IRAN ALONE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTINUATION AND AGGRAVATION OF THE WAR AND THAT THE TEN SHOULD THEREFORE EXERT ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURES ON IRAN. IRAQ HAD TAKEN A RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE THROUGHOUT AND SHOULD NOT (NOT) BE PLACED ON THE SAME FOOTING AS IRAN.

DETAIL.

2. THE TROIKA AMBASSADORS (THE FRENCH, FLANKED BY THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN THE ABSENCE OF A RESIDENT IRISH AMBASSADOR, AND THE GREEK CHARGE D'AFFAIRES) THIS MORNING DELIVERED TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THE TEXT OF THE AGREED DEMARCHE. THEY THEN COVEYED THE ADDITIONAL ORAL MESSAGE. THE TROIKA WERE RECEIVED BY ABDUR RAZZAQ AL-HASHIMI, FORMER MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND NOW AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE IN BONN, WHO IS TEMPORARILY STANDING IN AS THE HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT.

3. WITHOUT LOOKING AT THE TEXT, WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN TO HIM IN FRENCH AND IN ARABIC, AL-HASHIMI RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY. HE SAID THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT WERE SORRY ABOUT THIS STATEMENT AND DID NOT ACCEPT IT. IT WAS NOT WHAT THEY HAD EXPECTED FROM THE TEN. REFERRING TO SENATOR GARY HART'S INSISTENCE THAT THE GULF WAS NOT A US PROBLEM, HE SAID IT WAS TIME THAT THE TEN UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GULF WAS THEIR PROBLEM. THE TEN AND JAPAN WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED BECAUSE IT WAS THEY WHO DEPENDED ON GULF OIL SUPPLIES. IRAQ HAD THROUGHOUT ADOPTED A VERY RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE AND HAD DONE NOTHING NEW. AL-HASHIMI QUESTIONED, THEREFORE, WHY IRAQ SHOULD BE ASKED TO BE RESPONSIBLE NOW. HE ARGUED THAT IRAN WAS ENTIRELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT TENSION AND THAT ALL ACTION TO DEAL WITH IT SHOULD BE TAKEN IN TEHRAN. AL-HASHIMI ADDED THAT IT WAS THE RIGHT MOMENT FOR EUROPE TO STOP CONSIDERING IRAQ AND

ENTIRELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT TENSION AND THAT ALL ACTION TO DEAL WITH IT SHOULD BE TAKEN IN TEHRAN. AL-HASHIMI ADDED THAT IT WAS THE RIGHT MOMENT FOR EUROPE TO STOP CONSIDERING IRAQ AND IRAN ON THE SAME FOOTING. IRAQI HAD DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE ACHIEVE PEACE AND IN CONTRAST IRAN HAD DONE NOTHING. IRAQ WOULD TAKE EVERY POSSIBLE MEASURE THAT WOULD SHORTEN THE WAR EVEN BY ONE DAY AND WOULD DEFEND HERSELF TO HER UTMOST CAPACITY, EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF ACTION AGAINST KHARG ISLAND. AL-HASHIMI SAID THAT THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN ''GOOD GUYS'' LONG ENOUGH AND THAT THEY COULD NOT CONTINUE TO SEND THEIR MEN TO A SLAUGHTER. HE SAID THAT IN ORDER TO END THE WAR IT WAS NECESSARY TO BREAK ''THIS DIABOLIC SPIRAL'' AND URGED THAT IRAQ'S FRIENDS SHOULD ADOPT THE SAME ATTITUDE.

4. AL-HASHIMI RECAPITULATED HIS ARGUMENT AS FOLLOWS:-

A) IRAQ HAD DONE NOTHING NEW: SO THE REQUEST TO IRAQ WAS NOT UNDERSTOOD.

B) IRAN ALONE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTINUATION AND AGGRAVATION OF THE WAR.

C) IRAN ALONE HAD DONE WRONG, IE IN ATTACKING THIRD COUNTRY SHIPS OUTSIDE A MILITARY ZONE.

D) THEREFORE THE TEN SHOULD EXERT ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURES ON IRAN.

E) THE TIME WAS RIGHT TO ABANDON DEALING WITH IRAQ AND IRAN ON AN EQUAL FOOTING.

F) EUROPE WAS THE PARTY CHIEFLY INTERESTED IN THE OIL AND THEREFORE IRAQ EXPECTED A MORE DECISIVE EC STAND TOWARDS IRAN, INVOLVING ACTION TO STOP THE FLOW OF OIL FROM IRAN AND THE SUPPLY OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND OTHER GOODS TO IRAN.

5. THE TROIKA REPRESENTATIVES FORMED THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT AL-HASHIMI WAS ALREADY AWARE OF THTEXT OF THE DEMARCHE AND OF THE CONTENT OF THE ACCOMPANYING ORAL MESSAGE AND AND THAT HE HAD PREPARED HIS RESPONSE IN ADVANCE, WHICH WAS DELIVERED EFFECTIVELY AND WITH AUTHORITY.

6. AT ONE POINT AL-HASHIMI PICKED UP THE ARABIC TEXT AND POINTED TO THE REFERENCE TO RECOMMENDATIONS IN PARAGRAPH 3 AND SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT COULD BE GIVEN THE TEXT OF THE TEN'S RECOMMENDATIONS. THE TROIKA AVOIDED GIVING A PRECISE ANSWER TO THIS.

7. AL-HASHIMI ASKED WHETHER THE DEMARCHE IN TEHRAN HAD ALSO BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY AN ORAL MESSAGE AND HE ENQUIRED WHETHER HE COULD BE GIVEN THE TEXT OF THIS. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE COULD REFER THIS TO THE PRESIDENCY.

8. AL-HASHIMI UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THE TEXT OF THE EC DEMARCHE AND ACCOMPANYING MESSAGE TO HIS AUTHORITIES.

9. AT THE END AL-HASHIMI SAID HE REALISED THAT THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS AND THE GREEK CHARGE WERE NOT CONVEYING THE VIEWS OF THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS, WITH WHICH IRAQ HAD EXCELLENT RELATIONS. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE DEMARCHE WAS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE COMMUNITY AND REPRESENTED THE VIEWS OF THE COMMUNITY.

FCO PLEASE PASS INFO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

ROBERLY

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FROM KUWAIT 210930Z MAY 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 199 OF 21 MAY
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN
FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, TOKYO, GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, STOCKHOLM, CAIRO, MOSCOW, ALGIERS AND NEW DELHI.

ALGIERS TELNO 98 : ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING.

1. SEEN FROM HERE, ATTAF'S GLOOMY ANALYSIS LOOKS RIGHT. IF THE SITUATION DOES DETERIORATE, KUWAIT WILL PROBABLY BEAR THE BRUNT. KUWAIT IS NOW TOO LOCKED INTO THE IRAQI CAUSE TO HAVE MUCH FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE TOWARDS IRAN. I SHALL COMMENT SEPARATELY ON THE WAYS IN WHICH KUWAIT COULD RESPOND TO FURTHER ATTACKS BY IRAN AND ON THE TYPE OF HELP WHICH KUWAIT MIGHT SEEK FROM US.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 97 OF 21 MAY 84
INFO IMMEDIATE TO GULF POSTS,TEHRAN,BAGDAD,WASHINGTON,UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS,TOKYO,TUNIS,AMMAN,CAIRO,UKDEL NATO

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 95 TO FCO (NOT TO ALL):
ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING

1. MY APPOINTMENT AT 0700Z TODAY WAS CANCELLED AND I WAS ASKED TO CALL ON THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT 0930Z. SHAIKH AHMED BIN SAIF HAD PREVIOUSLY SEEN THE US AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS.

2. SHAIKH AHMED OPENED BY SAYING THAT HE WANTED TO APPRAISE THE UNSC PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETINGS IN RIYADH AND TUNIS.HE SAID THAT THE IRANIAN ATTACKS ON SHIPPING IN SAUDI AND KUWAIT WATERS HAD BEEN A TEST OF GCC AND WORLD REACTION.THE SAUDIS HAD SENT UP FIGHTER INTERCEPTORS BUT HAD NOT ENGAGED THE IRANIAN PLANES.SHOULD THE IRANIANS AGAIN ATTACK SHIPPING IN SAUDI WATERS THE SAUDIS WOULD ENGAGE THEM.

GCC AND WORLD REACTION. THE SAUDIS HAD SENT UP FIGHTER INTERCEPTORS BUT HAD NOT ENGAGED THE IRANIAN PLANES. SHOULD THE IRANIANS AGAIN ATTACK SHIPPING IN SAUDI WATERS THE SAUDIS WOULD ENGAGE THEM.

3. THE MEETING HAD DECIDED THAT THE GCC STATES SHOULD SEEK A THREE POINT UNSC RESOLUTION:

(1) CONDEMNING IRAN FOR ATTACKING SHIPS IN GCC WATERS,

(11) CALLING ON IRAN TO REFRAIN FROM ATTACKING SHIPPING USING GCC PORTS, AND

(111) THE REAFFIRMATION OF SCR 540.

SHOULD IRAN NOT RESPOND THEN THE GCC WOULD PRESS (AT A LATER DATE) FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN. WHEN QUESTIONED (JEDDA TEL 252) HE REPEATED THAT SANCTIONS WERE ONLY TO BE CONSIDERED IF IRAN DID NOT RESPOND. I MADE THE POINT THAT THE RESOLUTION WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO SUCCEED IF IT WAS A BALANCED ONE, AND THAT SANCTIONS HAD NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN THE PAST. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION HE SAID THAT QATAR HAD NOT ASKED IRAQ TO STOP ATTACKS ON SHIPPING.

4. SHAIKH AHMED THEN SAID THE MEETING IN RIYADH HAD INSTRUCTED HIM (QATAR CURRENTLY HEADS THE GCC) TO PRESENT THE GCC'S CASE TO THE UNSC. FOR THIS HE WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY ABDULLA BISHARA AND SHAIKH SABAH. HE SAID BISHARA WAS ALREADY ON HIS WAY TO NEW YORK AND THAT SHAIKH SABAH WOULD FLY THERE DIRECT FROM TOKYO. (KUWAIT TELEGRAM NUMBER 125 TO FCO.) HE HAD FURTHER BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PRESENT THE GCC CASE IN PARIS AND LONDON EN ROUTE TO NEW YORK. HE WAS LEAVING FOR PARIS ON WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON AND WOULD ARRIVE IN LONDON ON THURSDAY EVENING. HE VERY MUCH HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MEET YOU ON FRIDAY 25 MAY. FAILING THAT HE HOPED HE COULD SEE MR LUCE. HE ASKED FOR EARLY CONFIRMATION THAT A MEETING WAS POSSIBLE.

5. I HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONTACT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SINCE OUR CALL ON THE MINISTRY BUT NO DOUBT IN VIEW OF THE EFFORT THEY ARE PUTTING IN TO STRENGTHENING FRANCO/QATARI RELATIONS THEY WILL TRY TO RESPOND POSITIVELY. I HOPE WE CAN ALSO RESPOND POSITIVELY. SHOULD A DECISION NOT BE POSSIBLE BEFORE 230900Z SHAIKH AHMED CAN BE CONTACTED VIA THE QATAR EMBASSY IN PARIS.

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TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 252 OF 20TH MAY 1984.
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, PARIS AND TEHRAN.
INFO PRIORITY TUNIS, AMMAN, CAIRO AND UKDEL NATO.

MY TELNO 247 : ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING

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SUMMARY
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1. THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER SPOKE TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THREE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN JEDDA TODAY. HE SAID THE GCC WANTED OUR SUPPORT FOR A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD CONTAIN CHAPTER 7 LANGUAGE. THIS WOULD BE LESS COSTLY AND DANGEROUS THAN A WIDENING OF THE CONFLICT BY E.G. A DECLARATION OF WAR BY THE GCC ON IRAN. IF THERE WERE FURTHER IRANIAN ATTACKS WITHIN SAUDI TERRITORIAL WATERS, SAUDI ARABIA WOULD DEFEND ITSELF MILITARILY. IF THE ATTACKS WERE ON THE HIGH SEAS, THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE DEALT WITH INTERNATIONALLY.

DETAIL
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2. PRINCE SAUD RECEIVED MY FRENCH AND U.S COLLEAGUES AND ME THIS AFTERNOON. HE SAID WE WERE FACING A NOVEL SITUATION : ATTACKS ON GCC SHIPS INSIDE THEIR OWN TERRITORIAL WATERS. THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THE ATTACKERS WERE IRANIAN: SAUDI INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT HAD GOT WITHIN 10 KILOMETRES OF THEM AND IN ANY CASE RAFSANJANI HAD ADMITTED THE FACT.

3. THE GCC COULD NOT ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT THAT BECAUSE IRAQ HAD ACTED AGAINST IRAN, IRAN COULD ACT AGAINST THIRD PARTIES. IRAQI PORTS HAD BEEN ATTACKED AND BLOCKADED BY IRAN, BUT THEY WERE NOT TO BE EQUATED WITH GCC PORTS. THE PRESENT IRANIAN ATTACKS THREATENED BOTH THE VITAL INTERESTS AND THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE GCC STATES. THEY ALSO THREATENED THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS AND WERE A BREACH OF THE U.N. CHARTER.

IRAQI PORTS HAD BEEN ATTACKED AND BLOCKADED BY IRAN, BUT THEY WERE NOT TO BE EQUATED WITH GCC PORTS. THE PRESENT IRANIAN ATTACKS THREATENED BOTH THE VITAL INTERESTS AND THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE GCC STATES. THEY ALSO THREATENED THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS AND WERE A BREACH OF THE U.N. CHARTER.

4. ALL GCC STATES WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH THE PERMAENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE GCC AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF QATAR (AS PRESIDENT) AND KUWAIT WERE GOING TO NEW YORK. A LETTER HAD BEEN SENT V THE PRESIDENT OF THE SC. HE HOPED OUR REPRESENTIATIVES IN NEW YORK WOULD COOPERATE IN OBTAINING A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD PREVENT FURTHER INCIDENTS AND HELP TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS AND THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE GCC STATES.

5. I ASKED WHAT KIND OF RESOLUTION WAS ENVISAGED. SAUD SAID THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED BY THE GCC. THEY WANTED TO AVOID ESCALATION BUT FEARED THAT IRANIAN ACTIONS WOULD ESCALATE IF THEY WERE NOT STOPPED. MERE CONDEMNATION WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH. IRAN HAD TO BE SHOWN THAT ITS INTERESTS COULD BE AFFECTED. A RESOLUTION WOULD BE USEFUL ONLY IF IT CONTAINED "SOME ASPECT OF IMPLEMENTATION". HE WAS THINKING, HE SAID, OF CHAPTER 7. THE AMERICAN REMARKED THAT COLLECTIVE MEASURES UNDER CHAPTER 7 DID NOT HAVE A HISTORY OF EFFECTIVENESS. SAUD REPLIED THAT THEY COULD BE EFFECTIVE IF STRICTLY APPLIED. THIS WAS A SPECIAL SITUATION: OUTSIDERS TO A CONFLICT WERE BEING ATTACKED. THE GCC WAS TRYING TO MAKE A LEGAL RESPONSE RATHER THAN ENTERING UPON A WAR. CHAPTER 7 MEASURES WOULD BE LESS COSTLY THAN WIDENING THE CONFLICT. FOR THAT REASON THE GCC HAD NOT/NOT ASKED THE ARAB LEAGUE AT TUNIS FOR A DECLARATION OF WAR.

6. THE FRENCHMAN SAID THAT THE COMMUNITY WERE MAKING A DEMARCHE AT BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN AND ADDED THAT IT WOULD REFER TO RESOLUTION 540. SAUD SAID THE GCC WANTED TO AVOID LINKING THIS OPERATION WITH PREVIOUS AND GENERAL APPEALS FOR AN END TO THE WAR. THOSE APPEALS HAD BEEN INEFFECTIVE. THIS WAS A SPECIAL AND SEPARATE SITUATION.

7. I POINTED OUT THAT SOME OBSERVERS MIGHT ARGUE THAT THE FIRST ATTACKS ON GCC SHIPS HAD BEEN MADE BY IRAQ. SAUD SAID THEY HAD BEEN MADE WITHIN AN EXCLUSION ZONE WHICH SHIPS ENTERED IN FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE RISK. THERE WAS NO COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO TYPES OF ATTACK. THE AMERICAN SUGGESTED THAT SOME OF THE IRAQI ATTACKS HAD BEEN OUTSIDE THE EXCLUSION ZONE. SAUD REPLIED THAT THE IRAQI ATTACKS ON SAUDI SHIPS HAD BEEN INSIDE.

8. I ASKED WHETHER SAUDI ARABIA WAS URGING IRAQ TO AVOID PROVACATIVE ACTIONS AND THE AMERICAN SUGGESTED THAT IRAQI ATTACKS AFTER THE GCC MEETING (WHEN WE WERE ALL HOPING FOR A COOLING-OFF PERIOD) WERE NEITHER TIMELY NOR HELPFUL IN THE CONTEXT OF AN SC MEETING. SAUD SAID THE SAUDIS WERE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR IRAQI ACTIONS. IT WAS HARD TO URGE THE IRAQIS TO SWEETEN THE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE SC DEBATE WHEN THEY WERE FACING CONSTANT PROVOCATION BY IRAN (MASSING OF TROOPS, THREATS OF A RENEWED OFFENSIVE ETC). NEVERTHELESS "WE HAVE TALKED TO THE IRAQIS OF COURSE. WE TALKS TO THEM CONSTANLY AND WE HOPE THEY LISTEN".

9. THE FRENCHMAN ASKED IF THE SAUDIS HAD ASKED IRAN FOR AN EXPLANATION. SAUD SAID THEY HAD PROTESTED BUT HAD NOT HAD A REPLY.

10. I ASKED WHETHER SAUDA ARABIA INTENDED TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION

10. I ASKED WHETHER SAUDI ARABIA INTENDED TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION IF THERE WERE FURTHER ATTACKS. SAUD SAID IT WAS DIFFICULTY TO COPE WITH HIT-AND-RUN ATTACKS BUT THE SAUDIS HAD TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AND, IF THERE WERE ATTACKS SIMILAR TO THAT ON THE YANBU PRIDE, THEY WOULD TRY TO INTERCEPT THE ATTACKERS. IF THE ATTACKS WERE ON THE HIGH SEAS, THAT WOULD BE AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM, TO BE DEALT WITH INTERNATIONALLY. HE PRESUMED THAT COUNTIRES LIKE OUR THREE WOULD BE DEEPLY CONCERNED SINCE THEIR VITAL INTERESTS WOULD BE AFFECTED. ASKED IF SAUDI ARABIA WOULD IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES ASK FOR HELP, HE SAID (SOMEWHAT VAGUUELY) THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH US. AFTER THE GCC SUMMIT AT DOHA WE HAD ALL BEEN INFORMED OF THE GCC DECISION TO SEEK INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO DEAL WITH SUCH A SITUATION.

11. ANSWERING THE AMERICAN, SAUD SAID ARAB SUPPORT AT TUNIS HAD BEEN GRATIFYING. THERE HAD BEEN NO OBJECTION TO THE RESOLUTION EVEN FROM COUNTRIES WHICH HAD NOT ATTENDED THE BAGHDAD MEETING (SYRIA, PDRY AND ALGERIA). THE SYRIAN REPRESENTATIVE HAD BEEN QUITE CLEAR IN HIS "DENUNCIATION OF THE IRANIAN ACTION". ONLY THE LIBYAN HAD EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS.

12. INCIDENTALLY, THE FRENCHMAN AT ONE POINT ASKED WHAT WAS THE SAUDIS UNDERSTANDING OF TERRITORIAL WATERS. SAUD SAID 12 MILES.

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FROM KUWAIT 2013302 MAY 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 196 OF 20 MAY
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 195 : ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING.

1. GRIFFIN, US CHARGE, TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) THIS MORNING THAT, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON, HE WAS ABOUT TO CALL ON THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE MFA TO MAKE A DEMARCH URGING THE KUWAITIS TO THINK THROUGH VERY CAREFULLY THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHAT LOOKED LIKE BEING AN UNTARGETTED APPROACH TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OVER THE LATEST ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING. THE US WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN SUPPORTING ANY SC RESOLUTION WHICH DID NOT DEAL EQUALLY BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. THEY DID NOT WANT TO HAVE THEIR HANDS TIED BY A SECURITY COUNCIL INSISTENCE THAT ANY ACT OF INTERVENTION IN THE GULF HAD TO BE COLLECTIVE OR UNDER A UN LABEL. THEY COULD NOT AGREE TO ANY ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE CHAPTER VII SANCTIONS ON IRAN. RATHER THEY HOPED KUWAIT AND THE OTHER GCC STATES, INVOKING THE OPTION OF REGIONAL SELF-HELP ENVISAGED IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER WOULD SET LIMITS TO THE KIND OF OUTCOME THEY WOULD EXPECT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL. GRIFFIN DID NOT THINK THE KUWAITIS WOULD BE HAPPY WITH HIS MESSAGE.

2. GRIFFIN ALSO CONFIRMED THAT SO FAR THE AMERICANS HAD NOT BEEN

~~WA THE KUWAITIS WOULD BE HAPPY WITH HIS MESSAGE.~~

~~2. GRIFFIN ALSO CONFIRMED THAT SO FAR THE AMERICANS HAD NOT BEEN~~ ASKED FOR HELP (PARA 1 (C) OF FCO TELNO 220 TO JEDDA). HE THOUGHT THE KUWAITIS WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN MAKING SUCH A REQUEST GIVEN THEIR WELL PUBLICISED DISTASTE FOR SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION IN THE GULF. AS YOU KNOW, HOWEVER (MY TELNO 189), THERE IS A HIGH LEVEL US MILITARY TEAM IN KUWAIT AT PRESENT AND ANOTHER DUE ON 23 MAY AND THEIR PRESENCE MIGHT SPARK OFF SOME KUWAIT REQUEST FOR US HELP, PARTICULARLY IF THE SITUATION IN THE GULF DETERIORATES. I WILL TRY TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH GRIFFIN WHOSE OUTSPOKENESS WITH WITH US WILL, I HOPE, NOT GET HIM INTO TROUBLE IN WASHINGTON.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 157 OF 20 MAY 84
INFO IMMEDIATE GULF POSTS, TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, TOKYO, TUNIS, AMMAN, CAIRO, UKDEL NATO

M I P T: ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING: US/OMAN DISCUSSIONS

SUMMARY

1. DURING VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT THE OMAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS URGED THE US NOT TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN THE GULF.

DETAIL

2. I SPOKE THIS MORNING TO UNDER-SECRETARY MURPHY, WHO ACCOMPANIED VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH ON HIS VISIT HERE BUT STAYED ON AFTER BUSH'S PARTY HAD LEFT. (I SHALL BE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON BUSH'S VISIT).

3. MURPHY SAID THAT IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE VICE-PRESIDENT ABOUT THE ATTACKS ON SHIPPING, THE SULTAN AND YOUSUF AL ALAWI (MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS) HAD TAKEN A SIMILAR LINE TO BATTASHI IN THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN MIPT. BUT ALAWI HAD THEN GONE ON STROMGLY TO URGE THE AMERICANS NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED MILITARILY IN THE GULF. ALAWI SAID THAT THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE ATTACKS BY BOTH THE IRAQIS AND THE IRANIANS AND MORE SHIPS WOULD BE SUNK. BUT THIS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED: A FEW SUNKEN SHIPS WERE BETTER THAN MILITARY INTERVENTION BY OUTSIDE POWERS. IN ANY CASE, SAID ALAWI, THE PRACTICE OF ATTACKING SHIPS MIGHT WELL CEASE FAIRLY SOON (HE GAVE NO REASON FOR THIS BELIEF). MURPHY SAID THAT HE REPLIED THAT WHILST THE US HAD NO PRESENT INTENTION OF INTERVENING MILITARILY, IF INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS ON SHIPPING CONTINUED THE US MIGHT HAVE TO DO SOMETHING TO HONOUR ITS COMMITMENT TO FREE NAVIGATION. ALAWI MERELY REPEATED THAT A FEW SHIPS LOST WERE BETTER THAN MILITARY INTERVENTION.

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INFO PRIORITY PARIS, TOKYO, TUNIS, AMMAN, CAIRO, UKDEL NATO

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 220 TO JEDDA: ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING

SUMMARY

1. THE OMAN GOVERNMENT SHARE THE GCC'S CONCERN AT THE ESCALATING ATTACKS ON SHIPPING. BUT PRIVATELY THEIR CONCERN IS MODIFIED BY THE FACT THAT THE CRISIS CONTAINS SOME ADVANTAGES FOR OMAN. THE UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS GIVEN ME THE OUTLINE OF A RESOLUTION WHICH THE GCC WISH THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO PASS. HE INDICATED THAT THE OMAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER MODIFICATIONS TO THE RESOLUTION. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE GCC HAD URGED THE IRAQIS TO STOP THEIR ATTACKS ON SHIPPING.

DETAIL

2. FOR THE LAST TWO DAYS, THE OMAN GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN BUSY WITH THE VISIT OF VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH, BUT I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TALK PRIVATELY TO A NUMBER OF OMANI MINISTERS. THE OMANIS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE IRANIAN ATTACKS ON SHIPPING AND ANXIOUS TO SHOW THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE OTHER GCC STATES. BUT THE OMANIS FEEL SOMEWHAT DETATCHED FROM THE PROBLEM AND THE OMANI CONCERN IS A LONG WAY SHORT OF PANIC. IN PARTICULAR I DETECT A CERTAIN QUIET SATISFACTION ON THE OMANI SIDE ON TWO POINTS:

(A) THE FACT THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE CHOSEN TO ESCALATE THE CONFLICT BY ATTACKING SHIPPING IN THE UPPER GULF TENDS TO CONFIRM THE THEORY THAT THE IRANIANS REGARD ACTION IN THE STRAITS, WHICH WOULD AFFECT THE OMANIS DIRECTLY, AS A LAST RESORT SEMI COLON

(B) IF SHIPOWNERS BECOME RELUCTANT TO SEND TANKERS INTO THE GULF, THEN THIS WILL MAKE OMANI OIL MORE SOUGHT AFTER.

3. I WAS SUMMONED THIS MORNING TO CALL ON SAIF AL BATTASHI, THE UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. BATTASHI SAID THAT THE RECENT GCC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING HAD DECIDED TO REFER THE PROBLEM CAUSED BY THE IRANIAN ATTACK ON SHIPPING

SAID THAT THE RECENT GCC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING HAD DECIDED TO REFER THE PROBLEM CAUSED BY THE IRANIAN ATTACK ON SHIPPING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ABDULLAH BISHARA WOULD BE ARRIVING IN NEW YORK ON THE 21ST AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF KUWAIT AND QATAR WOULD FOLLOW SHORTLY THEREAFTER. THE GCC WISHED THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO PASS A RESOLUTION CONTAINING THREE POINTS:-

(A) CONDEMNING IRAN FOR ATTACKING SHIPS BELONGING TO GCC COUNTRIES IN GCC WATERS OR WHILST ON PASSAGE FROM ONE GCC PORT TO ANOTHER SEMI COLON

(B) CALLING UPON IRAN TO DESIST FROM THIS PRACTICE SEMI COLON

(C) REAFFIRMING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 540.

BATTASHI ADDED THAT THE GCC COUNTRIES HOPED THAT, IF IRAN TOOK NO NOTICE OF THE RESOLUTION AND CONTINUED TO ATTACK SHIPPING, THEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD ADOPT SANCTIONS AGAINST HER UNDER CHAPTER 7 OF THE UN CHARTER.

4. I SAID THAT MY GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED AT THE MOUNTING SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE IN THE GULF AND WISHED TO SEE THIS REVERSED. IT MIGHT WELL BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE GCC TO REFER THE PROBLEM TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT SPEAKING PERSONALLY, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT A RESOLUTION ON THE LINES WHICH BATTASHI HAD OUTLINEDWAS HEAVILY WEIGHTED TOWARDS THE IRAQI POINT OF VIEW. A MORE BALANCED RESOLUTION MIGHT HAVE MORE CHANCE OF SUCCESS. BATTASHI REPLIED THAT THE OMAN GOVERNMENT WISHED TO HEAR THE ADVICE OF THEIR FRIENDS AND WOULS THEREFORE WELCOME ANY COMMENTS WHICH HMG MIGHT HAVE ON THE GCC PROPOSAL. HE ALSO HOPED THAT THE BRITISH AND OMANI DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK WOULD WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER.

5. I THEN ASKED BATTASHI WHETHER THE GCC STATES, EITHER COLLECTIVELY OR INDIVIDUALLY, HAD URGED IRAQ TO CEASE ATTACKING SHIPPING GOING TO AND FROM KHARG ISLAND, SINCE THIS SEEMED TO BE WHAT HAD PROVOKED THE IRANIAN ATTACKS. BATTASHI REPLIED THAT, FRANKLY, ALL THE GCC STATES (EXCEPT, OF COURSE, OMAN) WERE AFRAID OF IRAQ. THEREFORE, SO FAR AS HE WAS AWARE, THEY HAD NOT SAID ANYTHING TO THE IRAQIS: OR, IF THEY HAD, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN VERY MILD TERMS. BATTSHI ADDED THAT, IN ANY CASE, THE IRAQIS WERE NOT LIKELY TO TAKE ANY NOTICE OF WHAT THE GCC COUNTRIES SAID TO THEM SINCE THE IRAQIS BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE FIGHTING WITH THEIR BACKS TO THE WALL.

6. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING YOU WISH ME TO SAY TO THE OMANIS ABOUT THE PROPOSED DRAFT RESOLUTION.

7. PLEASE SEE M I F T.

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FROM: A S COLLINS, MED
20 May 1984

Private Secretary

cc: PS/Lady Young
PS/Mr Rifkind
PS/Mr Luce
PS/Mr Whitney
PS/PUS
Sir J Bullard
Mr Wright
Sir J Leahy
Mr Egerton
Mr Adams
MED : MAED : ESSD
Defence Dept : News Dept

ATTACKS ON SHIPPING IN THE GULF:
SITREP AT 1800 ON 20 MAY

1. Panamanian bulk carrier FIDELITY was sunk south of Kharg Island at 0140 on 19 May. FIDELITY was carrying steel from Spain to Bandar Khomeini. FIDELITY has no known UK connections. Neither side has admitted responsibility, but Iraq is obvious candidate. No confirmation of Iraqi claim to have attacked two ships on 18 May.

Washington

2. Although they are not optimistic of preventing further attacks, the Americans share UK objective of acting by diplomatic means and clearly intend a cautious approach. They have received no requests for assistance from the Gulf States and have made no such offers. They have had no contacts with Russians but will discuss this and action at the UN at US/UK talks in Washington on Tuesday.

3. US Ambassador in London has reported his conversation with the White House. This confirms American intention to focus on diplomatic activity and need to calm situation, especially oil market.

New York

4. UN Secretary-General increasingly anxious about the Gulf and considering taking action himself to bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council. However, he is content to wait for action by the GCC at the UN.

The Ten

5. Political Directors of the Ten have agreed on a démarche in Tehran and Baghdad. The fact of the démarche is to be made public but not details. The Embassy in Paris have been asked to press French to take early action.

Arab League Meeting in Tunis on 19 May

6. An emergency meeting of the Arab League adopted a resolution expressing deep concern at Iranian attacks on shipping, called

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on Iran to stop such attacks, and called on the Security Council and the international community to take firm action to prevent such aggression. Algeria, Syria and Libya prevented stronger condemnation of Iran. An Arab League delegation of GCC members will go to New York to seek Security Council action this week.

Saudi Arabia

7. Saudi Foreign Minister said in Tunis that Arabs could not stand by in face of Iranian action. They have confirmed that the GCC will act at the UN. The Saudis will give more details of their position at a meeting they have called of Security Council Ambassadors on 20 May.

Kuwait

8. Kuwaitis extremely concerned and are pursuing GCC action at UN. Foreign Minister may go to New York after cutting short a visit to Tokyo on 21 May. The Kuwaitis will not be pressing Iraq to stop its attacks on Iranian shipping.

Oman

9. Omani Government share GCC concern at Iranian attacks but do not expect the GCC to put pressure on Iraq to stop its own attacks. They have urged the Americans not to intervene. GCC states have offered outline of possible Security Council resolution condemning Iran.

Bahrain

10. Bahrainis concerned at developments but no sign of requests for assistance from US or UK. They will probably not themselves urge caution on Iraq but hope Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will do so.

UAE

11. UAE worried but look to other Gulf States to take lead.

Tehran

12. Statements by Iranian leaders show determination to continue war and threaten action against countries which intervene in the Gulf.

Baghdad

13. Iraqi press has said that Iraqi attacks on shipping will continue to force Iran to peace talks.

Diplomatic Pressure on Iran

14. We have urged Turkey, Pakistan, Algeria, India and Japan to use their influence to restrain Iran.

/15.

15. While the Japanese will continue to urge restraint on both Iran and Iraq, they do not feel they have much leverage with Iran.

Soviet Union

16. Moscow reports a short exchange on the Gulf at the UK/Soviet round-table. The Russians said that they supported freedom of navigation but drew a distinction between action in the Gulf with which they were associated, and that involving only the US and its allies. The latter would cause Soviet 'displeasure'.

Approach by Union of British Seamen

17. National Union of Seamen have asked FCO and General Council of British Shipping to instruct British shipping not to enter the Gulf until freedom of navigation can be guaranteed. As an interim reply, the Union have been told of the warning on dangers in the Gulf issued to British shipping last week.

A S Collins.

A S Collins
Middle East Department

20 May 1984

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ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING : IRAQI POLICY STATEMENTS

1. A FURTHER AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT OF IRAQI POLICY ON ATTACKS ON SHIPPING IN THE GULF WAS GIVEN BY IRAQI FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER, TAHA YASIN RAMADHAN IN A SPEECH YESTERDAY. THE FOLLOWING WERE THE MAIN POINTS:

(A) IRAQ HAD STARTED AN INDEFINITE SIEGE OF KHARG ISLAND ON 27 FEBRUARY WITH A RENEWED WARNING TO ALL SHIPS AND OIL TANKERS TO STAY AWAY FROM THE ISLAND AND OTHER IRANIAN PORTS.
(B) IRAQ HOPED THAT THE PARTIES CONCERNED SHOULD TAKE THESE WARNINGS INTO ACCOUNT WHEN SENDING THEIR SHIPS TO THE AREA.
(C) IRAQ WOULD NOT ASSUME ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR DAMAGES AFFECTING ANY PARTY THAT IGNORED THE WARNINGS.
(D) THE FORTHCOMING 3 MONTHS WOULD WITNESS A DEVELOPMENT IN THE BLOCKADE OPERATION AGAINST IRAN. (THIS MAY HAVE BEEN A REFERENCE TO INDICATIONS REFERRED TO IN PARA 4 BELOW THAT IRAQ HAS NOT ABANDONED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ATTACK ON KHARG ISLAND ITSELF).
(E) IRAQ'S DECISION WAS NOT AIMED AT HARMING ANYONE BUT WAS A RETALIATION WHICH IRAN'S RULERS UNDERSTOOD.
(F) IRAQ'S ACCEPTANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 540 AND PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN'S SPEECH ON THE SAME NIGHT ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE AFFIRMED THAT IRAQ WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR.
(G) IT WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO TAKE A POSITIVE MOVE TO END THE WAR, BUT IT REMAINED EITHER AN ONLOOKER OR SOUGHT TO BENEFIT FROM ITS CONTINUATION.

2. RAMADHAN CLAIMED THAT IRAQ'S ATTACKS ON SHIPPING HAD BEEN AN ECONOMIC SUCCESS, CUTTING IRAN'S OIL EXPORTS TO 55%.

3. ARTICLES IN IRAQ'S OFFICIAL PRESS HAVE REPORTED WITH SATISFACTION INCREASES IN SHIPPING INSURANCE RATES AND LIKE RAMADHAN CLAIMED ECONOMIC DAMAGE TO IRAN. A MAIN THEME HAS BEEN TO UNDERLINE THE FACT THAT IRAQI ATTACKS ARE IN RETALIATION FOR IRAN'S CLOSURE OF IRAQ'S SHIPPING OUTLETS.

4. A MILITARY SPOKESMAN LAST WEEK WENT OVER THE SAME GROUND WITH THE ADDITION THAT IRAQ HAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE NOT TO HIT AND DESTROY THE OIL LOADING TERMINALS ON KHARG ISLAND ITSELF IN THE HOPE THAT IRANIAN RULERS WOULD COME TO THEIR SENSES AND PUT AN END TO THEIR AGGRESSION. HOWEVER, SHOULD THE IRANIAN REGIME CONTINUE TO DEPRIVE IRAQ OF ITS LEGAL RIGHTS FREELY TO USE ITS PORT FACILITIES IN THE GULF, IRAQ WOULD BE FORCED TO RETHINK AND TO HIT AND DESTROY THE ISLAND ITSELF.

15.

5. LAST FRIDAY, 18 MAY, AL-JUMHURIYA COMMENTED CRITICALLY ON THE FCO STATEMENT, ATTRIBUTED BRITISH POLICY TO THE OVERWHELMING DESIRE TO SPARE IRAN ANY POSSIBLE DEGREE OF CONDEMNATION AND WENT ON TO SAY: '' THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE KNOWS FULL WELL A NUMBER OF FACTS, SUCH AS THE LIMITS OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE DECLARED BY IRAQ IN THE NORTH-EASTERN PART OF THE GULF. IRAQI PLANES RAIDED SHIPS WHICH IGNORED THE MILITARY EXCLUSION ZONE, AS WELL AS OIL TANKERS TRYING TO HELP IRAN TO PROTRACT ITS WAR OF AGRESSION AGAINST IRAQ. IRAQI PILOTS ARE EXTREMELY ACCURATE WHEN HITTING DEFINED TARGETS, TRYING TO FORCE THE IRANIAN SIDE TO ACCEPT ANY FORMULA THAT WOULD GUARANTEE ESTABLISHING PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY AND ENUSRE THE RIGHTS OF EACH SIDE TO FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF.''

PARIS PLEASE PASS SAVING UKDEL OECD.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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SAVING TO UKDEL OECD.

MY TELNO 266 : ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING.

SUMMARY.

1. STATEMENTS BY IRANIAN LEADERS OVER THE WEEKEND SHOWED DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE WAR AND THREATENED ACTION AGAINST REGIONAL AND WESTERN COUNTRIES IF THEY INTERVENED. THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER APPEALED TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL LAST WEEK TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST IRAQ'S ATTACKS ON SHIPPING.

DETAIL.

2. IRAN AT FIRST DENIED IRAQ'S CLAIM TO HAVE ATTACKED TWO NAVAL TARGETS IN THE GULF ON THE MORNING OF 18 MAY, BUT HAS SINCE REPORTED THE SINKING OF THE PANAMANIAN-REGISTERED BULK CARRIER FIDELITY.

3. AT FRIDAY PRAYERS ON 18 MAY, RAFSANJANI TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF, AMID SHOUTS OF ''WAR, WAR UNTIL VICTORY'' FROM THE CONGREGATION. HE SAID THAT SADDAM'S NEW POLICY TO SAVE HIS TOTTERING REGIME WAS TO EMBARK ON ADVENTURISM AND ESCALATE THE WAR INTO A REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT. THE US, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND FRANCE WERE ACCOMPLICES IN THIS POLICY. THERE WAS A PLOT TO PUT PRESSURE ON IRAN AND CUT ITS OIL EXPORTS. SHOULD THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC DISPLAY THE SLIGHTEST DEGREE OF WEAKNESS, WITHIN A FORTNIGHT, NO SHIP WOULD COME TO KHARG, BUT IRAN WAS PREPARED TO PAY ANY PRICE AND WOULD NEVER SURRENDER TO INTERNATIONAL BULLYING. HE WARNED THE GULF COUNTRIES NOT TO GET DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE WAR, AS SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT ALREADY HAD THROUGH THEIR RECENT COLLABORATION WITH THE IRAQI REGIME. HE ALSO WARNED THE SUPERPOWERS NOT TO THINK IN

KHARG, BUT IRAN WAS PREPARED TO PAY ANY PRICE AND WOULD ~~NEVER~~ SURRENDER TO INTERNATIONAL BULLYING. HE WARNED THE GULF COUNTRIES ~~NOT TO GET DIRECTLY~~ INVOLVED IN THE WAR, AS SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT ALREADY HAD THROUGH THEIR RECENT COLLABORATION WITH THE IRAQI REGIME. HE ALSO WARNED THE SUPERPOWERS NOT TO THINK IN TERMS OF INTERVENING IN GULF AFFAIRS. IF THEY AND SECOND-RATE WESTERN POWERS INTERVENED, IRAN WOULD HAVE TO PREPARE FOR A WORLDWIDE WAR AGAINST ANY COUNTRY WHICH DID SO.

4. IN A COMMUNIQUE ISSUED LATE ON 18 MAY, THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS WARNED THAT THEY WOULD TURN THE WHOLE MIDDLE EAST INTO A BATTLEFRONT IF THE SUPERPOWERS AND THEIR REGIONAL AGENTS SOUGHT TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES DIRECTLY IN THE WAR. THEY ALSO CALLED ON ALL MUSLIM ACTIVISTS TO PREPARE THEMSELVES FOR ACTION AGAINST AMERICAN INTERESTS THROUGHOUT THE GLOBE IF THE US CONTINUED ITS ADVENTURISM IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES.

5. IN A SPEECH AT QOM ON 18 MAY, PRESIDENT KHAMENE'I SAID THAT IRAN'S ENEMIES HAD STARTED THE WAR AND WERE NOW TRYING TO IMPLEMENT DIABOLICAL PLANS IN THE GULF, BUT THEY WOULD BE DEFEATED.

6. ON 19 MAY THE IRANIAN RADIO REPORTED THAT LAST WEEK THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SENT A NOTE TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL CALLING FOR ACTION TO STOP IRAQ ATTACKING SHIPPING IN THE GULF IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

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GRS 725
CONFIDENTIAL
FM ALGIERS 201425Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 98 OF 20 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, BIS TEHRAN
INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, TOKYO, GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, STOCKHOLM, CAIRO, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

YOUR TELNO 301 TO TOKYO: ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING

1. I SPOKE TODAY TO ATTAF, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS AT MFA. I PRESENTED THE APPROACH AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THE DISCUSSIONS ON IRAN/IRAQ AND THE IMPORTANCE OF FREEDOM OF GULF NAVIGATION WHICH MR LUCE HAD WITH DR IBRAHIMI LAST WEEK.

2. ATTAF SPOKE VERY OPENLY. FOLLOWING THE ESCALATION OF ATTACKS ON SHIPPING THE ALGERIANS HAD MADE A FRESH ANALYSIS OF THE ATTITUDE OF BOTH PARTIESM. THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT BOTH SIDES' POSITION HAD NOW STIFFENED AND THERE WAS EVEN LESS HOPE OF RATIONAL REFLECTION ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS LATEST DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT THAN MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE CASE A FEW WEEKS AGO. FOR THEIR PART THE IRANIANS WERE NOW SO COMMITTED TO THE STRUGGLE THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO RISK BRINGING ALL SHIPPING IN THE GULF TO A STANDSTILL NOT BY PHYSICALLY BLOCKING HORMUZ WHICH WAS IMPRACTICABLE BUT BY COUNTER STIKES AGAINST THIRD COUNTRY SHIPPING WHICH WOULD DETER ALL BUT THE BOLDEST FROM ENTERING THE GULF. THE FACT THAT IT WAS IRAN WHICH PROBABLY STOOD TO LOSE MOST IN ECONOMIC TERMS BY SUCH ACTION DID NOT COUNT WITH THEM. ONLY THE REMOVAL OF SADDAM HUSSAIN WOULD PLACATE KHOMEINI. THE ALGERIANS HAD THOUGHT THAT, WITH THEIR POSITION REINFORCED BY THE RECENT ELECTIONS, THE IRANIAN REGIME MIGHT HAVE CONSIDERED DROPPING THIS CONDITION. BUT THE REVERSE HAD HAPPENED IN THE FACE OF IRAQ'S ATTACKS ON KHARG SHIPPING. THE RISK OF THE SITUATION SLIDING INTO A BROADER CONFLICT INVOLVING GULF STATES AND THE MAJOR POWERS WAS NOW VERY REAL. RASFANJANI'S THREAT BEFORE THE HIGHER DEFENCE COUNCIL TO STRIKE AT ALL THOSE WHO HELPED IRAQ HAD TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.

3. THE IRAQIS TOO WERE NOW MORE COMMITTED TO AN ALL OUT FIGHT THAN EVER. TAHA RAMADAN'S RECENT STATEMENT THAT IRAQ HAD ACHEIVED A 50% REDUCTION IN IRANIAN OIL EXPORTS ILLUSTATED IRAQ'S INTENTION TO

3. THE IRAQIS TOO WERE NOW MORE COMMITTED TO AN ALL OUT FIGHT THAN EVER. TAHA RAMADAN'S RECENT STATEMENT THAT IRAQ HAD ACHIEVED A 50% REDUCTION IN IRANIAN OIL EXPORTS ILLUSTATED IRAQ'S INTENTION TO CONTINUE THE CAMPAIGN OF SHIPPING STRIKES.

4. ATTAF SAID ALGERIA THUS SAW VERY LITTLE PROSPECT OF ACHIEVING AN EARLY STABILISATION OF THE SITUATION THROUGH DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION. HE COULD ASSURE US THEY WERE ACTIVELY URGING MODERATION ON BOTH PARTIES THROUGH ALGERIAN EMBASSIES IN BOTH CAPITALS BUT COULD DETECT NO INDICATION THAT A HIGHER LEVEL APPROACH WOULD GET ANY WHERE. I ASKED WHETHER A BROADER BASED FORUM OFFERED ANY PROSPECT OF MEDIATION AT THIS CRITICAL STAGE. ATTAF DISMISSED THE UN AND PALME'S EFFORTS AS A NON-STARTER SO FAR AS IRAN WENT. NOR WOULD THE GOOD OFFICES COMMISSION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE FARE ANY BETTER, NOT ONLY BECAUSE SEKOU TOURE WAS NO LONGER AROUND BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE HOSTILE IRANIAN REACTION TO THE COMMISSIONS EARLIER REPORT, SEEN AS FAVOURING IRAQ. NOR WAS HE HOPEFUL OF THE NAM. WE AGREED THIS LEFT ALGERIA IN A POTENTIALLY KEY ROLE. BUT HE INSISTED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT COULD NOT ACT WHILE BOTH PARTIES REFUSED TO LISTEN.

5. I ASKED HOW ALGERIA SAW THE POSITION OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES. HE SAID THESE WERE ALL PRESSING ALGERIA HARD TO DO SOMETHING. IT WAS ALL VERY WELL FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE TO PASS STERN RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING IRAN, BUT IRAQ MUST CARRY HER SHARE OF BLAME TOO. HE SAID THAT, SPEAKING VERY FRANKLY, ALGERIA RECOGNISED THAT IF IRANIAN RETALIATION INVOLVING GULF STATES CONTINUED, THE US, PERHAPS WITH OTHER WESTERN STATES, WAS LIKELY TO BECOME MILITARILY INVOLVED IN THE PROTECTION OF SHIPPING. THIS WAS A VERY DISTURBING PROSPECT, AS IT COULD DRAW BOTH SUPER POWERS INTO SOME DEGREE OF CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF. BUT SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER GULF STATES WERE OBVIOUSLY INCAPABLE OF ENSURING THEIR OWN PROTECTION AND IN PRACTICE MIGHT HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO ASK FOR WESTERN HELP. FOR THEIR PART THE RUSSIANS, EVEN IF THEY WISHED TO DO SO, CARRIED NO SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE WITH IRAQ, AND CERTAINLY NOT WITH IRAN.

6. COMMENT. A VERY REALISTIC IF SOMBRE APPRAISAL. ATTAF WAS BEING VERY CANDID WITH US. THE ALGERIANS REALISE THEY PROBABLY CARRY AS MUCH WEIGHT AS ANYONE, AND ARE EVIDENTLY DOING THEIR BEST TO CALM THINGS BUT WITH LITTLE HOPE OF SUCCESS. I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THEY ARE FACING UP TO EVENTUALITY OF WESTERN INTERVENTION TO PROTECT SHIPPING, BUT ARE CLEARLY UNEASY ABOUT WHAT ACTION THE US MAY TAKE AND POSSIBLE RUSSIAN RESPONSES. BEYOND SAYING THAT HE ASSUMED WE WERE IN DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS ABOUT CONTINGENCY ACTION, ATTAF DID NOT SEEK TO BRACKET US WITH THE AMERICANS IN HIS EXPRESSION OF CONCERN ABOUT SUPER POWER INVOLVEMENT. HE RECOGNISED THAT OUR OWN LINKS WITH THE GULF STATES WERE CLOSE. IF WE WERE TO BECOME DRAWN INTO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, I HOPE THAT WE CAN GIVE ALGERIANS SOME EXPLANATION OF WHAT WE INTEND.

CCN..... PRA 2 LINE 3 ...OF BOTH PARTIES. THEY ETC ETC

MUNRO

NNNNN

SENT/RECD AT 2016572 JC/RJ

PP TOKYO

PP ABU DHABI

IRAN/IRAQ ADVANCE COPIES

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
HD/MED
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RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No.10 DOWNING ST (2)

CABINET OFFICE D I O

GRS925

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 191450Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1574 OF 19 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, ROUTINE TUNIS, STOCKHOLM, CAIRO, AMMAN, ISLAMABAD, ANKARA, ALGIERS AND NEW DELHI

YOUR TEL 944: ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING

SUMMARY

1. STATE DEPARTMENT SHARE OUR OBJECTIVE OF STOPPING ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING. THEY AGREE THAT ALL POSSIBLE AVENUES SHOULD BE PURSUED, BUT ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC. THEY HAVE RECEIVED NO (NO) REQUESTS FROM GCC STATES FOR MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS AND HAVE MADE NO SUCH OFFERS. THEY WOULD NOT NOW EXPECT SUCH A REQUEST UNLESS THE COUNTRY CONCERNED WAS UNDER IMMEDIATE THREAT. NO FURTHER CONTACTS WITH THE RUSSIANS. POL/MIL TALKS WITH OURSELVES ARRANGED FOR 22-23 MAY.

DETAIL

2. ACTION TAKEN TODAY WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GULF. WE STRESSED THE NEED FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION AND THE REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH THE ATTITUDE AND INTENTIONS OF GCC COUNTRIES, EXPLAINING THAT MINISTERS BELIEVED THAT OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO REDUCE THE CURRENT WAVE OF ATTACKS ON SHIPPING BY BOTH SIDES.

3. PLACKE ENTIRELY ENDORSED THIS OBJECTIVE. THE AMERICANS HAD TAKEN ACTION IN BAGHDAD WITH THE RESULT REPORTED IN BAGHDAD TEL NO 266. EAGLETON HAD SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN SUMMONED BY SAHAAF WHO HAD MADE A POINT BY POINT REFUTATION OF THE AMERICAN CASE. THE AMERICANS DREW THE CONCLUSION THAT THEIR PRESSURE ON IRAQ WAS UNLIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE UNLESS THEY COULD FIND SOMETHING NEW TO OFFER. THEY BELIEVED THAT THEIR ACTIONS LAST AUTUMN IN RAISING THE PROFILE OF THEIR POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, OFFERING HELP IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF PIPELINES, ENCOURAGING JAPANESE MEDIATION, AND HOLDING OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF IRAQI OIL EXPORTS THROUGH THE GULF HAD DEFERRED AN IRAQI DECISION TO EXPAND THE WAR. FOR THE MOMENT THEY HAD NOW NEW IDEAS OF THIS KIND. INDEED, THEY HAD HESITATED TO MAKE THEIR RECENT DEMARCHE LEST IT ACTUALLY ENCOURAGE THE IRAQIS TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR ATTACKS ON SHIPPING WERE ACHIEVE THEIR AIM OF

~~MAKE THEIR RECENT DEMARCHE LEST IT ACTUALLY ENCOURAGE THE IRAQIS TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR ATTACKS ON SHIPPING WERE ACHIEVE THEIR AIM OF~~ DRAWING IN THE WESTERN POWERS. THEY HAD EVENTUALLY DECIDED TO GO AHEAD SO AS TO LEAVE NO ONE IN ANY DOUBT THAT THEY FAVOURED A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT.

4. PLACKE DOUBTED WHETHER SAUDI OR KUWAITI PRESSURE WOULD HAVE MUCH EFFECT UNLESS THESE COUNTRIES WERE PREPARED TO CUT BACK ON FINANCIAL AID TO IRAQ. HE HAD NO INFORMATION ON THIS POINT. MEANWHILE, THE IRAQIS SEEMED TO WELCOME IRANIAN ATTACKS ON KUWAITI AND SAUDI SHIPPING AS BEING LIKELY TO REDUCE THE PROSPECTS OF THESE COUNTRIES REACHING AN ACCOMMODATION WITH IRAN (ALTHOUGH THE OPPOSITE CASE COULD JUST AS WELL BE ARGUED.)

5. IN REPLY TO A DIRECT QUESTION, PLACKE SAID THAT THE US HAD RECEIVED NO REQUESTS FOR ANY MAJOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM GCC COUNTRIES AND HAD MADE NO SUCH OFFERS. THIS DID NOT EXCLUDE ACCELERATED DELIVERY OF EQUIPMENT OF INCREASED AIR SURVEILLANCE. PLACKE DID NOT, HOWEVER, ANTICIPATE REQUESTS FOR MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS TO THESE COUNTRIES IN ANY SITUATION SHORT OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN A GCC COUNTRY AND IRAN. EVEN THEN, THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED MIGHT WAIT UNTIL THEY WERE SUFFERING ACTUAL DAMAGE BEFORE SEEKING HELP. THE AMERICANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD NOT MAKE ANY SUCH DEPLOYMENTS WITHOUT A PUBLIC REQUEST FROM THE STATES CONCERNED. THIS REQUIREMENT HAD BEEN MADE PUBLIC BY THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN THE PREVIOUS DAY.

6. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION WHETHER THE US HAD CONSIDERED SENDING A REASSURING MESSAGE TO THE SOVIET UNION, PLACKE SAID THAT THIS MATTER HAD NOT BEEN EXAMINED. THE GENRAL PRESUMPTION WAS THAT FOR SO LONG AS THE US WAS TAKING NO ACTION, THERE WAS LITTLE ADVANTAGE, AND SOME DISADVANTAGE, IN DISCUSSING MATTERS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE EVENT OF A MILITARY DEPLOYMENT HE EXPECTED THAT THE POSITION WOULD BE EXPLAINED TO THE RUSSIANS. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE US HAD MADE NO NEW MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN RELATION TO THE SITUATION IN THE GULF. WE SUGGESTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE ADVANTAGE IN SOME MESSAGE TO THE SOVIET UNION IF ONLY TO REMOVE POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS. PLACKE REPLIED THAT THIS COULD USEFULLY BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AT THE POL/MIL TALKS NOW ARRANGED FOR 22/23 MAY (IN WASHINGTON).

7. MORE GENERALLY, PLACKE SAID THAT THE US APPROACH WAS VERY CLOSE INDEED TO OUR OWN. IF THERE WAS ANY DIFFERENCE, IT LAY IN THE ROLE OF THE UN. THE US DID NOT DENY THAT THERE COULD BE A UN ROLE, BUT WISHED TO AVOID IMPOSING CONSTRAINTS ON US FREEDOM OF ACTION. PLACKE ACCEPTED THAT THE MATTER MIGHT WELL BE RAISED BY OTHERS AND THAT THERE MIGHT BE ADVANTAGE IN OUR PRE-EMPTING LESS DESIRABLE INITIATIVES. THIS TOO COULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AT THE POL/MIL TALKS.

COMMENT

8. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICANS INTEND AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT TO PROCEED WITH CAUTION, USING DIPLOMATIC NOT DIRECT ACTION, AND REGARDING A PUBLIC REQUEST FROM THE STATE CONCERNED AS A SINE QUA NON FOR ANY EVENTUAL MILITARY DEPLOYMENT. THEY HAVE EMPHASISED THESE POINTS ON THE PUBLIC RECORD, FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THIS IS A SATISFACTORY POSTURE AT THE OPENING OF WHAT COULD PROVE TO BE A DIFFICULT CHAPTER. IN MY VIEW, IT OWES A GOOD DEAL TO THE DISCUSSIONS HELD HERE BY MR LUCE AND TO SUBSEQUENT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS. IN ADDITION, THE LEBANON EPISODE HAS HAD AN EXTREMELY CHASTENING EFFECT ON THOSE HERE WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE SHOWN MORE ENTHUSIASM FOR MILITARY ACTION. RUMSFELD'S RESIGNATION, ANNOUNCED TODAY, MUST ALSO BE GOOD NEWS IN THIS CONTEXT. FINALLY, WE CAN

~~ENTHUSIASM FOR MILITARY ACTION. RUMSFELD'S RESIGNATION, ANNOUNCED~~ TODAY, MUST ALSO BE GOOD NEWS IN THIS CONTEXT. FINALLY, WE CAN EXPECT CONGRESS TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT ANY US MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE GULF.

WRIGHT

NNNN

IRAN/IRAQ ADVANCE COPIES 19

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
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PS/No.10 DOWNING ST (2)

CABINET OFFICE D I O

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM MOSCOW 190725Z MAY 84

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 618 OF 19 MAY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON,UKDEL NATO,PARIS,BONN,UKMIS NEWYORK, BIS TEHRAN,BAGHDAD AND KUWAIT.

GULF WAR : SOVIET VIEWS.

1. DURING THE MEETING OF THE UK-SOVIET ROUND TABLE IN MOSCOW (16-17 MAY), ON WHICH I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY, THERE WAS A SHORT EXCHANGE ON THE GULF WAR. LORD HARLECH AND OTHERS ON THE BRITISH TEAM PRESSED THE RUSSIANS TO AGREE THAT THE PRESERVATION OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF SHOULD BE A MAJOR OBJECTIVE TO WHICH ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD SUBSCRIBE. WOULD THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORT EFFORTS TO KEEP THE GULF OPEN, IF NECESSARY BY FORCE ?

2. IN REPLY, THE RUSSIANS (MENSHIKOV OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND TROFIMENKO OF THE USA/CANADA INSTITUTE) STRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AS A UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE. THEY CLAIMED THAT U S SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE WAS PARTIAL AND MENTIONED IN THIS CONTEXT THE AMERICAN MINING OF HAIPHONG AND NICARAGUAN WATERS. TROFIMENKO DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTION TAKEN IN THE GULF WITH WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WAS ASSOCIATED AND THAT INVOLVING THE U S AND ITS ALLIES ONLY - IMPLYING THAT THE LATTER WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO MOSCOW. '' WE CANNOT GIVE THE AMERICANS CARTE BLANCHE FOR UNILATERAL BOMBING ''. MENSHIKOV REFERRED TO A REACTION OF SOVIET ''DISPLEASURE'' IN THE EVENT OF UNILATERAL ARMED U S ACTION TO KEEP THE GULF OPEN . '' WHETHER WE WOULD INTERFERE MILITARILY IS ANOTHER MATTER ''.

SUTHERLAND

NNNN

AJC

The Resident Clerk sent over the attached on Saturday evening for information.

He said that he had discussed it with Peter Ricketts who had thought it best to leave any action (Cyprus by the FCO) until Monday morning.

As a consequence I did not show it to the PM.

A. J. C. 21/5

Mark

19/5.

CONFIDENTIAL

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON, ENGLAND

CHARLES H. PRICE II
AMBASSADOR

May 19, 1984

Dear Geoffrey:

Pursuant to our conversation I will summarize the various points covered during my conversation with Bud McFarlane that I felt would be of interest.

1. Bud stressed with me the need to avoid talk of Western military action in the Gulf and instead focus on diplomatic activity with the Gulf Cooperation Council and the belligerents and statements to help calm a jittery oil market.

2. He asked whether the UK Department of Energy could issue statements that would help keep the market calm. Individual efforts by Western and Japanese Energy ministers collectively might emphasize continuing consultations, projecting a sense of assurance that we had the situation in hand. U.S. Energy Secretary Hodel will be doing this. The U.S. also plans to try to restrain Iraq by moving ahead on efforts to halt arms deliveries to Iran.

3. Bud hopes you will urge Iraq to behave. I told him you had already tried.

4. The USG is maintaining our force posture in the Arabian Sea at current levels (one carrier battle group).

5. Any Western military help must only be at the invitation of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

6. Anything Britain can do at the May 23 meeting of the International Development Association would be helpful.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. At the June Summit, it might be helpful to issue a moderate statement stressing consultations among the participants to handle the Gulf situation, acknowledging our capability to act strongly if necessary, but underlining that adequate oil supplies exist and disruption of the market is not inevitable.

8. Washington is looking forward to further consultations with FCO Middle East Department Head Keith Haskell and MOD official Michael Legge next Tuesday to review our contingency planning for an emergency.

I would be pleased to meet with you, Richard Luce, or others you felt appropriate in order to convey your reaction to the foregoing.

Sincerely,

Charles H. Price, II
Ambassador

The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, SW1.

PRIME MINISTER

You may have heard that a merchant ship (not British) was sunk in the Gulf at dawn today.

It was allegedly hit by a missile in the northern part of the Gulf, near Kharg Island Oil Terminal.

There was no immediate confirmation of who hit the ship.

Of the crew, 24 members were picked up by a passing vessel and 12 are reported to be in life rafts.

The FCO will keep us informed of any further details and/or developments.

Thanks on

STEPHANIE
19.5.84

SECRET

38

PRIME MINISTER'

Iran/Iraq War: Guidelines for Loan Service Personnel

You were invited to approve earlier some guidelines for the involvement of UK Loan Service Personnel in the event of an external attack on the Gulf State in which they are serving.

You queried the description of the legal position in the Defence Secretary's minute of 25 April (Flag A).

The MOD Have now commented on your observations (Flag B). You were quite right. You wrote to the Sultan in July 1982 accepting that our LSP should play their full part in Oman's defence in the event of a direct threat which did not allow time for consultation, emphasising our wish to be consulted before any commitment outside Oman's territorial limits.

Oman is an exceptional case. It is not envisaged that the guidelines now under discussion would be issued to our Ambassador in Oman - only to those in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE.

The Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary are now content that these guidelines (Flag C) should be issued. Agree?

I agree MT

N.B. The Oman point that I was referring to arose not in 1982, which I remember, but the weekend [1979 or 1980?] the Iran/Iraq war started. I think that I was given the advice that I referred to - whether it referred only to Oman L.S.P. or to L.S.P. generally I cannot remember. MT.

18 May 1984

SECRET

IRAN/IRAQ ADVANCE COPIES 18

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
HD/MED
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HD/DEFENCE D

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No.10 DOWNING ST (2)

CABINET OFFICE D I O

IMMEDIATE

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 182310Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TEL NO 511 OF 18 MAY 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS BAGHDAD BIS TEHRAN
GULF POSTS MOSCOW CAIRO NEW DELHI AMMAN STOCKHOLM
UKDEL NATO TOKYO ISLAMABAD

YOUR TELNO 267: (NOT TO ALL): ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS GETTING INCREASINGLY ANXIOUS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF AND IS CONSIDERING TAKING ACTION HIMSELF UNDER ARTICLE 99 OF THE CHARTER. BUT HE SEEMS RECONCILED TO WAITING UNTIL THE GCC DECIDE WHETHER TO TAKE THE MATTER THEMSELVES TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL ASKED TO SEE ME THIS MORNING, 18 MAY, AFTER THE INFORMAL CONSULTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON PALESTINIAN REFUGEES (REPORTED SEPARATELY). HE SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE GULF SITUATION TO THE (RUSSIAN) PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IF IT DETERIORATED FURTHER HE WAS THINKING OF USING HIS PREROGATIVE UNDER ARTICLE 99 OF THE CHARTER (TO "BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ANY MATTER WHICH IN HIS OPINION MAY THREATEN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY"). HE DID NOT FEEL THAT THE SITUATION COULD BE ALLOWED TO GET WORSE WITHOUT SOMEBODY DOING SOMETHING.

3. I SAID THAT THIS WAS POTENTIALLY THE MOST SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL SITUATION THAT EXISTED. I HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED TO HEAR OF MORE IRAQI ATTACKS THIS MORNING SINCE THIS COULD ONLY INVITE IRANIAN RETALIATION. I HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE KUWAITI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE THAT THE GCC MEETING IN RIYADH HAD AGREED:

A) TO REFER THE WHOLE MATTER TO FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ARAB LEAGUE IN TUNIS ON 19 MAY

B) TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. TO THIS END ABDULLA BISHARA WOULD BE ARRIVING IN NEW YORK ON 20 OR 21 MAY TO EVALUATE THE SITUATION WITH MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. DEPENDING ON THE RESULTS OF THIS EVALUATION HE MIGHT THEN CALL OFFICIALLY FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IF ONE TOOK PLACE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF KUWAIT, QATAR AND BAHRAIN WOULD COME. HE ADDED THAT THE ARABS WERE THINKING OF A RESOLUTION THAT WOULD NOT BE BASED ON SCR 540 BUT WOULD FOCUS ON THE GULF AND CONCENTRATE ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.

4. I STRESSED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT HMG DID NOT WANT TO GET INTO A MILTARY SITUATION AND WISHED TO TAKE ALL SENSIBLE NON-MILITARY STEPS FIRST. WE BELIEVED THAT OUR ALLIES VIEWED THE SITUATION IN THE SAME LIGHT. WE WERE INCLINED TO LET THE GCC TAKE THE LEAD. THAT SAID THE SITUATION WAS VERY DANGEROUS AND THINGS COULD GO WRONG OVER THE WEEKEND.

5. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT WHAT WAS BADLY NEEDED WAS A CO-ORDINATED APPROACH BY THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS BUT THE FATE OF HIS SIMILAR SUGGESTION OVER CYPRUS DID NOT GIVE HIM MUCH ENCOURAGEMENT. NEVERTHELESS HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE RUSSIANS (WHO HAD MENTIONED THE IMPENDING ARRIVAL OF BISHARA) AND WOULD BE SEEING THE AMERICANS AND FRENCH AFTER ME. I SAID THAT I HAD PUT IT TO MY RUSSIAN COLLEAGUE THAT SOVIET AND WESTERN INTERESTS OVER LAPPED IN THE GULF. I WENT ON TO SUGGEST TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, ON A PERSONA

THE GULF. I WENT ON TO SUGGEST TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, ON A PERSONAL BASIS, THAT IF A NEW RESOLUTION COULD BE DE-LINKED FROM SCR 540 THIS MIGH ALLOW FOR ACQUIESCENCE BY THE SUPERPOWERS IN A TEXT ON WHICH THE GULF ARABS COULD THEN BASE THEMSELVES IF THEY NEEDED PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE. HE WELCOMED MY IDEA AND AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE AS WELL TO TRY TO MOBILISE THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON A NEW AND VERY SERIOUS SITUATION GETTING AWAY AS FAR AS POSSIBLE FROM ENTRENCHED PRO-IRAQI OR PRO-IRANIAN POSITIONS.

6. THE SECRETARY GENERAL CONCLUDED THAT HE REMAINED SERIOUS ABOUT INVOKING ARTICLE 99 BUT DID NOT WISH TO INTERFERE WITH WHATEVER THE ARABS DECIDED TO DO.

7. THE SECRETARY GENERAL TOOK THE SAME LINE WITH THE AMERICANS (MRS KIRKPATRICK IS AWAY). HE SHOWED SIGNS OF IMPATIENCE WITH THE ARABS AND ASKED FOR AMERICAN THINKING. AFTER CONSULTING WASHINGTON AT OFFICIAL LEVEL THE AMERICANS HAVE GONE BACK TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL (THROUGH CORDOVEZ) TO SAY THAT THE SITUATION IS OF COURSE SERIOUS BUT NOT OVERLY SO AND THEY DO NOT EXPECT ANY MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE WEEKEND. THE IMPRESSION THEY SOUGHT TO LEAVE WITH THE SECRETARIAT WAS THAT THEY WERE ''WORKING HARD BUT NOT FLAPPING''. THEY HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY DO NOT WANT TO DISCOURAGE THE SECRETARY GENERAL BUT THAT THERE IS CONCERN IN WASHINGTON THAT IF ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS STARTED IT MAY HAVE THE EFFECT OF TYING AMERICAN HANDS AND BE HARD TO TURN OFF.

8. I HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO THE SAUDI AMABSSADOR WHO SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN TALKING TO PRINCE SAUD LAST NIGHT. HIS VERSION OF GCC INTENTIONS WAS SIMILAR TO THAT OF MY KUWAITI COLLEAGUE (PARA 3 ABOVE) EXCEPT THAT HE SAID THAT THERE WAS A DEFINITE DECISION TO GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THAT ONLY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF KUWAIT AND QATAR WERE EXPECTED. QUITE HOW THIS SQUARES WITH THE PLAN FOR THE KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER TO BE ON AN ARAB LEAGUE MISSION IN TOKYO ON 21 MAY (WHICH WAS CONFIRMED TO US AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON BY THE JAPANESE MISSION) IS NOT CLEAR.

THOMSON

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'

Iran/Iraq War: Guidelines for Loan Service Personnel

You were invited to approve earlier some guidelines for the involvement of UK Loan Service Personnel in the event of an external attack on the Gulf State in which they are serving.

You queried the description of the legal position in the Defence Secretary's minute of 25 April (Flag A).

The MOD Have now commented on your observations (Flag B). You were quite right. You wrote to the Sultan in July 1982 accepting that our LSP should play their full part in Oman's defence in the event of a direct threat which did not allow time for consultation, emphasising our wish to be consulted before any commitment outside Oman's territorial limits.

Oman is an exceptional case. It is not envisaged that the guidelines now under discussion would be issued to our Ambassador in Oman - only to those in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE.

The Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary are now content that these guidelines (Flag C) should be issued. Agree?

18 May 1984

SECRET

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36A CCPC

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930-7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/9/4/2

17th May 1984

Dear John,

Tim Flesher's letter of 30th April sought further advice on the guidelines for the use of our Loan Service Personnel (LSP) in the Gulf in the light of the Prime Minister's recollection that she had been informed at the start of the Iran/Iraq war that our LSP in Oman could be used for defence but not for attack. You asked us to check that this was consistent with the Defence Secretary's minute of 25th April.

The Prime Minister is quite correct in her recollection of the position of our LSP in Oman. This is not, however, inconsistent with the proposal in my Secretary of State's minute of 25th April. As paragraph 2 of that minute pointed out, Oman is an exception among the Gulf States. It was clearly envisaged under the 1977 Memorandum of Understanding governing the provision of British LSP that they would take part in military operations under the Sultan's direction; the British Loan Service Commanders of the Sultan's Armed Forces are expressly responsible for the planning, direction and control of such operations, subject to a requirement under a 1978 exchange of side letters that there should be consultation between the two Governments before the commitment of LSP in circumstances which could prove embarrassing to either. These arrangements governed the situation in 1980 when, as the Prime Minister recalls, the Sultan of Oman had briefly agreed to Iraqi use of Omani airfields for operations against Iran. Since then the Prime Minister's letter to the Sultan of July 1982 (to which Mr Heseltine's minute of 25th April referred) has provided further clarification of the role of our LSP, accepting that they should play their full part in Oman's defence in the event of a direct threat which did not allow time for consultation under the 1978 exchange of side letters, but emphasising our wish still to be consulted before any commitment of British LSP outside Oman's territorial limits. Against this background, as the final paragraph of my Secretary of State's minute indicated, there is no need for the proposed guidelines to apply to Oman.

A J Coles Esq

Our LSP in the other Gulf States are, however, in a very different position, and it is to these States that the guidelines are addressed. British LSP have been provided on the clear understanding that they will not take part in military operations (beyond the minimum requirements of immediate self-defence) except with the prior permission of HMG, for which a host State request would be needed. Extracts from the Memorandum of Understanding are attached. The guidelines will allow our Ambassadors to respond to a host Government request on behalf of HMG when there is no time to consult London first.

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of Tim's.

Yours ever

Mike Evans

(N H R EVANS)
Private Secretary

IRAQ PT 4 IntSit

10. DOWNING STREET.

GR 500 **CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS 171900Z MAY 84
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 599 OF 17 MAY
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, BIS TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, GULF POSTS, MODUK.

YOUR TELNO 123 TO KUWAIT: ATTACKS ON SHIPPING IN THE GULF

SUMMARY

1. CONSIDERABLE CONCERN IN PARIS ABOUT THE SITUATION BUT THE FRENCH SEE LITTLE THAT THEY CAN DO. RELUCTANCE TO APPEAR TO BE CONCERTING CLOSELY WITH THE US AND BRITAIN.

DETAIL

2. THE QUAI ISSUED A STATEMENT YESTERDAY WHICH CONFINED ITSELF TO EXPRESSING THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S DEEP CONCERN AND APPEALING TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT SCR 540 AND RE-ESTABLISH PEACE IN THE GULF. NO REFERENCE WAS MADE TO CONTACTS WITH ALLIES. WHEN WE SOUGHT THE QUAI'S ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, PIETTON (DESK OFFICER FOR IRAQ) TOLD US THAT THE FCO SPOKESMAN'S REFERENCE TO ''CONSULTATIONS'' WITH EC PARTNERS HAD CAUSED RAISED EYEBROWS AT THE QUAI. ON THE BASIS OF RETRACT NUMBER 023 WE SAID THAT ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION THE SPOKESMAN HAD SPOKEN ONLY OF HMG BEING IN CLOSE TOUCH.

3. PIETTON SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE GENUINELY WORRIED. THEY FEARED THAT THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE, WHILE LESS THAN FULLY EFFECTIVE, WAS STILL POTENT AND CAPABLE OF HITTING MANY MORE TANKERS. THE FRENCH HAD HAD REPORTS OF IRANIAN OVERFLIGHTS OF THE UAE, AS WELL AS OF IRANIAN NAVAL VESSELS ENTERING THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF DUBAI AND MILITARY REINFORCEMENT OF THE GULF ISLANDS. HOWEVER THE QUAI DID NOT CONSIDER IT LIKELY THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD TRY TO BLOCK THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. AS TO IRAQI INTENTIONS, PIETTON THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQIS WERE ESCALATING THE SITUATION AS A MEANS OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE GULF ARABS TO PUT PRESSURE IN TURN ON THE US TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY ASSURANCES FROM ISRAEL FOR THE SECURITY OF THE PIPELINE ACROSS JORDAN. (CF. PARA 2 OF BAGHDAD TELNO 317). PIETTON INTERPRETED SADDAM'S RECENT INTERVIEW IN THE US PRESS IN THIS CONTEXT. AS TO ACTION BY FRANCE, PIETTON SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE WAITING TO SEE THE OUTCOME OF TODAY'S GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL MEETING. WHAT, HE WONDERED, WOULD THE GULF ARABS ASK OF THE AMERICANS, THE FRENCH AND OTHERS? HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR FRANCE TO INTERVENE WITH IRAQ, WHICH AFTER ALL UNLIKE IRAN COULD NOT SHIP ANY OF ITS OIL THROUGH THE GULF AND WAS ONLY TOO READY FOR A COMPLETE CEASE-FIRE: AND IT WAS POINTLESS FOR THE FRENCH TO TRY TO INTERVENE IN TEHRAN.

4. MEANWHILE THE FRENCH MEDIA HAVE REPORTED COPIOUSLY AND DRAMATICALLY THE LATEST EVENTS. THE TENDENCY IS TO REGARD POSSIBLE WESTERN INTERVENTION WITH ALARM.

COMMENT

5. THE RAISED EYEBROWS (PARA 2 ABOVE) ARE AN INDICATION OF THE CONTINUING SENSITIVITY OF THE FRENCH TO THE REMOTEST SUGGESTION OF FORMAL CONCERTATION WITH THE US OR BRITAIN IN THE GULF. AS ALWAYS, THEY DO NOT WANT TO SEEM TO HAVE THEIR HANDS TIED IN ANY WAY, EVEN IF, AS GUTMANN AGREED WITH THE PUS, THEY ARE PREPARED FOR MORE AD HOC CONTACTS WITHOUT PUBLICITY.

FRETWELL

IRAN/IRAQ

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IRAN/IRAQ

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PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

OD(EM) - IRAN/IRAQ GULF WAR

BACKGROUND

1. OD(EM) has been convened to consider the latest developments in the Gulf War with particular reference to the latest spate of attacks on shipping and possible Western responses to such attacks. A JIC Assessment assessing the implications of these attacks on tankers in the Gulf has be circulated. In addition, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is circulating a Private Secretary's letter* describing the diplomatic action already in hand.

2. Attacks on shipping in the Gulf have intensified during the past week with seven tankers involved. There is evidence that three of the tankers (2 Kuwaiti and 1 Saudi) were attacked by Iranian F-4 aircraft. Television reports last night suggested that Saudi aircraft had engaged an Iranian aircraft attacking one of these tankers but it is understood that although 2 Saudi F-15s were scrambled, they did not get to the area in time.

3. The Foreign and Commonwealth News Department yesterday issued a statement expressing serious concern at the recent attacks which appeared to have been mounted by both Iraq and Iran; pointing out that such indiscriminate attacks on shipping of neutral countries represent a serious escalation of the conflict; calling on both belligerents to end the fighting as soon as possible; and emphasising the need to respect freedom of navigation through the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. The Americans are reported to have said that the attack on the Saudi tanker YANBU PRIDE represented a dangerous escalation and to have expressed concern that the conflict might spread to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

4. As regards diplomatic action, HM Ambassadors in Kuwait and Jeddah have been instructed to inform the Saudi and Kuwaiti Governments that we would fully support any diplomatic action they wished to take in protest

* Now to be raised orally.

at the attacks (for example at the UN), and at a meeting of Political Directors we are seeking to persuade our Community partners that there should be a joint Community démarche in Baghdad and Tehran to urge restraint on both sides. HM Embassy in Washington is in close touch with the Americans, but we have no clear indication as yet of their reactions.

5. Given the escalation of action against tankers in the Gulf, it is possible that requests may be made by one or more members of the Gulf States for assistance. Also the United States may seek to implement contingency plans and press for British participation in the institution of a convoy system. The critical factor will be whether a substantial number of tanker owners will have been sufficiently alarmed by the Iranian attacks to refuse to operate in the North part of the Gulf, which would clearly have a major impact on Western oil supplies. However there is no sign of it happening so far; although insurance rates have risen sharply, oil prices have dropped back after yesterday's rise. The JIC hope to produce an Assessment next week of the effect of the present escalation on the oil market.

6. As regards the availability of forces in the vicinity of the Gulf, the position is as follows. The US have three warships and an auxiliary in the Gulf and a carrier battle group in the Arabian Sea. The two Armilla patrol ships HMS GLASGOW and HMS CHARYBDIS are in the northern Arabian Sea 48 hours from the Straits. Our mine counter measures force is in the eastern Mediterranean, but clearly would not be of use in response to Iranian action so far. Any action we might wish to take to protect shipping would have to be in support of the Americans; we have already conducted detailed discussion with them on possible operational concepts (without commitment) and further military talks with them are in progress in Florida at the moment. Fixed wing air cover would be essential. This could be provided from the USS Kitty Hawk, by indigenous forces from the Gulf States, or by Western aircraft deployed to the Gulf with the agreement of the local States.

7. The Lord President and the Chancellor of the Exchequer are unable to attend. The Secretary of State for Energy, the Secretary of State for Transport, the Economic Secretary, Treasury, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary

Of State, Department of Trade and Industry (Mr Fletcher), the Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Antony Acland have been invited to attend.

HANDLING

8. You should invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to give an oral report on the latest position on the ground and of the diplomatic action in hand. The Defence Secretary and the Chief of Defence Staff might be invited to comment on the military situation (including the state of play in the military talks with the Americans) and the Secretary of State for Energy on the implications for oil supplies. Points to establish are -

a. What judgement can be made of Iranian and Iraqi intentions in the light of the latest assessment? Are the Iranians likely to take further action against tankers or is a continued escalation of military action in the Gulf unlikely?

b. What further action can be put in hand to try to prevent such escalation by diplomatic means through international organisations (eg the European Community, The International Energy Agency, the United Nations, the Islamic Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement); or individual countries like Algeria who may have a special role to play in mediation?

c. Are tankers owners likely in the present situation to operate in the Gulf and what if anything can be done to allay their fears?

d. What action if any is being taken by the member states of the Gulf Co-operation Council? What should the UK's response be to any requests for assistance from the Gulf States? What planning is in hand with the Americans and are any further steps necessary with them and the French?

e. Does the Sub-Committee consider that Western military intervention at this stage would be premature and that the situation should be allowed to develop over the next few days before any judgement is taken?

f. Should we be encouraging any further consultation between the United States and the Soviet Union?

CONCLUSION

9. Subject to the points made in discussion, you could guide the Sub-Committee to note and approve the action already in hand and to approve any additional measures which may be judged necessary.

for A D S GOODALL

17 May 1984

IRAN/IRAQ ADVANCE COPIES 18

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IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL OECD 171600Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 85 OF 17 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTHER EC POSTS, GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
GULF: BILATERAL MEETING WITH MR DAM

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A BILATERAL MEETING WITH DAM IN THE MARGINS OF THE OECD MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING. DAM EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE GULF AND STRESSED THE US ADMINISTRATION'S DESIRE TO KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH US. IMPORTANT MEETINGS WERE TAKING PLACE TODAY IN WASHINGTON ON WHICH WE WOULD BE INFORMED. THE SAUDIS HAD CONTACTED THE STATE DEPARTMENT ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE GULF CO-OPERATION COUNTRIES.

GULF

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE MOST PRESSING IMMEDIATE ISSUE WAS THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE GULF. DAM AGREED AND SAID THAT MEETINGS WERE TAKING PLACE IN WASHINGTON TO ASSESS THE SITUATION. THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCES IN THE ASSESSMENTS OF THE SITUATION IN WASHINGTON. SOME SAID A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE SITUATION HAD OCCURRED. OTHERS DISAGREED. THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR HAD CALLED ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN WASHINGTON IN THE PAST FEW HOURS. HE HAD REPORTED THAT THE GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL WAS MEETING TO ASSESS THE SITUATION. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE GCC MIGHT TURN TO THE USA AND THE UK FOR ASSISTANCE. THE GCC POSITION WAS THAT THEY WOULD LIKE THE USA TO BE JUST OVER THE HORIZON, BUT NOT TOO CLOSE.

~~OVER THE HORIZON, BUT NOT TOO CLOSE.~~

3. DAM WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ASSIST BUT THIS WAS MILITARILY DIFFICULT WITHOUT ACCESS, ESPECIALLY WITHOUT A PRESENCE IN THE UPPER PART OF THE GULF. FROM THE PURELY OPERATIONAL STANDPOINT AIRCRAFT TAKING OFF FROM AIRCRAFT CARRIERS NEEDED TO REFUEL TO REACH THE UPPER PART OF THE GULF.
THE GCC'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTAMT BEARING ON WASHINGTON'S OWN EVALUATION. DURING MR LUCE'S DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMNET THAT WE WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO LOOK AT THE DISPOSITION OF OUR FORCES. WE COULD BE CALLED ON TO TAKE ACTION AT SHORT NOTICE. BUT HE WANTED TO EMPHASISE THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT CONSIDERING ANY UNPREMEDITATED ACTION.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN TOUCH. HE THOUGHT THAT DAM'S ASSESSMENT OF THE GCC ATTITUDE WAS ACCURATE. TICKELL SAID THAT HE HAD JUST HAD SOME USEFUL TALKS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WITH ALAN WALLIS ON THE ENERGY SIDE. DAM EXPLAINED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO CONSULT CONGRESS ON STOCK WITHDRAWAL, POLITICALLY IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SECURE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL. IN THAT CASE IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO MAKE SURE THAT THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES WERE SEEN TO BE WORKING TOGETHER.

UFFEN

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DESKBY FCO 180800Z
FM WASHINGTON 180015Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1561 OF 17 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, JEDDA, AND OTHER GULF POSTS, PRIORITY AMMAN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO 264 TO UKMIS NEW YORK, AND UKDEL OECD TELEGRAM NO 85:

ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING

SUMMARY

1. SAUDI PATIENCE IS RUNNING OUT, BUT NO SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR US MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE AMERICANS ARE ENCOURAGING OTHERS TO MAKE DEMARCHES IN TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD TO URGE RESTRAINT. THEY DO NOT WANT ACTION AT THE UN TO BLOCK DIRECT ACTION OF SOME KIND SHOULD IT PROVE NECESSARY. THEY MAY PROPOSE ANOTHER ROUND OF US/UK CONTINGENCY TALKS NEXT WEEK.

DETAIL

2. MINISTER CALLED ON RAPHEL AND KANTER THIS EVENING TO REVIEW THE SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE EARLIER TODAY, UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S CHAIRMANSHIP. THIS MEETING HAD CONCENTRATED ON ASSESSING THE POSITION IN THE GULF. CONSIDERATION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO ISSUING ANOTHER STATEMENT, BUT SHULTZ HAD BEEN AGAINST THIS. THE MAIN DECISIONS THAT HAD EMERGED HAD BEEN TO ENCOURAGE FRIENDLY NATIONS TO URGE RESTRAINT, (WESTERN EUROPEANS TO THE IRAQIS, AND ISLAMIC NATIONS E.G. ALGERIA TURKEY AND PAKISTAN TO THE IRANIANS) AND IN THE MEANTIME TO CONTINUE INTERNAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING. A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE TEN, WHICH THEY HAD HEARD

~~[illegible] PLANNING. A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE TEN, WHICH THEY HAD~~ WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION, WOULD BE HELPFUL.

3. THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON SHULTZ THIS MORNING HAD TAKEN PLACE BEFORE THE GCC MEETING HAD ENDED. BANDAR'S MAIN PURPOSE APPEARED TO BE TO INDICATE THAT SAUDI PATIENCE HAD RUN OUT AND THAT THEY WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF ACTION. RAPHEL THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO PROTECT SHIPPING. THERE HAD BEEN NO SUGGESTION THAT THE SAUDIS WERE CONSIDERING ATTACKS ON IRAN. SHULTZ HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR THE GCC TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES.

4. BANDAR ASKED FOR US ARMS SUPPLIES ALREADY IN THE PIPELINE TO BE ACCELERATED BUT HAD MADE NO SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR US MILITARY SUPPORT OR SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING. GENERAL TIXIER (PENTAGON) WOULD BE GOING TO SAUDI ARABIA LATER THIS MONTH TO DISCUSS ARMS SUPPLIES AND EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE EXCHANGES ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING. ON FAHAD'S INSTRUCTIONS, BANDAR HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT RECENT REPORTS OF ISRAELI ARMS SHIPMENTS TO IRAN: THE AMERICANS HAD SOUGHT AND RECEIVED ~~SAGTHE~~

~~HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT RECENT REPORTS OF ISRAELI ARMS SHIPMENTS TO IRAN: THE AMERICANS HAD SOUGHT AND RECEIVED~~D ANOTHER ISRAELI ASSURANCE YESTERDAY THAT THERE WERE NO SUCH SUPPLIES.

5. RAPHEL SAID ON INSTRUCTIONS THAT ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ALL DIPLOMATIC AVENUES HAD BEEN TRIED, SHULTZ DID NOT WANT UN ACTION TO PRECLUDE OTHER MEASURES BEING TAKEN IF THESE WERE JUDGED NECESSARY. THE STATES DIRECTLY CONCERNED HAD TO PRESERVE THEIR FREEDOM TO TAKE ESSENTIAL STEPS IN SELF-DEFENCE. SOME OF THE GCC STATES HAD SUGGESTED THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION COULD PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE UMBRELLA FOR SUBSEQUENT MILITARY ACTION BY THE US. THE AMERICANS WOULD BE MAKING CLEAR TO THEM THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE AND THAT SPECIFIC REQUESTS FROM THE GULF STATES WOULD BE REQUIRED.

6. RAPHEL SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOW CONSIDERING INTERDEPARTMENTALLY WHETHER TO PROPOSE A FURTHER ROUND OF US/US CONTINGENCY TALKS ON THE GULF NEXT WEEK. THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW WAS THAT SUCH TALKS WOULD BE USEFUL. THEY MIGHT COVER OUR RESPONSE TO THE SCENARIO WE WERE NOW FACING, CONCENTRATING ON DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY AND HOW TO HANDLE THE PROPOSED RECOURSE BY THE GULF STATES TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHAT WE COULD DO TO HELP THE SAUDIS EG BY PROVIDING MORE SURVEILLANCE AND AIR TO AIR REFUELING CAPABILITY AND WHAT ROLE THE FRENCH MIGHT PLAY. KANTER CONFIRMED THAT HIS BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE FRENCH IN PARIS IN APRIL HAD BEEN UNPRODUCTIVE.

COMMENT

7. THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION IN THIS EXCHANGE THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CONTEMPLATING ANY EARLY MILITARY MOVES. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SPECIFIC REQUESTS FROM THE GULF STATES THEY ARE CONCENTRATING FOR THE MOMENT ON DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AND INTERNAL PREPARATIONS. A ROUND OF BILATERAL TALKS HERE NEXT WEEK WOULD THEREFORE BE TIMELY PROVIDED WE HAVE OURSELVES TAKEN THE NECESSARY POLITICAL DECISIONS TO ENABLE OUR PARTICIPANTS TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE PART IN DISCUSSION OF WHAT IS BECOMING LESS AND LESS A HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION.

WRIGHT

SECRET

35

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

16 May 1984

Richard Mottram Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Defence

A.J.C. 16/5

Dear Richard

IRAN/IRAQ

The Chancellor has no objections to the proposals described in paragraph 3 of your Secretary of State's minute of 8 May to the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10), to the Private Secretaries of other members of OD(EM) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever.

David

D L C PERETZ
Principal Private Secretary

Iraq : Iran / Iraq Pt 8

SECRET

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 May 1984

Iran/Iraq Conflict:
Guidelines for Loan Service Personnel

You will have seen the Foreign Secretary's minute of 14 May to your Secretary of State on this subject.

I do not think the Prime Minister will be able to deal with these papers until an answer is available to the questions posed in Mr Flesher's letter to you of 30 April. I should be grateful if you could let me have a reply to that letter by the weekend.

JC

Richard Mottram Esq
Ministry of Defence

SECRET

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DESKBY FCO 151600Z

DESKBY MOD 151600Z

FROM KUWAIT 151420Z MAY 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 191 OF 15 MAY
AND TO IMMEDIATE MOD UK (FOR D14C AND D117)
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE GULF POSTS, TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, PARIS, STOCKHOLM, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL OECD AND UKREP BRUSSELS.

FCO TELNO 317 TO BAGHDAD: ATTACKS ON SHIPPING IN THE GULF.

1. THERE IS STILL NO OFFICIAL KUWAITI RESPONSE TO THE ATTACKS ON UMM CASBAH AND THE BAHRA, THOUGH SOMETHING MAY COME SOON, WITH AN UNSCHEDULED CABINET MEETING TODAY AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAVING GONE INTO CLOSED SESSION. GENERAL OPINION HERE IS FAIRLY EVENLY DIVIDED ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY, THOUGH THE PRESS ARE STILL LINKING THE ATTACKS TO PRESIDENT KHAME'NI'S WARNING TO SHIPPING IN THE GULF OF 11 MAY. KOTC FIRMLY BELIEVE IRAN IS TO BLAME AND REPORT THE BULGARIAN CREW ON THE BAHRA TO HAVE SPOTTED IRANIAN MARKINGS ON THE PLANES.

2. I THINK KOTC IS RIGHT. THE METHOD OF ATTACK IS MARKEDLY DIFFERENT FROM PREVIOUS IRAQI ATTACKS AND THE IRANIANS HAVE A MUCH STRONGER MOTIVE TO THREATEN THE NORMAL UPLIFTING OF OIL FROM KUWAITI PORTS THAN THE IRAQIS.

DIFFERENT FROM PREVIOUS IRAQI ATTACKS AND THE IRANIANS HAVE A MUCH STRONGER MOTIVE TO THREATEN THE NORMAL UPLIFTING OF OIL FROM KUWAITI PORTS THAN THE IRAQIS.

3. IF THIS REPRESENTS THE START OF REGULAR ATTACKS ON SHIPPING INTO KUWAIT, THE KUWAITIS HAVE A MAJOR PROBLEM ON THEIR BACKS. IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR KUWAIT THAT THE FREE MOVEMENT OF SHIPS SHOULD CONTINUE, BUT THERE IS LITTLE THEY CAN DO ABOUT THEIR OWN PROTECTION. KUWAIT HAS NO WARSHIPS TO PROTECT TANKERS AND ITS SMALL AIR SPACE PRECLUDES PROTECTION BY THE KUWAIT AIR FORCE. THE CHAIRMAN OF KOTC HAS SAID PRIVATELY THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO ARM HIS SHIPS, POSSIBLY WITH STINGER MISSILES, BUT WE DO NOT TAKE THIS TOO SERIOUSLY. MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN BY KOTC HAVE BEEN TO ORDER MASTERS TO SAIL FULL STEAM AHEAD (22 KNOTS) FROM AHMADI TO RASTANOURA AND TO SAIL AT NIGHT. IN THE SHORT TERM THIS MAY PREVENT ATTACKS, BOTH OF WHICH SO FAR HAVE TAKEN THE FORM OF A SPOTTER AIRCRAFT FINDING THE SHIP AND THEN BEING FOLLOWED IN BY TWO FIGHTERS, BUT SUCH MEASURES WOULD NOT PREVENT A DETERMINED CAMPAIGN.

4. GIVEN THEIR INABILITY TO DEFEND THEIR SHIPPING, THE KUWAITIS WILL BE LOOKING FOR OTHER WAYS TO ENSURE PROTECTION, PERHAPS INCLUDING AN APPEAL FOR ASSISTANCE EITHER FROM WITHIN THE GCC OR FROM OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. EFFECTIVE GCC ACTION WOULD REQUIRE A GREATER DEGREE OF INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION BETWEEN, IN PARTICULAR, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA AND OMAN THAN TAKES PLACE AT PRESENT. IT MIGHT EG ENVISAGE SHIPS MOVING IN CONVOY (WITH THE IRAQIS GIVEN DETAILS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF ATTACK FROM THAT QUARTER). A MORE LIKELY VARIATION COULD BE BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA, IN PARTICULAR THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE FROM THEIR AWACS, IF THE SAUDIS ARE PREPARED TO ALLOW THIS. THE MATTER WILL PRESUMABLY BE HIGH ON THE AGENDA OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE KUWAITIS AND THE SAUDI DEFENCE MINISTER, PRINCE SULTAN, WHO ARRIVED IN KUWAIT TODAY ON A PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED OFFICIAL VISIT. ALTERNATIVELY, THE KUWAITIS MIGHT APPEAL TO OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE NAVAL SUPPORT FOR CONVOYS. I ASSUME THEY WOULD TURN TO THE US FIRST, FOR PRACTICAL REASONS (MY TELNO 189, NOT TO ALL).

5. THE PICTURE MAY BECOME CLEARER AFTER TODAY'S CABINET MEETING. ON PAST FORM THE KUWAITIS ARE UNLIKELY TO NAME NAMES. NOR DO I THINK THAT, EVEN IF THEY ARE SURE IN PRIVATE THAT THE IRANIANS ARE RESPONSIBLE, THEY WILL ENVISAGE PRE-EMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION. THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME IS THAT, IF THERE ARE MORE ATTACKS ON THEIR SHIPS, THE KUWAITIS WILL CONTINUE TO FILL AND DESPATCH THEIR TANKERS BUT WILL REACT DEFENSIVELY AND MORE VIGOROUSLY.

6. ON A POINT OF DETAIL WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE RAS AL ZOUR (PARA 2 (D) OF TUR) HAS NOT BEEN ATTACKED AND IS PROCEEDING ON COURSE.

MELHUISH
BT

CONFIDENTIAL
FM F C O 141930Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 317 OF 14 MAY
TO IMMEDIATE ALL GULF POSTS, BIS TEHRAN, PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, STOCKHOLM, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, UDEL OECD, UKREP, BRUSSELS

YOUR TELNO259 (NOT TO ALL)
ATTACKS ON SHIPPING IN THE GULF
1. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR REPORTS FROM YOU AND GULF POSTS. THE IRAQIS NOW CLAIM TO HAVE HIT TWO OIL TANKERS (BOTH SOUTH OF KHARG ISLAND) ON 13 MAY BUT HAVE SO FAR NOT (NOT) CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON THE KUWAITI VESSEL, UMM CASBAH, WHOSE CARGO OF FUEL OIL IS DESTINED FOR SHELL (UK). OIL AND SHIPPING CIRCLES IN LONDON (WITH WHOM WE ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH) ARE CONCERNED AT THE FREQUENCY AND INDISCRIMINATE NATURE OF THE LATEST ATTACKS. INSURANCE RATES FOR TANKERS CALLING AT KHARG ISLAND WERE TODAY INCREASED FROM 2 PERCENT TO 3 PERCENT.
DETAIL.
2. THE SHIPS ATTACKED ON 13 MAY HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS:
(A) AN IRANIAN-REGISTERED TANKER, THE TABRIZ, WHICH WAS HIT ABOUT 10 MILES NORTH OF THE SAUDI-OWNED TANKER, AL AHOOD, AND IS REPORTED ON FIRE.
(B) A GREEK-REGISTERED TANKER, THE ESPERANZA, WHICH WAS HEADING NORTH IN BALLAST. IT WAS NOT BADLY DAMAGED BUT HAS TURNED BACK TO LAVAN.
WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED REPORTS OF FURTHER ATTACKS TODAY ON:
(C) A KUWAITI-OWNED CRUDE TANKER, THE BAHRA, HEADING NORTH IN BALLAST TO KUWAIT. THIS HAS BEEN HOLED BY AN EXOCET, BUT IT IS NOT IN DANGER. TWO CREW WERE INJURED.
(D) A KUWAITI-OWNED PRODUCTS TANKER, THE RAS AL-ZOUR. WE HAVE NO DETAILS OF WHEREABOUTS OR DAMAGE IF ANY.
3. BP CURRENTLY HAVE TWO VESSELS IN THE GULF AREA. THE FIRST,

THE SHOOSH, IS OPERATED BY BP'S IRANIAN JOINT VENTURE COMPANY. THIS VESSEL LEFT KUWAIT YESTERDAY AND SHOULD NOW BE OUTSIDE THE IMMEDIATE DANGER ZONE. THE OTHER BP VESSEL, BRITISH SUCCESS, LEFT KUWAIT EARLY THIS MORNING AND MAY STILL BE IN THE NORTHERN GULF.

4. COMMENT. THERE IS MUCH SPECULATION HERE ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ATTACK ON THE UMM CASBAH. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THE IRANIANS TO BE RESPONSIBLE, BUT WE HAVE NO CORROBORATION. FOR THEIR PART, THE IRAQIS HAVE TAKEN A HARD-LINE APPROACH TO THE WHOLE QUESTION OF ATTACKS. ON 10 MAY (IE, AFTER THE ATTACKS ON THE SAUDI-OWNED TANKERS) THE IRAQI MINISTERS OF OIL REPORTEDLY TOLD KUWAITI JOURNALISTS THAT THE IRAQIS COULD NOT (NOT) DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FRIENDLY AND UNFRIENDLY TANKERS. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND FROM THE AMERICANS THAT IRAQI LEADERS RECENTLY TOOK A VERY TOUGH LINE WITH THE JAPANESE, ASSERTING THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO ATTACK TANKERS IN THE GULF AS LONG AS IRAQ IS DENIED USE OF HER GULF PORTS.

5. FOR TEHRAN. WE ARE SOMEWHAT SCEPTICAL ABOUT REPORTS THAT THE IRANIANS ATTACKED THE UMM CASBAH, BUT IF TRUE COULD REFLECT INCREASING IRANIAN CONCERN ABOUT THE CONTINUING IRAQI ATTACKS AND THEIR OWN INABILITY TO LAUNCH THE MUCH EXPECTED GROUND OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH. GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE.

HOWE

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD (PALACE)

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ECD(E)
MAED
ESSD
ERD
ESID
CONS D
CONS EM UNIT
DEFENCE DEPT
MR EGERTON

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

IRAN/IRAQ

C

cc K. 33.

FCS/84/142

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Iran/Iraq Conflict: Guidelines for Loan Service Personnel

1. Thank you for your minute of 25 April enclosing draft guidelines for our Ambassadors in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates on the question of the involvement of our Loan Service Personnel (LSP) in dealing with an external attack on the Gulf State in which they are serving. I have also seen No 10's minute of 30 April recording a comment made by the Prime Minister and to which, I understand, your Office will be replying.

2. The guidelines were drawn up in consultation with FCO officials and take full account of the legal advice provided. I am therefore content that they should be issued. I suggest that they be telegraphed to the posts concerned under cover of a telegram on the lines of the draft attached. If the Prime Minister, yourself and our other OD(EM) colleagues are content we shall arrange despatch of the guidelines and the covering telegram to the posts concerned.

3. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and other members of the OD(EM) Sub-Committee, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
14 May 1984

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
		SECRET	PRIORITY

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	SECRET
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 141630Z MAY 84
PRE/ADD	7	TO PRIORITY BEHRAIN
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	AND TO PRIORITY KUWAIT, DOHA, ABU DHABI
	10	INFO PRIORITY MUSCAT
	11	IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT: GUIDELINES FOR LOAN SERVICE
	12	PERSONNEL IN GULF STATES
	13	1. Against the background of a possible escalation of
	14	the Iran/Iraq conflict, we wish to avoid the possibility
	15	of weakening the defence capabilities of the Gulf States
	16	in a situation in which our LSP were unable to act, other
	17	than in self defence, in the event of a sudden external
	18	attack. Ministers have therefore agreed that guidelines
	19	on the use of LSP should be issued to HM Ambassadors in
	20	Bahrain, Kuwait, Doha and Abu Dhabi. The guidelines are
	21	in MIFT.
///	22	2. As indicated in the first paragraph of the IFT please
//	23	show the guidelines to the Senior British Loan Service
/	24	Officers in each State. You should not for the present
	25	bring them to the attention of the host governments but,

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword for
File number	Dept: Defence	Distribution: Limited, Defence D, MED, PS, PS/PUS, PS/Mr Wright, Sir J Leahy, Mr Cartledge, Mr Egerton, Legal Advisers; Copes to MOD DS11
Drafted by (Block capitals): R D Hart		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

XY 48

	Classification and Caveats		Page
	SECRET	PRIORITY	2

<<<<

<<<<

for your information, if the situation were to deteriorate to the extent that an external attack on one or more of the States concerned was a real possibility, you would probably be given discretion to explain to the governments to which you are accredited that you had delegated authority to approve LSP involvement, if the time factor ruled out reference to London and provided that this was in response to a clear invitation.

3. Under the terms of the Prime Minister's letter to the Sultan of 15 July 1982 we have already agreed that in the event of a direct threat to Oman which did not allow time for consultation with London we would be content for British personnel to play their part in Oman's defence. There is no need therefore for the guidelines in IFT also to be issued to HM Ambassador, Muscat. You should know that Ministers considered the possibility of extending a similar undertaking to that given to the Omanis to the other Gulf States but concluded that as our defence relations were not so close with them as with Oman an open-ended commitment of this kind was not justified. Ministers also rejected the possibility of delegating authority to Senior British Loan Service Officers as, legally, this would be inconsistent with the terms of the various Memoranda of Understanding on the provision of LSP.

HOWE

NNNN

///

//

/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword

Iraq : Iran/Iraq relations 44

14 MAY 1984



SECRET

u/c 32.

N.D.P.D.

PM/84/77

A.J.C. 14/5

PRIME MINISTER

h.a.

Iran/Iraq

with AJC

1. I was grateful to receive a copy of the Defence Secretary's minute of 8 May to you, outlining the basis on which he proposes to allow our team to participate in the next round of military to military talks with the Americans on contingency planning for a Gulf crisis. I agree with him that it will be important to make clear that the talks would be entirely without commitment on either side. Given this caveat, the principles he outlines seem eminently sensible.

2. I am copying this letter to OD(EM) colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
14 May 1984

SECRET

NARA: Iran/Iraq Rels PR4

61



SECRET

FCE SH

6 cc: SPC

cc: LPCO
HMT
FCO
CO

31

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 May, 1984

Dear Richard,

Iran/Iraq

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 8 May.

Subject to the views of OD(EM) colleagues, she agrees that the US/UK military talks on the Gulf should now proceed to cover, without commitment, such matters as rules of engagement and command and control - and that, accordingly, Mr. Heseltine should instruct our delegation to the talks to proceed on the basis outlined in his paragraph 3.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of other members of OD(EM) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

Charles.

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET

SH

IRAN/IRAQ ADVANCE COPIES 18

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
HD/CONS. D
HD/CONS. EM UNIT
HD/NEWS D
HD/DEFENCE D
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No.10 DOWNING ST (2)

CABINET OFFICE D I O

RESTRICTED

DESKBY FCO 131300Z

DESKBY MOD 131300Z

DESKBY BAHRAIN 131400Z

DESKBY ABU DHABI 131400Z

DESKBY DUBAI 131400Z

ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE

FROM KUWAIT 131120Z MAY 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 186 OF 13 MAY
AND TO IMMEDIATE MOD (FOR DIAC)
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI AND DUBAI.

IRAN/IRAQ

1. SULAIMAN AL SHAHEEN, DIRECTOR OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S O OFFICE, TOLD US CHARGE' THIS MORNING THAT A KUWAITI TANKER HAD JUST BEEN HIT, APPARENTLY BY A MISSILE, IN THE LOWER GULF. THE SHIP, WHICH WE HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED IS CALLED THE UMM CASBAH OWNED BY KOTC AND CARRYING 80,000 TONS OF FUEL OIL FROM KUWAIT TO THE UK, WAS SAID BY AL SHAHEEN TO BE HEADING BACK FOR BAHRAIN.

2. AL SHAHEEN WONDERED WHETHER IT HAD BEEN HIT BY AN IRANIAN

FOR BAHRAIN.

2. AL SHAHEEN WONDERED WHETHER IT HAD BEEN HIT BY AN IRANIAN RATHER THAN AN IRAQI MISSILE. DUBAI MIGHT PICK UP DETAILS THROU THEIR CONTACTS WITH SALVAGE ASSOCIATION.

MELHUISH
BT

NNNN

1141

cc PC 30

Prime Minister.

Agree that the US/UK military talks on the Gulf should now proceed to cover, without commitment, such matters as rules of engagement and command and control?

A.J.C. 10/4.

MO 3/9/4/2

PRIME MINISTER

IRAN/IRAQ

I read with considerable interest the Foreign Secretary's minute of 3rd April covering Richard Luce's report on his discussions in Washington on 19th/20th March. I share his view that this was a very useful visit which served to underline both our essential support for the Americans' policy in the Gulf, but also our concerns about the risks of precipitate or over-excessive military action.

2. In paragraph 3 of his minute the Foreign Secretary has identified a number of areas for further discussion with the Americans, including questions of rules of engagement and joint operational planning. As you know, we have already held two rounds of military-to-military talks with the US in parallel with the politico/military discussions but, as reported in the paper which Sir Robert Armstrong submitted to you on 5th March, these have so far stopped short of any form of joint planning. They have concentrated essentially on an exchange of information about each side's operational capabilities; we have been given a considerable amount of detail about the US operational concept known as PORT GRAND concerned with maintaining free sea and air passage in the Gulf. However, if we are to go further, for example into the areas of rules of engagement and command and control, we shall be getting very close to defining a joint concept of operations which would only require political approval to become an operational plan.

3. We have previously recognised the risks involved in joint planning: in particular that we should either be drawn in to supporting military action that we could not control, or that in a crisis we might be forced to disappoint US expectations of support. Nevertheless I think there is a case for allowing the military talks to proceed naturally to this next step, on the clear understanding that the discussions should be confined to considering separate but co-ordinated operations, that they would take place entirely without commitment on either side, and that all planning would be subject to political approval in the event of an actual operation. Mr Weinberger has already made it clear he would welcome closer military co-ordination, and the deployment of our MCM force to the Mediterranean has already created a climate of expectation in Washington which will not be significantly strengthened by joint planning. Moreover if we are seen to draw back now, it will erode much of the advantage gained by the MCM deployment and Richard Luce's visit. Finally talks on these lines will enable us to identify and perhaps clarify some of the more complex issues which might be difficult to resolve in a fast-moving crisis.

4. A further round of military talks has been provisionally scheduled for mid-May. Subject to your agreement and that of our OD(EM) colleagues, I therefore propose to instruct our team to proceed on the basis outlined in paragraph 3 above.

5. I am copying this minute to our OD(EM) colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
8th May 1984

IRAQ PT 4

Internal Sit.



~~J661~~

CCPC.

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET

Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215) 5144
GTN 215)
(Switchboard) 215 7877

From the Minister for Trade

A.d.c. 4/5

Private Secretary to
Richard Luce Esq MP
Minister for State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Whitehall
LONDON SW1

4 May 1984

Dear Private Secretary

Officials of our two Departments have been in touch about developments within the EEC about the imposition of licensing controls on chemicals which could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons in Iran and Iraq following our decision before Easter to impose controls on the export of 8 chemicals to those countries.

Mr Channon understands that the other Nine Members of the Community have agreed to control the exports of five chemicals all of which are on the UK list but that they all consider that the controls should be imposed on exports to all destinations in order to prevent the risk of diversion through third countries. My Minister understands that, if the United Kingdom fails to go along with the other Nine, there is a risk that the whole agreement will crumble and that the UK would bear the brunt of the blame. He recognises that this would be most unfortunate particularly since it was we who had taken the initiative and had been the first among the Ten to impose controls on these chemicals. At the same time he is anxious to minimise the effect of these controls on legitimate trade and proposes to grant open individual licence to British companies which we are satisfied are reliable exporters, to enable them to export the chemicals in question freely to other OECD countries and any other country where we can be sure that there is no possibility of diversion. Mr Channon understands that these arrangements would be consistent with what has been proposed by the representatives of the Ten. Officials will be having discussions about the details with the chemical industry next week.

On this basis, Mr Channon is content that your officials should lift the reservation which they have put on the proposals of the Ten.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Prime Minister and to the Minister for Defence Procurement.

Yours sincerely

Steve Nicklen

STEPHEN NICKLEN
Private Secretary to the
Minister for Trade (PAUL CHANNON)

2

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 May 1984

~~Prime Minister~~ AR 3/5

P.A.

Dear John, DT 2/5

International Committee of the Red Cross

We have received the enclosed personal letter of thanks from the President of the ICRC to the Prime Minister in reply to her letter of 9 March about the ICRC's appeal on behalf of the victims of the Iran/Iraq war and the need to uphold the Geneva Convention in the area. No reply is called for but as you will see Mr Hay writes warmly of the example which the United Kingdom has set other Governments in supporting ICRC's work. His letter also acknowledges our most recent contributions to ICRC, announced by Mr Raison on 2 March. These contributions amounted to £2,675 million, including that for the Iran/Iraq appeal.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

29

file
da

cc LPO
FCO
HMT
CO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 April 1984

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 25 April to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about guidelines for loan service personnel in relation to the Iran/Iraq war. Mrs. Thatcher has commented that she is rather surprised at the legal position as set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of your Secretary of State's minute. She recalls that when the Iran/Iraq war began and we heard that Oman could be used by Iraqi planes for landing purposes, she enquired about the position of loan service personnel and was told that they could be used for defence but not for attack. She would be grateful therefore if the records of that period could be checked to ensure that the advice on the position of loan service personnel is consistent with that given at the time.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for this point to be considered and further advice to come forward.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Private Secretaries to members of OD(EM) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Timothy Flesher

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

28

A

MO 3/9/4/2

Prime Minister ①

Content with the approach at X in para 4, subject to OD(EM) colleagues?

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

Draft 27/4 see pt 3 attached

IRAN/IRAQ WAR: GUIDELINES FOR LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL

You will recall that at the meeting of OD(EM) on 26th January we agreed that the rules governing the employment of our loan service personnel (LSP) serving in the Gulf should be reviewed. Our concern was to avoid the possibility of weakening the defence capabilities of the Gulf States in a situation where our LSP in critical posts were unable to act (other than in self-defence) in the event of a sudden external attack.

2. The present situation is that our defence co-operation arrangements with the various Gulf States (mostly in the form of Memoranda of Understanding) prohibit the use of our LSP in hostilities without the prior consent of HMG. The main exception is Oman (where British LSP serve in command posts); in her letter to the Sultan in July 1982 the Prime Minister said that in the event of a direct threat to Oman which did not allow time for consultation we would be content "that British personnel should play their full part in Oman's defence". We could of course extend this sort of undertaking to the other Gulf States, either by amending the various Memoranda of Understanding (which would, however, involve serious practical problems) or by means of a similar letter to the other local Rulers. But our relations with Oman are a good deal closer than with the other States, and I do not think we would be justified in entering into an open-ended commitment to use our LSP in defence of the latter, irrespective of the circumstances.

3. In view of these difficulties I have considered the possibility of delegating authority to the Senior British Loan Service Officers (SBLSOs) to commit LSP to operations in defence against external attack on the host country when there was insufficient time to seek HMG's consent. This would have the advantage of ensuring that those of our personnel who have vital defensive roles would be able to play a timely part in the defence of their host nations. Unfortunately, there are over-riding legal objections to delegating authority in this way. Under the terms of the various MOUs our LSP can only be used in defence of the Gulf States after consultation between the host Governments and HMG. If the LSP were to go into action without the clear political authority of the host Government, and the approval of HMG, they could be held to have exceeded their authority and to have intervened in the affairs of the host state. The FCO Legal Advisers have therefore advised us that it would not be satisfactory for the SBLSO to have delegated authority to give HMG's approval to the use of his own men.

4. I therefore believe that the only acceptable solution would be to give delegated authority to the British Ambassador (or Charge d'Affaires in his absence) to approve the involvement of our LSP on behalf of HMG in response to a clear invitation from the host Government in the event of an external attack when there was no time to consult London. This is not an ideal solution since it adds a potential delay to the approval process. Nonetheless, it would ensure that our men were acting legally at all times. Moreover, in most circumstances in which the threat is so immediate that the delay would be critical, the threat to our LSP would almost certainly allow them the right to act with their host forces in self-defence (the MOUs do not constrain the right of self-defence). In order to speed up the process of consultation our Ambassadors could be given discretion to approach the host Governments in an emergency and explain that they have delegated authority to approve LSP involvement in response to an invitation when time precludes consulting London. Naturally, if host Governments feel they might need swifter assistance in the event of

external attack, it is open to them to propose modification of the terms of the MOUs.

5. I therefore attach draft guidelines which might be sent to our Ambassadors in the Gulf to give them this delegated authority. The guidelines would not be applicable to Oman, since they do not go as far as our existing undertaking to the Omanis, but a copy would be sent to HMA Muscat for information. They cannot, of course, be regarded as comprehensive instructions identifying all the circumstances which might arise, but Ambassadors would be able to seek more specific guidance if they felt that there were particular situations for which the guidelines did not fully cater. For instance, the constraint on operations outside the territorial limits of the host country could prove unsatisfactorily restrictive if there were any British pilots of fast jet aircraft serving in the countries concerned, as defensive action in this environment would be very difficult to confine within territorial limits. At present, however, there are no such LSP in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar or the UAE. I should be grateful to know whether you, and our OD(EM) colleagues to whom I am copying this minute, are content for us to proceed accordingly.

Ministry of Defence
25th April 1984

I am surprised at the legal position. When the Iran/Iraq war started - and we heard that Oman could be used by Iraq planes for landing purposes - I enquired about the position of LSP and was told that they could be used for defence purposes only. Is there not some reference to this in the telegrams/correspondence at the time? You remember that the weekend was very active diplomatically to prevent the extension of the war down the Gulf etc

DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR APPROVAL OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF UK LSP IN AN EXTERNAL ATTACK ON THE GULF STATE IN WHICH THEY ARE SERVING (TO BE ISSUED TO HM AMBASSADORS IN BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, QATAR AND THE UAE)

Ministers have agreed that confidential guidelines should be issued to you concerning the basis on which British Loan Service Personnel normally employed in critical defensive posts may operate in the event of a sudden external attack. You should ensure that these guidelines are read and initialled by the Senior British Loan Service Officers (SBLSO), who may acquaint their junior officers with the contents. You may delegate the authority contained in these guidelines to the Charge d'Affaires in your absence, but no further delegation is allowed. These guidelines complement, but in no way supersede, the relevant Memoranda of Understanding and, where applicable, Chiefs of Staff Directives.

2. In the event of an approach by your host government asking for HMG's approval for LSP employed routinely in vital defence functions to participate in defensive operations, in the event of an external attack, if you judge that the urgency of the situation precludes consultation with London you may give approval on HMG's behalf, provided you are satisfied that the circumstances warrant it. In exercising this delegated authority you should consult first with the SBLSO, and ensure that he is aware of the need to act in concert with indigenous forces, and to take all appropriate steps to minimise the risks to British personnel commensurate with supporting the indigenous defence effort. You should

report any authorisation given under these guidelines immediately to the FCO and MOD.

3. This delegated authority does not apply to any operations concerned with internal security even if externally inspired, nor to the enforcement of law and order, in which British personnel should not become involved. Nor does it permit British participation in operations outside the territorial limits of the host country.

4. Nothing in these guidelines shall be construed to inhibit the inherent right of all British loan service personnel to self-defence in response to an immediate threat to their safety, nor to conflict with their obligations to act in accordance with UK Service Regulations and International Military Law.

Iraq Pt 4

Int. Sit

P^a Evans 27/4

Prime Minister

It remains to be seen whether there is any connection with today's events at the Consulate. But the background is not helpful.

Duncan 26/4

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 450
CONFIDENTIAL
FM TEHRAN 251030Z APR
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 230 OF 25 APRIL 1984
INFO PRIORITY UKDIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, MODUK
INFO ROUTINE GULF POSTS, WASHINGTON, PARIS, STOCKHOLM, THE HAGUE, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO
SAVING TO UKDEL OECD, UKREP BRUSSELS.

MY TELNO 209 (NOT TO ALL) : CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

SUMMARY.

1. AN IRANIAN DEPUTY MINISTER HAS LEFT FOR GENEVA TO ATTEND THE DISARMAMENT TALKS. THE ANITI-BRITISH PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN CONTINUES. THE MFA TOLD ME THEY DO NOT CONSIDER OUR STATEMENTS ON CW SUFFICIENT, AND ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT WE DID NOT SUPPLY CASINGS FOR CW BOMBS TO IRAQ. I REPLIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN PLENTY OF TIME TO PRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE THAT WE HAD SUPPLIED CW AND WE EXPECTED A FORMAL RETRACTION.

DETAIL.

2. THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST US FOR ALLEGEDLY SUPPLYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO IRAQ HAS NOT STOPPED, EVEN IF WE ARE NOT NOW THE ONLY TARGET. SOME FANCIFUL PRESS ARTICLES ARE STILL APPEARING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE EVENING NEWSPAPER 'KAYHAN' OF 22 APRIL QUOTED WHAT IT CALLED INFORMED DIPLOMATIC SOURCES IN LONDON AS CONFIRMING THAT A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS USED BY THE IRAQI REGIME HAD BEEN SUPPLIED BY BRITAIN. ANOTHER REPORT, IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY'S NEWSPAPER ON 24 APRIL, QUOTED LIBYAN TELEVISION AS SAYING THAT IRAQ HAD PURCHASED CONSIDERABLE QUANTITIES OF CW FROM UNSPECIFIED BRITISH AND BRITISH/AMERICAN COMPANIES.

3. I CALLED ON MAHALLATI ON 23 APRIL AND HANDED HIM A COPY OF MR LUCE'S STATEMENT OF 18 APRIL (YOUR TELNO 25 TO UKDIS GENEVA). MAHALLATI MADE NO COMMENT ON THIS BUT AGAIN CRITICISED OUR FAILURE TO CONDEMN IRAQ: IRAN DID NOT CONSIDER BRITISH STATEMENTS TO BE SUFFICIENT. NOR WAS SHE CONVINCED THAT WE HAD NOT SUPPLIED SOME OF THE CASINGS. THESE WERE STILL BEING EXAMINED.

4. IN/

CONFIDENTIAL

4. IN REPLY, I REFERRED TO RAJAIE AND SADATIAN'S CALL ON LEAHY ON 3 APRIL (YOUR TELNO 174 TO UKMIS NEW YORK, NOT TO ALL). NOT UNEXPECTEDLY, MAHALLATI HAD HEARD NOTHING ABOUT THIS FROM SADATIAN. I SAID THAT IRAN HAD HAD AMPLE TIME TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE IF IT EXISTED AND SHOULD NOW ADMIT PUBLICLY THAT HER ALLEGATIONS WERE MISTAKEN. I HANDED HIM A NOTE TO THAT EFFECT (COPY BY BAG TO FCO ONLY), ADDING THAT I HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT THE IRANIANS BELIEVED THAT ANOTHER COUNTRY WAS THE SOURCE OF THE CASINGS. MAHALLATI ADMITTED THE SOVIET UNION WAS ALSO UNDER SUSPICION.

5. SHAIKHOLESLAM, THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN THE IRANIAN MFA, LEFT FOR GENEVA ON 24 APRIL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, HE TOLD REPORTERS THAT HE WXBYEULD DRAW PARTICIPANTS' ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE SUPERPOWERS WERE TRYING TO OBSTRUCT MOVES TO PREVENT IRAQ FROM REPEATING ITS HEINOUS CRIMES.

FCO PASS SAVING UKDEL OECD, UKREP BRUSSELS.

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

SIMPSON-ORLEBAR
BT

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD

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MR EGERTON
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IRAN/IRAQ

CONFIDENTIAL

DD 242230Z SEOUL
DD 250015Z TOKYO

GRS460
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 242230Z
FM FCO 241718Z APR 84
TO IMMEDIATE SEOUL
TELEGRAM NUMBER 81 OF 24 APRIL
AND TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 250015Z TOKYO
FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM PRIVATE OFFICE
IRAN/IRAQ

1. THE FOLLOWING IS AN UP-DATE OF THE IRAN/IRAQ BRIEF (ANNEX 1(B)) COVERING THE MAIN EVENTS OF THE LAST WEEK OR SO.

2. THE WAR

THE LONG-AWAITED IRANIAN OFFENSIVE HAS STILL NOT MATERIALISED ALTHOUGH PREPARATIONS CONTINUE. THE DELAY IS PUZZLING. WE SHOULD WELCOME ANY COMMENTS THE JAPANESE MAY HAVE FOLLOWING THE RECENT VISIT TO TOKYO OF THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER.

3. MEDIATION

THE EGYPTIAN PEACE PROPOSALS (WHICH THEY INTEND TO SUBMIT THROUGH THE NAM AND POSSIBLE THE UN) SEEM UNLIKELY TO COME TO ANYTHING. STILL NO SIGN THAT THE IRANIANS ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE.

4. ESCALATION IN THE GULF

WE WERE INTERESTED TO READ FROM THE REPORT OF VELAYATI'S VISIT (TOKYO TELNO 310 OF 17 APRIL) THAT THE JAPANESE HAD AGAIN RAISED THE QUESTION OF AN AGREEMENT WHEREBY IRAQ WOULD REFRAIN FROM ATTACKS ON KHARG ISLAND AND SHIPPING IN THE GULF IN RETURN FOR ASSURANCES FROM THE IRANIANS THAT THEY WOULD NOT ATTACK IRAQI PORTS. DO THE JAPANESE INTEND TO PURSUE THIS PROPOSAL FURTHER WITH THE TWO SIDES?

5. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

FOLLOWING THE US DECISION ON 30 MARCH TO EXTEND EXPORT LICENSING CONTROLS ON FIVE CHEMICALS WHICH COULD BE USED TO MANUFACTURE MUSTARD GAS OR NERVE AGENTS, WE ANNOUNCED OUR DECISION TO EXTEND EXPORT CONTROLS TO IRAN AND IRAQ ON EIGHT CHEMICALS WITH EFFECT

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM 12 APRIL FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. WE ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH OUR EC PARTNERS ON THIS,AND HAVE ALSO EMPHASISED TO OECD MEMBERS THE NEED FOR MULTILATERAL ACTION TO PREVENT THE EXPORT OF CHEMICALS LIKELY TO BE USED BY IRAQ OR IRAN TO MANUFACTURE CW. THE JAPANESE RESPONSE TO OUR APPROACH (TOKYO TELNO 314 OF 19 APRIL) WAS NOT ENCOURAGING. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY WISH TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO REINFORCE THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE MULTILATERAL ACTION ON THIS QUESTION, AND REMIND THE JAPANESE OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD) IN GENEVA TO SECURE A WORLD-WIDE BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

6. CONTINGENCY PLANNING (DEFENSIVE USE ONLY)

WE CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND ARE HOLDING FURTHER MEETINGS THIS WEEK IN LONDON AT OFFICIAL LEVEL.

7. VISIT OF ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION (DEFENSIVE USE ONLY)

AN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION, HEADED BY THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IS DUE TO ARRIVE IN LONDON ON 30 APRIL. WE UNDERSTAND THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT IS TO DISCUSS THE SUPPLY OF MILITARY ITEMS TO IRAN. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THE DELEGATION WILL SUBSEQUENTLY VISIT JAPAN. WHAT IS THE JAPANESE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAN (INCLUDING THAT OF A NON-LETHAL NATURE)?

HOWE

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD

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CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IRAN/IRAQ

CONFIDENTIAL

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CEPC

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

18 April 1984

Len Appleyard Esq
Private Secretary
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Dear Len

The Chancellor has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 10 April and is content with the proposals therein.

I am copying this letter to John Coles and to the Private Secretaries of other members of OD(EM).

Yours ever
David

D L C PERETZ
Principal Private Secretary

Iraq: Iran/Iraq Relats Pt 4.



CONFIDENTIAL

MO 3/9/4/2

Prime Minister (2)

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

IRAN/IRAQ: KUWAITI REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

Thank you for your minute of 6th April concerning Shaikh Sabah's wish for an assurance of possible UK help in an emergency. As you say, we can neither ignore this approach nor reject it outright. As yet, however, we have no specific idea of likely Kuwaiti requirements either for equipment or experts. While we might be able to provide some appropriate help, it will clearly be important to avoid giving any commitment, at least until Kuwait's specific requirements are much clearer.

2. I spoke briefly to Shaikh Salim, the Kuwaiti Defence Minister, when he was in London last weekend. As you suggested, I invited him to have discussions with me on his return from Washington. He accepted this invitation and I hope to arrange a meeting around the Easter weekend. In subsequent discussion with the Kuwaiti Embassy it emerged that Shaikh Salim would look for an answer "in principle" on UK assistance in an emergency. It would therefore be most useful if HMA, Kuwait could speak before hand to the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister along the lines proposed in your letter. I understand that our officials have set this in hand.

3. When I meet Shaikh Salim I shall also follow up your suggestion about exploring the nature of his discussion with the Americans.

4. Copies of this minute go to OD(EM) colleagues.

Ministry of Defence
16th April 1984

IRAQ PT 4 Internal Sec

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

cc: P.C

OD(EM) LPC CO
(FCO)
HMT
MOD

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 April, 1984

IRAN: SUPPLY OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 10 April.

Subject to the views of OD(EM) colleagues she is content with Sir Geoffrey Howe's proposals for handling this matter, as set out in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the minute.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD(EM).

A.J. COLES

P. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

cc SW e.c.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 April 1984

Iran/Iraq: Supply of Chemicals

Thank you for your letter of 10 April describing the action which you have taken with regard to the control of exports to Iran and Iraq of substances which might be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons.

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter and (as I informed the Minister of Trade's office this afternoon) that Mr. Channon is proposing to answer a Question on this matter in the House of Commons on 12 April.

I am copying this letter to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and David Goodall (Cabinet Office).

A.J. COLES

Peter Ricketts Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL GENÈVE

LE PRÉSIDENT

Geneva, 10 April 1984

Dear Madam,

I should like to thank you very much indeed for your kind letter of 9 March, which was handed to me recently, and to let you know how much I appreciated your encouraging sentiments.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher M.P.
Prime Minister
10, Downing Street
London S.W. 1

17, AVENUE DE LA PAIX, CH-1211 GENÈVE - TÉL. 022 / 34 60 01

Your understanding of and support for the role of our institution in favour of victims of conflicts stands as an example which I hope will be shared by other governments and their respective leaders. Your support is not limited to words but expresses itself in substantial contributions, not only for the victims of the Iran/Iraq war, but for those suffering as a result of conflicts throughout the world. The recent substantial contributions (including the £ 100,000 for Iran/Iraq, mentioned in your letter of 9 March) from Your Government more than testify to this effect.

Thanks to support received from the international community, the ICRC is able to fulfil its tasks consistent with the Geneva Conventions and much of the credit for this goes to you and the U.K. Government and for which I should like to reiterate my deep gratitude and sincere appreciation.

Yours sincerely,

Alexandre Hay

IRAQ: Int Fil: RL4

CC PC (2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister.

10 April 1984

To be aware of the action which is being taken.

A.J.C. 11/4

Dear John.

Iran/Iraq: Supply of Chemicals

In your letter of 2 April, you recorded that the Prime Minister had asked to be kept informed about the results of our efforts to control exports to Iran and Iraq of substances which might be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons. The Foreign Secretary raised this subject in Cabinet on 5 April.

The same day officials informed representatives of the UK chemical industries of the Government's concern about the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf and that Ministers were due to consider the possible extension of controls to the export of certain chemicals to Iran and Iraq. The companies raised no objection, except to point out that supplies of the chemicals likely to be controlled could be obtained from elsewhere.

At a meeting here on 6 April, Mr Luce and Mr Channon agreed that export controls should be introduced on the five chemicals on which a US embargo was already in operation, that two other chemicals, dimethylamine and chloroethanol should also be included, and that subject to further consultation among officials, which has now taken place, methyl phosphonyl dichloride (which has been identified as an ingredient in the manufacture of the nerve agent Sarin), should also be included. They also agreed that although sodium and potassium cyanide could conceivably be used in CW manufacture, their wide availability and commercial application argued strongly against their inclusion in an exercise of this kind. Finally they agreed that export controls should be limited to Iran and Iraq, and should be reviewed after six months.

Sir Geoffrey Howe raised this with Community colleagues in Luxembourg on 9 April. He told them that we intended to extend the list of chemicals covered by the Export of Goods Control Order so as to make it possible to control the direct export of those goods to Iraq and Iran and urged them to take similar action. In subsequent discussion the following points emerged:

/(a)

(a) there was a consensus on preventing the export of chemicals likely to be used by Iraq or Iran to manufacture CW in the present conflict;

(b) a number of partners, including the major chemical exporters, are planning or considering measures similar to our own;

? (c) joint Community action is not possible, at any rate at this stage, for Danish doctrinal reasons;

(d) partners will therefore keep one another fully informed as they take national action, and will harmonise this as far as is possible;

(e) the problems of diversion of trade etc which will inevitably arise as the Ten take their separate national actions will be discussed by a group of experts of the Ten which the Presidency will urgently convene for this purpose;

(f) the Community machinery will discuss the matter as necessary.

Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that we should aim for an early announcement of the new controls. I understand that the Department of Trade and Industry (who are responsible for the Export of Goods (Control) Order) are proposing to arrange an inspired PQ to be answered on the afternoon of Thursday 12 April, when the new controls will come into effect.

I am sending copies of this letter to Callum McCarthy(DTI), Richard Mottram (MOD) and David Goodall (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Office

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

IRAQ Pt 4

Internal Sit



27

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
HD/CONS. D
HD/CONS. EM UNIT
HD/NEWS D
HD/DEFENCE D
HD | ACDD (CHEMICAL WEAPONS ONLY)
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No.10 DOWNING ST (2)

CABINET OFFICE D I O



SECRET

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

FROM UKDEL NATO 101545Z APR 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 191 OF 10 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PRIORITY PARIS MUSCAT BAGHDAD TEHRAN ABU DHABI BAHRAIN DOHA DUBAI KUWAIT JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN CAIRO ROME
INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL OECD

YOUR TELNO 659 TO WASHINGTON: IRAN/IRAQ: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. AS FORECAST IN PARAGRAPH 8 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, ABSHIRE (US) RAISED THIS ISSUE AT THE END OF TODAY'S WEEKLY LUNCH OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES. HE SAID THAT IRAN WAS ON THE POINT OF LAUNCHING ITS BIGGEST OFFENSIVE YET AND, DEPENDING ON THE FORTUNES OF WAR, IRAQ MIGHT ATTACK KHARG ISLAND OR BLOCK TANKERS EN ROUTE TO OR FROM IT. THAT COULD LEAD TO FURTHER ESCALATION WITH THE RISK OF ACTION BY IRAN IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. BOTH SIDES BORE A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR, BUT IRAN WAS NOW THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PEACE. THE US HAD CONDEMNED IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND IRAN'S USE OF CHILDREN AND REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE. GIVEN THE GRAVITY OF WESTERN INTERESTS AT STAKE, THE US BELIEVED IT RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN MILITARY PLANNING THOUGH THEY WOULD PLACE PRIORITY ON DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. THE US WOULD OPPOSE

~~BELIEVED IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IN MILITARY PLANNING THOUGH THEY~~
WOULD PLACE PRIORITY ON DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. THE US WOULD OPPOSE ANY ACTION WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE CLOSURE OF THE HORMUZ STRAITS. THEY WOULD TAKE NO ACTION WHICH WAS NOT ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE AND THEY REALISED THE IMPORTANCE OF INVOLVING THE GULF STATES ALTHOUGH THE LATTER HAD HITHERTO MADE NO COMMITMENTS. THE US GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND WOULD MAINTAIN CONTACT AND CONSULT WITH THEM IN ANY CRISIS. THEY DID NOT THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD RESPOND MILITARILY, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD NO DOUBT CRITICISE WHATEVER ACTION THE WEST MIGHT TAKE.

2. I SAID THAT WHILE HMG TOOK A SOMEWHAT MORE SANGUINE VIEW OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF ESCALATION, IT WAS NEVERTHELESS PRUDENT THAT WE SHOULD BE THINKING ABOUT WHAT ACTION WE MIGHT TAKE SHOULD THE WORST COME TO THE WORST. HMG'S VIEW WAS THAT PRIORITY MUST BE GIVEN TO DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS, AND THAT IF IT CAME TO MILITARY ACTION IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT IT SHOULD BE TAKEN ON THE BASIS OF AN INVITATION FROM A REGIONAL STATE.

3. ABSHIRE'S STATEMENT CLEARLY TOOK OTHERS BY SURPRISE AND THERE WAS A REQUEST FOR A COPY OF HIS SPEAKING NOTES IN WRITING. ABSHIRE SAID THAT HE COULD MAKE NO PROMISES ABOUT THIS BUT WOULD TRY TO OBTAIN AUTHORITY. OLCAY (TURKEY) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE IRANIANS BUT HAD FOUND THEM TOTALLY NEGATIVE, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD AT LEAST ALLOWED DISCUSSION OF THE DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM: WITH MANY OTHERS THEY HAD REJECTED EVEN THAT.

4. AFTER LUNCH OJEDA (SPAIN) TOOK ME ASIDE TO EXPRESS CONCERN AT WHAT ABSHIRE HAD SAID, WHICH HE SEEMED TO HAVE INTERPRETED AS PRESAGING IMMEDIATE ACTION. I ASSURED HIM THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT ABSHIRE HAD BEEN TALKING MERELY OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

PARIS PASS SAVING UKDEL OECD

GRAHAM

CSPC

Prime Minister.

Content with approach in para. 6 and 7, subject to OD(EN) colleagues?

A.J.C. 13/4.

PM/84/62

PRIME MINISTER

see IRAQ A3 Intercept attached

Iran: Supply of Defence Equipment

1. We agreed at OD(EM) on 27 January that I should attempt to protract negotiations over the supply of tank-related spares to Iran, in the hope of achieving a more defensible position relative to the moderate Arab States.

2. We have since discussed this further with the Iranians in Tehran. Not surprisingly they reacted adversely to the news that we intended to review again the items in the interim package to eliminate lethal items. They have since said that they want negotiations to continue. However, they have made the signature of the contract for the two Yarrow ships (worth £23 million to the UK) conditional on the receipt of assurances from us that:

(i) we would release all non-lethal spare parts as soon as our review is complete;

(ii) agreement would be reached between IMS and the Iranian MOD within three months thereafter on what to do about the lethal items, and also on tank ammunition, which is outside the package; and

(iii) negotiations should continue on outstanding elements of other pre-revolutionary items outside the interim settlement, with particular emphasis on the terminated tank contract.

3. The question of how we should respond turns largely on judgement of the likely reaction in the US and the moderabe

/Arab

Arab States. There is no doubt that they remain concerned. We have refused suggestions planted in the press by an American official that we were supplying to Iran major items such as Spey engines for military aircraft; and have worked hard to explain our policy that while we continue to supply non-lethal equipment and spares to both Iran and Iraq (quite separately from this interim package), and to trade normally with both, we do not supply lethal items to either side. However, Mr Shultz has recently further criticised our supply of spares to Iran, in an interview in The Times. There has been a shrill anti-British campaign on the subject in Iraq and we have also had representations from the Saudis, Kuwaitis and Jordanians recently. and Bahrain.

4. All this, coupled with the heightened international concern about the situation in the Gulf, means that we must expect considerable further criticism if we decided to release tank spares, even if, as suggested in paragraph 5, these are by our own definition at the non-lethal end of the range. Whether this would be translated into action of any kind against us by the Arabs is impossible to predict: but the edge may perhaps have been taken off this to some extent, as we have already informed the Saudis and the Secretary General of the Arab League, as well as the Americans, of our position on the release of the Yarrow support ships, and have explained that our policy is, and will remain, evenhanded. Implicit in this has been a steadfast refusal to explain in detail what precisely we mean by "lethal" and "non-lethal", terms which we have to interpret according to the ebb and flow of the war, and about which we cannot be too specific in public.

5. Further delay with the Iranians of course risks considerable damage to our commercial interests there, which they have linked to progress on the interim package. They might take measures against our exports (£630 million in 1983) and react in other unpredictable ways, if they judged that we were stalling

/unreasonably

unreasonably on the interim package and at the same time engaging in contingency planning in the Gulf with the Americans.

6. This is, as we have always recognised, a very difficult decision. My preliminary view is that:

(i) we should agree to release very shortly items in category C and D (automotive, communications and electric and other equipment). These are clearly non-lethal. Their total value is about £3.5m);

(ii) we should refuse to release items in category A (guns and fire control equipment);

(iii) there may also be a case for releasing at least the items in category B(ii) (brakes, steering axles, wheels and tracks) which could add a further £2.5m to the items released, or some 70% of the total value. We could ask officials, perhaps chaired by a Cabinet Office representative, to examine further the hull-related items in B(i) to see whether some of those items might also be released in due course.

7. Progressive release on these lines would be evidence of our serious intent, and would also allow us the flexibility to limit release if Arab or US reactions looked like going beyond mere words. As for the assurances sought by the Iranians on the other elements and contracts outside the interim packages, we shall have to ask our negotiators to continue to play for time, but it may be necessary in due course to give the assurance in paragraph 2(ii) above. Under no

/circumstances

circumstances would lethal items or ammunition be supplied to Iran while hostilities continue; but the Iranians might insist on their money back.

7. I am copying this minute to other members of OD(EM).

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
10 April 1984

10 APR 1984

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CONFIDENTIAL

CO/PC (2)

Prime Minister.

A.J.C. 6/4.

FCS/84/110

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Iran/Iraq: Kuwaiti Request for Assistance

1. The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Shaikh Sabah, called on me on 3 April to express his concern about the Iran/Iraq war. He took the opportunity to say that, in an emergency, Kuwait might wish to request weapons and experts from the UK. He hoped that we would be able to give an assurance that we would be prepared to send Kuwait military supplies quickly, if necessary from our own stocks. In answer to my question, he confirmed that nothing more was required and I think we can take this to mean that he is not seeking a commitment to provide British forces. He also said that he would not be making a similar request to the United States (indeed he made a number of disparaging remarks about them), although he will probably have made the same request to M. Cheysson whom he had seen the previous day in Paris.

2. Since then, we have heard that Shaikh Salim, the Kuwaiti Defence Minister, will be passing through London this weekend on his way to Washington for official talks with Mr Weinberger. Shaikh Salim has never shared Shaikh Sabah's anti-Americanism, and we know they have not always taken the same view on contingency planning. It is possible that Shaikh Salim would be less reluctant to approach the Americans. It would, I am sure, be useful if you could suggest to Shaikh Salim that he stop over for discussions on his way back from Washington to enable us to clarify this point.

3. Despite this apparent ambiguity in the Kuwaiti attitude to the Americans, we are still left with Shaikh Sabah's request. It clearly raises considerable difficulties. But in view of our wish to do what we can to preserve the stability of the

Gulf States, I do not believe we can ignore it or reject it outright. Furthermore, our response is bound to have an affect on our long-term defence sales prospects in Kuwait, and possibly in the rest of the GCC as well.

4. We shall need to know in much greater detail what the Kuwaitis have in mind before we can consider giving any assurance along the lines that Shaikh Sabah is seeking. Shaikh Salim may give you some clarification if you are able to see him on his return. Meanwhile, I propose to instruct our Ambassador to contact the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister and to say that while we are willing to see what we can do within our own limited resources, we would need to know a great deal more about exactly what military supplies and expert assistance they require, and in what circumstances they might call upon us, before we can consider giving any assurances.

5. I am copying this minute to our colleagues in OD(EM).

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
6 April 1984

File 26

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 April 1984

IRAN/IRAQ

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 3 April and the accompanying documents about the visit to Washington by the Minister of State, Mr. Luce, to discuss contingency planning arrangements with the Americans.

Mrs. Thatcher is glad that Mr. Luce's visit was so successful. She has noted the points on which further detailed discussion with the Americans will be necessary and has no comments to make about these.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of other members of OD(EM).

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

25

Prime Minister.

A. & C. 3/4.

PM/84/58

PRIME MINISTER

Iran/Iraq

1. You may wish to have a progress report on our contingency planning arrangements, particularly as they affect our contacts with the Americans.

2. I enclose a copy of a report by Richard Luce on his discussions in Washington on 19 and 20 March. This account, and the separate comments from Sir Oliver Wright in Washington telegram No 986, which you have already seen, show that the visit proved timely and was very well received by the Americans. Richard Luce was able clearly to register our concern that the Americans should not rush into hasty or excessive military action should there be any further escalation of the conflict, while reaffirming that we are ready to play our part in whatever efforts may be needed to contain and dissipate any crisis. He also made the point that the West needed to ensure that the purpose of any military action was not misunderstood by the Soviet Union. Mr Shultz said that he had already spoken to Dobrynin about this.

3. Richard Luce identifies a number of particular points on which we need further detailed discussions at official level with the Americans. These include:

(a) the handling of contacts with Gulf States, all of whom are worried about US insensitivity in the handling of any crisis;

(b) the need to explore fully all possibilities for action at the United Nations (where the Americans are less ready than ourselves to acknowledge that some action will be necessary) if only to pre-empt the activities of less well-disposed countries;

(c) the need to ensure that all diplomatic options are thoroughly explored before recourse to military action;

(d) the need for a clear understanding on rules of engagement, and on the circumstances in which it might be necessary to consider counter-action against Iranian forces and/or territory;

(e) the extent to which there is a need for joint - or as we would prefer - separate but co-ordinated planning of naval operations, especially the protection of merchant shipping.

These points will be taken up at a meeting with US State department and DOD officials in London next week. (We pressed for talks on 3 or 4 April, but those dates unfortunately proved unacceptable to the Americans.)

4. In addition I believe officials should look particularly carefully at those contingencies in which the Iranian response is more concerned with terrorism or subversion against one or more Gulf states than with closing the Straits. From all I have heard, this seems to be at least as likely a reaction on their part. By the same token, the less that is said publicly about a possible closure of the Straits the better: we do not want unnecessarily to alarm public opinion, nor do we want to give the Iranians a pretext for intemperate action.

5. I shall of course let you know how these discussions progress. In the meantime, any comments you or other colleagues may have on the points to be discussed with the Americans would be welcome. The Annex takes stock of other action in hand.

6. I am copying this minute to colleagues on OD(EM).

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

GEOFFREY HOWE

3 April 1984

(iv) With NATO. We have proposed to the Americans that it would be useful to hold a discussion among Permanent Representatives in NATO and are pressing them for a reply.

(v) Oil Supplies. FCO and the Department of Energy are reviewing the extensive contingency planning already done on this subject.

FROM: RICHARD LUCE

DATE: 22 March 1984

Secretary of State

cc: All Ministers
PUS
Sir J Leahy
Mr Egerton
Mr Haskell, MED

TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS ON THE GULF

Objective

1. I spent Monday and Tuesday in Washington, discussing the Gulf with the American Administration. My objectives, in line with last week's Cabinet decision, were to reaffirm our commitment to maintain freedom of navigation in the Gulf; to discuss ways in which we should cooperate with the Americans to this end; to ensure that our views were properly understood in Washington; and to secure a basis of understanding and cooperation in order to minimise the risk of crossed wires later on.

2. The Prime Minister's message opened all doors. I had meetings with Vice President Bush, Weinberger, McFarlane (Security Adviser to the President), Shultz, Dam (with a strong supporting State Department team including Burt, Eagleburger, Howe and Murphy), and appointments on the Hill with Congressman Hamilton (Chairman of the Middle East Sub-Committee of the House) and Senator Tower.

Our Position

3. I emphasised throughout that we shared the US view of the importance of the Gulf, and were prepared to play our part. The Armilla patrol and our decision to bring our Mine Counter Measures force to a higher state of readiness were evidence of our commitment and sincerity. I emphasised no less clearly the need to consider carefully the diplomatic and military parameters within which we should operate. These included:

(i) Maximum involvement of the Gulf States. We should be seen to be responding to an invitation from, and as far as possible acting in concert with, the states in the area.

(ii) The importance of exhausting all diplomatic options, including the UN, before resorting to force (though there are clearly circumstances in which this may not be possible).

/(iii)

(iii) Involving as many interested parties as possible. The French, Italians, Germans, Japanese, Australians and New Zealanders all emerged in discussion.

(iv) Ensuring that the Russians did not misunderstand our intentions.

(v) If force proved inevitable, it should be kept to a minimum and be clearly related to the specific objective of securing freedom of navigation in international waterways.

(vi) We should not play into Khomeini's hands through an ill-judged response.

(vii) We should have the fullest, frankest possible consultations in advance of any firm decisions.

American Position

4. The American response was reassuring. There is no sense of panic. Although their own oil supplies would be little affected, they pay considerable attention to the effects on the international oil market, and thus on all Western economies, of a prolonged interruption of Gulf oil supplies. To minimise this, they are determined to have their contingency plans ready on all fronts - diplomatic, military, and energy.

5. The attention of all, from the President downwards, is engaged. As Vice President Bush made clear, they are extremely pleased by our willingness to play our part and anxious to know our views. The Administration is concerned about the isolationist streak in the recent public pronouncements of Democratic Presidential candidates, particularly Senator Hart. They want - indeed for domestic political reasons they need - to have the support and cooperation of other interested parties, especially ourselves.

6. There is much common ground between us. The Americans accept the need:

(i) to bring along the Gulf States (though they attach less importance than we do to securing public requests for assistance);

(ii) to maximise international support. They are active with a number of Western European countries, as well as the Japanese, the Australians and New Zealanders (who are heavily dependent on Gulf oil). They have had military talks with the French, and look to them for naval support from their forces stationed at Djibouti.

/(iii)

(iii) to square the Russians. Shultz has already spoken to Dobrynin;

(iv) to minimise use of force and to ensure that, if it is used at all, it should be limited to the immediate objective of securing the free flow of oil from the Gulf. They are anxious to avoid becoming involved with ground (as opposed to naval and air) forces.

Policy is not being dictated by desire to teach Iran a lesson, though a sharp response to Iranian provocation could prove popular in Congress.

7. In sum, the Administration is looking coolly and rationally at the problem. The various parts of the machine, so often pulling in different directions, are as far as one can tell coordinating reasonably well. They are helped in this by the relatively low level of Congressional and public interest in the Gulf. The isolationist streak I have mentioned above is still more a distant cloud than an active constraint on policy. There are no strong lobby groups at work.

US/Iran

8. The Americans see no prospect of an early end to the war. Their first objective is accordingly containment, and persuading other countries to cut/ supplies which enable Iran to sustain /off hostilities. I explained our position on the Kharg and the support ships, about which there is still considerable doubt and nervousness. In doing so, I laid particular stress on the British self-interest in ensuring that nothing was supplied to either side which could subsequently be used against us. This point was well taken and has, I think, largely defused a potential area of difficulty. Overall, however, there is no doubt that the Americans remain sensitive about Iran. McFarlane warned that President Reagan is particularly concerned about Iranian state-sponsored terrorism. They will be in touch with us about this.

Potential Problem Areas

9. Although the area of agreement is considerable, potential problems remain:

(i) I suspect that, in any crisis, American impatience will get the better of them. We must therefore expect to be faced with pressure for military action before we might ourselves believe this is justified. Weinberger in particular is hawkish. Despite their assurances, we must live with the possibility that they will act first and consult afterwards - or at least at the last minute.

/(ii)

(ii) The problem over rules of engagement which we faced in Lebanon is likely to re-surface. Weinberger spoke in reassuring terms of a narrow interpretation of self-defence. But Shultz took the line that, in the event of, eg an air attack, the response should be at source.

(iii) The Americans may press for coordination to be taken to the extent of joint military planning. Weinberger is clearly keen on this.

(iv) The division between military precautionary measures (which they accept should be low-key) and deterrence remains a very grey area in American eyes. This may be more a question of semantics, given that the Americans accept that a high profile military build-up could be counter-productive. But I think we need to explore this further.

(v) American handling of the Arab/Israel dispute will not enhance their standing in the Gulf. There is insufficient awareness in Washington of the inter-relationship between the two issues, and the effect it is having on their credibility in the Gulf.

Conclusions

10. I believe that, following my talks, we and the Americans understand each other considerably better on this issue. The Cabinet decision on MCMs was well judged to impress our commitment on them. We can be reassured that they are not seeking to recover prestige lost in Lebanon with some ill-considered strike in the Gulf. They reacted well to our positive approach. Fears that we were out to play simply a blocking role have been dispelled.

11. We must expect our influence to be related closely in American eyes to the role we are prepared to play. But in assessing this, the Americans will take into account our diplomatic assets, and especially the fact that we have better relations with many of the Gulf States than they do, as well as our military contribution. Without over-emphasising what we can do, we can therefore have confidence that we have something to offer that the Administration will find of value. They are keen to carry forward the process of consultation. Equally, they will be looking to us to see that our present level of commitment is sustained and not just a flash in the pan.

12. There are opportunities here we should build on. The immediate need is for detailed talks at official level to

/analyse

analyse the various scenarios, and to agree together a range of possible diplomatic and military responses. While avoiding being drawn into joint military planning, it clearly makes sense to look closely now at who might do what. A team of officials will be coming to London for this purpose at the beginning of next month. We should match this with regular exchanges at political level by message and personal contact to ensure that we are kept fully abreast of policy thinking at the top. In this latter regard, there is no substitute for the personal touch. The boost given to our relations with the Administration by Bush's weekend at Chequers, to take one recent example, is quite remarkable.

13. Follow-up action will also be necessary in a number of other areas. We should:

(i) discuss further with the Americans the handling of the Gulf States;

(ii) coordinate our posture at the UN, including on the question of the UN Maritime Force (the Americans are chary of any UN involvement, though they recognise that if the war escalated, the Security Council will be bound to react);

(iii) make our own soundings about involving other interested parties;

(iv) follow up with the Americans on their rules of engagement;

(v) consider whether any further action in NATO is required;

(vi) consider whether we should talk ourselves to the Russians;

(vii) on the energy front, ensure the closest possible coordination. I will follow up with Peter Walker, whose own recent visit to Washington included detailed discussions on this aspect.

Richard Luce

Richard Luce

SECRET

24 JR

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 April 1984

DEPLOYMENT OF A MCM FORCE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your Secretary of State's minute of 28 March about the precautionary deployment, in view of the situation in the Gulf, of a MCM force to the Mediterranean.

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 April 1984

Iran/Iraq: Chemical Weapons

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 30 March and would like to be kept informed about the results of our efforts, together with those of other countries, to control the exports to Iran and Iraq of substances which might be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons.

I am copying this letter to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), and David Goodall (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

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23

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N. B. P. D.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

A. J. C. 3/4.

IRAQ/IRAN - CHEMICAL WEAPONS

I have studied the report by officials which was commissioned in response to your exchange of letters with Norman Tebbit on 23rd and 26th March.

2. The report makes it clear that unilateral action by the UK will not be fully effective and that it would represent something of a new departure in our licensing arrangements. Nevertheless, we are in an exposed position as a result of the Iranian allegations that we have assisted Iraq to develop a chemical warfare capability. Despite the action taken to refute these allegations they have gained currency and have given rise to some political criticism in this country. Now that the United Nations report has confirmed that chemical warfare has been used in the Gulf War and the United States has acted promptly to extend its own licensing controls, I believe that we must take similar action to ensure that our own national controls are as rigorous as possible. It would be extremely damaging in present circumstances if we were to allow any chemicals to be supplied to Iraq or Iran which could be used to develop or enhance either sides capability to wage chemical warfare.

3. I therefore agree that we should take the earliest possible action to extend our export licensing controls to cover supplies of the chemicals listed in the report to Iraq and Iran for an initial period of six months subject to review. We should also urgently seek the co-operation of the chemical industry in preventing Iran and Iraq from obtaining supplies through third parties. These consultations should cover distributors as well as producers since I understand that Aldrich, the firm proposing to supply to Iran


the two chemicals of concern, does not manufacture these itself. I hope that action can be taken in good time to prevent these immediate shipments.

4. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
30th March 1984

IRAQ Pt 4

Internal Sit



3 APR 1984



SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 March 1984

Iran/Iraq: Chemical Weapons

Thank you for your letter of 26 March drawing our attention to two points raised by the Prime Minister concerning the proposed supply by the Aldridge Chemical Company to Iran of two chemicals (Chloroethanol and Thiodiglycol) used in the manufacture of mustard gas.

Since receipt of your letter, an FCO official has discussed the matter informally with the company concerned. As a result, I understand that the company have decided not to supply the Thiodiglycol. 700 kilos of the Chloroethanol (the material of lesser concern to us) had left for the shipping agent before we first learnt of the proposed supply and this is believed to be already on its way to Iran. However, we understand that the company will not now supply the remaining order of 300 kilos. We have indicated to them that these decisions are welcome.

On the question of wider action, DTI, MOD and FCO officials met on 27 and 28 March to consider the implications of extending export control to various chemicals used in the manufacture of mustard gas and tabun (the use of which in Iran the UN Team confirmed in their report published on 26 March). I enclose a copy of the report agreed by officials. The paper identifies the ingredients needed to manufacture those chemical weapons and it considers the merits of an extension of licensing to such chemicals.

The US Administration today instituted new licensing arrangements for exports to Iran and Iraq of five chemicals, including Thiodiglycol, which could be used to manufacture the chemical weapons being used by Iraq. The Americans are reviewing the whole issue of export licensing in this area and have said that further controls might be introduced. They have asked other governments to consider urgently the introduction of similar export controls.

/Sir Geoffrey

SECRET

Sir Geoffrey Howe raised the question of chemical exports with Mr Van Den Broek in Brussels on 27 March. The latter envisaged some difficulty in extending the list to control Dutch chemical exports. He agreed with the Secretary of State that any change would be less embarrassing if action were taken by a number of countries together, and that this should be carefully considered. I understand that this issue is being raised today by DTI officials in the Article 113 Committee in Brussels.

This Community approach is in line with the outcome of the brief discussion of the subject in Cabinet yesterday.

We are trying to arrange a discussion between FCO, DTI and MOD MInisters next week to review specific actions in the light of the agreed paper, which will be updated as necessary, and of the US action. This review should provide us with the basis for any further action in the Community context.

I am letting you have this in time for this weekend's box. I shall be showing this letter in parallel to the Secretary of State this evening.

I am copying this letter to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and David Goodall (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

020 Mr Coles

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Report by Officials

The UN Inspection Team has confirmed in a Report published on 26 March that both mustard gas and the nerve gas Tabun have been used in the Iran/Iraq war as chemical weapons. Concern has been expressed about a consignment of chloroethanol and thiodiglycol awaiting delivery from the UK to Iran since these chemicals can be used in the manufacture of mustard gas. The DTI has also learned separately about attempts to purchase on behalf of an unnamed Middle Eastern client substantial quantities of dimethylmethyl phosphonate which can be used to manufacture the nerve gas Sarin; the UK manufacturer has however refused to supply.

2. Following an exchange of minutes between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, officials were instructed to consider all the implications of an extension of the Export of Goods (Control) Order to cover the chemicals involved.

4. <u>"Mustard gas"</u> (dichlorodiethyl sulphide) can be manufactured through two chemical routes -

a) Ethylene + Hypochlorous acid = Chloroethanol
Chloroethanol + Sodium Sulphide = Thiodiglycol
Thiodiglycol + Hydrogen Chloride = "Mustard Gas"

b) Ethylene + Sulphur chloride = "Mustard Gas"
(but this produces a very unstable product).

Tabun can be manufactured through a single route

Phosphorous oxychloride + dimethylamine = intermediate(a
Intermediate (a) + sodium cyanide = intermediate(b)
Intermediate (b) + Ethanol = Tabun

Both "mustard gas" and Tabun are liquids which operate by skin contact or through breathing the vapour given off.

Sarin can be manufactured from dimethylmethyl phosphonate, but the process is complicated. The view of the MOD is that Iraq/Iran are capable of manufacturing Sarin only on a laboratory scale if at all.

The manufacture of mustard gas by route (a) and the manufacture of Tabun involve relatively easy chemical processing. Officials consider that these are likely to be the preferred routes used by Iran/Iraq. Controls on the ingredients for the manufacture of Sarin (which are in common industrial use) are not therefore further considered at this stage but will be kept under review.

4. The ingredients required for the manufacture of mustard gas and Tabun are in common use for a wide range of industrial applications (see Annex A) and are freely available throughout

the world. All the ingredients for the manufacture of tabun are produced in the UK and in many industrialised countries though the UK appears to be the sole W.European producer of Dimethylamine (see Annex B for W.European producers). In 1983 the UK exported £34m worth of ethanol and £12m worth of sodium cyanide to all destinations; lesser quantities of other ingredients were exported (see Annex C). Enquiries have not so far shown that the ingredients for the manufacture of mustard gas (chloroethanol and thiodiglycol) are manufactured in the UK, but there is substantial production capacity in W.Europe, the USA and the Soviet bloc. All these chemicals are traded internationally on a substantial scale.

5 The particular consignment of chloroethanol and thiodiglycol referred to in paragraph 1 is a re-export, and is awaiting despatch by the Aldrich Chemical Co via an intermediary to an end-user in Iran. The stated end user is the "Red Crescent" which claims that the end use is for crop spraying, but there is considerable doubt about the validity of this claim. The intermediary is a firm of international traders, two of whose members are known to have been involved in illegal exports of nuclear materials to Pakistan. The Aldrich Chemical Co is a UK subsidiary of a US corporation and operates here as a distributor of its parent's products. The company have been advised of the Government's concern about these chemicals and only some of the chloroethanol has left the UK. We do not yet know whether the US administration intends to ban the export of these chemicals from the US (see below para 10).

Export Licensing Control

6 Controls on the export of certain goods are provided for in the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1981 (as amended) made under the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939. Orders made under the Act are not subject to Parliamentary approval, and can be brought into force with immediate effect if need be. The 1981 Order provides that listed goods may not be exported without a licence issued by the Secretary of State. The export licensing system is operated by the Department of Trade and Industry in consultation with MOD, FCO and other Departments. Current controls cover industrial goods of strategic concern (in accordan with COCOM requirements), nuclear materials and equipment; works of art and antiques (national heritage protection); steel to the US and scrap metals (both under EC requirements); live cattle, sheep and pigs (from Northern Ireland); aircraft, arms and military equipment etc; and certain items of human rights concern.

7. A list of noxious chemicals, including mustard gas, is already subject to export licensing control to all destinations under the Export of Goods (Control) Order. Tabun however is not on the list because it is not in commercial production whereas mustard gas has a medical end use in small quantities. Given the ease with which Tabun can be manufactured from commonly available chemicals its omission from the

Export Control Order should be reviewed in slower time.

8. Licensing control could be introduced for

a) named destination countries (eg Iran/Iraq)

b) all destination countries

c) all destination countries except the EEC.

Controls which involved a restriction on intra-Community trade (ie (b) above) would arguably breach our EEC obligations and could be challenged, by any exporter affected, by an action for judicial review.

International action

9. In the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a total ban, applied world-wide, on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, the United Kingdom has submitted proposals for verification of non-production of chemical weapons in civilian chemical industries. This verification would be one aspect of the comprehensive routine international on-site inspection being sought by us and our Allies. The negotiations on such a ban are unlikely to be completed this year, thus ruling out this element of multilateral action on non-production for the immediate future.

10. The UK approach on non-production envisages varying degree of verification (ranging from on-site inspection to the availability of production data) for a variety of chemicals ranging from high risk chemicals, which could be used only as chemical weapons, down to medium/low risk chemicals which have industrial end-uses but which could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons.

11. The US Administration informed the Washington Embassy on March 27th that they intend to control with effect from 30 March the export of anhydrous potassium fluoride which is used in the manufacture of Sarin. They also intend to take similar action with respect to the export of certain other chemicals which can be used to manufacture Tabun though we do not know at this stage which chemicals they have in mind. The US say that their action will be limited initially to direct exports from the US to Iran and Iraq - ie they are not proposing to exercise at this stage extra-territorial powers on re-exports. The controls are stated to have effect initially for 180 days. The Embassy have been informed that the UK will be asked to take parallel action. We have no information on action contemplated by the French or West German authorities. We have made recent representations to the Dutch about exports of Thiodiglycol and certain other chemicals from the Netherlands to Iraq which had come to our notice. We have not yet had a response.

Possible UK Action

12. The UK is not in a position to influence the supply of ingredients to manufacture mustard gas and Tabun to any significant extent by unilateral action. As noted above the UK does not appear to manufacture thiodiglycol and choloroethanol, and any unilateral control would thus affect only transit traffic or imports surplus to UK industrial requirements. Given the widespread availability of the ingredients for Tabun unilateral control could have only very limited effect on the ability of Iran/Iraq to secure supplies.

13. The inclusion of these ingredients in an Export of Goods (Control) Order would carry significant political impact. It would enable the Government to state, as they have in the past, that the UK is not involved in the supply of chemical weapons. It would also re-emphasise our rebuttal of Iranian claims that the UK has supplied such weapons to Iraq. Early action would strengthen our hand in seeking, with the Americans, international co-operation to impose temporary controls on relevant exports to those countries. In the absence of concerted international action the development of such weapons in Iraq and Iran could continue. But that in itself has not prevented the Government in the past from taking actions which it believes are in the country's best interests.

14. There are however major arguments of principle and practice against imposing unilateral export controls on these ingredients:-

a) a control on the export of goods whose normal end-uses are wholly innocent taken individually, but which could conceivably be misused in combination, other than on the basis of international agreement, would entail a significant departure from current export control policy, and would lay the Government open to pressure for control on wide and unpredictable range of goods particularly chemicals;

b) licensing control limited to direct exports to Iran/Iraq of ingredients for chemical weapons would be open to criticism on the grounds that on this limited basis it would be clearly open to evasion by directing orders through third countries. Pressure to extend licensing control on this basis to all destinations could therefore be expected. However, if other major suppliers are not prepared to control exports, any such extension would be no more effective than licensing control limited to Iran/Iraq;

c) the Export Licensing system is already under heavy and increasing pressure as a result of COCOM controls. It has not been possible in the time available to assess

the impact of export licensing control but given the substantial quantities exported, the effect of licensing control extending beyond Iran/Iraq is likely to be significant. The potential expansion of the licensing system to new categories of goods would have unwelcome long term staffing implications.

15. If despite these objections Ministers conclude that some form of licensing control is required, then it should be on the following basis:-

a) limited to Iran and Iraq (provided such control were even handed it would be unlikely to have any adverse effect on our trade to Iran/Iraq);

b) limited in time - say for six months in parallel with US controls - and to be reviewed in the light of action by other supplying countries;

c) limited to phosphorous oxychloride and dimethylamine. (Dimethylamine because the UK appears to be the only W. European supplier; phosphorous oxychloride because it would not impose any significant licensing burden). Ethanol and sodium cyanide would not be covered in view of the large quantities being traded internationally. Although the US do not apparently intend to control exports of chloroethanol and thiodiglycol, these should also be included in any Order.

16. Whether or not export licensing control is introduced an informal approach should be made to the UK manufacturers of chemical ingredients for manufacturing Tabun to warn them of Middle East interest in acquiring these chemicals, and to seek their co-operation in avoiding as far as possible supply to non-bona-fide purchasers. A meeting between the leading chemical manufacturers and officials is to take place on April 5 to discuss the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. This occasion could be used to enlist their co-operation. It would be desirable to extend such an arrangement as far as practicable to include exporters.

17. The UK should also take the occasion offered by the Article 113 Committee (Full Members) meeting in Brussels on 30 March to raise the question informally, of preventing the export of ingredients for manufacturing Tabun and mustard gas to Iran/Iraq with a view to securing early co-operation by other EC members.

CONCLUSIONS

18. a) Action by the UK alone will not be effective in preventing Iran or Iraq acquiring or enhancing their CW capability. But given the allegations against the UK already made by Iran and the action now about to be taken by the US there are strong arguments for tightening our own controls if these could be made effective;

b) however, the imposition of licensing control in this case in the absence of international agreement would entail a major departure from current export licensing policy. World-wide export controls would hamper a considerable volume of legitimate civil trade and pose a further burden on hard pressed export licensing staff. Unilateral controls limited to Iran and Iraq would not be fully effective unless backed by parallel action by other producing countries but would nevertheless carry considerable political impact;

c) if Ministers decide to go for export controls these should be limited to Iran/Iraq; limited to 6 months initially subject to review, and on a limited range of chemicals as proposed in para 15;

d) whether or not export licensing controls are introduced an approach should be made to UK manufacturers to enlist their support in preventing supplies reaching non-bona-fide purchasers. If such an arrangement could be publicised it would have considerable presentational value;

e) action towards the shipments of chloroethanol and thiodiglycol by Aldrich should follow the decision on export controls. If no controls are instituted an informal approach should be made to persuade Aldrich not to ship.

f) An early approach should be made to our EC partners to enlist their support in following whichever course Ministers decide upon.

Department of Trade and Industry

28 March 1984

Principal End Uses of Certain Chemicals

A Phosphorous oxychloride (phosphoryl chloride)

Manufacture of cyclic and acyclic esters for plasticisers, fuel additives, hydraulic fluids, and organophosphorus compounds; chlorinating agent and catalyst; dopant for semiconductor grade silicon; tricresyl phosphate and fire retarding agents.

B Dimethylamine

Acid gas absorbent; solvent; antioxidants; mfg. of dimethylformamide and dimethylacetamide; dyes; flotation agent; fuel stabilizers; pharmaceuticals; textile chemicals; rubber accelerators; electroplating; dehairing agent; missile fuels; pesticide propellant; rocket propellants; surfactants.

C Sodium cyanide

Extraction of gold and silver from ores; electroplating; heat treatment of metals; hydrocyanic acid; insecticide; cleaning metals; fumigation; dyes and pigments; nylon intermediates; chelating compounds; ore flotation.

D Ethanol

Solvent; extraction medium, mfg. of acetaldehyde, acetic acid, ethylene, butadiene, dyes, pharmaceuticals, elastomers, detergents, cleaning preparations, surface coatings, cosmetics, explosives; antifreeze; beverages; antisepsis; gasohol.

E Chlorobenzene

Manufacture of phenol, chloronitrobenzene, aniline; solvent; pesticide intermediate; heat transfer agent.

F Chloro-ethanol (Ethylene Chlorohydrin) is used as a solvent for cellulose acetate and ethyl cellulose in film production; can be used as an intermediate in the production of ethylene oxide and ethylene glycol, both of which are commodity chemicals; in organic syntheses; in the production of certain insecticides and also to activate sprouting in dormant potatoes.

G Thiodiethanol (Thiodiglycol) is used as a chemical intermediate for some specialised antioxidants; in organic syntheses; and as a specialised solvent in textile printing.

Principal Western European Producers of Certain Chemicals

A. Phosphorous oxychloride

UK	Albright and Wilson
France	PCUK
	Rhone - Poulenc
W. Germany	Hoechst
	Preussag

B. Dimethylamine

UK	ICI

C. Sodium cyanide

UK	W R Grace
	ICI
	Monsanto
Belgium	Degussa
France	Rhone-Poulenc
W.Germany	Degussa
	BASF
Italy	Montedison
Netherlands	Dutch State Mines
Spain	E and I Aragonesas

D. Ethanol

UK	BP Chemicals Ltd
France	SODES
Germany	C W Huls
	Erdochemie
Netherlands	Akzo

F. Chlorobenzene

UK	ICI
France	PCUK
	Rhone-Poulenc
W.Germany	Bayer
	Hoechst
Italy	Rumianca
Spain	F B de Colorantes
	CROS
	Ugimica

		1981	1982	1983
Total UK exports				
- ethanol	[2208.1035]	25,000	189,000	836,000
	[2208.3035]	20,944,000	24,438,000	34,310,000
- sodium cyanide	[2843.2100]	9,459,000	9,843,000	12,379,000
- phosphorous oxychloride	[inc in 2814.4100]	81,000	89,000	78,000
- dimethylamine	[inc in 2922.1100]	1,110,000	1,860,000	2,494,000
- Chloro benzene	[2902.9100]	15,000	60,000	41,000
UK exports to Iran				
- ethanol	[2208.1035]	-	-	-
	[2208.3035]	3,000	2,000	14,000
- sodium cyanide	[2843.2100]	18,000	-	-
- phosphorous oxychloride	[inc in 2814.4100]	-	-	-
- dimethylamine	[inc in 2922.1100]	-	-	-
- chloro benzene	[2902.9100]	-	-	-
UK exports to Iraq				
- ethanol	[2208.1035]	-	-	-
	[2208.3035]	19,000	3,000	-
- sodium cyanide	[2843.2100]	-	-	37,000
- phosphorous oxychloride	[inc in 2814.4100]	-	-	-
- dimethylamine	[inc in 2922.1100]	-	-	424
- chloro benzene	[2902.9100]	-	-	-


30 MAR 1984

GPS 450
UNCLASSIFIED
FROM WASHINGTON 302302Z MAR 84.
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1075 OF 30 MARCH
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, UKMIS GENEVA,
PARIS, BONN, DTI, MODUK.

1. SUMMARY. PRESS REPORTS OF INTELLIGENCE ON GROWING IRAQI CAPABILITY. ALLEGED DISCUSSION OF PRE-EMPTIVE AIR ATTACK, POSSIBLY BY THE ISRAELI'S. STATE DEPARTMENT DENIALS. PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY A GERMAN COMPANY.

IRAN/IRAQ: CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

2. DETAIL. AN ARTICLE BY HERSH IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES, QUOTING US OFFICIALS, CLAIMS THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE INTELLIGENCE THAT IRAQ HAS UP TO FIVE DISPERSED SITES FOR THE STORAGE PRODUCTION AND ASSEMBLY OF NERVE GAS WEAPONS. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN ASKED TO EXAMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF AN AMERICAN AIR STRIKE ON THESE SITES. ONE OFFICIAL IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THERE WERE MANY IN THE US GOVERNMENT WHO WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE ATTACK THEM AND THAT THE POSSIBILITY HAD ALREADY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SENSITIVE HIGH LEVEL TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS.

3. OFFICIALS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT, WITHOUT IINTERVENTION IRAQ IS ESTIMATED TO BE WEEKS OR MONTHS AWAY FROM THE CAPACITY TO MOUNT MAJOR CHEMICAL ATTACKS. CASEY IS CREDITED WITH HAVING DRAWN THE ISSUE FIRMLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL ATTENTION.

4. THE ARTICLE ALSO CLAIMS THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE INTELLIGENCE THAT IRAQ HAS BOUGHT SOPHISTICATED LABORATORY EQUIPMENT, TO BE SUDED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NERVE GAS, FROM THE WEST GERMAN COMPANY, KARL KOLB, AND THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE LOW LEVEL REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT THIS TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. GERMAN OFFICIALS ARE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT A PESTICIDE PLANT HAD BEEN SOLD TO IRAQ BY THE KOLB COMPANY, BUT A SPOKESMAN FOR THE COMPANY DENIED THIS.

7 5

5. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WAS CLOSELY QUESTIONED ABOUT THIS AT TODAY'S PRESS CONFERENCE. HE CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD CONSIDERED ATTACKING IRAQI PLANTS OR DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT CONDONE ANY SUCH ACTION BY THE ISRAELIS. HE CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONTACT WITH BONN OVER EXPORTS TO IRAQ. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE CONFIDENT THAT THE GERMANS WERE TAKING ALL NECESSARY MEASURES. HE REFERRED FURTHER QUESTIONS TO THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES. AFTER REHEARSING US EFFORTS, INCLUDING DIRECT APPROACHES TO THE IRAQIS AND THE IMPOSITION OF EXPORT CONTROLS, TO PREVENT THE IRAQIS USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE FOCUS SHOULD NOT BE ENTIRELY ON THIS ISSUE TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF LIVES WHICH HAD BEEN LOST BECUASE OF THE IRANIAN REGIME'S EFFORTS TO EXPORT ITS REVOLUTION.

WRIGHT

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD

MED
NENAD
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IRAN/IRAQ

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TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 95 OF 28 MARCH

AND TO IMMEDIATE DUBAI

RFI IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, BIS TEHRAN, JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, MUSCAT

RFI PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL OECD, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO

IRAQI ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING

1. IRAQ CLAIMED YESTERDAY TO HAVE ATTACKED TWO 'NAVAL TARGETS' SOUTH-EAST OF KHARG ISLAND USING SUPER ETENDARD AIRCRAFT. FROM SHIPPING AND OIL SOURCES, WE UNDERSTAND THAT ONE VESSEL WAS THE GREEK-REGISTERED SILIKON L, OWNED BY GP LIVANOS, CARRYING A CARGO OF FUEL OIL FROM KUWAIT TO SICILY. ACCORDING TO THE OWNERS, SHE WAS HIT OUTSIDE (REPEAT OUTSIDE) THE MEZ, OFF RAS TANURA. SHE WAS HIT BY A MISSILE WHICH STRUCK THREE FEET ABOVE THE WATERLINE, AND MADE A 50 CENTIMETRE HOLE BUT APPARENTLY FAILED TO EXPLODE. THE SHIP IS BELIEVED TO BE PUTTING INTO DUBAI OR FUJAIRAH FOR REPAIRS, AND DUBAI MAY BE ABLE TO PICK UP FURTHER INFORMATION LOCALLY.

2. THE SECOND SHIP HIT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN AN ARAMCO WORKBOAT SUPPLYING THE MARJAN FIELD, ALSO PRESUMABLY OUTSIDE THE MEZ. WE HAVE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT A THIRD SHIP (TYPE AND NATIONALITY UNKNOWN) WAS ATTACKED AND HIT TODAY.

3. ACCORDING TO BP, ESSO HAVE ADVISED THEIR OWN TANKERS NOT (NOT) TO GO INTO THE GULF FOR THE TIME BEING, AND ARE TELLING OWNERS OF TANKERS CHARTERED TO THEM THAT THE DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO ENTER THE GULF IS UP TO THEM. BP AND SHELL HAVE NOT AS YET TAKEN ANY ACTION IN RESPECT OF THEIR OWN SHIPS. SPOT OIL PRICES AND INSURANCE RATES HAVE NOT YET CHANGED, BUT ARE LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED IF ATTACKS, OR RUMOURS OF ATTACKS PERSIST.

4. GRATEFUL FOR ANY FURTHER INFORMATION YOU OR INFORMATION ADDRESSEES CAN PROVIDE. BY ATTACKING SHIPS OPERATING FROM KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA, THE IRAQIS SEEM TO HAVE SCORED TWO SPECTACULAR OWN GOALS. THIS OUGHT TO INTENSIFY PRESSURES ON THEM FROM OTHER ARAB STATES NOT TO DO ANYTHING FURTHER WHICH MAY ESCALATE THE WAR, BUT WE WOULD NOT (NOT) BET ON THIS.

HOWE

IRAN/IRAQ

STANDARD

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IRAN/IRAQ

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21A

Prime Minister.

MO 3/9/4/2

A.J.C. 3/4.

PRIME MINISTER

DEPLOYMENT OF A MCM FORCE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN

Following our decision in Cabinet to send a MCM force to the Mediterranean as a precautionary deployment in view of the situation in the Gulf I thought you would like to know the latest plans for the movements of the group.

2. The four MCMVs will leave their UK ports (Rosyth and Portsmouth) on 26th March and will arrive at Gibraltar on 31st March - 1st April. A support ship (OIL ENDEAVOUR) has been taken up from trade and is now being converted at Rosyth. If this proceeds smoothly she should be ready to leave the UK about 31st March and arrive at Gibraltar about 6th April.

3. If the situation in the Gulf deteriorates the ships can proceed directly through the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean. At the moment this does not appear to be necessary and the current plan is that the complete force will leave Gibraltar on 14th/15th April. This time at Gibraltar will enable the ships to carry out essential work on completing the storing and maintenance of the ships, following a relatively hurried departure from the UK, and weapons testing on the range at Gibraltar. It will also enable the force to exercise together for the first time. I am sure this period is essential at the start of what may be a long deployment. Unless the force is sent to the Gulf the next major event in their programme will be participation in the NATO MCM exercise off Sicily from 1st - 16th May which is, as you know, the cover story for the despatch of the force. From 15th April to 1st May the force will sail to the Eastern Mediterranean and, subject to Foreign Office views, will possibly pay a short visit to Crete.

4. We can consider the movements of the force after the end of the NATO exercise nearer the time, taking account of the situation in the Gulf.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Secretary of State for Trade, Secretary of State for Energy, Secretary of State for Transport and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
28th March 1984

2 APR 1964



(2)

CC PC

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET
Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215 5422
GTN 215) .....
(Switchboard) 215 7877

21

JU62
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

26 March 1984

SECRET

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

Already reply to my letter of today's date.
A.J.C. 26/3
p.a.

D Geoffrey,

IRAQ/IRAN : CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Thank you for your minute of 23 March.

2 The potential use of mustard gas in the Iran/Iraq conflict is a most worrying development and I agree that we should consider carefully what our response should be. However, we do not yet have sufficient facts upon which to base a decision and we need to consider fully the implications of the various courses of action open to us as well as in particular the actions which other countries are prepared to take.

3 I therefore agree that officials should meet early this week to consider the matter. Steps are already in hand to convene a meeting tomorrow morning. However, I would be most reluctant to extend export licensing control to goods whose end uses are wholly innocent, but which could conceivably be misused in one way or another. If we were to accept the possibility of misuse as a criterion for licensing control there would be no end to the list of items which one pressure group or another could legitimately argue should be added to the list.

4 I do not think there are sufficient grounds for interfering at this stage with the shipment of Thiodiglycol. (I understand that the shipment of Chloro ethanol left the UK on Saturday). The question whether the export of these chemicals should be controlled has yet to be addressed, and as you say we do not know for sure that Iran has ordered these chemicals in order to make mustard gas and the quantities involved are not large enough for immediate operational requirements.

5 I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister to the Secretary of State for Defence.

Yours Norman

NORMAN TEBBIT

SECRET

IRAQ pt 4

Internal Sit

26 MAR 1984

SECRET

20 5

Pic

be Sir P Cradock

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 March 1984

Iraq/Iran: Chemical Weapons

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 23 March to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry about the proposed supply by the Aldrich Chemical Company to Iran of two chemicals which can be used in the manufacture of mustard gas.

The Prime Minister has asked whether we can be certain that this firm will not export the chemicals by the time the meeting proposed by Sir Geoffrey Howe is arranged. She has further asked whether if the firm does export the chemicals, an Order would prevent actual delivery to Iran.

You will doubtless be seeking to establish, through the proposed informal approaches to the company, what its precise intentions are.

I should be grateful for comments from you or from Callum McCarthy as soon as possible, today

I am copying this letter to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

Iran/Iraq Relats SECRET

19

cc Sir P. Cradock

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 March 1984

Iran/Iraq War: Mr. Luce's Visit to the United States

The Prime Minister has seen Washington telegram no. 986 of 23 March.

With regard to paragraph 5, Mrs. Thatcher has made two comments. Sir Oliver Wright states that in the US view, if the President is forced to take action in the Gulf, such action would have to be decisive. The Prime Minister has observed this decisive action may in the event not be possible.

Secondly, she has noted Sir Oliver Wright's statement that the US would seek to avoid the commitment of ground forces, there being no support for a land commitment. On this Mrs. Thatcher has observed that air and sea action by the United States could mean that the Gulf States would suffer a land attack.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Peter Ricketts Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

18

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Mike Nicholls.

A.J.C. 20/3.

FCS/84/89

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Are we certain that the firm will not export these chemicals by the time the meeting is arranged? If so can an order stop the delivery to Iran? no

Iraq/Iran: Chemical Weapons

1. We learned yesterday of the proposed supply by a British firm (Aldrich Chemical Co Ltd) to Iran of two chemicals which can be used in the manufacture of mustard gas. Although the quantities involved are not large enough for immediate operational requirements, they may well be intended for Iranian research into the production of chemical weapons.

2. The two chemicals concerned are thiodiglycol, used extensively in the textile printing and dyeing industry, and chloro-ethanol, a chemical intermediary in the formation of thiodiglycol. Thiodiglycol, combined with hydrochloric acid or similar compound produces mustard gas, in a stable and controlled way.

3. I understand that neither thiodiglycol nor chloro-ethanol are subject to licensing under the Export of Goods Control Order; that there would be difficulties in making them subject to licensing under the Export of Goods Control Order, given that the normal end-use of these chemicals is industrial rather than military; and that any licensing arrangement would need to be extended across the board rather than applied only in the case of Iran (or Iraq).

/4.

4. It seems to me we have three options:

(i) to make informal approaches to the British company with the aim of persuading them to delay or cancel this shipment. I know that our officials are in touch direct on this, but any action must be taken very quickly if there is to be any hope of stopping this shipment. I would hope that your officials could take the lead on this with the company;

(ii) to act immediately to bring the two chemicals within the scope of the Export of Goods Control Order;

(iii) to arrange an inter-departmental meeting of officials very early next week to consider all the implications of an extension of the Export of Goods Control Order.

5. There are good grounds for early action. We have condemned the use of chemical weapons throughout the world and we should, as a matter of principle, do all we can to discourage their proliferation. The UK has played a leading role in promoting a ban on chemical weapons at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and public disclosure of this shipment could undermine our position. Of more immediate concern, we have been accused repeatedly by Iran of supplying chemical weapons to Iraq. We have not done so, and have worked hard to put the record straight in public. Publicity in the present case would lead many in the Arab world to suspect that we were acquiescing in the supply of chemical weapons to Iraq instead.

/6.

6. On the other hand, I have some doubts about precipitate action to extend the Export of Goods Control Order. We do not know for sure that Iran has ordered these chemicals in order to make mustard gas. Given that the chemicals concerned may be widely used, there could be considerable administrative problems in including them under the Order. I am also struck by the fact that other major Western countries do not seem to be moving quickly to impose their own ban. I understand that the Americans have set up an inter-agency body to review the list of chemicals which migt be made subject to licensing if it was established that they could be used in the Gulf war. This does not suggest that they will be acting overnight. We have drawn the attention of the Dutch authorities to secret reports of supplies by Dutch chemical companies to Iraq. We have not had any reports to suggest that they have acted swiftly to impose controls.

7. In the circumstances, my inclination would be to adopt the approach in para 4(iii) above, as well as pressing ahead urgently with the informal contacts to discourage this particular shipment suggested in para 4(i) above. If informal approaches fail to stop this shipment - and more particularly if the result of our enquiries confirms our fears about the purpose of the order - we might need to move quickly to amend the Export of Goods Control Order, all the more so if we get wind of further shipments). Early inter-departmental consideration of the issues involved would put us in a better position to do so.

/8.

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Visit by the Iraqi Minister of Trade

IRAQ

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April 1981

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~~28.4.81~~							
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 November 1985

Dear Rathbew,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE IRAQI MINISTER OF TRADE

The Prime Minister received the Iraqi Minister of Trade for a meeting this morning. Mr. Hassan Ali was accompanied by the Iraqi Ambassador. Mr. Channon was also present.

The Prime Minister recalled with pleasure her earlier meeting with Mr. Hassan Ali which she remembered (according to the brief) as being in 1983. Mr. Hassan Ali was firm that it had been in 1981. He conveyed to the Prime Minister greetings from Saddam Hussein and from Deputy Prime Minister Ramadhan.

Trade Relations

Mr. Hassan Ali said that the Iraqi Government was well satisfied with the development of trade and economic relations between Iraq and the United Kingdom. These had expanded greatly in recent years. He was particularly grateful for the credit facilities which had been extended to Iraq. His Government wished to see British companies more active in Iraq.

The Prime Minister enquired how the recent meeting of the Joint Commission had gone. Mr. Hassan Ali said that he and Mr. Channon had yesterday signed the agreed minutes. The British side had been very co-operative and good results had been achieved which would further expand the volume of commercial and economic relations. These relations were now satisfactory for both sides. He hoped that political relations could be raised to the same level.

Iran/Iraq

The Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom was distressed by the continuing conflict between Iran and Iraq. We were not supplying equipment to Iran which would be any help in its war effort. Mr. Hassan Ali said that he did not need to explain Iraq's position in detail. Iraq was working hard for a peaceful settlement through the United Nations and other international organisations and had found increasing understanding for its position from the United

SHJ

States and the Soviet Union. He believed that this tacit understanding could help in ending the war. He would like to see Europe have a better appreciation of the war situation and give more positive support to Iraq's position. This would help the peace prospects.

Mr. Hassan Ali continued that he was frequently told that many countries were not exporting weapons to Iran but this was not borne out by the facts. He acknowledged that Iran might in some cases be obtaining weapons from companies without the knowledge of Governments. But he felt that if Governments issued appropriate directions the supply of weapons would dry up. The Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom had exercised an extremely tight control and cited a recent example where we had prohibited the supply of equipment to Iran because it might have a military use. We were very well aware of Iraq's point of view on this matter. Mr. Hassan Ali said that there was abundant evidence that Iran was preparing for a new offensive. Iraq was confident of its ability to repel this. An end to the war would benefit other countries including Britain because it would lead to greatly expanded trade. So he must repeat his hope that Britain and Europe would support Iraq's efforts to secure peace.

Arab/Israel

Mr. Hassan Ali said that Iraq supported the PLO as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. The PLO had to be involved in any discussions about a peace settlement. There could never be a reasonable solution of the Palestinian problem if the PLO were excluded. For this reason, Iraq had supported the February 11 Agreement between King Hussein and the PLO. He recognised that a number of PLO splinter groups and individuals had committed acts of terrorism. This was not desirable and could lead to conflict. Iraq welcomed the recent statement by Mr. Arafat in Cairo condemning terrorism.

The Prime Minister gave an account of the background to her offer to see a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation and the reasons why this had unfortunately foundered. The current wave of terrorist violence was a set back to efforts to open peace negotiations. We recognised that King Hussein must have an international framework for such negotiations. We were working with the United States and friendly Arab Governments to achieve such a framework.

Smith and Hagger

The Prime Minister raised the cases of Mr. Smith and Mr. Hagger. They had been found guilty by Iraqi courts and had already served substantial sentences. But they had not been guilty of terrorism or violence. She hoped that in view of the length of sentence they had already served, the Iraqi Government would exercise clemency. People in the United Kingdom found it hard to understand that such long sentences had been imposed for non-violent offences. It would do a great deal of good for relations between Britain

and Iraq if we were able to point to the release of the two men. She would be raising the question with the Iraqi Minister of External Relations the following week.

Mr. Hassan Ali said that Mr. Smith and Mr. Hagger had originally been sentenced to death and commutation to imprisonment was already a gesture by the Iraqi Government. Iraq had sought to discuss a possible exchange of Mr. Smith and Mr. Hagger for Iraqi prisoners in British gaols. But Iraq had been told that the judiciary were responsible for sentencing and that the British Government could not interfere in the course of justice. He would have to say that the same considerations applied in Iraq. If, however, it could be agreed that a joint solution should be found, Iraq was ready for discussions. The Prime Minister said that there was no equivalence whatsoever between murder and the technical offences for which Mr. Smith and Mr. Hagger had been convicted and there was no possible scope for the sort of bargain proposed by Mr. Hassan Ali. She found his response deeply disappointing.

I am copying this letter to Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

yours ever,

(Charles Powell)

Matthew Cocks, Esq.,
Department of Trade and Industry.

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH IRAQI MINISTER OF TRADE

You are seeing Mr. Hassan Ali briefly tomorrow. He will be accompanied by the Iraqi Ambassador. Mr. Channon will also be present.

Mr. Hassan Ali last called on you in October 1983. He is here this time for a meeting of the UK/Iraq Joint Commission.

You will want to ask Mr. Channon to report on the Joint Commission, and make some general remarks of encouragement about UK/Iraq trade (which is well up).

You will want to mention the Iran/Iraq war and repeat assurances that we are not supplying any arms to Iran.

It is very important that you mention the cases of Smith and Hagger. We must take every opportunity to press Iraq on them.

You are seeing the Iraqi Foreign Minister next week.

CDP

CHARLES POWELL
28 November 1985

EL3AST

Miss Marr will have to remain in to Work in Room

told J Quirk

10 DOWNING STREET

CDP

Meeting with Iraqi Minister of Trade
0930 Friday 29 November

John Quirk from British Overseas Board of Trade (212 3346) rang with the details of the party coming tomorrow morning. It will consist of:

His Excellency Hassan Ali

British Overseas Board of Trade Representative: Miss Jean Marr

Iraqi Ambassador: Dr Wahei

Interpreter: Miss Clair Kahtan

I have informed the Front Door of car details.

Amanda 28.11

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cc PC
BUP

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET
Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215) 5144
GTN 215)
(Switchboard) 215 7877

From the Minister for Trade

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

28 November 1985

CD 27/11

Dear Charles

CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY IRAQI MINISTER OF TRADE, MR HASSAN ALI: 29 NOVEMBER 1985

Following my letter of 18 November, I attach a brief and personality note for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Hassan Ali on 29 November 1985. Mr Channon is most grateful to the Prime Minister for her agreement to this meeting.

As I have confirmed to your diary secretary, Mr Channon will attend the meeting. Mr Hassan Ali understands some English but speaks very little, and he will therefore need to be accompanied by his interpreter, Miss M C Kahtan. The Iraqi Ambassador will also attend.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Peter Ricketts (FCO).

Yours sincerely

Matthew Cocks

MATTHEW COCKS
Private Secretary to the
Minister for Trade (Paul Channon)

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CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY IRAQI MINISTER OF TRADE, MR HASSAN ALI, 29 NOVEMBER 1985

OBJECTIVES

UK/Iraq Trade

To underline HMG's commitment to good trade relations with Iraq and support for British firms' efforts in Iraqi market.

Smith and Hagger

To impress on the Minister that relations with Iraq will continue to be hampered until the British prisoners (Smith and Hagger) are released.

POINTS TO MAKE

UK/Iraq Trade

Note with satisfaction good trade relations and 44 per cent increase in trade over last year. Hope Minister's visit and Joint Commission will reinforce them.

British firms have benefited from credits; hope these are also helping Iraq.

Despite conflict with Iran, note Iraq's continued economic development. What are priorities for coming year, how can UK firms play a part?

Smith and Hagger

Excellent progress in economic and political matters (especially Iraq's conflict with Iran) but British public and parliamentarians will continue to focus on this humanitarian issue. Sentences harsh. Hagger, an old (68) and foolish man; if not released he will die in Iraqi prison. Smith's sentence very much longer than

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would be given in UK for same offence. Has now served six years; this should be enough.

DEFENSIVE POINTS

Smith and Hagger

(If Mr Hassan Ali seeks to draw parallel with case of Iraqi terrorist Salem Hassan and to secure his release.) No parallel, Salem Hassan a terrorist; Iraqi policy same as ours; no support for international terrorism. Every Iraqi Minister and diplomat knows of the need to stand firm against political terrorism. No deal.

BACKGROUND

Prime Minister last met Mr Hassan Ali when he called on her in October 1983 with Mr Ramadhan, the First Deputy Prime Minister.

Trade

UK exports to Iraq £337m in Jan-Sept 1985; 44 per cent above last year. Trade relations are good. Strengthened by two tranches of ECGD medium term credit given in 1983 and 1984 and certain cash contracts switched to credit.

Aim in current Joint Commission is to delay offer of further new credit until more of 1984 allocation is taken up. Mr Channon will report outcome of Joint Commission.

Lord Jellicoe gained favourable impression of Iraq's ability to cope with war constraints when he visited Iraq recently and met Mr Ramadhan, Mr Hassan Ali and other Ministers.

Smith and Hagger

Prime Minister aware of general background of Smith and Hagger.

Recently Smith and Hagger cases have been re-examined in the light of the arrest in this country of three Iraqis who now await trial on charge of criminal arson. Possibility put to Home Office of Home Secretary exercising powers to deport Iraqis as lever to secure Smith and Hagger's release. Home Office are considering implications.

[They reach the conclusion nothing can be done].

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Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Office (Tariq Aziz) calling on Prime Minister of 4 December. Smith/Hagger issue will be major topic of discussion.

Mr Channon's meeting with Mr Hassan Ali

Mr Hassan Ali raised two main substantive points during his meeting with Mr Channon on Wednesday 27 November:

(a) his Government's desire that the UK should buy more Iraqi crude oil, to improve the trade balance in their favour;

(b) their desire that the UK should increase the availability of ECGD credit, in particular for medical goods.

Mr Channon replied that the UK was of course a substantial oil exporter, but that officials would examine both these points.

DTI
27 November 1985

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HASSAN 'ALI (NASSAR AL 'AMIRI)

Minister of Trade.

Member of RCC and Regional Leadership. Reconfirmed in both jobs at the ABSP 9th Regional Congress. 27 June 1982.

Born 1938 Baghdad. Shi'a. Graduate of Baghdad University (Political Economics) 1960. Diploma from Institute of Economic Development in Rome 1962. Imprisoned with Saddam Hussain (qv) under the 'Arif regime. Chairman of State Establishment for Spinning and Textile Industries 1971. Secretary-General of Federation of Arab Economists 1972. Member of National Front Secretariat 1972. Under-Secretary Ministry of Municipalities 1973. Head of Popular Organisations Bureau 1974. Member of Regional Leadership January 1974. Minister of Home Trade May 1976; member of tribunal that condemned 8 detainees to death after Shi'a riots, February 1977; Minister of Trade (on amalgamation of Home and Foreign Trade Ministries) March 1977; member of RCC September 1977. Vice-Chairman of Higher Agricultural Council and a member of the "Follow-up" Committee until their abolition in August 1979. Member of the Trade Regulations Board (since 1976). Member of the Special Tribunal set up after the conspiracy in July 1979. Secretary of the ABSP(I) Central Labour Office.

Received his present portfolio as a reward for his willingness to sit in judgement on his fellow Shi'a after the riots of February 1977, and appears to be a pliable henchman of Saddam Hussain. Occasionally brusque and dismissive in manner he is capable of coarse good humour. He has recently curbed, but not suppressed his predilection to political rhetoric in private conversation. His personal loyalty to Saddam Hussain is thought to be very great (they have been together since the 1950s. both in Cairo. and in prison under 'Anf), though some see him as a possible successor.

At one stage thought not to be well disposed towards Britain (partly because we refused him a visa in 1974). He made this evident to Lord George Brown in September 1979 but thereafter the matter seems to have been forgotten and he now appears well disposed towards the UK. He is an attentive and affable host (to Minister and Secretary of State for Trade in October and November 1979, again to Mr Biffen in October 1981 and to Mr Channon in November 1984). Paid a successful visit to the UK in June 1981. Visited London again in October 1983, for the UK/Iraq Joint Commission meeting, and to accompany Taha Yasin Ramadhan (qv). Tough, unpolished and hard-working. Hassan Ali is increasingly a figure of influence.

Understands some English but speaks very little and prefers to use an interpreter.

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CCPC

CABINET OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AS

Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

Tel No: 233 3299
7471

20 November 1985

Matthew Cocks Esq
Private Secretary to the Minister
for Trade
Department of Trade and Industry
1-19 Victoria Street
LONDON
SW1H 0ET

CDP
20/XI

Dear Matthew,

VISIT OF HASSAN ALI, IRAQI TRADE MINISTER, WEEK BEGINNING 25 NOVEMBER

Thank you for the copy of your letter of 18 November to Charles Powell.

The Chancellor of the Duchy is content to receive Mr Hassan Ali for a short courtesy call on the afternoon of 28 November. Our diary secretary will be in touch to arrange details. I should be grateful if you could let me have briefing for the Chancellor for this engagement, to be with this office on Tuesday 26 November.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10), Peter Ricketts (FCO) and David Morris (Lord Privy Seal's Office).

Yours ever,

Andrew Lansley

ANDREW LANSLEY
Private Secretary

Visit by Iraqi Minister of Trade
: IRAQ April '81.



CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

cc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 November, 1985

VISIT OF HASSAN ALI

Thank you for your letter of 18 November about the visit of Hassan Ali.

The Prime Minister agrees to see Mr. Hassan Ali for fifteen minutes at 0930 hrs on 29 November. This is the only time available in her diary and we can offer no alternative. You should be aware that the Prime Minister will use the meeting to raise the cases of Mr. Smith and Mr. Hagger, and you will wish to ensure that this is fully covered in the briefing, which should reach us by 1600 hrs on 28 November.

I am copying this letter to Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

(C.D. Powell)

M. Cocks, Esq.,
Department of Trade and Industry.

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9.30/or 29

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(1)

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET
Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215) 5144
GTN 215)
(Switchboard) 215 7877

From the Minister for Trade

Prime Minister
This is a bore.
But quite a lot of trade could hang on it: and you could raise Smith & Hagger.
Agree to find him 15 minutes?
CDP 18/11

9.30-9.45 Tue 29 Nov

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

18 November 1985

Dear Charles

VISIT OF HASSAN ALI, IRAQI TRADE MINISTER, WEEK BEGINNING 25 NOVEMBER

Mr Hassan Ali, the Iraqi Trade Minister, is visiting London as co-chairman of the UK/Iraq Joint Commission and has asked for calls on the Prime Minister, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Mr Biffen and Mr Tebbit as well as Mr Brittan (Mr Channon as UK co-chairman will be his host).

Mr Hassan Ali has met the Prime Minister twice before on visits to London, in June 1981 when he came to sign the UK Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation, and again in 1983 when he called on her with Mr Ramadhan, the First Deputy Prime Minister. Mr Hassan Ali has met Sir Geoffrey Howe in the UK previously, and knows Mr Biffen, who signed the Agreement establishing the Joint Commission and was the first UK co-chairman with Mr Hassan Ali. He would like to meet Mr Tebbit because he did not have the opportunity to do so when he was Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (he is aware that Mr Tebbit is Chairman of the Conservative Party).

As a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, Hassan Ali is a leading figure in the Iraqi Government. Like all senior Iraqis he sets great store by the level at which he is received on overseas visits. During Lord Jellicoe's recent call on him in Baghdad he underlined the importance which he personally attaches to renewing his acquaintance with the Prime Minister during his forthcoming visit and hinted that disappointment would not help bilateral commercial relations - which have improved over the past two years following the provision of successive tranches in medium term credit. Our Ambassador in Baghdad recommends in favour of a brief courtesy call; Lord Jellicoe strongly supports that recommendation.

Mr Brittan is aware that the Prime Minister has agreed to see Tariq Assiz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, on 4 December and recognises that she might be reluctant to spare time to receive a call from a more junior Iraqi Minister a few days earlier. He feels, however,

L02ACE

Charles Powell Esq November 1985

that Hassan Ali, by virtue of his office as Minister of Trade and role of co-chairman of the Joint Commission, could if disappointed use his influence to the disadvantage of British exporters. UK exports to Iraq, most of them to the public sector, are running at an annual rate of £450m and are up 45% in the first nine months of 1985 - well above the trend for the Middle East and worldwide. Mr Brittan is most anxious to encourage this favourable trend and not to jeopardise the good bilateral relations painstakingly built up in the past four years. He would, therefore, be extremely grateful if the Prime Minister could find time to receive a brief courtesy call from Hassan Ali lasting no more than 15 minutes, which would give him much personal satisfaction and protect our important and growing commercial interests in Iraq. The substance of the discussion could be confined to economic matters and need not anticipate the subsequent discussion with the Foreign Minister on wider political questions. The main purpose would be to welcome progress in trade relations, to underline the importance of payments being made on time, and to indicate our general willingness to provide further credit without making any specific commitment.

Mr Brittan would also be grateful if the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Lord Privy Seal could spare a few minutes to receive brief courtesy calls from Hassan Ali, which would help to maintain the good relations from which UK exporters could continue to benefit.

Mr Hassan Ali is, at present, expected to arrive in the UK about midday on Tuesday 26 November and to leave on Friday 29 November. He would be available to call on Ministers on the morning of 27 November and at any time other than late morning on 28 November. If the Prime Minister and the other Ministers concerned are willing to receive him, perhaps you and their Private Offices would suggest convenient times so that we may finalise a programme.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Lord Privy Seal.

Yours

Matthew Cocks

MATTHEW COCKS
Private Secretary to the
Minister for Trade (Paul Channon)

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999-49



E. R.

postponed indefinitely

1. MR COLES A.S.C 21/2

2. CONFIDENTIAL FILING

DR 1/3

VISIT TO LONDON BY THE
IRAQI TRADE MINISTER
MR. HASSAN ALI
WEDNESDAY 2 MARCH

The visit has been postponed. But he may come with the Deputy Prime Minister the following week.

C.J.

21 February 1983

Iraqi

Iraq

RSA

File

Done

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 January 1983

VISITS OF IRAQI MINISTERS

Thank you for your letter of 20 January about the visit by the Iraqi Trade Minister. The Prime Minister would be glad to see Mr. Hassan Ali at 0930 hours on 2 March (for 30 minutes).

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), David Edmonds (Department of the Environment) and David Heyhoe (Lord President's Office).

A. J. COLES

John Rhodes, Esq.,
Department of Trade

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE 1 VICTORIA STREET LONDON SW1H 0ET Telephone 01-215 7877

(930 on 2 March).

Prime Minister

Can we try to find 30 minutes for the Iraqi Trade Minister in the first two days of March?

A. J. C. 24/1

From the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London
SW1

20 January 1983

Dear John,

VISITS OF IRAQI MINISTERS

The Secretary of State very much welcomed the Prime Minister's agreement to meet and host a lunch for the Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Ramadhan, when he visits this country in the second half of February.

Our exports to Iraq are likely to total about £800 million last year. It is a country where the award of any contracts of significance are very strongly influenced by political considerations. The Prime Minister's hospitality will be of great assistance in sustaining and improving our export effort.

A similar, if smaller, problem applies to the visit of the Iraqi Trade Minister, Hassan Ali, (shortly after Mr Ramadhan's own visit) for the new Anglo-Iraqi Joint Economic Commission scheduled for the week of 28 February. Mr Ali ranks highly in the Revolutionary Command Council, and was received by the Prime Minister when he last visited Britain to sign the agreement which established the Commission in June 1981. The businessmen who form our Department's Area Advisory Group - COMET - have frequently expressed the view that the rapid growth in our exports to Iraq over the past 18 months owes much to the success of Mr Ali's 1981 visit. The call on the Prime Minister then had clear substantial impact. A similar short courtesy call this year is very strongly advised. It is unfortunate that this would follow so shortly after Mr Ramadhan's own visit. But whether we like it or not, the Iraqis are extremely protocol conscious. If Mr Ali were disappointed, it would act to undermine the very favourable impression created by the hospitality for Mr Ramadhan. Mr Ali will be in London from 1 March to midday 4 March.

I am copying this to John Holmes (FCO), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), David Edmonds (Environment), and to David Hayhoe (Lord President's office), to whom I am writing separately suggesting that their Ministers might also be involved in Mr Ali's visit.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN RHODES
Private Secretary

20 JAN 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

copied to Master.

File . Iraq

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 June 1981

Dear Francis,

Visit of the Iraqi Trade Minister

The Iraqi Minister of Trade, Mr. Hassan Ali, called on the Prime Minister this morning. He was accompanied by the Iraqi Ambassador and by Mr. Farouq Obaidi.

The Israeli Attack

After an exchange of courtesies, in the course of which Mr. Hassan Ali conveyed President Saddam Hussein's greetings to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister reciprocated, Mr. Hassan Ali raised the question of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear installation near Baghdad. He expressed his Government's gratitude for the constructive attitude taken by the United Kingdom in condemning the Israeli action. The Israelis had committed a flagrant aggression contrary to all international laws and norms of behaviour. The developing countries had the right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful uses. The Israeli action could only be interpreted as meaning that the Israeli Government reserved to itself the right to prevent any effort by the Arabs to construct civil nuclear installations. Iraq had not been fully satisfied with the resolution adopted by the United Nations. The Prime Minister said that HMG regarded the action of Israel as totally wrong and contrary to international law. As such, they had condemned it. She herself had been very anxious, as the Iraqi Ambassador was aware, that the facts about the nuclear installation should come out. Now that they had done so, it was clear that the allegations made by the Israeli Government, e.g. about what President Saddam Hussein had said, were untrue. This had had a considerable effect on the climate of opinion in the United States. Mr. Hassan Ali thanked the Prime Minister for what she had said. He noted that the nuclear installation had been subject to continuing inspection by the IAEA. Even after the Israeli attack, the Iraqi Government had agreed to receive an inspection mission from the Agency. The installation was still being operated, as they had been in the past, for peaceful purposes and for scientific research. The Israeli allegations had been no more than a pretext for the attack.

The Iran/Iraq War

Mr. Hassan Ali said that Iraq had accepted all the international initiatives taken in pursuit of a peaceful solution to

the Iran/Iraq war, notably those by the United Nations, by the Islamic Conference and by the Non-Aligned Movement. However all had been rejected by Iran. The difficulty was that the chaotic situation in Iran made it difficult for the Iraqi Government to know with whom they were dealing. The Iraqis were increasingly concerned that the situation in Iran might develop in the same way as that in Afghanistan. The Tudeh Party, which was working steadily to implement its policies under the cover of support for Khomeini, was gaining strength. The Soviet Union was, of course, a neighbouring state. There might be many surprises in store. The Prime Minister agreed and said that she too was worried about the threat posed by the Communists in Iran.

Bilateral Relations

The Prime Minister said that she was pleased with the way bilateral relations between Iraq and the United Kingdom were developing. The trend in bilateral trade was particularly satisfactory. Mr. Hassan Ali agreed that great progress had been made recently in bilateral relations in economic and technological fields. The agreement that he was due to sign with the Secretary of State for Trade tomorrow should be helpful. The Iraqi Government was launching a balanced and "explosive" development which would offer great opportunities to British enterprises. The Iraqi Government would place no "veto" on the activities of firms interested. He had extended an invitation to Mr. Biffen to attend the Baghdad Trade Fair in October together with a delegation of businessmen. He was also looking forward to the forthcoming visit of Mr. King. The outlook for trade relations between the two countries was very healthy. The Prime Minister said she was delighted to hear this. There was a new mood in our exporting industries. They were increasingly determined to fight for orders.

Mr. Hassan referred to his meeting with the Secretary of State for Defence yesterday. He said that he had submitted a list of the Iraqi Government's requirements to Mr. Nott. He hoped the Prime Minister would give the green light for the further development of co-operation in the military field. This would help both countries to expand and diversify their relationship. The Iraqi Government was at this stage seeking no more than approval in principle. They planned to send a technical delegation in the near future to discuss the details of what could be done. They recognised that deliveries could not take place "tomorrow". They would ensure that there was no embarrassment whatever to HMG.

The Prime Minister hoped that military co-operation would develop fruitfully over the next few years, in the course of which period she hoped of course that hostilities between Iraq and Iran would have come to an end. She noted Mr. Hassan Ali's assurance that there would be no embarrassment to HMG: on that basis she was confident that approval in principle would be forthcoming. In the meantime it was clearly important that detailed examination of the possibilities should go ahead.

/I

I am sending copies of this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade), David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01 ~~930 7622~~ 218 2111/3

MO 26/9/22

22nd June 1981

Dear Michael,

VISIT OF MR HASSAN ALI

My Secretary of State has asked me to write to you to let you know, in advance of the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Hassan Ali tomorrow, of a number of points which arose at his meeting this afternoon.

Mr Hassan Ali, in a tete-a-tete discussion, first said that Iraq wished to purchase, as soon as possible, 200 tanks and 500 FH 70 155 mm Howitzers. He was not clear about the standard of tank required, but asked for our "very latest". This request is no surprise to us, and is a repeat of one given to Defence Sales and IMS representatives last month. It does, however, pre-empt an OD paper, currently in draft, which is being prepared to bring Ministers up to date on the position on defence sales to Iraq, and to seek their agreement to start negotiations on tanks and FH 70, on the condition that supply would not take place until after the war with Iran had ended.

My Secretary of State considered it vital to respond positively to the Iraqi Minister's request and confirmed that we would be prepared to supply but subject to the ending of the hostilities by the time of delivery. In the case of the tanks, this would be in any case no earlier than two years from order (for a standard Chieftain) and three years for a more advanced version; for the FH 70 delivery time could be no earlier than 2½ years. Mr Nott also mentioned, in connection with the FH 70, the difficulty at present of obtaining the endorsement of the sale to the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Prime Minister should be aware that there would probably be serious security difficulties over selling to the Iraqis even the standard of Khalid tank which we are supplying to the Jordanians; and there could be problems over production capacity on both the tank, and also the FH 70. Nevertheless, my Secretary of State considers it essential in terms of our developing relations with Iraq to respond encouragingly to a further Iraqi request, to indicate that we are willing to

M O'D B Alexander Esq

co-operate with Iraq as far as possible given the constraints of the current hostilities (which President Saddam Hussein agreed with Sir Ron Ellis) and also of delivery schedules. In responding to further Iraqi interest, the Prime Minister may wish:-

a. to recall the visit of Sir Ron Ellis in March 1981, and his very worthwhile discussions with President Saddam Hussein and the Minister of Defence (Air Chief Marshal Adan);

b. refer to the developing relationship between the two countries, in both civil and potential defence trade;

c. mention the current visit by IMS to Baghdad to inspect and categorise the 130 Chieftain tanks captured from Iran, and the arrangements to re-furbish them through Jordan. (I understand that this mission is making good progress.) This, together with the supply of armoured recovery vehicles are positive examples of a pragmatic relationship that we wish to foster, with full understanding on both sides.

Mr Hassan Ali also referred to certain eletronic equipment about which he was unclear, although details will be forwarded to us. There could well be security constraints if these are electronic warfare equipments but clearly we shall have to wait to hear more. The Secretary of State referred to potential for the Hawk and the P110 but Mr Hassan Ali was not briefed on these and made no substantive response.

I am copying this letter to Francis Richards (FCO), Nicholas McInnes (DOT) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Richard Dawson

(J D S DAWSON)

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 June 1981

Dear Michael,

Visit of the Iraqi Trade Minister

In my letter of 19 June I promised a supplementary brief on the Israeli raid on Iraq when the UN vote had been taken. This I now enclose.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
No 10 Downing Street
London SW1

IRAQI TRADE MINISTER'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER

Points to Make

Israeli Raid on Iraq

1. We condemned the raid unequivocally. Congratulate Iraq for achieving consensus vote in the Security Council. Clearly right to avoid sanctions. US support for resolutions will have real impact in Israel.

2. Recognise problems which raid creates for search for comprehensive peace. But case for such a peace is not weakened by the raid but strengthened.

Essential Facts

1. The Text of the Security Council Resolution which was adopted unanimously on 19 June is attached. It was negotiated directly between the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Sa'adun Hammadi, and Mrs Kirkpatrick, US Ambassador to the UN. On 18 June Hammadi had, in order to achieve US support, agreed to drop the call for mandatory sanctions against Israel.

2. The original Iraqi draft resolution, reflecting the call for mandatory sanctions from the meeting of the Arab League in Baghdad on 11 June, had included a paragraph requiring, in Chapter 7 language, all states 'to refrain from furnishing Israel with any military, economic or technical assistance which might encourage it to pursue its policy of expansion and aggression'.

3. The Americans for their part had been prepared to accept a formulation which recommended UN members to 'refrain from military and technical assistance and sales to Israel and all nations in the region which would increase the likelihood of aggression or contribute to the development of nuclear arms'. The sticking point with the Iraqis was the inclusion of the reference to 'all states in the region'. We had been prepared to press the US to delete this, but the Iraqi agreement to remove all reference to sanctions made this unnecessary.

4. The Iraqis have spoken appreciatively in Baghdad of Sir A Parson's role in the debate, particularly in bringing Hammadi and Mrs Kirkpatrick together.

Near East and North Africa Department

22 June 1981

GRS 550

UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 190830Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 182130Z JUNE 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 546 OF 18 JUNE.
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MIDDLE EAST POSTS, EC POSTS, VIENNA (FCR RES REP IAEA).

MIPT: ISRAEL/IRAQ IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. FOLLOWING IS AGREED TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
HAVING CONSIDERED THE AGENDA CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT
HAVING NOTED THE CONTENTS OF THE TELEGRAMME DATED 8 JUNE 1981 FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAQ
HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS MADE TO THE COUNCIL ON THE SUBJECT AT MEETINGS....
TAKING NOTE OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF I.A.E.A. TO THE AGENCY'S BOARD OF GOVERNORS ON THE SUBJECT ON 9 JUNE 1981,
(AND THE STATEMENT MADE TO THE COUNCIL BY THE AGENCY'S REPRESENTATIVE ON .....
FURTHER TAKING NOTE OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE I.A.E.A. ON 12 JUNE 1981 ON THE QUOTE MILITARY ATTACK ON THE IRAQ NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTRE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AGENCY UNQUOTE,
FULLY AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IRAQ HAS BEEN A PARTY TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SINCE IT CAME INTO FORCE IN 1970 THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT TREATY IRAQ HAS ACCEPTED I.A.E.A. SAFEGUARDS ON ALL ITS NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, AND THAT THE AGENCY HAS TESTIFIED THAT THESE SAFEGUARDS HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORILY APPLIED TO DATE,
NOTING FURTHERMORE THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT ADHERED TO THE N.P.T.,
DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGER TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY CREATED BY THE PREMEDITATED ISRAELI AIR ATTACK ON IRAQI NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS ON 7 JUNE 1981, WHICH COULD AT ANY TIME EXPLODE THE SITUATION IN THE AREA WITH GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE VITAL INTERESTS OF ALL STATES:
CONSIDERING THAT, UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 2, PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: QUOTE ALL MEMBERS SHALL REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNQUOTE,

1. STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE MILITARY ATTACK BY ISRAEL IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT:
2. CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO REFRAIN IN THE FUTURE FROM ANY SUCH ACTS OR THREATS THEREOF:

/3,

3. FURTHER CONSIDERS THAT THE SAID ATTACK CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE ENTIRE I.A.E.A. SAFEGUARDS REGIME WHICH IS THE FOUNDATION OF THE N.P.T.
4. FULLY RECOGNIZES THE INALIENABLE SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF IRAQ, AND ALL OTHER STATES ESPECIALLY THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH PROGRAMMES OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT TO DEVELOP THEIR ECONOMY AND INDUSTRY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR PRESENT AND FUTURE NEEDS AND CONSISTENT WITH THE INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED OBJECTIVES OF PREVENTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION:
5. CALLS UPON ISRAEL URGENTLY TO PLACE ITS NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER I.A.E.A. SAFEGUARDS:
6. CONSIDERS THAT IRAQ IS ENTITLED TO APPROPRIATE REDRESS FOR THE DESTRUCTION IT HAS SUFFERED, RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHICH HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY ISRAEL.
7. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL REGULARLY INFORMED OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

ENDS

PARSONS

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

NENAD	MAED
MED	ES & SD
NAD	ERD
UND	ESID
EESD	CONS DEPT
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE
RID	

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

Repetition to SANA'A

referred for departmental decision,

repeated as requested to other posts.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

June 1981

Dear Michael,

Visit of the Iraqi Trade Minister

The Prime Minister has agreed to see Mr Hassan Ali on 23 June at 9.30 am. I understand that the Department of Trade are sending separate briefing on trade matters. I enclose a brief covering Anglo/Iraqi relations and Middle East issues, except the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear station. A brief on this subject will follow as soon as the UN debate and vote are over.

I enclose a personality note on Mr Hassan Ali. As you will see, he was refused a visa in 1974 to enter this country, because he was identified as a member of the Iraqi intelligence service (our policy is to exclude all identified intelligence officers; exceptions are only made in special circumstances). The refusal rankles.

Mr Hassan Ali is a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, the cabinet of the ruling Ba'ath regime in Iraq. He has the ear of the Iraqi President, Mr Saddam Hussein. He is considered politically more influential than the Iraqi Foreign Minister, whom the Prime Minister saw in March. (Mr Hassan Ali cancelled his visit last year in the wake of Mr Hammadi's decision not to come). Like Hammadi, he has not a reputation as an easy interlocutor. His visit is nevertheless important and comes at a time when our trade with Iraq is increasing.

During his call on the Prime Minister, Mr Hassan Ali may seek to steer the conversation to a discussion of political issues. The Iraqis will still be smarting at the Israeli attack on their nuclear station. He will no doubt deliver a diatribe against Israel. He may also seek to justify the continuing conflict with Iran.

There will clearly be insufficient time for detailed discussions, but the Prime Minister may wish to reassure Mr Hassan Ali of our wish to see our bilateral relations deepen and improve across the board. On the subject of the Israeli raid, she may wish to reiterate her condemnation. If the question of Gulf security is raised, the Prime Minister might repeat our now well known stance on the Rapid Deployment Force and our attitude to the recently formed Gulf Security Council.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

IRAQI TRADE MINISTER'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER :
23 JUNE 1981

POINTS TO MAKE :

UK/Iraq relations

1. Encouraged that our relations are developing. Want to see them improve across the board. Trade links important. Pleased to note award of major contracts to British companies this year.

Iran/Iraq war

2. Concerned to see conflict end and to see both sides settle differences by peaceful means. Hope efforts at mediation will bring about early negotiated settlement. Instability in area threat to peace, not only of region but of world.

Arms supplies to Iraq

3. We want in principle to reply positively to Iraqi requests. Prospects for long-term future co-operation are good. In short-term, certain constraints imposed by Iran/Iraq war. We welcome Saddam Hussein's assurance that he would not expect delivery of lethal items (ie arms and ammunition) while hostilities continue at present level. But no objection, of course, to discussion now of lethal items for long-term delivery.

/Arms

Arms Supplies to Iran (Defensive)

4. We have supplied no military equipment to Iran since November 1979. Ban on supply of lethal equipment during war naturally applies also to Iran. We shall at some stage have to start discussing with Iran the confused position arising from cancelled /suspended contracts. We may release the Kharg (but it could not be used in war and no decision has been taken). We shall observe the undertaking given to Hammadi (Iraqi Foreign Minister) to inform Iraqis if we release the Kharg.

Gulf Security (Defensive)

5. We welcome Gulf Co-operation Council. Though the Russians have called in a 'creation of NATO', we both know it was an independent initiative by the Gulf states. [The Iraqis are not in fact very keen on it.]

UK policy/Rapid Deployment Force

6. Valuable series of ministerial visits in recent months, especially mine in April. Gulf states fully understand we would give what help we could if they asked us - eg over training and equipment. Talk of Western or US intention of establishing military bases quite unrealistic.

/Arab

Arab/Israel

7. Dutch have completed their consultations and are reporting to the European Council. Much work remains to be done. UK considering next steps, but no easy answers. Basis of European approach will remain Venice principles. Hope that Iraq will see merit of these balance principles.

8. US role vital for realistic hopes of settlement. Important to influence US attitudes towards Palestinian rights. Clear signal of conditional PLO willingness to live in peace with Israel would have most impact.

Lebanon

9. Very concerned at continuing crisis, particularly Syrian/Israeli tensions. Fully support Habib's efforts. Grave risks if he fails.

10. Watching efforts of Arab League Follow-Up Committee with interest. Progress towards reconciliation on the ground in Lebanon could help defuse present crisis : in longer term provide means of forestalling Israeli interference.

11. Accept the internal affairs of Lebanon are Arab affair. Do not want to interfere. We see our role as supporting legitimate Government there.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

UK/Iraq Relations

1. Relations have had their ups and downs since Ba'ath regime came to power in 1968. Signs that Iraqis for reasons of self-interest, ready to develop closer ties. Relations have improved. Trade has increased. Discussions and negotiations on supply of wide range of defence equipment could result in sales in excess of £1,000 million. Foreign Minister's visit in March a success. Successful visit by Trade Minister could lead to further deepening of bilateral relations.

Iran/Iraq War

2. Now in its tenth month. Both sides may hope that internal pressures on other will work to their advantage. Both belligerents ready to negotiate if face saving formula for negotiated settlement can be found. Mediation committees - Non Aligned Movement, Islamic Conference and Olaf Palme - continue their efforts but early breakthrough unlikely. Fighting could continue at present low level of activity for months.

Arms Supplies to Iraq and Iran

3. We explained to Hammadi in March our obligations of neutrality. They know that we are not prepared to supply 'lethal' items while hostilities continue and are prepared to discuss the purchase of such items with long-term delivery dates. While they understand that we must treat both sides evenhanded, they may react adversely, despite forewarning, to the supply of equipment to Iran. The Iranians have, however, postponed plans to send a military delegation to London to discuss blocked supplies and suspended/cancelled contracts. The day may be some way off before final decisions need to be taken.

/Gulf Security

Gulf Security

4. Iraq probably resents its exclusion from the Gulf Cooperation Council, despite its welcoming words. The leadership of the GCC undoubtedly belongs to Saudi Arabia; Iraq would rather have it. Iraq - and conceivably even Jordan - might wish to join.

Arab/Israel

5. The Iraqis are not central to the Arab/Israel conflict despite the lead they frequently take in attacks on Israel, Egypt, the US, etc. Their views are hardline: they have never accepted 242 and their aim remains the dissolution of Israel. However, they know that Israel cannot be militarily defeated in the near future, and to promote their aim of Arab leadership, they have not since Camp David pressed their opposition to any form of negotiated settlement. They have concentrated their hostility on Camp David. Their recent close relationship with Jordan has reinforced this policy. They support the PLO but their relationship with it is uneasy and they are only too ready, if it suits their purposes, to drop Fatah and support one or other of the extremists groups. Arafat's efforts to mediate in the Iran/Iraq war has earned him few friends in Baghdad.

6. The Iraqi attitude to European efforts is politely sceptical. They welcome the Venice Declaration as a step in the right direction, but see it as falling far short of Arab minimum requirements. They do not believe we have any real influence on the US or Israel.

Lebanon

7. Iraqi position. The Iraqis have expressed their support for Syria in the missile crisis with Israel. On 14 May Hammadi, the Foreign Minister, said in an interview that notwithstanding Iraq's relations with the Syrian regime Iraq would fight beside Syria. Iraq also supports Arab League activity to promote a settlement within Lebanon.

/8.

8. Lebanon Internal. The League's so-called 'Follow-up Committee' for Lebanon (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon and Syria) met near Beirut on 7-8 June. It reached agreement on a ceasefire (which appears to be holding), but has not made much progress towards solving the fundamental differences between the parties within Lebanon. It is to meet again on 4 July with a preparatory meeting on 23 June.

9. The UK has expressed firm support for the Committee's activities, and for the authority of the central Government as the basis for national reconciliation.

10. Israel/Syria. The second stage of Habib's mission has moved at a slow pace, having been overshadowed by the aftermath of the Israeli attack on Iraq. Although Begin has again said publicly (on 14 June) that Israel will attack the missiles if their removal cannot be negotiated, he may be less inclined, with the domestic success of the attack on Iraq under his belt, to risk this before the Israeli elections on 30 June. The missiles are well defended and quite minor casualities would be damaging electorally.

11. The Presidency made a demarche, urging restraint, to the Israelis and Syrians on behalf of the Ten soon after the missile crisis began.

12. South Lebanon has been relatively quiet. UNIFIL, under its new (Irish) commander, General Callaghan, has recently achieved some small improvements in its position. Quiet deployment of the Lebanese Army with UNIFIL has continued while attention has been attracted elsewhere. The UNIFIL mandate was due for renewal by the Security Council on 19 June.

30 HASSAN 'ALI (NASSIR AL 'AMIRI)

Minister of Trade.

Member of RCC and Regional Leadership.

Born 1938 Baghdad. Shi'a. Graduate of Baghdad University (Political Economics) 1960. Diploma from Institute of Economic Development in Rome 1962. Imprisoned with Saddam Hussain (qv) under the 'Arif regime. Chairman of State Establishment for Spinning and Textile Industries 1971. Secretary-General of Federation of Arab Economists 1972. Member of National Front Secretariat 1972. Under-Secretary Ministry of Municipalities 1973. Head of Popular Organisations Bureau 1974. Member of Regional Leadership January 1974. Minister of Home Trade May 1976; member of tribunal that condemned 8 detainees to death after Shi'a riots, February 1977; Minister of Trade (on amalgamation of Home and Foreign Trade Ministries) March 1977; member of RCC September 1977. Vice-Chairman of Higher Agricultural Council and a member of the "Follow-up" Committee until their abolition in August 1979. Member of the Trade Regulations Board (since 1976). Member of the Special Tribunal set up after the conspiracy in July 1979.

Received his present portfolio as a reward for his willingness to sit in judgement on his fellow Shi'a after the riots of February 1977 and he appears to be a pliable henchman of Saddam Hussain. He can be uncouth in manner and often seems sullen but he is capable of coarse good humour. He has recently curbed, but not suppressed his predilection to political rhetoric in private conversation. One of the most active and conscientious Iraqi Ministers, constantly travelling or receiving visitors.

Not well disposed towards Britain (partly because we refused him a visa in 1974). He made this evident to Lord George Brown in September 1979, but he was an attentive and affable host to the Minister and Secretary of State for Trade in October and November 1979.

Some English, but normally uses an interpreter.

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE 1 VICTORIA STREET LONDON SW1H 0ET Telephone 01-215 7877

From the Secretary of State

p/w F.C.O. briefing

Michael Alexander Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London, SW1

18 June 1981

Dear Michael

COURTESY CALL BY IRAQI MINISTER FOR TRADE

The Prime Minister has agreed to meet Mr Hassan Ali, the Iraqi Minister for Trade, for a courtesy call at 9.30, Tuesday 23 June. Mr Hassan Ali will be accompanied by his Ambassador, Dr Al-Shawi, and by a senior Trade official, Mr Farouq Obaidi, who will interpret for the Minister.

I enclose:

... (i) Background note on trade and speaking notes;

... (ii) Defence Sales brief;

... (iii) Personality notes.

Lord Carrington's Office will forward further briefing direct.

Hassan Ali belongs to the ruling elite as a member of the Revolutionary Command Council. He may well seek to broaden discussion over political relations.

Yours sincerely
Catherine Capon.

CATHERINE CAPON
Private Secretary

18 JUN 1981

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH IRAQI TRADE MINISTER

POINTS TO MAKE

1 Glad to note increased volume of trade last year (UK exports £322m, + 60%).

2 Hope new agreement on economic and technical cooperation you are signing with John Biffen tomorrow (24 June) will produce further stimulus to trade.

3 Pleased that British firms are now winning sizeable contracts (eg John Laing £66m roads scheme in Baghdad; Patterson Candy International £54m water treatment plant; Baghdad metro consultancy £34m). But believe we can do even better.

4 British industry very keen to participate in Iraq's economic development and to help restore industrial installations damaged in war with Iran.

BACKGROUND

Trade £m

			Jan-Feb	
	1979	1980	1980	1981
UK exports	201.2	321.9 (+60%)	42.1	81.4 (+93%)

UK exports: mainly machinery (34.9%), chemicals (8.9%), vehicles (5.8%). Imports: oil (98.9%). UK imports: (1980, £533m) are 99% oil, and reflect crude price increases.

2 Iraq fastest growing Middle East market (+44% in 1980). UK market share increased to 7.5%. The market is fiercely competitive, and the Iraqis are difficult customers.

3 As a result of UK Ministerial effort trade relations improved dramatically in last two years. Economic and Technical Cooperation agreement to be signed during visit. Prospects bright. Businessmen's enthusiasm not damped by Gulf War. So far, this year, major contracts over £250m awarded to UK.

DEFENCE SALES BRIEF FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH IRAQI TRADE MINISTER

LINE TO TAKE

Keen to assist in meeting Iraq's requirements for Defence equipment. UK has done business in excess of £100m in recent months. Neutrality obligations mean that we cannot supply lethal equipment while war with Iran continues, but happy to open discussions on major items for supply in the future.

BACKGROUND

Iraq is keen to move away from its military dependence on the Soviet Union. Main European supplier has hitherto been France, but improvement in UK/Iraqi relations means that Iraq is now one of our most important potential customers with current prospects for sales in excess of £3,000m, including Hawk aircraft, Main Battle Tanks and FH70 artillery. Lethal items cannot be supplied until Iraq/Iran war has finished, but discussions are being opened with a view to supply at a later date.

PERSONALITY NOTE

HASSAN 'ALI (NASSIR AL 'AMIRI)
Minister of Trade.

Member of RCC and Regional Leadership.

Born 1938 Baghdad, Shi'a. Graduate of Baghdad University (Political Economics) 1960. Diploma from Institute of Economic Development in Rome 1962. Imprisoned with Saddam Hussain (qv) under the 'Arif regime. Chairman of State Establishment for Spinning and Textile Industries 1971. Secretary-General of Federation of Arab Economists 1972. Member of National Front Secretariat 1972. Under-Secretary Ministry of Municipalities 1973. Head of Popular Organisations Bureau 1974. Member of Regional Leadership January 1974. Minister of Home Trade May 1976; member of tribunal that condemned 8 detainees to death after Shi'a riots, February 1977; Minister of Trade (on amalgamation of Home and Foreign Trade Ministries) March 1977; member of RCC September 1977. Vice-Chairman of Higher Agricultural Council and a member of the "Follow-up" Committee until their abolition in August 1979. Member of the Trade Regulations Board (since 1976). Member of the Special Tribunal set up after the conspiracy in July 1979.

Received his present portfolio as a reward for his willingness to sit in judgement on his fellow Shi'a after the riots of February 1977 and he appears to be a pliable henchman of Saddam Hussain. He verges on the uncouth in manner and often seems sullen but he is capable of coarse good humour. Given to political rhetoric. One of the most active Iraqi Ministers, constantly travelling or receiving visitors.

Not well disposed towards Britain (partly because we refused him a visa in 1974); made this evident to Lord George Brown during their meeting in September 1979.

Some English, but normally uses an interpreter.



Mr. Hishan Al Shawi

35 HISHAM IBRAHIM (AL SHAWI) (DR)

Ambassador to London.

Born Baghdad, 1931. Educated at Baghdad, American University, Beirut (BA Political Sciences, 1952), and St Antony's Oxford (BA International Relations, 1956). Assistant Professor and Head of Political Department, Baghdad and Mustansariya Universities, 1958–70. Dean, College of Law and Politics, Al Mustansariya University, 1970; Ambassador at MFA, February 1972; Permanent Delegate to UN, Geneva, March 1972; Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, May 1972; Minister of State, November 1974; Ambassador at the MFA May 1976; named as Permanent Representative at UN, New York in 1977; but before taking up appointment was instead made Director of the President's Office, which post he held until March 1978. Ambassador to London August 1978.

Brother of Mundhir Ibrahim (al Shawi) (qv) and Sultan Abdul Qadir (al Shawi) (qv). Political theorist and originally a Nasserite, he had the foresight to keep in th Ba'ath during the 1960s. Imprisoned by the Qasim regime. Many present Ba'ath leaders studied under him. Perhaps still regarded as politically not quite reliable, but widely respected for his mind. Appears well-disposed to the West.

A very snappy dresser; vain. A keen shot.

Exceptionally good English with an exaggerated accent.

B/F.

FCO

Iraq

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 April 1981

VISIT BY THE IRAQI MINISTER OF TRADE

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to Mike Pattison of 24 April about the visit to this country of the Iraqi Minister of Trade. She has agreed to receive Mr. Hassan Ali for a short courtesy call at 0930 on Tuesday, 23 June.

I am sending copies of this letter to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Jonathan Dawson (Ministry of Defence).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

John Rhodes, Esq.,
Department of Trade.

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE 1 VICTORIA STREET LONDON SW1H 0ET Telephone 01-215 7877

(1) Mr Alexander
(2) Prime Minister

Would you be happy to see the Iraqi Minister of Trade. I could fit him in for a short time. GS. 25/4

From the Secretary of State

Mike Pattison Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London, SW1

24 April 1981

Yes MT

Dear Mike,

VISIT TO LONDON OF THE IRAQI MINISTER OF TRADE

The Iraqi Minister of Trade has accepted my Secretary of State's invitation to make a 3 day visit to London beginning on 22 June.

Our main objective is to further cultivate our relations with Iraq. At present, and in part because of the stresses from the war with Iran, the Iraqi regime is looking for an improvement in its standing with this country and with other EC countries. The Iraqi Foreign Minister came to London in March this year, the first Iraqi Ministerial visit since the Government took office. The proposed visit by the Trade Minister, Hassan Ali, is another step forward. As a member of the Revolutionary Command Council he is more important in the Iraqi hierarchy than the Foreign Minister and is certainly closer to President Hussain. He is, in short, a key member of the Iraqi regime and we need to treat him accordingly.

The political importance of the visit is certainly greater than its benefit to trade. But in terms of trade too Iraq is a market in which our exporters have made considerable progress recently. United Kingdom exports in 1980 rose by 60% to over £320m, and in the first two months of 1981 were twice that of the corresponding period last year. For the first time United Kingdom companies are winning large projects - 4 worth over £40m each since the start of the year - a clear sign of our political favour. It is also intended that a centrepiece of the visit will be the signing of an Economic Co-operation Agreement. If we can maintain or improve our relations with Iraq it is a market that offers greater scope than most for future growth.

The Ministry of Defence also have a keen interest in the visit, and we are approaching Mr Nott's office for an appointment.

Hassan Ali knows that his politically junior colleague (the Foreign Minister) called on the Prime Minister in March. In Belgium and Italy on recent visits Hassan Ali has been received by both Prime and Foreign Ministers. Both my Secretary of State and Lord Carrington have agreed to see Hassan Ali, and strongly recommend that he is also received by the Prime Minister. Even a short courtesy call


From the Secretary of State

would have a big impact. If the Prime Minister agrees I would be grateful if you could let me know when she would be free.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Francis Richards (FCO) and Jonathan Dawson (Ministry of Defence).

Yours sincerely,

JOHN RHODES
Private Secretary


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CONFIDENTIAL FILING

PROPOSED VISIT TO UK OF MR TAHA RAMADHAN, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ AND PROPOSED VISIT OF HIS SUCCESSOR: TARIQ AZIZ

IRAQ

NOVEMBER 1987

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~25.11.87~~							
~~14.1.82.~~							
~~9.3.82.~~							
~~17.1.83~~							
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~~24.3.83~~							
~~5.5.83~~							
10.5.83							
~~24.8.83~~							
~~30.9.83~~							
~~6.10.83~~							
~~7.10.83~~							
4.12.85							

PREM 19/1544

SUBJECT cc MASTER.

JAIAG4

CA file

ccPC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 December 1985

Dear Peter,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

The Prime Minister met the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq this morning. Mr Tariq Aziz was accompanied by Mr al-Haddawi and by the Iraqi Ambassador in London. HM Ambassador Baghdad was also present.

The Prime Minister greeted Mr Tariq Aziz as a very welcome visitor to Britain. Mr Tariq Aziz said that he brought regards from President Saddam Hussain, who had asked him to stress the importance which he attached to strengthening the bilateral relations between Britain and Iraq. Iraq was well satisfied with the results of the recent visit to London by the Minister of Trade. They would like to see political contacts given the same priority.

Iran-Iraq War

Mr Tariq Aziz said that the war was not just a matter of concern to Iraq and Iran. It carried grave dangers for the whole region, particularly for the Gulf. Iraq was confident of its ability to defend itself but would like to see western countries taking a more direct interest in efforts to find a solution to the conflict. He appreciated the position taken by the British Government. The most pressing need was to get across to the Iranians the wider dangers of a continuing conflict and the penalties for their own people. The Iranians were not prepared to negotiate and constantly set absurd preconditions. Iraq was ready to talk either directly or indirectly to Iran and to use whatever channels of mediation appeared to offer the best prospects of success. But Iraq felt that other Governments were not making the political effort required to bring pressure on Iran to negotiate.

The Prime Minister said that we felt frustrated. Appeals to Iran appeared to have little effect. We had

SRW

terminated the supply of weapons to Iran and even the supply of items which might possibly have a military application. Nonetheless Iran was continuing to receive weapons through Libya and Syria. We constantly raised the issue of the Iran-Iraq war in international meetings. It would be helpful to have a more precise idea of what particular action the Iraqi Government would like us to take.

Mr Tariq Aziz said that this was a subject on which the two Governments could exchange views. He would follow it up with the Foreign Secretary and officials. The basic need was for more political pressure on Iran. He was convinced that pressure on Iran would produce results in the long term. People in Iran were sensitive to external opinion. Iraq appreciated the efforts which Britain had made towards limiting the flow of weapons to Iran and was acting through the Soviet Union to stop supplies from Libya, Syria and North Korea.

The Prime Minister asked whether Iraq expected a further Iranian offensive. Mr Tariq Aziz thought that military operations against Iraq were largely a function of domestic political developments in Iran. There appeared to be instead difficulties at present, which made a new offensive more likely. But Iraq would succeed in crushing any attack. The Prime Minister referred to the support which Iraq received from the Gulf states. Mr Tariq Aziz observed that the Gulf States knew that, if Iraq were to lose the war, it would be doomsday for them.

The Prime Minister enquired about progress with the new oil pipeline through Saudi Arabia. Mr Tariq Aziz said that the first phase had been finished and exports through it were now running at 350 thousand bpd. The main pipeline would take another two years to complete and would enable Iraq to export 1.7 million bpd. There was also agreement with the Turkish Government to increase the capacity of the pipeline through Turkey to 1.5 million bpd by late 1986 or early 1987. He referred to the sad lack of responsibility shown by the Syrian Government in shutting the pipeline through Syria. Syria was the odd man out in the region.

Smith and Hagger

The Prime Minister said that she wished to raise the cases of Mr Smith and Mr Hagger. Both men had served sentences which seemed to British public opinion to be unfairly long in relation to the offences they had committed. These offences did not involve violence, as was the case with Salem Hassan, who had been convicted of murder. We very much hoped that President Sadam Hussain would consider clemency for Mr Smith and Mr Hagger.

Mr Tariq Aziz said that he would report the Prime Minister's remarks to President Sadam Hussain. Although the cases were not similar to that of S~lem Hassan from the legal and technical point of view, Iraq also had to take account of popular feelings. It would not be understood if Mr Smith and Mr Hagger were to be released without any kind

of development in the situation of Salem Hassan. He was not proposing anything specific and recognised the sensitivity of the issue. But it would be helpful if representatives of both governments were to meet to discuss possible human and legal solutions. The Prime Minister said that there was no comparison between the two cases and therefore no scope for bargaining. Salem Hassan had been convicted of terrorist murder. Mr Tariq Aziz said that Iraq was strongly opposed to violence. The Prime Minister repeated that she hoped that Mr Tariq Aziz would convey her strong appeal to President Sadam Hussain.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), John Mogg (Department of Trade and Industry) and to Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office).

Yours ever,

Charles Powell

(Charles Powell)

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 December 1985

Dear Charles,

Call on the Prime Minister by Mr Tariq Aziz, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister: 11 am, 4 December

I enclose briefing for the Prime Minister for the above call.

FCO officials held talks in Stockholm on 28 November on the UN Secretary-General's mediation proposals and the planned visit by the Swedish Political Director Mr Eliasson (appointed by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr Olof Palme) to Tehran in December to explore the current attitudes of the parties. The briefing takes into account Mr Eliasson's latest thinking on the attitudes of the two parties.

On a separate point, the Iraqi Minister of Trade, Mr Hassan Ali, claimed when he met the Prime Minister that the Iraqi Government have already made their "gesture" on Mr Smith and Mr Hagger by commuting death sentences to ones of life imprisonment. This is not factually correct. Messrs Smith and Hagger were not sentenced to death. Either he misread his brief, or he may have meant to say that either man could have received the death sentence as the maximum penalty for their crimes.

As we agreed on the telephone, the following will be present at the call in addition to Mr Tariq Aziz:

HE Mr Abdul Jabbar Younis al-Haddawi; Ambassador and Head of First International Dept, Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs

HE Dr Abdul Amir al-Anbari; Iraqi Ambassador in London

Mr Terence Clark, HM Ambassador, Baghdad.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL


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AM 8 5

CONFIDENTIAL

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, MR TARIQ AZIZ:
WEDNESDAY 4 DECEMBER

OUR OBJECTIVES

a) To impress on Iraqis that Parliament will not permit our relations to improve further so long as Smith and Hagger remain in prison. Confirm we shall never accept link between Salem Hassan and Smith/Hagger.

b) To emphasise British impartiality in the Iran/Iraq conflict and support for peace moves.

ARGUMENTS

a) Economic and political relations show improvement. But Smith and Hagger problem will not go away. Continued press, public and parliamentary interest - because of long sentences. Not critical of Iraqi justice but scope for humanitarian act or amnesty? Hagger case is a

time-bomb in media terms. Could undo at a stroke all improvement in Anglo/Iraqi relations.

b) Britain supports any realistic method of working towards peace. Full support for UN Secretary General's good offices. Acknowledge Iraq's willingness to enter peace process. Recognise difficulties of Iranian intransigence. But how can progress be made in the face of this Iranian attitude? How do Iraqis see internal Iranian scene?

TACTICAL ARGUMENTS

a) Smith. Understand seriousness of corruption offence in Iraq. Not all sentenced were hanged; some were released. Possibility of shortening Smith's sentence? He has done six hard years.

Hagger. Agree espionage serious; But Hagger not a spy. An old fantasiser whose mental health giving us increasing cause for concern. Request Iraqis accept examination by psychiatrists (perhaps jointly by British as well as Iraqi experts: we should like an outside opinion).

b) Secretary General's 8 point proposals still offer best prospect for negotiations. New initiatives from outside powers not appropriate while Secretary General's proposals on the table.

c) Secretary General's special respresentative, Olof Palme, sending his Political Director (Eliasson) back to Tehran 8-12 December. We are in close touch with the Swedes (and Americans). Eliasson briefed FCO representative in Stockholm on 29 November. Mr Palme coming to London 16 December and will give us his view on how best to move forward in light of Eliasson's contacts in Tehran. Swedes have considerable experience of handling Iranians. Main aim is to develop linkage between a ceasefire and step by step proposals as set out in United Nations Secretary General's 8 points.

THEIR OBJECTIVES

a) To maintain demands for Salem Hassan's release as a condition of Smith and Hagger's freedom. Possibly to seek a deal over three Iraqis arrested at Eastleigh: ie a new link rather than the old one.

b) To ensure conflict with Iran is not forgotten. Some Iraqis believe only solution is through wider internationalisation - hence attacks in Gulf. To obtain condemnation of Iran by UK, as Permanent Member of Security Council; or at least our agreement to come out openly against Iran in due course.

c) To get HMG to agree to a total ban on defence sales to Iran.

OUR RESPONSE

a) No deal. Would be a total compromise of British and Iraqi policy. Iraq, like us, rejects terrorist acts - President Saddam Hussein's letter to President Reagan underlined Iraqi position. Murder of Iraqi Airline manager in Nicosia. No-one is safe if terrorists allowed to operate without constraint. Urge Aziz to accept difference in kind between crime committed by Hassan and those of Smith and

Hagger. Iraq's image as opponent of terrorism damaged if Iraqis maintain link between Salem Hassan and Smith and Hagger.

Eastleigh Three (if pressed)

3 Iraqis arrested at Eastleigh Airport have a case to answer. Still sub judice. Not possible for HMG to intervene.

b) UK is working behind the scenes to find common ground between parties. As UN Security Council Permanent Member, open critisicm of either party to conflict not likely to produce solution. Condemnation of Iran will not result in willingness to negotiate, which must be our main objective. Give Swedes a clear run, at least for the next few weeks to see if they can come up with new proposals. Must avoid cutting across Eliasson's activities.

c) UK defence equipment supplies to Iran minimal. Strictly controlled. Do not enhance Iranian military capability. No equipment to either side which might prolong or exacerbate the conflict. UK policy poses no threat to Iraq, which is extremely well armed (in part by ourselves) but bears heavily on Iran.

CONFIDENTIAL

CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, MR TARIQ AZIZ: WEDNESDAY 4 DECEMBER

REFERENCES: A. Defence Sales. Individual contracts.
B. UN Secretary General's 8 point proposals.

BACKGROUND

1. Prime Minister last met Tariq Aziz during visit of Arab League Delegation in May 1985.

a) Smith and Hagger. Prime Minister aware of general background.

Recently Smith and Hagger cases have been re-examined in light of arrest at Eastleigh of 3 Iraqis (includes 2 Army Officers) now awaiting trial on charges of criminal arson. FCO officials suggested to Home Office on 17 October that Home Secretary might consider exercising discretionary powers to deport Iraqis, before or after trial, as a lever to secure Smith and Hagger's release. Home Secretary has examined all options carefully but has ruled out repatriation, remission of sentences, use of

Royal Prerogative and deportation before trial. Has indicated possibility of deportation after sentence served, with prospect of early return of accused (particularly if they were to plead guilty). Likely to be of limited appeal to the Iraqis and unlikely by itself to sway them over Smith and Hagger.

Iraqis will probably continue to draw parallel with Salem Hassan. We must resist; try to delink. If they drop the link with Hassan, they may try to establish a new link with some or all of the Eastleigh three. Iraqi Embassy implicated but not clear if Iraqi Government knew. Trial date not yet set.

Hagger's mental balance may be deteriorating, but he remains physically fit. Concept of near 70 year old suffering in Iraqi jail a gift to the British press if he gets ill or dies in prison.

b) Stalemate in conflict continues. Iraqis eager for solution but no clear or consistent strategy. Hoping to force Iran to negotiate through military and economic pressures but attacks on Kharg now less

frequent. Iran's oil exports back to normal. Attacks on Iranian economic targets unlikely to be sufficiently damaging to force Iranians to negotiate. Mediation efforts continue via UN. Secretary General's Representative Prime Minister Olof Palme is sending Mr Eliasson (Political Director of the Swedish MFA) to Tehran 8-12 December to explore the current Iranian position in detail. His aim is not to discuss the United Nations Secretary General's 8 points (Annex) - which the Swedes claim a hand in drafting - but to test Iranian pre-conditions for movement, eg possibilities for further Security Council action on CW, exchange of prisoners, or cessation of attacks on civilian targets; also possible attraction of a commission of enquiry into the origins of the war. Eliasson/Palme see this as a long term exercise, to draw the Iranians into talks with a third party in the hope that changes in the conflict and pressure on the Iranian economy will create opportunities for movement in 1986. Australians have also been active during November Presidency of Security Council but without apparent success. Iran believes Security Council is biased against it.

c) Iraqis constantly seeking to put UK on spot about defence sales to Iran, particularly on small number of contracts recently fulfilled eg vehicle spares supplied under old contracts. Their wilder claims (boats, helicopter plants etc) are nonsense. (Annex for list). UK support for Iraq is implicit in quantity of defence equipment supplied to Iraq since war began in 1980; and in presence of 100 Iraqis who attended military training courses in UK last year. Pilots, aeronautical engineers also being trained.

The UN Secretary General [illegible] point plan to the Iranian and Iraqi representatives in [illegible] late March. He put the same points forward during his discussions in Tehran and Baghdad in early April. The text of these points has not been made public but is as follows:

(1) The prime goal is the cessation of hostilities and proposals are therefore made for "global arrangements" to deal with the underlying questions, in accordance with a set timetable as preliminary steps thereto.

(2) A restoration of the moratorium on attacks on civilian targets.

(3) Cessation of threats against civilian aircraft.

(4) Both parties should give confidential undertakings that they would comply with the 1925 Geneva Protocol (banning the use of CW) on the understanding that the undertakings would not be public, nor exploited by either side for propaganda purposes.

(5) Cessation of attacks on unarmed merchant vessels.

(6) Measures to prevent attacks on ports, terminals and other facilities so that they could be rebuilt and resume their activities.

(7) Promises to cooperate with the ICRC in order to conclude arrangements which would lead to the exchange of prisoners of war within the framework of the Third Geneva Convention.

(8) Each party should subscribe in good faith to the above and should press on with continuous discussions with the Secretary General on subsequent measures to normalise the situation.

NOTES

(i) Point (1) in the UN Secretary General's plan refers to the prime goal being "the cessation of hostilities" which is interpretable as "a ceasefire".

(ii) On withdrawal to frontiers, Riza has stated that:

(a) although it was not mentioned specifically in the eight points it was implied in the reference to 'global arrangements"; but that

(b) this was an area at which the Secretary was looking, in particular following Iraqi representations, to see whether amendments could be made.

ANNEX A

VISIT OF IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER: 3-6 DECEMBER

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAN: INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS

CW: You know about this; a lorry overturned this summer in West Germany carrying insect aerosol sprays, not CW. Incident closed. Example of how innocent items can be misunderstood.

Boats: No trace of alleged supply to Iran of over 200 small boats by British civilian contractor. Boats over 7.5 metres long now licensable.

Helicopters: Have not supplied helicopters or spare parts for them. Servicing? No. Engine Test Facility? Ministers have agreed; but not yet supplied.

Ships/Vehicle Spares: Explained formally to Arab League Delegation in May and last year to you. Do not intend to go into detail again. (Contracts and payment pre-revolution; non-lethal; no reason to delay supply further.)

CR

VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY MR TARIQ AZIZ
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
3-6 DECEMBER 1985

ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN
(To be read in conjunction with the
printed programme)

TUESDAY 3 DECEMBER

Arrival

When the aircraft has landed, a representative of the British Airports Authority will accompany His Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq to the aircraft and escort the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Special Representative of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir John Stow, who will present (in order):

Mr T J Clark	HM Ambassador at Baghdad
Brigadier Alan Cowan	Secretary, Government Hospitality
Group Captain Robert Thomson	Government Hospitality Escort Officer
Air Commodore Philip Moore	Government Hospitality Escort Officer

Members of the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq will be present.

Transport

Cars are provided for the Official Suite by Government Hospitality throughout the visit. (See car plan at Annex 1.)

Participation of the Official Suite in the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs' Programme

His Excellency Dr Abdul Amir Al-Anbari, the Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq to London, and Mr Terence Clark, HM Ambassador at Baghdad, will accompany His Excellency Mr Tariq Aziz throughout the programme.

The other members of the Official Suite, as listed at page 1 of the printed programme, are expected to accompany His Excellency Mr Tariq Aziz throughout the programme except for the call on the Prime Minister at which only His Excellency Ambassador Abdul Jabbar Younis Al-Haddawi will be present.

SUEAAI

WEDNESDAY 4 DECEMBER

1500 Meeting with MPs - House of Commons

The visitors will be met at the Members Entrance by Mr Roy Hughes, MP, who will act as host during the House of Commons visit.

1500-1515 Mr Aziz will be escorted to the Distinguished Strangers Gallery by Mr Hughes, accompanied by Group Captain Thomson and a Special Branch officer. Mr Hughes will arrange for the other members at the official suite to be taken to the Jubilee Room in the interim to await Mr Aziz's return from the Distinguished Strangers Gallery at 1515.

NOTE: Visitors to the Distinguished Strangers Gallery are respectfully requested to maintain silence, or when necessary, to converse in as quiet a manner as possible so as not to disrupt the proceedings in the House.

T Wynn
Protocol Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
273 3586

SUEAAI

ANNEX I

CAR PLANS

Heathrow Airport to the Savoy Hotel

Car 1	His Excellency Mr Tariq Aziz His Excellency Dr Abdul Amir Al-Anbari Special Branch Officer
Police Car	Special Branch Officer Iraqi Security Officer
Car 2	His Excellency Mr Abdul Jabbar Younis Al-Haddawi Mr Clark Group Captain Thomson
Car 3	Mr Adnan Nsayyif Jasim Dr Samir Khairy Air Commodore Moore

The above will be the basis of the car seating plan throughout the visit - adjusted by Group Captain Thomson as necessary.

SUEAAI

DISTRIBUTION

10 Downing Street

PS (2)
Press Secretary (2)
Mr Joce (1)

House of Commons

Mr Roy Hughes MP (1)

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq

Dr Abdul Amir Al-Anbari (15)

Home Office

PS/Mr Hurd (2)

Department of Trade and Industry

PS/Mr Brittan (2)

Ministry of Defence

PS/Mr Heseltine (2)
Group Captain Dillon (1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PS (2)
PS/Mr Renton (2)
Mr E A J Fergusson
Mr S L Egerton
Mr S P Day
MED (Mr D Harding) (6)
Miss R Hazell (1)

Government Hospitality Fund (25)

SUEAAI

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Iraqi Foreign Minister

1. He warrants only half an hour.

2. Subjects are:

(a) Iran/Iraq war. Only new fact is that Palme is sending his Political Director on an exploratory mission to Teheran next week on behalf of UN Secretary General.

(b) Smith & Hagger.

3. You last met him with Arab League delegation in May. CDP.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 October 1985

Thank you for your letter of 11 October about the forthcoming visit of the Iraqi Foreign Minister to London.

The Prime Minister has agreed to see Mr. Tariq Aziz and we have provisionally arranged that this should be at 11 o'clock on 4 December for half an hour. The Prime Minister has commented that we should let Mr. Aziz know in advance that we are expecting progress on the cases of Mr. Smith and Mr. Haggar.

(Timothy Flesher)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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CONFIDENTIAL

(1) CCPC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 Ocotber 1985

Prime Minister
This is difficult but not impossible in diary terms. Agree to a brief meeting? CDP 14/X.

Yes
P.S. We might let him know in advance that we should be expecting progress on

Dear Charles,

Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister to London

As you know, we have an outstanding invitation from the Secretary of State to Tariq Aziz to visit the UK in December. The visit, accepted in principle by the Iraqis, is planned for 4/5 December.

Since our last correspondence, the new Iraqi Ambassador, during a call on the PUS, has made it clear that Tariq Aziz is expecting substantive high level discussions, including with the Prime Minister, during his stay. We have been told that Tariq Aziz would rather postpone his visit than not see the Prime Minister (whom he last met when the Arab League Delegation called on the Prime Minister in November last year). Sir Geoffrey fully understands the pressures on the Prime Minister's time and entirely agrees with the need to keep down calls on the Prime Minister by Foreign Ministers. But he feels that there will inevitably be a small number of exceptional cases in which it will be necessary to ask the Prime Minister to see a Foreign Minister. He considers that there are grounds for making an exception in the case of Tariq Aziz.

Smith Hagger at such a meeting. CDP

First, a call would enable the Prime Minister to register at the highest level our concern over the cases of Smith and Hagger.

Second, it would provide an opportunity to dispel at the highest level the ever-present suspicion in Iraqi minds that HMG is officially and secretly sustaining the Iranian regime's ability to continue the war by the supply of vital defence equipment.

[you've already done that].

Finally, Tariq Aziz is aware that the Prime Minister had been prepared to offer him a call when the visit was originally planned in February. The Iraqis would interpret a refusal to receive him at Prime Ministerial level as a change

/in HMG's

11.00 4 Dec.

CONFIDENTIAL

in HMG's attitude towards Iraq. As a Deputy Prime Minister and senior member of the Revolutionary Command Council, Tariq Aziz ranks second only to Taha Ramadan in his ability to influence Saddam Hussein. If anything, he has gained in domestic and international stature since February, as Iraq's fortunes in the war have prospered.

In the light of the above, Sir Geoffrey Howe hopes that the Prime Minister will agree that it would be right to see Tariq Aziz on 4 or 4 December.


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Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

29 July 1985

From the Private Secretary

VISIT OF THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER TO LONDON

Thank you for your letter of 26 July about the visit of Tariq Aziz.

As you know, we are trying to put a stop to the notion that Foreign Ministers are entitled to expect to call upon the Prime Minister. I have consulted the Prime Minister about this particular case and she has said that no commitment should be given that she will see Tariq Aziz. I suggest therefore that arrangements for the visit should go ahead without anything being said on the subject of a meeting with the Prime Minister. If the Iraqis enquire you will have to say that we cannot make any commitment at this stage.

(C.D. Powell)

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 July, 1985

Prime Minister

It's a very tiresome man: and we are trying to limit calls on you by Foreign Ministers. But having originally agreed to see him, it will be hard to refuse now that the visit is to be reinstated. Agree to a short meeting? Dear Charles,

No commitment yet

Charles. 4th December is straight after Euro Council, but statement ch. The 5th would be better, if we have to do it. MT 26/7

Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister to London

COP 27/7

A long standing invitation from Sir Geoffrey Howe to Tariq Aziz to pay an official visit to London has now been accepted by the Iraqis for 4-5 December. Previous plans for a visit in February fell through when Tariq Aziz was unable to make the dates we proposed.

The Prime Minister agreed to see Tariq Aziz when we were making plans for the February visit (your letter of 31 January). In proposing those dates, we confirmed to the Iraqis that the intended programme would include a call on the Prime Minister. As well as being Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz holds the rank of Deputy Prime Minister and is a member of the influential Ba'ath party junta, the Revolutionary Command Council. As in the case of the February visit, we would also propose to arrange calls for Tariq Aziz on other Government Ministers.

Sir Geoffrey Howe continues to believe that a visit by Tariq Aziz would be useful and endorses our post's view that the success of the visit is likely to depend on the level of Ministerial attention he is granted. Having been offered a call on the Prime Minister last time, the highly protocol-conscious Iraqis would certainly react badly if they were not offered a similar call this time. They could well decide not to go ahead with the visit. Our relations with Iraq have never been smooth and the furtherance of Britain's commerical and other interests in Iraq depend to a large extent on taking the occasional opportunities that come up for high-level Ministerial contacts with the Iraqis. In particular, a call on the Prime Minister would enable us to emphasise at the highest level the importance we attach to the early release of the two Britons who have spent a number of years in Iraqi jails, Messrs Smith and Hagger. There is continuing concern in this country for the welfare of these two men.

Sir Geoffrey has therefore reluctantly concluded that it would be right to ask the Prime Minister to

/agree

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agree to a call by Tariq Aziz on 4 or 5 December.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Maureen Dodsworth (DTI).


Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street


26. VII
AM 8 5


AM 6 5

RESTRICTED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 February 1985

Dear Charles,

Visit of Tariq Aziz to London

In your letter of 31 January, you confirmed that the Prime Minister would be able to receive a call from the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, at 11.00 am on 26 February. Since then the Iraqis have told us that the dates we proposed to them (i.e. 25-27 February) are not suitable, and the visit has therefore been postponed.

We have left it to the Iraqis to suggest alternative dates to us. We shall be in touch with you again in due course about revised dates.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

IRAQ

Relations July 1979.

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET
Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215)
GTN 215)
(Switchboard) 215 7877

From the Minister for Trade

Advised by DTI:- Mtg now OFF 11/2/85

NBPT
CDP
11/2

CONFIDENTIAL

P F Ricketts Esq
Private Secretary to
Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London
SW1A 2AH

11 February 1985

Dear Peter

VISIT OF IRAQI MINISTER TO LONDON

Mr Channon has seen your letter of 30 January to Charles Powell and his reply of 31 January.

Mr Channon will be happy to see Mr Tariq Aziz, whom he met in Baghdad in November. He would be prepared to offer a meeting and lunch on 27 February, or, if Mr Tariq Aziz has left the UK by then, a meeting on 25 or 26 February. Officials in our Departments will keep in touch about dates.

I am sending copies of this letter to Charles Powell (No 10 Downing Street) and Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever
Steve

STEPHEN NICKLEN
Private Secretary to
the Minister for Trade

IRAQ; Relations; July 1979

11 FEB 1985

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 January 1985

Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister to London

Thank you for your letter of 30 January about the forthcoming visit of the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to London.

The Prime Minister will be able to see Tariq Aziz on 26 February at 1100 for half an hour.

The Prime Minister has had reports that both the Iraqis and a number of Governments in the Gulf believe that considerable quantities of British arms, ammunition and spare parts beyond the limited quantities authorised by Ministers are still reaching Iran; and that Tariq Aziz is likely to make a great deal of this during his visit to the United Kingdom. I should be grateful if the briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting could provide a firm, comprehensive defence against these allegations.

I am sending copies of this letter to Steve Nicklen (Department of Trade and Industry) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Charles Powell

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

26 Feb 11 1170

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CCPC (1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 January, 1985

Prime Minister

Agree to see Iraqi Foreign Minister? (It's after the Washington visit).

CDP 30/1

Dear Charles,

Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister to London

In November Sir Geoffrey Howe invited the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to stop off in London for talks on his way to an official visit to Washington. In the event, Tariq Aziz was unable to travel to London due to the death of his mother, but Mr Luce (during his visit to Baghdad in November) subsequently invited the Foreign Minister to reinstate the visit, some time in the New Year.

We should now like to suggest firm dates to the Iraqis and have identified 25-27 February as a convenient period. However, in proposing these dates to the Iraqis we shall, at the same time, have to give them some idea of what the programme is likely to include. Our Ambassador in Baghdad has strongly recommended a call on the Prime Minister, pointing out that as well as being Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz holds the rank of Deputy Prime Minister and is a member of the influential Baath Party junta, the Revolutionary Command Council. Apart from arranging a call on the Prime Minister, we would also propose to arrange calls for Tariz Aziz on Mr Heseltine and Mr Channon.

Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that a visit by Tariz Aziz soon would be useful, and endorses our Ambassador's view that the success of the visit is likely to depend on the level of Ministerial attention. Our relations with Iraq have always been difficult, but the atmosphere has improved in recent months, following the visits by Mr Luce and Mr Channon at the end of last year. We are keen to build on this improvement by having a further round of exchanges with Tariz Aziz. We continue to regard Iraq as an important market in the future for British companies (our visible exports are evn now running at £330m per year); prospects in the medium and long-term should be enhanced when the conflict with Iran is over and Iraq resumes her position as a leading oil exporter in the Middle East. In addition, we would value another opportunity to make further high level representations on behalf of the two British subjects imprisoned in Iraq, John Smith and Donald Hagger, and if necessary explain further our policy on the question of UK defence sales to Iran, which has been a contentious issue with the Iraqis and their Arab allies.

Sir Geoffrey appreciates that the Prime Minister's diary for this period will already be very full, but would be grateful if she could consider receiving Tariz Aziz for a brief meeting at some time during the dates we intend to propose to the Iraqis, ie on 25 or 26 February.

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Nickeln (DTI) and Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

FILE

RW

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 October, 1983

VISIT OF THE FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Ramadhan on his departure from the United Kingdom.

A. L. DOLES

J. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Fay

Prime Minister (2)

AR 7/10

MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER FROM FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ - CONVEYED BY TELEPHONE FROM GROUND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

On the occasion of the departure of myself and my delegation from the British sky I would like to express to your Excellency once again my profound thanks and gratitude for the warm reception and cordial hospitality accorded to us during our visit to your friendly country. I feel confident that the talks we held will further strengthen the ties of co-understanding and co-operation existing between us in the interest of our two friendly countries and people.

I wish your Excellency good health and the friendly British people further progress and prosperity.

7 October, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 October 1983

Dear John,

VISIT OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

I enclose a record of the formal talks between the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq which took place at 10 Downing Street this morning.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Jonathan Spencer (Department of Trade and Industry) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

Charles.

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

ce master.

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ ON THURSDAY 6 OCTOBER AT 10 DOWNING STREET AT 12 NOON

Present:

Prime Minister

Minister of State, FCO
(Mr. Richard Luce MP)

Minister of State, DTI
(Rt. Hon. Paul Channon MP)

H.E. Mr. J. C. Moberly

Mr. S. L. Egerton

Sir A. Parsons

Mr. A. J. Coles

H.E. Mr. Taha Yasin Ramadhan
(Deputy Prime Minister)

Mr. Hassan Ali
(Minister of Trade)

Mr. Ahmed Taqi
(Minister of Oil)

Mr. Qaraghuli
(Ambassador)

Mr. Sahhaf
(MFA official)

* * * * * * *

Welcoming Mr. Ramadhan, the Prime Minister said that she would be glad to hear his views on world problems, especially those affecting the Middle East, and on the economic situation in Iraq. We were particularly interested in the current problems of the Gulf and especially the prospects for bringing the Iran/Iraq war to an end. Both our countries were oil producers. We were both interested in the price of oil and in future oil supplies.

Mr. Ramadhan thanked the Prime Minister for her invitation to him to visit this country and for the opportunity which this provided for direct consultations on matters affecting mutual interests. He firmly believed that direct contact at this level offered the best opportunity to create understanding, especially on fundamental issues.

/ He would

He would like to deal with two questions - the bilateral relationship between Iraq and the United Kingdom, and the Iran/ Iraq war.

In recent years there had been a considerable development in our relationship. He believed that the background to this relationship, especially in the cultural field, would enable us to develop relations still further. He had frequently said to his colleagues that they must take opportunities to inform British representatives of developments in Iraqi society. It was important that Britain did not have an out-dated idea of Iraq.

Iraq was rich in resources and in ambition. The constant goal of the leadership was to develop Iraq socially and economically so that it was able to play an important role on the world stage. In the past Iraq had been hampered by illiteracy, ignorance and political chaos. That stage was now over. The country had now reached the stage of political maturity and had taken the lead in eradicating illiteracy.

It followed an independent policy. It took its decisions and developed its relationships on a basis of joint interests. The closeness or distance of its relations with each country depended on the nature of the response it received. Unquestionably political attitudes had an effect on the quality of relations. The closer political attitudes were, the more fruitful relations were.

The economic agreements arrived at during the present visit were an important step towards the further development of relations. He wished to express his pleasure at the reports that he had received of the progress in the negotiations. There were great hopes for further development. He wished to assure the Prime Minister that the horizons were wide for developing relations and that the opportunities for cooperation could be multiplied.

/ He would be

He would be pleased to brief the Prime Minister on the economic situation of Iraq even though this was an internal matter.

Under the five year plan Iraq had reached a new economic stage which could be termed "explosive development". Iraq had passed from the stage of being an under-developed country. Now was a period of special experiment. Much had been done in construction, industry and agriculture. Unemployment had been completely eliminated, even though there were 1½ million non-Iraqis working in Iraq. Investment during the first two years of the war had reached $25 milliards. This was less than Iraq could have accommodated had there been the means to implement projects. But prospects had been reduced by the severance by Syria of the oil pipeline and the cutting off of Gulf oil early in the war.

In the last year the financial situation, but not the economic situation, had been difficult. The fact that the war was fought on a front of 1,180 kms. indicated Iraq's difficulties. The closure by Syria of the pipeline meant that 700,000 barrels of oil per day did not flow. This had lead to financial difficulties. But it was a temporary situation.

Countries other than Iran had tried to contribute to Iraq's economic difficulties with the aim of bringing about a collapse of the economy. Many parties were basing their policy on an out-dated assessment of Iraq. They took no account of the strength of contemporary Iraq. The Government had taken a number of wise economic measures to frustrate these attempts. In order to cope with temporary problems, billions of dollars had been spent on directing consumption and stimulating the economy. There was close contact with foreign companies which were working in the development field. Steps had been taken to remedy the slowness of payments due to these companies. Agreements had been made with no less than 90% of them.

/ Even

Even if the war lasted for ten years, Iraq's future prospects were rosy. The Prime Minister said that the war had already gone on for four years and that was long enough. Mr. Ramadhan said that Iraq was determined to do what was necessary. It had a very large population and the birthrate was high. Britain should speak to the party that did not want peace. Iraq had decided not to bend its knee to the aggressor.

But returning to Iraq's future prospects, as soon as the war ended the economy would pick up. Steps had been taken to implement a number of export-oriented projects. The Iraq/Turkey pipeline was being extended and would be finished in March next year. This would increase oil exports by 50%. Iraq would also soon sign a gas agreement. It was negotiating with Saudi Arabia for a pipeline across her territory which would have a capacity of 1½ million barrels daily. Agreement in principle had been reached. The project now had to be implemented. Taken together, these projects would give Iraq the capacity to export about 3 million barrels of oil a day, which was roughly its capacity before the war. This capacity would be much increased after the war when other pipelines came on stream. The most difficult phase of development was now over. Implementation of the projects he had described would begin early in 1984. Growth would not be rapid but it would be evident. Iraq had excellent cooperation with friendly countries. It was known to respect its obligations. Companies working in Iraq could be sure of a fair deal.

He wished to repeat his satisfaction at the agreements reached with the United Kingdom. He hoped that they would be implemented with the same enthusiasm because the prospects for the future were good.

Turning to the Iran/Iraq war, the question arose of why it had lasted so long. He wished to speak frankly. If the two super-powers had wished to, they could have stopped it long ago. But they viewed the conflict in the light of their own interests.

/ The

The Prime Minister asked whether Mr. Ramadhan could elucidate. How could the super-powers have stopped the war? It seemed to us that many people had tried to, but none had been successful.

Mr. Ramadhan said that Iraq had from the beginning consistently called for peace and was ready to implement all resolutions which called for peace. So it was clear that it was Iran that was the aggressor. The declarations of the Iranian authorities proved that Iran wished to continue the war, to extend it and to export revolution. Recent history showed that the super-powers had been able to stop war. But countries had developed their relations with Iran, taking no account of its desire to continue the war. That country had begun to threaten the world and to implement a policy of blackmail. It had threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz if France delivered five Super Etendards to Iraq. How had the international community reacted? The United States had brought pressure on France not to deliver the aircraft to Iraq because, in their view, this would threaten the export of oil. But Iran was itself threatening to stop oil exports. Was the attitude of these powers likely to encourage Iran to work for peace or to carry on the war? The day would come when Iran would say to countries like France and Britain that if they sold bread to Iraq the Straits would be closed. The United States and other countries knew that the only country which had been denied the benefits of the Gulf, in terms of oil and trade, since the start of the war was Iraq. But he had seen no protest from the international community.

He wanted to make it clear that Iraq was genuinely concerned for the true interests of the Arab states in the Gulf. These interests were best served by a strong Iraq. If Iraq collapsed, Iran's principal aim would have been achieved.

He had to say that he was uneasy at the action of the United Kingdom in expressing its concern to France about the delivery of the Super Etendards. This matter had been discussed in the Revolutionary Command Council which could not understand the British attitude.

Iraq had made proposals for the partial cessation of hostilities. It had also proposed the resumption of normal activities on the basis of the cessation by all Gulf States of military activity.

Iraq had been told that the United States' motive in bringing pressure to bear on France was that the Gulf States had expressed unease about the aircraft. But when Iraq had contacted the Gulf States they had found that this was not the case. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had specifically urged France to implement the contract.

There was considerable potential for the great powers to play a role in bringing an end to the war. Iraq had taken many initiatives for peace in order to create a better atmosphere. Iran would do anything in its own country, even murder children and pregnant women. Iraq would continue to develop its military potential because it wished to be strong. They would adopt all necessary measures, including the purchase of Super Etendards from France.

The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Ramadhan for his frank exposition to which we had listened carefully. No-one in Britain under-estimated the development achievements or the technological requirements of Iraq. The speed of its development was remarkable. This was greatly to the credit of the Iraqi leadership. The pipeline projects, pursued inspite of the war, were encouraging. We recognised the importance of Iraq to the Middle East, the Arab world and the whole of the Western world. We shared Iraq's desire for peace and were frustrated that efforts to bring it about had been fruitless. We were impressed by Iraq's enormous potential for development when the war was over. We recognised that it would become a powerful and influential nation. We wished to use power and influence for good.

We were pleased with his visit and hoped he was too. Conversation could continue informally over lunch. She hoped

/ that

that Mr. Ramadhan would take a message of greeting from her to President Saddam Hussein.

The talks ended at 1300 hours.

A.J.C.

6 October 1983

TOAST SPEECH DSR 11C

Your Excellency,

Your visit to this country is long overdue and we are delighted that on this occasion there was no last minute postponement. I accept full responsibility for the postponement of your visit in June. Although the clash of dates with the General Election was unfortunate, I was always confident that I would be in a position to renew the invitation personally after the election, and I am glad that the visit is now taking place.

Although I have not yet had the pleasure of visiting Baghdad, I have heard much about the ambitious development plans which have transformed Baghdad in recent years and I am delighted that a number of British firms have been able to participate in this development. It is encouraging that this progress has continued despite the sad and costly war with Iran which all of us sincerely hope will soon be ended.

I am also aware that there are a number of similarities between our two countries. I know that Iraq, like Britain, is blessed with a remarkable diversity of scenery and peoples, and the two countries also enjoy substantial oil riches in a world where this precious commodity means so much to our future prosperity.

/We

A.W.O. Ltd. 11: 82. 56-3683. 200m.

We attach great importance to our relations with Iraq and we earnestly hope that these relations will be further strengthened as a result of your visit.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

YOUR VISIT TO THIS COUNTRY IS LONG OVERDUE AND WE ARE DELIGHTED THAT ON THIS OCCASION THERE WAS NO LAST MINUTE POSTPONEMENT.

I ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE POSTPONEMENT OF YOUR VISIT IN JUNE.

ALTHOUGH THE CLASH OF DATES WITH THE GENERAL ELECTION WAS UNFORTUNATE, I WAS ALWAYS CONFIDENT THAT I WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO RENEW THE INVITATION PERSONALLY AFTER THE ELECTION, AND I AM GLAD THAT THE VISIT IS NOW TAKING PLACE.

/ALTHOUGH

ALTHOUGH I HAVE NOT YET HAD THE PLEASURE OF VISITING BAGHDAD, I HAVE HEARD MUCH ABOUT THE AMBITIOUS DEVELOPMENT PLANS WHICH HAVE TRANSFORMED BAGHDAD IN RECENT YEARS AND I AM DELIGHTED THAT A NUMBER OF BRITISH FIRMS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS DEVELOPMENT.

IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT THIS PROGRESS HAS CONTINUED DESPITE THE SAD AND COSTLY WAR WITH IRAN WHICH ALL OF US SINCERELY HOPE WILL SOON BE ENDED.

/I AM ALSO

I AM ALSO AWARE THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SIMILARITIES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

I KNOW THAT IRAQ, LIKE BRITAIN, IS BLESSED WITH A REMARKABLE DIVERSITY OF SCENERY AND PEOPLES, AND THE TWO COUNTRIES ALSO ENJOY SUBSTANTIAL OIL RICHES IN A WORLD WHERE THIS PRECIOUS COMMODITY MEANS SO MUCH TO OUR FUTURE PROSPERITY.

WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND WE EARNESTLY HOPE THAT THESE RELATIONS WILL BE FURTHER STRENGTHENED AS A RESULT OF YOUR VISIT.

VISIT OF HE MR TAHA YASIN RAMADHAN,

FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

5-7 OCTOBER 1983

ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN

(to be read in conjunction with programme attached)

ARRIVAL

The First Deputy Prime Miniser of Iraq HE Mr Taha Ramadhan and party will arrive by special aircraft at LHR Southside. As soon as the aircraft doors open a representative of the British Airport Authority will escort the greeting party to the aircraft. The Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq HE Dr Wahbi Abdul-Razaq Fattah Al Qaraghuli will board the aircraft and escort the First Deputy Prime Minister to the tarmac where he will introduce the welcoming party (in order).

Mr Richard Luce MP
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Mr J C Moberly
HM Ambassador at Baghdad

Brigadier Alan Cowan
Secretary, Government Hospitality

Group Captain Robert Thomson
Escort Officer

Colonel Philip Worrall
Escort Officer

Transport

Cars are provided by Government Hospitality Fund. The seating which is shown at Annex 1 is for the arrival and departure only. Car plans throughout the visit will be made on a daily basis by the Escort Officers.

5 October

The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, The Rt Hon Cecil Parkinson MP, will host a luncheon. See separate programmes for Mr Hassan Ali and Mr Taqi. The following members of the official suite are also invited: Mr Al Sahhaf, Mr Adham and Mr A'jam.

6 October

The following will accompany the First Deputy Prime Minister aboard the 'Royal Nore' to the Thames Barrier:

Mr Hassan Ali

Mr Taqi

Mr Qaraghouli

Mr Sahhaf

Mr Adham

Mr A'jam

plus 4 others whose names are yet to be announced. The party will be accompanied by Mr Adrian Franklin, Area Development Manager, Middle East Costain International Ltd and Mr Colin Clark, Area Manager for the Middle East, Costain International Ltd.

Talks with the Prime Minister

The following will also be present:

Mr Hassan Ali

Mr Taqi

Mr Qaraghouli

Mr Sahhaf

Luncheon at No 10 Downing Street

The following are also invited:-

Mr Hassan Ali

Mr Qasim Taqi

Mr Mohammed Sa'id Sahhaf

Mr Abdul Razzak Qaraghouli

Mr Abdul Munim Hassan 'Alwan As Sammarai

Mr Majid Adham

Mr Waddad A'jam

Mr Abdul Wahhab Al Mufti

Visit to British Aerospace

The following will accompany the First Deputy Prime Minister in the helicopter: Mr Hassan Ali and Mr Qaraghouli plus two whose names are yet to be announced.

Dinner: Host The Rt Hon Viscount Whitelaw

The following are also invited:

Mr Hassan Ali

Mr Qasim Taqi

Mr Mohammed Sa'id Sahhaf

Mr Abdul Razzak Qaraghouli

Mr Adjul Minim Hassan 'Alwan As Sammarai

Mr Majid Adham

Mr Waddad A'jam

Mr Abdul Wahhab al Mufti

Mr Farook Dawood Salmaan al Obeidi

Friday 7 October

Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst

The following will accompany the First Deputy Prime Minister:

Mr Hassan Ali

Mr Mohammed Sa'id Sahhaf

Mr Abdul Razzak Qaraghouli

Mr Majid Adham

Mr Waddad A'jam

Mr Na'el Kemal Abdul Majid

3 Security Officers

7 October

DEPARTURE

Details to be announced.

Anne Hutchison

Anne Hutchison (Miss)
Inward Visits Section
Protocol Department

ANNEX I

GHF A


VISIT OF

VEHICLE SEATING ARRANGEMENT

Car No 1

1 HE Mr Ramadhan
2
3 HE Amb of Iraq
4 ADC
5
6 Spec. Branch Officer


Driver



Car No 4

1 Mr Bafi
2 Mr Majid
3 Mr Latij
4 Mr Ibrahim
5 ADC
6


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Car No 2

1 HE Mr Ali
2
3 HE Mr Taqi
4 Mr Moberly
5 Spec. Branch Officer
6 Grp Capt Thomson


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
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Car No 3

1 Mr Sahhef
2
3 Mr Adham
4 Mr A'jam
5 Spec. Branch Officer
6 Col Worrall


Driver



Car No

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Driver



DISTRIBUTION

10 DOWNING STREET

Private Secretary (2)
Press Office (2)

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ (6)

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Private Secretary (2)
PS/Mr Luce (2)
PS/PUS (1)
Sir John Leahy (1)
Mr Egerton (1)
Mr Haskell (1)
Mr Henderson - MED (6)
News Dept (3)
Resident Clerk
Protocol Dept (6)
Miss Lothian

GOVERNMENT HOSPITALITY FUND (15)

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Private Secretary (2)
PS/Mr Channon (2)

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Private Secretary

Viscount Whitelaw,
Privy Council Office, Whitehall SW1

TREASURY MEDICAL ADVISER

Dr Semmence

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 October 1983

VISIT OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

I am sending to you separately the record of the formal talks.

The Prime Minister raised informally with Mr. Ramadhan the cases of Mr. Smith and Mr. Hagger. She said that she wished to appeal to him on the basis of humanity to review the sentences and to improve the conditions of imprisonment of the two men. I believe that the Prime Minister spoke twice to this effect.

Mr. Ramadhan simply took note.

I am sending copies of this letter to Jonathan Spencer (Department of Trade and Industry) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A.J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Top Copy on
~~Defen~~ Middle East
Arms Sales, Pt 3

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-~~XXXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

MO 26/9/22

5th October 1983

Dear Tim

IRAQ: SALE OF NIMROD AIRCRAFT

The Prime Minister's brief for her talks and lunch tomorrow with Mr Taha Ramadhan, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, included reference to the possible sale of Nimrod Aircraft to Iraq. The British Aerospace/MOD team referred to in the brief returned from Baghdad last night, and you might find it useful to know the latest position.

BAe's formal response to the Iraqi request for a Company-to-Government contract was given by two senior directors, who explained that the deal could only be achieved on a Government-to-Government basis, given the background of the Iraqi request for onerous bank guarantees. The Iraqis took this in good heart (not least because the message was given at senior level) and after some discussion the Iraqis agreed to reconsider Government-to-Government terms. The plan is to return to Iraq towards the end of November with a draft Government contract.

The fact that the Iraqis have reverted to a Government-to-Government structure is no panacea. The problems that caused the breakdown of the Government-to-Government talks in March will still have to be resolved (for example, a settlement of the bank guarantee problem, payment terms, applicable law and termination liability). Moreover, the Iraqis made no secret of their acute financial problems and made it clear that they could not accept the substantial advance payments required by BAe. In order to maintain a positive cash flow on the sale - essential given the volatile political scene in the region - we would be looking for around 30% on signature with at least 5% every 6 months thereafter. The Iraqis also referred to the possibility of credit for Nimrod, but in line with OD Committee's decision in November 1982 it was made clear that the deal had to be on cash terms.

T Flesher Esq

None of the points arising from the discussions in Baghdad alter the original Defence Sales assessment in the brief on Nimrod. We are effectively in an end-game; a sale seems increasingly unlikely (the Iraqis have not yet heard the full price of around £1.8bn on forward fixed rates); and our best short-term hopes are to disengage amicably and to try again later when Iraqi finances (or her Arab backers) allow. The Prime Minister's firm statement of support to Mr Ramadhan for the deal will therefore be a key feature in this short-term strategy.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (FCO) and Ruth Thompson (DTI).

Yours

(S H LOWE)

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 October 1983

Dear John,

Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister's Call on the Prime Minister
6 October 1983

I enclose briefs for Mr Ramadhan's call on the Prime Minister tomorrow.

MR Ramadhan proposes to be accompanied by the Minister of Trade, Mr Hassan Ali, the Minister of Oil, Mr Ahmed Taqi, Mr Qaraghuli the Iraqi Ambassador, and Mr Sahhaf a senior official of the Iraqi MFA. On the FCO side, Mr Luce, Mr Moberly (HM Ambassador, Baghdad) and Mr Egerton are free to attend if the Prime Minister wishes. You may wish to have support from DTI also.

N. Clarke will attend.

I would draw your attention particularly to the briefs on credit (No 3(a)) and consular cases (No 2(b)). Credit is likely to be the centre-piece of the visit as far as the Iraqis are concerned. Ministers have yet to take a final decision on this issue and the briefing takes account of this.

From our point of view the visit represents a unique opportunity to tackle the Iraqis at a high level on the question of our consular cases. The prison conditions under which the two British nationals (Smith and Hagger) are held are appalling. We have been pressing for some time for improvements. But our main objective during this visit will be to persuade the Iraqis that an early review of the long setenences imposed on both prisoners would be widely welcomed in this country.

The Foreign Secretary is calling on Mr Ramadhan today. I will let you know if any particular points arise. I enclose a copy of the full programme.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET
TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-215 5144
SWITCHBOARD 01-215 7877

From the Minister for Trade

Andrew Turnbull Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London SW1

5th October 1983

Dear Andrew,

Before the Prime Minister sees Mr Ramadhan tomorrow, it might be helpful to let you and copy recipients know how Mr Channon's Joint Commission meeting with Trade Minister Hassan Ali went this afternoon.

Hassan Ali's initial reaction to our offer of £250M 5 year credit was that of a good Souk haggler - grudging appreciation, coupled with comments of "not enough", and an immediate attempt to bargain into our offer "strategic" consumer goods, such as medicines, food and clothing. Nonetheless, there are clear signs that the Iraqis are well pleased - as they should be.

The Ministers then adjourned so that officials could begin negotiations, likely to continue late into the night, of the text of a Financial Protocol. This will be in general terms - ECGD will have to negotiate in detail in coming months - but must contain tough conditions safeguarding our own interests. It seems likely, to judge from the atmosphere at the Ministerial meeting, that the Protocol will be ready for Mr Channon and Hassan Ali to sign tomorrow, along with the Agreed Minutes of the Joint Commission covering lesser matters, at 11.00 immediately before the meeting with the Prime Minister; but should officials fail to reach agreement, the fall-back would be for signature to be delayed until Mr Channon's visit to Iraq early next month for the Baghdad Fair. I shall confirm the outcome by telephone tomorrow morning.

In Mr Channon's view, the Prime Minister should be advised to reiterate to Ramadhan, as he has done to Hassan Ali, that we have made a unique effort to be helpful, and have very little flexibility in negotiation on terms and conditions - in short, something close to "take it or leave it".

In addition, Mr Channon was only able to mention the Kier problem over lunch, the meeting itself becoming too confused (on the Iraqi side) to repeat it. He is not confident that Hassan Ali has taken in how seriously we regard it. Since Ramadhan himself is the source of the problem, he thinks it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could make a point of telling Ramadhan that, if efforts to reach a compromise this week fail (as is very likely), the best solution would be for the Iraqis to return Kier's bond money and agree to an amicable suspension (ie termination) of the contract; it was, after all, an Iraqi default on a cash contract which caused the problem in the first place.

I am copying this letter to John Kerr (HM Treasury), Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Jonathan Rees

JONATHAN REES
Private Secretary to the
Minister for Trade (PAUL CHANNON)

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF IRAQI FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER

I suggest that the talks (at noon) are held in the Cabinet Room - though you will need to end Cabinet by 1150 in order that the room can be prepared.

He will be accompanied by:

Mr. Hassan Ali	(Minister of Trade)
Mr. Ahmed Taqi	(Minister of Oil)
Mr. Qaraghuli	(Ambassador)
Mr. Sahhaf	(MFA official)

We shall have Mr. Luce, Mr. Channon, Mr. Moberly (our Ambassador) and Mr. Egerton.

The briefs are not easy to summarise and I hope you will have time to glance through them.

The following are perhaps the main points you should make:

(a) Encouraged by improvement in relations. This visit should improve further.

(b) Have made effort on credit. Expect prompt payment to UK firms, some of whom are suffering badly.

(c) Hope Consular cases will not prevent further progress (mention specific cases of Hagger and Smith informally over lunch).

(d) Hope we can make progress with Nimrod and Hawk Trainer sales.

(e) Hope Iraq will not support Argentine resolution on Falklands.

(f)

(f) How do they see the war with Iran.

(g) Oil - March OPEC agreement successful in restoring order but market remains fragile.

I shall let you have separately an up-to-date brief on credit, following Mr. Channon's talks today.

Mr. Ramadhan speaks no English. There will therefore be Arabic/English ineterpretation which will reduce the time for talking.

AJC

5 October 1983

PRIME MINISTER

Visit of Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister

I suggest that the talks (at noon) are held in the Cabinet Room - though you will need to end Cabinet by 1150 in order that the room can be prepared.

He will be accompanied by:

Mr. Hassan Ali	(Minister of Trade)
Mr. Ahmed Taqi	(Minister of Oil)
Mr. Qaraghuli	(Ambassador)
Mr. Sahhaf	(MFA official)

We shall have Mr. Luce, Mr. Channon, Mr. Moberly (our Ambassador) and Mr. Egerton (FCO).

The briefs are not easy to summarise and I hope you will have time to glance through them.

The Foreign Secretary had an unproductive meeting with Ramadhan this afternoon. The latter spent a lot of time setting out his views on the world. When Sir Geoffrey raised the cases of Mr. Hagger and Mr. Smith he immediately linked them to the case of the convicted terrorist, Salim Hassan, and virtually implied that the latter's actions had the approval of the Iraqi Government. It will be necessary to make it plain that there can be no exchange of prisoners.

I attach a letter describing Mr. Channon's meeting with the Iraqi Trade Minister this afternoon. The Iraqis were, predictably, not very gracious about our offer of credit. But there is every prospect that the two sides will sign a satisfactory agreement at 11 o'clock tomorrow, before your talks. Mr. Channon will attend the talks.

/As Mr. Ramadhan

As Mr. Ramadhan speaks no ~~Arabic~~ English there will have to be interpretation, which will cut down the time for talking.

You may think that the best way to handle the formal talks is to keep them fairly general. You may like to follow these headings:

a) His view of the situation in the Gulf and the Iran/Iraq war.

b) Oil - March OPEC agreement successful in restoring order but market remains fragile.

c) Encouraged by improvement in bilateral relations. Have made effort on credit (see attached letter from DTI). Expect prompt payment to UK firms, some of whom are suffering badly.

d) Hope Consular cases will not prevent further progress (mention specific cases of Hagger and Smith over lunch).

e) Hope we can make progress with Nimrod and Hawk trainer sales.

f) Hope Iraq will not support Argentine resolution on Falklands.

I attach some notes for an after lunch speech.

A.J.C.

5 October 1983

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 August 1983

Dear Willie.

Visit of First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

John Coles wrote to me on 25 July to say that the Prime Minister could offer talks and lunch for Mr Taha Ramadhan on Thursday 6 October. Baghdad have now confirmed that Ramadhan has accepted the dates for the visit. 6 October fits well for the Prime Minister's involvement.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

Willie Rickett Esq
10 Downing Street

Visa.
Possible visit
to Ramadhan
Nov. 5th

CONFIDENTIAL

Brc

file

DC: Tim Flesher

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 July 1983

VISIT OF FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

I am sorry that it has not been possible to give you an earlier reply to your letter of 1 July proposing that Mr. Taha Ramadhan should be invited to visit the United Kingdom some time in October. Before taking a view on this, it has been necessary to fix dates for certain other foreign affairs engagements for the Prime Minister.

Mrs. Thatcher would be able to offer talks and lunch for Mr. Ramadhan on Thursday 6 October. Perhaps you could let me know in due course whether this is acceptable? (I should warn that it will be difficult to find alternatives).

I am copying this letter to Jonathan Spencer (Department of Trade and Industry) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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①.

Prime Minister

Agree to hold talks, followed by lunch, on Thursday, 6 October?

A J. C. 22/7.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 July, 1983

Dear John,

Visit of Taha Ramadhan, First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

You will recall that this visit, which was due to take place from 8-10 June, was postponed because of the general election. The visit has been postponed on two previous occasions and the Prime Minister's invitation to Mr Ramadhan has now been open for over eighteen months.

The arguments in favour of Mr Ramadhan's visit to the United Kingdom were set out in my letters to you dated 7 January and 15 March (copies enclosed). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that a visit by Ramadham would still benefit our relations with Iraq, and that it is in our interest that the visit should go ahead. On previous form the Iraqis will no doubt wish to link the Ramadhan visit to a meeting of the UK/Iraq Joint Commission. We and the Department of Trade are again happy to go along with this but as before we will make it clear to the Iraqis that the Prime Minister will take no substantive part in the talks on the UK side.

You will be aware from the previous correspondence on this visit that talks with the Prime Minister followed by a meal would be an essential part of the programme for Ramadhan if it was to be a success.

On timing, Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that sometime after the summer months, preferably October, would be best. Sir Geoffrey would therefore be grateful to know if the Prime Minister would agree to reschedule the arrangements for talks and a meal with Mr Ramadhan to sometime in October and if you could offer a specific date for this which we could put to the Iraqis.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade and to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

John Holmes.

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

7 January 1983

Dear John,

Visit by Mr Taha Ramadhan, First Deputy Prime Minister

Francis Richards wrote to Michael Alexander on 23 November 1981 with a proposal that the First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr Taha Ramadhan, should be invited by the Prime Minister to visit the United Kingdom as her guest. Michael Alexander's reply of 25 November 1981 recorded the Prime Minister's agreement.

Iraq's preoccupation with the war against Iran and Mr Ramadhan's ministerial responsibilities have prevented him from taking up the invitation before but he has spoken warmly of his interest in coming at the earliest possible time. He has now told us that he would like the visit to take place in late January or February. We understand that the Prime Minister's diary over both these periods is such that while she might be able to receive Mr Ramadhan for talks, she would be unable to offer him a meal.

Mr Pym believes that a visit by Mr Ramadhan soon would be useful. There has been a steady improvement in our bilateral relations over the past three years. Exports have risen steadily. 1982 figures seem certain to outstrip comfortably the 1981 record total of £680 million. Iraq's current economic problems caused by the war mean that we, and our competitors, are unlikely to sustain these levels next year. But when the war ends, Iraq promises to be a very lucrative market for our exporters. It is a difficult regime. There remain a number of thorny problems in our bilateral relations, mainly consular cases, but we have much to gain from developing closer links. Mr Ramadhan continues to be the economic overlord in Iraq. His visit would provide us with an opportunity to show him British industry and in particular to promote specific projects in which he will have a direct interest, eg Nimrod and Hawk.

/Unfortunately

Unfortunately, Mr Ramadhan can be very touchy about protocol. We need to offer him a programme which takes account of this and of his position as number two in the Ba'ath regime. So far as the official part of the programme is concerned, Mr Pym envisages a round of calls, as well as hospitality. He hopes that the Prime Minister as nominal host will agree to talks and a meal (as envisaged in Francis Richards's letter under reference). A call at noon followed by lunch might be the best arrangement. Mr Pym believes that it would jeopardise the success of the visit if the programme did not include the offer of a meal hosted by the Prime Minister. It would be better therefore to offer dates some way ahead, if necessary, than to offer earlier dates without the prospect of hospitality by Mrs Thatcher. Our Ambassador in Baghdad has advised that Mr Ramadhan will probably refuse to come if he is not offered hospitality by the Prime Minister.

I should be grateful to know if the Prime Minister would agree to talks and a meal as proposed, and if you could let me have perhaps alternative dates which we could put to the Iraqis for the visit.

I am copying this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade), Ian Ellison (Department of Industry) and David Oman (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary


A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 March 1983



Dear Tony,

Visit of Taha Ramadhan, First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

As you know, the above visit, which was to have taken place between 8-10 March, was postponed late in February by the Iraqis. They pleaded the war, the deteriorating economy and the call of the NAM Summit. They suggested rescheduling the visit to the second half of May or the month of June. The UK/Iraqi Joint Commission talks, and visit of Trade Minister Hassan Ali, due to take place between 8-10 March, were also postponed.

The Prime Minister's invitation to Mr Ramadhan has now been open for over a year. The arguments in favour of Mr Ramadhan's visit to the United Kingdom were set out in my letter to you of 7 January. These arguments remain valid, and while Iraqi behaviour so far is tiresome and there can be no guarantee that things will be better next time round, Mr Pym believes that it is in our best interests that the visit should go ahead, preferably before 12 June (since the fasting month of Ramadhan begins then, which could lead to complications for a visit later in the month). The Iraqis have asked that the Joint Commission talks should also be rescheduled to June, so that Taha Ramadhan can 'take the chair' on the Iraqi side. We and the Department of Trade are content to go along with this, but we have made it clear to our Ambassador in Baghdad that the Prime Minister would take no substantive part in the talks on the UK side, though some association between the joint Commission and the high level visit may in the event be appropriate.

The essential part of the programme for a visit by Ramadhan would be talks with the Prime Minister, followed by a meal. I should therefore be grateful to know if the Prime Minister would agree to reschedule the arrangements

/for

CONFIDENTIAL

for talks and a meal to some time between mid-May and 12 June and if you could offer a specific date for this which we could put to the Iraqis.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade) and to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Iraq's Nov '81
Visit of Ramadhan



~~SUBJECT~~ OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence Deskby
CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE

~~CC MMAFAC~~ ~~OPS~~

~~PRIME MINISTER'S~~
~~PERSONAL MESSAGE~~
~~SERIAL No.~~ .....

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TEL NO

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GRS
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER
RAMADHAN VISIT

1. The timing of the election means that Ramadhan's visit will have to be postponed. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to Ramadhan:

BEGINS: 'Your Excellency

I am sorry to have to tell you that I shall not now be able to receive you as planned in June. As you may have heard, I have decided that a general election should be held on 9 June. I am afraid that our proposed meeting on 10 June cannot therefore take place.

As you know, I attach ~~considerable~~ importance to our relations with Iraq and I know that your visit would have been a valuable means of strengthening these links. I very much hope that we shall be able to find mutually agreeable dates again for you to come to London soon.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration. ENDS

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File number	Dept: PRIVATE OFFICE	Distribution: MED, PCD, TRED, PS, PS/Mr Hurd, PS/PUS
Drafted by (Block capitals): J E HOLMES		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch: JEHolmes		
Cover reference: 10/5	Time of despatch	

copies to PS/Prime Minister
PS/Lord Colville
PS/Mr Rees.

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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10 May, 1983

VISIT OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

Thank you for your letter of 9 May. The Prime Minister has approved the proposed message to Mr. Ramadhan (with the deletion of the word "considerable" from the second paragraph) and I should be grateful if you could arrange for its despatch.

A. J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

9

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 May 1983

Dear John.

Visit of Taha Ramadhan

This visit is obviously affected by the general election on 9 June. Relations with Iraq are tricky and though the Iraqis have have twice postponed the visit themselves, it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could send a short message to Ramadhan on the lines of the attached draft.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER
RAMADHAN VISIT

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As you know, I attach ~~considerable~~ importance to our relations with Iraq and I know that your visit would have been a valuable means of strengthening these links. I very much hope that we shall be able to find mutually agreeable dates again for you to come to London soon.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration. ENDS

MS

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File number	Dept: PRIVATE OFFICE	Distribution
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Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch: JEH		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

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		Classification and Caveats		Page
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5 May 1983

Visit of First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 4 May.

I confirm that the talks with Mr. Ramadhan will begin at noon on 10 June.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 May, 1983

Dear John,

Visit of First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 24 March.

I can now confirm that the Iraqis have agreed to our proposed date of 10 June for Ramadhan's talks and lunch with the Prime Minister. May we assume that the talks will start at noon? We are now proceeding on the basis of a three day visit from 8-10 June.

You mentioned in your letter that these new dates might cause problems for the Secretary of State for Trade. This has now been resolved. We have made it clear to the Iraqis that Lord Cockfield may be away during this period, but that Dr Vaughan who visited Baghdad last autumn has agreed to co-chair the Joint Commission talks if required.

I shall let you have a draft guest list for the lunch as soon as possible.

I am copying this to John Rhodes (Department of Trade) and to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Gray: Visited for Ramadhan Nov 1980

4 MAY 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

da

Iraq

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 March 1983

Visit of First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 15 March.

The only day in the period between mid May and 12 June when the Prime Minister could hold talks and give lunch to Mr. Taha Ramadhan is Friday, 10 June. I have today seen John Rhodes' letter to you of 24 March which suggests that the Secretary of State for Trade may have some difficulty about this date. If that difficulty can be resolved, the Prime Minister would be content for you to put the new date to the Iraqis.

I am copying this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade) and to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE 1 VICTORIA STREET LONDON SW1H 0ET Telephone 01-215 7877

From the Secretary of State

John Holmes Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London, SW1A 2AL

24 March 1983

Dear John,

VISIT OF TAHA RAMADHAN, FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

I have seen a copy of your ~~15~~ March letter to John Coles, suggesting revised dates for Mr Ramadhan's visit of sometime between mid-May and 12 June.

The Secretary of State is thinking in terms of making overseas visits during this period. I am not yet in a position to approach you formally for the Foreign Secretary's approval, but it is very probable that he will be making a European visit between Thursday 26 May-Tuesday 31 May inclusive, and quite likely that he will be looking to make a Far Eastern visit very shortly afterwards in the first two weeks of June.

From the Secretary of State's point of view, therefore, it would clearly be preferable if any visit by Mr Ramadhan took place in the third or fourth weeks of May, and preferably the third week beginning Monday 16 May. Clearly, real difficulties could arise if, in the event, the Secretary of State was expected to co-chair a Joint Commission with Mr Ramadhan.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Coles (Number 10) and to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours sincerely,

JOHN RHODES
Private Secretary

Iraq : Proposed visit by Int Rep. P.M

11/87

24 MAR 1988

(1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 March 1983

Prime Minister

The only possibility is talks followed by lunch on Friday, 10 June. Agree?

A.F.C. 15/3.

Surely there is the possibility of dinner? If not - yes.

Dear John,

Visit of Taha Ramadhan, First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

As you know, the above visit, which was to have taken place between 8-10 March, was postponed late in February by the Iraqis. They pleaded the war, the deteriorating economy and the call of the NAM Summit. They suggested rescheduling the visit to the second half of May or the month of June. The UK/Iraqi Joint Commission talks, and visit of Trade Minister Hassan Ali, due to take place between 8-10 March, were also postponed.

The Prime Minister's invitation to Mr Ramadhan has now been open for over a year. The arguments in favour of Mr Ramadhan's visit to the United Kingdom were set out in my letter to you of 7 January. These arguments remain valid, and while Iraqi behaviour so far is tiresome and there can be no guarantee that things will be better next time round, Mr Pym believes that it is in our best interests that the visit should go ahead, preferably before 12 June (since the fasting month of Ramadhan begins then, which could lead to complications for a visit later in the month). The Iraqis have asked that the Joint Commission talks should also be rescheduled to June, so that Taha Ramadhan can 'take the chair' on the Iraqi side. We and the Department of Trade are content to go along with this, but we have made it clear to our Ambassador in Baghdad that the Prime Minister would take no substantive part in the talks on the UK side, though some association between the joint Commission and the high level visit may in the event be appropriate.

The essential part of the programme for a visit by Ramadhan would be talks with the Prime Minister, followed by a meal. I should therefore be grateful to know if the Prime Minister would agree to reschedule the arrangements

/for

for talks and a meal to some time between mid-May and 12 June and if you could offer a specific date for this which we could put to the Iraqis.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade) and to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Iraq, Nov 81
visit of PM
deputy

PS No 10



With the compliments of

MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

25.2.83.

GR 500 CONFIDENTIAL cc J. Dawson. PS No: 10
CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY
DESKBY 231100Z
FM BAGHDAD 231020Z FEB 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 128 OF 23 FEBRUARY, 1983
INFO IMMEDIATE DOT (OT5), MODUK (FOR DEFENCE SALES)

MY TELEGRAM NO 123 (NOT TO ALL): VISIT OF TAHA YASIN RAMADHAN.

1. SAHHAF, DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, SUMMONED ME TO THE MFA THIS MORNING TO ANNOUNCE, WITH CINSIDERABLE REGRET, THAT, AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, THE FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HAD RELUCTANTLY COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT HE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT AFTER ALL BE ABLE TO VISIT THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 9 MARCH. SAHHAF, WHO WAS EVIDENTLY EMBARRASSED, SAID THAT THERE WERE THREE REASONS FOR RAMADHAN'S DECISION:-

(A) THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS ATTENDANCE AT THE DELHI NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT FROM 7 TO 11 MARCH AS HEAD OF THE IRAQI DELEGATION SEMICOLON

(B) THE THREAT OF A RENEWED IRANIAN OFFENSIVE TOWARDS AMARA FOR WHICH RAMADHAN'S RESPONSIBILITIES AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE THE POPULAR ARMY WOULD NECESSITATE HIS REMAINING IN THE COUNTRY SEMICOLON

(C) RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE ECONOMY WHICH WAS NOW UNDER ACUTE PRESSURE.

2. RAMADHAN HAD INSTRUCTED SAHHAF TO SAY THAT THE DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED WITH THE UTMOST RELUCTANCE BECAUSE RAMADHAN SINCERELY ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IN PARTICULAR TO HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE WARMLY RECIPROCATED THE VIEW THAT HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS OF THE KIND ENVISAGED WOULD ONLY BE OF BENEFIT IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. WHILE OFFERING HIS MOST SINCERE APOLOGIES FOR THE INCONVENIENCE THAT THIS LATE CHANGE OF PLANS WMULD UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSE, RAMADHAN HAD HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO AGREE TO RESCHEDULE THE VISIT EITHER TO THE SECOND HALF OF MAY OR TO ANY DATE IN JUNE. SAHHAF ADDED THAT RAMADHAN HAD WISHED HIM TO SAY THAT HE WOULD GIVE THE MOST CATEGORIC UNDERTAKING THAT, IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR US TO AGREE TO EITHER OF THESE PROPOSALS, A VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD RECEIVE PRIORITY OVER ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

3. I REPLIED TO SAHHAF THAT WHILE I WOULD OBVIOUSLY REPORT THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER'S DECISION HE COULD NOT EXPECT THAT YOU WOULD BE PLEASED. I DID NOT REFER TO THE LAST TWO OF THE THREE REASONS OFFERED FOR THE POSTPONEMENT (WHICH I REGARD IN ANY CASE AS SPECIOUS WINDOW-DRESSING) BUT I SAID THAT I WAS ASTONISHED TO LEARN

THAT THE COINCIDENCE OVER THE DATES OF THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN RAMADHAN INITIALLY AGREED TO MEET THE PRIME MINISTER ON 9 MARCH, AT HIS MEETING WITH HM AMBASSADOR ON 22 JANUARY. SAHHAF ADMITTED LAMELY THAT THE POINT HAD INDEED BEEN OVERLOOKED. I REMINDED HIM THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION TO RAMADHAN HAD REMAINED OPEN NOW FOR OVER A YEAR AND THAT RESCHEDULING HIGH-LEVEL VISITS OF THIS SORT WAS INEVITABLY EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. SAHHAF SAID THAT THE IRAQIS ACKNOWLEDGED THIS BUT NONETHELESS HOPED THAT ALTERNATIVE DATES IN THE PERIODS MENTIONED COULD BE FOUND.

4. I ASKED SAHHAF WHETHER THE DECISION TO POSTPONE RAMADHAN'S VISIT ALSO INCLUDED THE JOINT COMMISSION TALKS WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN POSTPONED ONCE. DID THE IRAQIS NOW PROPOSE THAT IT SHOULD BE POSTPONED YET AGAIN IN ORDER TO TAKE PLACE CONCURRENTLY WITH RAMADHAN'S VISIT (ASSUMING WE WERE ABLE TO ARRANGE ONE) OR WERE WE EXPECTED TO RECEIVE HASSAN ALI ALONE BETWEEN 8 AND 10 MARCH ? SAHHAF REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW THE MINISTER OF TRADE'S PLANS BUT WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS MINISTRY IMMEDIATELY AND LET ME HAVE THE ANSWER WITHIN 24 HOURS.

RAMSAY

LIMITED
ME D
MV D
PC D
NEWS D
PUS D
PS | MR HURD
MR EGERTON

COPIES TO :
MR MARTION,
OTS, D.O.T.

Iraq cf. Please file. CJ. 14/2

10 DOWNING STREET

MR COLES MR 14/2

VISIT OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ TO LONDON

As the Foreign Office have not heard from the Iraqis they are assuming that he will not be here next week. I have therefore taken the lunch out of the diary for the 16th.

CJ.

11 February, 1983

file RO7
Iraq

10 DOWNING STREET

MR COLES

cc:- Mrs Goodchild

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

Tom King's Office rang . He is a good friend of Mr. Ramadhan and would like to be included on the luncheon guest list when he comes.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

26 January, 1983

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE 1 VICTORIA STREET LONDON SW1H 0ET Telephone 01-215 7877

IRAQ

Prime Minister

Can we try to find 30 minutes for the Iraqi Trade Minister in the first two days of March?

A. J. C. 24/1

From the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London
SW1

20 January 1983

Dear Tony,

VISITS OF IRAQI MINISTERS

The Secretary of State very much welcomed the Prime Minister's agreement to meet and host a lunch for the Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Ramadhan, when he visits this country in the second half of February.

Our exports to Iraq are likely to total about £800 million last year. It is a country where the award of any contracts of significance are very strongly influenced by political considerations. The Prime Minister's hospitality will be of great assistance in sustaining and improving our export effort.

A similar, if smaller, problem applies to the visit of the Iraqi Trade Minister, Hassan Ali, (shortly after Mr Ramadhan's own visit) for the new Anglo-Iraqi Joint Economic Commission scheduled for the week of 28 February. Mr Ali ranks highly in the Revolutionary Command Council, and was received by the Prime Minister when he last visited Britain to sign the agreement which established the Commission in June 1981. The businessmen who form our Department's Area Advisory Group - COMET - have frequently expressed the view that the rapid growth in our exports to Iraq over the past 18 months owes much to the success of Mr Ali's 1981 visit. The call on the Prime Minister then had clear substantial impact. A similar short courtesy call this year is very strongly advised. It is unfortunate that this would follow so shortly after Mr Ramadhan's own visit. But whether we like it or not, the Iraqis are extremely protocol conscious. If Mr Ali were disappointed, it would act to undermine the very favourable impression created by the hospitality for Mr Ramadhan. Mr Ali will be in London from 1 March to midday 4 March.

I am copying this to John Holmes (FCO), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), David Edmonds (Environment), and to David Hayhoe (Lord President's office), to whom I am writing separately suggesting that their Ministers might also be involved in Mr Ali's visit.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN RHODES
Private Secretary

16 Feb or 19 March. Iraq

FCO SW

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 January, 1983

Visit by First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 7 January. The Prime Minister could offer Mr. Ramadhan talks at noon followed by lunch on either 16 or 25 February.

I am copying this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade), Jonathan Spencer (Department of Industry) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Iraq.

10 DOWNING STREET

Note for File

25th Feb is no longer a suitable date for PM to give a lunch for the Deputy PM of Iraq. This is one of the dates set aside for Anglo/Italian Summit.

Steve
17/1/83

(1).

Prime Minister

You could offer the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister talks followed by lunch on either 16 or 25 Feb? Content?

A. & C. 17/1

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 January 1983

Dear John,

Visit by Mr Taha Ramadhan, First Deputy Prime Minister

Francis Richards wrote to Michael Alexander on 23 November 1981 with a proposal that the First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr Taha Ramadhan, should be invited by the Prime Minister to visit the United Kingdom as her guest. Michael Alexander's reply of 25 November 1981 recorded the Prime Minister's agreement.

Iraq's preoccupation with the war against Iran and Mr Ramadhan's ministerial responsibilities have prevented him from taking up the invitation before but he has spoken warmly of his interest in coming at the earliest possible time. He has now told us that he would like the visit to take place in late January or February. We understand that the Prime Minister's diary over both these periods is such that while she might be able to receive Mr Ramadhan for talks, she would be unable to offer him a meal.

Mr Pym believes that a visit by Mr Ramadhan soon would be useful. There has been a steady improvement in our bilateral relations over the past three years. Exports have risen steadily. 1982 figures seem certain to outstrip comfortably the 1981 record total of £680 million. Iraq's current economic problems caused by the war mean that we, and our competitors, are unlikely to sustain these levels next year. But when the war ends, Iraq promises to be a very lucrative market for our exporters. It is a difficult regime. There remain a number of thorny problems in our bilateral relations, mainly consular cases, but we have much to gain from developing closer links. Mr Ramadhan continues to be the economic overlord in Iraq. His visit would provide us with an opportunity to show him British industry and in particular to promote specific projects in which he will have a direct interest, eg Nimrod and Hawk.

/Unfortunately

Unfortunately, Mr Ramadhan can be very touchy about protocol. We need to offer him a programme which takes account of this and of his position as number two in the Ba'ath regime. So far as the official part of the programme is concerned, Mr Pym envisages a round of calls, as well as hospitality. He hopes that the Prime Minister as nominal host will agree to talks and a meal (as envisaged in Francis Richards's letter under reference). A call at noon followed by lunch might be the best arrangement. Mr Pym believes that it would jeopardise the success of the visit if the programme did not include the offer of a meal hosted by the Prime Minister. It would be better therefore to offer dates some way ahead, if necessary, than to offer earlier dates without the prospect of hospitality by Mrs Thatcher. Our Ambassador in Baghdad has advised that Mr Ramadhan will probably refuse to come if he is not offered hospitality by the Prime Minister.

I should be grateful to know if the Prime Minister would agree to talks and a meal as proposed, and if you could let me have perhaps alternative dates which we could put to the Iraqis for the visit.

I am copying this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade), Ian Ellison (Department of Industry) and David Oman (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary


A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Iraq, Nov '81, visit by Mr Ramadan

7 JAN 1983

Iraq (30)

COPY



GR 110 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BAGHDAD 090950Z MAR 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 132 OF 9 MARCH
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION DOT (FOR MR R WILLIAMS), MODUK (FOR DEFENCE SALES MR JEFFS), DOI (PS/MR JENKIN

MY TELS NOS 52 AND 94: VISIT OF FIRST DEPUTY PREMIER RAMADHAN.

1. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED A NOTE FROM MFA STATING THAT THE 5/7 MAY PROPOSED DATE FOR RAMADHAN'S VISIT TO THE UK IS NOT (NOT) CONVENIENT BECAUSE OF PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS. THE MATTER WILL BE KEPT UNDER REVIEW AND PROPOSALS FOR A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATE SUBMITTED LATER.

2. THIS IS SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTING SINCE IT MAY PUT THE VISIT BACK WELL INTO THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR. BUT IT IS SOMETHING, GIVEN IRAQI PREOCCUPATIONS, TO HAVE BEEN INFORMED BEFORE THE LAST MINUTE.

EGERTON

LIMITED
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NENAD
NEWS D
PCD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
MR MOBERLY

COPIES TO:-
PS/MR REES
MR ROY WILLIAMS OTB 1B8 DOI
PS/MR JENKIN DOI

CONFIDENTIAL

Caroline
I agree. C.P. 14/1
MR 14/1

MR. COLES

Visit of the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

The Foreign Office have asked whether the Prime Minister could see him on Wednesday, 5 May, at 0930, as well as giving him lunch on Friday, 7 May, as she is nominal host. I am told she ought to see him on the first day of his visit.

It is OK by me if it is OK by you.

C.S.

14 January, 1982.

(116)

CONFIDENTIAL

NBR 026/1
38401 - 35
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO.
30 NOV 1981
DESK OFFICER | REGISTRY
INDEX | PA | Action Take

GRS129
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 241745Z NOV 81
TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 685 OF 25 NOVEMBER
YOUR TEL 682: INWARD MINISTERIAL VISITS FROM IRAQ

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS AGREED TO INVITE TAHA RAMADHAN TO PAY AN OFFICIAL VISIT AND TO ACT AS HIS NOMINAL HOST. YOU SHOULD SEEK AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS A VISIT WITH TAHA RAMDHAN AND TO SEEK HIS VIEWS ON POSSIBLE TIMINGS. THE BEST DATES FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WOULD BE 2/3 DAYS AROUND EITHER 7 MAY OR 16 JUNE, ON EITHER OF WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE FREE TO TAKE PART IN HIS PROGRAMME. YOU WILL NEED TO STRESS THAT ONCE DATES HAVE BEEN AGREED, IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ALTER THEM.

2. WHEN DATES HAVE BEEN AGREED, WE SHALL ARRANGE FOR A FORMAL INVITATION FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO BE FORWARDED TO YOU FOR DELIVERY.

CARRINGTON

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SIR J GRAHAM

CONFIDENTIAL

B/F f
Tel

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 November 1981

VISIT BY THE FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 23 November suggesting that the First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Taha Ramadhan, should be invited to this country. The Prime Minister is content that an invitation should be issued. You may, therefore, like to arrange for the despatch of the telegram enclosed with your letter.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade), Ian Ellison (Department of Industry) and David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Prime Minister

Not a very attractive guest, I fear, but the visit might be lucrative in the long run. Agree?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 November 1981

Dear Michael,

Lord Carrington has read with interest Mr Biffen's report to the Prime Minister of his successful visit to Baghdad at the beginning of October.

Lord Carrington has been considering proposals for further inward visits by Iraqi Ministers, and in particular a recommendation that the Prime Minister should be asked to extend an invitation to Mr Taha Ramadhan, the First Deputy Prime Minister, to come here as a guest of the Government.

The steady improvement in our relations with the Iraqis over the past year or so is encouraging. High-level visits have undoubtedly played a very valuable part in strengthening our links. The visits this year of the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Trade Minister, and Oil Minister provided opportunities for frank exchanges on bilateral, regional and international issues. The Iraqis place much importance on these visits. Lord Carrington believes that they have contributed enormously towards improving our bilateral relations with the Iraqis. We are reaping the rewards in trade. As Mr Biffen has pointed out, Iraq is a lucrative market, albeit one which, for political reasons, we must watch carefully. The prospects are good, with exports currently running at a rate of £700 m.p.a.

Lord Carrington thinks that we need to keep up the momentum. He therefore believes that it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to invite Taha Ramadhan to pay an official visit.

Ramadhan is in charge of Iraq's overall economic policy, is Commander of the People's Army, a 200,000 strong party militia, and is a senior member of the Revolutionary Command Council, second only to Saddam Hussein. His standing has grown since the war with Iran started to go wrong. He has considerable influence in the awarding of major contracts in industries immediately within his control. A visit here would provide an occasion for him to have useful talks and to see something of our industry. Ramadhan considers himself to be of Prime Ministerial rank (rather like Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, also a 'First Deputy Prime Minister'). This would necessarily mean some involvement by the Prime Minister with his programme, for the Iraqis are very conscious

/of their

of their dignity (and Taha Ramadhan can be personally very awkward on occasion). Lord Carrington would envisage therefore a round of official talks, and the Prime Minister being host at a lunch or dinner. In inviting Taha Ramadhan here, we would have to accept that he would be likely to invite the Prime Minister to repay his visit, perhaps in 1983. While the war with Iran continues, this would be out of the question. But if and when it ended, there could be arguments in favour of her accepting, perhaps including Iraq as part of a trip to other countries, eg Jordan or Turkey.

I should be grateful to know if the Prime Minister would agree in principle to invite Mr Taha Ramadhan sometime in May/June 1982. The Iraqis will be preoccupied next year with arrangements for the November Non-Aligned Movement summit, to which they are host, and this might lead them to use the summit as an excuse for putting off their acceptance until later in the year. But it would be appropriate, nevertheless, to put in our offer soon to demonstrate our interest. I enclose a draft of a telegram which subject to the Prime Minister's views we would propose to sent to Baghdad.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Rhodes (Dept of Trade), Ian Ellison (Dept of Industry) and David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
CONFIDENTIAL	PRIORITY


ZCZC 1 ZCZC
GRS 2 GRS
CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS 4
DESKBY 5
FM FCO 6 FM FCO 241745Z NOV 81
PRE/ADD 7 TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD
TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 YOUR TEL 682: INWARD MINISTERIAL VISITS FROM IRAQ
10 1. The Prime Minister has agreed to invite Taha Ramadhan to
11 pay an official visit and to act as his nominal host. You
12 should seek an early opportunity to discuss a visit with
13 Taha Ramdhan and to seek his views on possible timings. The
14 best dates from our point of view would be 2/3 days around
15 either 7 May or 16 June, on either of which the Prime Minister
16 would be free to take part in his programme. You will need to
17 stress that once dates have been agreed, it will be very
18 difficult to alter them.
19 2. When dates have been agreed, we shall arrange for a formal
20 invitation from the Prime Minister to be forwarded to you for
21 delivery.
/// 22
// 23
/ 24
25

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept	Distribution Limited — PS/Mr Hurd MED — PS/LPS NENAD — PS News Dept — PS/PUS PCD Mr Moberly Sir J Graham
Drafted by (Block capitals) PRIVATE SECRETARY		
Telephone number 233 4831		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

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10 DOWNING STREET

THIS FILE MUST NOT GO OUTSIDE 10 DOWNING ST

FILE TITLE: IRAQ / IRAN RELATIONS IRAQ / SYRIA RELATIONS (CLOSED) Threat to oil Supplies from the Gulf	SERIES: IRAQ PART: 9
PART BEGINS: January 1988	PART ENDS: December 1988
CAB ONE:	

PART CLOSED.

REM 19/2269

TOP SECRET

Printed in the UK for HMSO Dd 4599073 7/94 C15 59064

PART

CLOSED

SECRET

35

file

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 December 1988

Dear Brian,

THE FUTURE OF ROYAL NAVAL DEPLOYMENT IN THE GULF

The Prime Minister has considered the Defence Secretary's minute of 20 December about the future pattern of Royal Navy deployments in the Gulf in the light of recent developments.

The Prime Minister very much agrees that we should retain the Armilla Patrol, while making the minor operational adjustments proposed by the Defence Secretary. Provided that is generally agreed, she will be content for the Foreign Secretary to take the opportunity of his visit to the Gulf area in January to explain that we intend to withdraw our Mine Counter Measures vessels in March, while being prepared to redeploy them rapidly to the Gulf should the need arise. The Americans should be informed in advance of what we intend.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Roy Griffins (Department of Transport), Shirley Stagg (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

C. D. POWELL

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

FUTURE OF ROYAL NAVY DEPLOYMENTS IN THE GULF

I attach an important note by the Defence Secretary about the future of our Royal Navy deployments in the Gulf. You will want to read it in full. But in summary, its conclusions are:

- The situation in the Gulf is calm and the ceasefire is expected to hold. Other Western navies have reduced their levels.

- Nonetheless, we should keep the Armilla Patrol as a demonstration of our continued commitment to the Gulf States.

- But we should make some operational adjustments. We could allow the second Armilla ship to be up to 96 hours away rather than 72 hours as at present, in order to make more naval visits. We could also allow the Armilla Patrol to make visits to the northern Gulf including Kuwait to make our presence there more visible.

- Minesweepers represent a more difficult problem. The present batch are due to leave in March and their replacements would have to set out in early February.

- Operation CLEANSWEEP will be concluded by early January. The other ships of the Joint Minesweeping Force will leave. Ours will have no particular task left. There is no immediate prospect of being called on to conduct minesweeping inside Iran or Iraq's territorial waters.

- There are pressing defence reasons to return the minesweepers to their normal tasks in the Atlantic, including the survey work on the Polaris exit routes and fishery protection duties.

- The only argument for keeping them in the Gulf is a diplomatic one. But provided we keep the Armilla Patrol there, we have a high profile presence to which the minesweepers do not add greatly now they have no specific role.

- The Foreign Secretary might therefore use his visit to the area in January to explain that we intend to withdraw the minesweepers in March, while making clear that we would re-deploy them to the area if necessary (which would take about five weeks).

Content with these conclusions?

Yes

C_D?

C. D. POWELL
20 December 1988

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MO 3/21L

PRIME MINISTER

THE FUTURE OF RN DEPLOYMENTS IN THE GULF

My Department has been reviewing, in conjunction with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department of Transport, the future pattern of RN deployments in the Gulf in the light of recent developments in the region and the approaching end of the current phase of MCM operations. This minute reports the conclusions of the review and seeks colleagues' agreement on the way ahead.

2. The operations of the ARMILLA Patrol and the integrated UK/Dutch/Belgian CALENDAR MCMV force have been a resounding success. The regional backdrop against which they have been conducted has, however, improved significantly in recent months with the ending of hostilities in the Iran/Iraq War. Other Western navies in the Gulf have made reductions in their force levels and we ourselves have recognised the reduction in the immediate threat by changing the role of ARMILLA from accompaniment to patrolling at the beginning of November. This move was welcomed by the shipping industry and has been seen more widely as an entirely reasonable lowering of the RN profile. There is a general perception that the situation has continued to improve, despite slow progress in the peace negotiations, and that the ceasefire is likely to continue to hold.

ARMILLA

3. In spite of the powerful military arguments for the redeployment of ships, I have concluded that no change should be made to the size of ARMILLA itself. The continuing presence of ARMILLA's three

warships is the clearest demonstration of the UK's proclaimed commitment to assist regional stability by avoiding premature force withdrawals. It is also the key to providing reassurance to our merchant fleet. If the warships are to remain, I believe that it is essential that they continue to be equipped with high capability defence systems to protect themselves and British merchant vessels in the event of any sudden flare up. The relaxation in tension does, however, allow us to consider minor operational adjustments. There would be advantage in slightly relaxing the deployment restrictions on the second ARMILLA ship so that it can be at 96 hours rather than the present 72 hours notice from the Straits of Hormuz. This would still leave one ship inside the Gulf at all times, with another available very rapidly, but would increase the flexibility available to naval planners and allow more ship visits in support of UK diplomatic and other interests in the Indian Ocean area. The Foreign Secretary has also suggested that there would be diplomatic benefits from permitting ARMILLA ships to be seen from time to time in the Northern Gulf, in particular from making port visits to Kuwait. I am entirely happy to agree to this, although I would not wish to extend patrols, as such, to this area.

MCMVs

4. Our present group of three MCMVs is due to leave the Gulf at the end of March to return to the UK. A replacement group has begun training and would have to leave by early February if we are to keep a continuous MCMV presence inside the Gulf. The question we need to decide is therefore whether there is a real role for the new group which would justify the significant diversion of defence resources which they represent.

5. Operation CLEANSWEEP will be concluded by very early January and the other national elements of the CALENDAR force will by then have left the Gulf. RN MCMVs will then have no task ahead of them apart from a two to three week survey of harbour waters requested by Bahrain. I recognise the diplomatic benefit of the Bahraini task (although it has no direct military value); this would be similar to the work already carried out in UAE waters and can be completed by the present group before it leaves. We do not foresee any requests for similar tasks arising from the GCC states and thereafter, assuming the ceasefire holds, the main threat to Gulf shipping will be the possibility of floating mines breaking free and drifting down from the Iranian and Iraqi minefields in the Northern Gulf. MCMVs have no special capability to detect or destroy "floaters" and we are unlikely to be able to tackle the moored mines at source for the foreseeable future because these are inside Iranian and Iraqi territorial waters or exclusion zones. There is some chance that the UN or the group of local states participating in the Regional Organisation for Protection of the Maritime Environment (ROPME - which includes Iran and Iraq) might, in due course, arrange for these restrictions to be lifted. But, because the issue of freedom of navigation has become entangled in the largely stalled Iran/Iraq peace negotiations, such a development is unlikely to arise in the near future.

6. The arguments for dispatching the next MCM group must therefore be entirely diplomatic rather than military. Here I recognise that we must take careful account of the contribution that the MCMVs in the Gulf make to perceptions of the UK held by Allies and local states. But small, essentially coastal craft such as minesweepers are far less powerful symbols than destroyers or frigates, and therefore are likely to gain us little credit by their mere presence when they are not operationally useful. In this respect, it is worth noting what other navies have done. The US Navy has reduced its

d

number of major units since the ceasefire - as we have not - and is likely soon to reduce from 6 to 4 minesweepers in the Upper Gulf. The US Navy shares our disinclination to consider MCM operations in territorial waters at present and has not identified any useful task in the Northern Gulf which they might undertake (with or without RN involvement) after the present phase is completed. All other European navies will have left the Gulf entirely by January except for the French, whose pattern of deployments inside the Gulf is occasionally 1 or 2 frigates accompanied less than 50% of time by one of 3 MCMVs based in Djibouti. I should perhaps add that we do not see any defence sales opportunities at present which might benefit from the continued presence of MCMVs.

7. From the defence point of view, I am reluctant to keep minesweepers away from their normal operating areas without any proper role as the crews would face a tedious deployment with lowering effect on morale. Moreover, there would be considerable penalties involved in continuing the commitment. Gulf operations take 40% of the total availability of our most modern HUNT Class MCMVs. This has considerably reduced our ability to play our full part in NATO exercises, which has in turn affected our standing in the Alliance. Indeed SACLANT has complained strongly about inadequate RN MCMV participation in Exercise Teamwork this year. We have also had to revert to contributing an obsolescent wooden TON class MCMV to the high profile Standing Naval Force Channel, although these are well known to be less capable than other nations' ships.

8. The cost of the Gulf MCMV commitment is also significant in other ways. Due to a shortage of small craft to which the Gulf commitment contributes, MOD will fall 41 ship days short on its commitment to MAFF for Fishery Protection duties this year. RN surveys of coastal war routes are becoming increasingly outdated, and

our coverage of the Polaris exit routes out to the Atlantic through the Clyde, which is essential to the security of our strategic deterrent, has been degraded.

9. The Foreign Secretary takes the view that there are no overriding foreign policy reasons for withdrawing the vessels in March and some advantages in keeping as many RN vessels there as long as possible. I fully accept this and, indeed, believe that a withdrawal at any time could therefore be politically difficult.

10. Nevertheless, there are strong defence arguments for seeking to end the MCM commitment and, presentationally, the completion of all outstanding MCM tasks provides an obvious operational reason for withdrawal. (The actual departure date would, of course, be significantly later than that of the Dutch, Belgians and Italians.) The Transport Secretary believes that this would be understood by the shipping industry, and the possibility of any adverse impact overseas would be minimised if we were to couple an announcement with a clear statement that we did not intend to reduce ARMILLA force levels. Here the Foreign Secretary's suggestion that ARMILLA ships should visit the Northern Gulf would also be very useful presentationally, both with the Americans and the Gulf States. Moreover we could and should make publicly clear that if a proper task for MCMVs arose (for example a request from ROPME) we would live up to our commitment by rapidly redeploy them to the area. This could be done at about 5 weeks notice, and MCMVs could be kept earmarked for the contingency without undue inconvenience and cost. It would, of course, be essential to let both the Gulf States and the Americans know what we had in mind before any announcement. Again, presentationally, it is useful that the Foreign Secretary is due to visit the Gulf in early January and could therefore explain our plans personally. Finally, the Foreign Secretary has suggested that we could use the MCMVs' return journey for promotional purposes, perhaps through visits to Aden and Egypt, and I would be very happy to do this.

11. There is a difficult balance to be weighed. Unfortunately, there is no satisfactory way out involving half measures. The MCMVs should remain in a group of at least three if they do stay in the Gulf, if they are to be able to operate effectively. Nor do I believe that if we fail to make a decision now we should expect a decision to be any easier later on next year and there are presentational advantages in acting now. My own view is that - fully accepting the importance of the diplomatic factors involved - the defence benefits are sufficiently strong as to justify non replacement of the present MCM Group - unless, of course, a genuine new task arises. The Foreign Secretary would be content with such a decision provided that colleagues are also content, that the Americans are informed in advance of what we intend, and that it was carefully presented in the way I have described (particularly accompanied with a clear statement on ARMILLA's continuing role and a willingness to return if a suitable task for MCMVs arose). I would be grateful to know whether you and colleagues are content to proceed on this basis.

12. I am copying this minute to Geoffrey Howe, Paul Channon, John MacGregor (in view of the possible implications for the Fisheries protection task) and to Sir Robin Butler.

G.H.

Ministry of Defence
20th December 1988

[redacted]

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 October 1988

MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN

The Prime Minister has signed the reply to King Hussein's message about Iran/Iraq. You will find it enclosed. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its early delivery.

(CHARLES POWELL)

R.N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T160a/88

RL6

DAS
T

bc PC
FCO.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

SUBJECT
CC OPS
MASTER

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 October 1988

Your Majesty,

Thank you for your message recording your recent discussions with President Saddam Hussein and setting out Iraq's position on the settlement talks with Iran. I share your concern that early progress should be made, and welcome your assurances that President Saddam genuinely wants a peace treaty. I can understand Iraq's caution. It is not surprising, after so many years of conflict, that the differences between the two sides should be hard to resolve. I recognise that a settlement can only be effective if both sides feel that there is a balance of advantage. But it is essential for both parties to show flexibility if an equitable solution is to be achieved. For our part, we maintain a position of strict impartiality between the two parties.

The five permanent members of the Security Council met at Foreign Minister level at the United Nations General Assembly in September. At that meeting, the Secretary-General outlined his objectives as being:

- consolidation of the arrangements for the ceasefire, including freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz;
- withdrawal to internationally recognised boundaries within a time frame of some two weeks;

- the release and repatriation of prisoners of war, the process to be completed within specific time frame;
- implementation of paragraph four of SCR 598 under which the urgency of clearing the Shatt al Arab was clearly expressed.

We and the other permanent members of the Security Council consider this a fair and sensible approach and have endorsed it. We continue to give our full support to the Secretary-General.

The immediate task is to achieve implementation of the first operative paragraph of Security Council Resolution 598 in its entirety. This is the only way to consolidate the ceasefire. The Secretary-General and his staff have told us that they continue to hope, in the light of the last round of talks in New York, that a compromise acceptable to both sides can be reached on the issues of freedom of navigation in the Gulf, arrangements for survey and clearance of the Shatt al Arab, and setting a time frame for the withdrawal of forces to the international boundaries. They are very concerned that a further round of talks at the level of Foreign Ministers should take place before the end of October. I hope that both parties will agree to meet, and will be able to reach agreement on operative paragraph one. They will then be in a position to address the other important questions - including the status of the Shatt al Arab - which must be resolved before a lasting and comprehensive settlement can be achieved.

Mr Reeve explained to you last week that we might be forced to request the withdrawal of some members of the staff of the Iraqi Embassy in London. We have in fact now asked Iraq to withdraw three people and we have served an exclusion order on another, for activities incompatible with their status. You will understand that we cannot countenance unacceptable activity by diplomats accredited in London. Recent action taken against other missions should have been warning enough, not to mention the despatch to Baghdad in

July of a special emissary by the Foreign Secretary to bring home to the Iraqi authorities the damage which the activities of a number of their officials in the United Kingdom threatened to cause to Anglo-Iraqi relations. We have not sought this difficulty and would very much like to have a more normal relationship; but it is vital that the Iraqis should ensure that their diplomats in London do not misbehave. If you have an opportunity to mention my concern on this point to President Saddam Hussein, I should be most grateful.

As always, I shall continue to welcome and value your advice. As I said in my letter of 15 August, I am sure that you will continue to use your influence - particularly with President Saddam - to work for the peaceful settlement in the Gulf region which we all desire.

With warm regards.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Can one key
Hurstein a reply to
his message about
Iraq.

This does not say
a great deal – but
says it quite
nicely.

Agree to sign?

"Kind Regards"
"With warm regards"

C.D.P.

CCPK

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

20 October 1988

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Dear Charles

Iran/Iraq: Message to King Hussein

Thank you for your letter of 17 October. I enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister to King Hussein.

There have been few developments in the Iran/Iraq talks since the Five Foreign Ministers met in New York. We do not know all the details of what took place at the meetings between the Secretariat and the two parties during the last round of talks in New York at the beginning of October. The Secretariat believe that some further headway has been made towards a compromise on the outstanding issues relating to the ceasefire, on which King Hussein outlined Iraq's position. But reports [redacted] indicate that neither side wishes to be the first to make concessions, and the Secretariat are not certain that talks can be reconvened at Foreign Minister level later this month in Geneva. The Foreign Secretary does not recommend that the Prime Minister enter into substantive discussion of Iraq's views. It might prejudice our role in the Five to comment at this stage directly on the negotiating position of either party. But the draft conveys a clear message that flexibility is required on both sides, ie including Iraq.

We have also incorporated a passage on the requested withdrawal from London of the Iraqi diplomats. Mr Reeve has already alerted King Hussein to this in an audience granted on 15 October. The Foreign Secretary does not consider that this is the best moment to say more to King Hussein about our contacts with the Iranians. Even through the Geneva talks have been adjourned, our raising the subject would point up the contrast with the diplomatic problems we are having with Iraq, at a time of some misapprehension in the Arab world that British policy is tilting in favour of Iran.

We have not included the Arab/Israel issue. The Prime Minister made our position clear in her meeting with the King on 5 September. Given the King's close personal relationship with Saddam, we see merit in maintaining this separate correspondence on the Gulf.

Yours ever

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:
Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

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CAVEAT .....

Enclosures flag(s) .....

AAAAEF (1)

TO:
His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal

Copies to:

SUBJECT: DS400

Type for signature

Thank you for your message recording your recent discussions with President Saddam Hussein and setting out Iraq's position on the settlement talks with Iran. I share your concern that early progress should be made, and welcome your assurances that President Saddam genuinely wants a peace treaty. I can understand Iraq's caution. It is not surprising, after so many years of conflict, that the differences between the two sides should be hard to resolve. I recognise that a settlement can only be effective if both sides feel that there is a balance of advantage. But it is essential for both parties to show flexibility if an equitable solution is to be achieved. For our part, we maintain a position of strict impartiality between the two parties.

The five permanent members of the Security Council met at Foreign Minister level at the United Nations General Assembly in September. At that

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meeting, the Secretary-General outlined his objectives as being:

- consolidation of the arrangements for the ceasefire, including freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz;
- withdrawal to internationally recognised boundaries within a time frame of some two weeks;
- the release and repatriation of prisoners of war, the process to be completed within specific time frame;
- implementation of para 4 of SCR 598 under which the urgency of clearing the Shatt al Arab was clearly expressed.

We and the other permanent members of the Security Council consider this a fair and sensible approach and have endorsed it. We continue to give our full support to the Secretary-General.

The immediate task is to achieve implementation of the first operative paragraph of Security Council Resolution 598 in its entirety. This is the only way to consolidate the ceasefire. The Secretary-General and his staff have told us that they continue to hope, in the light of the last round of talks in New York, that a compromise acceptable to both sides can be reached on the issues of freedom of navigation in the Gulf, arrangements for survey and clearance of the Shatt al Arab, and setting a time frame for the withdrawal of forces to the international boundaries.

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They are very concerned that a further round of talks at the level of Foreign Ministers should take place before the end of October. I hope that both parties will agree to meet, and will be able to reach agreement on operative paragraph one. They will then be in a position to address the other important questions - including the status of the Shatt al Arab - which must be resolved before a lasting and comprehensive settlement can be achieved.

Mr Reeve explained to you last week that we might be forced to request the withdrawal of some members of the staff of the Iraqi Embassy in London. We have in fact now asked Iraq to withdraw three people and we have served an exclusion order on another, for activities incompatible with their status. You will understand that we cannot countenance unacceptable activity by diplomats accredited in London. Recent action taken against other missions should have been warning enough, not to mention the despatch to Baghdad in July of a special emissary by the Foreign Secretary to bring home to the Iraqi authorities the damage which the activities of a number of their officials in the UK threatened to cause to Anglo-Iraqi relations. We have not sought this difficulty and would very much like to have a more normal relationship; but it is vital that the Iraqis should ensure that their diplomats in London do not misbehave. If you have an opportunity to mention my concern on this point to President Saddam Hussein, I should be most grateful.

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(Revised 5/87)

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In Confidence

As always, I shall continue to welcome and value your advice. As I said in my letter of 15 August, I am sure that you will continue to use your influence - particularly with President Saddam - to work for the peaceful settlement in the Gulf region which we all desire.

AAAAEF (4)

32 SECRET FILE LR

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 October 1988

Dear John,

ARMILLA AND CALENDAR: NEXT STEPS IN THE GULF

Thank you for your letter of 17 October proposing changes in the role of the Armilla Patrol in the Gulf and the retention of our minesweepers until early next year to complete Cleansweep. The Prime Minister is content on both counts.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Roy Griffins (Department of Transport) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES POWELL

John Colston, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

KK.

SECRET

31A-B

CCA

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

Agreed - both points

Rt Hon

MO 3/21L

17th October 1988

Agree to the proposed change in Armilla's deployment pattern?

Dear Charles

And to the minesweepers staying at least until January?

CDP 17/X

ARMILLA AND CALENDAR: NEXT STEPS IN THE GULF

The Defence Secretary has asked me to write to you concerning the results of a study by the Ministry of Defence, in consultation with the FCO, of future policy for the RN forces in the Gulf, and to seek confirmation that the Prime Minister would be content with the changes proposed in the role of the ARMILLA Patrol.

In the continuing absence of attacks on merchant ships in the Gulf, the demand for ARMILLA's protection from British merchant ships is markedly decreasing. From a peak of about 80 accompaniment transits in June, demand is now running at under 1 request per day. Other Western navies (the US, French and Italians) have all announced or are about to announce their intention to move from an operational pattern of escorting or accompanying merchant ships to a posture of independent patrolling. Having consulted the FCO and the Department of Transport, we believe that we should now make a similar adjustment to ARMILLA's mission. The General Council of British Shipping has indicated that this would be acceptable to its members, who are in any case increasingly reluctant to accept the inevitable delays necessary to obtain RN accompaniment, given their perception of a much reduced level of threat in the Gulf.

We therefore propose that, after giving two week's notice through the GCBS, ARMILLA should cease accompanying merchant ships and move to a patrol mission. This would not involve any reduction in ship time spent inside the Gulf. Our public commitments not to prejudice regional security by premature withdrawal would not therefore be undermined. ARMILLA ships would remain able to move swiftly to the assistance of British vessels, and their patrol pattern would concentrate on the areas most used by our shipping. Masters of entitled ships would continue to notify the ARMILLA tanker of their intended itineraries so that accompaniment could be rapidly reintroduced if the situation demanded. At least one RN destroyer or frigate would remain in the Gulf at all times and ARMILLA would continue to provide protection for CALENDAR mine countermeasures vessels.

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

As far as CALENDAR's future is concerned the force will remain fully committed to the CLEANSWEEP operation, clearing a 300 mile shipping lane, in concert with other WEU navies, until approximately January. After that date, when we expect the Dutch and Belgian MCMVs to have been withdrawn, there will be a number of options for employing the remaining 3 RN MCMVs. The Bahrainis have asked us to survey the approaches to their harbours and we may be able to undertake similar route survey work for other friendly GCC States. We shall, however, need to give careful thought to further possible tasks for the Royal Navy's MCMVs in the Gulf in the light of developments in the region over coming months, progress in the settlement talks between Iran and Iraq, the actions of our WEU partners and the United States, and the views of the friendly states in the Gulf.


I should be grateful for your confirmation that the Prime Minister would be content that ARMILLA should move to a patrol pattern and that CALENDAR should remain committed to CLEANSWEEP until completion in the New Year. Subject to the Prime Minister's views, my Secretary of State would hope to announce the changes in the role of the ARMILLA patrol during the defence debate on 19th/20th October. Ministers would seek to emphasise that, despite any international differences in naval terminology, ARMILLA will be doing no less for the direct protection of entitled shipping than any other Western Navy in the Gulf. We intend that Embassies in the region should have the opportunity privately to explain the change to the Governments of friendly Arab Gulf states so as to avoid any misunderstanding.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Roy Griffins (Department of Transport) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Steve McCue

pp (J P COLSTON)
Private Secretary



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

17 October 1988

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Mr President,

Thank you so much for sending me a copy of your address on the implications of the Iran-Iraq war (which actually only arrived with me yesterday). It is by far the clearest and most perceptive account of the conflict and its implications which I have read, and I very much agree with your conclusions.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Chaim Herzog

CONFIDENTIAL

KK1AFU

returned disc to FCO

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 October 1988

IRAN/IRAQ: MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN

Your letter of 17 October proposed a reply from the Prime Minister to King Hussein's message about his discussions with President Saddam Hussein. But I think the Prime Minister will find that the draft reply is very short of substance and will decline to send it unless we can pump some air into the tyres. Is it really all we have to say? Have there been no developments worthy of comment since the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Five Permanent Members in September? I thought there had been some movement. Might we not say more about our own contacts with the Iranians? Since we are about to eject some Iraqis, ought we perhaps to hold a message until we can say something to the King about that and enlist his understanding if not help. If we really have so little to say on Iran/Iraq, should we not widen out a message to cover latest developments on Arab/Israel (the possible meeting between the King, Mubarak and Arafat in Aqaba?). And perhaps mention Lebanon?.

I think there is room for further work on this before it goes anywhere near the Prime Minister.

(C. D. POWELL)

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 October 1988

Dear Charles

Iran/Iraq: Correspondence between The Prime Minister and King Hussein

I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to King Hussein's recent message reporting his discussions with President Saddam Hussein on 2 October.

Mr Reeve considers it likely that similar messages have been sent to Heads of Government of the other Permanent Members of the Security Council. The Foreign Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should respond in order to maintain her dialogue with the King on Iran/Iraq. He last wrote on 4 August, and the Prime Minister replied on 15 August.

It is not surprising that King Hussein's account of the current situation in the settlement talks shows a strong leaning towards Iraq. The Foreign Secretary does not recommend that the Prime Minister should take up points of detail in the King's explanation of the Iraqi position. We know that the Iraqis think that we have been favouring Iran. The draft reply strikes a neutral note on the substance of the settlement talks. It highlights the need for flexibility on both sides, reaffirms our objectives, and welcomes the King's continuing active involvement.

Yours ever

Bob Peirce

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:

PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT

TEL. NO:

Reference

~~PO8ABN~~

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

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Confidential
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Unclassified

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CAVEAT .....

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO:

HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN BIN TALAL

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your message ~~recording~~ telling me of your recent discussions with President Saddam Hussein and setting out Iraq's position on the settlement talks with Iran. I ~~share your concern that~~ also want to see early progress ~~should be~~ made in the talks on implementation of Security Council Resolution 598, and so welcome your assurances that President Saddam genuinely wants a peace treaty. It is not surprising, after so many years of conflict, that the differences between the two sides should be hard to resolve. ~~I recognise that a settlement can only be effective if both sides feel that there is a balance of advantage. But it is essential for both parties to show flexibility if peace is to be achieved.~~ Both sides will need to feel that we have given enough if we have taken them. But to achieve this, both will have to be ready to show flexibility.

The five permanent members of the Security Council met at foreign ministers level at the United Nations General Assembly in September. At that meeting, the Secretary-General outlined his objectives as being:-

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- consolidation of the arrangements for the ceasefire, including freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz;
- withdrawal to internationally recognised boundaries within a time frame of some two weeks;
- the release and repatriation of prisoners of war, the process to be completed within a specific time frame;
- implementation of para 4 of SCR 598 under which the urgency of clearing the Shatt Al Arab was clearly expressed.

We and the other permanent membersm of the Security Council consider ~~this a fair and sensible approach and have endorsed it. We continue to give our full support to the Secretary-General's conduct of the settlement talks.~~ the approach proposed by the UN Secretary-General is fair and sensible and we continue to support his efforts.

The immediate task is to ~~achieve implementation of~~ the first operative paragraph of Security Council Resolution 598 in its entirety. ~~We agree with the Secretary-General's assessment that~~ this is the only way to consolidate the ceasefire. I hope that when the talks are resumed, the parties will be able rapidly to reach agreement on implementation of that paragraph, and begin addressing the other important issues which must be resolved before a lasting and comprehensive settlement can be achieved.

DSR 11C
(Revised 5/87)

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PRIVACY MARKING

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In Confidence

As always, I shall continue to welcome and value your adice. As I said in my letter of 15 August, I am sure that you will continue to use your influence - particularly with President Saddam - to work for the peaceful settlement which we all desire.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON, W8 4QB
Telephone: 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

14th October 1988

Mr. Charles Powell,
No.10 Downing Street,
London, SW1

Dear Charles,

I have been requested to transmit the enclosed letter from Mr. Chaim Herzog, President of Israel, to Prime Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher.

Yehuda Avner
Ambassador of Israel

ISRAEL ישראל


17.X.
PM 5

מדינת ישראל

دولـة اسـرائيل

STATE OF ISRAEL

رئيس الدولة

THE PRESIDENT

הנשיא

Jerusalem, 20th September, 1988

The Right Honorable
Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London S.W.1

Dear Prime Minister,

I do hope that the enclosed comments of an observer from nearby, might be of interest to you.

Warmest regards,

Chaim Herzog

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF ISRAEL, MR. CHAIM HERZOG
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE IRAN IRAQ WAR
ORGANISED BY THE JAFEE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY AND CO-SPONSORED
BY THE U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

4TH SEPTEMBER 1988

The Gulf War between Iran and Iraq, which lasted almost eight years, is undoubtedly one of the bloodiest conflicts which has raged anywhere since the end of World War II and, indeed, it ranks as one of the longest wars in this century.

The Iragis started the war in 1980 in the hope of gaining a quick victory over a neighbour weakened by the overthrow of the Shah. But they discovered within a matter of months the truth of a famous dictum: "Never attack a revolution."

In the past year it has become clear that the final victory promised annually by the Iranians was improbable. An exhausted tie was the result the rest of the world wanted. This futile war cost somewhere between one to one-and-a-half million casualties, and came to a conclusion as it did along roughly the same line along a 730 miles front from Turkey to the Persian Gulf, on which it started.

I doubt that it will be a war which will be studied by military historians for its strategic lessons or battle field accomplishments. One of the documents that I read recently described the war as a "delicate balance of incompetence", and as an illustration of the failure to apply most of the classic principles of war from the adoption of realistic war aims to the conduct of the war itself. But since military failure no less than success contributes to the development of military knowledge, obviously the lessons of this war with its very broad implications, particularly for the Near and Middle East, cannot be overlooked.

In analysing the origins of the war one cannot ignore the longstanding ethnic rivalry between the Arabs and the Persians and the rivalry between opposing versions of Islamic practices by the Sunnis and the Shi'ites. Persia was converted to Islam after the Arab conquest in the 7th Century. In the 16th Century Iran adopted the Shi'ite version of Islam as its official religion and thus became the center of Shi'ism.

T[illegible], with 85% of its population Shi'ite, Iran stood out from the rest of the Moslem world which was mainly Sunni and its influence on Shi'ite communities in their countries was significant. The differences between these two Moslem sects are not only concerned with the question of the Prophet Mohammed's succesor; they also tend to be separated by political and economic conditions. In the Arab world of today only Iraq and Bahrain have a majority of Shi'ites although, paradoxically enough, the Iraqi leaders are all Sunni.

During the period which produced modern Iran, its successive leaders tried, particularly through the arts and architecture, to give their country a distinct cultural identity, which would set it apart from the rest of the Middle East.

The advent of both Iranian and Arab Nationalism in the 20th Century helped to drive Iran and Iraq even further apart. At the end of the 60's Iraq adopted a policy of Pan-Arabism combined with an increasingly secular outlook just as the Shah of Iran was embarking on an ambitious program to promote his interests in the area.

I was witness to the obsession of the late Shah of Iran with power. For I was personally directly involved in the special relations which developed between Israel and Iran and became closer and more involved as the years passed, indeed, until the Khomeini revolution. On repeated occasions I heard from the Shah in the early sixties a clear unequivocal enunciation of his resolution to make Iran the dominant military power in the Gulf, with a view to creating an Iranian zone of influence in West Asia. My activities at the time when I was serving as Israel's Director of Military Intelligence, were a function of the strategic understanding of the late David Ben-Gurion of the common strategic interests shared by Israel and Iran, and other states peripheral to the Arab world.

When the British withdrew from the Gulf in 1971 the Shah reacted by intensifying Iran's military growth on which he had already embarked in the 60's. His policy was supported by the U.S. and Britain, both of which saw the advantages of strengthening Iran, thus guaranteeing the stability of the Gulf. The Shah's military purchases as his appetite grew, became an important economic consideration for the Western powers. By the time of Khomeini's revolution Iran's arms purchases in the preceding decade surpassed some 20 billion dollars' worth.

The beginning of the Shah's policy of regional assertiveness coincided with the advent to power of the present Iraqi regime. The Iranian drive for regional hegemony was not ignored by Iraq. Since its accession to power in 1968, the present Iraqi Baath regime found itself forced to respond again and again to

challenges posed by Iran. Iraq began to focus on the extension of its ground and air forces. The nature of the military purchases and developments in Iraq at this period indicate an understanding by its leaders of its basic inferiority in relation to Iran. The "mix" of the Iraqi purchases reflected its essential defensive posture, with its preoccupation with domestic affairs and the need to deter its two hereditary enemies - Syria and Iran. We must remember too that during the 1970's Iraq's ground forces were concerned both with the Kurdish revolution in the North and the stability of the regime.

Iraqi forces crossed the Iranian frontier in strength in September 1980. One of the grievances announced by the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein a week later was the question of the sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab. This dispute about the control of the stretch of water running from the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to the Gulf dates from the period of the Ottoman and Persian Empires. The various arrangements reached in the 19th Century were the basis of Iraq's claim as successor to the Ottoman Empire to the Shatt-al-Arab. Despite the fact that these treaties upheld the principle of unrestricted navigation on the Shatt by ships of all nations, Iran had never been satisfied with the status quo. Iran was concerned because of the growing economic importance of the ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr and the shipping traffic to them. Disputes continued, especially during the period of General Qassem after the overthrow of King Faisal. The continued open Iranian support for the Kurdish Revolt in Northern Iraq finally forced Baghdad to give in to Iran's claims.
In 1975 Saddam Hussein, then Foreign Minister of Iraq, was obliged to sign the Algiers Agreement whereby Iran cut off aid to the Kurds in Iraq in return for the regulation of the frontier along the Shatt. Thus the sovereignty in the Shatt was divided, with the line of deepest water replacing the eastern bank as the international boundary. This agreement, incidentally, represented a deep personal humiliation for Saddam Hussein, who became President in 1979 and he, undoubtedly, harboured a strong desire to avenge this set back.

However, it is most unlikely that given the military predominance of Iran and its relations with the U.S. and the major Western Powers, Saddam Hussein's desire for revenge would have materialized and would have driven him to attack the Shah's Iran. The catalyst was provided by the triumph of the new Islamic regime in Iran in February 1979. Khomeini's accession to power in Iran brought about a major change in the political atmosphere. The Islamic regime in Iran questioned the legitimacy of traditional rulers as well as that of the Iraqi Baath. Khomeini appealed to the Shi'ites of the Gulf. He attacked the Baath regime in Iraq. The seriousness of this

attack was underlined by Iraq's demography. Some 60% of Iraqi Moslems are Shi'ites, as opposed to some 20% Sunnis. This ethno-religious composition made Iraq extremely vulnerable. To this, one must add the complications created by the Kurdish Revolution which forced the Iraqis to sign the Algiers Agreement.
Indeed, in 1980 Saadam Hussein publicly aired his fears that Iraq might disintegrate into separate Sunni, Shi'ite and Kurdish communities. Khomeini for his part had an account to settle with Saddam Hussein, who had expelled him from Iraq after an exile of 14 years, at the Shah's request.

The war of words in 1980 became more intense, with Ayatollah Khomeini calling for the Baath regime to be consigned to the "dustbin of history". As the situation became very intense, more frequent and heavier border clashes were reported during the summer. The Iraqis maintained that the war began in early September when Iraq was forced to reply to Iran's shelling. An analysis of the developments, however, indicates that the war broke out when Iraq invaded Iran. It was clear that Saddam Hussein came to the conclusion that it would be wise on his part to take advantage of what appeared to be a moment of Iran's weakness following the purge of its armed forces and the deterioration of its equipment and to preempt a possible future intervention by a militarily reorganized Iran.
It is fair to conclude that the Iran Iraq war was, to quote a contemporary Iranian commentator, a direct outcome of the Iran revolution, both in terms of the threat it posed to Iraq and the opportunity it presented.

The Iraqi attack took place at what seemed from the military point of view to have been a particularly opportune period in the developments in Iran. The revolution had thrown the Iranian armed forces into total disarray. Khomeini's regime emasculated and purged them and had established the Revolutionary Guard Militia, Pasdaran, as a counter weight to the military. In the first phase the senior ranks which included many of my former colleagues and friends were decimated. Some 85 senior officers were executed and hundreds more (including Major Generals and most Brigadier Generals) were imprisoned or forced to retire.

The purges continued until by the outbreak of war in 1980 some 12,000 had been purged, 10,000 of them from the army. Thus the Iranian army lost over half of its officers in the ranks of Major to Colonel. The airforce reportedly lost half of its pilots and 15-20% of its officers, NCO's and technicians. In addition about half of the regular servicemen deserted and many more were killed during and after the revolution.

It was perhaps the most devastating destruction of a military

force by its own government since Stalin's Red Army purges of 1936-38. Precise information is very difficult to obtain and nearly impossible to verify, but it would appear that more than 5,000 Iranian officers were executed by their own government, while additional thousands were imprisoned or forced into exile. Those who remain are supervised by "spiritual guidance officers," just as post-purge Red Army line officers were supervised by political commissars.

Many fighting formations were dissolved or fell apart. By the outbreak of the war it was a reasonable assumption on the part of the Iraqis to estimate that the Iranian armed forces were inferior to the Iraqi army. The Iranian army was down from 285,000 to around 150,000, whereas the Iraqi army stood at 200,000. Indeed, it was estimated at the time that the 12 Iraqi divisions faced 6 under strength Iranian divisions. The operational strength and ability of the Iraqi army was estimated to be far superior to that of the Iranian forces. While Iraq could deploy almost all of its major weapons systems (2750 tanks, 2500 AFV and some 920 artillery pieces) Iran could hardly deploy half of its 1735 tanks, 1700 AFV and 1000 artillery pieces.

The Iranian airforce was unable to fly more than half its aircraft, with key avionics removed from most of Iran's F14, F4 and F5 following the departure of the American advisors. The Iraqi airforce on the other hand, had modernized and attained a high level of servicability. Only at sea was Iran's pre-1979 superiority maintained.

Numbers are, however, not everything. One cannot discount the problem of the quality of military leadership, combat experience, training and command and control. Blinded by its own numerical strength, Iraq ignored its basic deficiencies as well as Iran's qualities. The Baath regime over the years went to extraordinary lengths to strengthen its grip on the armed forces. It naturally led to a situation where Sunni and Takriti affiliation were the most important criteria for military promotion. Saddam Hussein's near relatives were prominent in the military leadership. Indeed, in both countries the military leadership was selected and promoted not according to professional criteria but rather because of its loyalty to the regime. Both countries, even at the time of the Shah, had great difficulty in maintaining the advanced major weapons systems which they had acquired. Six Iranian brigades had been rotated in the suppression of the Dhofari rebellion between 1972-1975 in Omman. They did not particularly distinguish themselves.

On the other hand, Iraq's combat experience in the October War in 1973 was no more impressive. The armoured division that

arrived at the Golan Front ten days after the war began, was ambushed by Israeli forces and lost some 100 tanks within a very short period of time.

But in the Gulf war Iraq did have a central command in that Saddam Hussein controlled the war from the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) where each of the war services was represented. Iran, on the other hand, at the outbreak of the war, had no central command and control system which could coordinate the execution of its war strategy and suffered from a power struggle between the revolutionary Guard Corps, the Pasdaran, and the armed forces.

Iraq began the war on 22 September 1980 with a large scale air attack on ten military airfields in Iran, intended to destroy the Iranian air force on the ground. This failed, but five Iraqi divisions crossed the border the next day and began to advance into Iran. Within a week Saddam Hussein announced (in his 'Address to the Nation' on 28 September) that Iraq's territorial aims had been attained and that his country was willing to cease hostilities and to negotiate a settlement. This declaration, which reflected Iraq's limited strategy, was founded on apparently solid gains.

The Pasdaran bore the brunt of halting the Iraqi advance; the Iranian army deployed only one armoured division in the whole of Khuzestan (around Ahvaz), while the majority of its units were deployed in the hinterland and the north (along the Soviet border and in Kurdistan). According to President Bani Sadr, the absence of the army from the southern war theatre was premeditated, designed to give it more time to recover from the purges. In the long run this consideration proved to be prudent and enabled the army, which did not suffer heavy casualties during the invasion, to preserve its strength and to move to the offensive in 1981. But this would seem to be the wisdom of hindsight; in the short run, Iran's total lack of co-ordination prevented it from putting up an effective defence and accounted for the initial Iraqi successes. Contrary to common belief, the fervour and determination of the Pasdaran generally proved insufficient to halt the Iraqi army in open terrain. It was only in urban warfare (especially in the fighting for Khorramshahr) that the Pasdaran came into their own and made a significant operational impact. Their determination and the defensive advantages of built-up areas caused great problems for the advancing Iraqi forces, which seemed most unwilling to accept the casualties inevitably caused by street fighting. Long-range bombardment could not dislodge the Pasdaran from the rubble of Khorramshahr, only infantry on foot could do that, and for weeks the Iraqis were reluctant to face this prospect. Incidentally, casualties in the Battle of Korramshahr alone exceeded the total of all the

casualties sustained by Israel and the Arab armies together in all the Arab-Israeli wars.

To compensate for its weakness on the ground, Iran rapidly escalated the conflict by extending it to Iraqi cities and strategic targets. As early as 24 September, the Iranian navy attacked Basra and, destroyed two oil terminals near the port of Faw. The Iranian air force struck at a variety of strategic targets within Iraq, including oil facilities in Mosul and Kirkuk, dams on the Zab river, petrochemical plants near Basra and Zubair and the nuclear reactor near Baghdad. By 1 October, Baghdad itself had been subjected to eight air raids. Despite the low level of damage caused by these raids, Iraq retaliated with a series of strikes against Iranian targets, such as the oil complex on Kharg Island, but this did not cause Iran to desist. Soon both sides were involved in widespread strategic exchanges.

Within a fortnight the war turned from a limited dynamic war into a general static one. This escalation was a direct result of the Iranian war strategy which sought to strike at Iraq's weak points by extending the theatre of war to the rear. The shift from a dynamic to a static campaign, on the other hand, was a deliberate Iraqi move. Having swept aside the Pasdaran and occupied the territories assigned as the objectives, Iraq seemed quite satisfied with its strategic position and showed no appetite for further territorial gains; thus, for example, the Iraqi army stopped its advance in front of Ahvaz and Susangerd and made no attempts to occupy them. Although Saddam Hussein did not announce Iraq's resort to a defensive strategy until 7 December 1980, the strategy from mid-October onwards, and particularly after the fall of Khorramshar (24-25 October 1980), was in effect one of static war which aimed at retaining captured territories rather than attempting further advances. Thereafter, the two armies remained more or less locked in a typical static war for about eight months. Very few ground operations were mounted by either side.

An interesting personal observation: In January 1981 I visited Egypt in a private capacity and met with the late President Sadat in Aswan. I asked him for his evaluation of the four-months-old war between Iran and Iraq, He said then that he estimated that in the course of 1981 both leaders - Khomeini in Iran and Hussein in Iraq would be overthrown by their own people and the war would come to an end. He added, for good measure, that he believed that President Assad's position was a very weak one and his reign could conceivably also come soon to an abrupt end. In 1981 President Sadat was the only leader assasinated in the Middle East.... So much for prophecy!

As I remarked previously, Saddam Hussein's strategy was one of a limited war. But limited wars have a habit of not remaining

very limited. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States intervention in Vietnam, President Sadat's crossing of the Suez Canal in 1973, the Israeli intervention in Lebanon in 1982, and many other examples come to mind.

The invasion of Iran was carried out by some five divisions, approximately half the Iraqi army. The Iraqi war plan was for three simultaneous thrusts along a front of some 400 miles. The main axis of attack involving the bulk of the forces was made in Khuzestan, the armoured thrust aimed at separating the Shatt-al-Arab from the rest of Iran and establishing a territorial security belt along the Southern frontier. The operations in the central (Mehran-Qasr-e-Shirin) and far Northern (Penjevin) fronts were no more than secondary and supportive efforts designed to secure Iraq against an Iranian counter-attack. The occupation of Qasr-e-Shirin which dominated the traditional Teheran-Kermanshah-Baghdad invasion route was intended to protect Baghdad situated only 80 miles from the frontier. The operations on the Northern front aimed at establishing strong defence positions opposite Sulaymaniyah to protect the Kirkuk oil complex.

Iran's initial war strategy, on the other hand, was for general war. Recognizing its military inferiority, its response was a determined resistance within and around the border towns and reliance on strategic depth to contain the invading forces. At the same time, Iran was quick to carry the war to the Iraqi rear by initiating air and naval raids on Iraqi strategic targets within less than 24 hours of the outbreak of hostilities.

From 1981 onwards, however, Iraq began to lose its strategic advantage. Iran carried out several successful local attacks with its infantry, and relieved Abadan which had been under siege. Baghdad then switched to a defensive strategy. The situation at the front remained virtually at a stalemate until May 1982 when the Iraqi troops were pushed back almost to the frontier. Once it had liberated its territory Iran did not confine its efforts to maintaining military pressure on Hussein. Instead, Iranian spokesmen placed more and more emphasis on the need to invade Iraq, which they viewed as a step on the path to "liberate Jerusalem." At the end of the year Iran crossed the border and opened up new fronts in Iraqi territory in the direction of Basra in the south and Mandali in the north, as well as in the central zone. It did not, however, succeed in winning a single decisive victory. In 1983 three limited offensives enabled Iran to make some gains, particularly in the north, and the Iranian infantry launched massive frontal attacks on the Iraqi lines. However, the delivery of five French Super Etendard fighters armed with Exocet missiles strengthened Iraq's air force, which not only attacked strategic and economic targets in the heart of Iran

but also opened fire on merchant shipping and oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. It also attacked Iran's main oil terminal on Kharg Island. Unlike Iran, which had never stopped exporting its oil by sea, Iraq had been forced shortly after the beginning of the war to rely on overland pipelines for its exports.

The following year a series of Iranian offensives on the southern and central fronts resulted in the capture of important strategic objectives including almost all the oilfields on the Majnun islands north of Basra. While both sides were stepping up their attacks in the Persian Gulf, Iraq had begun to bomb population centres in Iran, in a prelude to what would become known as "the war of the cities." Meantime Iraq began to use chemical weapons in cynical defiance of international accords and norms.

In 1985 Iran launched an offensive on its southern front, north of Basra, which involved heavy loss of life. Iranian troops also fought in the north, in the mountainous area of Kurdistan. Air raids in the Persian Gulf were increasing. By that date, more than 300 tankers sailing under the flags of various nations had been attacked by one or the other of the belligerents. Iraq's air offensive was designed to compensate for its disadvantages on land and to weaken Iran by reducing its capacity both to produce oil and to export it. The principal targets for Iraqi air attacks in the Gulf were oil terminals and complexes, oilfields and tankers which were either Iranian or chartered by Iran. Iran's naval attacks, on the other hand were principally directed at ships which it suspected of delivering arms to Iraq.
It was the crossing of the Shatt-al-Arab by Iranian forces, in 1986, however, followed by the capture of the port of Fao, which was of great strategic importance, for this two-pronged attack opened the route to Basra, Iraq's second most important city, and ultimately to Baghdad. Meanwhile the war of the cities continued and was especially effective against the Iranian population.

In January 1987 an Iranian offensive known as Operation "Karbala 5" was launched against the Iraqi lines east of Basra, apparently with the object of either capturing or encircling that city. After six weeks of violent fighting Iran gave up this attempt which had, however, enabled it to occupy territory in the area of Shalamcheh and some islands in the Shatt-al-Arab.

A large part of the world's oil supply passes through the Persian Gulf, which is an area of major strategic importance. In 1987 the United States deployed additional air and naval forces in the Gulf in order to facilitate navigation there. Following Iraq's attack on the frigate USS Stark, in May 1987,

and in response to several requests from Kuwait, Washington undertook to provide an escort of warships for eleven Kuwaiti tankers which were already registered under the US flag. Shortly before this the Soviet Union had lent Kuwait several Soviet tankers. Italy, France, Great Britain and the Netherlands backed up the United States by also deploying warships and minesweepers in the area. The fact that Iran had missile launching pads near the Strait of Hormuz, at the entrance to the Gulf, was a particular source of concern to the Americans. In addition Tehran had stepped up the naval war by making greater use of fast patrol boats armed with missiles and grenade launchers. These developments led to several encounters in the Gulf between Iran's forces and those of the United States.

The war in the Gulf is fraught with paradoxes and this applies equally to the way in which hostilities developed. Since 1981 Iraq had proposed a cease-fire on several occasions, and as the years passed these proposals were accompanied by fewer and fewer conditions. Baghdad appealed to the UN and to other organizations to act as mediators. Iran, on the other hand, made any cease-fire conditional on the payment of billions of dollars in reparations, and also insisted on the removal of Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein. Iraq's determination to end the war did not prevent it, however, from resorting to tactics with serious consequences from several points of view. These included its use of chemical weapons and its attacks on Iranian cities as well as on the shipping in the Gulf.

I do not propose to elaborate in detail on the developments of the war and on the various battles. This will undoubtedly be done by many of the speakers who will make presentations at this Conference and who are certainly more qualified today to make the necessary evaluations than I am. The turning point in the war occurred at the outset of 1987 with the Iranian failure to capture Basra. Khomeini's main purpose was to bring about the downfall of Saddam Hussein. The Iranians believed that the fall of Basra would inevitably bring about his downfall.

Now, however, they were defending their own country and after the experience gained in years of fighting, the Iraqi forces improved. They built effective fortifications based on the natural obstacles on the ground. They made good use of their superiority in fire-power, artillery, tanks and attack helicopters, and perfected the rapid movement of reinforcements to weak spots in their defences. Tens of thousands of young basij volunteer Iranian militia, endowed with an overdose of religious fervour but lacking military training, lost their lives as they stormed the Iraqi defences. For the first time officers in the Iranian forces began to talk about "the lost war".

On the other hand the success at Basra proved Saddam Hussein's ability to maintain his power and to control a complex military situation, moving over ultimately to an all-out attack. Side by side with the improvement in the military showing of Iraq and the leadership of Saddam Hussein, the internal front in Iran began to falter. The defeats and military debacles which Iran suffered both from the Iraqis and at the hands of the Americans in the Gulf, wore down the fanatic motivation of the Iranians and enabled the Iraqis to move over to a major attack last April.

Iranian confidence eroded. Despite the apparent religious fanatic determination of the Iranian population to follow its Imam, Iranian morale broke. This was brought about by a realisation by much of the Iranian population that the war was an orgy of senseless blood-letting without any end in sight, certainly as long as Khomeini lived. The failure to take Basra despite Iranian human-wave assaults was followed by the Iraqi counterattack. Iraqi's air superiority enabling it to attack civilian targets began to have its effects. Iraq's success in extending the range of the Soviet made Scud ground-to ground missiles to aproximatly 5-600 kilometers, enabled the Iraqis to attack Iranian cities.

Between February and April in the so-called war of cities, Iraq launched 160 missile attacks on urban areas in Iran terrifying the civilian population. Following the missile attack on Tehran an estimated one-and-a-half million people fled the city of 8 million population. This coupled with the fear that the missiles, might be armed with poison gas, increased the panic. Iraq increased its use of chemical weapons and the world was shocked last March by the published results of Iraq's chemical weapons attack on Halabja in Northern Iraq which severely demoralized Iranian troops. The employment of chemical weapons and the publishing of its effects on the human body had its effect too on the national morale in Iran. It affected directly the spirit of volunteering and the normal contingent of 300,000 Baseji volunteers attached to Iran's Revolutionary Guard, the Pasdaran, fell off by one third.

The lack of cohesion in the Iranian armed forces began to have its effects as defeat followed defeat. The Iraqi army demonstrated superior training, organization and morale. Unlike the fearful and uncertain Iranian regulars who were purged, spied upon and saddled with military incompetent "spiritual guidance officers" the Iraqi army had the full and enthusiastic support of its government. Saddam Hussein appeared in public only in army uniform. Quantitatively Iraq more than doubled the army's first-line manpower from less than 200,000 when the war began to almost a half-a million.

As defeat followed defeat the Pasdarans lack of military

experience and lack of discipline contrasted sharply with the by now smoothly oiled Iraqi war machine, making use of chemical weapons. The defeat the Pasdaran at Fao was a rude awakening for the Iranian Command.

An analysis of Iran's failure during this current war cannot be complete without taking into account the economic aspects. During the war the oil production of both countries dropped considerably, but evened out to roughly half the pre-war production. Iraq managed to recover to a certain extent by increasing its pipeline capacity through Turkey. Furthermore, these oil production facilities were not seriously damaged by the attacks of a very weak Iranian airforce. Iraq's airforce which on the other hand had continued to improve by experience and by the acquisition of additional aircraft used its air superiority to good effect against the Iranian oil pumping and oil loading facilities. The direct involvement of the U.S. and other Western countries prevented Iran from effective retaliation measures against oil tanker traffic.

In 1988 Iran went from defeat to defeat. Fao in April, Majnun in May, Shalamtche and Mehran in June, Dehlonan in July, emphasised to the leadership in Tehran the gradual military decline which had occurred since the major battle of Karbala 5 in January 1987. At the beginning of June 1988, following the Fao and Majnun defeats, Khomeini obviously saw the writing on the wall and with it the danger to the Revolution. He appointed Ali Akbar Hashem Rafsanjani, the Speaker of Iran's Parliament, to be acting Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Rafsanjani, a political pragmatist, displeased the more extreme Islamic Fundamentalists by his pragmatism during the war, as for instance in connection with the alleged negotiations which led to the Irangate affair. It is clear from his public statements at the time that he appreciated the scope of Iran's basic problems. Unlike Iraq, which had a regular supply of arms and equipment from Russia and later from the French, not to mention, incidentally, over a billion dollars worth of military purchases from Egypt, Iran had to shop around the arms' markets of the world. This, incidentally, created a very difficult logistic problem for the Iranians, having to adapt themselves to various types of weapons which were bought not because of the logistic convenience of Iran, but because of their availability on the market. The U.S. Government decided at a certain stage in 1987 to block Iran's sources of arms and mounted a diplomatic offensive in the various capitals of the world, in countries which were suspected of being suppliers of arms to Iran. Gradually this so-called "Operation Staunch" began to have its effect. Rafsanjani and many other leaders in Iran became increasingly desperate and concerned by their country's isolation from the rest of the world. Rafsanjani recently admitted that "we pushed those who could have been neutral into hostility". Accordingly he mounted a major effort

to mend Iran's fences in different parts of the world. In June, after the freeing of the French hostages in Lebanon, Iran resumed normal relations with Paris. In July, diplomatic relations with Canada were resumed.

Iran's attack on neutral shipping in the Gulf indicated that Tehran had been counting on the U.S. and the Soviet Union to neutralize each other in the Persian Gulf. Khomeini's extreme policy of isolation led to an increased ideological hostility towards Iran's theocracy on the part of the Soviet Union. In April this year Gennadi Gerasimov, who was seen as the chief spokesman for the Soviet leader Michail Gorbachev, said when discussing Soviet policy in the Persian Gulf: "We now have something which we haven't had for a very long time: a Soviet American dialogue, not just on disarmament but on all the issues. This includes regional conflicts. There are many problems made more difficult by our rivalry that we can solve together."

The Iranians must surely have been aware of the fact that the Soviet Union did not condemn the attack by the U.S. on the Iranian oil platforms and ships in April. They were well aware of the fact that the U.S.S.R. was Iraq's main arms' supplier and that it provided all the surface to surface missiles that had been employed against Tehran. There were reports indicating that some of the chemical munitions used on Iraq's Soviet-made guns and rocket launchers could well be Soviet equipment. There was widespread suspicion that Iraqi planes that had bombed Iranian targets along the Caspian Sea near the Soviet border in 1987 refuelled in the Soviet Union. However, accurate these reports might or might not have been it was reasonable for the sober element in the Iranian leadership to assume that the two major powers might be moving towards a concensus on the question of Iran. Rasfanjani obviously saw the situation in all its stark reality. He was facing an Iraqi army of a million troops - one of the largest in the world - with eight years of continuous battle experience and an appreciable edge in tanks, training and aircraft. War weariness was obviously gripping Iran, and military enlistment had dropped sharply. The resolve of the U.S. and the allies to keep the oil shipping lanes open in the Gulf was evident to all. Iran was isolated from the rest of the world. Rasfanjani understood that he must bring the war to an end and that the only one capable of so doing in Iran today was Khomeini. While reports of Khomeini's impending death have proved to be erroneous in the past, it was quite clear that he was neither getting younger nor healthier. It was obvious to Rafsanjani and his supporters that Khomeini's departure will almost certainly open a period of political turmoil in Iran, with prolonged jockeying for position by among others, Rafsanjani and Ayatolah Hussein Abu Montazani, Khomeini's designated successor. Amid the labyrinthine domestic manoevers. the Iranian leaders

realized that Khomeini alone possessed the power to extricate his country and, incidentally, his Revolution, from the war. It was vital for Khomeini to move now, for after his death there could well be nobody with the authority to do so. The proverbial straw that may well have given Rafsanjani his chance was the accidental U.S. shooting down of an Iranian Jet liner on July 3rd with the loss of 290 lives. This tragic incident gave to moderate political figures in Tehran a chance to argue the futility of continuing the war which they insisted the U.S. would never permit Iraq to lose. The U.S. Navy was protecting the Gulf shipping from Iranian attack. The U.S. forces had attacked Iranian oil platforms and ships in the Gulf. The U.S. was accused of providing military intelligence to Iraq.

In mid July a meeting of leaders which included Ahmed Khomeini, the Ayatola's eldest son took place. The meeting was reportedly marked by much recrimination but it decided to recommend to the Imam to agree to a cease fire. In his broadcast to the Iranians on July 20th, Ayatolah Khomeini offered no pretense that Iran had achieved a victory. He called his decision to accept Resolution 598 "more deadly than taking poison".

Thus, to all intents and purposes, ended this foolish war. It is early to evaluate the possible train of events in Iran as apparently a policy based on irrational ideological revolution has made way for a rational appproach based on national interests. In Iraq too burdened with a 50 billion dollar debt and facing a long period of recovery, questions will bound to be asked about Saddam Hussein's misreading of the post-Revolutionary confusion in Iran, which brought about a futile war with its horrendous cost in life and resources. Sooner or later, when the cheering dies down, even Saddam Hussein may have to answer many embarassing questions.

This war came as a rude reminder to the world that even at the end of the twentieth century violent conflicts based on religious fanaticism are not a phenomenon of the past.

Furthermore, this is a war worthy of a place of honour in Barbara Tuchman's March of Folly. It will be cited as a classic example of the power of an individual's blind dogmatism in totalitarian states to lead a people towards disaster and thereby to change history. This occurrence could well repeat itself especially in the prevailing instability presided over by autocratic regimes in our region.

In summing up I do not want to add my voice to the spate of conjecture which characterized the public discussion in Israel immediately after Iran accepted the cease fire. In my view, much of this conjecture was premature. Iraq, and also Iran, created and maintained two of the largest armies in the world in the field of battle for a period of eight years. This is no

small achievement in the Middle East in terms of military experience and potential, Israel cannot and dare not ignore it. However, it seems to me that from a short term point of view, both countries will continue to be more preoccupied one with the other, with a major reconstruction effort and with internal developments as the scope of one of history's major blunders in our area sinks in with all the consequences that are liable to develop therefrom.

I would hesitate today to prognosticate except to say that we could well be witness to major developments in both countries with all that this implies. Somebody is bound to present a demand for an accounting of the tragic massacres and destruction which have gone on for eight years because of the obstinacy of two foolish men. It is early to draw all the conclusions and lessons. They are not necessarily in the field of military science. It is clear that each army, but more especially in the case of Iraq, as it was driven on the defensive in order to protect its own soil and to fight off an invasion, fought more resolutely than in other circumstances. Not all Iranians support Ayatola Khomeini's Revolution but most seemed willing to fight off the invasion. Iraq's Shia Moslems have quarrels with President Saddam Hussein's predominantly Sunni regime, but most became loyal Arabs when they had to fight a Persian enemy. Khomeini in Teheran and Saddam Hussein in Baghdad face an identical question: How long will thess loyalties last once the war is over?

Obviously Iraq's greatest mistake was to open only a limited war and to stop and try to negotiate once they had made their first advance. Their army was doing well, the enemy was disorganized, the cost of giving the Iranians time to mobilize more young men was eight years more fighting.

A thought about air power. The Iraqi pilots have thousands of hours of flying time. They did not have to face a serious airforce nor a serious anti-aircraft system. But they did mount long-range attacks reaching a distance of 1000 km., hit their target, refuelled in the air and returned safely. Few airforces in the Middle East are capable of carrying out such attacks. On the other hand one cannot avoid noting that Iran never had air superiority anywhere but until the last year of the war almost always won.

The degree of international duplicity, cowardice and hypocrisy which accompanied the reaction to the use of chemical weapons by the Iragis, is a devastating commentary on world morality. Who could have dreamt that the world would stand by almost mute, and in fact by doing nothing, acquiesce in a ruthless use of poison gas by two third-world countries? The taboo has been broken and every army facing the possibility of war must now take into consideration that the international accords

[illegible]ring the use of chemical weapons in war are apparently of little binding value.

What a sad commentary on international hypocrisy it is to comtemplate that if the world's reaction to the widespread and indiscriminate use of chemical weapons against soldiers, innocent civilians, men women and children in Iran, had approached the level of international righteous indignation which greeted Israel's efforts to impose law and order against petrol bomb and stone-throwers by the use of batons, we might have witnessed some form of second thoughts on the part of the users of poison gas.

However, it seems to me that the main lesson for all countries to note is that the standing in the world of a country engaged in a military struggle is a vital element not only politically, but also economically and therefore militarily. What brought Iran to agree to a cease fire was its isolation internationally. No country can afford to become isolated while at the same time maintaining a strong military posture. The nations of the world are interdependent, and a major element in any middle and small nation's military capability must of necessity be based on its international economic and political standing. The Gulf war proved that this must be a major and vital consideration in the defence of any country.

Furthermore, one cannot ignore a new element which has begun to have its effects on many of the conflicts in the world today. Most conflicts thrived when they took place against the background of the hostility and rivalry between the two major powers. But as we in Israel are aware from the days of our struggle for independence, nothing can stand in the way of a consensus between the two great powers. This was highlighted by the very significant remark made a few months ago by Mr. Gennadi Gerasimov of the Soviet Union, whose words I quoted earlier on. This truism is amply demonstrated by what is happening now in the Gulf. It is a lesson that dare not be overlooked.

In conclusion, I have only scratched the surface in talking about the Iran Iraq war. The distinguished participants in the course of the next few days of this Conferece will analyse in depth the various aspects of the war: the military implications, the missile war, the air war, the naval war, the tanker war, the economic war, the involvement of the super powers and of the various countries in the region and developments following the cease fire, and the internal developments which will, doubtless, ensue in both Iran and Iraq.

Suffice it to say that while, as I pointed out at the outset, from a pure battlefield point of view there is little to learn from this senseless, dreadful conflict, which was such a tragic

mistake from start to finish, the broader implications are of vital interest to everybody and above all - to Israel. They deserve a most thorough analysis and study, so that all can learn from them in the hope that such ghastly and tragic errors will not recur.

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INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON,
INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS.

SIC

Summary only

MODUK FOR SEC(O)(C)

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1320 TO FCO: WEU COOPERATION IN THE GULF: OPERATION CLEANSWEEP

SUMMARY

1. ENCOURAGING SIGNS THAT ANDREOTTI MAY NOW GIVE HIS GO-AHEAD TO A CONTINUING ITALIAN PRESENCE IN THE GULF ON SAME BASIS AS AT PRESENT UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR. MAJOR POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES SEEN OVER ANY CONTINUATION BEYOND THEN.

DETAIL

2. I RAISED THE QUESTION OF ITALIAN PARTICIPATION LAST NIGHT WITH ZANONE (MINISTER OF DEFENCE) AND PERLOT (POLITICAL DIRECTOR, MFA).

3. I TOLD ZANONE OF MIGLIUOLO'S LATEST CONVERSATION WITH THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL (UKMIS NEW YOR TUR). WE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD PROVIDE ANDREOTTI WITH THE REASSURANCE WHICH THE ITALIANS HAD BEEN SEEKING. ZANONE SAID HE SAW THE ADVANTAGE OF WEU FORCES IN THE GULF ENDING THE PRESENT OPERATION IN A SUITABLY COORDINATED WAY. HE WOULD PERSONALLY BE HAPPY FOR ITALIAN SHIPS TO STAY IN THE GULF UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR. BUT THERE HAD ALWAYS BEEN POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT.
THE PRESENT FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS AGREED BY PARLIAMENT WOULD EXPIRE ON 31 DECEMBER, AND IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ITALIANS TO KEEP THE SHIPS THERE BEYOND THAT DATE.
I MENTIONED TO ZANONE THAT THE PRESENCE OF WEU FORCES IN THE GULF WAS LIKELY TO COME UP IN THE COMMONS DEFENCE DEBATE ON 20 OCTOBER,

AND THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CLARIFY THE ITALIAN POSITION BEFORE THEN. ZANONE UNDERTOOK TO SPEAK TO ANDREOTTI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, (THOUGH THIS CANNOT BE BEFORE 20 OCTOBER, WHEN ZANONE RETURNS FROM ARGENTINA).

4. WHEN I CALLED LATER ON THE ITALIAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR, PERLOT TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT THE BLOCKAGE CAUSED BY ANDREOTTI'S DOUBTS OVER THE UNSG'S VIEWS WAS COMING CLOSE TO BEING RESOLVED. MIGLIUOLO'S RECENT CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD BEEN QUOTE LESS PROBLEMATIC UNQUOTE. AS PERLOT HAD MENTIONED IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH RATFORD (AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITH BIANCHERI, THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON), AGREEMENT WAS BEING SOUGHT FROM ANDREOTTI, WHO WAS IN MOSCOW WITH DE MITA, THAT THE ITALIAN SHIPS COULD NOW GO AHEAD AND JOIN IN THIS LAST MINE-SWEEPING EFFORT UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR. ANDREOTTI'S (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) WRITTEN CONFIRMATION WAS, HOWEVER, NECESSARY AND THIS MIGHT NOT ARRIVE UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK. PERLOT ALSO GAVE ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF THE ITALIAN SHIPS STAYING BEYOND THE END OF THE YEAR, AND THAT IN THE ITALIAN VIEW IT MUST REMAIN FOR NATIONAL DECISION WHEN THE SHIPS OF A CONTRIBUTING NATION WOULD FINALLY BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE AREA. PERLOT ALSO REINFORCED ZANONE'S POINT ABOUT THE PARLIAMENTARY DIFFICULTIES: ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN THIS FINAL PHASE WOULD HAVE TO BE ON A NATIONAL BASIS, RESPECTING THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY PARLIAMENT LAST YEAR. HE SAID THAT THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE WORKED OUT AS SOON AS ANDREOTTI'S FORMAL AGREEMENT WAS GIVEN.

5. I AGREED WITH PERLOT THAT THINGS NOW SEEMED MORE HOPEFUL, AND MENTIONED TO HIM THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEXT WEEK'S COMMONS DEFENCE DEBATE. PERLOT'S PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT ANDREOTTI'S AGREEMENT WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN TIME FOR THIS. HE WENT ON TO STRESS THAT ANDREOTTID'S PERSONAL CAUTION OVER THIS LAST PHASE OF THE WEU'S EFFORTS IN THE GULF WAS CLOSELY LINKED TO HIS CONCERN THAT TOO CONSPICUOUS A WEU PROFILE IN THIS LAST PHASE COULD GIVE RISE TO UNHELPFUL SUSPICIONS IN IRAN.

THOMAS

YYYY

FILE
~~DAS~~
~~PC~~

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 October 1988

Dear Peter,

IRAQ: CREDITS FOR 1989

Thank you for your letter of 12 October setting out the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's proposals for increasing export credit cover for Iraq. The Prime Minister is content with these proposals.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD, the Chief Secretary, the Secretary of State for Energy and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

C. D. POWELL

Peter Smith, Esq.
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's
Office

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COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL
FM AMMAN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 445
OF 041100Z OCTOBER 88
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

IRAN/IRAQ: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN

1. MIFT CONTAINS A MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH SETS OUT JORDAN'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE IRAQI POSITION FOLLOWING THE KING'S VISIT TO IRAQ ON 2 OCTOBER.

2. THE MESSAGE IS DATED 3 OCTOBER. WE RECEIVED IT ON 4 OCTOBER. THE FRENCH EMBASSY HAVE ALSO RECEIVED SIMILAR MESSAGE. WE ASSUME THAT IT HAS GONE TO THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

REEVE

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MAIN 4
NO DISTRIBUTION 0
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dti

the department for Enterprise

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt. Hon. Tony Newton OBE, MP
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and
Minister of Trade and Industry

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

Department of Trade and Industry

1-19 Victoria Street
London SW1H 0ET

Switchboard
01-215 7877

Telex 8811074/5 DTHQ G
Fax 01-222 2629

Direct line 215 5147
Our ref
Your ref
Date 12 October 1988

Prime Minister
Agree to proposed new credits for Iraq?
CDS 12/x.

Dear Charles,

IRAQ - CREDITS FOR 1989

Your letter of 2 September to Bob Peirce asked that the Prime Minister be consulted on all relevant decisions on Iraq and Iran. The Prime Minister will wish to be informed of the proposals concerning new credits which the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster proposes to offer to Iraq during the forthcoming Joint Commission negotiations in Baghdad commencing on 3 November.

The paper circulated under cover of the Foreign Secretary's minute of 31 August, to which your letter responded, noted that further business with Iraq would undoubtedly depend upon the offer of new medium term credit and that the Export Guarantees Committee (EGC) would be reporting to Ministers shortly. The EGC has now recommended a package of new credits for Iraq totalling £340m (loan value). This would increase ECGD's current total estimated exposure of £900m at the end of this year by £244m, to around £1,150m by the end of 1989, after taking into account repayments due to be made by Iraq in 1989. At this stage the detailed make-up of the package has yet to be determined. However, it is envisaged that around £80m will be used for pharmaceutical products leaving £260m for capital goods and individual projects. This compares with £75m for pharmaceuticals and £100m for capital goods agreed last year.

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the department for Enterprise

The case for offering substantial new credits is clear. The UK has earned itself favoured nation status because it has continued, since 1983, to provide external credit facilities. Iraq has throughout this period honoured its repayment obligations under existing ECGD facilities, but those other countries who have held back on granting new credits have had their debts rescheduled. Offering new credits should ensure that our status as preferential creditor is maintained. EGC judge £340m to be about the minimum necessary to secure this position, since, although it is substantially more than the £175m agreed last year, it is only around £100m more than what the Iraqis are due to repay in 1989.

The scope for UK companies winning business in Iraq will inevitably exceed the limited amount of credit available. The DTI and ECGD have identified some £1,250m of potential projects and the Iraqis have indicated that a substantial slice of the reconstruction business now in prospect could come to the UK if financing is available. Although the Iraqis and UK exporters will probably be disappointed with £340m, EGC's view, which the Chancellor of the Duchy endorses, is that we need to exercise restraint, given ECGD's current total exposure and against the uncertainties about Iraq's economic prospects and debt position. EGC would normally expect to review the level of credit in Autumn 1989 but, depending on developments, may wish to do so earlier than then.

I should be grateful to know that the Prime Minister is content that export credit cover for Iraq should be increased along the above lines.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of Members of OD, of the Chief Secretary, and the Secretary of State for Energy; and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Peter

PETER SMITH
PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY

TN5ABH

KAQ : Wagl Lian PTQ



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T152/88

SUBJECT

cc MASTER
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COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL
FM AMMAN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 446
OF 041102Z OCTOBER 88
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

MIPT: IRAN/IRAQ - MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I AM WRITING TO YOU REGARDING THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. I DO SO ON THE BASIS OF MY KNOWLEDGE OF YOUR GREAT INTEREST IN SEEING A GENUINE PEACE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN, WHICH IS THE CORNER-STONE OF STABILITY IN THE GULF REGION, AND WHICH WILL HOPEFULLY BE A PRECEDENT FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE OTHER REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN OUR AREA.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS SENT ME A MESSAGE EXPLAINING THE REASONS FOR THE PRESENT IMPASSE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND REQUESTING MY ASSISTANCE IN OVERCOMING THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES.

I MET WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN YESTERDAY IN BAGHDAD AND DISCUSSED WITH HIM AT LENGTH THE CONTENT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MESSAGE. I FOUND THE PRESIDENT TO BE FULLY COMMITTED TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. HE IS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN ARRIVING AT A PEACE TREATY WITH IRAN EXPEDITIOUSLY. HIS POSITION APPEARS TO ME TO BE LOGICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. IT CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

IRAQ ACCEPTED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598 AS SOON AS IT WAS ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL. IRAN, WHICH MAY HAVE FELT AT THE TIME THAT IT HAD THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE AND WAS IN OCCUPATION OF IRAQI TERRITORY, FAILED TO ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION UNTIL A YEAR LATER. IRAQ ACCEPTED THE CEASE-FIRE IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT BY THEN IT HAD RECOVERED ITS TERRITORY OCCUPIED EARLIER BY IRAN AND ACHIEVED THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE. IRAN ACCEPTED TO ENTER INTO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAQ TO ARRIVE AT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND A CEASE-FIRE CAME INTO EFFECT ON LAND, IN THE AIR AND AT SEA. IRAQ BELIEVES THAT THE BENEFITS OF THE CEASE-FIRE MUST BE EQUALLY REAPED BY BOTH SIDES, ON LAND, IN THE AIR AND AT SEA. THE MUTUAL BENEFITS ON LAND AND IN THE AIR ARE ALREADY ESTABLISHED, BUT AT SEA IRAN HAS BENEFITED AS A RESULT OF THE CEASE-FIRE. IT HAS BEEN ABLE TO NAVIGATE THE GULF FREELY, TO AND FROM ITS PORTS WITHOUT IRAQI HINDRANCE. THE EQUAL BENEFIT FOR IRAQ MUST SURELY BE IRAQ'S RIGHT TO USE THE GULF FREELY AND TO BENEFIT FROM THE USE OF ITS PORTS IN THE SHATT AL-ARAB. HENCE THE IRAQI INSISTENCE FOR THE RIGHT OF UNRESTRICTED NAVIGATION IN THE GULF AND THE URGENTLY NEEDED AGREEMENT ON OPERATIONS TO CLEAR THE SHATT AL-ARAB WATERWAY,

IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN. THE PRESIDENT TOLD ME THAT WHILE IRAQ ACCEPTS IRAN'S RIGHT TO FREELY NAVIGATE THE WATERWAY, IRAQ DOES NOT MAKE NOR ACCEPT ANY LINKAGE BETWEEN THE AGREEMENT TO CLEAR THE WATERWAY AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE NEEDED CLEARING WORK ON THE ONE HAND AND THE FINAL LEGAL STATUS OF THE WATERWAY ON THE OTHER. THE FINAL LEGAL STATUS OF THE WATERWAY CAN BE DETERMINED AND RESOLVED UNDER OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH FOUR OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598.

I HOPE THE ABOVE CLARIFIES THE IRAQI POSITION. I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO ASSIST BOTH PARTIES TO ARRIVE AT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. YOU CAN REST ASSURED THAT I WILL CONTINUE TO DO MY UTMOST IN SUPPORT OF YOUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD, WHICH I HIGHLY VALUE AND GREATLY APPRECIATE.

PLEASE ACCEPT MY RESPECTS, REGARDS AND BEST WISHES FOR YOUR CONTINUED GOOD HEALTH, HAPPINESS AND SUCCESS IN YOUR NOBLE ENDEAVOURS.

I AM,

YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,

HUSSEIN.

REEVE

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OF 260955Z SEPTEMBER 88
INFO ROUTINE ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, KUWAIT, RIYADH
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, ANKARA

AUDIENCE WITH THE SULTAN: IRAN/IRAQ AND CW

1. WHEN I SAW THE SULTAN ON 24 SEPTEMBER I OUTLINED THE CONTINUING EFFORTS WE WERE MAKING TO BRING PRESSURE ON IRAQ ON CW. THIS HAD BEEN A MAJOR SUBJECT IN A FORTHRIGHT DISCUSSION BETWEEN YOURSELF AND HAMMADI.

2. THE SULTAN SAID THAT HE WAS EXTREMELY WORRIED BY CONTINUING IRAQI USE OF CW. IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD FIND A WAY OF BRINGING THIS TO A HALT. IF NOT HE WAS FEARFUL THAT POSSESSION OF CW WOULD VERY RAPIDLY SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. SEVERAL STATES (SYRIA, ISRAEL, EGYPT) HAD THE CAPABILITY TO DEVELOP CHEMICAL WARFARE NOW AND EVEN SMALLER STATES IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULAR (HE MENTIONED QATAR) MIGHT COME TO FEEL THAT THEY SHOULD LOOK AT THE OPTIONS.

3. I SAID THAT THIS WAS OUR VIEW EXACTLY. THIS WAS WHY WE AND THE AMERICANS WERE GIVING SUCH PROMINENCE TO IT. I SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNT THAT THE SULTAN WAS DUE TO RECEIVE AN IRAQI EMISSARY TODAY. I HAVE ASKED THE PRESIDENT OF THE DIWAN TO PASS THE SULTAN A MESSAGE TO SAY THAT I KNOW THAT MINISTERS IN LONDON WOULD GREATLY WELCOME IT IF HE HE FELT ABLE TO PRESS THEM STRONGLY ON THIS ISSUE.

4. I ALSO OUTLINED THE POSITION YOU TOOK WITH HAMMADI ON THE SHATT AL ARAB (FCO TELNO 523 TO UKMIS NEW YORK). THE SULTAN SAID HE QUITE AGREED THAT THE ALGIERS AGREEMENT SHOULD BE THE POINT OF DEPARTURE.

ALSTON

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IRAN/IRAQ

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26/9.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 3/21L

26th September 1988

Dear Charles

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

The Defence Secretary has asked that I should let you have a note of the details of the latest operational instructions given to the joint UK/Dutch/Belgian mine countermeasures force (CALENDAR) in the Gulf, in parallel with diplomatic action to implement the recent UK initiative to achieve concerted WEU route checking of a 300 mile shipping lane through international waters.

To give impetus to the decisions of other WEU nations and to make maximum use of the remaining Belgian MCMV in case it is withdrawn - despite HMG's persuasive efforts - by mid November, the Defence Secretary has agreed that CALENDAR should be instructed to start the route checking task today within its area of responsibility shown on the attached map. We hope that the French and Italians will soon follow suit in their sectors. The precise duration of the operation (which we have provisionally designated CLEANSWEEP) will depend on local weather conditions, possible discovery of new mine danger areas to be cleared elsewhere in Gulf waters, and the number of MCMVs which continue to participate. Local cooperation by naval commanders should allow ships to move as necessary between different national sectors to speed up the task and spread the load (this is especially likely to happen with CALENDAR because the 60 miles of the route needing to be swept in its sector represents only about half the lengths through the French and Italian sectors and should therefore be finished early).

No announcement of Operation CLEANSWEEP is planned until the WEU Ministerial meeting on 15th/16th November, which should give the opportunity for extensive positive media coverage of the British and WEU roles in the Gulf. Meanwhile the activities of the ARMILLA Destroyers and Frigates in accompanying entitled merchant ships and giving protection when necessary to CALENDAR operations continue as before.

I should also mention that Mr Younger has today written to Signor Zanone in Rome, in the same way as Sir Geoffrey Howe has

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

approached Signor Andreotti, in order to emphasise the importance we place on Italy continuing to act in concert with other WEU Allies in the Gulf and not withdrawing its naval contingent prematurely, which we understand that they may be considering.


I am copying this letter to Bob Peirce in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Yours sincerely,

John Colston

(J P COLSTON)
Private Secretary

ANNEX A


BASRA
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IRAQI MEZ
Dubiyan
Ganavegh
Faylakah
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AREA OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR MINE CLEARANCE
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Lavan
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Bahrain
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Sirri
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GREYSWIFT BUOY: CURRENTS AND DEPTHS MAKE WATER TO THE NORTH EAST IMPRACTICABLE FOR MINING
PROPOSED MERCHANT SHIP ROUTE
IRANIAN 'ADVICE' AREA

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO DESKBY 240830Z FCO
TELNO 1147
OF 240015Z SEPTEMBER 88
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, PEKING, BAGHDAD
INFO PRIORITY RIYADH, CAIRO
INFO ROUTINE OTHER GULF POSTS, AMMAN, ALGIERS, UKMIS GENEVA
INFO ROUTINE BONN, ROME, TOKYO, STOCKHOLM

UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 488 (NOT TO ALL) : IRAN/IRAQ TALKS: MEETING WITH IRANIANS

SUMMARY

1. CONSTRUCTIVE MEETING WITH SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICIAL IN ADVANCE OF YOUR MEETING WITH THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER NEXT WEEK. I MADE THE POINT ONCE MORE ABOUT BRITISH PRISONERS AND HOSTAGES IN LEBANON.

DETAIL

2. THE IRANIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN GENEVA (NASSERI) ASKED TO SEE ME ON 23 SEPTEMBER. HE WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED LEST THE IRAQIS SHOULD FAIL TO APPEAR FOR THE ROUND OF TALKS IN NEW YORK PROPOSED FOR A WEEK'S TIME. HE SAID THE IRANIANS WERE STILL UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT THE COMPROMISE WHICH HAD EMERGED ABOUT DATES, BUT WERE CONTENT FOR AN INITIAL BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 30 SEPTEMBER, AN IRAQI BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 1 OCTOBER, AND JOINT MEETINGS THEREAFTER AS REQUIRED.

3. NASSERI SUMMED UP IN OBJECTIVE TERMS THE OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED IN THE GENEVA TALKS. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CONTINUE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK SET OUT AT THE START OF THE GENEVA ROUND AND REPEATED IN ELIASSON'S STATEMENT TO THE TWO SIDES ON 10 SEPTEMBER (UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 505). THIS MEANT REACHING AGREEMENT ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF SCR 598, AND THEN ON PROCEDURE AND TIMING FOR THE REMAINING ELEMENTS OF THE RESOLUTION. THE MAIN OBSTACLES LAY IN IRAQ'S POSITION ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, AND ON STARTING CLEARANCE OF THE SHATT. HE REITERATED THE IRANIAN POSITION THAT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION SHOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND MENTIONED THE WAY OUT OF THE PROBLEM REPORTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF TEL UNDER REF. AS FOR CLEARANCE OF THE SHATT, THIS COULD START IMMEDIATELY, BUT ONLY ACCORDING TO THE PROCEDURES LAID DOWN IN THE 1975 AGREEMENT. IRAQ'S PUBLICLY STATED WISH TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT

WAS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH SCR 598, AND POSED SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE IRAQI ATTITUDE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. IRAN FOR ITS PART FELT THAT IF THE TWO SIDES COULD NOT AGREE ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ANNEX RELATING TO THE CEASEFIRE, IT WOULD NOT BE EASY TO AGREE SUBSEQUENT POINTS. WHAT WAS THE POSITION OF THE FIVE? WHAT WERE BRITISH VIEWS?

4. I SAID THAT THE FIVE CONTINUED TO GIVE FULL SUPPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AND WANTED FULL AND RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598. APPLICATION OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 WAS THE INDISPENSABLE FIRST STEP. THE FIVE WERE NOW PREPARING FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH FOR THE FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 30 SEPTEMBER. WHEN HE PRESSED ME FURTHER I SAID IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR THE FIVE OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO BECOME ENGAGED IN THE DETAIL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT NATURALLY WE WERE DOING ALL WE COULD TO HELP THEM ALONG. ON THE SPECIFIC ISSUES HE HAD RAISED, THE BRITISH VIEW WAS:

- FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION: WE PREFERRED TO LEAVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WHO HAD LINKED THIS ISSUE TO THE CEASEFIRE IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS, TO SORT THE MATTER OUT WITH THE PARTIES. WE BELIEVED THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN NEAR IN GENEVA, AND HOPED IT COULD SOON BE REACHED.

- CLEARANCE OF THE SHATT: WE WISHED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WELL IN FINDING A FORMULA TO RESOLVE THE PRESENT DEADLOCK, BUT WOULD NOT WISH THIS ISSUE TO IMPEDE PROGRESS IN APPLYING OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1. IF IT REQUIRED LONGER TERM CONSIDERATION, THEN IT WOULD BE BEST DEALT WITH UNDER OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4.

- PLACE OF TALKS: WE BELIEVED THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS IN NEW YORK SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIVE. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO HAVE THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH WAS THE FOUNT OF HIS AUTHORITY, NEAR AT HAND. NASSERI HIMSELF WOULD HAVE SEEN THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN GENEVA. NATURALLY THE TALKS COULD CONTINUE ELSEWHERE LATER ON IF THE PARTIES SO WISHED.

5. ON YOUR MEETING WITH VELAYATI ON 30 SEPTEMBER, I SAID THAT THE OCCASION WOULD BE MORE FRUITFUL IF VELAYATI COULD BRING NEWS OF PROGRESS ON THE TWO BRITISH PRISONERS IN IRAN, FOR WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT WAS RESPONSIBLE, AND ON THE HOSTAGES IN LEBANON, WHERE IT HAD OFFERED TO HELP. NASSERI INDICATED EMBARRASSMENT. HE KNEW THAT VELAYATI HAD PROMISED THE EARLY RELEASE OF NICOLA.

WE WOULD SEE RESULTS ON HIM VERY SOON. THE CASE OF COOPER WAS MORE DIFFICULT AS WIDER CONSIDERATIONS WERE INVOLVED, BUT MATTERS WERE WELL IN HAND. HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY ON HOSTAGES IN LEBANON. HE WENT ON TO WELCOME WHAT HE SAW AS A SLOW BUT STEADY IMPROVEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. HE HOPED WE COULD MOVE TO RESTORE FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BEFORE OPPOSITION HAD TIME TO REASSERT ITSELF IN TEHRAN. HIS AUTHORITIES HAD NOTED A MORE FAVOURABLE ATTITUDE TOWARDS IRAN IN THE BRITISH PRESS IN RECENT DAYS.

COMMENT

6. NASSERI WAS QUICK, WELL INFORMED AND ANXIOUS TO BE ACCOMMODATING. HE INDICATED DIVIDED OPINIONS IN TEHRAN ON THE PRISONERS/HOSTAGES ISSUE, AND THE DIFFICULTY OF DELIVERING WHAT WE - AND HE - WANTED. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE IRANIANS VALUED THE PART WE WERE PLAYING OVER IRAN/IRAQ ISSUES GENERALLY.

TICKELL

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 24

ADVANCE 24

.IRAN/IRAQ
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
MR MUNRO
SIR D MIERS
HD/MED
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AUS (C) MOD
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MR L S T SMITH (BANK OF) (ENGLAND)

NNNN

RESTRICTED

FILE
Sam
cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 September 1988

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT: CURRENT UK POLICY TOWARDS THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT

Thank you for your letter of 22 September enclosing the Government's reply to the Committee report on UK policy towards the Iran/Iraq conflict. I think the Prime Minister would be content with this.

CHARLES POWELL

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 September 1988

Dear Charles

Foreign Affairs Committee Report:
Current UK Policy towards the Iran/Iraq Conflict

As you know, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons issued a report on 27 June on UK policy towards the Iran/Iraq conflict. Broadly speaking, it endorsed the Government's policy not only on the conflict but also on relations with Iran.

I am enclosing a copy of the Government's reply, cleared by the Foreign Secretary, which is to be sent for printing next week with a view to laying and publication on Wednesday, 19 October.


I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD).

Yours ever

Bob Peirce

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT: CURRENT UK POLICY TOWARDS THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT

1. This paper represents the Government's comments on the Foreign Affairs Committee's report on Current UK Policy towards the Iran/Iraq conflict, issued on 27 June 1988.

2. The Government welcome the Report and consider it a valuable analysis of British policy towards the conflict. For the most part, the Government agree with the Report and its conclusions and recommendations. As the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs said in the House on 30 June 1988, the Report in general constitutes a powerful all party endorsement of the Government's policy.

3. Events have moved rapidly over the summer. The Government consider that developments since the publication of the report have further vindicated their policy. Iran's acceptance of Security Council Resolution 598 on 18 July was a major and most welcome breakthrough. Since Iraq had accepted the resolution when it was passed in July 1987, the way was opened for the ceasefire which came into effect on 20 August. Direct talks between the two sides, under the auspices of the UNSG began in Geneva on 25 August.

4. The Government believe the achievement of the ceasefire and the start of talks on a comprehensive settlement were a major achievement for the United Nations. We pay tribute to the patience and persistence of the Secretary General and his staff. Our own energetic diplomatic activity, particularly as co-ordinator of the Five Permanent Security Council Members, has been a valuable contribution to achieving this progress.

5. There is now a unique opportunity to bring what the report rightly describes as a "horrific conflict" to an end in negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary General. The Government's objective is a comprehensive and lasting settlement through the full implementation of all the operative paragraphs of Security Council Resolution 598. We shall continue to offer our complete support to the efforts of the Secretary General. The course of the settlement

talks to date has demonstrated that the process has barely begun. There are many highly complex and contentious points at issue between the parties. As the Report has indicated the disputes are of a deep-rooted historical nature. We call on both sides to exercise maximum restraint, and to work with the Secretary General in a positive and co-operative spirit in pursuit of peace.

6. The Government view with profound concern the continued use of chemical weapons in the conflict after publication of the Report. This is a matter of utmost gravity. The use by Iraq of CW against Iranian civilians was particularly barbaric. We sponsored Security Council Resolution 620 which was unanimously adopted on 26 August. This resolution requires the UN to investigate promptly allegations of the use of CW; not just those that may be in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol but also those which may contravene other relevant rules of customary international law. The Government continue to seek a comprehensive, verifiable and worldwide ban on chemical weapons, as well as progress on the specific proposals made by the Foreign Secretary at the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament on 7 June 1988 to strengthen the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

7. We are also greatly concerned by reports of a military offensive by the Government of Iraq, following the ceasefire with Iran, against the Kurdish population in the North of the country. The Government of Iraq should refrain from systematic attacks on its own civilian population. The subsequent offer of another amnesty for the Kurds has been received sceptically. Evidence that CW has been used against the Kurds is a matter of the greatest concern. We have, together with a number of other governments, urged the UN Secretary-General to mount an investigation in accordance with the recently adopted Security Council Resolution 620.

8. The Government have the following observations on the detailed conclusions and recommendations of the Report:

(i) Paras 8.2, 8.3, 8.4

The Government entirely agree that the unity of the Permanent Members of the Security Council must be maintained. We are working actively for this. We hope

the Five will continue to support the Secretary General during the talks on a settlement of the conflict. The Government are heartened by the unprecedented and continuing co-operation between the Five and welcome the generally positive role which the Soviet Union has played. We hope that this co-operation will be extended to the handling of other regional crises. Provided the ceasefire holds, consideration of an arms embargo is inappropriate. We should certainly wish to consider an international approach on these lines if either party were to withdraw from settlement talks or recommence hostilities.

(ii) Paras 8.5, 8.6, 8.7, 8.9, 8.10

The Government welcome the Report's support for the work of the Royal Navy's Armilla Patrol. The concerted Western naval efforts to uphold the principle of freedom of navigation in international waters and to protect merchant shipping have also been an important factor in hastening the end of hostilities and maintaining regional security. Royal Naval forces, both frigates and mine hunters, will remain in the Gulf so long as the Government consider that a significant threat to British shipping remains. The situation in the Gulf and the requirment for a Western presence will be kept under review, in co-ordination with our Partners in the Western European Union (WEU). The Government pay tribute in particular to the participation of the Governments of the Netherlands and Belgium in the joint mine hunting force (Operation Calendar). We also acknowledge the important contribution of the United States in protecting innocent neutral vessels during the conflict. We shall keep in close contact with the Government of the United States and with the Secretary General.

(iii) Paras 8.8

The Government note the recommendation of the Committee regarding the role of Japan in contributing to security of the Gulf. They welcome the decision by the Government of Japan to contribute financially to support the peace

efforts of the Secretary General including the operations of UNIIMOG (United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group). They also welcome the initiative of Japan to finance installation of a navigational system in the Gulf. The Government hope that the Government of Japan will feel able to continue to contribute to the financing of United Nations efforts in pursuit of a settlement.

(iv) Paras 8.11, 8.12

The Government welcome and endorse the Committee's comments on British relations with the Arab States of the Gulf. It is an important British policy objective that we should continue to be regarded as a reliable political interlocutor and trading partner by those states, and the Government spares no effort in nurturing these relationships.

(v) Para 8.13

The Government's attitude to Iraq's use of chemical weapons and her approach to the Kurdish minority has been described in paragraphs 6 and 7 above. How Iraq uses her influence in the region once a settlement has been reached with Iran is of interest to HMG. As the Committee points out, the treatment of British citizens and the human rights record in general are relevant to any the development of bilateral relations, which the Government desire.

(vi) Paras 8.14 - 8.19

The Government note the observations of the Committee on the question of British relations with Iran. They are conscious of the importance of Iran and would welcome an improved relationship based on mutual benefit and respect. They endorse the conclusions of the Committee set out in paragraphs 8.14 - 8.19.

(vii) Para 8.20

The Government note the Committee's recommendations that the FCO should maintain an adequate stock of Persian specialists and remedy any weakness by further training or recruitment. There are currently 32 Persian language specialists in the Diplomatic Service. The need to maintain these skills is fully recognised in current recruitment and training programmes.

The National Archives

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RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE ALERT HEAD, MED
FCO TELNO 1456: IRAQI KURDS
SUMMARY
1. SHULTZ WARNS HAMMADI ABOUT CONSEQUENCES OF IRAQI CW USE ON US-IRAQI RELATIONS. US WANT IRAQ TO RENOUNCE CW USE AND ACCEPT AN INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION IN NORTHERN IRAQ. BROAD US SUPPORT FOR NORDIC GROUP INITIATIVE IN NEW YORK BUT INTERNAL US REVIEW UNDERWAY ON TACTICAL OPTIONS. US INTEREST IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS ANGLE NOW LESS URGENT.
2. STATE DEPARTMENT ALSO REVIEWING OPTIONS FOR UNILATERAL MEASURES AGAINST IRAQ, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INTENSIFYING PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN. SENATE PASSES DRAFT BILL MANDATING WIDE RANGING SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ.
DETAIL
3. HAMMADI SAW SHULTZ LATE ON 8 SEPTEMBER. (A COPY OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S RECORD OF THE MEETING FOLLOWS BY BAG.) HAMMADI TOOK A STANDARD IRAQI LINE ON THE DEADLOCKED TALKS IN GENEVA. SHULTZ DECLINED TO COMMENT ON DETAILS OF THE ALGIERS ACCORDS OR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS. HE TACKLED HAMMADI REPEATEDLY ABOUT USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW). THREE TIMES HAMMADI DENIED IRAQI USE. SHULTZ WARNED HIM THAT CONTINUED CW USE WOULD HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON US-IRAQI RELATIONS.
4. AFTER THE MEETING, STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:
QUOTE THE SECRETARY TODAY CONVEYED TO IRAQI MINISTER OF STATE HAMMADI OUR VIEW THAT IRAQ'S USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS ON ITS MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAQI KURDS IS UNJUSTIFIABLE AND ABHORRENT. THE SECRETARY STRESSED TO DR HAMMADI THAT WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ, BUT THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO PURSUE THIS COURSE IF ILLEGAL IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES CONTINUE. THE SECRETARY ASKED THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WEIGH THIS FACTOR FULLY IN ITS DECISION-MAKING.

WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN THE WORLD, WE WILL BE EXPLORING WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN INFLUENCE IRAQ TO END THESE PRACTICES, WHICH ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE CIVILIZED WORLD. UNQUOTE

5. STATE HAVE TOLD US THAT THEIR IMMEDIATE AIM IS TO PRESS IRAQ:

A. TO ACCEPT AN INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION IN NORTHERN IRAQ OF THE ALLEGED USE OF CW, AND

B. TO MAKE A CLEAR PUBLIC STATEMENT RENOUNCING USE OF CW.

STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ON 9 SEPTEMBER SAID THAT AN IRAQI STATEMENT THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS SHOULD NOT BE USED WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP. MURPHY ALSO MADE BOTH POINTS TO THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR, IN A MEETING ON 9 SEPTEMBER. AND STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE INSTRUCTED THE US AMBASSADOR TO TAKE THE SAME ROBUST LINE IN BAGHDAD ON 10 SEPTEMBER (SHE HAS BEEN SUMMONED BY THE IRAQI MFA - NO DOUBT TO HEAR A STRONG PROTEST AT THE US LINE).

6. AFTER HIS MEETING WITH SHULTZ, HAMMADI REPEATED IN PUBLIC HIS DENIALS OF IRAQI CW USE. AT A FURTHER PRESS CONFERENCE ON 9 SEPTEMBER, HOWEVER, HE APPEARED TO OPEN A SMALL WINDOW TO SOME FORM OF THIRD PARTY INVESTIGATION. HE SAID THAT WITH ACTIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS CONTINUING, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US DIPLOMATS OR THIRD PARTIES TO GO TO THE AREA. BUT, ONCE THEY HAD STOPPED, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

7. SHULTZ HAS INSTRUCTED THAT A COMPREHENSIVE PAPER BE PREPARED (DEADLINE CLOSE OF PLAY ON 12 SEPTEMBER) COVERING:

(I) OPTIONS FOR MULTILATERAL ACTION, IN NEW YORK AND ELSEWHERE, AND

(II) POSSIBLE UNILATERAL STEPS TO GIVE TEETH TO HIS WARNINGS TO HAMMADI.

BURLEIGH (DAS/NEA) TOLD US THAT THE US HAD NO PROBLEM WITH MAKING AN EXAMPLE OF IRAQ OVER CW, PROVIDED THIS WAS DONE IN A COHERENT AND THOUGHTFUL WAY. UNILATERAL ACTION WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE. THE US WOULD THEREFORE BE CONSULTING CLOSELY ABOUT POSSIBLE MULTILATERAL STEPS. HOWEVER, ANY FURTHER IRAQI USE OF CW WAS LIKELY TO QUOTE UNLEASH AN UNSTOPPABLE JUGGERNAUT OF PRESSURE UNQUOTE FOR UNILATERAL US MEASURES (SEE PARAGRAPH 10 BELOW FOR SENATE ACTION LATER ON 9 SEPTEMBER).

8. PENDING DECISIONS ON THE BASIS OF THAT REVIEW, STATE HAVE INSTRUCTED THE US MISSION IN NEW YORK TO GIVE BROAD SUPPORT TO THE NORDIC INITIATIVE (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1071) AND TO CONSULT FURTHER AMONG THE FIVE ABOUT OTHER OPTIONS. THE US BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN INDEPENDENT UN INVESTIGATION IN IRAQ (AND IN TURKEY, IF APPROPRIATE). THEY ARE OPENMINDED AT THIS STAGE ABOUT THE BEST TACTICS TO ACHIEVE THIS.

9. THE US ARE STILL INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE HUMAN RIGHTS

ANGLE, POSSIBLY THROUGH THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO STUDY AND REPORT ON KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. BUT STATE NOW SEE THIS AS SOMETHING FOR THE LONGER TERM. THE CW ISSUE IS FIRMLY TO THE FORE.

10. US PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST HAS INTENSIFIED THROUGHOUT THIS WEEK. RIDING ON THIS WAVE OF EMOTION AND TO UNDERLINE CONCERN ON THE HILL THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT ACTED SEVERELY ENOUGH AGAINST PAST IRAQI (AND IRANIAN) CW USE, THE SENATE ON 9 SEPTEMBER PASSED A FREE-STANDING DRAFT BILL (TEXT IN MIFT), MANDATING WIDE RANGING SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ, UNLESS THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIES THAT IRAQ QUOTE IS NOT COMMITTING GENOCIDE AGAINST THE KURDS, IS NOT USING CW AND IS PROVIDING RELIABLE ASSURANCES THAT IT WILL NOT USE CW. UNQUOTE IDENTICAL LEGISLATION WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (HFAC) ON 14 SEPTEMBER. AN HFAC STAFFER HAS TOLD US THAT THE COMMITTEE WILL WANT TO HEAR THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONSIDERED VIEWS. HE CRITISED THE SENATE'S IMPETUOSITY. WE HAVE DISCREETLY DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE RISK THAT DISAGREEMENT AMONG ALLIES OVER SANCTIONS COULD DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM IRAQI CW USE.

11. ON FIRST VIEW, THERE APPEAR TO BE NO (NO) EXTRATERRITORIAL PROVISIONS IN THE SENATE DRAFT BILL LIKELY TO AFFECT UK COMPANIES, OTHER THAN THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTROLS ON MILITARY OR COCOM-COVERED EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY THE UK TO IRAQ (IF SECTION 3(C) IS INTERPRETED TO REQUIRE RE-EXPORT CONTROLS: IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS IS INTENDED OR WOULD BE THE EFFECT IF THE TEXT BECAME LAW). THE REFERENCE TO OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS DOES NOT (NOT) APPEAR TO BAN PRODUCTS REFINED IN THE UK FROM IRAQI CRUDE. WE MAY NEED TO INVESTIGATE THESE QUESTIONS MORE THOROUGHLY IF THE BILL APPEARS LIKELY TO MAKE PROGRESS.

12. IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT LEGISLATION IN THIS FORM WILL BECOME LAW. THE US FARM LOBBY IS LIKELY TO ARGUE STRONGLY AGAINST THE SUSPENSION OF EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES FOR AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES (MORE THAN DLRS 1.1 BILLION TO IRAQ IN THE LAST YEAR). BUT THE SURGE OF LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY IS A CLEAR SIGNAL TO THE ADMINISTRATION THAT CONGRESS WANT FIRMER AND MORE EFFECTIVE US ACTION OVER CW USE. STATE'S PRELIMINARY REACTION TO THIS IS THAT THEY WILL NOT BE STAMPEDED BUT WILL KEEP TO THEIR OWN TIMETABLE, SET BY SHULTZ, FOR A CONSIDERED REVIEW OF THE OPTIONS.

EVIDENCE OF IRAQI CW USE

13. TO SUPPORT RECENT US STATEMENTS, STATE DEPARTMENT INTEND

TO MAKE PUBLIC SOME DETAILS OF MIKE AUSTRIAN'S REPORT ABOUT HIS INVESTIGATIONS IN TURKEY (ANKARA TELNO 418). AUSTRIAN TOOK PHOTOGRAPHS TO SUPPORT HIS CONCLUSIONS. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT THESE WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO US AS SOON AS THEY HAVE BEEN PROCESSED.
14. SEE MIFT

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EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
21 QUEEN'S GATE,
LONDON SW7 5JG

9th September 1988

Dear Reader,

It gives me great pleasure to present herewith a copy of the speech delivered on August 6th,1988, by H.E.SADDAM HUSSEIN, President of the Republic of Iraq:

As you will see, this speech paved the way for Peace in the Gulf War in that we relinquished our legitimate demands for direct talks to take place under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council prior to the implementation of a ceasefire. This provides another indication of the peaceful intentions we have maintained ever since Iran first instigated its aggression against Iraq on September 4th 1980.

It is well-known that Iraq accepted all United Nations Security Council resolutions, the first of which came on September 28th 1980. We also agreed to all forms of mediation, whether from various international organisations or from individual countries.

Iran, on the other hand, has rejected all resolutions and mediation efforts by international bodies and other countries Moreover, it only agreed to accept United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 one year after it was first adopted on July 20th, 1987, whereas Iraq promptly accepted the Resolution the day after it was issued.

We firmly believe that Iran only accepted Resolution 598 in view of the military defeats it had suffered and after realising the impossibility of occupying Iraq and the Gulf by military conquest. For example, prior to the ceasefire Iraq had succeeded in liberating its land occupied by Iran since 1984, and had also penetrated the Iranian Heartland. Then Iraq unilaterally withdrew its forces to the international borders. Moreover, even when Iran finally accepted Resolution 598, its leaders stated that such acceptance did not signal an end to the war.

President Saddam Hussein's speech demonstrates that our President and the leadership of Iraq adopted their position out of a genuine desire for peace and certainly not as the result of any pressure brought to bear.

It is in this context that I present you with a copy of the President's speech.

Please accept the assurance of my highest consideration.

Yours Faithfully

M.S. Al-Mashat

Dr. M. Al-Mashat
Ambassador



The Message which delivered Peace

The speech by President Saddam Hussein on August 6th, 1988, to the people of Iraq, the Arab Nation and the International Community

Great Iraqi people and brother Arabs wherever you may be.

You will remember how war broke out between Iraq, which is part of the Arab nation, and Iran, which has been the enemy of the Arab nation. You are aware of the noble aims of Iraq to build a future for itself and live in peace. You know how hatred, ambition, delusions and expansionist aims have been responsible for so much havoc and bloodshed, not only in Iran and Iraq, but throughout the entire region and even in other parts of the world. You will remember that the people of Iraq closed ranks to defend the rights of Iraq and the Arabs, and to save their values and their aspirations to a better life. In so doing, they succeeded in crushing the attacking waves which came against us in relentless succession.

Despite the unremitting hostility by Iran, the Iraqis continued to show their regard for peace. At the same time they were ready to shed their blood freely for the sake of victory, and they were supported by the prayers and assistance of other countries of the Arab nation.

You will also remember how the leaders of Iran lost their sense of reality. This happened particularly whenever they felt themselves to be in a position of strength, and it was at such times that they mistakenly interpreted all our appeals for peace and our reasoned views as signs of weakness and fear.

Despite the attempts on the part of these imposters to discredit Iraq, we have never, whether for a day, a month or a year, abandoned the path of peace, nor our desire to achieve it. Iran's leaders, on the other hand, have persistently rejected or ignored appeals for peace and all resolutions adopted by international bodies from the time of the resolution adopted by the UN Security Council on September 28th, 1980, until the Council's adoption of Resolution 598 in July, 1987. But Iraq accepted all international or regional resolutions aimed at restoring peace, irrespec-

tive of whether, at the time, it was in occupation of Iranian territory, involved in border fighting in defence of its homeland, or whether some parts of its national territory were in the hands of the enemy army.

The misjudgement and vanity of the Iranian leaders continued to grow when in the war they succeeded in occupying Fao, the Majnoon islands, Halabjah and various other parts of Iraqi territory. But in a series of brilliantly executed operations earlier this year, the Iraqi forces comprehensively defeated the Iranian forces and regained all this territory and restored the full integrity of our lands.

These overwhelming successes had a tremendous impact on the leading circles in Iran, whose slogan was "war unto victory". Confusion and consternation spread among these leaders who had wanted to occupy Iraq and destroy the future of the Arab nation. As a result, the leaders of Iran discovered that the Iranian peoples have seen through their slogans and aggressive schemes and realised that they were responsible for the outbreak of war. The peoples of Iran and the Iranian armed forces have equally come to appreciate that the Iraqis have no designs on Iran and are unconcerned about the path which the people of Iran either choose or have imposed on them by their leaders.

Having understood this, the Iranian armed forces, the Revolutionary Guard units and the peoples of Iran have repudiated the slogan of "war until the extermination of Iraq and the Arab nation", turned away from the path to destruction, and have chosen instead the path which Iraq has advocated whatever the position has been in terms of the fighting. This even includes the position after Iraq's decisive victories in the heavy battles which took place between mid-April and mid-July of this year.

If you were to follow our policies and words, and the statements made by representatives of Iraq at all the various levels of officialdom ever since the war with Iran began, you would find that they are totally devoid of anything which would indicate that we were harbouring ambitions regarding Iranian territory or regarding expansion at the expense of Iran. You would also find that they are devoid of any desire on our part to export our policies or programmes by means of aggression. What you would find is that our policy, our mission and our desire for peace have not essentially changed over the last eight years, whether times were hard and difficult, or whether circumstances were such that our armed forces were achieving their greatest victories in our recent history. By contrast, you would find that the slogans and objectives of Iran are coloured by the circumstances of the war. In other words, Iran's eagerness for expansion and its aggressive attitude would increase and the slogans would be raised higher with any military victory that happened to be gained in the field by acquiring one piece of territory or another, irrespective of the scale of losses suffered as a consequence. So you would find that Iran's objectives and slogans are based on aggran-

dement, aggression and ambition, and have been for eight years or more.

As this comparison shows, Iraq wants peace because it believes it is the right way to live, should we have the opportunity to make an honourable choice. Iraq has therefore endorsed all the resolutions for peace which have been put forward by international forums. Iran, on the other hand, has rejected all resolutions and initiatives for peace, beginning with the resolution adopted on September 28th, 1980, by the Security Council, up to Resolution 598 adopted one year ago and only accepted by Iran in the wake of military defeats. It is apparent that Iran does not want true peace. Its endorsement of Resolution 598 after this succession of rejections is not necessarily to be interpreted as an endorsement of peace, or as meaning that the leaders in Iran have discovered that the path of peace and respect for the life and civilisation of other peoples is a better path than that of exporting their concepts and policies and slogans by means of violence.

You will recall how Khomeini said in his recent speech that he had drunk the endorsement of Security Council Resolution 598 as he would a cup of poison. You will also recall that he says of his condition, "I am so miserable at present", and only thirteen days before his endorsement of the Security Council Resolution, Iran prompted its consultative assembly to enact a law making the war a permanent strategy.

It is factors such as these which has prompted us to seek direct negotiations and reject a ceasefire only or merely a truce. We remember all Iran's aggressive and expansionist policies and the bitter experience of the Arab nation. We are also conscious of the right of all those who are at war with each other to sit down at the negotiating table and discuss peace measures and ideas. I am telling you now that it is all this which has made us demand direct negotiations as an expression of good will and as a first test of intentions. Does the endorsement of the Security Council Resolution by Iran's rulers mean the establishment of a full, comprehensive and lasting peace with Iraq and the Arab nation? Or is it, as they have said, intended mainly to alleviate the military, national and international pressures on them?

We want direct negotiations because they are the shortest way to peace and the best formula. The other way to peace is conducive to trickery and duplicity, and the outcome would be short-lived. We do not want a temporary truce which will carry us further away from a lasting and stable peace and make it more difficult to achieve.

The path of direct negotiations before the implementation of a ceasefire is the surest path, and also the fairest to both the Iranian and Iraqi parties. However, we have consulted with our Arab brothers and convened a series of meetings of the Revolution Command Council and the regional leadership of the Party, and at a time when all due awareness, caution and deliberation have been and remain ever-present in

our minds, we declare our readiness for a ceasefire. We make this declaration on condition that Iran clearly and unequivocally declares its agreement to enter into direct negotiations with us immediately after the ceasefire, in order that we may discuss, reach agreement on and implement all provisions of Security Council Resolution 598 other than those relating to the ceasefire, beginning with withdrawal to international boundaries, and proceeding through to Paragraph B, including all operative paragraphs. If Iran refuses to enter into direct negotiations in response to our call by the way of an express and clear declaration communicated to us through the Security Council or the Secretary-General of the United Nations, it will show that Iran alone is once again assuming the responsibility for more bloodshed and rejecting the path to an honourable peace.

If Iran declares its readiness to accept our initiatives, and expressly agrees to enter direct negotiations regarding the implementation of Resolution 598 in all its operative paragraphs, we and our people and our Arab nation shall enjoy additional good fortune following our military success. After a durable and comprehensive peace has been achieved with the agreement of both parties under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, each may go on his own way.

We, of course, confirm that we shall use the Shatt al-Arab in accordance with our established rights and the Arabian Gulf in accordance with international law immediately the ceasefire takes effect.

We have once again shown to Iran that, although we have had to drive away the spectres of enmity and darkness and defend ourselves by armed force, we are not disposed to behave in such a way as to make anyone feel we intend to humiliate them. We understand that the people of Iraq and the Arab nation are neighbours to Iran. We understand history and we have a deep appreciation of it, and we know that feelings of bitterness, humiliation and injustice are intolerable. Therefore, bearing in mind what is pleasing to God, we extend the hand of friendship, forbearance and peace to the peoples of Iran.

God is great, God is behind the intention. Let whatever is unworthy be driven away.

Saddam Hussein
August 6th, 1988 A.D.
corresponding to 23 Dhu al-Hijja 1408 A.H.

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SIC

YOUR TELNO 418: USE OF CW AGAINST IRAQI KURDS

1. THE PRELIMINARY VIEW OF EXPERTS AT CDE PORTON DOWN IS THAT THE FINDINGS AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 3-4 OF TUR ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND GIVE RISE TO VERY STRONG SUSPICIONS BUT ARE NOT IN THEMSELVES ABSOLUTELY CONCLUSIVE.

2. ATTACK WITH CHEMICAL BOMBS WOULD INDEED TEND TO PRODUCE THE KIND OF EFFECTS REPORTED BY THE EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNTS OF BOMBING. ALTHOUGH IN THEIR PURE FORM NERVE OR MUSTARD AGENTS (WHICH ARE THE AGENTS USED BY IRAQ IN THE PAST) WOULD NOT PRODUCE WHITE OR YELLOW SMOKE WE CANNOT BE SURE OF THE PRECISE IRAQI FORMULATION OR THE EFFECT OF IMPURITIES. THE CHARACTERISTIC ODOURS OF SOME POSSIBLE AGENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A) MUSTARD AGENT: GARLIC
B) TABUN (NERVE AGENT): FRUITY SMELL
C) SARIN (NERVE AGENT): ODOURLESS

3. THE SYMPTOMS SHOWN BY THE TWO DOZEN CHILDREN THAT AUSTRIAN EXAMINED COULD WELL HAVE RESULTED FROM CHEMICAL ATTACK, (ALTHOUGH SYMPTOMS SUCH AS VOMITING, DIARRHOEA, NOSE BLEEDS AND IRRITATION AROUND THE EYES AND MOUTH MIGHT ALSO HAVE A NUMBER OF OTHER CAUSES). IF IRAQ HAD BEEN USING MUSTARD AGENT (PERHAPS THE MOST OBVIOUS OPTION) WE WOULD EXPECT IN PARTICULAR:

A) LARGE-SCALE BLISTERING WITH A SIMILAR APPEARANCE TO A SECOND-DEGREE BURN.

B) BLISTERING COMMENCE UNDERLINING UNDER CEASE UNDERLINING CLOTHING, IN PARTICULAR AROUND THE GROIN.

C) TEMPORARY BLINDNESS.

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4. YOU WISH TO DRAW ON THIS PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS IN FURTHER CONTACT WITH AUSTRIAN. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE HIS COMMENTS ON 3A)-C) AND ALSO HOW LONG AFTER THE ALLEGED ATTACK EACH OF THE SYMPTOMS DEVELOPED (IE THE ORDER MAY GIVE GUIDANCE TO THE TYPE OF AGENT USED).

5. FOR UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON. YOU MAY USE THIS BACKGROUND WITH YOUR OWN CONTACTS.

HOWE

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12/9

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London
SW1

9 September 1988

Dear Charles,

IMPLICATIONS OF THE END OF THE GULF WAR

The Chancellor and the Chief Secretary have seen the Foreign Secretary's minute of 31 August on the economic conseqences of the end of the Iran/Iraq conflict, and your letter to Bob Pierce of 2 September recording the Prime Minister's views. They accept the broad conclusions of the paper.

The Foreign Secretary drew attention to the need to consider our policy on export credit. The Prime Minister will wish to know that officials of the Export Guarantees Committee met this morning and have recommended that ECGD's Section 2 market limit for Iran should be increased from £50 million to £75 million and the horizon of risk should be extended from 360 days to 24 months.

Iran is likely to remain largely a cash market for exports in the near future - reflecting the regime's general aversion to credit - but this increase should provide useful support for UK exporters' efforts in this market. More than 60 firms will be represented at the Tehran trade fair which opens on Monday.

I should be grateful to know that the Prime Minister is content that our export credit cover should be increased in this way.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of OD, Stephen Haddrill (Energy) Sir Robin Butler and Malcolm Stephens

Yours sincerely,

P. Wanless

PETER WANLESS
Assistant Private Secretary

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OF 092330Z SEPTEMBER 1988
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RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE INFORM MED
UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 505 IRAN/IRAQ: GENEVA TALKS

SUMMARY
1. SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTS TO SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS ON THE TALKS IN GENEVA AND HIS PLANS FOR A SWITCH TO NEW YORK, BUT WITHOUT MENTIONING HIS PLANNED RESUMPTION DATE.

DETAIL
2. ON 9 SEPTEMBER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL GAVE SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS AN INTERIM INFORMAL REPORT ON THE TALKS IN GENEVA. READING FROM A PREPARED TEXT, HE SAID HE HAD INDICATED AT THE OPENING OF THE TALKS THAT THE TASK WAS TO PROCEED WITH THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598 AS IN HIS LETTER OF 8 AUGUST TO THE PARTIES AND THAT IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD PROCEED ON THE LINES OF HIS PLAN AS ENDORSED BY THE COUNCIL. THE TALKS HAD FALTERED ON THE VARIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS NEEDED TO CONSOLIDATE THE CEASEFIRE. DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND NOT ACRIMONIOUS. HOWEVER, IT APPEARED THAT THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE TWO SIDES ON WHAT CONSTITUTED CONSOLIDATION OF THE CEASEFIRE DIFFERED: THAT DIFFERENCE REMAINED.

3. THE IRAQIS TOOK THE POSITION THAT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CEASEFIRE IRAN AND IRAQ SHOULD AGREE TO RESPECT UNIMPEDED NAVIGATION OF ALL VESSELS, IE THERE SHOULD BE NO SEARCHES AND VISITING OF SHIPS, INCLUDING THEIR OWN COMMERCIAL AND NAVAL VESSELS GOING TO AND FROM THEIR OWN PORTS, AS WELL AS PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. THE IRAQIS ALSO TOOK THE POSITION THAT AS PART AND PARCEL OF THE CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS, IRAN AND IRAQ SHOULD AGREE TO ENTRUST THE UN WITH THE TASK OF UNDERTAKING IMMEDIATELY THE CLEANING OF THE SHATT AL ARAB AND RESTORING IT TO SAFE AND NORMAL NAVIGATION. THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION WOULD BE ADDRESSED AS CLEARING PROCEEDED,

WITHOUT INTERRUPTION. THE IRAQIS CONSIDERED THAT THE BENEFITS OF THE CEASEFIRE SHOULD FLOW TO THE TWO SIDES ON THE BASIS OF EQUITY AND BALANCE AND ACCORDINGLY THAT THE CEASEFIRE WOULD NOT BE COMPREHENSIVE AND FIRMLY ESTABLISHED UNTIL THIS WAS ACHIEVED. THEY ALSO INSISTED THAT NO DISCUSSION ON ANY OTHER ASPECTS OF THE RESOLUTION, INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL, WAS POSSIBLE UNTIL AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND CLEARING THE SHATT.

4. THE IRANIANS FELT THAT SINCE THE CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN AGREED ON AND WAS ESTABLISHED, IT SHOULD NOT BE AMONG THE SUBJECTS FOR THE DIRECT TALKS, BUT THAT RATHER THE TWO SIDES SHOULD PROCEED TO COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION AND THE PROCEDURE AND TIMING FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. ACCORDINGLY WITHDRAWAL TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED BOUNDARY SHOULD ALREADY HAVE STARTED. THE IRANIANS ACCEPTED QUOTE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW UNQUOTE WHICH IN THEIR VIEW DID NOT PRECLUDE THE RIGHT TO SEARCH AND VISIT SHIPS IN THE PRESENT CONDITIONS SHORT OF PEACE. IRAN ALSO ACCEPTED THE NEED TO CLEAR THE SHATT, BUT INSISTED THAT THIS BE DONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT OF 26 DECEMBER 1975. IRAN INSISTED THAT THESE TWO ISSUES WERE EXTRANEOUS TO THE CEASEFIRE AND SHOULD BE ADDRESSED UNDER OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION.

5. OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS EACH SIDE HAD BEEN GIVEN THE FULLEST OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS AND CLARIFY ITS POINT OF VIEW. HOWEVER, DESPITE REPEATED EFFORTS IT HAD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO BRIDGE THE DIFFERENCES. INDEED, PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE IN BOTH CAPITALS HAD FURTHER CRYSTALLISED THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS AND UNDERMINED THE CHANCES FOR COMPROMISE. NEVERTHELESS, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WENT ON, HE WAS GRATIFIED TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL THEIR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE PEACE PROCESS. IT WAS HIS CONSIDERED OPINION THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR BOTH PARTIES TO REFLECT ON THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE TALKS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THEM TO COMPLY FULLY WITH THE RESOLUTION AND UNTIL THE RESOLUTION WAS FULLY IMPLEMENTED THEY SHOULD TAKE NO ACTION THAT COULD PREJUDICE THE CEASEFIRE THAT WENT INTO EFFECT ON 20 AUGUST. ACCORDINGLY, HE INTENDED TO INSTRUCT HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO CONVEY IN A PLENARY MEETING ON 10 SEPTEMBER TO THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS HIS THOUGHTS AS OUTLINED ABOVE AND TO INVITE THEM TO JOIN HIM IN NEW YORK TO PURSUE THE PEACE PROCESS STARTED ON W25 AUGUST. HE TRUSTED THE PROCEDURES SUGGESTED WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH AND HOPED HE COULD COUNT ON THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE COUNCIL.

6. AFTER READING HIS TEXT, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE IMPORTANT

THING NOW WAS TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT THE TALKS HAD COLLAPSED: THIS WAS QUOTE NOT EXACTLY THE CASE UNQUOTE. HE THOUGHT THE PARTIES NEEDED TO REFLECT, AND HOPED A RETURN TO NEW YORK WOULD ENABLE HIM BETTER TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE COUNCIL AS WELL AS TO CONSULT FOREIGN MINISERS WHO WOULD BE HERE FOR THE GENERAL DEBATE LATER THIS MONTH. HE EMPHASISED THAT THERE WAS NO BREAKDOWN.

7. ALL REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT EXPRESSED THANKS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR HIS EFFORTS.
COMMENT
8. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DID NOT MENTION HIS PLANNED RESUMPTION DATES OF 22 SEPTEMBER: PRESUMABLY HE WANTS TO MAKE SURE THAT THE PARTIES AGREE TO IT BEFORE HE TELLS THE FULL COUNCIL.

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PRIME MINISTER

EXPORT CREDIT FOR IRAN

The Foreign Secretary's paper you saw at the beginning of the month (attached) drew attention to the need to consider policy on export credit for Iran.

Officials of the Export Guarantees Committee met this morning and have recommended that ECGDs Section 2 market limit for Iran should be increased from £50m. to £75m., and that the horizon of risk should be extended from 360 days to 24 months.

The Chief Secretary's Office tell me this evening that he supports that recommendation; and that he would be content for the change to be announced to coincide with the opening on Monday of the Tehran Trade Fair, at which more than 20 UK firms will be represented.

Would you be content for this change to be made and announced on Monday; or would be prefer to take the decision in slightly slower time?

Paul Gray

9 September 1988

Prime Minister

This deals with three points which the Armilla commander raised with you. The answer on ammunition is satisfactory, but on the other two points the MOD are fuzzy. But I think the Armilla officers will be aware that you raised their concerns.

cc PS (2)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 3/21L

5 September 1988

Dear Charles,

ARMILLA PATROL

Thank you for your letter of 9th August which asked for the Defence Secretary's comments on three points which emerged from the Prime Minister's visit to the Armilla Patrol on 9th August.

On the quantity of ammunition available to the ships of the Armilla patrol for training purposes, I can confirm that a requirement for additional practice ammunition had already been identified. The short term need for extra ammunition is being met from within existing stocks, and our procurement programme will be adjusted to include future provision for extra practice rounds for Armilla ships and our minecountermeasure vessels in CALENDAR.

You asked about the latitude permitted to senior officers of the Armilla patrol when dealing with the media. There are clearly many relatively straightforward questions which senior officers in the Gulf can and do answer without consulting MOD. However, it is frequently impossible - because of the speed with which situations often develop - to ensure that the Senior Naval Officer and the other Commanding Officers are always fully up to date with the full range of Government policy concerning our interests in the Gulf. In these circumstances they could inadvertently give answers in response to questions from the media which might be interpreted as differing from the line being taken in London. The acute political sensitivities in the Gulf make it particularly important to ensure that this cannot happen.

For this reason, Commanding Officers are provided with a comp rehensive Question and Answer brief for use at pre-arranged media visits and briefings. This is updated frequently and can therefore be amended to take account of any particular concerns raised by the patrol itself. Commanding Officers can easily and quickly contact the Ministry of Defence for additional advice if necessary. The media in the Gulf are well aware that the Senior Naval Officer and the other

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Commanding Officers do not give immediate "quotes" on any and every incident.

We believe that this approach has worked well and that the Royal Navy has enjoyed excellent and very favourable publicity for the work it is doing in the Gulf.

You also asked about the adequacy of the "training margin" for Armilla. I understand that the primary concern of naval officers in the Gulf with regard to training is that their programme prior to deployment is necessarily brief and provides barely sufficient time for whole-ship training as well as specific training on the equipment enhancements fitted for Armilla vessels. This is a valid criticism, but has to be seen in the context of the balance of activity which the Navy has to achieve for each individual ship within the Fleet's overall commitments. If more time were programmed for Armilla preparations (and everyone would like more time), it would be at the expense of some other commitment, for example, maintenance, pre-deployment leave, or NATO exercises. It could also increase "stretch" on other destroyers and frigates which are equally hard-pressed in meeting the large number of commitments from within current force levels. The most economical achievement of the best balance between conflicting requirements, particularly for pre-deployment programmes, is a constant preoccupation for the Fleet staff. The high standards maintained by the ships - and observed by the Prime Minister - suggest that this balance is being achieved at present. But it is a fine judgement, which is kept under very close review both by the Commander-in-Chief Fleet and by the Ministry of Defence.

The Prime Minister's impressions and congratulations on the high standards attained by the ships of the Armilla have been passed to the Chief of Defence Staff and the Chief of the Naval Staff who were most grateful to the Prime Minister for finding the time in her very busy schedule to visit the Armilla patrol and for her very warm comments.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (FCO) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Brian Hawtin

(B R HAWTIN)
Private Secretary

IRAQ : The Gulf Pt 9.



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MRS MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER

FROM : SPOKESMAN KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY - IRAQ
5/9/1988

FIGHTING IS STILL CONTINUING BETWEEN OUR GUERILLAS AND THE IRAQI ARMY IN THE AMADIYAH AND SHERWAN DISTRICTS.

THE ARMY HAS OVERRUN SOME OF OUR BASES NEAR THE TOWN OF ZAKHO AND THE PROVINCIAL TOWN OF DAHUK BUT OUR GUERRILLAS ARE STILL ENGAGED IN FIERCE FIGHTING INSIDE IRAQ TO RESCUE THE REMAINING POPULATION FROM SEVERE IRAQI REPRISAL. ALSO OUR GUERILLAS ARE STILL OPERATING DEEP INSIDE IRAQI KURDISTAN.

THE IRAQI TROOPS HAVE NOT ENTIRELY CONTROLLED THE IRAQI-TURKISH BORDER. IN CERTAIN AREAS, BEFORE THE CURRENT OFFENSIVES STARTED, THEY HAD ALREADY ADVANCED TO BASES CLOSE TO THE FRONTIER IN SHERANESH, KANI MASI AND SHERWAN MAZAN. FROM THESE BASES THEY HAVE MOVED TO THE BORDER.

OUR RESISTANCE IS CONTINUING AND IT WILL CONTINUE FOR THE SURVIVAL OF OUR PEOPLE AND AS LONG AS OUR TACTIC IS GUERILLA WARFARE, AND WE AVOID FRONTAL BATTLES, THE IRAQI ARMY WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO PUT AN END TO OUR LEGITIMATE STRUGGLE.

SINCE IRAQS LATEST CAMPAIGN STARTED ON 19/7/88, THEY HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES AMOUNTING TO 7000 CASUALTIES INCLUDING THE KILLED AND THE WOUNDED. SO FAR THE FOLLOWING IRAQI UNITS HAVE SUFFERED DEVASTATING BLOWS.

THE 38TH, 45TH, 33RD INFANTRY DIVISIONS, THE 702 INFANTRY BRIGADE, THE 66TH, 68TH SPECIAL FORCES BRIGADE, THE 2ND COMMANDOS BRIGADE AND 4 HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS SHOT DOWN.

OUR CASUALTIES AMOUNT TO ABOUT 250 GUERILLAS KILLED. THE UNARMED CIVILIANS SUFFERED 1900 KILLED AND NEARLY 5000 WOUNDED MOSTLY FROM CHEMICAL ATTACKS ON THEIR VILLAGES AND SETTLEMENTS.

IRAQI OFFICIALS HAVE DENIED THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE INVITE U.N. INVESTIGATORS OR AN INDEPENDENT ENQUIRY TEAM FROM AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL OR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS TO VISIT THE SITE OF 65 KURDISH VILLAGES LOCATED IN DAHUK, MOSUL AND ERBIL PROVINCES TO SEE THE HORRIFIC SCENES OF CHEMICAL USE ON HUMAN LIFE AND NATURE AND TO EXAMINE THE CHEMICALLY WOUNDED REFUGEES IN TURKISH CLINICS.

SPOKESMAN
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY - IRAQ
5/9/1988

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MRS MARGARET THATCHER
THE PRIME MINISTER

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FROM SPOKESMAN, KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY - IRAQ

2/9/88

IRAQI ARMY COMMITS A MASSACRE AND TRAPS 43,000 KURDS

IRAQI KURDISH REFUGEES ARE STILL DAILY ENTERING TURKEY IN THOUSANDS. NOW AS MANY AS 90,000 REFUGEES HAVE ALREADY BEEN TEMPORARILY RESETTLED IN SOUTHERN TURKEY.

WHILE APPROXIMATELY 43,000 CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN TRAPPED AND CUT OFF BY THE ADVANCING IRAQI ARMY IN THE REGIONS OF BARZAN, ACRA, DAHOK AND SHEKHAN. THEY SUFFER FROM HUNGER, DISEASE AND MANY SUFFER FROM SERIOUS CHEMICAL INJURIES AND THEY FACE A MASSACRE.

ON 28/8 THE ARMY CARRIED OUT A MASSACRE WHEN IT ARRESTED SOME 1,300 CIVILIANS MAINLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND UNARMED MEN. THE MAJORITY WERE SUFFERING FROM CHEMICAL INJURIES AND THEY WERE KILLED AND BURIED IN MASS GRAVES TO HIDE THE CRIME. THIS HAPPENED IN THE DAHOK AREA. IRAQI CHEMICAL ATTACKS HAVE CONTINUED ON 31/8 AND 1/9 ON THE VILLAGES OF ETOT, SHEEVE, BENAVI IN AMADIYA DISTRICT.

FIGHTING IS ESCALATING AND NOW FOUR IRAQI ARMY CORPS ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN THE CAMPAIGN. THEY ARE THE 3RD, 5TH AND THE 7TH AND A WHOLE ARMY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS.

FIERCE FIGHTING IS NOW TAKING PLACE AROUND OUR MAIN BASE, THE FIRST BRANCH IN THE AMADIYA DISTRICT.

WE CALL UPON THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO STOP THE WAR OF GENOCIDE AND TO PUT AN END TO THE DAILY USE OF CHEMICALS BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE KURDISH PEOPLE.

SPOKESMAN
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY - IRAQ 2/9/88

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COPIGO TO IRAN: Relations PTIO

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 September 1988

Dear Bob.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE END OF THE GULF WAR

The Prime Minister has read and noted the Foreign Secretary's minute of 31 August covering a paper on the economic consequences of an end of the Iran/Iraq conflict, and your letter of 31 August about future relations with Iran. She is in general content with the strategy set out in these two documents and also with the various short term steps viz. sending a Commercial Secretary out to Tehran for a reconnaissance visit, inviting a senior Iranian official to London to discuss the question of representation, and a meeting between the Foreign Secretary and the Iranian Foreign Minister in New York in October to discuss future relations. She agrees very strongly that restoring effective representation in Tehran must be on the basis of strict reciprocity in terms of staffing and status of our respective missions.

The general strategy, however, will obviously require decisions over the next few weeks and months on a number of difficult and sensitive issues such as the guidelines for defence sales to Iran and Iraq and the pace at which we build up relations with Iran. The Prime Minister will wish to be kept very closely in touch at every stage and consulted on all relevant decisions.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD, the Energy Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Bob Peirce Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SW

PRIME MINISTER

IMPLICATIONS OF THE END OF THE GULF WAR

I attach two important papers about the implications of the end of the Gulf war.

The first deals with the economic consequences of peace in the Gulf. It is fairly broad-brush, but its main conclusions are:

- both Iran and Iraq are likely to try to maximise their oil production and this will take the price down;

- there will be very substantial business opportunities provided by reconstruction in both countries. At the moment we are not in a good position to take advantage of this in Iran where there is a "Buy British Last" policy in operation and where we do not have any substantial diplomatic relations;

- there is also likely to be a great deal of defence sales business. We shall need to consider fairly soon whether any amendment to our existing guidelines is required to enable British firms to compete for this. But there would be great difficulties in the case of Iran, particularly while the hostages remain in captivity;

- both countries are likely to require substantial credit cover. We already extend medium term cover to Iraq and shall need to decide whether to do likewise for Iran;

- British Airways are likely to want to resume flights both to Baghdad and Tehran as well as over-flights to both Iraq and Iran on their routes to the Far East.

The general point to bear in mind is that there is likely to be a growing clamour from British business for relaxation of restrictions on defence sales and for greater credit, together with allegations that we are allowing ourselves to be out-paced in the scramble for contracts by France, Germany and

Italy because of our reluctance to improve political relations. This is something we shall simply have to put up with as the price of following a consistent and honourable policy where others have been prepared to make shabby deals, e.g. over hostages.

The second paper deals with the question of our relations with Iran and needs to be considered in tandem with the earlier paper. The paper covers Mr. Reddaway's report on his recent visit. The basic strategy recommended is that we should divorce the question of relations with Iran from representation in Iran. On relations, we are bound by our firm position that we can only normalise relations with Iran if there is an improvement in Iran's behaviour, in particular in relation to support for terrorism and detention of the hostages. On representation, the problem is basically one of reciprocity. The Iranians want to get back to a situation where they had a full-scale Embassy and we just had an Interests Section. We want to get to a situation where we both have proper functioning embassies, under a Chargé d'Affaires to start with, or neither does. In dealing with both aspects we obviously have to keep very much in mind the position of the hostages. Equally, we have to take account of Iran's strategic importance, our historically strong position there and our desire to win a fair share of commercial business.

The short term steps which the Foreign Secretary proposes are:

- to send a Commercial Secretary out to Tehran for a brief reconnaissance visit on the lines of that recently paid by Mr. Reddaway;

- to agree to a visit here by a senior Iranian official to discuss representation in both capitals; and

- to offer a meeting with the Iranian Foreign Minister in New York during the General Assembly to discuss both relations and representation.

The Foriegn Secretary seeks your endorsement of the general strategy set out in both papers and the short term steps noted above. Other issues will come to you for decision as and when appropriate.

Agree to the strategy, subject to being kept closely informed and consulted on all major decisions?

CDP

(C. D. POWELL)
1 September 1988

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

1 September 1988

Dear Bob,

MINE CLEARANCE IN THE GULF

Thank you for your letter of 31 August enclosing a joint FCO/MoD paper on the issue whether we and other WEU countries have a role to play in helping clear mines from the Gulf and associated waterways.

The Prime Minister agrees that we should encourage our WEU partners to join us in an operation to clear mines from established shipping lanes in the Gulf, on the understanding that the exercise would be conducted under national flag and national command. She further agrees that we should not conduct such mine clearing operations in Iranian or Iraqi territorial waters or in Shatt-al-Arab.

Your letter does not deal with the eventuality that some or all our WEU partners will not be prepared to agree to take part in mine clearing in international waterways in the Gulf. In the Prime Minister's view, this should not affect our own decision to do so, even though inevitably it could not be such a comprehensive operation. We should if necessary go ahead alone or with a smaller group. She believes that willingness to undertake at least a part of this task counts for a great deal in our relations with the smaller Gulf States.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence).

Yours sincerely.

(C. D. POWELL)

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

MINE CLEARANCE IN THE GULF

The attached papers deal with mine clearance in the Gulf and associated water-ways. The joint FCO/MOD recommendation is:

- we should encourage our WEU partners to take part in an operation to clear mines from established shipping lanes in the Gulf. The exercise would be conducted under national flag and command, but in co-operation with the UN;

- we would not however agree to conduct such operations in Iranian or Iraqi territorial waters or in the Shatt-al-Arab.

One could argue that this is only half a job. The mines in Iraqi and Iranian territorial waters could be a threat to British shipping, and could anyway drift into international shipping lanes. Even so, I think the FCO/MOD recommendation is right: we have no idea how extensively these territorial waters are mined, how far each country may wish to retain defensive minefields, and whether they would anyway welcome any outside involvement. It is best to keep out, at least for now.

What is not clear from the papers is whether we should maintain our offer to clear international shipping lanes even if some or all of our WEU partners decline to join in. My own view is that we should - it is clearly the wish of the smaller Gulf States, and we should reap considerable political credit.

Agree to FCO/MOD proposals, with the proviso that we go ahead if necessary without WEU partners?

CDP

CHARLES POWELL
31 August 1988

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PM/88/044

PRIME MINISTER

The Economic Consequences of Peace in the Gulf

1. The acceptance by Iran of UN Security Council Resolution 598, and the start of peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq have created new conditions which may have far-reaching implications for the future of the region. The attached paper, prepared by FCO officials in consultation with officials from HM Treasury, the DTI, Ministry of Defence, Department of Transport, Department of Energy, ECGD and the Bank of England and incorporating contributions from the last three of these, attempts a first analysis of the economic consequences of peace. Its conclusions are of necessity only general, as it is still too early to predict when, on what terms and indeed whether a peace settlement could be achieved. Nevertheless, the paper identifies those factors which we must take into account when reformulating our policies to the region.

2. An important conclusion of the paper is that the post-war reconstruction of Iran and Iraq will create major opportunities for British industry. We need to consider carefully our policy on such issues as credit, commercial support for businessmen on the ground, defence sales and the problem of visas.

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CONFIDENTIAL

3. Work is already underway on all these points. The Export Guarantees Committee is today considering the question of new credit for both Iran and Iraq. Tony Newton will attend the Baghdad Fair in November, and the DTI are providing financial help to British exhibitors at the Tehran Fair in September. Alan Clark will use this occasion to deliver a message of encouragement to British businesses interested in Iranian markets, and I am minuting to you separately on the proposal that a Commercial Secretary attend the Fair to give support. COMET and the Middle East Association are organising a joint mini-mission to Tehran in early October. An exercise is also under way to ensure that British business suffers the minimum of inconvenience from British visa requirements.

4. Our commercial interests are of course only one element, albeit a vitally important one, of our relations with both Iran and Iraq. Iraq is a far from easy partner, and there could be bumpy moments in the future development of our bilateral relationship. Nevertheless, British business is already well established in Baghdad, and we hope that, hiccups notwithstanding, our trade links can develop steadily. Iran presents a rather more serious problem, as the pace at which relations can grow depends above all on Iranian readiness to obey civilised

/rules

rules of behaviour. We cannot yet be sure that recent encouraging signs will be sustained. We must nevertheless ensure that whatever the state of our relations at any stage, we make the maximum available use of the opportunities for promoting British commercial interests. I am minuting separately on other aspects of UK/Iranian relations.

4. I am copying this minute, together with the paper to OD colleagues.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
31 AUGUST 1988

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AN END TO THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT

1. This paper focusses on the economic consequences for countries in Arabia and the Gulf, and for their suppliers, of an end to the Iran/Iraq conflict. It can be no more than preliminary at this stage. We assume that the ceasefire will come into force and will stick.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAQ AND IRAN

2. In Iraq the main task of the regime is to ensure its own survival as the country moves from war politics to peace politics. The war is ending without the achievement of Iraq's objectives, destruction of the revolutionary regime in Tehran and recovery of the Shatt-al-Arab. It is most unlikely that Iraq will make gains beyond the 1975 Algiers Agreement on the Shatt-al-Arab in the course of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement. Iraq's propaganda has presented the outcome as victory of the forces of civilization against Iranian fanticism. The present regime will need early progress on reconstruction to compensate for the losses of the past eight years. Saddam Hussein may survive but his position is less secure now than it was during the conflict.

3. Iran's acceptance of SCR 598 represents a big change in policy. There remains opposition to it from a few senior figures, who may try to exploit hiccups in the negotiations to make trouble for Rafsanjani and his allies. Khomeini's endorsement of the change has strengthened the peace faction, but his influence may now be much reduced. The most encouraging sign is that the Iranian people have clearly had enough of the war and it would take nothing less than a further Iraqi invasion of Iranian territory to revive the willingness to fight. The clinical death of the Imam may lead to instability, but at least the decision on whether or not to make

peace can be attributed to him and removed from the battle for the succession. Once again the speed of reconstruction and the restoration of workable relations with the West will tend to encourage stability.

4. Both Iran and Iraq will regard strong armed forces as a necessary deterrent against the other. They will want to make good equipment and munitions shortages; this especially applies to Iran. Mutual suspicion could provoke competition between them in buying costly sophisticated equipment. This would not only revive tension but weaken their peacetime economies. There are therefore economic as well as political benefits in a durable peace.

OIL PRODUCTION POLICY

5. The first question is what effect peace will have on the oil production and export policies of Iran and Iraq and on other OPEC members. Both Iran and Iraq will face enormous foreign exchange needs to repair the physical and economic damage done by the war; they will also still need to re-equip their armed forces in order to deter aggression from the other. A major part of the money for these expenditures will have to come from the sale of oil by Iran and Iraq, and by their backers. Supplier credit may contribute.

6. Iraq's current oil output of about 2.7 mbd is constrained by export rather than production capacity. The Iraqi oil minister puts the latter at about 4 mbd. Steady additions to reserves suggest that, with new investment, Iraq could increase production capacity to 5 mbd by the early 1990s, and perhaps earlier. It has ignored the quota of 1.54 mbd allocated at the December 1986 OPEC meeting, and has increased its share of OPEC output since 1985 at the expense of all other members except Saudi Arabia. Iraq achieved this by compensating for the loss of the Gulf export terminal and the Syrian pipeline by exporting through new pipelines across Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and by truck through Turkey and Jordan.

7 Iraq could theoretically expand its current export capacity as follows:

- the IPSA II pipeline across Saudi Arabia, due for completion in late 1989, could provide an additional 1.1 mbd (net);

- the pipeline through Turkey could carry an additional 0.5 mbd within a few months, if the pumping stations were upgraded;

- Gulf exports might resume via temporary facilities. How much and how fast is unclear, particularly in view of Fao's vulnerable position, but perhaps 1 - 1.5 mbd within 6-12 months of a ceasefire might be feasible;

- the oil pipeline via Syria might be reinstated although the supposed poor state of repair probably rules this out within 18 months of a ceasefire.

If Iraq took up these options, export capacity would rise by 2.5 - 3 mbd from its current level of about 2.3 mbd. Against all this, Iraq might also cut back some existing export routes, eg trucking oil through Turkey and Jordan is extremely expensive. More important, production capacity is not likely to be sufficient to fill 5 mbd of export capacity.

8. By the end of 1989 Iraq will probably be able to produce 4 mbd and export about 3.75 mbd, an increase of 1.3 mbd on current output. Iraq's steady expansion of output in defiance of OPEC quotas suggests that at least some of this capacity will be used, though Iraq did rein in output in 1988 in the face of oil price weakness and GCC persuasion. Iraq's declared readiness to accept quota parity with Iran at 2.37 mbd, provided the rest of OPEC abides by its quota, has yet to be tested.

9. Little is known about how much oil Iran could produce in peacetime. Iranian oil exports have on average been restricted by Iraqi attacks to below the quota of 2.37 mbd, although there have

been limited periods when production may have risen as high as 2.9 mbd. Although Iranian oil production was over 6 mbd in 1974, it had begun to decline well before 1979. The war damaged the existing producing base, though it is not known how seriously or permanently. Official oil reserve figures have risen sharply, but are probably overstated, since industry experts believe Iran's search for reserves has tended to find gas rather than oil. It is unlikely that Iranian production could exceed 3 mbd (compared with current production of 2.1 mbd) in 12 months after a ceasefire, although expansion beyond this is possible depending on the extent of the damage to the oil fields.

10. By the end of 1989, Iran and Iraq together could probably increase oil production by around 2 mbd from 4.9 mbd (1988 HI). However their priority should be to maximise oil revenue rather than production, possibly by limiting output as part of a successful OPEC move to keep prices up. On the other hand the incentive to be a free rider - increasing output while hoping that others will not cheat - will probably be more attractive at least initially. However, Iran's more limited capacity (and greater physical damage) suggests she may continue to be a price hawk. This suggests that an immediate drop in price could if substantial bring about an effective OPEC agreement (if only temporarily) on production constraints.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OIL MARKET AND OIL REVENUES

11. There are likely to be conflicting pressures on the oil market as peace returns to the region. On the one hand, downward pressures will come from the need by Iran and Iraq quickly to maximise revenue. We see little likelihood of OPEC, of its own accord, persuading both Iraq and Iran unilaterally to limit their exports for the common good. Nor are we convinced that either country would be prepared to give the organization such influence over their reconstruction and rearmament programme unless this were part of some broader reconstruction aid package. In the absence of such

action, the prospect is of Iranian and Iraqi exports rising rapidly to the medium term ceiling referred to above. This would inevitably lead to a downward adjustment in oil prices, perhaps to the sort of levels seen in 1986. To make matters worse, those oil producers with substantial spare capacity, principally Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, would probably feel obliged to increase their own production in the face of lower prices in order to protect revenues. Over the longer term, cheaper and easier oil transport, and the need to accommodate the new capacity will also tend to pull prices down.

12. However, the memory of 1986 will give a strong incentive for OPEC to seek to avert another price collapse. It might be possible to negotiate some balance between acceptance of more realistic export quotas representing approximate parity and reconstruction aid/reparations either as a result of an initial collapse of prices or in reaction to the threat of one. To be attractive any deal would have to leave Iraq and Iran better off than if they maximized oil exports and would still have to allow them at least their current share of the oil market, if not more. An agreement of this kind, possibly supplemented by some temporary "barter oil" quota for reconstruction, might be one outcome. The subsidy provided to Iraq from Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian neutral zone production could also be a negotiable element. In theory it would be open to the Gulf donors to discontinue this aid or make it conditional on Iraq not increasing its oil production beyond a certain level. If OPEC failed to reach an agreement of some sort quickly enough there could be a period of extremely low oil prices.

RECONSTRUCTION AID/REPARATIONS

13. Iran and Iraq would no doubt like the Gulf Arab oil producers to finance a major part of the reconstruction of both Iraq and Iran. It has been rumoured at various times in recent years that the Gulf Arabs had agreed to pay up to $50 billion dollars in reparations to Iran. If this were true, they would be bound to pay a similar figure to their Iraqi brethren. Yet this seems hardly credible.

When this rumour first emerged, Iran held the upper hand in the conflict. The situation has now reversed, and the political incentive to buy off Iran no longer exists. Furthermore we doubt the ability of the Gulf Arabs to make such payments anyway. The donors may try to contribute in the form of soft loans for specific projects instead of cash, but these seem likely to go the way of the $30bn already "lent" to Iraq which will never be repaid. Iran will regard any loans as "reparations". If genuine reparations become payable after the Commission of Inquiry decides that Iraq was the aggressor, Iraq will not agree to pay them. Paragraph 7 of SCR 598 recognises the need for post-war reconstruction: with appropriate international assistance: and requests the Secretary-General to appoint a team of experts to prepare a report. We would not think this will place HMG under any obligation to contribute. There has been no sign so far that either country (although IMF members) would consider turning for help to international financial institutions.

14. Apart from grants from governments the investment opportunities in both reconstructed countries may attract private Arab funds. Iraq is immediately attractive with a flourishing private sector which is encouraged by the regime. The situation in Iran is less clear: the economic reform programme is at an early stage and may not prove encouraging to foreign private capital. Nonetheless many wealthy Shiite businessmen in the Gulf states will probably find rewarding opportunities.

CREDIT

15. Opportunities for increased trade may depend on the availability of official export credits. In this connection ECGD proposals will be considered shortly in the Export Guarantees Committee and a separate report will be made to ministers on this aspect. Meanwhile the position can be broadly summarised as follows:-

16. Iraq is unlikely to become a cash market for some years. It has incurred substantial foreign debt, partly to other Arab countries (which it does not expect to repay), but also to Western creditors. It is not clear how Iraq will deal with this problem but spontaneous recourse to the IMF or the Paris Club seems unlikely. ECGD has been offering medium term credit (as well as short term) since 1983 and in return has so far received preferential treatment in the payment of debt. Further business will undoubtedly depend upon the offer of new medium term credit (but other Western export credit agencies may now be expected to compete with ECGD in offering such cover). Credit terms and commercial factors such as price - rather than gratitude for our good record during the conflict - are likely to be the main factors in the award of reconstruction contracts. However, the UK/Iraq Joint Commission meeting at the beginning of November - at which Mr Newton will lead the UK Delegation - will provide a suitable opportunity to build on our position.

17. Since the Islamic revolution Iran has shown little interest in medium term credit, preferring to pay cash or extract short term credit by rolling forward credit. Its trade related debt - of perhaps $5bn - is thus far less than that of Iraq. However the pragmatic atmosphere which led to the decision to accept SCR 598, and the need to reconstruct and resume economic development may alter that attitude. ECGD does not provide cover for medium term credits at present but has been maintaining short term cover. Its recent payment experience has been good. Iran is already becoming the focus of a good deal of attention by British companies as a promising export market and ECGD will be considering whether or not to support a medium term line of credit for this purpose if requested by the Iranians. However apart from an improvement in bilateral relations, there is the matter of some £130m of pre-revolution debt owed to ECGD. Some progress to resolve this matter would be required on our side. However the cases are not straightforward and resistance to some of the debts can be expected. Moreover, ECGD debts apart, it is possible that the sum of Iranian claims against the UK may exceed British claims against Iran. It is possible that both Iran and Iraq may be attracted to oil barter

deals as a vehicle for financing larger purchases in the reconstruction period. If large arms cases on credit were to be set in motion this would hold back or pre-empt cover for civil projects.

18. An annex is attached on the attitude of British banks to Iran and Iraq.

WHERE WILL THE BUSINESS BE?

19. The oil market uncertainties are such that it is very difficult to predict how rapidly Iraqi and Iranian imports will grow. There might even for a while be no room for growth if oil prices fall very low following an increase in production by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. However once the major Gulf producers reach a modus vivendi over the oil market Iranian and Iraqi revenues should rise. The most important consequence of peace is therefore that new business opportunities will preponderantly be found in Iraq and Iran. In the traditional Gulf markets the picture will be mixed. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and to some extent Abu Dhabi and Qatar will be able to protect themselves from falling oil prices by raising production, and in any new OPEC agreement they will be able to hold out for comparatively high quotas. Their revenues at the end of the day are unlikely to be any higher than at present and may be somewhat lower. Gulf producers with no spare capacity - Oman, Dubai and Bahrain - can expect a sharp fall in revenues, though in the case of Dubai the transit trade for Iran will provide something of an offset. North Yemen should see its revenues continue to rise, but less rapidly than they would have done without a fall in price.

20. In the early post-conflict era the opportunities for sales of defence equipment to Iran and Iraq will be considerable. Our defence sales policy will need to be reviewed. We doubt if the review will lead to early withdrawal of the Government guidelines on defence sales to Iran and Iraq. Nevertheless we can use discretion

within the ministerial guidelines to adopt a phased approach to borderline cases, relaxing control on a growing number of categories as peace takes hold. But we must take care not to upset our major defence equipment customers in Arabia whose purchases over the next ten years will exceed the value of any defence business we might permit ourselves to do with Iran and Iraq. In the short term we may be able to keep a foot in the door by reviving military training courses for Iraq and Iran.

21. In Iraq reconstruction will focus on Basra and other border towns, mainly in the south. New towns, water, sewerage and communications systems will need to be built or repaired. The Shatt-al-Arab waterway will need to be cleared and made navigable again. The oil export terminal at Fao will be recommissioned. In addition to reconstruction, Iraq is pushing ahead with development projects such as the central refinery, a petrochemical complex, two power stations and extension to another. Within these major projects can be found many opportunities for supply and instal contracts and straight supply. The agricultural and industrial development of Iraq beyond the reconstruction phase offers hugh potential for British and other developed country suppliers. Competition will be fierce. In the early stages much business will be done through Kuwait. With the Gulf safely navigable and the Shatt-al-Arab reopened, Jordan will lose much of its transit trade, but will hope to compensate through the strong links which have been built up during the conflict. Jordanian labour will be much in demand.

22. Similar circumstances prevail in Iran, but with a larger population, huge land area and mineral resources other than oil and gas, the potential for develoment may be even grater than Iraq's. Trade into Iran will be through Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE in addition to direct supply. In Dubai, where the merchants have maintained good contacts with Iran throughout the conflict, stocks are being built up and a boom in supplying the construction and consumer goods trade in confidently expected.

23. We have a fully functioning commercial section in our Embassy in Baghdad which is eager to exploit every opportunity, although the market is difficult. The Iranian market is also hard, but of great interest to British business. Over thirty five companies responded to a last-minute invitation to the UK to attend the Tehran International Fair. There will be no official British stand at this event, but the occasion will be used for a message of encouragement to British exporters from the Government. We are under increasing pressure from industry to ease the problems of Iranian business visitors to the UK who have encountered delays in securing visas and who, in the absence of a British presence in Tehran, are obliged to apply for them at British posts in third countries. With regard to the first difficulty, an interdepartmental exercise is already underway to ensure that, while not losing sight of the important security considerations, we reduce the burden on bona fide business applicants. We are less sanguine about solving the second problem quickly. It will be some time before a full embassy with a functioning visa section can be re-established in Tehran. Much depends on Iranian willingness to rebuild a workmanlike relationship with the UK. Even before an Embassy is fully functioning again, we intend to concentrate the first limited operation on export promotion.

TRANSPORT

Air Services

24. British Airways have long been keen to resume their services to Baghdad and Tehran for which, particularly the latter, they expect strong demand. They are likely to resume services to Baghdad as soon as they can make the necessary operational arrangements, and have made contingency arrangements (such as entering the route on computer reservation systems) for Tehran. They need reassurances on safety: in particular, confirmation that the 1985 Iraqi Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) disclaiming responsibility for damage to civil aircraft in Iranian airspace, has been rescinded. They also

need the approval of their insurers to resume services

25. A further benefit to British airlines of an end to the conflict would be the ability to overfly Iran and Iraq on services between the UK and South-East Asia, the Far East and Australasia. This will provide a valuable additional option for planning purposes and should help alleviate operating cost penalties imposed by other restrictions on Middle East overflights, eg over Syria. British Airlines will also welcome the prospect of improved security for civil flights in the Lower Gulf, particularly around the Straits of Hormuz.

Shipping

26. The impact on shipping markets will of course be determined by the pace of the return to normality and growth in the regional economies. British shipping companies have traditionally been strong in these markets and believe they will be in a strong position to take up opportunities that arise. Such opportunities would include increased trade world-wide with these countries and would not simply be limited to the bilateral trades. There may also be opportunities in dredging and salvage work. Assuming a reduction in the escort facilities offered by the Armilla Patrol, we can expect fewer politically awkward requests for reflagging of ships to UK and dependent territory registers. On the other hand this will accentuate the decline of the UK shipping register.

CONCLUSIONS

27. We offer the following preliminary conclusions:

(a) Iran and Iraq will probably push up oil exports and the price of oil will fall though how far and for how long depends on the speed with which OPEC and other oil producers react to the threat of

substantial over-supply and very low prices.

(b) In the earliest years of peace markets in Arabia are unlikely to grow much. Some - Oman, Bahrain and Dubai - may contract sharply.

(c) Huge business opportunities will arise in the reconstruction and development programmes of Iran and Iraq; in Iraq large projects will be dependent on credit; Iran may follow suit.

(d) While private sector confidence will revive in Arabia, government spending will continue to be restrained by a low oil price and subsidies to Iraq and Iran. Steady business will be done, but the growth area will be Iran/Iraq-related business either direct or through entrepots such as Kuwait and Dubai.

(e) Iran and Iraq will continue to buy defence equipment. We should aim to get the non-lethal business and build on that. In short term military training for Iran and Iraq should be revived.

(f) UK airlines will benefit from the resumption of direct services and overflights. Increased activity in cargo shipping should benefit UK shipping companies.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

26 August 1988

ANNEX

ATTITUDE OF BRITISH BANKS

The British banks are currently maintaining their cautious attitude to the two belligerants, particularly given the general trend to concentrate on (more profitable) domestic business. Regional general managers require more than a short period of cease-fire to justify proposals to credit committees to increase their exposure. However a few banks had begun to dip a toe in the water with a modest increase in exposure, or had proposals before their credit committees which could be implemented relatively quickly, (almost invariably to Iran rather than Iraq) some time before the cease-fire. The need to make large provisions against lending to Iraq was likely to continue to inhibit new business, though all banks expected to be drawn into more exposure to both countries than they would spontaneously seek, as a result of pressure from a few key customers (probably in association with ECGD).

Ostensibly, Iraq had conferred 'privileged creditor' status on the British banks; but this was narrowly defined and most, like ECGD, had suffered default on claims which the Iraqis regarded as outside this framework. Iraq's poor performance (probably aggravated by the heavy burden of constant bilateral negotiations, personnel shortages as a result of the war and, indeed, war damage to their banks) made most banks reluctant even to contemplate any increase in exposure. Even if arrears were cleared, Iraq would need to establish a track record of honouring its commitments to justify further loans, particularly given the need to make large provisions against such business. The implications of the establishment of a new Iraqi bank added a further complication. Although quotations for Iraqi debt on the secondary market leapt from 10 to 60 cents in the dollar following the cease-fire, the volume of such trading, if any, is likely to be very thin.

8. Iran's generally punctilious performance since the revolution had encouraged a limited number of banks to increase their exposure, or at least to stand ready to do so, some time before the cease-fire. A number of banks had outstanding nationalisation claims or repayments due in syndicates led by US banks (which had refused Iranian offers of payment); but withholding credit was not thought likely to enhance the prospect of repayment. One bank is reputed to finance up to 25% of Iran's trade; it seems unlikely to wish to increase its exposure further, particularly as the current very high margins (8% or so) are likely to be eroded sharply as competition for Iranian business increases. Iran remains a substantial net creditor of BIS area banks, though an unknown proportion of its assets reflect balances held on escrow accounts which are not at Iran's free disposal.


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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 August 1988

Dear Charles

Mine Clearance in The Gulf and Clearance of the Shatt-al-Arab

FCO and MOD Ministers have considered whether we and our WEU Partners have a role to play in helping clear the Gulf of mines following the end of the Iran/Iraq conflict. There are three separate issues:

- clearance of mines in international waters in the Gulf;

- clearance of mines in Iranian and Iraqi territorial waters;

- clearance of the Shatt-al-Arab itself.

I enclose a paper which sets out an agreed position on each of these. You will also recall that the Prime Minister recently sent a message to the Italian Prime Minister which has a bearing on this.

You will see that we are in favour of action by WEU partners to sweep established shipping lanes and known minefields in international waters. We are hampered by lack of precise information. It is not certain how many mines would be uncovered in such an exercise - perhaps very few. But it is an important job for the future safety of British merchant shipping. There are also broader political arguments. A continuing role in the Gulf would be a visible British contribution to restoring regional security in the context of a settlement of the Iran/Iraq conflict. It would also strengthen the existing cooperation between WEU countries in out of area activity, and enhance the record of the European allies in the US for burden sharing. We do not favour direct Royal Navy involvement in clearing mines in the territorial waters of Iran and Iraq, or in clearance of the Shatt al Arab itself.

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The views of our WEU Partners are not yet known. Some may be reluctant to join in further minesweeping operations, and may be looking to withdraw their naval vessels from the Gulf. The Belgians, who are currently working with us in the joint Calendar mine clearance force, are presently committed to withdrawal of their single minehunter after 15 November. They will need soon to consider the future of their involvement. Their decision will influence the Dutch.

It is not certain that the Secretary General will issue an invitation to WEU Partners to help in the Gulf in the near future, if at all. The longer the delay, the greater the risk of unilateral and uncoordinated withdrawals by WEU countries from the Gulf. There is therefore a case for our taking the initiative in proposing a WEU role to the Secretary General. The attitudes of Iran, Iraq, the US and the USSR would need to be taken into account. Squaring them will be a job for the Secretary General. Although the Iranians have called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Gulf, Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani told Sir David Miers on 30 August that Iran would in principle welcome British involvement in a broader operation to sweep international waters. (He strongly implied that the Russians would not be welcome). It is possible that an international minesweeping effort with Iranian acquiescence would help to strengthen the hand of the pragmatists in the Iranian leadership.

We propose to discuss all the issues at a WEU meeting on 6 September, when our objective will be to secure agreement that the WEU should agree to cooperate over work on the shipping lanes in international waters and at the same time inform the Secretary General that we stand ready to offer this help in the context of the Geneva talks if that would be useful to him. I am copying this letter an enclosure to Brian Hawtin in the Ministry of Defence.

Yours ever

Bob Peirce

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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POSSIBLE BRITISH ROLE IN MINE CLEARANCE IN THE GULF AND CLEARANCE OF THE SHATT AL ARAB

1. It is possible that the UK will be approached by the UN Secretariat to assist in mine clearance in the Gulf and clearance of the Shatt al Arab. There may in any case be advantages in our seeking a role as a visible contribution to the restoration of regional stability following the Iran/Iraq conflict.

2. Our interests are:

- to help minimise future risk to British merchant vessels and seamen in the Gulf;

- to maintain the record of WEU cooperation in the Gulf and to underline to the US the European role to burden-sharing;

- to gain maximum political prestige from our contribution to the settlement of the Iran/Iraq conflict;

- in doing so, to expose RN men and vessels to the minimum risk;

- to incur the lowest possible costs.

FCO ministers are in principle in favour of our seeking a role. MOD ministers would be content for the Royal Navy to participate on the following basis, which has been agreed in consultations between the FCO and MOD.

Mine Clearance in International Waters in the Gulf

3. **We should be ready to agree to participation by British naval vessels in mine clearance in international waters.** Our agreement should be subject to the following conditions:

- we should not undertake to establish that the Gulf as a whole is clear of mines. This is not feasible. We should only agree to participate in sweeping of established shipping lanes, including those disused during the conflict, and of known minefields and mine danger areas;

- we should seek to involve WEU Partners (particularly Belgium and the Netherlands);

- we would expect the Secretary General to secure the acquiescence of the US and the Soviet Union to action by the WEU. We should also need to take into account the attitudes of Iraq and Iran;

- we should work in cooperation with the UN, but RN vessels would remain under the British flag and under national command;

- adequate naval protection should be provided, drawing on the resources of WEU nations;

- our activity might include assisting in mine clearance in the territorial waters of friendly Arab Gulf States at their request.

4. To try to clear the entire Gulf of mines would be an unrealistic undertaking. We need to limit our objectives. There are two known minefields in international waters in the Northern Gulf - Mina al Amadi and Farsi Island. The US have already swept both but there may be up to 10 mines unaccounted for at Farsi. Other mines may have been sown in the Northern Gulf in the early years of the conflict. A number have drifted ashore in the littoral

states. There are four known mine danger areas in the Southern Gulf and the Gulf of Oman - Fujairah, Bahrain Belle, Sousan, and Shah Alom. All have been swept, and are unlikely to contain residual mines, but there may still be some unaccounted for. The exercise of sweeping these fields and established shipping lanes may therefore uncover few or no mines. Some WEU partners may be reluctant. But it is an important job from the point of view of ensuring the future safety of merchant shipping, although because of the persistant risk of drifting mines, we would need to disclaim responsibility for any subsequent incidents in areas we had swept.

Mine Clearance in the Territorial Waters of Iran and Iraq

5. **We should examine with extreme caution any request for the RN to assist in mine clearance in the territorial waters of Iran and Iraq.**

6. There may still be large numbers of mines in territorial waters in the Northern Gulf. We do not know whether the Iraqis and Iranians will want to clear their own defensive fields: we assume that they will and that they know where these fields are located. This would be a very sensitive task for outsiders to take on. Drifting mines could still pose a threat to shipping in the Gulf.

Clearance of the Shatt al Arab

7. **We should not agree to deploy RN ships to help clear the Shatt al Arab. But we should keep an open mind about the participation of British civilian and possibly military personnel - for example in a consultancy role in surveying the Shatt.**

8. Clearance of the Shatt is a complicated and potentially dangerous task. It is mined and blocked with sunken hulls and ordnance. It is also badly silted. The extent of the job needs to be carefully studied. Our existing ships in the Gulf may not be suitable for the task in such shallow waters. Sovereignty over the Shatt will be a major bone of contention in the peace talks in Geneva: both sides maintain heavy troop concentrations in the area. The situation there will remain explosive for some time. The UNSG

is considering contracting the work out to private companies under the control of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). We should not rule out participation by British personnel in such an exercise.

Finance

9. British agreement to any role would depend upon satisfactory financial arrangements. This would be a matter for discussion in the WEU and with the UN Secretariat.

10. If there were to be a rebate from the UN towards the cost of the operation, the MOD would expect to be reinbursed accordingly. If no UN funding were forthcoming, MOD Ministers would be prepared in principle to bear the costs of RN participation in mine clearance in international waters as contributing to the protection of British shipping in the area. The size and the duration of the commitment would need to be agreed with MOD. The existing minesweeping operation is already imposing considerable strain on the RN's MCMV force and affecting its ability properly to fulfil defence commitments. For these reasons the MOD would wish to reduce the number of RN MCMV's participating in any post ceasefire clearance operation.

Tactics

11. It is not yet clear whether, and if so when, the Secretary General will approach us. In order to avoid the piecemeal withdrawal of WEU Partners from the Gulf we intend to propose a WEU initiative on sweeping in international waters. We shall discuss this with WEU Partners on 6 September.


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SUMMONS BY SADDAM HUSSEIN

SUMMARY.

REPRESENTATIVES OF 5 UNEXPECTEDLY SUMMONED BY IRAQI PRESIDENT, WHO SETS OUT IRAQ'S POSITION ON THE CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATIONS AND IN THE CURRENT TALKS AT GENEVA. HE STRESSES NEED FOR FIRM AGREEMENTS, BEFORE WITHDRAWAL, ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND CLEARANCE OF THE SHATT. THE 1975 TREATY NULL AND VOID AND SHOULD BE REPLACED BY A MORE PRECISE AND DURABLE AGREEMENT TO '' PREVENT A RECURENCE OF THE TRAGEDY''

DETAIL

2. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 5 IN BAGHDAD WERE SUMMONED TO THE MFA AT 1800 LOCAL ON 31 AUGUST. WE WERE EVENTUALLY DRIVEN FROM THERE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE WHERE WE WERE ADDRESSED FOR ONE AND A QUARTER HOURS BY THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ZAHAWI (MFA) AND HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY. NONE OF US HAD BEEN GIVEN ANY PRIOR HINT OF THIS MEETING.

3. SADDAM BEGAN BY RECOUNTING IRAQI ACCEPTANCE, AND IRANIAN REJECTION OF ALL PREVIOUS U.N RESOLUTIONS FOR AN END TO THE WAR STRESSING IRAQS OWN CONSISTENT REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PARTIAL SOLUTIONS, AS IRAQ WANTED A LASTING , COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. FINALLY IRAN HAD ACCEPTED 598, BUT AS KHOMENI'S SPEECH HAD MADE CLEAR, THIS WAS NOT OUT OF RESPECT OR FEAR OF THE UNSC, NOR OF RESPECT FOR THE MANDATORY RESOLUTION. THE REAL REASONS WERE:

A) IRAN'S MILITARY POSITION

B) THE EFFECT OF IRAN'S AGGRESSIVE POLICY ON ITS INTERNAL SITUATION

C) THE COLLECTIVE CALLS ON IRAN MADE BY THE 5 (IN VARIOUS DEGREES) TO END THE WAR.

IF IRAQ DID NOT ACCEPT PEACE, WHAT COULD IT DO? EVEN WITH AN ARMY DOUBLED IN SIZE IT WOULD NOT WANT TO ESTABLISH AN IRAQI ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN. BUT IF IRAN REFUSED PEACE IT MIGHT FORCE THE PERMANENT MEMBERS THEMSELVES TO INTERVENE DIRECTLY IN THE CONFLICT- OTHERWISE THE WHOLE MAP OF THE AREA MIGHT BE CHANGED , GIVENIRAN'S SHAMELESS POLICY OF EXPANSION. THE WHOLE WORLD HAD BENEFITTED FROM IRAQ'S SACRIFICES, AND IT WAS THUS ONLY FAIR (AND, FROM A PRACTICAL VIEWPOINT, IMPORTANT) THAT IRAQ'S VIEWS SHOULD BE RESPECTED.

4. IRAQ KNEW THAT IF 598 HAD BEEN ADOPTED ON 18 JULY 1988 ITS ITS TEXT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT IN CERTAIN RESPECTS TO REFLECT REALITY MORE ACCURATELY , BUT DESPITE HER MILITARY VICTORY IRAQ WAS NOT ARROGANT, -,^ 2-' -:58NG CORRECTLY AND REASONABLY. AS IN SEPTEMBER 1980, IRAQ SOUGHT PEACE FOR BOTH PARTIESN SO THAT THEY COULD GO THEIR OWN WAYS. BUT AGRESSIVE POLICIES SHOULD NOT BE REWARDED. ANY REWARDS SHOULD TO TO IRAQ, WHO HAD CONSISTENTLY COOPERATED WITH THE UN.

5. IRAQ HAD, THEREFORE, TO CONSIDER WHY IRAN HAD ACCEPTED 598 AND TO AVOID BEING DECEIVED BY IRAN, TO HER COST. FOR THIS REASON IRAQ HAD PROPOSED IMMEDIATE DIRECT TALKS, BUT IN DEFERENCE TO WORLD DESIRE FOR PEACE HAD AGREED TO A CEASEFIRE TO BE FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY DIRECT TALKS WITH IRAN UNDER THE UNSG'S AND UNSC'S AUSPICES. THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD CONVEY IRAQI VIEWS TO IRAN, AS IRAQ HAD MADE CLEAR.

6. UNFORTUNATELY THE S-G SOMETIMES PUT FORWARD SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DIRECT TALKS, WHICH RAN COUNTER TO THE AGREEMENT OF 8 AUGUST. SOMETIMES, ALSO, UNSC MEMBERS MADE STATEMENTS EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE S-G. IRAQ CERTAINLY WANTED THE S-G TO BE INVOLVED IN THE PEACE PROCESS, BUT THE 5 SHOULD REMEMBER THE NEED TO PRESERVE BALANCE AND NOT TO FOSTER IRANIAN ILLUSIONS, WHICH COULD LEAD TO RENEWED AGRESSION, WHILE DISCOURAGING IRAQI COOPERATION.

7. IRAQ WAS CONCERNED THAT BEFORE THE REMAINDER OF 598 WAS DEALT WITH IN SEQUENCE THE CEASEFIRE BE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED BY LAND, AIR AND ESPECIALLY, BY SEA,

AND SHOULD BRING EQUAL BENEFIT TO BOTH PARTIES, GIVEN IRAQ'S LIMITED ACCESS TO THE SEA IN CONTRAST TO IRAN'S LONG COASTLINE. THE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT LAST A YEAR AND IT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE POLITICALLY OR MILITARILY FOR THE SHATT TO BE CLOSED WHILE IRAN ENJOYED EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS OF FREE NAVIGATION. IRAQ HAD NOT DEMANDED TO CLEAR THE SHATT HERSELF, NOR REFUSED TO MOVE ON TO THE REMAINING OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS UNTIL THE SHATT HAD BEEN CLEARED. INSTEAD SHE PRESSED FOR AN AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THE U.N SECRETARIAT SHOULD SUPERVISE A SURVEY, FOLLOWING WHICH A TIMETABLE, AGREED BY THE SECRETARIAT, SHOULD BE DRAWN UP FOR THE ACTUAL CLEARANCE OPERATION.

8. IRAQ HAD AT THE OUTSET OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS DECIDED NOT TO ISSUE PUBLIC STATEMENTS, TO HELP THE ATMOSPHERE AT THE TALKS AND TO MINIMIZE MEDIA PRESSURE. UNFORTUNATELY IRAN HAD ISSUED STATEMENTS CALLING FOR THE SHATT TO BE DEALT WITH UNDER THE 1975 TREATY, AND RENEWING THE OLD DEMANDS WHICH IRAN HAD PERSISTED IN UNTIL THE IRAQI RECAPTURE OF FAO, FOR THE ''AGGRESSOR'' TO BE IDENTIFIED AND PUNISHED AND FOR IRAQ TO PAY REPARATIONS. WHILE IRAQ HAD ALWAYS AGREED TO AN IMPARTIAL BODY EXPLORING THE ORIGINS, INITIATION AND CONTINUATION OF THE WAR, SUCH STATEMENTS SUGGESTED THAT IRAN HAD INDEED ACCEPTED 598 FOR TACTICAL REASONS. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE EASY FOR IRAN TO RESUME FIGHTING, THE 5 SHOULD TAKEN NOTE OF SUCH STATEMENTS AND BRING PRESSURE ON IRAN TO DISILLUSION HER. PRESSURE ON IRAQ TO MAKE CONCESSIONS WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON HER, BUT IT MIGHT ENCOURAGE IRANIAN ILLUSIONS, HARM THE PEACE PROCESS, AND '' ALLOW THE VOLCANO TO ERUPT AGAIN''.

9. SADDAM THEN WENT OVER THE BACKGROUND TO THE 1975 AGREEMENT, WHICH, HE SAID, CONTAINED THREE BASIC PROVISIONS.

A) IRAN TO RECTIFY FRONTIER ENCROACHMENTS

B) NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE OTHER PARTY

C) THE THALWEG BORDER LINE IN THE SHATT (A CONCESSION FORCED BY THE SHAH'S MILITARY PRESSURE ON IRAQ VIA THE KURDS AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT ALL PREVIOUS FRONTIER AGREEMENTS HAD ACCORDED IRAQ SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WHOLE WATERWAY) .KHOMEINI HAD ATTACKED THE THE 1975 TREATY EVEN WHEN STILL IN EXILE, FUNDAMENTALLY BECAUSE ITS NON-INTERFRENCE CLAUSES CUT DIRECTLY ACROSS HIS OWN CONCEPT OF HIMSELF AS VELEYAT E FAKEH, WITH A MISSION TO SPREAD HIS OWN BRAND OF ISLAM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. IN VIEW OF PERSISTENT

IRANIAN STATEMENTS ATTACKING THE TREATY AFTER 1979 , IRAQ HAD ASKED IRAN TO CLARIFY HER ATTITUDE TO IT, BUT HAD RECEIVED NO REPLY. THE ENCLAVES HAD NOT BEEN RETURNED, IRAN HAD INTERFERED IN IRAQ AND THE ALGIERS TREATY HAD EFFECTIVELY BROKEN DOWN, LEADING IRAQ TO DECLARE IT NULL AND VOID. THUS IRANIAN TALK OF RETURNING TO THE 1975 AGREEMENT WAS SIMPLY AN ATTEMPT TO PLACE OBSTACLES ON THE ROAD TO PEACE.

10 . THE SECURITY OF THE AREA REQUIRED A NEW DURABLE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ''GIVE NOTHING NEW TO IRAN'' (IRAQ HAD NO AMBITIONS), WOULD PREVENT INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHERS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND WOULD CONTAIN SPECIFIC DETAILED MEASURES TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THE TRAGEDY. THE IMMEDIATE (AND URGENT) WAY FORWARD WAS TO CONFIRM THE CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS CLEARLY AND THEN PROCEED LOGICALLY TO NEGOTIATE WITHDRAWAL, EXCHANGE OF POW'S AND SO ON, WORKING OUT A STABLE, INTERFERENCE-FREE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN UNDER OPERATIVE PARA 4.

11. '' IN THE LAST 24 HOURS'' THE S-G HAD MADE SOME SUGGESTIONS, BUT THESE WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY PRECISE TO ENSURE THAT CLEARANCE OF THE SHATT EVENTUALLY TOOK PLACE UNDER UN AUSPICES. IRAN AND IRAQ NEEDED (IN HIS VIEW) TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT NOW, COVERING THIS AS WELL AS THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CEASEFIRE, INCLUDING FREEDOM OF NAVIA-GATION IN THE GULF /STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND THE OTHER DETAILS ON LAND AND IN THE AIR.

12. HASTY IDEAS OR TACTICS (SUCH AS, HE IMPLIED, THOSE OF THE UN SG) WOULD ONLY MAKE THE PEACE PROCESS HARDER. THE S-G AND UNSC SHOULD CERTAINLY REMAIN IN TOUCH WITH BOTH PARTIES IN ORDER TO FACILITATE A SOLUTION, BUT ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE AGREED FORMULA WAS FOR DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE PARTIES (IN THE PRESENCE EITHER OF THE S-G OR OF HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE).

13. IN AN APPARENT REFERENCE TO THE TEXT CONTAINED IN MY TEL NO 545 TO YOU, SADDAM THEN SAID THAT THE S-G WAS WRONG TO PRESENT THE EARLY RETURN OF POW'S AS SOMETHING TO WHICH IRAQ NOW ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE. THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN TRUE IN THE PAST, BUT NOW THE MAJORITY OF THE 35,000 HELD BY IRAQ WERE FIT AND COULD SOON REJOIN THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES AFTER REPATRIATION , WHEREAS MOST OF THOSE HELD BY IRAN WERE EITHER CIVILIANS, MEMBERS OF THE POPULAR ARMY , OR SICK IN MIND AND BODY AS THE RESULT OF IRANIAN MALTREATMENT AND BRAINWASHING. SO ANY EARLY EXCHANGE OF POW'S WOULD NOT BE TO IRAQ'S ADVANTAGE.

14. IRAQ WAS NOT SEEKING ONE-SIDED SOLUTIONS , BUT COULD NOT ALLOW HER RIGHTS TO BE TREATED IN AN IMPRECISE WAY. FOR THIS REASON A WRITTEN AGREEMENT WAS REQUIRED, CONFIRMING BOTH SIDES ACCEPTANCE OF THE U.N SUPERVISING THE TASK OF CLEARING THE SHATT. IRAQ DID NOT WISH TO HAMPER PROGRESS, AND LOOKED FORWARD TO MOVING ON DOWN THE AGENDA ONCE THESE POINTS WERE CLEARED UP. SHE WANTED PEACE SOON- BUT NOT AT THE COST OF INACCURACY AND IMPRECISION. IRAQ SHOULD NOT BE PUT IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO REJECT PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD NOT FURTHER THE CAUSE OF PEACE. IRAQ HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON IRAN IN THE PAST- NOR HAD SHE NOW. BUT IRAN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DERIVE BENEFITS AT IRAQI EXPENSE. SADDAM ENDED BY ASKING US TO CONVEY THESE POINTS TO OUR GOVERNMENTS, WITH HIS BEST WISHES.

COMMENT

15. THIS MEETING-IF NOT THE STYLE OF THE SUMMONS (WE DID NOT KNOW THAT WE WOULD BE SEEING SADDAM HIMSELF UNTIL HE ENTERED THE ROOM) - WAS AN UNUSUAL EVENT, AND WILL NO DOUBT RECEIVE WIDE PUBLICITY HERE (WE WERE FILMED BY A TV CREW AT THE START OF THE MEETING).

16. SADDAM SPOKE MILDLY, AND IN MEASURED TONES. ALTHOUGH MUCH OF WHAT HE SAID WAS SIMPLY REINFORCING, AT GREATER LENGTH, THE LINE TAKEN WITH US BY IRAQI OFFICIALS HERE (E.G ZAHAWI ON 30 AUGUST-MY TELNO 578) OR IN GENEVA (UKMIS GENEVA TEL NO 465 TO FCO), I HAVE, GIVEN THE SOURCE, REPORTED IT IN SOME DETAIL.

17. SADDAM'S MAIN THRUST WAS TO JUSTIFY IRAQ'S CURRENT POSITION, AND TO WARN THE 5 AGAINST LENDING THEIR SUPPORT TOO READILY TO THE S-G'S ATTEMPTS TO PRESSURIZE IRAQ (AS HE DESCRIBED IT) THE MEETING SHOULD ALSO BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF HAMMADI'S VISIT TO PARIS (AND, EVENTUALLY, OTHER CAPITALS) AND RAMADHAN'S TRIP TO KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA (MY TELNO 581) AS WELL AS A FURTHER COUNTERBLAST TO IRANIAN PROPAGANDA, REFERRED TO BY SADDAM IN PARA 8 ABOVE.

18. THE REMARKS ON THE NEED FOR A NEW TREATY (PARA 10 ABOVE) APPEAR TO LEAVE OPEN THE IRAQI POSITION OVER SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SHATT, BUT THE REFERENCE IN PARA 9 TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES COMPELLING IRAQI ACCEPTANCE OF THE THALWEG IN 1975 (AS WELL AS HAMMADI'S REMARKS REPORTED IN MY TELNO 577) SUGGEST THAT IRAQ WILL EVENTUALLY TAKE A FIRM LINE . HAVING CAPTURED THE IRANIAN ENCLAVES THIS SUMMER AND HAVING NOW EMBARKED ON A MAJOR

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KDP AREAS IN THE NORTH, THE IRAQIS MAY REGARD THEMSELVES AS BEING A FAIR WAY TO RESTORING (BY THEIR OWN EFFORTS) THE POSITION ON LAND AS PROVIDED FOR BY THE 1975 TREATY. THEY MAY THUS BE THAT MUCH LESS WILLING TO BARGAIN OVER THEIR '' TRADITIONAL RIGHTS '' (PARA 9) IN THE SHATT.

KEALY

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The Italian Ambassador

7911

Italian Embassy
4, Grosvenor Square
London, W. 1.

30th August, 1988

CDP
19/9

Dear Charles,

Further to my previous letters of 11th and 12th August last, I take pleasure in sending you the original text of two letters addressed to the Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP, by the President of the Council of Ministers, Signor Ciriaco De Mita.

Yours ever,

Boris Biancheri

encs.

Mr. Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
for Overseas Affairs
10 Downing Street
London S W 1

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FM UKMIS GENEVA
TO DESKBY 291330Z FCO
TELNO 466
OF 291215Z AUGUST
AND DESKBY 291230Z UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, PARIS

MY TELNO 465: IRAN/IRAQ: GENEVA TALKS

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY GENERAL BRIEFS GENEVA MISSIONS OF FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS AND SEEKS SPECFIC SUPPORT OF FIVE FOR NEGOTIATING LINE TO BE TAKEN LATER TODAY WITH TWO SIDES. EARLY REPLY NEEDED IN ADVANCE OF RESUMPTION OF TALKS LATER THIS AFTERNOON/EVENING, 29 AUGUST.

2. SECRETARY GENERAL ASKED REPRESENTATIVES OF GENEVA MISSIONS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CALL ON HIM TODAY, 29 AUGUST, AT 12 NOON TO BRIEF THEM ON PROGRESS OF THE IRAN/IRAQ TALKS AND TO SEEK THEIR GOVERNMENTS' SUPPORT FOR THE LINE HE INTENDED TO TAKE WITH THE TWO PARTIES WHEN TALKS RESUMED LATER TODAY.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF TALKS ON LINE OF MTUR. HE EXPLAINED THAT AN IMPASSE REMAINED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, DESPITE SOME EIGHT HOURS OF INDIRECT TALKS ON 28 AUGUST. IRAQ COULD NOT ACCEPT AS SUFFFICIENT A STATEMENT OF COMMITMENT TO GENERAL FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, THEY SOUGHT A SPECIFIC UNDERTAKING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SEARCHING OF VESSELS BY IRANIANS, IN KEEPING WITH CEASEFIRE CALLED FOR IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF RESOLUTION 598. IRAN FOR ITS PART WAS CONVINCED THAT IRAQ WISHED TO OBTAIN GUARANTEES OF FREEDOM OF UNIMPEEDED NAVIGATION, BUT HAD NO INTENTION OF PROCEEDING WITH WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES OR WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF RESOLUTION 598. THERE WAS A DEEP MUTUAL SUSPICION WHICH SECRETARY GENERAL NEEDED TO BRIDGE. THE S-G WAS CONVINCED THAT BOTH ISSUE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES COULD BE DEALT WITH TO SATISFACTION OF BOTH SIDES, PROVIDED NEITHER WAS GIVEN A PLACE OF PRIORITY OVER THE OTHER.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE SECRETARY GENERAL SPECIFICALLY APPEALED FOR THE SUPPORT OF FIVE PERMANENT MEMBER GOVERNMENTS FOR LINE HE HOPED TO TAKE WITH BOTH SIDES AND WHICH HE WOULD INDICATE HAD THE BACKING OF THE FIVE,

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A) THAT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION WAS INDEED PART OF CEASEFIRE AND THAT IRAQ CONCERN ON THIS ISSUE SHOULD BE MET IN CONTEXT OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF RESOLUTION 598.

B) THAT DATE FOR COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES SHOULD BE SET BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL, ON BEHALF OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AS PART OF HIS MANDATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 598 AND THAT THE DAY FIXED SHOULD BE, AT THE MAXIMUM, TWO WEEKS FROM 29 AUGUST.

C) THAT S-G WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH AN IMMEDIATE SURVEY OF THE SHATT AL ARAB IN PREPARATION FOR ITS CLEARANCE, BUT THAT THE DETAILS OF THE CLEARANCE OF THE SHATT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE APPRORIATE TIME, WITHOUT LINKAGE TO THE CEASEFIRE.

5. ELABORATING ON THESE POINTS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL COMMENTED THAT THEY WERE SOMETHING OF A COMPROMISE. HE ADMITTED THAT IRAQ HAD A POINT IN LINKING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION TO THE CEASEFIRE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS A VIOLATION OF RES 598 NOT TO PROCEED TO WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES. WITHOUT THIS, CEASEFIRE WOULD REMAIN VERY FRAGILE. DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE BATTLE ZONES WAS ESSENTIAL TO MAKE CEASEFIRE '' SOLID''.
6. THE SECRETARY GENERAL ASKED FOR EARLY ENDORSEMENT OF HIS NEGOTIATING LINE AT RESUMPTION OF TALKS LATER TODAY, 29 AUGUST. GRATEFUL FOR EARLY RESPONSE WHICH I CAN CONVEY TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR.

7. WE ALL UNDERTOOK TO REPORT IMMEDIATELY AND CONVEY RESPONSE.

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IRAN/IRAQ: GENEVA TALKS

SUMMARY

1. IRANIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE SAYS THAT TALKS ON 25/26 AUGUST WERE BLOCKED BY IRAQI DEMAND THAT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF AND CLEARANCE OF THE SHATT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CEASEFIRE. IRAN WAS WILLING TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES AT A LATER STAGE, BUT NOT AT THE OUTSET. IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS THAT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND CLEARANCE OF SHATT ARE ESSENTIAL TO AVOID GIVING IRAN UNFAIR ADVANTAGE BECAUSE OF HER GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION. BOTH AGREE THAT ATMOSPHERE ON SECOND DAY WAS LESS TENSE. TALKS RESUMED ON 28 AUGUST.

DETAIL: IRANIAN VIEWS

2. I SAW IRANIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON 27 AUGUST. NASSERI SAID THAT SECRETARY GENERAL (AND IRAN) HAD HOPED THAT TALKS WOULD BE BUSINESS-LIKE, WITH SHORT DISCUSSIONS ON EACH POINT OF THE RESOLUTION/IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND WITH NO LENGTHY DEBATES. HOWEVER, IN FIRST ROUND ON 25 AUGUST IRAQ HAD MADE LONG STATEMENT INSISTING THAT THERE SHOULD BE IMMEDIATE DISCUSSION OF UNIMPEDED FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF AND CLEARANCE OF THE SHATT. IRAN'S VIEW WAS THAT BOTH THESE ISSUES WERE IMPORTANT AND SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME, BUT THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO DISCUSS THE CEASEFIRE.

3. HOWEVER, IRAQ HAD CONTINUED TO PRESS THE SAME POINTS ON 26 AUGUST. THEY HAD SUBMITTED A NON-PAPER, WHICH THEY LATER WITHDREW (NASSERI GAVE NO DETAILS). TO JUSTIFY THEIR POSITION, IRAQ CLAIMED THAT UNIMPEDED NAVIGATION WOULD STRENGTHEN THE CEASEFIRE, WHILE THE CLEARANCE OF THE SHATT WAS IN ACCORD WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD BENEFIT EQUALLY FROM THE CEASEFIRE.

4. THE IRANIAN POSITION WAS THAT BASICALLY THE CEASEFIRE WAS HOLDING., THERE HAD BEEN NO MAJOR INCIDENTS. DETAILS SUCH AS THE PRECISE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES ON BOTH SIDES NEEDED TO BE WORKED OUT, BUT NEW SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES UNCONNECTED WITH THE CEASEFIRE SHOULD NOT BE INTRODUCED AT THIS STAGE. WITH REGARD TO THE IRAQI ARGUMENTS IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH, NASSERI COMMENTED THAT IRAQI AGREEMENT NOT TO ATTACK THE KURDS WOULD ALSO STRENGTHEN THE CEASEFIRE, BUT IRAN WOULD NOT RAISE THIS ISSUE NOW. AS FOR EACH SIDE BENEFITTING EQUALLY, BASRA WAS NOT SERIOUSLY DAMAGED WHEREAS KHORAMSHAH WAS DESTROYED - SHOULD IRAN INSIST ON KHORAMSHAH BEING REBUILT TO MAKE IT EQUAL TO BASRA?

5. TO SUM UP, IRAN BELIEVED THE TWO ISSUES RAISED BY IRAQ SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND NOT MADE A PRECONDITION. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD NOW TAKE HIS RESPONSIBILITIES AND MAKE A DECISION ON HIS OWN, OR SEEK THE GUIDANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IRAN HOPED THE PERMANENT MEMBERS WOULD GIVE THE SECRETARY GENERAL THEIR FULL SUPPORT. NASSERI NOTED THAT AT THE MEETING ON FRIDAY EVENING (26 AUGUST) THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WAS NOT SO TENSE. VELAYATI HAD KEPT COOL AND AVOIDED RAISING THE TEMPERATURE.

6. CONCLUDING, NASSERI SAID HIS GOVERNMENT ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE ROLE OF BRITAIN AS A PERMANENT MEMBER. HE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL TO HAVE BRITISH VIEWS ON THE IRAQI CONTENTION THAT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND CLEARANCE OF THE SHATT WERE PRIORITY ISSUES. HE HAD NOTED SUGGESTIONS IN BRITISH NEWSPAPERS THAT IRAQ WAS DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE A CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED BORDERS, AND HE ASKED WHETHER BRITAIN CONSIDERED EITHER SIDE COULD TRANSLATE A TEMPORARY MILITARY SUPERIORITY INTO A TERRITORIAL GAIN AND WHAT BRITISH REACTION WOULD BE IF IRAQ APPEARED WILLING TO RESUME THE WAR TO ACHIEVE A REVISION OF FRONTIERS.

7. I SAID THAT I WAS GRATEFUL TO NASSERI FOR GIVING ME SUCH A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE TALKS. AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, MY GOVERNMENT NATURALLY WISHED TO HAVE THE FULLEST INFORMATION ABOUT ISSUES ON THE COUNCIL'S AGENDA. I WOULD TRANSMIT NASSERI'S REQUEST FOR AN INDICATION OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT VIEWS TO MY AUTHORITIES. MEANWHILE, WE FULLY SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN HIS DELICATE TASK AND HOPED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE PRESENT DIFFICULTY.

IRAQI VIEWS

8. I SAW IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK ON 28 AUGUST.

KITTANI SAID THAT IRAQ POSITION WAS BASED ON PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF 6 AUGUST, WHICH MADE IT CLEAR THAT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF AND CLEARANCE OF THE SHATT WERE ESSENTIAL TO MAKE THE CEASEFIRE SOLID - AT PRESENT IT WAS EXTREMELY FRAGILE. THE IRAQ POSITION WAS LOGICAL AND FAIR, AS THE CEASEFIRE SHOULD BRING A BALANCE OF BENEFITS AND NOT GIVE AN ADVANTAGE TO ONE SIDE. BECAUSE OF HER GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION, IRAN COULD HAVE ALL TYPES OF VESSEL (NAVAL OR CIVILIAN) VISIT HER PORTS FREELY. ALL THAT IRAQ WAS ASKING WAS A SIMILAR RIGHT FOR VESSELS (NAVAL OR CIVILIAN) OF ANY COUNTRY TO HAVE THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE TO IRAQ PORTS, INCLUDING BASRA (HENCE THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT ON THE COMMENCEMENT OF CLEARANCE OPERATIONS IN THE SHATT).

9. IRAQ WOULD REGARD ANY ATTEMPT BY IRAN TO SEARCH VESSELS AS A HOSTILE ACT. THE IDEA OF BOARDING VESSELS TO LOOK FOR CONTRABAND WAS A PRE- WORLD WAR I CONCEPT. IRAQ WOULD NOT SEARCH OR HARASS VESSELS BOUND FOR IRANIAN PORTS AND EXPECTED RECIPRICAL TREATMENT BY IRAN. CONTRARY TO PRESS REPORTS, IRAQ HAD NOT RAISED THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT. THE ONLY ISSUE NEEDING IMMEDIATE DISCUSSION WAS TO BEGIN CLEARANCE: QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY COULD BE DISCUSSED AT A LATER STAGE.

10. KITTANI NOTED THAT IRAN HAD SAID THAT SHE WOULD BE READY NOT TO EXERCISE HER ''RIGHT'' TO SEARCH VESSELS AND THAT SHE TOO WANTED THE SHATT TO BE CLEARED. IF THIS WAS SO, THEN THERE WAS NO REASON WHY IRAN SHOULD NOT AGREE TO THESE TWO POINTS AT ONCE, AS REQUESTED BY IRAQ. THESE POINTS WOULD BENEFIT IRAN AS WELL AS IRAQ. IRAQ HAD TABLED ITS NON-PAPER AT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REQUEST AT THE BEGINNING OF FRIDAY'S MEETING, BUT HAD QUICKLY WITHDRAWN IT WHEN IT SEEMED LIKELY TO COMPLICATE DISCUSSIONS RATHER THAT HELP THEM.

11 KITTANI EMPHASISED THAT IRAQ HAD COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HE HAD TO BE FIRM, FAIR AND A REAL MEDIATOR. BUT IRAQ HAD TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH IRAN, NOT THE SECRETARY GENERAL. ONE DIFFICULTY WAS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAD GREAT EXPERIENCE WITH LAND AND AIR CEASEFIRES BUT NOT WITH NAVAL CEASEFIRES. BUT IRAQ REGARDED CEASEFIRE BY LAND, SEA AND AIR AS AN INTEGRAL WHOLE, AND ANY ATTEMPT BY IRAN TO DENY IRAQ EQUAL RIGHTS BY SEA WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE.

12. TO SUM UP, KITTANI SAID THAT IRAQ WAS NOT WANTING TO PROCRASTINATE. SHE HAD NO INTEREST IN DELAYING WITHDRAWAL, WHICH WAS THE NEXT STEP AFTER THE CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN MADE ''SOLID''. BUT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND CLEARANCE OF THE SHATT WERE INTEGRAL PARTS

OF THE CEASEFIRE. IT DID NOT MATTER THAT THEY WERE NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN RESOLUTION 598: THIS RESOLUTION WAS NOT THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA.

13 CONCLUDING, KITTANI SAID HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE ATMOSPHERE ON THE SECOND DAY (FRIDAY). THERE WAS NO HOSTILITY OR RANCOUR, BUT MORE WARMTH AND CIVILITY. HIS INSTINCTS TOLD HIM THAT IRAN WANTED TO REACH A SETTLEMENT. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT BRITAIN WOULD SUPPORT THE IRAQI POSITION.

14. I THANKED KITTANI FOR HIS BRIEFING AND SAID I WOULD INFORM YOU IMMEDIATELY.

COMMENT

15. THE IRAQ AND IRAN ACCOUNTS SUPPORT EACH OTHER AND ARE SIMILAR TO THAT GIVEN BY PICCO (MY TUR) EXCEPT THAT CLEARANCE OF THE SHATT IS GIVEN EQUAL IMPORTANCE WITH FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION (WHICH KITTANI STRESSED INCLUDED NAVAL VESSELS). BOTH AGREED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS MORE RELAXED ON THE SECOND DAY (FRIDAY). THE TALKS RESUMED ON THE AFTERNOON OF 28 AUGUST.

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MY TELNO 456: IRAN/IRAQ: GENEVA TALKS

SUMMARY

1. DIFFICULT START TO TALKS. IRAQIS PRESS ISSUE OF FREEDOM ON NAVIGATION. POSSIBLE TEMPORARY BREAK IN TALKS, WHICH IRAQIS MAY USE TO LOBBY FIVE IN NEW YORK AND CAPITALS. NEXT STEPS. S-G LOOKS TO FIVE FOR SUPPORT AND COMMON FRONT ON NAVIGATION ISSUE TO ALLOW PROGRESS ON WITHDRAWAL AND OTHER ITEMS.

DETAIL

2. FIRST ROUND OF TALKS ON 25 AUGUST WENT BADLY, CONTRARY TO TONE OF POSITIVE PRESS COMMENT. FIRST BILATERALY WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THEN IN DIRECT TALKS WITH IRANIANS, IRAQIS INSISTED ON PRIOR AGREEMENT ON FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS OF THE GULF BEFORE MOVING ON TO DISCUSS OTHER ITEMS ON S-G'S AGENDA: WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS, POWS AND COMPOSITION OF IMPARTIAL BODY. S-G'S EFFORTS TO PERSUADE IRAQIS THAT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION WAS NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE FAILED, DESPITE NUMBER OF ATTEMPTS AT COMPROMISE LANGUAGE. TALKS WILL RESUME THIS MORNING, 26 AUGUST, FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY BILATERAL CONTACT WITH IRANIANS. IRAQ IS EXPECTED TO PRODUCE LIST OF DEMANDS ON ISSUE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, WHICH WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE BOTH TO IRANIANS AND S-G. THIS MAY PROVOKE A TEMPORARY BREAK IN THE TALKS, DURING WHICH THE S-G EXPECTS IRAQ TO APPEAL TO THE FIVE, PROBABLY IN NEW YORK BUT ALSO IN CAPITALS, FOR SUPPORT AND TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE S-G TO MEET IRAQI DEMANDS.

3. PROCEDURALLY, ACCORDING TO PICO (S-G'S STAFF), S-G ENVISAGES INFORMING CHINESE PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL OF EVENTS SO FAR IN THE TALKS. PICCO HAS ALSO BRIEFED THE AMERCIANS HERE. S-G IS PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS IN LIGHT OF THE REQUEST BY HAMMADI TO VISIT LONDON AND THE OTHER FOUR CAPITALS (BAGDAD TELNO 570 TO FCO) THAT THE FIVE SHOULD PRESENT A COMMON FRONT ON ISSUE OF FREEDOM OF

NAVIGATION, NAMELY:

(A) PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS, ACCORDING OT INTERNATIONAL LAW, DOES NOT PROVIDE UNIMPEDED PASSAGE FOR ALL SHIPS, PARTICULARLY WHEN STATE OF BELLIGERENCY EXISTS,

(B) IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER DEMAND FOR FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AS AN ESSENTIAL OR RELEVANT COMPONENT OF THE CEASEFIRE. NO MENTION IS MADE OF IT IN RESOLUTION 598.,

(C) S-G WOULD EXPECT ALL PARTIES TO SHOW RESTRAINT, WHETHER IN ATTEMPTING PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERS OR IN RESPONSES TO ANY SUCH PASSAGE.

4. THE S-G HOPES THAT SOLIDARITY BY THE FIVE WITH HIM ON THIS ISSUE CAN REINFORCE PRESSURE ON IRAQ TO CONCENTRATE ON THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL AT AN EARLY DATE, LEADING ON TO DISCUSSION OF THE OTHER AGENDA ITEMS.

COMMENT

5. PICCO WAS NOT CONFIDENT THAT ANY PROGRESS COULD BE MADE IN TALKS TODAY. HE ENVISAGED A BREAK UNTIL AFTERNOON OF SATURDAY 27 AUGUST (MORNING WOULD BE TAKEN UP WITH TALKS WITH PLO AND POLISARIO). PICCO WAS PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO ENSURE THAT UKMIS NEW YORK WERE AWARE OF EVENTS SO FAR AND TO USE US (AND AMERICANS) AS CHANNEL FOR INFORMING OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS, ALTHOUGH S-G WOULD BE OBLIGED TO TALK TO CHINESE PRESIDENT AS A MATTER OF COURTESY. PICCO SAID THAT THE S-G DID NOT EXCLUDE CALLING ON OTHERS EG. THE SAUDIS AT A LATER STAGE TO REINFORCE THE MESSAGE OF THE FIVE TO IRAQ.

SANKEY

YYYY



DISTRIBUTION 24

ADVANCE 24

.IRAN/IRAQ
PS + Mrs Chalker
PS/MR WAI DEGRAVE
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
MR MUNRO
SIR D MIERS
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
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CABINET OFFICE DIO
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HD/SEC (O) (C) MOD
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The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2269 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
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FILE EL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 August 1988

ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE
ABOUT THE GULF

The Prime Minister has agreed the enclosed reply to Signor De Mita's recent message about the Gulf. I should be grateful if the text could be telegraphed to Rome for delivery as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence).

(C. D. POWELL)

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

KK



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T130/88

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Subject as more 05

THE PRIME MINISTER

26 August 1988

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for your recent message about the situation in the Gulf and the role of Western naval forces there. Like you, I welcome the announcement of a ceasefire to be followed by talks between Iran and Iraq under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General. I also agree that the solidarity of the Western members of the Security Council has been an important factor in achieving this result. We must continue to support the Secretary-General in what promise to be difficult talks. I welcome Italy's offer to contribute forces to the United Nations Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group.

The Western naval forces in the Gulf have done an invaluable job in helping to uphold freedom of navigation as I saw for myself when I visited the Armilla Patrol earlier this month. We should continue to do so until the threat to merchant shipping has been removed through an effective ceasefire, and the principle of freedom of navigation fully restored and respected. I agree that the Western allies, and in particular members of the Western European Union (WEU), should remain in close contact about the situation in the Gulf and, as the current President of the WEU, we intend to play our part in ensuring this. Any decision on the future of our respective naval forces should be taken in a coherent

fashion after the fullest consultation and our Ministers of Defence should indeed keep in touch as you suggest.

I am looking forward to our meeting in October.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Signor Ciriaco De Mita

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 August 1988

Dear Charles

The Gulf

Thank you for your letter of 12 August enclosing a copy of the message to the Prime Minister from the Italian Prime Minister about the situation in the Gulf and the deployment of Western naval forces there. I enclose a draft reply cleared with MOD.

Signor De Mita mentions a recent reduction in the number of Italian ships in the Gulf. This reduction from three frigates to two took place in July as a result of a rationalisation of the Italian navy's modus operandi. The decision was taken before Iran's acceptance of SCR 598, although some have mistakenly interpreted the action as an immediate response to Iran's change of policy.

Nevertheless, the continuing Italian naval presence in the Gulf remains a contentious domestic political issue, and the Italian government may come under renewed pressure to withdraw unilaterally. At a WEU meeting on 3 August they committed themselves to further consultation before taking action. They said that they would respond favourably to any request for assistance from the Secretary General, but were non-committal about an informal suggestion that they might contribute to a joint WEU minesweeping force after a ceasefire. We have proposed that the WEU meet again to discuss these matters on 6 September.

The Italian Prime Minister also mentions Italy's offer to contribute to UNIIMOG. This has been rejected by the Iraqis: bilateral relations are not warm. The Italians may participate on the Iranian side of the border.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Bob Peirce

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 1[redacted] (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:
Prime Minister
DEPARTMENT:
TEL. NO:
BUILDING:
ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

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CAVEAT .....

N10ABJ

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO:

Signor Ciriaco De Mita
President of the Council of
Ministers

Copies to:

C24.

SUBJECT:

Note for file

~~I was pleased to receive~~ your recent message about the situation in the Gulf and the role of Western naval forces there. Like you,

I ~~join you in~~ welcome the announcement of a ceasefire to be followed by talks between Iran and Iraq under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General. ~~Let us hope that they will lead to~~ full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 and a ~~lasting~~ settlement. I also agree that the solidarity of the Western members of the Security Council has been an important factor in ~~bringing~~ achieving ~~peace~~. this result We must ~~now~~ continue to support the Secretary-General in what promise to be difficult talks. I welcome ~~applaud~~ Italy's offer to contribute forces to the United Nations Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group.

The Western naval forces in the Gulf have done an invaluable job in helping to uphold freedom of

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DSR 11C
(Revised 5/87)

navigation. It is important that we should continue to do so until the threat to merchant shipping has been removed through an effective ceasefire, and the principle of freedom of navigation fully restored. I entirely agree that the Western allies, and in particular members of the Western European Union (WEU), should remain in close contact as we keep the situation in the Gulf under review. Cooperation between us so far has demonstrated our determination to fulfil our responsibility for common defence. As Presidency of the WEU, we intend to play our part in maintaining this record. I am sure it is right that any decision on the future of our respective naval forces in the Gulf should be taken in a coherent fashion after the fullest consultation, and I welcome your proposal that our Ministers of Defence should keep in touch.

Ch.



A: Duty Clerk
to Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

164042
MDHOAN 2392

(A/Mr Duke)
16/8

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 160500Z AMMAN
TELNO 236
OF 151000Z AUGUST 88
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD

MY TELNO 233 AND TELECON FRASER(MED) SYNNOTT: IRAN/IRAQ:
DIALOGUE WITH KING HUSSEIN

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO KING HUSSEIN:

BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER ABOUT EFFORTS TO BRING AN END TO THE GULF CONFLICT. EVENTS HAVE MOVED QUICKLY. I WAS DELIGHTED - AS I AM SURE YOU WERE - TO HEAR THE NEWS THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAD BEEN ABLE TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE TO BE FOLLOWED BY TALKS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598.

THERE IS STILL A LONG WAY TO GO. IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL THAT THE CEASEFIRE ANNOUNCED FOR 20 AUGUST IS EFFECTIVE AND THAT BOTH SIDES ENTER IN GOOD FAITH INTO THE TALKS TO ACHIEVE THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF RESOLUTION 598. I ENTIRELY AGREE THAT WHAT IS NEEDED IS A FULL, JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT. IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED, SCR 598 PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR THAT. MEANWHILE WE SHALL KEEP THE ARMILLA PATROL AND OUR MINESWEEPERS IN THE GULF AS LONG AS THE THREAT TO SHIPPING REMAINS.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS DONE A VERY GOOD JOB. WE SHALL GIVE HIM OUR FULL AND ACTIVE SUPPORT IN WHAT PROMISE TO BE TESTING AND COMPLEX DISCUSSIONS ON THE ISSUES WHICH DIVIDE THE TWO COUNTRIES. I SHALL CONTINUE TO VALUE YOUR WISE ADVICE DURING THIS PERIOD, AND I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL USE YOUR INFLUENCE TO ENSURE THAT THIS OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE IS SEIZED.

ENDS

YOU MAY NOW DELIVER THIS TO KING HUSSEIN. A SIGNED COPY WILL FOLLOW BY BAG.

2. TUR LISTED SUBJECTS ON WHICH IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SOUND OUT KING HUSSEIN. MANSLEY CAN BRIEF YOU ON DISCUSSIONS WITH THE JORDANIANS ABOUT IRAN INTERNAL. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS:

- ON THE CONFLICT WE BELIEVE THE MOST IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IS TO SECURE AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE.
  WE UNDERSTAND THE IRAQIS' WISH TO

ENSURE THAT THE IRANIANS ARE SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE, AND SHALL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598 AND A LASTING SETTLEMENT. BUT THIS WILL NOT BE EASILY ACHIEVED. WE EXPECT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA TO BE DIFFICULT AND LENGTHY. IF FRUSTRATION LEADS TO BREAK DOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE THERE WILL BE NO PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THE BROADER NEGOTIATIONS. THE FIVE WILL WORK TO KEEP IT IN PLACE. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT JORDAN AND THE GULF STATES WILL DO LIKEWISE.

- IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW KING HUSSEIN'S VIEWS ABOUT THE GENEVA TALKS, AND IN PARTICULAR WHAT THE IRAQIS ARE LIKELY TO WANT. THERE IS GROWING SPECULATION THAT THEY WILL NOT BE CONTENT TO RETURN TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE ALGIERS AGREEMENT ON SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SHATT-AL ARAB, BUT WILL PRESS FOR RESTORATION OF IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WHOLE WATERWAY.
- WE SEE BRITAIN'S ROLE NOW, WITH THE FIVE, AS BEING RATHER LOWER IN PROFILE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN THE DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA OF THE TECHNICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN A SETTLEMENT. WE REMAIN READY TO WEIGH IN IN SUPPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IF ASKED WE WILL ALSO CONSIDER ANY REQUEST BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR ASSISTANCE.
- ON UK/IRANIAN RELATIONS THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR POSITION IS UNCHANGED. WE REMAIN CAUTIOUS AND WILL NOT BE TAKEN IN BY SUPERFICIAL SHIFTS IN TEHRAN. BEFORE WE COULD CONSIDER ANY IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WE WOULD NEED TO SEE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS ON THE ISSUES OUTLINED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE HOUSE ON 30 JUNE, NAMELY, THE DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL OR PROPER CONSULAR TREATMENT OF THE BRITISN PRISONERS, COOPER AND NICOLA: DISREGARD FOR OBLIGATIONS UNDER DIPLOMATIC AGREEMENTS: HARASSMENT AND ASSASINATION OF OPPONENTS AND FOMENTING INSTABILITY ABROAD: SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST GROUPS, INCLUDING HOSTAGE-TAKERS: DEFIANCE OF THE UN AND ATTACKS ON NEUTRAL SHIPPING. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS MAY IMPLY IMPROVED IRANIAN BEHAVIOUR ON THE LAST TWO COUNTS, BUT OUR OTHER CONCERNS REMAIN. THE VISIT OF REDDAWAY TO TEHRAN IS PURELY EXPLORATORY. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO QUESTION OF ANY CHANGE IN OUR POSITION ON HOSTAGES. WE CONTINUE TO EXPECT ANY COUNTRY WHO CAN HAVE INFLUENCE OVER THOSE HOLDING HOSTAGES TO WORK FOR THEIR RELEASE.

CHALKER

YYYY

DSC

FILE

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T125/88

SUBJECT ⊂ MASTER
OPS

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 August 1988

Your Majesty,

Thank you for your recent letter about efforts to bring an end to the Gulf conflict. Events have moved quickly. I was delighted - as I am sure you were - to hear the news last weekend that both governments had been able to agree to a ceasefire to be followed by talks on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 598.

There is still a long way to go. It will be essential that the ceasefire announced for 20 August is effective and that both sides enter in good faith into the talks to achieve the full implementation of all the operative paragraphs of Resolution 598. I entirely agree that what is needed is a full, just and lasting settlement. If fully implemented, SCR 598 provides the basis for that. Meanwhile we shall keep the Armilla Patrol and our minesweepers in the Gulf as long as the threat to shipping remains.

The Secretary General has done a very good job. We shall give him our full and active support in what promise to be testing and complex discussions on the issues which divide the two countries. I shall continue to value your wise

KK

advice during this period, and I am sure that you will use your influence to ensure that this opportunity for peace is seized.

With warm regards.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal

file SD 84

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 August, 1988.

THE GULF

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from the Italian Prime Minister about the situation in the Gulf. As you will see, he suggests that the Western countries should keep in touch about continued presence of their Naval units in the Gulf, and asks for the Prime Minister's views on the way ahead. I should be grateful for a draft reply in due course.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MRS. GREEN

The attached missed the PM's pen. Could you please get it typed up again and approved. We will then telegraph it out, ahead of the signed original.

JANICE RICHARDS
12 August 1988

NB: Mufaxed to Cornwall 1218.

(3)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Although King Hussein's letter to you on Iran/Iraq has been rather overtaken by events, you ought to send a brief reply.

Agree to sign the attached?

"Dear Majesty"
"With warm regards" CDP

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file FD 88

bc. PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 August, 1988.

IRAN/IRAQ: CORRESPONDENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN

Thank you for your letter of 11 August enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to King Hussein's recent letter about the Iran/Iraq conflict. I enclose a text which the Prime Minister has agreed, and which may now be telegraphed to Amman for Mr. Reeve to deliver. A signed copy will follow in due course.

(C.D. Powell)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your recent letter about efforts to bring an end to the Gulf conflict. Events have moved quickly. I was delighted - as I am sure you were - to hear the news last weekend that both governments had been able to agree to a ceasefire to be followed by talks on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 598.

There is still a long way to go. It will be essential that the ceasefire announced for 20 August is effective and that both sides enter in good faith into the talks to achieve the full implementation of all the operative paragraphs of Resolution 598. I entirely agree that what is needed is a full, just and lasting settlement. If fully implemented, SCR 598 provides the basis for that. Meanwhile we shall keep the Armilla Patrol and our minesweepers in the Gulf as long as the threat to shipping remains.

The Secretary General has done a very good job. We shall give him our full and active support in what promise to be testing and complex discussions on the issues which divide the two countries. I shall continue to value your wise

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advice during this period, and I am sure that you will use your influence to ensure that this opportunity for peace is seized.

His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 3/21V

12th August 1988

Dear Bob,

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

You may like to see the attached text of a letter which the US Secretary of Defense has sent to the Defence Secretary, which was passed to us today by the US Embassy. I have asked our officials to consult with yours in preparing a draft reply.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,
John.

(J P COLSTON)
Private Secretary

Bob Pierce Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

THE RT. HON. GEORGE YOUNGER, M.P.
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENSE
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
MAIN BUILDING
WHITEHALL

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

WE ARE MOST HAPPY TO HEAR OF IRAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RES 598, WHICH HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY KHOMEINI PERSONALLY. THIS IS A MAJOR DEVELOPMENT AND A VICTORY FOR ALL OF US. HOWEVER, PEACE HAS YET TO BREAK OUT, AND TOUGH BARGAINING LIES AHEAD. THE PERSISTENCE AND SOLIDARITY DISPLAYED BY THOSE ALLIES WITH NAVAL VESSELS IN THE GULF CERTAINLY CONTRIBUTED TO IRAN'S WELCOME DECISION. WE NEED TO SUSTAIN THIS COOPERATION THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE A DURABLE PEACE.

IN THE AFTERMATH OF IRAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT, WE WILL ALL FACE DOMESTIC PRESSURES TO CUT OUR GULF DEPLOYMENTS. WE INTEND TO RESIST THESE PRESSURES UNTIL REDUCTIONS ARE CLEARLY JUSTIFIED BY THE SITUATION IN THE AREA. WE APPRECIATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO DO SO AS WELL.

IT WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR US TO COORDINATE OUR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS. NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE WILL TAKE TIME AND, IN THE MEANTIME, THE THREAT TO SHIPPING REMAINS. WHILE WE DO NOT SEE THE IRANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF 598 AS A TACTICAL PLOY, PARTICULARLY AFTER KHOMEINI'S PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE DECISION WAS HIS, WE ALSO DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IRAN HAS ABANDONED ITS GOAL OF HEGEMONY IN THE GULF.

IN OUR VIEW, IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT NOTHING BE DONE OR SAID WHICH WOULD SUGGEST THAT OUR NAVAL DEPLOYMENT IS A BARGAINING CHIP TO BE PLAYED IN THE CONTEXT OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN. THIS WOULD BE THE WRONG SIGNAL TO SEND, AND IT WOULD NOT BE AN APPROPRIATE WAY TO RESPOND TO THE IRANIAN DECISION TO ACCEPT 598. THERE SHOULD BE NO SUGGESTION THAT IRAN HAS A LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO DISCUSS THE PRESENCE OF WESTERN NAVAL VESSELS IN THE INTERNATIONAL WATERS OF THE GULF.

LET US CONTINUE TO CONSULT TOGETHER CLOSELY IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

SINCERELY,
FRANK C. CARLUCCI.


15.VIII

94 7405

070

The Italian Ambassador

Italian Embassy
4, Grosvenor Square
London, W. 1.

Dear Charles,

11th August 1988

I take pleasure in sending you herewith enclosed the text of a message, a translation of which is also attached, addressed to the Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP, by the President of the Council of Ministers, Signor Ciriaco De Mita.

Yours sincerely

Boris Biancheri

Mr. Charles Powell
Private Secretary to
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
10, Downing Street
London S.W.1.

We intend to have a deep exchange of views with our main western allies on these problems. One of the main reasons for the success of the mission of our fleets in the Gulf is the close coordination that we have kept between our countries and our fleets in the area. Therefore, I have asked our Defence Minister, Signor Zanone, to keep in close contact with his western colleagues in order to set up the necessary consultations for any future development.

I should be grateful if you would let me know your views on the matters.

Yours sincerely

Signed: Ciriaco De Mita

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 August 1988

Dear Charles,

Iran/Iraq: correspondence with King Hussein

I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to King Hussein's recent letter in which he sought to explain Iraq's position on negotiations in New York for an end to the Gulf conflict. The text of King Hussein's letter was repeated telegraphically to the Prime Minister's party in Brisbane, and FCO telno 30 to Brisbane commented on it and suggested an outline for a reply. I enclose copies of these papers.

King Hussein's letter has been overtaken by the decision of the Iranian and the Iraqi governments to agree to a ceasefire to be followed by direct talks on implementation of SCR 598. The enclosed draft reflects this development. We no longer need to ask King Hussein to urge Saddam to be flexible. The draft also eschews comment on the substance of King Hussein's letter which was an apologia for their previous insistence on direct talks before a ceasefire.

The Jordanian Foreign Minister is planning to visit London on 15 August as representative of the Arab League Follow-up Committee on Iran/Iraq. The original intention was to present Iraq's condition for agreeing to a ceasefire. But Masri is apparently still planning to come. He will be received by Mrs Chalker.

Since writing the letter, King Hussein has mentioned to our Embassy that he would welcome an exchange of views on the Gulf conflict. It is not clear whether this request also pre-dated acceptance of a ceasefire. With a long period of difficult negotiation in prospect in New York and Geneva, it will in any case be useful to keep in contact with King Hussein who has good access in Baghdad. The final paragraph of the draft letter from the Prime Minister reflects this point. Mr Reeve proposes personally to hand over the Prime Minister's reply to King Hussein, and to use this opportunity for a broader discussion of the implications of a ceasefire and settlement. Public holidays and the Muslim weekend means that the earliest opportunity to see the King will be Saturday 13 August.

Yours ever, Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

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DS[illegible]1 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:
PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

BUILDING: ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

Enclosures flag(s).....

TO:
KING HUSSEIN

KKIACC

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

IRAN/IRAQ

Thank you for your recent letter about efforts to bring an end to the Gulf conflict. Events have moved quickly. ~~We quite understood the reasons for the Iraqi Government's cautious initial reaction to Iran's acceptance of Security Council Resolution 598. But~~ I was delighted - as I am sure you were - to hear the news last weekend that both governments had been able to agree to a ceasefire to be followed by talks on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 598.

There is still a long way to go. It will be essential that the ceasefire announced for 20 August is effective and that both sides enter ~~with sincerity~~ in good faith into talks to achieve the full implementation of all the operative paragraphs of ~~the~~ Resolution 598. I entirely agree that what is needed is a full, just and lasting settlement. If fully implemented, SCR 598 provides the basis for that.

HAMACR (1) CONFIDENTIAL

Reasonable we shall help to Amilla Patrol & minesweepers in Gulf ~~with the~~ as long as the threat to shipping remains.

DSR 11C
(Revised 5/87)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
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.....

In Confidence

The Secretary General has done ~~an excellent~~ a very good job. We shall give him our full and active support in what promise to be testing and complex discussions on the issues which divide the two countries. I shall continue to value your wise advice during this period, and I am sure that you will use your influence to ensure that this opportunity for peace is seized.

136760
MDHOAN 1868

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 050100Z BRISBANE
TELNO 30
OF 041630Z AUGUST 88
AND TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE TUNIS, KUWAIT, RIYADH, MOSCOW, PEKING, PARIS

FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY
AMMAN: TELNO 359: IRAN/IRAQ: FOLLOW UP TO SCR 598
1. WE HAVE REPEATED TO YOU FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY AMMAN TELNOS 361 AND 362. THE LATTER CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN FORESHADOWED IN TUR.
2. WE PROPOSE TO PROVIDE A DRAFT REPLY FOR THE PRIME MINISTER ON HER RETURN. DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK THIS WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE REASONS BEHIND IRAQI CAUTION IN RESPONDING TO THE IRANIAN DECISION ON SCR 598, BUT WOULD ENCOURAGE KING HUSSEIN TO URGE THE IRAQIS TO COOPERATE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO ACCEPT HIS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AS THE BEST ROAD TO PEACE. IT WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT RATHER THAN MERELY A CEASEFIRE WHICH MIGHT DO NO MORE THAN GIVE IRAN A BREATHING SPACE. BUT IT WOULD MAKE THE POINT THAT SCR 598 PROVIDES THE ONLY FRAMEWORK FOR THIS, AND THAT ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT AND NOT JUST A CEASEFIRE, IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS, AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A WHOLE, AS HAS BEEN MADE PLAIN TO BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ. IT MIGHT ALSO ACCEPT THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE AN IMPORTANT EARLY ELEMENT IN IMPLEMENTATION TO THE RESOLUTION, BUT THAT THE IRAQI INSISTENCE ON THEM SHOULD NOT IMPEDE PROGRESS ON A CEASEFIRE.
3. FOR AMMAN: PLEASE INFORM THE JORDANIANS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE MRS CHALKER WILL BE PLEASED TO RECEIVE THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION HEADED BY MASRI (YOUR TELNO 359). SHE IS FREE TO DO SO AT 1000AM ON MONDAY 15 AUGUST OR ALTERNATIVELY ON 1100AM ON WEDNESDAY 17 AUGUST. IN TALKING TO THEM YOU MAY DRAW ON THE POINTS IN THE SUGGESTED OUTLINE ABOVE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY.
4. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT KING HUSSEIN AND THE ARAB LEAGUE FOLLOW UP COMMITTEE HAVE COME UNDER PRESSURE AND PERHAPS INDUCEMENT

FROM THE IRAQIS, WHO ARE MOUNTING A CONSIDERABLE DIPLOMATIC COUNTER OFFENSIVE TO WIN SUPPORT FOR THEIR INSISTENCE ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN. (WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SADDAM MAY HAVE PROMISED TO PASS ON TO KING HUSSEIN CHIEFTAIN TANKS CAPTURED FROM THE IRANIANS IN RECENT IRAQI OFFENSIVES). OUR POLICY IS TO MAINTAIN A CONSTRUCTIVE MIXTURE OF PRESSURE ON AND ASSURANCES TO THE IRAQIS TO BRING THEM TO COOPERATE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO ACCEPT A PROCEDURAL COMPROMISE WHICH BRIDGES THE GAP BETWEEN THEIR REQUIREMENT FOR DIRECT TALKS WITH IRAN BEFORE A CEASEFIRE, AND IRAN'S INSISTENCE ON A CEASEFIRE BEFORE DIRECT TALKS. WE UNDERSTAND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS WORKING ON SUCH A FORMULA AT PRESENT WHICH WOULD GO SOME WAY TO MEET THE IRAQIS. THERE IS A LIKELIHOOD OF THE IRAQIS RAISING FURTHER ISSUES EXTRANEOUS TO SCR 598 - EG FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE SHATT-AL ARAB OR THE GULF AND REVISION OF THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT ON BORDERS - AS OBSTACLES TO GETTING PEACE MOVES UNDER WAY. WE MUST PRESS FOR SUCH ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED IN DUE COURSE UNDER OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE RESOLUTION, WHICH THE IRAQIS STILL CLAIM THEY WISH TO SEE IMPLEMENTED IN SEQUENTIAL ORDER OF ITS PARAGRAPHS.

CHALKER

YYYY

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PRIME MINISTER'S SUBJECT & OPS MASTER

PERSONAL MESSAGE

ROUGH TRANSLATION SERIAL No. T123A/88

Dear Prime Minister and friend,

The Government of Italy has learnt, with deep satisfaction and great relief, the news that a definite date has been fixed for the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq. We all hope that, after eight years of war, a formal truce can be finally reached.

Since the beginning Italy has fully supported the role of the United Nations and of their General Secretary Perez de Cuellar during the difficult negotiations held with the two countries at war. The positions held by the western Members of the Security Council have been firm and uniform and have played an important role in order to obtain eventually the success of the peace plan mentioned in the 598 resolution.

The final effort of mediation by the General Secretary has been successful thanks also to the continuous and constant support given by the Security Council to his initiative.

Italy has immediately stated its full availability to be part of the delegation of observers who will be responsible for having the ceasefire respected. Moreover, the Government of Italy will not fail to participate in the reconstruction of Iran and Iraq.

The new perspectives ensuing from the resolution enable us to reconsider the role and functions that the Italian military ships have had so far in the Gulf. As you know, we have already reduced the number of our ships in the area, and this is due to a better planning of the missions assigned to them. However, it seems clear that any further decision will be taken only after the formal truce is agreed between the two countries, with adequate international guarantees.

T E X T

"Signor Primo Ministro e cara Amica,

Il Governo italiano ha appreso con profondo compiacimento e grande sollievo la notizia della definitiva fissazione della data del cessate il fuoco fra Iran e Iraq. Noi tutti ci auguriamo che, dopo otto anni di guerra, una tregua formale possa essere in fine raggiunta.

L'Italia ha fin dall'inizio appoggiato pienamente il ruolo delle Nazioni Unite e del Segretario Generale Perez de Cuellar nel difficile negoziato condotto con le due parti in conflitto. La fermezza e l'uniformità di posizioni mantenute dai membri occidentali del Consiglio di Sicurezza sono stati un importante elemento che hanno permesso di giungere infine al successo del piano di pace indicato dalla 598. Lo sforzo finale di mediazione del Segretario Generale ha potuto essere coronato da successo anche per il continuto e costante appoggio fornito alla sua iniziativa da parte del Consiglio di Sicurezza.

L'Italia si è subito dichiarata pienamente disponibile a partecipare al corpo di osservatori che sarà incaricato di far rispettare il cessate il fuoco. Il Governo italiano non mancherà inoltre di contribuire all'opera di ricostruzione di Iran e Iraq.

Le nuove prospettive che si sono ora aperte permettono di riconsiderare il ruolo e le funzioni che le navi militari italiane hanno finora svolto nel Golfo Persico. Come Lei sa, abbiamo già in parte ridotto il numero delle nostre Unità presenti nella zona, grazie anche ad una migliore programmazione delle missioni loro assegnate. Appare chiaro comunque che qualsiasi ulteriore decisione verrà presa solo dopo che sarà stata

concordata una tregua formale fra i due belligeranti con adeguate garanzie internazionali.

Su questi problemi contiamo di poter avere un approfondito scambio di idee con i nostri principali Alleati occidentali. Una delle ragioni principali del successo della missione delle nostre flotte nel Golfo è stato lo stretto coordinamento sempre mantenuto tra i nostri Paesi ed i nostri Comandi sul posto. Ho richiesto pertanto al Ministro della Difesa Zanone di mantenersi in stretto contatto con i suoi colleghi occidentali, al fine di avviare le consultazioni necessarie per qualsiasi evoluzione futura.

Le sarò grato per ogni valutazione che vorrà farmi direttamente pervenire su questi temi.

Con i miei più cordiali saluti.

Ciriaco De Mita"

Il Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri

Roma, 10 agosto 1988

Signor Primo Ministro e Cara Amica,

il Governo italiano ha appreso con profondo compiacimento e grande sollievo la notizia della definitiva fissazione della data del cessate il fuoco fra Iran e Iraq. Noi tutti ci auguriamo che, dopo otto anni di guerra, una tregua formale possa essere infine raggiunta.

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S.E. Margaret THATCHER
Primo Ministro del Regno Unito di
Gran Bretagna e Irlanda del Nord

L O N D R A

Il Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri

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Le sarò grato per ogni valutazione che vorrà farmi direttamente pervenire su questi temi.

Con i miei più cordiali saluti

CONFIDENTIAL

CF FOR POL
PM's visit to Australia
etc may 1988

Mr ECL
cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 August 1988

Dear Brian,

ARMILLA PATROL

The Prime Minister had a highly successful visit to HMS Manchester on the Armilla Patrol in the Gulf on 9 August and has written to thank those concerned. A number of points emerged from the visit on which the Prime Minister would welcome the Defence Secretary's comments. The main ones are:

- it was represented to the Prime Minister that there was insufficient ammunition available to the ships of the Armilla Patrol for training purposes. The Prime Minister would like to know if this is indeed the case and what steps are in hand to remedy it. Even allowing for expenditure constraints, this would seem a dangerous area in which to economise.

- it was also suggested that the senior officers of the Armilla Patrol were not given any latitude whatsoever on matters of public presentation of their role in the Gulf. Instead every single request, even the smallest, had to be referred to MOD. While it is obviously the case that naval officers must work within very clear guidelines, it seemed to the Prime Minister that the present policy is too restrictive. Again she would welcome the Defence Secretary's comments.

- the point was also made to the Prime Minister that the training margin (which I took to mean the scope to allow officers and men adequate time away from operational duties to undertake training) was inadequate. The Prime Minister would like the Defence Secretary's views on this point as well.

I should underline that these points were elicited under strenuous questioning by the Prime Minister and were not volunteered by the senior officers whom she met.

The Prime Minister was particularly struck by the fact that all to whom she spoke expressed great satisfaction with the Rules of Engagement for the Armilla Patrol. The Prime Minister was also very impressed by the high professional standards and

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state of readiness of HMS Manchester, which she understands is matched by the other ships of the Armilla Patrol and the MCMVs. She would like her impressions, together with her congratulations on the high standards attained, brought to the attention of the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chief of the Naval Staff.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

yours ever,

C. D. POWELL

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

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FM COI LONDON
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TELNO RETRACT Ø2Ø
OF Ø8133ØZ AUGUST 88
AND TO IMMEDIATE COI INFORMATION ITEM ADDRESSEES

FCO NEWS CONFERENCE AT 123Ø HOURS ON MONDAY 8 AUGUST 1988

IRAN/IRAQ

SPOKESMAN ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

''WE WELCOME THE DECISIONS BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAQ AND IRAN TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE TO BE FOLLOWED BY DIRECT TALKS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL.

WE HOPE THAT THIS WILL LEAD TO AN EARLY CEASEFIRE WHICH WILL OPEN THE WAY FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF SCR 598.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO GIVE FULL SUPPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE AND JUST SETTLEMENT AND BRING PEACE AND SECURITY TO THE GULF REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCR 598.''

BRITISH REPRESENTATION IN TEHRAN

SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT A BRITISH DIPLOMAT, MR DAVID REDDAWAY, WOULD GO TO TEHRAN ON 11 AUGUST FOR A BRIEF VISIT. WHILE IN TEHRAN HE WOULD BE A MEMBER OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION OF THE SWEDISH EMBASSY. SPOKESMAN ADDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO BRITISH REPRESENTATION IN TEHRAN SINCE AUGUST 1987 EXCEPT FOR A SHORT PERIOD IN APRIL THIS YEAR. MR REDDAWAY'S PRESENCE WOULD HELP US TO ASSESS IRANIAN ATTITUDES TO ALL ASPECTS OF UK/IRAN RELATIONS.

IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A PERMANENT BRITISH PRESENCE IN TEHRAN, SPOKESMAN SAID IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598, AND ON WHETHER THIS SIGNIFIED A MORE RESPONSIBLE IRANIAN ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIOUR ACROSS THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF UK/IRAN RELATIONS. WE WOULD MONITOR EVENTS CLOSELY. IN ANSWER TO FURTHER QUESTIONS, SPOKESMAN SAID THAT MR REDDAWAY WOULD CERTAINLY RAISE THE CASES OF MR COOPER AND MR NICOLA AND HE WOULD REMIND THE IRANIANS OF OUR VIEW THAT ANY STATE IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE THOSE HOLDING WESTERN HOSTAGES, INCLUDING TERRY WAITE AND JOHN MCCARTHY SHOULD USE THAT INFLUENCE TO SEEK THEIR RELEASE.

ENDS SPOKESMAN

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OF Ø822ØØZ AUGUST 88
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BANGKOK FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY .

MY TELNO 933 : IRAN/IRAQ: FOLLOW-UP TO SCR 598

1. AFTER INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THIS MORNING 8 AUGUST, THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET TO HEAR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT ON THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. THE COUNCIL INVITED THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF IRAN AND IRAQ TO SIT AT THE TABLE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THEN ANNOUNCED THAT A CEASEFIRE WOULD TAKE EFFECT AT Ø3ØØ HOURS GMT ON 2Ø AUGUST 1988, AND THAT HE WOULD INVITE THE TWO SIDES TO DIRECT TALKS UNDER HIS AUSPICES TO BEGIN IN GENEVA ON 25 AUGUST. FULL TEXT OF STATEMENT IN MY FIRST IFT.

2. THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT THEN MADE A STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF COUNCIL MEMBERS AGREED EARLIER IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. TEXT IN MY SECOND I F T.

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BANGKOK FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY

MIPT: IRAN/IRAQ: ANNOUNCEMENT OF CEASEFIRE DATE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 8 AUGUST:

BEGINS
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ARE AWARE THAT, OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS, I HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AIMED AT ACHIEVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598 (1987). AS A RESULT OF THESE EFFORTS AND IN EXERCISE OF THE MANDATE GIVEN TO ME BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I NOW CALL UPON THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ TO OBSERVE A CEASE-FIRE AND TO DISCONTINUE ALL MILITARY ACTION ON LAND, AT SEA AND IN THE AIR AS OF Ø3ØØ GMT ON 2Ø AUGUST 1988. I HAVE BEEN ASSURED BY THE TWO PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT THAT THEY WILL OBSERVE THIS CEASE-FIRE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 598. THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ HAVE ALSO AGREED TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS AS OF THE TIME AND DATE OF THE CEASE-FIRE. I SHALL EXTEND TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ A FORMAL INVITATION TO SEND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES TO GENEVA ON 25 AUGUST FOR DIRECT TALKS UNDER MY AUSPICES. I AM SENDING LETTERS IN THIS CONNECTION TO BOTH SIDES. ON THE DATE OF THE CEASE-FIRE, I SHALL CONFIRM THAT I AM MAKING THE NECESSARY PREPARATIONS AIMED AT CARRYING OUT THE MANDATE ENTRUSTED TO ME BY THE RESOLUTION UNDER THE VARIOUS OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS, IN PARTICULAR PARAGRAPHS 4, 6, 7 AND 8. I NOTE THAT MILITARY ACTIVITY HAS DECREASED IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. I WISH ON THIS OCCASION, HOWEVER, TO APPEAL TO ALL CONCERNED, IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS, TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO REFRAIN FORTHWITH FROM ANY HOSTILE ACTIVITY ON LAND, AT SEA AND IN THE AIR, IN THE PERIOD BEFORE ENTRY INTO EFFECT OF THE CEASE-FIRE. I WISH TO EXPRESS MY DEEPEST APPRECIATION FOR THE EFFORTS MADE BY THE PARTIES, THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHERS OVER THE PAST WEEKS. I AM CONFIDENT THAT I SHALL BE ABLE TO COUNT ON THE CONTINUING COOPERATION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ WHEN WE CONVENE IN GENEVA. THE RESTORATION OF PEACE WILL BRING TO THE PEOPLES OF BOTH COUNTRIES VICTORIES FAR GREATER THAN THOSE OF WAR.
ENDS.

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BANGKOK FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY

MIPT: IRAN/IRAQ: FOLLOW UP TO SCR 598

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING UNIIMOG EXPECTED TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL ON 9 AUGUST:

BEGINS
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 598 (1987), IN PARTICULAR OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 THEREOF,

1. APPROVES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT S/20093.

2. DECIDES TO SET UP IMMEDIATELY, UNDER ITS AUTHORITY, A UNITED NATIONS IRAN-IRAQ MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP (UNIIMOG) AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO THIS EFFECT IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS ABOVE-MENTIONED REPORT.

3. FURTHER DECIDES THAT UNIIMOG SHALL BE ESTABLISHED FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS UNLESS THE COUNCIL DECIDES OTHERWISE:

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL FULLY INFORMED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.
ENDS.

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BANGKOK FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY

MIPT: IRAN/IRAQ: FOLLOW UP TO SCR 598

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO BE MADE ON 8 AUGUST:

BEGINS
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WELCOMES THE STATEMENT IN ITS ENTIRETY JUST MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESOLUTION 598 OF 20 JULY 1987.

THE COUNCIL ENDORSES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ANNOUNCEMENT, (FOLLOWING HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH IRAN AND IRAQ), THAT THE CEASEFIRE DEMANDED IN THE RESOLUTION SHALL COME INTO EFFECT AT ..... HOURS ON ..... AUGUST 1988, AND THAT DIRECT TALKS UNDER HIS AUSPICES BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES SHALL BEGIN ON ..... AUGUST.

THE COUNCIL FIRMLY SUPPORTS THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO BOTH SIDES TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO REFRAIN FROM ALL HOSTILE ACTIVITIES IN THE PERIOD BEFORE THE ENTRY INTO EFFECT OF THE CEASEFIRE.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES ITS DETERMINATION THAT ITS RESOLUTION 598 (1987) BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED AS AN INTEGRAL WHOLE AND REAFFIRMS ITS FULL SUPPORT FOR THE CONTINUING EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THIS END.
ENDS.

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BANGKOK FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY

MIPT: IRAN/IRAQ: FOLLOW UP TO SCR 590

SUMMARY
1. GOULDING GAVE ADVANCE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED UN OBSERVER FORCE TO THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS.

DETAIL
2. AFTER THE INFORMAL MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, GOULDING (ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNED) CALLED A PRIVATE MEETING OF THE FIVE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO GIVE THEM ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE UN OBSERVER FORCE. GOULDING SAID THAT HE HOPED TO LET US HAVE THE FULL TEXT LATE TONIGHT. IF SO I WILL FAX IT. IN THE MEANTIME, YOU MAY WISH TO KNOW THE MAIN POINTS.

3. GOULDING SAID THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NEW UN OBSERVER FORCE, TO BE NAMED UNIIMOG, WOULD BROADLY FOLLOW THOSE FOR UNIFIL (SEE IN PARTICULAR UN DOCUMENT S.12611 OF 19 MARCH 1978). THE SECRETARY-GENERAL INTENDED TO SET UP UNIIMOG AS SOON AS THE DATE FOR THE CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN DECLARED. A RESOLUTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO IT WOULD BE PUT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON TUESDAY 9 AUGUST.

4. GOULDING SAID THAT HAVING ESTABLISHED THE MANDATE AND TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE FORCE, ITS PURPOSES WOULD BE DEFINED AS TO ESTABLISH AGREED CEASEFIRE LINES: TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE: TO INVESTIGATE ANY VIOLATIONS: TO PREVENT - NATURALLY THROUGH NEGOTIATION - ANY ATTEMPTED CHANGE IN THE STATUS QUO PENDING WITHDRAWAL TO INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED FRONTIERS: SUPERVISE THE WITHDRAWAL TO THOSE FRONTIERS: MONITOR THE CEASEFIRE ON EACH SIDE OF THE FRONTIERS: AND OBTAIN AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES TO CERTAIN CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (FOR EXAMPLE SEPARATION OF LAND FORCES, SPECIFICATION OF ZONES IN WHICH MILITARY AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT FLY, AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR MARITIME PATROLLING IN THE MOUTH OF THE SHATT EL ARAB AND SURROUNDING SEAS).

5. THE GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING UNIIMOG AND THE GUIDELINES FOR ITS ACTIVITIES WOULD BROADLY FOLLOW THE UNIFIL PRECEDENT. CONDITIONS FOR ITS EFFECTIVENESS WERE OBVIOUS: THE FULL BACKING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: THE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES: ABILITY TO FUNCTION AS A MILITARY UNIT: AND ADEQUATE FINANCIAL SUPPORT.

6. THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE WOULD ALSO FOLLOW THE UNIFIL PRECEDENT. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS APPROACHING POSSIBLE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS IN CONSULATATION WITH THE TWO SIDES. THE KIND OF PEOPLE HE WANTED WERE COMPETENT OBSERVERS AND SUPPORT STAFF, PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELD OF COMMUNICATIONS. THE CANADIANS WERE READY TO HELP IN THIS RESPECT. UNIIMOG WOULD ALSO NEED A FEW FIXED WING AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS. AFTER ALL THE FRONTIER WAS 1,180 KM LONG. IN ADDITION HE WOULD NEED SMALL AIR AND NAVAL UNITS, SUPPORTING CIVILIAN STAFF, A TRANSPORT FLEET (INITIALLY FROM THE PARTIES CONCERNED BUT LATER FROM ELSEWHERE) AND SUCH FACILITIES AS ACCOMODATION AND OFFICES TO BE SUPPLIED BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED AT THEIR OWN EXPENSE.

7. ON NUMBERS GOULDING SAID HE THOUGHT THAT UP TO 350 OBSERVERS WOULD BE NECESSARY, PLUS AIR, NAVAL, COMMUNICATIONS AND CIVILIAN STAFF. THE HEADQUARTERS WOULD BE SPLIT BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN UNDER THE COMMAND OF A MAJOR GENERAL, WITH AN IRANIAN DETACHMENT AND AN IRAQI DETACHMENT, EACH UNDER THE COMMAND OF A BRIGADIER. STATIC POSTS MIGHT ALSO BE NECESSARY ALONG THE LINES.

8. GOULDING SAID THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WANTED TO SEND OUT TWO ADVANCE PARTIES OF 12 BY AIR ON THE EVENING OF 9 AUGUST. THE OBSERVER FORCE WOULD THEN GRADUALLY BE BUILT UP. HE FORESAW THAT THE FORCE WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR AS LONG AS NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED ON SCR 598, WHICH SUGGESTED A PERIOD OF 12 MONTHS. HE DID NOT YET HAVE A FIGURE FOR LIKELY COSTS. A VITAL POINT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS THAT THE COSTS SHOULD BE BORNE ON THE BASIS OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS (ARTICLE 17 PARA 2 OF THE CHARTER). WHETHER THIS SHOULD BE IN THE REGULAR BUDGET OR THROUGH SOME SPECIAL ACCOUNT WAS YET TO BE DETERMINED.

COMMENT

9. AFTER GOULDING HAD COMPLETED HIS SUMMARY, LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT 12 MONTHS WAS TOO LONG A PERIOD FOR THE FORCE. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GO FOR SIX. WALTERS (U S), BLANC (FRANCE), LI (CHINA) AND I AGREED. SIX MONTHS WAS QUITE ENOUGH. A LONGER PERIOD WOULD GIVE THE POLITICAL IMPRESSION THAT WE EXPECTED NEGOTIATIONS TO BE INTERMINABLE. GOULDING UNDERTOOK TO PUT THIS POINT IMMEDIATELY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

TICKELL

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO DESKBY 080700Z FCO
TELNO 933
OF 080025Z AUGUST 88
INFO IMMEDIATE BANGKOK, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, GULF POSTS, ANKARA, CAIRO, ALGIERS, BONN, ROME
INFO PRIORITY TOKYO, ISLAMABAD, UKMIS GENEVA, TUNIS

BANGKOK FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY

MY TELNO 931: IRAN/IRAQ: FOLLOW UP TO SCR 598

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ANNOUNCE ON 8 AUGUST DATES FOR D-DAY AND START OF DIRECT TALKS. STATEMENT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT ALSO ENVISAGED FOR 8 AUGUST, FOLLOWED BY ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION ON 9 AUGUST ESTABLISHING AN OBSERVER FORCE. INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED.

DETAIL

2. IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL LATE ON 7 AUGUST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTED ON HIS CONSULTATIONS SINCE 26 JULY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598. HE MADE CLEAR THAT THESE HAD INVOLVED CONTACTS WITH OTHERS BEYOND THE TWO SIDES. HE NOW HAD A FAIRLY CLEAR IDEA OF IRANIAN VIEWS ON HIS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN. IN AN ASIDE HE POINTED OUT THAT IRAQ HAD REFUSED TO RECEIVE A COPY OF IT. BUT THE IRAQI PRESIDENT HAD THEN MADE HIS ANNOUNCEMENT OF 6 AUGUST, AND THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ASSURED HIM ON 7 AUGUST (AND WOULD CONFIRM IN WRITING LATER TODAY) THAT HIS GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED DIRECT TALKS IMMEDIATELY AFTER A CEASEFIRE. THE TWO SIDES NOW CONCURRED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD ANNOUNCE A DATE (D-DAY) FOR THE CEASEFIRE AND DEPLOYMENT OF OBSERVERS ALONG THE CEASEFIRE LINES, AND INVITE THEM TO JOIN HIM FOR FACE TO FACE TALKS UNDER HIS AUSPICES TO PURSUE THE NECESSARY ''DISCUSSIONS AND CONSULTATIONS''.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONTINUED THAT HE SOUGHT THE VIEWS OF BOTH SIDES ON THE COMPOSITION, COMMAND AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE OBSERVER FORCE (UNIIMOG). HIS REPORT WOULD ISSUE SHORTLY (SEE MY IFT). TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE, AND HE TRUSTED THAT THE COUNCIL COULD TAKE THE DECISIONS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THE FORCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE HOPED THIS COULD BE SIMULTANEOUS WITH HIS ANNOUNCEMENT OF D-DAY AT A FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ON 8 AUGUST. AT THE SAME MEETING HE WOULD ANNOUNCE THE DATE OF THE START OF DIRECT TALKS AND MAKE AN APPEAL TO THE TWO SIDES TO REFRAIN FROM HOSTILE ACTIVITIES ON LAND, AT SEA, AND IN THE AIR IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO D-DAY. HE HOPED THE COUNCIL WOULD MAKE A SIMILAR APPEAL.

4. IN THE ENSUING DISCUSSION SOME MEMBERS, NOTABLY YORK (FRG), NOGUEIRA-BATISTA (BRAZIL) AND KAZEMBE (ZAMBIA) ON BEHALF OF THE NON-ALIGNED REVEALED DISQUIET AT THE SPEED OF DEVELOPMENTS. BUT IT WAS AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD MEET IN FORMAL SESSION IN THE AFTERNOON OF 8 AUGUST. A DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL TO WELCOME THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NAMING OF D DAY, THE DATE FOR DIRECT TALKS, AND HIS APPEAL FOR RESTRAINT IN THE MEANTIME WOULD BE CONSIDERED AT AN INFORMAL MEETING IN THE MORNING. THE PRESIDENT LATER CIRCULATED A DRAFT (TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT). SINCE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT ON UNIIMOG WAS NOT EXPECTED UNTIL LATER, SOME MEMBERS FELT IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THE COUNCIL TO TAKE A DECISION ON A RESOLUTION TO ESTABLISH THE FORCE AS EARLY AS 8 AUGUST. THE PRESIDENT (CHINA) NONETHELESS CIRCULATED A DRAFT RESOLUTION. THE TEXT IS IN MY THIRD IFT. THE COUNCIL WILL AIM TO ADOPT THIS RESOLUTION OR SOMETHING LIKE IT ON 9 AUGUST.

5. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE ON THE DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT BY Ø8133ØZ AND FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION BY Ø817ØØZ.

COMMENT

6. AFTER THE MEETING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOOK ME ASIDE TO SAY THAT HE HAD HAD A DIFFICULT DAY. THERE HAD BEEN NO PROBLEM WITH THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER: BUT THE IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAD CLEARLY BEEN UNHAPPY. THE CHINESE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL LATER AMPLIFIED THIS POINT. HE TOLD ME THAT THE IRAQI HAD BEEN INSISTING THAT PRESIDENT KHOMENI MAKE SOME PUBLIC DECLARATION COMPARABLE TO THAT MADE BY PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN OF IRAQ. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD ARGUED THAT THIS WAS SCARCELY CONCEIVABLE. HE HAD INSISTED THAT VELAYATI'S STATEMENT TO HIM, SHORTLY TO BE CONFIRMED BY LETTER, WAS ALL THAT WAS POSSIBLE OR NECESSARY.

7. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

TICKELL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD

FOLLOWING FROM CHARLES POWELL, AIRBORNE.

IRAN/IRAQ

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK CLOSELY AND IS PLEASED THAT WE ARE PLAYING SUCH AN ACTIVE ROLE. AS WELL AS BEING HELPFUL TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS EFFORTS TO GET A CEASE-FIRE, OUR ACTIVITY IS CLEARLY EARNING US CONSIDERABLE CREDIT WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES. WE SHOULD CONTINUE.

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS NOTED IN PARTICULAR THE TWO TELEGRAMS REPORTING SIR CRISPIN TICKELL'S TWO MEETINGS WITH PRINCE BANDAR AND THE SUGGESTION OF A NEW RESOLUTION. HER VIEW IS THAT IT IS CERTAINLY WORTH CONSIDERING A FOLLOW-UP RESOLUTION OR STATEMENT AS A MEANS OF EXERTING PRESSURE ON IRAQ. WHETHER IT SHOULD EMPLOY CHAPTER VII LANGUAGE IS DEBATABLE: GIVEN THE FAILURE TO ENFORCE SCR 598 ITSELF, THIS MIGHT ACTUALLY DIMINISH ITS CREDIBILITY. THE REAL LEVERAGE WILL PRESUMABLY COME FROM IRAQ'S WISH TO AVOID BEING PUT IN THE DOCK. TIMING IS ALL-IMPORTANT IN THAT RESPECT: WE NEED TO USE THE PROSPECT OF A FURTHER RESOLUTION OR STATEMENT AT THE MOMENT MOST LIKELY TO PUSH THE IRAQIS INTO A MORE REASONABLE ATTITUDE (AND THE LATEST ASSESSMENT OF THEIR MILITARY PREPARATIONS IS NOT ENCOURAGING). UKMIS NEW YORK WILL BE BEST PLACED TO JUDGE THIS.

I REALISE THAT WE ARE NOT NECESSARILY FULLY UP TO DATE ON DEVELOPMENTS. BUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S INSTINCT IS THAT WE SHOULD GO ALONG WITH PRINCE BANDAR'S SUGGESTION AT THE RIGHT MOMENT AND SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE US AND FRANCE IN THIS DIRECTION. YOU WILL WISH TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT.
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INFO

FOLLOWING FROM CHARLES POWELL, AIRBORNE

IRAN/IRAQ

The Prime Minister has been following developments in New York closely and is pleased that we are playing such an active role. As well as being helpful to the UN Secretary-General in his efforts to get a cease-fire, our activity is clearly earning us considerable credit with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. We should continue.

The Prime Minister has noted in particular the two telegrams reporting Sir Crispin Tickell's two meetings with Prince Bandar and the suggestion of a new resolution. Her view is that it is certainly worth considering a follow-up resolution or statement as a means of exerting pressure on Iraq. Whether it should employ Chapter VII language is debatable: given the failure to enforce SCR 598 itself, this might actually diminish ~~the~~ its credibility. ~~of any follow-up resolution or statement.~~ The real leverage will presumably come from Iraq's wish to avoid being put in the dock. Timing is all-important in that respect: we need to use the prospect of a further resolution or statement at the moment most likely to push the Iraqis into a more reasonable attitude (and the latest assessment of their military preparations is not encouraging). UKMIS New York will be best placed to judge this.

I realise that we are not necessarily fully up to date on developments. But the Prime Minister's instinct is that we should go along with Prince Bandar's suggestion at the right moment. You will wish to take this into account.

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O/P

& Should encourage the US AND ~~&~~ France in this ~~&~~ direction.

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INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, JEDDA
INFO PRIORITY OTHER GULF POSTS, ANKARA, CAIRO, ALGIERS, BONN, ROME
INFO PRIORITY TOKYO, ISLAMABAD, UKMIS GENEVA, TUNIS

BRISBANE FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY

MIPT: AND JEDDA TELNO 87 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ: MEETING WITH SAUDIS

SUMMARY
1. PRINCE BANDAR, WHO IS CONSULTING THE FIVE INDIVIDUALLY, SUGGESTED A NEW RESOLUTION TO ENDORSE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IMPLEMENTATION PLAN. HE SAID HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT AND WELCOMED THE FIVE'S DEMARCHE TO IRAN AND IRAQ.

DETAIL
2. PRINCE BANDAR (SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON) ASKED FOR A MEETING WITH ME TODAY. HE WAS ALSO SEEING THE AMBASSADORS OF THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. OUR CONVERSATION LASTED ABOUT AN HOUR.

3. PRINCE BANDAR SAID THAT HE WAS UNDER PERSONAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM KING FAHD TO PROMOTE A CEASEFIRE AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598. AS I ALREADY KNEW, HE HAD BEEN ACTIVE IN THIS RESPECT. HE WANTED TO TALK TO ME NOT ONLY ON ACCOUNT OF OUR ROLE AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES WHICH HAD BECOME MANIFEST IN OUR COMMITMENT TO SAUDI DEFENCE THROUGH OUR RECENT ARMS DEAL. KING FAHD HAD PARTICULAR RESPECT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. HE HAD GREATLY APPRECIATED WHAT SHE HAD SAID AT HER MEETING WITH THE EMIR OF BAHRAIN.

4. PRINCE BANDAR SAID THAT AT PRESENT THERE WAS SUCH A CRISS-CROSSING OF EMISSARIES THAT IT WAS HARD TO KEEP TRACK OF THEM. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN WAS IN NO DOUBT OF THE VIEWS OF KING FAHD, PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND OTHERS. HE DREW MY ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERS AT BAGHDAD ON 2 AUGUST, AND THE WORDS USED ON THE NEED TO APPLY SCR 598 IN SEQUENCE: IN OTHER WORDS A CEASEFIRE FIRST. I SAID THAT THE STATEMENT WAS ALSO REMARKABLE FOR WHAT HAD BEEN LEFT OUT: ANY ENDORSEMENT OF IRAQI DEMANDS FOR A FACE TO FACE MEETING WITH THE IRANIANS BEFORE A CEASEFIRE.

5. PRINCE BANDAR SAID THE PROBLEM WAS WHERE WE WENT NEXT. HE HAD WELCOMED THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE FIVE WHICH HE REALIZED HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO PROVIDE THE IRAQIS WITH SOME MEASURE OF REASSURANCE. WHEN I SAID THAT TARIQ AZIZ HAD RECEIVED ME WELL BUT HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT ROUGH WITH MY U S COLLEAGUE ON THE SUBJECT THIS MORNING, PRINCE BANDAR SAID THAT EITHER TARIQ AZIZ HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO BE TOUGH, OR, ANOTHER HYPOTHESIS, HE HAD RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS AT ALL. BUT IRAQI FEARS WERE GENUINE. THE IRAQIS WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF AFTER A CEASEFIRE THE IRANIANS JUST SAT PAT AND REFUSED TO ENTER INTO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD DONE NOTHING OVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS TO ENFORCE SCR 598. THE IRAQIS FEARED THAT THE SAME WOULD FOLLOW IF THE IRANIANS ENJOYED THE BENEFIT OF A CEASEFIRE BUT NEGOTIATED FOREVER OVER A SETTLEMENT. HE ADDED THAT HE KNEW VERY WELL WHY THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD NOT MOVED TO ENFORCEMENT MEASURES. IT WAS NOT OUR FAULT. BUT IN VIEW OF RECENT SOVIET MANOEUVRES, IRAQI FEARS MIGHT BE WELL FOUNDED.

6. PRINCE BANDAR SAID THAT FOR THIS REASON HE HAD BEEN TURNING OVER IN HIS MIND POSSIBLE IDEAS FOR PROVIDING THE IRAQIS WITH YET MORE ASSURANCE. ONE WAS FOR A NEW RESOLUTION, TO FOLLOW UP SCR 598, WHICH WOULD ENDORSE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PLAN OF IMPLEMENTATION, DEMAND THAT IT BE FULLY AND COMPREHENSIVELY ADHERED TO, AND LOOK TO ACTION UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER AGAINST WHICHEVER OF THE PARTIES FAILED TO RESPECT IT. PRINCE BANDAR SAID HE HAD PUT THIS THOUGHT TO GENERAL WALTERS (U S) WHO HAD NOT BEEN NEGATIVE. HE HAD LIKEWISE SPOKEN TO THE SOVIET CHARGE, WHO HAD PROMISED SOVIET IDEAS ON IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, CONCEIVABLY BY TOMORROW, 5 AUGUST: AND HE PROPOSED TO PUT IT TO MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE LATER THIS EVENING. WHAT DID I THINK?

7. I REPLIED THAT HMG WAS GRATEFUL FOR SAUDI EFFORTS WHICH WENT IN THE SAME SENSE AS OUR OWN. THE TEXT AGREED BY THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS HAD GONE A LONG WAY TO MEET IRAQI CONCERNS. MY FIRST THOUGHT WAS THAT WE SHOULD ALLOW SOME TIME FOR ITS EFFECTS TO SINK IN BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER. THE IDEA OF SOME SORT OF DECLARATION OR RESOLUTION TO ENDORSE THE TIMING OF A CEASEFIRE, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PLAN, AND THE NEED FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598 WAS AN OBVIOUS POSSIBILITY. WE WOULD NOT WISH TO DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT HAVE THE EFFECT, HOWEVER INADVERTENT, OF WEAKENING SCR 598 ITSELF. THE INVOCATION OF CHAPTER VII WOULD GIVE A NEW DIMENSION TO THE PROBLEM, AND I KNEW THAT HMG WOULD WISH TO THINK VERY CAREFULLY BEFORE PROCEEDING IN THAT DIRECTION.

8. PRINCE BANDAR WENT ON TO DISCUSS SOME OF THE PERSONAL FACTORS INVOLVED. I REGRETTED THAT TARIQ AZIZ SEEMED TO BE DEVELOPING SOME PERSONAL ANIMUS AGAINST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. PRINCE BANDAR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS SO. TARIQ AZIZ SHOULD CHANGE HIS MIND. HE WOULD MAKE THIS POINT EMPHATICALLY TO HIM WHEN HE SAW HIM TONIGHT. I REMARKED THAT TARIQ AZIZ MIGHT FEEL THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD PUT PRESSURE ON HIM: BUT FOR HIS PART THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WHO WAS A MAN OF PEACE, HAD NOT APPRECIATED THE WAY IN WHICH TARIQ AZIZ HAD TWICE REFUSED EVEN TO ACCEPT THE PLAN OF IMPLEMENTATION WHICH PEREZ DE CEULLAR HAD TRIED TO GIVE HIM. IF THERE WAS A PERSONAL PROBLEM, IT HAD TO BE RESOLVED. PRINCE BANDAR WARMLY AGREED.

9. PRINCE BANDAR ADMITTED THAT THOSE HE KNEW LEAST WELL WERE NOT SURPRISINGLY THE IRANIANS. THEY WERE MOST UNRELIABLE. HE CITED BESHERATI'S ASSURANCES THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MORE ATTACKS ON SHIPPING, AND THE ATTACK ON A NORWEGIAN SHIP THIS MORNING. THE DIFFICULTY WAS TO IDENTIFY WHO HELD POWER AND WHEN. WHAT DID I THINK OF VELAYATI? WHAT WAS MY INTERPRETATION IN THE CHANGE IN THE IRANIAN ATTITUDE? I FOREBORE TO SAY MORE THAN THAT FROM MY EXPERIENCES OF TWO MEETINGS VELAYATI HAD BEEN A PROFESSIONAL AND CIVILIZED INTERLOCUTOR. THE IRANIANS MIGHT HAVE USED THE AIRBUS INCIDENT AS A COVER FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF SCR 598 (AND BY IMPLICATION OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL): BUT IN FACT THEIR POSITION HAD BEEN EVOLVING FOR SOME TIME. FOR MONTHS THEY HAD BEEN EXPRESSING WILLINGNESS TO COMPLY WITH SCR 598, EVEN IF THEY COULD NOT OPENLY ACCEPT IT FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS. NOW THEY HAD DECIDED TO GO THE WHOLE WAY. FOR THAT REASON WE FELT THAT THEY HAD OPENED UP OPPORTUNITIES WHICH MUST NOT BE MISSED.

10. PRINCE BANDAR SAID THAT WAS THE ESSENTIAL SAUDI MESSAGE TO THE IRAQIS. PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES MIGHT NOT RECUR. ON LEAVING I MENTIONED TO PRINCE BANDAR THAT I WOULD BE SEEING THE IRANIANS TONIGHT. HE ASKED ME TO PASS A VERY CLEAR MESSAGE TO THEM: THAT THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN AMONG THE FIRST PUBLICLY TO WELCOME IRANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF SCR 598, AND WERE DOING ALL THEY COULD TO HELP IN BRINGING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598.

COMMENT

11. PRINCE BANDAR APPROACHED ALL THESE PROBLEMS WITH RELISH AS WELL AS CONFIDENCE. MORE THAN ONCE HE ALLOWED HIS EXASPERATION WITH THE IRAQIS TO SHOW. HE WAS WELL AWARE OF SOVIET MANOEUVERING BUT UNSURE WHETHER THE IRAQIS OR THE RUSSIANS THEMSELVES HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE. EITHER WAY THE RUSSIANS HAD HAD THEIR FINGERS BURNT.

12. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AT LEAST PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE IDEAS, ALREADY CURRENT ELSEWHERE, ON SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEW RESOLUTION ON THE LINES DESCRIBED IN PARA 6 ABOVE. THE CHINESE PRESIDENCY MAY SOON BE UNDER PRESSURE TO DISCUSS THEM WITH COUNCIL MEMBERS IF THE PRESENT IMPASSE CONTINUES.

TICKELL

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INFO PRIORITY OTHER GULF POSTS, ANKARA, CAIRO, ALGIERS, BONN, ROME
INFO PRIORITY TOKYO, ISLAMABAD, UKMIS GENEVA, TUNIS

BRISBANE AND KUALA LUMPUR FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY

MY TELNO 924: IRAN/IRAQ: MEETING WITH PRINCE BANDAR

SUMMARY
1. THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON TOLD ME THAT PRINCE SAUD IS TO SEE SADDAM HUSSEIN IN BAGHDAD ON 6 AUGUST, AND TRAVEL TO NEW YORK ON 7 AUGUST. HE ASKED FOR OUR HELP IN FINDING MEANS FOR THE IRAQIS TO CLIMB DOWN FROM THEIR INSISTANCE ON PRIOR DIRECT TALKS, AND OBVIOUSLY THOUGHT SOME PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE AT LAST.

DETAIL
2. PRINCE BANDAR CALLED ON ME ON 5 AUGUST. HE SAID HE HAD SEEN TARIQ AZIZ SINCE OUR TALK THE PREVIOUS DAY (MY TUR) AND HAD AGAIN ARGUED FOR IRAQ NOT TO LOSE THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE. HE HAD AGAIN ARGUED AGAINST INSISTENCE ON DIRECT TALKS BEFORE A CEASEFIRE. TARIQ AZIZ HAD SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE ARGUMENTS, BUT ASKED TO BE ALLOWED A COUPLE MORE DAYS. THE DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN IN BAGHDAD.

3. PRINCE BANDAR THEN TOLD ME THAT KING FAHD HAD BEEN IN TOUCH AT LEAST FIVE TIMES WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHOSE LATEST RESPONSE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGING. THE KING HAD ACCORDINGLY DECIDED TO SEND THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER TO BAGHDAD TO SEE SADDAM HUSSEIN PERSONALLY IN THE AFTERNOON OF 6 AUGUST. PRINCE SAUD WOULD THEN TRAVEL TO NEW YORK (WITH A REFUELLING STOP IN PARIS) ARRIVING ON 7 AUGUST. PRINCE BANDAR'S OWN TASK MEANWHILE WAS TO KEEP TARIQ AZIZ UP TO THE MARK. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD PERSUADED TAQIQ AZIZ TO SEE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH SOME BALANCE WITH THE LATTER'S MEETINGS WITH VELAYATI (TARIQ AZIZ DULY CALLED ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TODAY AND I GATHER FROM THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR HAD A VERY GOOD TALK WITH HIM).

4. I TOLD PRINCE BANDAR THAT I HAD USED ARGUMENTS SIMILAR TO HIS WITH TARIQ AZIZ IN URGING HIM NOT TO INSIST ON FACE TO FACE TALKS BEFORE A CEASEFIRE. WE HAD TO STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN GIVING THE IRAQIS TIME TO FIND A WAY TO CLIMB DOWN, AND MAKING USE OF PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES. I WAS SURE THAT THE CHINESE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE THIS IN MIND AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON. PRINCE BANDAR ASKED IF WE COULD TREAT IN STRICT CONFIDENCE WHAT HE HAD JUST TOLD ME, BUT ALSO ASKED THAT I FIND A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY TO THE IRAQIS HOW FIRMLY THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN ARGUING THEIR CASE. THIS WPS IMPORTANT IN ORDER TO PREPARE THE IRAQIS FOR THE NECESSARY CLIMB DOWN FROM THEIR POSITION.

5. I SAID THAT I HAD PASSED ON HIS SUGGESTIONS FOR A POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO ENSURE COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598. PRINCE BANDAR SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY HAD A REPLY FROM THE RUSSIANS. THE SOVIET CHARGE HAD CALLED ON HIM AT 0900 HOURS THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WELCOMED THE IDEA, INCLUDING THAT OF USING CHAPTER 7 LANGUAGE. LOZINSKIY HAD REMARKED THAT THIS TIME THE RUSSIANS DID NOT WANT CO BE BEHIND EVERYBODY ELSE.

6. PRINCE BANDAR SAID THAT HE WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH WALTERS (U S) AND ME OVER THE WEEKEND. HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THINGS WOULD GO. HIS OWN VIEW WAS THAT WHEN SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED, IT MIGHT BE BETTER FOR THEM TO TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE NEW YORK. HERE THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE, AND THE FEVER OF PRESS INTEREST, WERE TOO GREAT. HE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD INFORMED HIM THAT VELAYATI HAD EXPRESSED THE WISH TO LEAVE NEW YORK FOR A WHILE TO RECEIVE THE OMANI AND ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS IN TEHRAN. BUT THE SECRETARY-GRNERAL HAD PERSUIDED HIM NOT TO GO.

COMMENT
7. PRINCE BANDAR OBVIOUSLY THOUGHT THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE AT LAST. HE TOOK SOME CREDIT FOR THE MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TARIQ AZIZ THIS MORNING. HE WAS FREE WITH HIS CRITICISMS OF THE IRAQIS, BUT ASKED OUR HELP IN FINDING MEANS TO HELP THEM CLIMB DOWN.

TICKELL

MIPT. to Canberra, Paris, Moscow, Peking, Tunis, Riyadh.

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PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T209/88.

SUBJECT a MASTER OPS.

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TO DESKBY 041330Z FCO
TELNO 362
OF 041257Z AUGUST 88
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD

MIPT: IRAN/IRAQ

LETTER FROM THE KING TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

BEGINS:

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

THE SEVEN-MEMBER ARAB COMMITTEE, WHICH WAS FORMED BY THE ARAB LEAGUE TO PURSUE THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, OF WHICH JORDAN IS A MEMBER, HAS JUST ENDED ITS LATEST MEETING IN BAGHDAD. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED A REPORT ON THE COMMITTEE'S DELIBERATIONS, AS WELL AS A SPECIAL ENVOY FROM PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN OF IRAQ.

I AM TAKING THE LIBERTY OF WRITING TO YOU TO CONVEY THE DETAILS OF THE IRAQI POSITION REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598.

AS YOU KNOW, IRAQ ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION AS SOON AS IT WAS ADOPTED. IT TOOK IRAN ONE WHOLE YEAR TO DECLARE ITS ACCEPTANCE. IRAQ BELIEVES THAT IRAN'S ACCEPTANCE IS A TACTICAL MOVE AIMED AT HALTING THE DETERIORATION WHICH IS ENGULFING IRAN INTERNALLY AND ON THE BATTLEFRONT, AND WHICH IS STARTING TO THREATEN THE SURVIVAL OF THE REGIME ITSELF.

IRAQ HAS DEEP SUSPICIONS ABOUT IRAN'S REAL INTENTIONS TO ACCEPT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 598 IN ALL ITS PARTS AND IN THEIR SEQUENCE. IRAQ BELIEVES THAT ALL IRAN WANTS IS A CEASE-FIRE TO ENABLE IT TO RECOUP ITS LOSSES, REORGANIZE ITS FORCES, REBUILD ITS STRENGTH, AND BREAK ITS INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION, SO THAT IT WILL BE IN A POSITION TO RESUME THE FIGHTING FROM A STRONGER POSITION. IRAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF WITHDRAWAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS OF WAR WORK IN ITS FAVOUR NOW, DUE TO THE LOSSES IT SUFFERED ON THE GROUND IN THE RECENT BATTLES.

WHAT IS REQUIRED IS AN END TO THE WAR, A TERMINATION OF ALL HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF AND AN ARRIVAL AT A NEGOTIATED PEACEFUL, PERMANENT AND JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. THIS WILL LEAD TO STABILITY AND TRANQUILITY IN THE REGION, AND WILL HOPEFULLY BE A PRECEDENT TO SOLVING OTHER REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IRAQ IS FULLY COMMITTED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 598 IN ALL ITS PARTS, AND IS WILLING TO ENTER INTO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN IMMEDIATELY TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN GOOD FAITH AND ARRIVE AT A PEACE TREATY. THESE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WILL TEST IRAN'S REAL INTENTIONS, AND ENSURE THAT IRAN IS NOT MERELY SEEKING A CEASE-FIRE, ESPECIALLY SINCE KHOMEINI HIMSELF HAS DECLARED PUBLICLY THAT ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 598 DOES NOT MEAN ENDING THE WAR.

WE SHARE IRAQ'S SUSPICIONS OF IRAN'S REAL INTENTIONS AND MOTIVES. NEVERTHELESS, IRAN'S DECLARED ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 598 IS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT ON WHICH WE SHOULD CAPITALIZE TO ARRIVE AT THE DESIRED OBJECTIVE OF A PERMANENT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD AVOID ANY PREMATURE ACTION ON THE PART OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH MIGHT COMPLICATE, PREJUDICE OR DERAIL THE PEACE PROCESS. WHAT IS NEEDED IS NOT MERELY A CEASE-FIRE THAT WILL BE A PRELUDE TO THE RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING, NOR A STATE OF NO-WAR NO-PEACE WHICH WILL ENSURE A CONTINUED STATE OF TENSION AND INSTABILITY IN THE WHOLE REGION, BUT A GENUINE PERMANENT PEACE.

ON THE BASIS OF THE CONTINUOUS CONSULTATION BETWEEN US, I FELT IT MY DUTY TO CONVEY TO YOU OUR VIEWS REGARDING THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON THE IRAN-IRAQ SITUATION AND TO SEEK YOUR VALUABLE SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE IN BRINGING THE TWO PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. MAY I URGE YOU, AS A FRIEND FOR WHOM I HAVE THE GREATEST RESPECT AND ADMIRATION, TO APPRECIATE IRAQ'S POSITION. YOUR POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION IN ENSURING THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL DOES NOT ONLY CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE MIGHT CONVINCE IRAN OF THE NECESSITY FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM PEACEFULLY.

PLEASE ACCEPT MY GRATITUDE AND SINCERE BEST WISHES.

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OF 032315Z AUGUST 88
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING,
INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, AMMAN, ANKARA, CAIRO, ALGIERS, BONN, ROME
INFO PRIORITY TOKYO, ISLAMABAD, UKMIS GENEVA, CANBERRA

MIPT: IRAN/IRAQ: FOLLOW - UP TO SCR 598

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DEMARCHE MADE BY THE FIVE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF IRAN AND IRAQ ON 3 AUGUST:

BEGINS
THE FIVE WISH TO EMPHASISE TO IRAN AND IRAQ THAT THEY VIEW THE CEASEFIRE DEMANDED IN SCR 598 AS THE FIRST STEP WHICH MUST LEAD WITHOUT DELAY TO A NEGOTIATED, COMPREHENSIVE, JUST, HONOURABLE AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THEY ARE DETERMINED THAT THE RESOLUTION BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED AS AN INTEGRATED WHOLE: ANY INCOMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.
THE FIVE ARE CONVINCED THAT DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE PARTIES UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT AN EARLY STAGE WOULD ASSIST THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION.
THE FIVE WISH TO REAFFIRM THEIR FULL SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS.
ENDS.

TICKELL

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TOTAL P.04

// I realise that we are not
necessarily fully up to date
on developments. But the Prime Minister's
strict is that we should go ~~along~~
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negotiations at the right moment. I am
still keen to take this into account.
account.

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INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, AMMAN, ANKARA, CAIRO, ALGIERS, BONN,
INFO PRIORITY ROME, TOKYO, ISLAMABAD, UKMIS GENEVA, CANBERRA

MIPT: IRAN/IRAQ: FOLLOW-UP TO SCR 598: MEETING WITH IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. TARIQ AZIZ WAS APPRECIATIVE OF THE FIVE'S AND OUR EFFORTS TO PROVIDE REASSURANCE ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION OFF ALL PARTS OF SCR 598. HE SOUGHT FOR SOME FURTHER COMMITMENT BY THE FIVE BUT I DECLINED TO INTERPRET THE FIVE'S TEXT.

DETAIL

2. TARIQ AZIZ READ THE FIVE'S TEXT CAREFULLY AND ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION. WHAT DID QUOTE AT AN EARLY STAGE UNQUOTE (PARAGRAPH 2) MEAN? I DECLINED TO INTERPRET WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED BY THE FIVE, BUT COMMENTED THAT IT REFLECTED IRAQ'S CONCERN FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598, AND RESPONDED TO IRAQ'S EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR FACE TO FACE TALKS. I ADDED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO MEET LATER IN THE WEEK TO CONSIDER THE REPORT OF THE UN TECHNICAL TEAM. I EXPECTED THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS TO TAKE A VIEW SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE FIVE. THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT (CHINA) MIGHT DECIDE TO ACQUAINT THEM WITH THE CONTENTS OF THE FIVE'S TEXT.

3. TARIQ AZIZ THEN PRESSED FOR CLARIFICATION OF WHAT QUOTE NOT ACCEPTABLE UNQUOTE (PARAGRAPH 1) MEANT. I AGAIN DECLINED TO INTERPRET THE PHRASE, WHICH SPOKE FOR ITSELF, AND REFERRED TO PREVIOUS EXAMPLES OF WHAT THE FIVE HAD MADE CLEAR WAS UNACCEPTABLE. TARIQ AZIZ REPLIED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE FIVE OR THE COUNCIL AS A WHOLE WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY LAG IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ELEMENTS OF SCR 598. BUT WHAT IF IRAN DRAGGED ITS FEET OR WAS DISHONEST ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION? HOW READY WOULD THE FIVE BE TO ACT WHEN PROBLEMS AROSE, AS HE EXPECTED THEY WOULD? I SAID THIS WAS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. THE PHRASE IN THE TEXT HAD BEEN AGREED BY ALL FIVE GOVERNMENTS. THE ACTION THEY MIGHT TAKE WOULD BE DETERMINED IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME. THE FIVE HAD DONE THEIR BEST TO MEET IRAQ'S DESIRE FOR REASSURANCE. IT WAS AS FAR AS ANY ONE COULD BE EXPECTED TO GO.

4. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, TARIQ AZIZ SAID THAT IRAQ HAD NOT CHANGED ITS POSITION IN ANY WAY, AND STILL BELIEVED IN THE STRICT SEQUENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598. IT WOULD NOT USE THE CARDS OF CEASEFIRE OR WITHDRAWAL TO IMPOSE CHANGES CONTRARY TO THE UN CHARTER OR INTERNATIONAL LAW. OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1, 2 AND 3 OF SCR 598 MET IRAQ'S REQUIREMENTS, BUT WERE NOW PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT TO IRAN. HE WISHED TO BE SURE THAT THE ENSUING PARAGRAPHS (FOR EXAMPLE, NUMBERS 4 (POWS) AND 8 (REGIONAL SECURITY)) WOULD BE PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED, THAT IRAQI SHIPS COULD SAIL THE GULF, AND THAT EXTERNALLY INSPIRED AGITATION OF THE SORT WHICH HAD SPARKED THE WAR WOULD NOT BE REPEATED. HE DWELT AT LENGTH ON THE NOW FAMILIAR IRAQI ARGUMENT THAT FACE TO FACE TALKS WERE ESSENTIAL TO PROVE IRANIAN SINCERITY.

5. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I TOLD TARIQ AZIZ THAT I THOUGH THE ISSUE OF DIRECT TALKS HAD NOW BECOME EXAGGERATED. OF COURSE THEY HAD TO HAPPEN. BUT AT EXACTLY WHAT POINT IT WAS NOT CLEAR. WIDER EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THAT DIRECT TALKS NEEDED CAREFUL PREPARATION AND DID NOT NECESSARILY PROVIDE A GUARANTEE OF THE SINCERITY OF THE INTERLOCUTOR. (THE IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, WHO WAS PRESENT, AGREED STRONGLY.) THE STEP THE FIVE HAD TAKEN IN ACTION OVER THE TEXT WAS A MEASURE OF THEIR CONCERN TO UNDERSTAND AND MEET IRAQI ANXIETIES. TARIQ AZIZ REPLIED WARMLY THAT THE IRAQI SIDE APPRECIATED WHAT THE FIVE AND I PERSONALLY WERE TRYING TO DO. I SAID IT WAS VITAL TO TAKE OPPORTUNITIES WHILE THEY EXISTED. THEY MIGHT NOT RECUR. SOME MICHT BE ONLY TOO HAPPY TO FISH IN TROUBLED WATERS. THERE WAS A DANGER OF UNFORESEEN SETBACKS AND THINGS GOING WRONG. TARIQ AZIZ DID NOT DEMUR.

COMMENT

6. TARIQ AZIZ WAS RELAXED AND AFFABLE. HE SEEMED GENUINELY TO APPRECIATE THE STEP THE FIVE HAD TAKEN. HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT IRAQ WAS PURSUING ANY OPTION OTHER THAN TRYING TO WEAR THE IRANIANS DOWN ON THE QUESTION OF DIRECT TALKS. BUT IS WAS INTERESTING THAT HE SAID NOTHING ABOUT SUCH TALKS HAVING TO PRECEDE A CEASEFIRE.

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INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, AMMAN, ANKARA, CAIRO, ALGIERS, BONN
INFO ROME, TOKYO, ISLAMABAD, UKMIS GENEVA, CANBERRA

MIPTS: IRAN/IRAQ: FOLLOW-UP TO SCR 598: MEETING WITH IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

SUMMARY
1. DEMARCHE MADE TO IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER. NEW COMPLAINT OF IRAQI USE OF CW.

DETAIL
2. AFTER SPEAKING TO VELAYATI AS IN MY THIRD IPT, I SAID THAT THE AIM OF THE FIVE WAS TO HELP FIND A WAY THROUGH THE PRESENT BLOCKAGE AND TO FACILITATE MATTERS. I ADDED THAT I WAS SPEAKING TO HIM ON BEHALF OF THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TOO.

3. VELAYATI SAID THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS SINCERE IN WANTING FULLY TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION: WE COULD RELY ON THEM. IRAN WOULD BE WILLING TO BEGIN FACE TO FACE TALKS AFTER THE CEASEFIRE AND PRELIMINARY STEPS. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE IRAQI INSISTENCE FOR SUCH TALKS AT THE OUTSET. HE APPRECIATED THE POSITION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, OUR EFFORTS AND OUR SINCERITY. IF BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ WERE SINCERE, THERE WOULD BE NO OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WITH WHOM HE WAS READY TO COOPERATE FULLY.

4. HE RAISED BRIEFLY THE QUESTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SAYING THAT HE HAD WRITTEN THAT DAY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COMPLAINING OF A FURTHER IRAQI ATTACK ON 2 AUGUST IN WHICH OVER A THOUSAND CIVILIANS HAD BEEN INJURED BY MUSTARD GAS. HE HOPED THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD DEAL WITH THE QUESTION. I SAID I EXPECTED THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE THIS MATTER UP WITH HIM. THE BRITISH POSITION WAS CLEAR AND WELL KNOWN (HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS). I REMINDED HIM OF YOUR SPEECH TO THE SPECIAL SESSION IN JUNE.

5. I ALSO MENTIONED BRIEFLY OUR PROPOSAL TO SEND A DIPLOMAT TO TEHRAN. VELAYATI SAID HE WANTED TO ESTABLISH NORMAL RELATIONS WITH US.

6. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

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M I P T : MEETING WITH IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER : SOVIET MANOEUVRES

SUMMARY

1. VALAYATI WARNED US OF SOVIET MOVES TO ARRANGE DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ ON SOVIET SOIL.

DETAIL

2. AT THE END OF THE MEETING (DESCRIBED IN M I P T) VELAYATI ASKED ALL HIS ADVISERS TO LEAVE EXCEPT FOR MAHALLATI, THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HERE.

3. VELAYATI SAID HE SUSPECTED A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT WAS UNDER WAY TO SABOTAGE SCR 598. VORONTSOV, THE SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, HAD VISITED TEHRAN RECENTLY AFTER GOING FIRST TO BAGHDAD AND DAMASCUS. HE HAD TOLD VELAYATI THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD MADE PLANS TO ATTACK IRAN AND OCCUPY TRACTS OF ITS TERRITORY. IRANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF SCR 598 HAD SPOILT THESE PLANS, AND THE IRAQIS HAD NOT KNOWN HOW TO REACT. BUT IF THE IRANIANS AGREED, THE RUSSIANS WERE NOW READY TO INVITE IRANIAN AND IRAQI REPRESENTATIVES FOR DIRECT TALKS IN THE SOVIET UNION (MOSCOW, BAKU AND KIEV HAD BEEN MENTIONED). VELAYATI SAID HE SUSPECTED SOME IN THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO UNDERMINE THE UNITED NATIONS AND SCR 598 (HE DREW PARALLELS WITH U S BEHAVIOUR OVER PALESTINE AND THE PERSIAN GULF, WHEN THEY HAD TRIED TO GO IT ALONE RATHER THAN IN AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK). HE ALSO SUSPECTED THE RUSSIANS MIGHT WANT TO PLAY THE ROLE OF SOLE MEDIATOR.

4. VELAYATI WONDERED WHETHER THE IRAQIS AND PERHAPS THE RUSSIANS MIGHT NOT PREFER TO TAKE THINGS OUT OF THE HANDS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AND TO USE THE WAR AS A BARGAINING CHIP TO HELP SOLVE OTHER PROBLEMS. BUT UNTIL RECENTLY THE RUSSIANS HAD ALWAYS URGED IRAN TO ACCEPT SCR 598: VORONTSOV'S APPROACH SEEMED ODD. PERHAPS THEIR DEFEAT OR DISAPPOINTMENT IN AFGHANISTAN, WHICH COULD HAVE GIVEN THEM A ROUTE TOWARDS THE GULF, HAD INDUCED

THEM TO TRY TO FIND AN ALTERNATIVE WAY TO A WARM WATER PORT. VELAYATI ADDED THAT AMONG THE TANKS AND ARTILLERY CAPTURED FROM THE IRAQIS IN THE RECENT FIGHTING WERE NEW HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED IMPORTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THE IRANIANS ESTIMATED THAT SOME 2,000 MAINLY NEW TANKS HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE RECAPTURE OF FAO, INCLUDING T-72S AND THEY BELIEVED T-84S: CERTAINLY SOME WERE RESISTANT TO RPG-7S.

5. VELAYATI WENT ON THAT HE HAD THANKED VORONTSOV FOR HIS OFFER, BUT SAID NO MORE. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID ONLY A FEW TOP OFFICIALS IN IRAN WERE AWARE OF VORONTSOV'S APPROACH, AND THAT WE WERE THE FIRST FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TO HAVE BEEN INFORMED. AS COORDINATORS OF THE FIVE IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD KNOW WHAT THE RUSSIANS WERE UP TO. I THANKED VELAYATI FOR HIS CONFIDENCE AND PROMISED TO REPORT IT.

COMMENT

6. AS VELAYATI HIMSELF REMARKED, THE STORY CERTAINLY SQUARES WITH THE LINE ON DIRECT TALKS WHICH TARIQ AZIZ HAS BEEN TAKING HERE. THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION THAT THE IRAQIS WERE TRYING TO ESCAPE FROM THE STRAIT-JACKET OF SCR 598, AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SPOKE OPAQUELY TO ME IN PRIVATE LATE TODAY ABOUT MOVES BY VORONTSOV IN MOSCOW WITH THE IRAQIS AND IRANIANS. NOR IS IT DIFFICULT TO UDERSTAND WHY THE RUSSIANS MIGHT HAVE WANTED TO MAKE SUCH A SUGGESTION TO THE IRANIANS (THOUGH NO CHANGE IS APPARENT IN THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET MISSION HERE). I SUPPOSE THAT VORONTSOV MIGHT HAVE BEEN FLYING A TRIAL BALLOON: BUT IF SO HE MUST HAVE REALIZED THE RISKS OF A LEAK AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFIDENCE IN SOVIET INTENTIONS AND POLICY.

7. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHY VELAYATI HAS GIVEN US THIS INFORMATION. WHILE HE STRESSED ITS CONFIDENTIALITY, HE DID NOT ASK THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE PASSED TO OTHERS, AND IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT HE WANTS US TO PASS IT ON TO THE AMERICANS AND PERHAPS THE FRENCH. FOR THE MOMENT I SHALL SAY NOTHING UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTED.

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YOUR TELNO 394: MEETING WITH IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. VELAYATI DESCRIBED CURRENT IRANIAN VIEWS ON THE NEGOTIATIONS: NO MAJOR NEW INSIGHTS. BILATERAL ISSUES COVERED FULLY.

DETAIL
2. I SAW THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON 28 JULY. THE CONVERSATION LASTED FOR AN HOUR AND A QUARTER.

IRAN/IRAQ.

3. I RECALLED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WISHED TO SEE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED AND THE WAR BROUGHT TO AN END. WE HAD DONE WHAT WE COULD IN DRAFTING SCR 598 AND IN URGING BOTH SIDES TO SETTLE. THERE WAS SATISFACTION AT IRAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION AND AT THE OPENING THIS PROVIDED. I INVITED VELAYATI TO GIVE ME AN ACCOUNT OF THE CURRENT TALKS.

4. VELAYATI SAID HE WAS AWARE OF THE BRITISH POSITION AND OF BRITAIN'S MAJOR CONTRIBUTION AS THE COORDINATOR OF THE FIVE. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE TIME OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON THE AIRBUS TRAGEDY THAT IF THE LATTER DID HIS BEST THEN, IT MIGHT PAVE THE WAY TO FURTHER COOPERATION OVER MORE IMPORTANT SUBJECTS THAN THE AIRBUS. AFTER HIS RETURN TO TEHRAN, QUOTE OUR IMAM DECIDED ON THE CHANGE UNQUOTE. DESPITE THEIR WELL KNOWN RESERVATIONS ON SOME PARAGRAPHS OF SCR 598, THE IRANIANS HAD DECIDED TO ACCEPT IT AS AN INTEGRATED WHOLE, AS THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IMPLEMENTATION PLAN. BUT SINCE THEN IRAQ HAD INTENSIFIED THE WAR. THE IRANIANS HAD SUSPECTED THEIR INTENTION HAD BEEN TO OCCUPY KHORRAMSHAHR AND USE IT AS A BARGAINING CHIP,

BUT FORTUNATELY THE IRANIAN FORCES HAD BEEN ABLE TO PUSH THEM BACK. BUT THE IRAQIS HAD CROSSED THE BORDER IN BAKHTARAN AND WERE STILL THERE. HE HAD HEARD FROM TEHRAN THE DAY BEFORE THAT THEY HAD USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS ON AN EVEN BIGGER SCALE THAN AT HALABCHA. IRAQI STATEMENTS OVER THE LAST TWO DAYS ABOUT THEIR INTENTION TO WITHDRAW HAD PROVED FALSE AND HE HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THEY WERE LIARS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD CHECKED AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT SATELLITE COVERAGE PROVED IRANIAN CLAIMS. VELAYATI SAID HE THOUGHT THE IRAQIS WERE LOOKING FOR A PRETEXT NOT TO IMPLEMENT SCR 598.

5. ASKED WHAT WERE THE OTHER POINTS OF DIFFICULTY FOR IRAN, VELAYATI SAID THAT ABOVE ALL PRESSURE WAS NEEDED TO PERSUADE IRAQ TO WITHDRAW TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDERS. IF THE IRAQIS WERE SINCERE, THEY SHOULD COOPERATE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. DIRECT TALKS WERE ANOTHER IRAQI PRETEXT: WERE HE TO MEET WITH TARIQ AZIZ AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE SAME TABLE, A QUARREL WOULD ENSUE WHICH WOULD THREATEN THE NEGOTIATIONS. PROXIMITY TALKS WERE A BETTER OPTION. IF AFTER A PERIOD THINGS SEEMED TO BE GOING WELL AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THOUGHT IT USEFUL, HE FORESAW NO PROBLEM IN DIRECT TALKS INVOLVING HIMSELF, TARIQ AZIZ AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. HE CLAIMED NOT TO UNDERSTAND THE IRAQI CONTENTION THAT DIRECT TALKS WERE A TEST OF IRANIAN SINCERITY. IRAN HAD NO RESERVATIONS ABOUT SCR 598. HE HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HE WOULD STAY IN NEW YORK UNTIL THE LATTER FELT THE CURRENT PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS HAD ENDED: HE DID NOT WANT TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. (THE SECRETARY-GENERAL LATER TOLD ME HE HAD JUST THREATENED TO LEAVE IN 3 OR 4 DAYS IF NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT BEGIN.)

6. VELAYATI CONTINUED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD ASKED ABOUT THE NATIONALITIES OF THE MEMBERS OF AN IMPARTIAL BODY AND HAD TOLD HIM HIS IDEAS: THEY CAUSED HIM NO PROBLEM. HE HAD HAD SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT TIMING, FOR EXAMPLE HOW LONG AFTER THE CEASEFIRE THE IMPARTIAL BODY WOULD START WORK. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD SUGGESTED THREE WEEKS, WHICH WAS ACCEPTABLE TO IRAN.

7. I RECALLED OUR WISH TO SEE SCR 598 FAITHFULLY IMPLEMENTED. WE SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: AS COORDINATOR OF THE FIVE, I COULD SAY THAT ALL THE FIVE SHARED THIS POSITION. (I HINTED AT WILLINGNESS TO PASS A MESSAGE FROM HIM TO THE FOUR BUT HE DID NOT TAKE IT UP.) WHILE A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT POINTS - BORDERS, THE IMPARTIAL BODY, WITHDRAWAL, PRISONERS, AN OBSERVER FORCE - COULD

ALL BE DEALT WITH IN TIME, AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE WAS CRUCIAL. IF WE COULD HELP PROMOTE A SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION, I WAS AT HIS DISPOSAL.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

8. I SAID I WAS INSTRUCTED TO SPEAK ABOUT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, ON WHICH I WOULD BE FRANK AND COMPLETE. I THEN SPOKE AS IN YOUR TUR. I RECALLED THAT YOU HAD SET OUT THE BRITISH POSITION TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 30 JUNE. WE ACCEPTED THE REALITY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN AND IRAN'S POSITION IN THE AREA. WE HAD HAD LONG AND DEEP RELATIONS WITH IRAN (VELAYATI INTERJECTED THEY WENT BACK OVER FIVE CENTURIES, AND CITED THE NAME OF THE FIRST BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO TEHRAN). OUR RELATIONSHIP RECENTLY HAD BEEN BUMPY, BUT WE HOPED TO SEE IT PUT RIGHT. WHILE WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE RECENT COMPENSATION AGREEMENT AND BY IRAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF SCR 598, CERTAIN THINGS WERE NECESSARY FOR A CIVILIZED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US.

9. FIRST WE EXPECTED THAT ATTACKS ON NEUTRAL SHIPPING IN THE GULF WOULD END AND THAT WITH A CEASEFIRE NAVAL CONDITIONS WOULD RETURN TO NORMAL. WE WERE CONCERNED AT VIOLATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY, AND AT THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF COOPER AND NICOLA. THEY HAD NEVER BEEN CHARGED AND WE DID NOT HAVE FULL CONSULAR ACCESS TO THEM. IRAN SHOULD EITHER TRY THEM OR RELEASE THEM: THIS WAS A MATTER OF KEEN PUBLIC CONCERN IN BRITAIN. NEXT, HUMAN RIGHTS WERE OF CONCERN TO US, IN IRAN AS ELSEWHERE. WE WERE EQUALLY CONCERNED ABOUT APPARENT IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAD USED TERRORISM AND KIDNAPPING: THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO HAD HAD PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF TERRORIST ATTACK, FOUND THIS ABHORRENT. WE WERE CONCERNED TOO ABOUT THE APPARENT USE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE OPPONENTS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION ABROAD. WE ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES, WHICH ENJOYED GOOD RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN. FINALLY WE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY VELAYATI'S STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ON HOSTAGES. WE HAD REPEATEDLY SOUGHT IRANIAN HELP OVER WAITE, KEENAN AND MCCARTHY, WHO WERE APPARENTLY HELD BY HIZBOLLAH IN LEBANON. OUR FIRM POSITION ON HOSTAGE TAKING WAS WELL KNOWN, BUT WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR HELP IN SECURING THEIR RELEASE. I SUMMED UP THAT DESPITE OUR RESPECT FOR IRAN AND THE REVOLUTION, ALL THESE MATTERS HAD SOURED OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE NOW WANTED TO IMPROVE IT ON A BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT.

10. VELAYATI (WHO HAD TAKEN NOTES) SAID THAT AS REGARDS DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY, THE FIRST STEP HAD BEEN THE BRITISH ACTION AGAINST THE

IRANIAN DIPLOMAT IN MANCHESTER ACCUSED OF SHOPLIFTING, WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY THE POLICE AND BEATEN. EXPULSION WOULD HAVE BEEN ENOUGH. THE TEHRAN INCIDENT (HE PRESUMABLY MEANT CHAPLIN) HAD HAPPENED AFTER THAT, AND (HE IMPLIED) WE HAD TO MAKE ALLOWANCE FOR CURRENT REVOLUTIONARY FERVOUR IN TEHRAN. HE HOPED THAT AFTER THIS NOT VERY GOOD PERIOD, BOTH SIDES WOULD TREAT EACH OTHER'S DIPLOMATS BETTER. ON NICOLA AND COOPER, VELAYATI SAID WE WERE RIGHT: THEY SHOULD BE TRIED OR RELEASED. HE WOULD PERSONALLY FOLLOW UP THESE CASES. ON ATTACKS AGAINST NEUTRAL SHIPPING, A WAR WAS GOING ON, AND HE COULD NOT ACCEPT IRAQI ATTACKS ON IRANIAN VESSELS (WITH EG FRENCH WEAPONS, INCLUDING RENTED SUPER-ETENDARDS) WITHOUT RESPONDING. HE HOPED A CEASEFIRE WOULD BRING A SOLUTION. IRAQ WAS NOT ACTING ALONE.

11. ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN, VELAYATI SAID THE BAHA'IS COULD NOT RETURN TO THE POSITION THEY HAD HELD BEFORE THE REVOLUTION IN IRAN. THERE WERE JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN DEPUTIES IN THE MAJLIS, BUT BAHA'IS WERE DIFFERENT, A POLITICAL AS WELL AS A RELIGIOUS GROUP, WITH CLOSE FOREIGN CONNEXIONS INCLUDING WITH ISRAEL. WE SHOULD FORGET ABOUT BAHA'IS WHO WERE TRYING TO SABOTAGE THE REVOLUTION. WHY WAS REAGAN SO CONCERNED ABOUT THEM QUES MORE GENERALLY, HE SAW NO REASON FOR IRAN TO FOLLOW WESTERN CRITERIA ON HUMAN RIGHTS. ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY WAS DIFFERENT. OFTEN AFTER REVOLUTIONS HUMAN RIGHTS SUFFERED (HE CITED ALGERIA). AS FOR OUR ALLEGATIONS OF IRANIAN COMPLICITY IN TERRORISM AND HOSTAGE TAKING, THERE WAS NO PROOF. BUT HE HOPED IRAN COULD BE OF MORE HELP IN FUTURE ON HOSTAGES.

12. VELAYATI CONTINUED THAT IRAN HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH OMAN, QATAR AND THE UAE AND ''MORE OR LESS'' WITH BAHRAIN. AFTER THE WAR, SHE COULD PERHAPS ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT. THERE WERE SPECIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE SAUDIS. IRAN HAD TRIED TO FOSTER RELATIONS WITH THE GCC BUT OMANI SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY IRAQ ON THE GROUNDS THAT IRAN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CREATE DIVISIONS BETWEEN ARABS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE IRANIANS WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL THEIR NEIGHBOURS. THOSE WITH TURKEY AND PAKISTAN WERE GOOD, AS HE HOPED THEY WOULD BE WITH AFGHANISTAN IN FUTURE. THEY HAD ''NORMAL'' RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WERE TRYING TO STRENGTHEN TIES WITH THE GULF.

13. I REPLIED THAT WE DIFFERED IN OUR INTERPRETATION OF WHAT HAPPENED TO OUR DIPLOMATS IN TEHRAN AND TO THE IRANIAN VICE CONSUL IN MANCHESTER, WHO DID NOT ENJOY DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY. I NOTED WHAT VELAYATI HAD SAID ON THE GULF. AS TO THE BAHA'IS, HE

SHOULD BE AWARE THAT RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WAS DEEPLY ENGRAINED IN BRITISH OPINION. ONE MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT OF THE UN HAD BEEN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH LAID DOWN UNIVERSAL NORMS WHICH ALL, INCLUDING IRAN, HAD ACCEPTED. SO WE DID NOT HAVE TO ARGUE OVER CRITERIA. I PROMISED TO TAKE NOTE OF THE REST AND TO REPORT.

COMMENT

14. THE MEETING WAS FRIENDLY. VELAYATI'S ACCOUNT OF THE TALKS ON IRAN/IRAQ WAS SOMEWHAT CURSORY, BUT HE SEEMED TO WARM UP AS WE PROCEEDED. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN WHAT I HAD TO SAY ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, AND I THINK FELT IT HAD BEEN USEFUL TO AIR OUR DIFFERENCES. HE MADE NO REFERENCE TO ANY FOLLOW UP EXCEPT TO WELCOME A REMARK THAT WE SHOULD REMAIN IN TOUCH IN NEW YORK.

15. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

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M I P T: IRAN/IRAQ: FOLLOW UP TO SCR 598

SUMMARY
1. SECRETARY-GENERAL SEEKS OUR HELP IN SHIFTING SADDAM HUSSEIN.

DETAIL
2. AFTER THE MEETING OF MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DESCRIBED IN M I P T I CALLED ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. I DESCRIBED MY EARLIER CONVERSATIONS WITH VELAYATI AND TARIQ AZIZ (MY TELS NOS 895 AND 890). THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT THE YUGOSLAV AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS HAD BOTH SEEN TARIQ AZIZ AND HAD BEEN TOUGH WITH HIM: THE U S AMBASSADOR WAS SEEING HIM SHORTLY AND HE EXPECTED HIM TO BE EQUALLY STERN. BUT TARIQ AZIZ WAS UNDER VERY STRICT INSTRUCTIONS FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN AS REGARDS DIRECT TALKS: HE HOPED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT WEIGH IN TO URGE SADDAM HUSSEIN TO CHANGE HIS MIND. HE HAD ASKED THE FRENCH AND THE SAUDIS TO ACT SIMILARLY.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID HE PROPOSED TO SEE THE IRAQIS OVER THE WEEKEND. HE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE AND KEEP UP AN APPEARANCE OF MOVEMENT. A MEETING OF THE FIVE WOULD BE USEFUL IN ORDER TO KEEP THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TOGETHER: HE FEARED THE IRAQI POSITION MIGHT UNDERMINE THEIR UNITY. BUT HE DID NOT ASK FURTHER ACTION OF THE FIVE AT PRESENT.

COMMENT
4. TODAY WAS SET ASIDE FOR ASSESSMENT, EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND REAFFIRMATION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE MESSAGE FROM THE COUNCIL AS A WHOLE IS CLEAR AND UNANIMOUS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I AM IN TOUCH WITH THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS WITH A VIEW TO ARRANGING A MEETING OF THE FIVE FOR TOMORROW 29 JULY OR EARLY NEXT WEEK. FOR THE MOMENT WE ARE KEEPING IN RESERVE THE IDEA OF A COLLECTIVE DEMARCHE OF THE FIVE

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TO THE IRAQI AND IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS OR IN CAPITALS. IN FACT THE IRAQIS AND IRANIANS HAVE SEEN MOST OF US INDIVIDUALLY, AND CAN HAVE NO DOUBT OF OUR VIEWS. FROM HERE IT IS HARD TO ASSESS HOW BEST TO PUT FURTHER PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN.

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MY TELNO 888: IRAN/IRAQ: FOLLOW-UP TO SCR 598

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY-GENERAL BRIEFED SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS ON HIS TALKS SO FAR. COUNCIL EXPRESSED CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR HIM IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS MANDATE UNDER SCR 598.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY-COUNCIL CONVENED PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ON 28 JULY TO ENABLE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT IN CONFIDENCE ON THE TALKS SO FAR. HE REPEATED TO THEM WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME YESTERDAY OF THE IRAQI POSITION (MY TELNO 886). HE ADDED THAT HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT TARIQ AZIZ MIGHT BE TRYING TO LIMIT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ROLE TO THAT OF A PROVIDER OF GOOD OFFICES RATHER THAN A MEDIATOR, WHILE AVOIDING DISCUSSION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND ALLOWING THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE BETWEEN THEMSELVES.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT HE HAD READ TO BOTH THE IRAQI AND THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS A PAPER ON THE FOLLOWING LINES. ON D-DAY (WHENEVER THAT TOOK PLACE) HE WOULD SET UP APPROPRIATE MECHANISMS TO CONSULT WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ AS CALLED FOR IN SCR 598 FOR THE PURPOSE OF STARTING DETAILED WORK ON A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES OF ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER. (THIS, HE REMARKED, FOLLOWED OPERATIVE PARA 4 OF SCR 598). HE WOULD ALSO CONSULT ON THE ASSIGNMENT AND DESPATCH OF A TEAM OF EXPERTS TO STUDY THE QUESTION OF RECONSTRUCTION (OPERATIVE PARA 7). WITH REGARD TO OPERATIVE PARA 8 (REGIONAL SECURITY), HE WOULD CONSULT WITH IRAN AND IRAQ AND WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN THE REGION WITH A VIEW TO SETTING UP, AGAIN

ON D-DAY, A MECHANISM TO EXAMINE MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE REGION. WITH RESPECT TO PARA 6 IMPARTIAL BODY) HE WOULD STATE PUBLICLY ON D-DAY THAT HE HAD BEGUN HIS PREPARATIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE IMPARTIAL BODY, WHICH WOULD THEN BE SET UP SHORTLY THEREAFTER. A TIMETABLE FOR THE COMPLETION OF ALL THIS WORK WOULD ALSO BE SET.

4. AS REGARDS OPERATIVE PARAS 1, 2 AND 3 (CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWAL, OBSERVERS AND PRISONERS OF WAR), THE BEGINNING OF THE WITHDRAWAL TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES WOULD START SOME FEW DAYS AFTER D-DAY AND SHOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN ''VERY, VERY FEW WEEKS.'' THE SUPERVISION OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY UN OBSERVERS WHO WOULD BECOME OPERATIVE AS OF D-DAY. THE RELEASE AND REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS WOULD BEGIN FOLLOWING THEIR COMPREHENSIVE REGISTRATION BY THE ICRC IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION AND THE PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY THE ICRC.

5. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COMMENTED THAT, AS COUNCIL MEMBERS COULD SEE, HIS IDEA WAS TO BRING ALL THE MAIN NEGOTIATING ISSUES TOGETHER (OPERATIVE PARA 5, CALLING FOR RESTRAINT, WAS ADDRESSED TO ALL STATES NOT PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, AND HE HAD NOT THEREFORE GONE INTO IT MUCH WITH VELAYATI AND TARIQ AZIZ). THE CEASEFIRE WOULD COME FIRST. HE EXPECTED THE TECHNICAL TEAM TO RETURN TO NEW YORK BETWEEN MONDAY AND WEDNESDAY NEXT WEEK, AND HE WOULD CONSIDER THE DATE OF D-DAY IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR REPORT. THE REST OF HIS PROPOSALS, AS SET OUT ABOVE, WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC ON D-DAY.

6. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WENT ON TO DESCRIBE TARIQ AZIZ'S RESPONSE TO THESE IDEAS. THE LATTER HAD SAID THAT AS A STARTER, IRAQ HAD TO HAVE FACE TO FACE TALKS WITH IRAN UNDER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S AUSPICES. INVITED TO HEAR THE IRANIAN REACTION, TARIQ AZIZ HAD REFUSED: HE WOULD LISTEN TO THE IRANIANS HIMSELF WHEN THEY WERE AT THE SAME TABLE. HE HAD THEN GONE ON TO SPEAK OF IRAQI MISTRUST OF IRANIAN INTENTIONS.

7. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONTINUED THAT, AT A LONG MEETING ON THE EVENING OF 27 JULY, VELAYATI HAD PRODUCED A POINT BY POINT REACTION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEAS AND SOUGHT CLARIFICATIONS. HE HAD ASKED WHY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS PROPOSING A DELAY IN WITHDRAWAL, WHICH HE (VELAYATI) BELIEVED SHOULD START AT THE SAME TIME AS THE CEASEFIRE: BUT AFTER LISTENING TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EXPLANATIONS, HE HAD SAID HE WAS CONTENT. VELAYATI HAD HAD NO PROBLEM OVER THE PROPOSALS ON THE CEASEFIRE

AND OBSERVERS. ON PRISONERS OF WAR, HE HAD MADE A COMPLICATED POINT ABOUT CIVILIAN PRISONERS HELD BY IRAQ SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT (INCLUDING ONE IRANIAN MINISTER). ON THE IMPARTIAL BODY, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD EXPLAINED THAT HE WOULD BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR ITS ESTABLISHMENT ON D-DAY AND WOULD DECIDE ON NAMES LATER, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES. VELAYATI HAD MADE NO DIFFICULTY OVER THIS, AND HAD AGREED ON ALL THE OTHER POINTS TOO.

8. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCLUDED THAT HE EXPECTED NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT FROM IRAQ UNTIL DIRECT TALKS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. HE HAD RAISED THE SUBJECT REPEATEDLY BUT IN LOW KEY WITH VELAYATI IN AN ATTEMPT TO BRING HIM ROUND: HIS RESPONSE HAD NOT BEEN NEGATIVE.

9. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE SAID HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE TIMETABLE SET OUT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS TOO LONG. COULD THE CEASEFIRE NOT BE DISCUSSED BEFORE THE TECHNICAL TEAM RETURNED FROM TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD QUES IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP UP MOMENTUM.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AGREED HE COULD INFORM COUNCIL MEMBERS OF THE TEAM'S CONCLUSIONS BEFORE THEIR RETURN.

10. THE PRESIDENT LATER CONVENED ANOTHER INFORMAL MEETING TO DISCUSS WHAT IF ANYTHING THE COUNCIL MIGHT DO. HE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS CONCERNED (IN THE LIGHT OF THE IRAQI POSITION ABOUT DIRECT TALKS TO PRESERVE HIS CENTRAL ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND HAD ASKED IF THE COUNCIL AGREED THAT SCR 598 COULD NOT BE COMPROMISED. BOTH THE IRANIANS AND IRAQIS HAD EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COUNCIL'S DISCUSSIONS. THE LATTER HAD CLARIFIED THEIR POSITION ON FACE TO FACE TALKS: THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT DIRECT TALKS AS A PRECONDITION TO NEGOTIATIONS, AND WOULD NOT AGREE TO SUCH TALKS UNTIL A CEASEFIRE WAS IMPLEMENTED.

11. WALTERS (UNITED STATES) URGED THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, BUT THAT WE SHOULD EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR HIM. I SPOKE IN SUPPORT, AS DID YUGOSLAVIA (FOR THE NON-ALIGNED), CHINA, THE SOVIET UNION, JAPAN AND FRANCE. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD TELL THE PRESS THAT WE HAD MET AND EXPRESSED OUR FULL SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS MANDATE UNDER SCR 598, AND THAT HE SHOULD SPEAK TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ACCORDINGLY.

12. SEE MIFT.

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MY TELNO 888: IRAN/IRAQ: MEETING WITH IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. TARIQ AZIZ EMPHASISED IRAQI DESIRE FOR PEACE AND INSISTENCE ON FACE TO FACE TALKS AS A MEANS TO PIN THE IRANIANS DOWN: IRAQ WANTED A QUICK CEASEFIRE, AND A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT GUARANTEED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

DETAIL

2. I SAW THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER AT HIS REQUEST ON 28 JULY. TARIQ AZIZ OPENED BY ASKING MY VIEW ON THE CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATIONS. SPEAKING PERSONALLY I SAID THAT THERE NOW SEEMED TO BE A GENUINE OPPORTUNITY TO END THE WAR. THE IRANIAN DECISION TO ACCEPT SCR 598 MIGHT HAVE BEEN SUDDEN. BUT PERHAPS THE AIRBUS INCIDENT HAD PROVIDED THE OCCASION. WE NOW HAD TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT. WE HOPED IRAQ WOULD FULFIL ITS REPEATED UNDERTAKINGS TO WITHDRAW FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY. PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO GET IN THE WAY. THE IDEA OF FACE TO FACE TALKS WAS NOT IN SCR 598. WE ACCEPTED THAT THEY MIGHT BE NECESSARY SOONER OR LATER BUT DID NOT SEE WHY THE IRAQIS WANTED THEM IMMEDIATELY. NOR WERE WE CLEAR WHY THE IRAQIS ON THE ONE HAND WANTED A GENERAL AGREEMENT ON ALL POINTS IN SCR 598 BEFORE A CEASEFIRE, AND ON THE OTHER CONTINUED TO DEMAND THEIR APPLICATION IN SEQUENCE. PARA 1 OF SCR 598 ESTABLISHED THAT AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE WAS THE FIRST STEP.

3. TARIQ AZIZ SAID THAT IRAQ WAS SINCERE IN ITS DESIRE TO END THE WAR. IT HAD ACCEPTED ALL PREVIOUS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON THE SUBJECT, AND HAD ACCEPTED SCR 598 IMMEDIATELY. THE IRANIANS HAD ACCEPTED SCR 598 NOT BECAUSE THEY WERE PERSUADED OF THE WISDOM OF PEACE BUT BECAUSE OF THEIR MILITARY COLLAPSE. THEY HAD LIKENED

THEIR POSITION TO TAKING POISON, WHEREAS THE IRAQ PEACE WAS SWEET. IT THEREFORE MADE SENSE TO BE CAUTIOUS. HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO WORK FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE IRANIAN POSITION AND TO SEEK GUARANTEES FROM IRAN AND FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT A CEASEFIRE WOULD BE REAL AND LASTING. HE NEEDED TO FORM HIS OWN PERSONAL IMPRESSION OF IRANIAN SINCERITY. HE ALSO NEEDED TO BE SURE THAT BOTH PARTIES UNDERSTOOD THE SUBSTANCE OF SCR 598 IN THE SAME WAY. BY A CEASEFIRE, FOR EXAMPLE, IRAN MIGHT MEAN ONLY AN END OF HOSTILITIES. BUT IRAQ WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF A CEASEFIRE. THEIR ONLY WATERWAY TO THE GULF, SHATT-AL-ARAB, COULD EASILY BE BLOCKED. THEY WANTED TO BE ABLE TO USE THE WATERWAY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE CEASEFIRE TOOK EFFECT. THEY ALSO NEEDED ARRANGEMENTS AND A TIMETABLE FOR THE RETURN OF IRAQI PRISONERS OF WAR WHICH WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO IRANIAN MANOEUVERING. THEY NEEDED TO KNOW HOW IRAN INTERPRETED PARA 4 OF SCR 598, AND TO AGREE ON PRINCIPLES OR GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ALSO NEEDED TO KNOW IRAN'S PERCEPTION OF PARA 6 OF SCR 598 (THE IMPARTIAL BODY). THIS WAS WHY IRAQ WAS ASKING FOR FACE TO FACE TALKS. IF THE IRANIANS SHOWED GOOD FAITH, THESE COULD GO VERY QUICKLY.

4. TARIQ AZIZ SAID THAT THE IRAQIS WERE NOT ASKING IRAN TO GO BEYOND THE NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS. THEY COULD NOT HOWEVER AFFORD TO RISK IRAN CREATING A ''NO PEACE NO WAR'' SITUATION. THEY WANTED A QUICK CEASEFIRE AND END TO THE WAR AND A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT GUARANTEED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ENSURE THAT IRAN DID NOT RESTART THE WAR. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF SCR 598 WHICH PROVIDED NOT JUST FOR A TRUCE BUT FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. FINALLY TARIQ AZIZ DREW ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT MADE BY HIS DEPUTY TO OUR AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD EARLIER TODAY (BAGHDAD TELNO 498). THIS REPRESENTED THE DEFINITIVE POSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT. HE HIMSELF WOULD STAY IN NEW YORK AS LONG AS WAS NECESSARY.

5. I SAID THAT WHILE WE UNDERSTOOD THE IRAQI DESIRE TO BE CAUTIOUS, THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY SHOULD NOT BE MISSED. WE WERE NOT CONVINCED THAT FACE TO FACE TALKS WOULD LEAD TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING. SUCH TALKS COULD EASILY GO WRONG, AND MIGHT MAKE IT EVEN HARDER TO ACHIEVE BROAD AGREEMENT. THE IRAQIS SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO BLOCK THE PROCESS BY ASKING FOR TOO MUCH TOO SOON. IN ANY NEGOTIATION IT WAS IMPORTANT TO LEAVE THE OTHER SIDE WITH DIGNITY. FACE TO FACE TALKS CARRIED A HIGH RISK, AND IF THEY TOOK PLACE WOULD NEED VERY CAREFUL PREPARATION. THE IRAQIS SHOULD NOTE THAT IF THE

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PRESENT EFFORTS FAILED, THE OPPORTUNITY MIGHT NOT RECUR. THERE WAS AN EVER PRESENT DANGER OF SOME UNEXPECTED UPSET, AND SOME GOVERNMENTS MIGHT BE HAPPY TO FISH IN TROUBLED WATERS.

6. TARIQ AZIZ SAID THAT IRAQ HAD NO WISH TO HUMILIATE THE IRANIANS. THE IRAQIS STILL BELIEVED THAT FACE TO FACE TALKS WERE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH IRANIAN SINCERITY. BUT THEY PLEDGED THEMSELVES TO BEHAVE WITH RESTRAINT IN THOSE TALKS, PROVIDED THE OTHER SIDE ALSO BEHAVED IN DIGNIFIED FASHION. HE HOPED THAT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD UNDERSTAND AND SUPPORT THE IRAQI POSITION BOTH ON SUBSTANCE AND ON TACTICS. I SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE IRAQI POSITION BUT LEFT TACTICS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, TO WHOM WE GAVE FULL SUPPORT. WE WERE READY TO HELP IN ANY WAY WE COULD.

7. AS I WAS LEAVING, KITTANI (IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE) TOOK ME ASIDE TO SAY THAT TARIQ AZIZ WAS UNDER STRICT INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS PRESIDENT ON FACE TO FACE TALKS AND COULD NOT BE FLEXIBLE ON THIS POINT. BUT ON THE SHATT-AL-ARAB WATERWAY HE THOUGHT THAT TARIQ AZIZ COULD ULTIMATELY SHOW FLEXIBILITY, BECAUSE THE IRAQIS RECOGNIZED THAT A RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE COULD TAKE MONTHS.

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MY TELNO 886: IRAN/IRAQ: FOLLOW UP TO SCR 598

SUMMARY
1. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ DISCOURAGING. IRANIANS SEEM FLEXIBLE.

DETAIL
2. AFTER MEETING THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER ON 27 JULY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOLD ME HE WAS DISCOURAGED BUT NOT DESPAIRING, AND PROMISED TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH.

3. PICCO (SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STAFF) CONFIRMED TO US THAT IN HIS OPENING MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 26 JULY VELAYATI HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE UNTIL IRAQI TROOPS HAD WITHDRAWN FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY (MY TELNO 883). THE SECRETARIAT HAD THE IMPRESSION THE IRANIANS WERE READY TO NEGOTIATE, AND TO BE FLEXIBLE: FOR EXAMPLE, THEY SEEMED CONTENT TO DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON THE EARLY CONVENING OF THE IMPARTIAL BODY AND SEEMED NOT TO EMPHASISE ITS IMPORTANCE AT ALL. VELAYATI HAD SAID THAT DIRECT TALKS WOULD BE DIFFICULT, BUT HE HAD NOT RULED THEM OUT.

4. PICCO SAID THAT AT HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TARIQ AZIZ HAD BEEN VIRTUALLY INSULTING. HE HAD INSISTED ON FACE TO FACE TALKS AND REFUSED TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL EXCEPT WITH VELAYATI PRESENT. ONE OF HIS MAJOR CONCERNS WAS CLEARLY TO SETTLE THE SHATT EL-ARAB BORDER ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO IRAQ. HE WANTED TO GET IRANIAN AGREEMENT TO THE SETTLEMENT AS A WHOLE BEFORE AGREEING ON A CEASEFIRE.

5. PICCO SAID THAT WHEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAW VELAYATI AGAIN TONIGHT 27 JULY, HE HOPED TO ACHIEVE CLEAR IRANIAN AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS SUBSTANCE IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A GRADUAL

IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY. IF HE GOT SUCH AGREEMENT, HE WOULD USE IT WITH TARIQ AZIZ ON 28 JULY. BEYOND THAT, THE OUTLOOK WAS NOT CLEAR. TARIQ AZIZ HAD NO PLANS TO LEAVE NEW YORK: THE SECRETARIAT EXPECTED HIM TO STAY THROUGH NEXT WEEK AND PERHAPS EVEN UNTIL AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. VELAYATI'S PLANS WERE LESS CLEAR. BUT ACTS OF THEATRE (EG PEREMPTORY DEPARTURES) COULD NOT BE RULED OUT AND PICCO DOUBTED IF A CEASEFIRE WOULD BE REACHED NEXT WEEK.

6. PAUL LEWIS (NEW YORK TIMES), WHO HAD AN HOUR WITH VELAYATI ON 27 JULY, TOLD ME THAT THE LATTER HAD SAID HE EXPECTED TWO PARTICULAR AREAS OF DIFFICULTY: THE IRAQIS WOULD TRY TO REWRITE THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT TO THEIR ADVANTAGE (C.F. THE POINT IN PARA 4 ABOVE ABOUT THE SHATT EL-ARAB): AND WOULD TWIST THE LANGUAGE OF PARA 6 OF SCR 598 TO SABOTAGE THE ESTABLISHMENT AND/OR FUNCTIONING OF THE IMPARTIAL BODY. NEVERTHELESS LEWIS HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT VELAYATI, WHO HAD APPEARED SUPRISINGLY CONCILIATORY THROUGHOUT, WOULD NOT STICK RIGIDLY TO THE PRESENT IRANIAN ATTITUDE ON THESE POINTS.

7. I AM TO SEE VELAYATI AT 1300Z ON 28 JULY (YOUR TELNO 394).

TICKELL

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MY TELNO 878: IRAN/IRAQ

SUMMARY

1. HOPES OF AN EARLY CEASEFIRE IN THE BALANCE: VELAYATI REFUSED TO DISCUSS IT UNTIL THE IRAQIS WITHDRAW FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOLD ME THIS EVENING 26 JULY THAT HOPES OF AN EARLY CEASEFIRE WERE NOW IN THE BALANCE. HE HAD SEEN THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING AND WOULD DO SO AGAIN TONIGHT. VELAYATI HAD BEEN IN A CONCILIATORY MOOD, BUT HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ABOUT CONTINUING IRAQI MILITARY ACTIVITY. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID HE HAD ADVISED THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHO WAS UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE IRANIANS, TO POSTPONE ANY FURTHER MEETING OR ACTION BY THE COUNCIL UNTIL TOMORROW WHEN THE SITUATION SHOULD BE CLEARER.

3. ON 25 JULY KITTANI (IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE) ANNOUNCED TO THE PRESS AND ON TELEVISION THAT IRAQI TROOPS WOULD HAVE LEFT IRANIAN TERRITORY BY NOON TODAY. BUT ACCORDING TO VELAYATI THE IRAQIS ARE STILL DEEP IN IRANIAN TERRITORY. THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN CONFIRMED TO ME BY THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE. FOR HIS PART KITTANI TOLD ME HE COULD NOT EXPLAIN WHAT WAS GOING ON. THE ARRIVAL OF HIS MINISTER HAD BEEN DELAYED A FEW HOURS (HE SHOULD BE HERE TONIGHT), AND TARIQ AZIZ HIMSELF WOULD HAVE TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION.

4. THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TELEPHONED FOR ADVICE. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT IT BEST TO AVOID A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OR FURTHER ACTION UNTIL TARIQ AZIZ COULD GIVE AN AUTHORITATIVE ACCOUNT OF IRAQI ACTIONS. NOGUEIRA BATISTA SAID HE HAD RECEIVED SIMILAR ADVICE FROM THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES. UNLESS THERE WERE FURTHER UNWELCOME DEVELOPMENTS, HE WOULD TRY TO

PERSUADE THE IRANIANS THAT IT WAS IN THEIR OWN BEST INTERESTS TO HOLD OFF UNTIL TOMORROW. MEANWHILE WE HAVE HEARD FROM THE AMERICANS THAT VELAYATI HAS REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN FURTHER DISCUSSION OF A CEASEFIRE UNTIL THE IRAQIS HAVE FINALLY WITHDRAWN FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY.

COMMENT

5. WALTERS (U S) WILL BRING ME UP TO DATE ON THE MILITARY SITUATION AT 1100 TOMORROW. TARIQ AZIZ HAS ASKED TO SEE ME AS SOON AS TIME ALLOWS. IN THE MEANTIME I FEAR THERE IS LITTLE WE CAN DO HERE SO LONG AS THE IRAQIS CONTINUE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IRANIAN MILITARY WEAKNESS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS UNDERSTANDABLY ANXIOUS THAT THIS COULD CAUSE THE COLLAPSE OF HIS EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A CEASEFIRE.

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T117/88

SUBJECT cc MASTER OPS

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

26 July 1988

Dear Ron,

Thank you for your letter of 11 July about the Iranair flight 655.

The incident was a tragedy for all concerned. It illustrated the terrible costs of the conflict in the Gulf and the dilemmas that can confront naval forces deployed there in order to uphold freedom of navigation.

The accident seems at least to have helped bring home to the Iranian leadership the urgent need for an end to the Gulf conflict. Let us hope that they mean what they say. I was glad that the Security Council was able to agree unanimously the terms of a resolution on the incident which called clearly for implementation of SCR 598. This was a good start. I hope we can now continue to work together to support the Secretary-General's efforts to bring a settlement in the Gulf region. We are doing what we can ourselves and through moderate Arab governments to urge Iraq to exercise restraint and co-operate in the establishment of a ceasefire as soon as possible.

Yours ever

Margaret

The President of the United States of America.

CCPC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 July 1988

Dear Charles

The Gulf: Accidental Shooting Down of Iranian Airbus

I enclose a self-explanatory draft reply to President Reagan's letter of 11 July to the Prime Minister. We delayed it until the result of the Security Council's consideration of the Airbus incident was known. It incorporates the thought in your letter of 20 July.

The unanimous adoption of SCR 618 was a satisfactory outcome which preserved the unanimity of the Council and upheld the authority of SCR 598 as a basis for the current efforts of the Secretary-General to conclude a settlement to the conflict.

Yours ever

Bob Peirce

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM: The Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

BUILDING: ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

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TO:

President Reagan

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SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 11 July about the Iranair flight 655.

The incident was a tragedy for all concerned. It ~~starkly~~ illustrated the terrible costs of the conflict in the Gulf and the ~~serious~~ dilemmas that can confront naval forces deployed there in order to uphold freedom of navigation.

~~It is a relief that this terrible~~ accident seems at least to have helped bring home to the Iranian leadership the urgent need for an end to the Gulf conflict. Let us hope that they mean what they say. I was glad that the Security Council was able to agree unanimously ~~- and with broad Irianian endorsement -~~ the terms of a resolution on the incident which called clearly for implementation of SCR 598. This was a good start. I hope we can now continue to work together ~~- especially through our missions in New York -~~ to support the Secretary-General's efforts to ~~take advantage of the suddent shift in the Iranian position and to~~ bring a ~~rapid~~

~~and lasting~~ settlement in the Gulf region. We are doing what we can ourselves and through moderate Arab governments to urge Iraq to exercise restraint and cooperate in the establishment of a ceasefire as soon as possible.

GH -

IRAQ: Int Sit PT 9.



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RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE ALERT MUNRO AND MED

MY TELNO 869: IRAN/IRAQ: FOLLOW UP TO SCR 598

SUMMARY

1. IRANIAN AND IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTERS AGREED TO COME TO NEW YORK FOR TALKS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598. IRAQI (AS WELL AS IRANIAN) AGREEMENT RECEIVED FOR THE VISIT OF THE TECHNICAL TEAM. ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN EVENTUAL OBSERVER FORCE IN HAND. THE FIVE MET THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DISPLAY THEIR SUPPORT.

DETAIL

2. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE MET ON 22 JULY. WE QUICKLY AGREED TO SEEK A MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO EXPRESS OUR SUPPORT FOR HIS EFFORTS AT A CRITICAL MOMENT. WE AGREED TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING DEMARCHES A CINQ IN BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN (EITHER THROUGH A SINGLE SPOKESMAN, OR JOINTLY, OR SEPARATELY BUT IN IDENTICAL TERMS), EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND URGING BOTH SIDES TO SEIZE THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY. WE ALSO AGREED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY THAT OUR COUNSELLORS MIGHT MEET TO TALK ABOUT THE PROPOSED OBSERVER FORCE (CONTRIBUTORS, MANNER OF FINANCING, COVERAGE OF SEA AND AIR AS WELL AS LAND) AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE IMPARTIAL BODY: A MEETING HAS BEEN ARRANGED FOR THIS PURPOSE FOR 26 JULY. PLEASE LET ME KNOW OF ANY SPECIAL POINTS YOU WOULD WISH US TO PUT.

3. WHEN THE FIVE LATER MET THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, I SAID AS SPOKESMAN THAT OUR PURPOSE IN ASKING TO CALL ON HIM WAS TO GIVE VISIBLE SUPPORT TO HIS EFFORTS WITHIN HIS MANDATE AT A DIFFICULT MOMENT. HE REPLIED THAT OUR TIMING WAS IMPECCABLE. HE HAD THAT MOMENT RECEIVED IRAQI AGREEMENT FOR THE TECHNICAL TEAM TO VISIT BAGHDAD (IT LEAVES FOR TEHRAN OVER THE WEEKEND, AND AFTER SPENDING THREE DAYS OR SO THERE WILL TRAVEL ON TO BAGHDAD VIA TURKEY): AND

HE HAD NOW HAD POSITIVE ANSWERS FROM BOTH THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTERS THAT THEY WOULD COME TO NEW YORK TO DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598. VELAYATI WOULD BE AVAILABLE FROM MONDAY 25 JULY. TARIQ AZIZ HAD NOT YET SAID WHEN HE WOULD COME, BUT HAD ASSURED THE SECRETARIAT THAT HE WOULD. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAW IT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS ALL ASPECTS OF THE RESOLUTION, INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL, PRISONERS OF WAR, THE IMPARTIAL BODY AND RECONSTRUCTION. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID THAT TARIQ AZIZ HAD NOT INSISTED ON FACE TO FACE TALKS WITH VELAYATI, PERHAPS BECAUSE IN RESPONSE TO MY ADVICE (MY TUR), HE HAD MADE HIS INVITATION ORALLY. HIS PLAN WAS TO START WITH INDIRECT TALKS AND SEE IF MATTERS COULD BE MOVED ON FROM THERE. THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT TALKS WAS CERTAINLY IN HIS MIND.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE REPORT OF THE TEAM SENT TO THE AREA TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED USE OF CW BY BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN WAS ON HIS DESK AND WOULD BE CIRCULATED PROBABLY ON 25 JULY: IT WAS TOUGH. HE CONTINUED THAT THE IRANIANS HAD SENT IN TWO LETTERS COMPLAINING ABOUT THAT DAY'S MILITARY OPERATIONS BY IRAQ (TEXTS IN MIFT). FINALLY, HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE COUNCIL WOULD NEED TO ADOPT A NEW RESOLUTION SETTING UP AN OBSERVER FORCE, AND HE PROMISED TO CONSULT US ON ITS COMPOSITION AND COMMANDER.

5. FOLLOWING THE MEETING, WE AGREED WITH THE REST OF THE FIVE THAT IN THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WAS LITTLE BENEFIT IN SEEKING TO AGREE A CONTINGENCY DRAFT TEXT FOR A DEMARCHE IN CAPITALS BY THE FIVE (PARA 2 ABOVE AND TELECON FRASER/BLATHERWICK). BUT THE OTHERS ARE CONTINUING TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PRINCIPLE AND CONTENTS OF ANY DEMARCHE.

6. THE SECRETARIAT HAS TOLD US SEPARATELY (YOUR TELNO 388) THAT IT IS ALREADY SEEKING OBSERVERS FROM THE TRADITIONAL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS ANS SOME OTHERS (ITALY HAS OFFERED PERSONNEL) BUT NOT FROM THE PERMANENT MEMBERS. THE AMERICANS HAVE TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT THEY ARE OPPOSED TO A NAVAL ELEMENT. AS TO FINANCING, THE SECRETARIAT EXPECT AT LEAST INITIALLY TO RESORT TO THE DLRS 10 MILLION ALREADY PROMISED BY JAPAN FOR IRAN/IRAQ PEACEKEEPING. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS PUT GOULDING IN CHARGE OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FORCE IN ADDITION TO HIS OTHER PEACEKEEPING RESPONSIBILITIES (PARA 6 OF YOUR TELNO 388). THE TECHNICAL TEAM WHICH IS TO VISIT BOTH CAPITALS INCLUDES SOMMEREYNS, A SENIOR POLITICAL OFFICER FROM CORDOVEZ'S STAFF: HE WOULD BE THE NATURAL CHOICE FOR IRONING OUT ANY ALLEGED BREACHES OF A CEASEFIRE. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WITH

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NEGOTIATIONS APPARENTLY LAUNCHED, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS LIKELY TO WANT TO KEEP MATTERS WITHIN HIS OWN HANDS AND THAT OF HIS IMMEDIATE STAFF: I DOUBT WHETHER HE WILL WISH TO APPOINT AN OUTSIDE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, WHO WOULD NEED LONG AND CAREFUL BRIEFING AND ASSIMILATION INTO THE MACHINE, AT LEAST UNLESS THINGS WERE TO BECOME BOGGED DOWN. THE ISSUE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY DEAD FOR THE TIME BEING.

7. ON THE IMPARTIAL BODY, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS THINKING OF A PANEL OF FIVE MEMBERS: ONE APPOINTED BY EACH COUNTRY, PLUS THREE OTHERS, ONE OF WHOM MIGHT BE AN ICJ JUDGE.

8. AS TO THE TURKS (PARA 7 OF YOUR TELNO 388), THEIR MISSION HERE KNOWS OF NO PLANS TO OFFER GOOD OFFICES IN THE REPATRIATION OF POWS. DETAILS OF THIS KIND WILL NO DOUBT BE SETTLED QUICKLY IF NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED SMOOTHLY.

COMENT
9. SO FAR SO GOOD. THE DIFFICULT POINTS FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL NEXT WEEK WILL BE MANAGING THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH VELAYATI AND TARIQ AZIZ (ESPECIALLY AFTER THE LATTER'S REQUEST FOR DIRECT TALKS), AND ENSURING THAT THE CEASEFIRE IS NOT LOST SIGHT OF DURING THESE NEGOTIATIONS, NOR POSTPONED UNTIL THE END OF THEM. TIMING WILL BE TRICKY.

10. WE ARE GIVING THOUGHT TO A DRAFT RESOLUTION, AND WILL LET YOU HAVE IDEAS FOR A DRAFT LATER.

TICKELL

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MY TELNO 478: IRAN/IRAQ AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY

1. IRAQ PROPOSED DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN UNDER UN AUSPICES

DETAIL

2. ALONG WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER MEMBER STATES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I WAS SUMMONED AT SHORT NOTICE LATE YESTERDAY BY UNDER-SECRETARY ZAHAWI TO RECEIVE THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM TARIQ AZIZ TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WHICH HAD JUST BEEN SENT TO NEW YORK. THE LETTER MAKES FIVE PROPOSALS:

(A) A MEETING BETWEEN AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVES OF IRAQ AND IRAN SHOULD BE CONVENED AT THE UN AND LATER IN BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNSG OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE TO ENTER INTO OFFICIAL AND DIRECT TALKS ABOUT THE MEASURES FOR IMPLEMENTING SCR 598 IN THE SEQUENCE OF ITS OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION. IN CASE OF DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ABOUT THAT, RECOURSE WOULD BE HAD TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE UN CHARTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE TREATMENT OF POWS OF 1949. THIS MEETING SHOULD BE CONVENED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE PROPOSAL TO HOLD A MEETING IN BAGHDAD OR TEHRAN IN ADDITION TO THE MEETING IN THE UN IS MEANT TO CREATE THE APPROPRIATE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A COMPREHENSIVE AND DURABLE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

(B) IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SHATT AL ARAB, WHICH IRAQ HAS ALWAYS UNDERLINED IN ITS CORRESPONDENCE AND TALKS WITH THE UNSG AND MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS WELL AS IN ITS OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUES, IRAQ REQUESTS THE UNSG TO ENTRUST THE SPECIALISED UN AGENCIES TO TAKE ON IMMEDIATELY THE TASK OF CLEARING THE SHATT AMD MAKING IT NAVIGABLE SO THAT BOTH COUNTRIES MAY USE

IT. THE UN SPECIALISED AGENCIES SHOULD ESTABLISH A DEFINITE TIMETABLE AND PROVIDE ALL THE NECESSARY FAILITIES TO COMPLETE THIS TASK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD ALSO OFFER THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES ASSISTANCE AND FACILITIES IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT TO EXPEDITE THE TASK.

(C) IRAQ'S COMPLETE RIGHTS TO FREE NAVIGATION IN THE GULF AND IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY GUARANTEED.

(D) AT A TIME WHEN IRAQ HOPES TO ACHIEVE AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES TO REACH A SPEEDY AGREEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE AND DURABLE PEACE AND GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AS A FOUNDATION FOR COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE REGION, IT WOULD BE NATURAL IN THE EVENT OF PARTIAL OR TOTAL FAILURE TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL THAT THE UNSG AND THE SECRETARIAT SHOULD PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN FACILITATING THE TASK OF OFFICIAL AND DIRECT TALKS AND PRESENTING RECOMMENDATIONS AND ADVICE TO FACILITATE THE TASK OF NEGOTIATIONS AS NECESSARY. IT REMAINS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO PLAY ITS EFFECTIVE ROLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE CHARTER TO INTERVENE AND TO TAKE THE APPROPRIATE DECISIONS AS NECESSARY.

(E) IRAQ CALLS ON IRAN TO REFRAIN FROM OBSTRUCTING OR ATTACKING SHIPS AND OIL TANERS OPERATING IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE GULF STATES WHICH ARE NOT PARTY TO THE CONFLICT AND IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

THE LETTER CONCLUDES BY HOPING THAT IRAN WOULD RESPOND FAVOURABLY TO THESE PROPOSALS AND THAT THE UNSG WOULD ADOPT THEM AND TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO PUT THEM INTO EFFECT.

COMMENT

3. THE PURPOSE OF THE IRAQIS IN PROPOSING DIRECT TALKS IS NOT CLEAR. ONE OBJECTIVE MIGHT BE TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF THE UNSG AS FAR AS POSSIBLE SINCE THE IRAQIS DISTRUST HIM. THE QUESTION MAY NOW BE SOMEWHAT ACADEMIC SINCE, ACCORDING TO THE BBC, IRAN HAS REJECTED DIRECT TALKS AND THE UNSG IS SENDING TECHNICAL TEAMS TO THE TWO CAPITALS. THIS PROCEDURE WOULD SEEM TO FALL FAR SHORT OF WHAT THE IRAQIS ARE SEEKING (TUR) AND IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THEY WILL ACCEPT IT. YOU WILL NOTICE THE FURTHER EMPHASIS ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE SHATT AND THE GULF, MAKING CLEAR IRAQ'S PERCEPTION OF ANY CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS AS EXTENDING BEYOND THE LAND FRONTIER. MEANWHILE, THE

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WAR GOES ON (MIFT).

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TELNO 859
OF 201445Z JULY 1988
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MY TELNO 857 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY-GENERAL BELIEVED A CORNER HAD BEEN TURNED WITH THE IRANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF SCR 598, AND HOPED WE WOULD PRESS THE IRAQIS TO PROCEED RAPIDLY TO IMPLEMENTATION. DID NOT INTEND TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE YET: ELIASSON RULED OUT.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOLD ME ON 19 JULY THAT THOUGH CAUTION WAS OBVIOUSLY ESSENTIAL, HE FELT THAT WITH IRANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF SCR 598 A CORNER HAD BEEN TURNED IN BRINGING THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR TO AN END. HE HAD LESS DOUBTS ABOUT IRANIAN THAN IRAQI GOOD INTENTIONS. WHEN THE IRANIAN ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAD COME TO SEE HIM ON 17 JULY (MY TELNO 851), HE HAD NOT ONLY MADE IT CLEAR THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS NOW QUOTE EAGER UNQUOTE FOR AN END TO THE WAR, BUT HAD INDICATED TWO CONCESSIONS. HE HAD DROPPED IRANIAN INSISTENCE THAT THE INSTITUTION OF A CEASEFIRE BE LINKED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN IMPARTIAL BODY, AND LET FALL THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF HIS INTENTION TO APPOINT SUCH A BODY WOULD PROBABLY BE SUFFICIENT. AND HE HAD DROPPED THE DISTINCTION THE IRANIANS HAD TRIED TO MAKE IN THE PAST BETWEEN AN INFORMAL AND A FORMAL CEASEFIRE. THE IRAQIS SEEMED NOT TO KNOW WHAT TO DO NEXT: THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO COMMIT HIMSELF WHEN HE SAW HIM ON 18 JULY. HE HOPED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD PUT THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE PRESSURE ON THE IRAQIS TO PROCEED RAPIDLY TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598.

3. I ASKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HIS CURRENT VIEWS ON A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE (YOUR TELNO 368) AND WONDERED WHETHER FURGLER, THE SWISS WHOSE NAME HE HAD MENTIONED IN THE PAST, HAD THE RIGHT QUALITIES. PEREZ DE CUELLAR REPLIED THAT FOR THE MOMENT HE WANTED TO KEEP MATTERS IN HIS OWN HANDS. HE FELT IT UNNECESSARY TO APPOINT

A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE UNTIL DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN. FURGLER WAS PRETTY GOOD, EVEN IF HE LACKED SOME PANACHE. BUT HE HAD HAD DIFFICULTY IN THINKING OF OTHERS. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID THAT ELIASSON WAS TOO CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH PALME, WHO HAD GOT ACROSS THE IRANIANS (THEY HAD SUSPECTED HIM OF INVOLVEMENT WITH ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAQ). IF WE HAD OTHER IDEAS, HE WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW THEM.

TICKELL

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From the Private Secretary

20 July 1988

IRAN/IRAQ

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a brief word this evening about Iran's acceptance of a ceasefire in the Gulf conflict. The Prime Minister said she hoped we were doing everything possible to encourage moderate Arab Governments to urge Iraq to exercise restraint and cooperate in the implementation of a ceasefire as soon as possible.

(CHARLES POWELL)

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MIPT: IRAN/IRAQ AT THE UN — i.e. draft resolution

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NON-PAPER CIRCULATED AT INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON 18 JULY:

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTER DATED 5 JULY 1988 FROM THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (S/19981) ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, FOREIGN MINISTER ALI-AKBAR VALAYATI (S/PV.2818) AND THE STATEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, VICE-PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH (S/PV. 2818),

DEEPLY DISTRESSED THAT A CIVIL AIRCRAFT OF IRAN AIR - SCHEDULED INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT 655 - WAS DESTROYED IN FLIGHT OVER THE STRAIT OF ORMUZ BY A MISSILE FIRED FROM THE UNITED STATES WARSHIP SS VINCENNES,

STRESSING THE NEED FOR A FULL EXPLANATION OF THE FACTS OF THE INCIDENT BASED UPON IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION,

GRAVELY DISTURBED AT THE INCREASING EXACERBATION OF TENSION IN THE GULF REGION,

1. EXPRESSES ITS DISTRESS AT THE DOWNING OF AN IRANIAN CIVIL AIRCRAFT BY A MISSILE FIRED FROM A UNITED STATES WARSHIP AND PROFOUND REGRET OVER THE TRAGIC LOSS OF INNOCENT LIVES:

2. EXPRESSES ITS SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS OF THE TRAGIC INCIDENT AND TO THE PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS OF THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN:

3. WELCOMES THE DECISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO), IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, ''TO INSTITUTE AN IMMEDIATE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE ALL RELEVANT FACTS AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE CHAIN OF EVENTS RELATING TO THE FLIGHT AND DESTRUCTION OF

THE AIRCRAFT'' AND WELCOMES THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND BY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN OF THEIR DECISION TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE ICAO INVESTIGATION:

4. STRESSES THE OBLIGATION OF ALL PARTIES TO THE CHICAGO CONVENTION OF 1944 ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION TO OBSERVE TO THE FULLEST EXTENT, IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING THE SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION, IN PARTICULAR THOSE OF THE ANNEXES TO THAT CONVENTION, IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE RECURRENCE OF INCIDENTS OF THE SAME NATURE:

5. CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO RESPECT TO THE FULLEST EXTENT THE RIGHT, UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, OF FREE NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS IN THE GULF:

(SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN)

6. CALLS UPON STATES OUTSIDE THE REGION MAINTAINING NAVAL FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS IN THE GULF TO PROMPTLY CONDUCT A REASSESSMENT OF THEIR PRESENCE IN SUCH INTERNATIONAL WATERS:

(SQUARE BRACKETS END)

(SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN)

6A. IN THE CONTEXT OF FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 598 (1987), CALLS UPON STATES OUTSIDE THE REGION MAINTAINING NAVAL FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS IN THE GULF TO PROMPTLY CONDUCT AN ASSESSMENT OF THEIR EXPANDED PRESENCE IN SUCH INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

(SQUARE BRACKETS END)

7. STRESSES THE NEED FOR A FULL AND RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESOLUTION 598 (1987), AS THE ONLY BASIS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST, HONOURABLE AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, AND REAFFIRMS ITS SUPPORT TO THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO IMPLEMENT THAT RESOLUTION, COMMITTING ITSELF TO WORK WITH HIM IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.
ENDS.

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SIC U2H

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 850: IRANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF SCR 598

1. THE IRAQI REACTION TO THE IRANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF SCR 598 HAS BEEN VERY CAUTIOUS. THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION ISSUED A STATEMENT LAST NIGHT SHOWING PREDICTABLY THAT THE IRAQIS HAD NOT YET SEEN THE TEXT OF THE IRANIAN'S MESSAGE TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND WOULD NEED TO STUDY IT BEFORE REACHING ANY CONCLUSIONS. HIS COMMENTS CONCENTRATED MORE ON RAFSANJANI'S SIMULTANEOUS STATEMENT ON THE REASONS FOR THE IRANIAN'S MOVE. HERE THE IRAQIS PROFESSED TO SEE NUANCES WHICH SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS ONLY TACTICAL. THE MINISTER DREW ATTENTION TO THE CALL IN THE IRANIAN STATEMENT FOR GENERAL MOBILISATION AND QUESTIONED WHY THIS WAS NECESSARY IF THEY SOUGHT GENUINE PEACE. THE MINISTER CONCLUDED THAT IRAQ NEEDED TO BE VIGILANT AND CAUTIOUS UNTIL PEACE WAS ACTUALLY ACHIEVED AND A CLEAR CUT COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED.

2. THE IRANIANS' MOVE APPEARS TO HAVE TAKEN THE IRAQIS BY SURPRISE. THERE WAS NO HINT OF IT WHEN MUNRO SAW TARIQ AZIZ ON 17 JULY AND THE IRAQI ARABIC NEWS MEDIA GAVE IT LOW PRIORITY IN ITS COVERAGE LAST NIGHT AND THIS MORNING. THERE HAS BEEN NO PUBLIC REACTION IN THE STREETS. IT MAY TAKE THE IRAQIS TIME TO DECIDE HOW TO PROCEED. MY GREEK COLLEAGUE ON BEHALF OF THE EC GROUP HAS SOUGHT A BRIEFING FROM THE MFA AT THE LATTER'S CONVENIENCE. THE ITALIAN CHARG'E TOLD ME THAT TARIQ AZIZ HAD BEEN DUE TO GO TO ROME TOMORROW FOR JOINT COMMISSION TALKS BUT HAD CANCELLED HIS VISIT.

3. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE IRAQIS WILL INTERPRET THE IRANIAN'S MOVE AS A VINDICATION OF IRAQI POLICY OF EXERTING MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON IRAN MILITARILY AND ECONOMICALLY WHILE INSISTING RESOLUTELY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598 AS DRAFTED. WITH SOME JUSTIFI -

CATION THEY COULD SAY THAT IF THEY HAD WAVERED AND ACCEPTED DISCUSSIONS ON THE UNSG'S PEACE PLAN THEY WOULD NOT HAVE ACHIEVED THE PUBLIC, WRITTEN, HIGH-LEVEL COMMITMENT TO PEACE WHICH THEY FELT NECESSARY TO BIND THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP AND WHICH THE LATTER HAS NOW GIVEN. IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT THE IRAQIS WILL NOT GLOAT BUT WILL CONCENTRATE ON COOPERATING FULLY WITH THE UNSG IN HIS DETAILED PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING SCR 598. IF IT IS ANY GUIDE, TARIQ AZIZ SAID TO MUNRO THAT IF THE IRANIANS SHOWED THEMSELVES TO BE SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE THEY WOULD FIND THE IRAQIS WOULD BEHAVE ''VERY RESPONSIBLY'' WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF IRAQ'S LEGITIMATE NATIONAL INTERESTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY. THEY WILL BE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED NOT TO ALLOW NEGOTIATIONS TO BE EXPLOITED BY THE IRANIANS TACTICALLY AS A BREATHING SPACE FOR REARMAMENT.

4. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR HOW THE IRAQIS WILL USE THE PERIOD UP TO THE FORMAL DECLARATION OF A CEASE-FIRE. AS OF YESTERDAY, THE IRAQI DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL GUIDANCE AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WAS STILL SAYING THAT IRAQ WOULD FORCE THE IRANIANS TO WITHDRAW FROM OCCUPIED AREAS IF THEY REFUSED TO PULL OUT. HE WAS COMMENTING ON THE CLAIM BY IRAN'S DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER HUSSEIN SHEIKH-UL-ISLAM THAT BOTH COUNTRIES HAD WITHDRAWN TO INTERNATIONAL BORDERS AS THEY STOOD IN 1980. THE IRAQI SPOKESMAN SAID IRAN STILL OCCUPIED PARTS OF IRAQI TERRITORY. IT IS POSSIBLE THEREFORE THAT THE IRAQIS WILL CONTINUE THEIR CLEARANCE OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH. THEY WILL STILL HAVE THE KURDS TO DEAL WITH ANYWAY.

CLARK

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Prime Minister

According to the Iranian News Agency, Iran accepts a cease-fire in the Gulf War. Not yet confirmed from other sources.

C.D.

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BAGHDAD TELNO 469: IRAN/IRAQ

SUMMARY

1. STATE GRATEFUL FOR ACCOUNT OF MUNRO'S DISCUSSIONS IN BAGHDAD ON IRAN/IRAQ. IN LIGHT OF IRANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF 598, THEY SEE PRIORITIES AS FIRST TO ESTABLISH THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S IMPLEMENTATION PLAN IS ACCEPTABLE: AND SECOND TO GET THE MODERATE ARABS WORKING ON THE IRAQIS.

DETAIL

2. AS AGREED WITH THE DEPARTMENT, WE BRIEFED BURLEIGH (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN NEA, STATE) ON 18 JULY ON MUNRO'S DISCUSSIONS ABOUT IRAN/IRAQ IN BAGHDAD. BURLEIGH WAS MOST GRATEFUL: IT HAD BEEN SOME TIME SINCE THE AMERICANS HAD THEMSELVES HAD A FULL DISCUSSION WITH TARIQ AZIZ. THE LATTER'S INTRANSIGENT LINE WITH MUNRO FITTED OTHER RECENT INDICATIONS THEY HAD RECEIVED OF THE PRESENT IRAQI APPROACH.

3. WE ASKED BURLEIGH WHAT STATE NOW SAW AS THE PRIORITIES IN THE LIGHT OF IRANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF 598 (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 850). BURLEIGH SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD SPOKEN THAT MORNING TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY AND HAD MADE PLAIN THAT HE INTENDED TO WORK FOR A CEASEFIRE BEGINNING ON 1 AUGUST. THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR AT THE UN HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT IRAN WANTED A CEASEFIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BURLEIGH COMMENTED THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO GET HOLD OF THE UN SECRETARIAT'S DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (WHCIH STATE HAVE NOT SO FAR SEEN). ONCE THE ADMINISTRATION WERE SATISFIED THAT THIS WAS A WORKABLE PROPOSAL, THEY THOUGHT THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE TO ENLIST THE HELP OF THE SAUDIS, EGYPTIANS, JORDANIANS AND KUWAITIS. THEY WERE BEST PLACED TO GET THE POSITIVE MESSAGE TO THE IRAQIS THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS WORKING ON IMPLEMENTING ALL PARTS OF THE RESOLUTION INCLUDING THOSE OF INTEREST TO IRAQ, EG. RETURN OF POWS. BURLEIGH AGREED THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY TO PROD THE RUSSIANS AND CHINESE INTO TAKING ACTION IN BAGHDAD.

4. BURLEIGH CONTINUED THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY TO RIDE THE IRAQIS OFF THEIR PRESENT POSITION ON THE SEQUENCE OF IMPLEMENTING

THE VARIOUS STEPS OUTLINED IN 598. THE US WOULD BE TAKING THE LINE WITH THEM THAT THIS WAS PRIMARILY AN ISSUE FOR THE DRAFTERS OF THE RESOLUTION: AND THAT THE CURRENT IRAQI POSITION DID NOT MATCH THE INTENTIONS OF THE DRAFTERS. IN SHORT THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL TO BE DONE: BUT THE MOOD IN STATE WAS THAT THIS OPPORTUNITY HAD TO BE SEIZED VERY RAPIDLY.

5. AS FOR US STATEMENTS AT THE UN, BURLEIGH SAID THAT THE US DELEGATION WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE SOME BALANCED POINTS ABOUT THESE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COURSE OF THE RESUMED DEBATE ON THE IRANIAN AIRBUS ISSUE. THE US WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY WELCOMED THE IRANIAN ANNOUNCEMENT: BUT THAT A LONG PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION LAY AHEAD: THAT THE US AGREED ON THE NEED FOR AN EARLY QUOTE D-DAY UNQUOTE: AND REGARDED BOTH THE CREATION OF AN IMPARTIAL BODY AND ACTION ON POWS AS INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION.

6. ON THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ABOUT THE TEXT OF A RESOLUTION OR STATEMENT ON THE AIRBUS INCIDENT (PARA.7 OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 851), BURLEIGH SAID THAT THE BRAZILIAN WAS TOYING WITH INCLUDING A REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR A QUOTE REASSESSMENT UNQUOTE OF THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN NAVIES IN THE GULF. BURLEIGH SAID THAT THE US WOULD VETO A RESOLUTION CONTAINING THIS POINT. BUT THEY HAD ALSO TOLD THE BRAZILIAN THAT THEY WOULD NOT OBJECT TO A RESOLUTION WHICH MADE THE POINT THAT, FOLLOWING FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF 598, STATES WITH NAVIES IN THE GULF SHOULD REVIEW THEIR NEED FOR SUCH DEPLOYMENTS.

7. WE ASKED BURLEIGH WHETHER STATE HAD ANY INITIAL THOUGHTS ON THE REASONS BEHIND THE IRANIAN DECISION TO ACCEPT 598. BURLEIGH SAID THAT THEY HAD NO EVIDENCE. BUT HIS OWN INSTINCT WAS THAT THE FOLLOWING FACTORS WERE RELEVANT:

(I) KHOMENEI MIGHT WELL BE CLOSE TO DEATH AND THE LEADERSHIP WOULD FIND IT VERY CONVENIENT TO HAVE SECURED HIS BLESSING ON A CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL

(II) THE IRANIANS MIGHT WELL SEE THEIR SITUATION IN THE LAND WAR AS EVEN MORE SERIOUS THAN HAD WESTERN ANALYSTS

(III) IN PARTICULAR, THE IRANIANS WOULD BE AWARE OF THE IRAQI BUILD-UP OPPOSITE ABADAN AND WERE PROBABLY ALARMED ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF AN IRAQI RE-INVASION. THIS TOGETHER WITH SUPER-SCUDS AND THE WIDESPREAD IRAQI USE OF CW MIGHT HAVE FINALLY CONVINCED THE LEADERSHIP THAT THEY HAD NOTHING TO GAIN AND MUCH TO LOSE FROM CONTINUING THE WAR.

8. BURLEIGH ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THE LONG ANTI-US DIATRIBE IN THE STATEMENT FROM THE GENERAL COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES ANNOUNCING IRANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF 598 AND THE REFERENCE TO THE

SHOOTING DOWN OF THE AIRBUS IN PRESIDENT KHAMENEI'S LETTER. THIS SUGGESTED THAT THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP MIGHT HAVE SEEN THE SHOOTING DOWN AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO JUSTIFY ACCEPTANCE OF 598, PARTICULARLY TO THEIR OWN PUBLIC OPINION, AS A RESPONSE TO INTOLERABLE PRESSURE FROM A SUPERPOWER. THAT WAS PROBABLY EASIER FOR IRANIANS TO SWALLOW THAN THE ALTERNATIVE OF ADMITTING MILITARY DEFEAT BY THE IRAQIS.
9. MIFT (NOT TO ALL) GIVES THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT ON THE IRANIAN MOVE.

FALL

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SIC

TELECON BLATHERWICK/YOUNG: IRAN/IRAQ

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KHAMENEI OF IRAN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATED 17 JULY. BEGINS:

PLEASE ACCEPT MY WARM GREETINGS WITH BEST WISHES FOR YOUR EXCELLENCY'S SUCCESS IN EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH PEACE AND JUSTICE.

AS YOU ARE WELL-AWARE, THE FIRE OF THE WAR WHICH WAS STARTED BY THE IRAQI REGIME ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1980 THROUGH AN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN HAS NOW GAINED UNPRECEDENTED DIMENSIONS, BRINGING OTHER COUNTRIES INTO THE WAR AND EVEN ENGULFING INNOCENT CIVILIANS.

THE KILLING OF 290 INNOCENT HUMAN BEINGS, CAUSED BY THE SHOOTING DOWN OF AN AIRBUS AIRCRAFT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN BY ONE OF AMERICAN WARSHIPS IN THE PERSIAN GULF IS A CLEAR MANIFESTATION OF THIS CONTENTION.

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, YOUR EXCELLENCY'S EFFORTS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 598 IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN HAS ALWAYS PROVIDED YOU WITH ITS ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE HAVE DECIDED TO OFFICIALLY DECLARE, THAT THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,-- BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO SAVING THE LIVES OF HUMAN BEINGS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JUSTICE AND REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY -- ACCEPTS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598.

WE HOPE THAT THE OFFICAL DECLARATION OF THIS POSITION BY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN WOULD ASSIST YOU IN CONTINUING YOUR

EFFORTS WHICH HAS ALWAYS RECEIVED OUR SUPPORT AND APPRECIATION.

HOPING FOR YOUR SUCCESS,
SEYED ALI KHAMENEI
PRESIDENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

ENDS.

TICKELL

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SIC

MY TELNO 850: IRAN/IRAQ AT THE UN

SUMMARY

1. ACCORDING TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE IRANIANS WANT VERY EARLY CEASEFIRE. HE PROPOSED TO COMMENCE CONSULTATIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598 URGENTLY, AND ADUMBRATED HIS PLANS FOR AN OBSERVER FORCE. PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HOPED TO CIRCULATE A TEXT ON THE AIRBUS INCIDENT ON 18 JULY. THE IRANIAN ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD MAKE IT LESS DIFFICULT TO CONCLUDE THE DEBATE SATISFACTORILY.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONVENED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THIS MORNING, 18 JULY TO ENABLE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT ON THE IRANIAN LETTER IN MY TUR.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT IN HANDING OVER THE LETTER (AT 1.00AM LOCAL TIME) THE IRANIAN ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAD GIVEN THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT IRAN WANTED A VERY EARLY CEASEFIRE. HE THEREFORE INTENDED URGENTLY TO COMMENCE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PARTIES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598 ON THE BASIS OF HIS OUTLINE PLAN, WITH THE AIM OF SETTING DATES FOR D-DAY AND FOR OTHER ELEMENTS. HE WOULD NEED TO DISCUSS WITH THE COUNCIL THE NATIONALITIES OF AN OBSERVER TEAM: HE PLANNED TO DESPATCH NOT MORE THAN 10 MEN INITIALLY, DRAWN FROM UNTSO, AND ENVISAGED THAT EVENTUALLY SOME 250 WOULD BE NEEDED. THE TEAM WOULD NEED TO BE IN PLACE AT LEAST 4 DAYS BEFORE D-DAY TO VERIFY AND OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE. HE AND/OR THE COUNCIL WOULD NEED TO APPOINT A CHIEF OBSERVER, DECIDE DATES OF ARRIVAL FOR THE ADVANCE PARTIES, ENSURE THAT IRAN AND IRAQ GAVE INFORMATION ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF THEIR FORCES AND AGREE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE PARTIES FOR THE TEAM'S DEPLOYMENT. A STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT AND THE

USUAL IMMUNITIES WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE SORTED OUT.

4. ON MY SUGGESTION, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL MIGHT TELL THE PRESS AFTER THE MEETING THAT THE COUNCIL WELCOMED THE NEWS AND FULLY SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT SCR 598 ON THE BASIS OF HIS OUTLINE PLAN. THE YUGOSLAV SUGGESTED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MIGHT VISIT BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ TO SPEED MATTERS UP: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL NODDED.

5. SPEAKING SUBSEQUENTLY TO THE PRESS, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID HE INTENDED TO BEGIN HIS TALKS WITH THE PARTIES THAT DAY, AND THOUGHT D-DAY (THE DATE OF A FORMAL CEASEFIRE) MIGHT BE AS SOON AS A WEEK TO TEN DAYS.

6. THE IRAQIS HERE ARE SAYING THEY ARE READY FOR CONSULTATIONS TO BEGIN.

7. THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL SPENT THE WEEKEND DISCUSSING DRAFTS ON THE AIRBUS INCIDENT WITH THE IRANIANS AND AMERICANS. THE LATTER TELL US THAT SOME POINTS REMAIN TO BE NEGOTIATED. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICANS ARE ENGAGED IN A DETAILED NEGOTIATION, AND THAT THERE IS A PROSPECT OF AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT, PROBABLY A DRAFT RESOLUTION. THE PRESIDENT TOLD COUNCIL MEMBERS THAT HE HOPED TO CIRCULATE A TEXT TONIGHT.

COMMENT

8. THE COUNCIL AND SECRETARIAT WERE OBVIOUSLY PLEASED WITH THE UNEXPECTED CHANGE IN THE IRANIAN POSITION. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS PLAINLY INTENT ON EMPHASISING THE IRANIAN DESIRE FOR AN EARLY CEASEFIRE AND HIS OWN WISH AND ABILITY TO MAKE GOOD SPEED. THE COMMON ASSUMPTION HERE IS THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE DECIDED THAT THEY CANNOT WIN THE WAR AND ARE CAUSING THEMSELVES GRAVE INTERNAL DAMAGE BY CONTINUING IT: THEY HAVE THEREFORE DECIDED TO USE THE CURRENT DEBATE TO COVER THEIR CHANGE OF POSITION. THEY MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE TENOR OF THE DEBATE ON 15 JULY (OUR TELNO 846), WHEN FEW PROVED READY TO CONDEMN THE UNITED STATES BUT ALL CALLED FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598 AND AN END TO THE GULF CONFLICT. CONVERSELY, THE IRANIAN ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD MAKE IT LESS DIFFICULT TO CONCLUDE THE DEBATE IN A MANNER SATISFACTORY TO ALL SIDES.

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INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD

RABAT FOR PS/MR MELLOR

MIPT: IRANIAN AIRBUS: SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY

1. NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS MAY BRING DIFFICULT DECISIONS IF WE END UP WITH AN ACCEPTABLE DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH THE AMERICANS NEVERTHELESS PRESS US TO VETO WITH THEM. WITH LUCK, DISCUSSIONS ON A TEXT MAY RUN INTO THE SAND.

DETAIL

2. THOUGH THE DEBATE IS NOW UNDER WAY, THE OUTCOME (WHETHER A STATEMENT, A RESOLUTION OR NOTHING) IS UNCLEAR. THIS TELEGRAM OUTLINES SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WE MAY FACE WITH TEXTS OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

3. THE (BRAZILIAN) PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL IS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. HE CANNOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE GAP BETWEEN THE U S AND THE IRANIAN POSITIONS IS UNBRIDGEABLE (AS IT ALMOST CERTAINLY IS) UNTIL HE HAS DEMONSTRABLY TRIED TO BRIDGE IT. SO HE IS PUTTING TOGETHER A TEXT AND PLANS TO CIRCULATE IT, PERHAPS TO COUNCIL MEMBERS INDIVIDUALLY, ON 15 JULY. HE IS ZEALOUS. HIS TEXT IS LIKELY TO CONTAIN ELEMENTS TO APPEASE IRAN ON THE LINES OF THE IRANIAN/FRG TEXT IN MY TELNO 822 (NOT TO ALL), DEPLORING THE U S ACTION, LOOKING FORWARD TO THE RESULTS OF AN INVESTIGATION AND PERHAPS PROMISING TO TAKE THE MATTER UP AGAIN THEN. WHILE NEITHER THE WEST NOR THE NON ALIGNED WILL ACCEPT OPEN CRITICISM OF THE AMERICANS, THE PRESIDENT WILL FEEL IT HIS DUTY TO TAKE IRANIAN VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT.

4. THE POSITIONS OF THE EUROPEANS (BRITAIN, FRANCE, FRG, ITALY) AND JAPAN ARE BY NO MEANS IDENTICAL. WE (PRESUMABLY LIKE THE AMERICANS) WANT A CLEAR REFERENCE TO SELF DEFENCE AND TO FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. OTHERS, THOUGH THEY WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE SUCH

REFERENCES INCLUDED, DO NOT INSIST. THE FRENCH AND JAPANESE, LIKE US, INSIST ON A REFERENCE TO THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT SCR 598. THE GERMANS AND ITALIANS SEEM READY TO FUDGE ON THIS POINT, AND TO TREAT THE INCIDENT IN ISOLATION.

5. THE U S POSITION AS REGARDS A RESOLUTION IS UNCERTAIN. PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THE U S GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT SUPPORT A RESOLUTION (YOUR TELNO 371, NOT TO ALL). THEY HAVE SINCE SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT ABSTAIN (MY TUR). LOGICALLY, THEREFORE, THE ONLY COURSE OPEN TO THEM IS TO VETO ANY RESOLUTION. THEY TOOK SUCH AN ATTITUDE ERALIER THIS YEAR TOWARDS A RESOLUTION ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. FROM MY CONVERSATION WITH THE AMERICAN TEAM TODAY I SUSPECT THAT A VETO IS INEVITABLE ON THE GROUNDS THAT NO RESOLUTION CAN BE TOTALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THEM IN EVERY DETAIL AND AMERICAN HONOUR IS AT STAKE.

6. IF A DRAFT RESOLUTION EMERGES, THEREFORE, WE MAY FIND OURSELVES IN FAMILIAR DIFFICULTIES, CAUGHT BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE EUROPEANS. OTHERS ARE LIKELY TO TRY TO IMPROVE THE TEXT SO AS TO BE ABLE TO VOTE FOR IT OR AT LEAST ABSTAIN. THE DANGER IS THAT IT MIGHT BE IMPROVED TO A POINT WHERE IT WOULD BE PLAIN TO EVERYONE THAT IT MET OUR REQUIREMENTS AND YET WE WOULD STILL COME UNDER GREAT U S PRESSURE TO VETO WITH THEM. THE AMERICANS HAVE TOLD US IN PRIVATE THAT THEY BELIEVE THEY CAN KEEP THE GERMANS, ITALIANS AND JAPANESE UNDER CONTROL: THEY HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN TWISTING THEIR ARMS HARD ALREADY. IF THE AMERICANS WERE TO VETO, THESE THREE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT FEEL ABLE TO VOTE IN FAVOUR, BUT THEY MIGHT INSIST ON ABSTAINING. SO MIGHT THE FRENCH.

7. THE PRESIDENT MAY STILL CONCLUDE, ON THE BASIS OF FURTHER CONSULTATIONS, THAT HE HAS NO HOPE OF TABLING A CONSENSUS TEXT (AND WE, THE AMERICANS THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN ASSIDUOUSLY REMINDING COUNCIL MEMBERS THAT TRADITIONALLY THE PRESIDENT HAS ONLY BEEN ABLE TO ACT ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS). HE MAY PREFER TO LET NEGOTIATIONS FOUNDER OVER A DRAFT STATEMENT (WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CONSENSUS) RATHER THAN RISK A DIVISIVE VOTE ON A RESOLUTION. WE MAY RUN OUT OF SPEAKERS BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ARE FINISHED, IN WHICH CASE THE COUNCIL WOULD ADJOURN AND THE EXERCISE MIGHT GET LOST IN THE SAND - A BROADLY SATISFACTORY RESULT FOR THE AMERICANS AND FOR US.

8. BUT IF WE DO FIND OURSELVES IN THE AWKWARD SITUATION OUTLINED ABOVE (A RESOLUTION WE CAN SUPPORT BUT WHICH THE AMERICANS INTEND TO VETO) WE MAY NEED TO DECIDE QUICKLY WHETHER WE SHOULD TRY TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS EITHER NOT TO VETO OR TO ACCEPT THAT

OTHERS CAN ABSTAIN. IF SO IT WOULD HELP IF WE COULD ACT WITH THE FRENCH.

BIRCH

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RABAT FOR PS/MR MELLOR
OTTAWA FOR UKREP ICAO

IRANIAN AIRBUS: SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, 14 JULY

SUMMARY

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON THE IRANIAN AIRBUS INCIDENT BEGAN ON 14 JULY AND AFTER HEARING THE IRANIANS (VELAYATI) AND AMERICANS (BUSH) ADJOURNED TO 15 JULY. VELAYATI, AFTER A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE INCIDENT, CALLED FOR CONDMENATION OF THE U S AND REMOVAL OF THEIR AND OTHER NAVAL FORCES FROM THE GULF: THE DEBATE WOULD BE A LITMUS TEST FOR THE COUNCIL. BUSH EXPRESSED SORROW AT A TRAGIC ACCIDENT BUT OFFERED NO CHANGE IN U S POLICY IN THE GULF. BUSH WINS ON POINTS.

DETAIL

2. VALAYATI SPOKE FOR ONE AND A HALF HOURS. HE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR IRAN TO COME TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THEY LOOKED ON THE DEBATE AS A TEST OF THE UN'S ABILITY TO FULFIL ITS RESPONSIBILITIES ACCORDING TO THE CHARTER DESPITE PRESSURE FROM A SUPER POWER.

3. HE GAVE A DETAILED ACCOUNT WHICH CLAIMED TO DISPROVE U S ASSERTIONS ABOUT THE ALTITUDE AND SPEED OF THE AIRCRAFT AND TO SHOW THAT IT WAS A NORMAL FLIGHT SUBJECT TO NORMAL CONTROL PROCEDURES. THE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN WHILE OVER IRANIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS, DURING A PREMEDITATED ATTACK BY U S SHIPS ON IRANIAN GUNBOATS IN TERRITORIAL WATERS. TO CLAIM IT WAS A CASE OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY WAS ABSURD. HE SOUGHT TO DISCREDIT U S ARGUMENTS OF JUSTIFIABLE SELF-DEFENCE BUT QUOTING THE CONTRADICTORY CLAIMS OF U S OFFICIALS MADE TO THE PRESS. HE LAID THE BLAME FOR THE TRAGEDY FIRMLY AT THE DOOR OF THE 'MORALLY BANKRUPT' AND 'ARROGANT' POLICY MAKERS IN WASHINGTON, RATHER THAN

WITH THE CAPTAIN OF THE VINCENNES, AND HE CALLED ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONDEMN A QUOTE FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UNQUOTE, SUPPORTING HIS ARGUMENT WITH REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 2 OF THE UN CHARTER, THE 1944 CHICAGO CONVENTION AND THE ICAO PROTOCOL OF MAY 1984. ANYTHING LESS THAN CONDEMNATION WOULD NOT ONLY SHOW DISRESPECT TO THE DEAD BUT WOULD WEAKEN THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS THAT HAD BEEN CONTRAVENED. FAILURE TO CONDEMN WOULD BE A TOTAL DISGRACE.

4. VELAYATI WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT THE PRESENCE OF U S FORCES IN THE GULF HAD RESULTED IN INCREASED INSTABILITY AND REDUCED SECURITY FOR CIVIL AVIATION AND SHIPPING. THE AMERICANS, HE CLAIMED, WERE NOT SUPPORTING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION BUT ACTIVELY HELPING IRAQ. THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD ACT IMMEDIATELY TO COMPEL THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER FOREIGN FORCES TO LEAVE THE GULF. WERE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TURN A BLIND EYE TO U S AGGRESSION, THE LAW OF THE JUNGLE WOULD PREVAIL. HE CALLED FOR EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO ENSURE THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND STOP THE SPREAD OF WAR, AND RECALLED IRANIAN PROPOSALS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY TALKS. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WERE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO EVADE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES, AN EVER-INCREASING THREAT TO CIVIL AVIATION WOULD RESULT: TODAY IRAN, TOMORROW SOMEONE ELSE.

5. BUSH SPOKE FOR 20 MINUTES. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE GIVEN TO THE DEBATE BY THE U S ADMINISTRATION AND DISMISSED OUT OF HAND THE 'RECKLESS AND INTEMPERATE' IRANIAN CHARGES. HE HOPED THAT GOOD MIGHT COME FROM THE IRANIAN PRESENCE IN THE COUNCIL IN THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE TO END THE GULF CONFLICT. HE REAFFIRMED THE RIGHT OF U S AND EUROPEAN FORCES TO BE IN THE GULF: THERE WOULD BE NO REDUCTION OF THE U S COMMITMENT TO PROTECT NEUTRAL SHIPPING AND THE FLOW OF OIL. HE CALLED FOR A TOTAL END TO THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ON THE HORRORS OF WHICH HE DWELT, AND FOR IRAN TO OBSERVE SCR 598. IRAN COULD NOT APPEAL TO THE UN WHILE REFUSING TO ACCEPT ITS DECISIONS. HE EXPRESSED DEEP SORROW AT A TRAGIC ACCIDENT. AS WELL AS CONTINUING THEIR OWN INVESTIGATION, THE U S GOVERNMENT WOULD COOPERATE FULLY WITH ICAO. MANY FACTS WERE STILL UNCLEAR. IRAN MUST SHARE THE BLAME FOR ALLOWING THE FLIGHT TO ENTER AN AREA OF HOSTILITIES. HE REMINDED THE COUNCIL OF THE U S HOSTAGES, OF 14 YEAR OLDS BEING SENT TO THE FRONT AND OF THE LACK OF A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND A FREE PRESS IN IRAN. HE WOULD NEVER DENY U S FORCES THE RIGHT TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. HE MENTIONED U S COMPENSATION TO THE FAMILIES OF THE BEREAVED AND STRESSED THAT THE U S WOULD PAY ONLY WHEN MECHANISMS WERE IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE MONEY WENT TO IRANIAN FAMILIES RATHER THAN THEIR GOVERNMENT.

HE ENDED BY SAYING THAT THE U S HAD HAD A NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE GULF FOR 40 YEARS AND LOOKED FORWARD TO CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD ALLOW IT TO RETURN TO A MORE MODEST LEVEL.

6. THE COUNCIL THEN ADJOURNED, AND WILL RESUME ON 15 JULY, WHEN I SHALL BE THE FIRST SPEAKER. TWELVE OTHERS ARE DOWN TO SPEAK, BUT THE LIST WILL NO DOUBT GROW.

COMMENT

7. VELAYATI'S SPEECH WAS VEHEMENT AND LONG, THOUGH IT AVOIDED THE WILDNESS OF SOME IRANIAN LANGUAGE IN THE PAST. NEVERTHELESS, HIS ACCUSATION THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF THE IRAN AIR FLIGHT WAS PREMEDITATED, HIS CALL FOR THE COUNCIL TO CONDEMN THE UNITED STATES AND HIS WARNINGS THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD DISGRACE ITSELF IF IT FAILED TO ACT FIRMLY WENT OVER THE TOP. AS BUSH POINTED OUT, NONE OF THOSE PRESENT COULD BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD ACT AS CALLOUSLY AS VELAYATI CLAIMED. BUT IN PUTTING A MAXIMALIST CASE, NO DOUBT WITH AN EYE ON THE AUDIENCE AT HOME, VELAYATI WAS ALSO PREPARING THE WAY FOR THE IRANIANS TO CLAIM LATER THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS FAILED THEM AND THEY WILL HAVE NO MORE TO DO WITH IT.

8. BUSH ALSO HAD AN EYE FOR THE TV CAMERAS AFTER A MEDIA BUILD-UP THAT HE WAS COMING TO THE UN TO STICK IT TO THE IRANIANS AND DISPEL THE WIMP IMAGE. IN THE EVENT, IT WAS A CALM AND FIRM PERFORMANCE. HE DECLINED TO ADDRESS THE DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT AND INSTEAD CONCENTRATED ON IRANIAN REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH SCR 598, ON THE NEED TO END THE WAR WHICH WAS THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE DEBATE AND ON U S SYMPATHY FOR THE VICTIMS AND THEIR FAMILIES. NO DOUBT AS A BALANCING POINT, HE DWELT ON IRAQI USE OF CW. AND HE GOT ALL THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN. UNLIKE SOME WHO PARACHUTE INTO THE COUNCIL, BUSH UNDERSTANDABLY HAD A GOOD FEEL FOR THE OCCASION, RESPONDING TO POINTS MADE BY VELAYATI AND AD LIBBING WITH COMMENTS ABOUT DEATH AND SORROW THAT WERE CLEARLY HIS OWN. DESPITE ACCUSATIONS OF ELECTIONEERING, MOST MEMBERS SAW HIS PRESENCE AS A MARK OF SERIOUS AMERICAN REGARD FOR THE COUNCIL AND FOR THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES.

9. WHILE MANY WILL SYMPATHISE WITH IRAN'S CLAIM TO SOME REDRESS AND WITH VELAYATI'S RESENTMENT OF THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THE GULF, ON BALANCE BUSH PROBABLY WON ON POINTS WITH HIS FRANK ADMISSION OF AN AMERICAN MISTAKE AND HIS APPEAL TO HUMAN SENTIMENT.

10. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

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OF 130050Z JULY 88
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M I P T : IRANIAN AIRBUS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR DRAFT OF POSSIBLE RESOLUTION.

BEGINS
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE DESTRUCTION OF IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 ON 3 JULY 1988 BY A UNITED STATES VESSEL DURING AN ENGAGEMENT IN THE GULF,
EXPRESSING SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED,
NOTING THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESSED ITS REGRET AT THE INCIDENT, AND HAS OFFERED TO PAY COMPENSATION TO THE FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED,
REAFFIRMING THE NEED TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT,
RECALLING THE RIGHT OF STATES TO SELF-DEFENCE CONFIRMED IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER,
RECALLING ALSO ITS RESOLUTION 552(1984), WHICH CALLED UPON ALL STATES TO RESPECT IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW THE RIGHT OF FREE NAVIGATION,

1. EXPRESSES ITS DEEP SORROW AT THE DESTRUCTION OF IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 ON 3 JULY 1988 AND THE CONSEQUENT LOSS OF LIFE, AND EXTENDS ITS CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED:
2. WELCOMES THE DECISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION (ICAO) TO CONDUCT A FULL INVESTIGATION:
3. URGES ALL STATES TO COOPERATE WITH ICAO TO PREVENT ANY RECURRENCE OF THIS TRAGIC INCIDENT: AND TO COMPLY FULLY WITH THE 1944 CHICAGO CONVENTION ON CIVIL AVIATION IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT:
4. RE-EMPHASISES THE URGENT NEED FOR THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESOLUTION 598 (1987), AND ITS SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THAT END.
ENDS

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10 DOWNING STREET
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From the Private Secretary

11 July 1988

THE GULF: ACCIDENTAL SHOOTING DOWN OF IRANIAN AIRCRAFT

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Reagan about the handling in the Security Council of the accidental shooting down of the Iran aircraft. I should be grateful for a draft reply.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence).

(C. D. POWELL)

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

July 11, 1988

CDB 11/7

Dear Prime Minister:

The President has asked me to deliver the attached letter to you. There will be no signed original.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Charles H. Price, II
Ambassador

Attachment: SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, SW1.

SECRET

SUBJECT cc MASTER OPS

July 11, 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T110/88

(2)

24(A-B)

Prime Minister

CBB

11/7

Dear Margaret:

I would like to share with you some thoughts about the recent Iranair 655 tragedy in the Persian Gulf. You will have seen my own statement of regret over the loss of life. It is a human tragedy of terrible proportions. The unfortunate incident took place as our naval forces were defending against unprovoked attacks by Iranian forces -- a situation for which Iran bears responsibility. We have a thorough military investigation underway, and are prepared to cooperate in every appropriate way with an investigation by the International Civil Aviation Organization, while protecting sensitive national security information as necessary. I want all the relevant facts to be brought to light as soon as possible.

As you know, Iran has called for an urgent Security Council meeting. We understand that Iran wants this meeting to focus solely on the airline disaster. But it is important that any Council deliberation be as constructive as possible, focussing on the basic problem of tensions in the area resulting from the long unresolved Iran-Iraq conflict, as well as on the need to prevent a repetition of this latest tragedy. It should not be used as a forum to undermine our mutual interests in the Gulf and the western naval presence there, or as a means to undermine Resolution 598 as the basic framework for a settlement.

With this in mind, we intend to take the following approach in the Council, welcoming your advice as the debate proceeds, and your support. We will not support a resolution by the Council, since any resolution short of one implementing Resolution 598 could undermine efforts to achieve a just and durable negotiated peace. We are, however, prepared to consider an agreed statement by the Security Council president, preserving the unanimity of the Council on the Iran-Iraq war. Such a statement could express the Council's regret at the loss of life, call for appropriate safeguards to prevent such tragedies from happening again, support an investigation by the ICAO, call for a lowering of tensions, and most importantly, reaffirm the Council's firm support for the earliest possible implementation of Resolution 598 in its entirety as the basis for a settlement of the war.

SECRET
US Declassified

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It is essential that this tragedy not divert us from our principal objective of ending the Iran-Iraq war. This is the only way to end the suffering of innocent victims. A year after the adoption of Resolution 598, bearing in mind the lessons of the Iranair tragedy and having in mind the recent shift in military effectiveness between Iraq and Iran, I believe it is incumbent on all of us as Council members to address urgently with renewed determination the task of securing implementation of the resolution and thus bringing this senseless and bloody war to an end. I would welcome your thoughts on how we can best proceed towards this, our shared goal.

Sincerely,

/S/

Ronald Reagan

cc/c

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

July 7, 1988

DM has seen
CAD

Dear Prime Minister:

The President has asked me to deliver to you the enclosed letter which was received at the Embassy today. There will be no signed original.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Charles H. Price, II
Ambassador

Enclosure

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, SW1.

FILE KK
LT

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 July 1988

I enclose a copy of a message from President Reagan to the Prime Minister about the accidental shooting down of the Iranian airliner in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

BR

US Declassified

SUBJECT
cc MASTER
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T107/88

July 7, 1988

Dear Margaret:

I want to thank you for your prompt support of U.S. defensive actions in the Iran airline incident. It was indeed a terrible tragedy which illustrates the urgent need to end this conflict. In the meantime, I look forward to continuing to work with you in the Gulf and in the U.N. to find a peaceful solution to this war.

Regards,

/S/

Ron

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OF 061800Z JULY 88
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WASHINGTON TELNO 1655: SHOOTING DOWN OF IRANIAN AIRBUS: US REACTIONS

SUMMARY

1. AFTER INITIAL SHOCK, PRESS, PARTY AND PUBLIC OPINION LARGELY ACCEPT THAT ACCIDENT RESULTED FROM A JUSTIFIABLE DECISION IN THE HEAT OF MILITARY ACTION. SOME RENEWED CRITICISM OF US/GULF POLICY. MEDIA NOW PURSUING THE UNANSWERED TECHNICAL QUESTIONS. MEDIA COMMENT MOVES ON TO DEBATE IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY. ADMINISTRATION SO FAR MANAGES TO HOLD THE LINE.

DETAIL

2. MOST DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN LEADERS HAVE SO FAR STOOD BY THE ADMINISTRATION'S PORTRAYAL OF THE INCIDENT AS AN APPALLING MISTAKE ARISING FROM A DECISION WHICH WAS UNDERSTANDABLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. DUKAKIS HAS SAID THAT THE US ARMED FORCES PLAINLY HAD THE RIGHT TO DEFEND THEMSELVES WHEN ATTACKED. SO LONG AS THE WAR CONTINUED THERE WOULD BE MORE TRAGEDIES AND THE US MUST TAKE THE LEAD TO STOP THE FIGHTING. IN BUSH'S VIEW THE VINCENNES COMMANDER QUOTE WAS DOING WHAT HE HAD TO DO UNQUOTE. STATEMENTS BY NUNN, WARNER AND OTHERS HAVE TAKEN BROADLY THIS LINE, THOUGH SOME HAVE RESERVED FINAL JUDGEMENT. JACKSON AND COELHO (D-HOUSE WHIP) HAVE BEEN HIGHLY CRITICAL OF US GULF POLICY BUT HAVE NOT QUESTIONED THE COMMANDER'S JUDGEMENT. WRIGHT AND WARNER HAVE CALLED FOR COMPENSATION FOR THE FAMILIES.

3. MOST MEDIA COMMENT, WHILST POINTING TO NUMEROUS UNANSWERED TECHNICAL QUESTIONS, HAS BEEN RESTRAINED ON THE INCIDENT ITSELF. THE NEW YORK TIMES SAID TMAT IT WAS HARD TO SEE WHAT THE NAVY COULD HAVE DONE TO AVOID IT. AMERICAN CAPTAINS IN THE GULF WERE BEING ASKED TO BEAR AN APPALLING RESPONSIBILITY. THIS WOULD NOT ARISE IF THE NAVY DID NOT HAVE TO BE IN THE GULF, BUT THAT PROSPECT DEPENDED ON TEHRAN'S WILLINGNESS TO BRING AN END TO ITS FULTIE WAR WITH IRAQ. THE WASHINGTON POST SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S ACCOUNT QUOTE PORTRAYS A CONSCIENTIOUS NAVAL SKIPPER TRYING DESPERATELY TO WARN OFF AN OMINOUSLY APPROACHING

AIRCRAFT UNQUOTE, AND DID NOT DISPUTE THAT DESCRIPTION. BUT THE BEST RESPONSE SHOULD BE A CONCERTED NEW PUSH TO STOP THE WAR. THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE BELIEVES THE PRESIDENT WAS RIGHT TO DEFEND THE US ACTION IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE US NAVY WAS ENGAGED IN A TOUGH THANKLESS JOB TO HELP PROTECT THE FREEDOM OF SHIPPING - A JOB MADE NECESSARY BY THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR.

4. MANY COMMENTATORS HAVE MOVED ON SWIFTLY TO CONSIDER OVERALL US POLICY IN THE GULF, AND SOME ARE CRITICAL. THE LOS ANGELES TIMES CLAIMS THAT THE BIGGEST AND MOST OVERDUE QUESTION TO BE ANSWERED QUOTE IS WHAT HAS BEEN THE POINT AND WHAT IF ANYTHING IS BEING GAINED BY THE ADMINISTRATION'S INCREASINGLY ONE-SIDED INTERVENTION IN THE GULF. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE OUTSET THAT AN UNNEUTRAL POLICY WAS AN UNWISE POLICY...IRAN IS NOW ABLE TO ALLEGE THAT THE SHOOTING DOWN..WAS DELIBERATE AND TO KNOW THAT MANY IN THE WORLD WILL BELIEVE THAT CLAIM UNQUOTE. THE CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER SAYS THAT EVEN NOW QUOTE THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO STAND BY A POLICY THAT HAS BEEN DISCREDITED BY THE IRAN CONTRA AFFAIR AND WHICH HAS COST THE LIVES OF HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE POLICY HAS HELPED BRING AN END TO THE WAR IN THE GULF UNQUOTE. BUT THE HEAVYWEIGHT EAST COAST PRESS IS MORE MODERATE. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL POINTS OUT THAT WHAT THE WORLD WANTS MOST IS AN END TO THE WAR AND WHAT THE US SHOULD WANT IS A BUSINESSLIKE RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN. QUOTE THE US HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACT BOTH FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND TO PROMOTE ITS OWN POLITICAL INTERESTS UNQUOTE, BY OFFERING TO PULL BACK ITS NAVAL PRESENCE FOR A SHORT PERIOD TO ALLOW IRAN AND IRAQ TO BEGIN TALKING TOWARDS AN ARMISTICE. THE WASHINGTON POST SAYS THAT THE GULF TRAGEDY QUOTE DOES NOT ALTER THE LARGER STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS THAT WERE APPARENTLY MOVING IRAN TOWARDS SOMETHING OF AN UNNANOUNCED MILITARY AND POLITICAL DE-ESCALATION UNQUOTE. THE US HAD DEEPLY ANGERED IRAN BUT BY ITS SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS QUOTE IT IS ALSO MAKING A SERIES OF GESTURES THAT INVITE A CONSIDERED IRANIAN RESPONSE UNQUOTE. THE NEW YORK TIMES IS ROBUST. QUOTE AMERICAN FORCE AND DIPLOMACY HAVE SUCCESSFULLY RESTRAINED AND ISOLATED IRAN UNQUOTE. THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THAT STRATEGY AND ONE ACCIDENT, HOWEVER HORRIFYING, WAS NO REASON FOR CHANGING THAT GOAL OR THE MEANS AMERICA HAS CHOSEN TO ACHIEVE IT.

5. THE PRESS ARE NOW HARD TO WORK ON THE TECHNICAL QUESTIONS NOTABLY:

A) IRANIAN AIRCRAFT TRANSPONDER SIGNALS. DOD SPOKESMEN ARE CLAIMING THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS EMITTING TWO SIGNALS, ONE NORMALLY EMITTED BY BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT, THE OTHER NORMALLY RESTRICTED TO MILITARY AIRCRAFT.

B) AIRCRAFT POSITION. ASPIN HAS DISPUTED ADMIRAL CROWE'S INITIAL STATEMENT THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS OUTSIDE THE ESTABLISHED COMMERCIAL FLIGHT CORRIDOR, CLAIMING THAT AT A DOD BRIEFING FOR HOUSE LEADERS OFFICIALS ADMITTED THAT IT WAS WITHIN THE CORRIDOR HEADING FOR THE CENTRE LINE WHEN ATTACKED.
C) AIRCRAFT HEIGHT. DOD SPOKESMEN HAVE CLAIMED CONFLICTING EVIDENCE FROM US NAVY AND AIRTRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ABOUT THE AIRCRAFT'S HEIGHT AND WHETHER IT WAS DESCENDING WHEN ATTACKED, AS STATED BY CROWE.
D) THREAT: THE WASHINGTON POST HAS UNEARTHED AN EX-PILOT CLAIMING THAT AN F14 WOULD POSE NO MAJOR THREAT TO THE VINCENNES.
6. THE MEDIA WILL CONTINUE FERRETING AT LEAST UNTIL THE DOD'S INVESTIGATION IS MADE PUBLIC. THE TEAM IS NOW IN THE GULF. BUT THE PRESS HAVE ALSO GIVEN PROMINENCE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE OF APOLOGY TO IRAN AND TO RAFSANJANI'S APPEAL ON TEHRAN RADIO AGAINST SWIFT REVENGE. THESE ANGLES, TOGETHER WITH A DEGREE OF SOLIDARITY AMONG POLTICAL LEADERS AND THE ABSENCE OF ANY CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE MISTAKE COULD EASILY HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, HAVE ENABLED THE ADMINISTRATION TO WEATHER THE STORM SO FAR.

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YOUR TELNO 1115: US/IRAN: SHOOTING DOWN OF IRANIAN AIRBUS

SUMMARY

1. US POSTS ON ALERT FOR IRANIAN MILITARY OR TERRORIST RETALIATION, BUT STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NO SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE OF HEIGHTENED THREAT IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. MAIN STATE CONCERN NOW TO REVIVE UN DIPLOMATIC PROCESS IN THE CONTEXT OF UNSCR 598.

DETAIL

2. WE ASKED LARRY POPE (DIRECTOR NEA/NGA) ON 5 JULY FOR STATE'S ASSESSMENT OF IRANIAN INTENTIONS. HE SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT IRAN WOULD SEEK TO EXTRACT MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA VALUE FROM THE TRAGEDY. IRANIAN REACTIONS HAD SO FAR BEEN CONFINED TO ANTI-US RHETORIC, BUT THIS MIGHT BE ONLY ONE ELEMENT IN A TWO-TRACK POLICY INVOLVING MILITARY RETALIATION OR TERRORIST ATTACKS ON US TARGETS. US MILITARY POSTS AND EMBASSIES WORLDWIDE HAD THEREFORE BEEN PLACED ON ALERT, BUT THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE TO INDICATE A HEIGHTENED THREAT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. (FURTHER DETAILS OF THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF IRANIAN INTENTIONS FOLLOWS SEPARATELY TO THE ASSESSMENTS STAFF).

3. THE IRANIANS HAD CALLED FOR AN URGENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE NEXT WEEK. THE US SAW THIS AS A POSITIVE STEP. THIS MIGHT INDICATE THAT IRAN WISHED TO TEST INTERNATIONAL REACTION BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER TO RETALIATE. RELATIVELY MODERATE ELEMENTS IN TEHRAN MIGHT ALSO WISH TO DEFER ANY MILITARY OR TERRORIST ACTION THAT COULD REDUCE INTERNATIONAL SYMPATHY FOR IRAN.

4. BUT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT IRANIAN REACTIONS. THERE WERE ELEMENTS IN THE GOVERNMENT (THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS) WHICH WERE ALWAYS INCLINED TO VIOLENT ACTION. THE US COULD ONLY SPECULATE HOW THESE ELEMENTS WOULD REACT IN THE EMOTIONAL AFTERMATH OF THE INCIDENT. STATE COULD NOT RULE OUT UNAUTHORISED ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST US TARGETS ON A SPONTANEOUS AND UNCOORDINATED BASIS.

5. POPE SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT HAD BEEN WIDELY

APPRECIATED. THE US WERE STILL ASSESSING REACTION FROM OTHER ALLIES AND WORLD OPINION. GULF RESPONSES IN PARTICULAR HAD BEEN MILD AND BALANCED SO FAR.

6. POPE NOTED THAT US DOMESTIC REACTION HAD BEEN GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE (WITH JESSE JACKSON A SIGNIFICANT IF PREDICTABLE EXCEPTION). HE WAS NOT SURE HOW LONG THIS CONSENSUS WOULD HOLD. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE FINDINGS OF THE US NAVY'S INVESTIGATION, WHICH WOULD TAKE ABOUT 3 DAYS TO COMPLETE.

7. STATE'S MAIN CONCERN WAS NOW TO REVIVE THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS IN NEW YORK WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF UNSCR 598. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE UN FACED UP TO ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. THE US DID NOT HAVE NEW IDEAS TO OFFER AND SAW SCR598 AS THE ONLY PRACTICAL PATH TOWARDS AN END TO THE WAR. IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING NEXT WEEK HELPED TO NUDGE ALL PARTIES IN THIS DIRECTION THEN SOMETHING MIGHT BE SALVAGED FROM THE TRAGEDY.

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SIC LBL/UAJ/VUA
SHOOTING DOWN OF IRAN AIRBUS
1. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT WITH THE LOCAL CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES, WHO SPOKE IN STRICT CONFIDENCE WHICH PLEASE PROTECT. THEY ARE SAYING NOTHING TO THE PRESS. THEY AGREED THAT THE APPARENT LOCATION OF THE STRIKE - EG THE POSITION 26.34N 55.59E REPORTED ON THE CLASSIFIED NAVY RED CHANNEL TO ALLIED FLEETS AND THE LOCATION OF IRANIAN SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS, WAS SOME 3 MILES INSIDE THE ALPHA 59 AIRWAY FROM BANDAR ABBAS TO DUBAI. THEY CONSIDERED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO HAVE TO HAVE REACHED THE HEIGHT OF 7,000 FEET AT THE POSITION AND TIME INDICATED HAD THE AIRCRAFT PURSUED ANYTHING OTHER THAN ITS NORMAL TAKE-OFF PROCEDURES.
2. THE LOCAL PRESS ON 3 JULY INCLUDED THE INFORMATION THAT IR655 WAS DUE IN DUBAI AT 1115 HOURS. IT TOOK OFF FROM BANDAR ABBAS AT 10.47 HOURS AND APPEARED TO BE EXACTLY ON TIME. THE LAST COMMUNICATION HEARD HERE FROM THE AIRCRAFT WAS THAT THE PILOT WAS CONFIRMING WITH ATC TEHRAN THAT HE HAD CLEARANCE TO CLIMB TO FLIGHT LEVEL 14. THIS IS NORMAL CRUISING HEIGHT FOR THE FLIGHT. THEY HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE, APART FROM THE AMERICAN ANNOUNCEMENT, THAT AT 10.53 HOURS LOCAL IT WAS DESCENDING OR PERFORMING ANY UNUSUAL MANOEUVRE.

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PS/SIR R BUTLER CAB OFF
SIR P CRADOCK CAB OFF
MR P J WESTON CAB OFF
MR POWELL NO.10 DOWNING ST.
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DEFENSE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING
ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF
BRIEFER:
ADMIRAL WILLIAM CROWE, CHAIRMAN JCS

SUNDAY, JULY 3, 1988

MR. DAN HOWARD: Ladies and gentlemen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, will be with you in a moment. He has an extensive statement to make, and after that he will take brief Q & A.

Admiral Crowe.

ADMIRAL CROWE: Good afternoon. After receiving further data and evaluating information available from the Persian Gulf, we believe that the Cruiser USS Vincennes, while actively engaged with threatening Iranian surface units, and protecting itself from what was concluded to be a hostile aircraft, shot down an Iranian airliner over the Straits of Hormuz. The US government deeply regrets this incident. A full investigation will be conducted, but it is our judgement that based on the information currently available, the local commanders have sufficient reasons to believe their units were in jeopard, and they fired in self defense.

The sequence of events commenced when the Vincennes helicopter was fired upon by Iranian surface units at 10:10 a.m. local Gulf time. For a correlation, that was 2:40 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, approximately 40 minutes before the air action. Subsequently, the Vincennes identified the Iranian firing units and closed to engage. The Iranian gunboats turned toward Vincennes at high speed and were engaged at 10:13 with gunfire from the Cruiser and the Frigate Albert B. Montgomery. While so involved, the Vincennes detected an aircraft over Iran at about 10:47 a.m., again, local time. This aircraft headed toward the Vincennes and commenced closing at high speed.

The Vincennes immediately began assessing this new threat. The suspect aircraft was outside the prescribed commercial air corridor. More importantly, the aircraft headed directly for Vincennes, on a constant bearing at high speed, approximately 450 knots. A warning was sent on both military and civilian distress frequencies beginning at 10:49 a.m. This procedure was repeated several times, but the aircraft neither answered nor changed its course. There were electronic indications on Vincennes that led it to believe that the aircraft was an F-14. There have been a number of F-14 flights in the area over the last few days.

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DEFENSE DEPT. 07/03/88

(QC)

Given the threatening flight profile and the decreasing range, the aircraft was declared hostile at 1015 [illegible] local. At 10:54 a.m., when the aircraft was about nine miles away, Vincennes fired two standard surface-to-air missiles, at least one of which hit at an approximate range of six miles. Due to the limited visibility, the aircraft was not visually sighted until the missile impacted.

In understanding this incident, it is important to appreciate the total context in which our ships operate. The US government emphasized from the outset that committing military units to the Persian Gulf mission would involve risks and uncertainties. This conclusion has been reinforced by several incidents. For example, the Bridgeton mining, the Stark tragedy, and the Samuel B. Roberts mining. A decision was made early to the commitment to give our commanders sufficient latitude to protect their people and equipment when hostile intent was manifested. They do not have to be shot at before responding. Throughout our involvement in the Persian Gulf, the Iranian government has repeatedly threatened and acted upon US forces.

In September 1987, as a result of the attack on the USS Stark, and other incidents, the United States issued a Notice to Airmen, locally known as a NOTAM, which advised all aircraft in the Persian Gulf region that US Navy ships were taking additional precautions, and of the need to identify themselves and to state their intentions.

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Additionally, they were advised that failure to respond to requests for identification and intentions or to warnings and operating in a threatening manner could place the aircraft at risk by US defensive measures. As to the recent environment, we have alerted our forces of indications that Iranian units might attempt to carry out attacks against our forces over the July 4th holiday period. We are still in the process of reconciling and collating all the data. And official investigation of the incident will be conducted by Rear Admiral William N. Fogarty(sp?), United States Navy of the US Central Command. That concludes my statement.

Q Admiral, has there been contact with the Iranian government, and if not, is any planned?

ADMIRAL CROWE: There has not been direct contact, no. I think we will be awaiting the results of the SAR effort and any other indications.

Q Have any orders been issued to change the mode of our operations in the Gulf?

ADMIRAL CROWE: No.

Q Admiral, the Aegis cruiser is supposed to be one of the most sophisticated in the fleet in determining threat. How is it that it apparently misidentified this aircraft?

ADMIRAL CROWE: I'm a little confused by your statement. It is one of the most sophisticated ships we have and certainly the improvements made in Aegis weapon system have greatly amplified our capability, and I'm talking about the number of targets that we can track, the ranges that we can detect a target, the attitudes, and our ability

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to detect and classify emanations from an aircraft. But it has not solved all of our problems, and it does not defy the laws of physics. And one of the most difficult problems is from a radar blip, particularly from a head on target, to identify the type of aircraft and so forth. I repeat for you, that the people in the command center, and the people operating the radar had about four minutes from the time they picked this target up until it was declared hostile. That alone is a severe constraint.

Q But what lead them to believe that it was an F-14 echo?

ADMIRAL CROWE: Some other electronic information, which is classified, and I'm not willing to discuss.

Q Was the airliner squawking, as it should be, with its IFF? Two, did the airliner have the right to be where it was? And what was your judgement? Was the skipper acting under the rules of engagement or was he a little bit impetuous here?

ADMIRAL CROWE: Let me do it in reverse order if I could, please, George. It is my judgement on the information that is available to us, that the commanding officer conducted himself with circumspection. And considering the information that was available to him, followed his authorities and acted with good judgement in a very trying period of time and under very trying circumstances. Let me repeal that not only was he following this aircraft, and was he concerned about it, he was engaged on the surface with Iranian units at the time. The aircraft was not in the the air corridor that it would normally be in, but the air corridor has a limited

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amount of air space, and he was outside of that. Whether that is a factor, I don't know at this point.

And what was your first one?

Q The last one was whether his IFF was squawking, and whether it would have happened if the old rules of engagement were still in force?

ADMIRAL CROWE: The old rules of engagement?

Q If we had't changed the rules in September, would he have held his fire -- the skipper?

ADMIRAL CROWE: Certainly, the rules of engagement would not have been as specific in the authorities it granted him. I don't know whether he would have or not, under the old rules. You're asking me about IFF. We did have some electronic emanations, but I really can't say any more than that.

Q But do you know(?), he didn't identify himself as a commercial or ---

ADMIRAL CROWE: No, he did not.

Q How come? Did he ---

ADMIRAL CROWE: Now, I should stress, of course, in that regard, that we warned him on the Civilian Air Distress Net three times in these few minutes, and four times on the Military Air Distress Net.

Q -- saying, "We have you" ---

ADMIRAL CROWE: Yes. We received no answers. Nor did he vary course, or he did he indicate in his conduct in any way that he had received our communications.

Q He was squawking something, but not the recognizable "I am an airliner?"

ADMIRAL CROWE: Well, it led us to believe that it was a military aircraft.

Q How come?

Q -- civilian aircraft, to be outside of its normal air corridors in that part of the world?

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ADMIRAL CROWE: I don't know that I can answer that question. It seems to me that two things are pretty clear. First of all, flying in that kind of constrained environment that you would be very careful, particularly given the warnings and the NOTAMs we had issued. And, secondly, I don't understand the responsibility of a country that, while it is attacking other ships, making a war zone

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out of a certain area of the ocean and then goes ahead and flies a commercial airliner over that part of the ocean at the time that attacks and hostilities are underway.

Q Was there anything else unusual in terms of speed or altitude of this aircraft, other than it did not respond and that they were out of their normal flight corridors?

ADM. CROWE: As I said at the conclusion of my statement, not all the data is in, but we do have indications that the people on the ship were led to believe, from the flow of information -- and we are reconstructing this now -- that the aircraft was not only on steady bearing and closing, but that it had gone up in altitude and was increasing -- or decreasing in altitude as it neared the ship.

Q What was the altitude (inaudible)?

ADM. CROWE: At what point?

Q The point at which the attack was commenced.

ADM. CROWE: Well, it was somewhere between 9,000 -- and I think the missile was at about 7,000 feet, somewhere in --

Q (Inaudible) thousand feet. Is the attack --

ADM. CROWE: Again, I'm qualifying this, because we're having to reconstruct and draw out all that data from the AEGIS system.

Q Did you say that the speed --

ADM. CROWE: It's not easy to do.

Q -- the speed of the aircraft was 450 knots. Is the attack speed of the F-14 not somewhat higher than that?

ADM. CROWE: It could be. The F-14 -- there were indications that as he got closer his speed was increasing. But not dramatically, just increasing.

Q Are there any indications that the Iranians are now heading up to take some further action or some response in addition -- in response to this?

ADM. CROWE: There was an attack this afternoon, after this morning's incident, on a -- I believe it was a Norwegian -- Norwegian ship. Further south, not in the vicinity of this event.

Q Were there any AWACS, either Saudia Arabian -- or did we have AWACS off our carrier in the Indian Ocean supporting the --

ADM. CROWE: No, there was not. No, there was no air cover, there was no -- either an E-2 or an AWACS in the vicinity.

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Q Why was that?

ADM. CROWE: Because we were not escorting an Earnest Will mission. These ships were returning from a convoy, coming through by themselves, through the Strait, and we just don't use our cover for that.

Q (Off mike) -- heightened state of alert since they permanently deployed the Silk Worms, (the?) anticipated 4th of July attack?

ADM. CROWE: But we were anticipating units that wouldn't require that.

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In any event, there was not.

Q Admiral, what did we do to find survivors, and what is it doing to search for the black box?

ADMIRAL CROWE: The wreckage, if, in fact, there is wreckage, is inside of Iranian territorial waters. They are conducting a SAR search in there. We are not in there, we've gone pretty close to try and follow events, what they are doing, but no, we are not in the vicinity of the wreckage.

Q How far out of the corridor --

Q -- F-14s operating out of Bandar Abbas -- they operated tandem with the F-4s. Can you tell us whether there were any other Iranian aircraft of any description in the in area --

ADMIRAL CROWE: There was an F-4 up later. Whether it had been up all the time or earlier we're not able to determine.

Q Was there a way to avoid these --

Q How much later?

ADMIRAL CROWE: Well, a few minutes. I don't know exactly, but it did not come out -- it didn't go feet wet(?), and it didn't play a part in this.

Q Have you determined what precipitated the first attack?

STAFF:(?): You might want to point out on the map, here, where the wreckage is.

ADMIRAL CROWE: This is sort of a simplistic chart, we're trying to keep it simple. The incident this morning when it all started was in this area, this is the -- (Off-mike.) -- Vincennes, their helicopter was fired on in this vicinity, and about in that same area, in this direction, somewhere -- (Off-mike.) -- the aircraft was impacted about here. The Iranians are reporting the wreckage in this vicinity, and that is -- (Off-mike.) -- southwest -- or rather southeast of Qishum Island. And we're still in the vicinity there trying to follow those events.

The -- this is the commercial air route, and the attack this afternoon was in this area.

Q -- (Off-mike.) -- located off the commercial air corridor, Admiral, when it was shot? How far out of the corridor was it?

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ADMIRAL CROWE: Well, it's somewhere, we believe, in the neighborhood of four to five miles.

Q Do you really --

ADMIRAL CROWE: Again, that is subject to (correction?) of the data we (find?).

Q You may be implying by the abnormal behavior of this aircraft that it's not inconceivable that the pilot was trying to draw the fire of these missiles?

ADMIRAL CROWE: I did not mean to imply that.

Q Admiral, the people are going to ask, "Okay, this happened, the Persian Gulf is a million accidents waiting to happen." Have you made any recommendations as to how to minimize the risk of this happening again? And what do we do from here?

ADMIRAL CROWE: We, of course, are constantly surveying and reviewing --

Q Admiral, could you get on the microphone, sir, please?

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ADMIRAL CROWE: We are constantly surveying and reviewing, not only the circumstances under which we operate, but also the rules of engagement. We do not discuss the rules in detail, but this, obviously, will put increased emphasis on such a review. There will also be a facet of the formal investigation. But I emphasize that as a matter of course, every single day and every single incident in the Gulf is reviewed, and if it suggests that we should do some -- our operating patterns should be different. We try and follow that. Learn it and profit from it. If we see something, as our study of this and our analysis of this to suggest that we can make it more safe and still protect ourselves, we'll change it. Let me repeat. The number one obligation of the Commanding Officer of a ship or of a unit are the protection of his own people. We deeply regret the loss of life here, but that Commanding Officer had a very heavy obligation to protect his ships, his people. We've made that clear thoughout the Persian Gulf mission, and we have acted on it accordingly, and we believe it is right and proper.

Q Admiral, what details do you have -- what happened after the missile hit the aircraft? Where did it hit the aircraft, and was it struck --

ADMIRAL CROWE: I don't know that we could determine that, but we do have some vague -- incidentally, the visibility in the Gulf at the time was about two to five miles. That, of course, depending upon where you are and variations may be mixed. But we do have some eye witness reports that saw the vague shape of the aircraft when the missile hit -- and it looked like it had disintegrated.

Q Admiral, have we done anything to join any search or help to rescue possible survivors?

ADMIRAL CROWE: We had some other reports, which is not too abnormal in this kind of situation, that, yes, they thought there was wreckage here, wreckage there. They were outside of Iranian territorial waters. We checked every one of those with helicopters and ships. We have attempted to run down and to assist in anyway we can without infringing Iranian territorial waters.

Q Was it raining or fog? You say poor visibility.

ADMIRAL CROWE: No. Just haze.

Q Admiral, have you determined what started the first incident? Why the helicopter was fired on? How that all started?

ADMIRAL CROWE: It's a little vague, but there were two merchant ships

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in the area, and probably a total of somewhere -- thirteen ---

STAFF: Thirteen to fifteen.

ADMIRAL CROWE: Thirteen to fifteen small boats. And our ships were coming back through the strait. And when they closed -- now, I don't have this in great detail. But when they closed, some of those small boats -- Boghammars -- left the area and presumably returned at high speed to Bandar Abbas. Several stayed in the area. We got no requests from the merchant ships. So when we passed, it looked like that our presence was deterring them. Later, to get a better picture, we put a helicopter in the area; and, when it went over toward those boats, they fired on it. That's when the Vincennes turned back toward -- to his helicopter ---

Q What did they fire with? Were they missiles or ---

ADMIRAL CROWE: No, it was gunfire.

Q Admiral, did the airliner make any kind of radio communication after the Vincennes fired its missile?

ADMIRAL CROWE: No.

Q Nothing after it was hit?

ADMIRAL CROWE: Either before or after.

Q Was only one missile fired, or were there more?

ADMIRAL CROWE: Two were fired.

Q Do we know in that sequence which one it was that sunk the aircraft?

ADMIRAL CROWE: No, we don't.

Q Has there been any pattern of Iranian F-14s using airliners in the area as shadow to conduct patrols or anything like

airliners in the area as shadow to conduct patrols or anything like that?

ADMIRAL CROWE: We have not detected that as a pattern. Now, the F-14s in the area is a relatively new development. We have had those, of course, in the central Gulf for some time -- mainly operating out of Bushehr -- are airports in the central part of Iran. But in the last few weeks, and particularly the last few days, we have had some F-14s in the southern Gulf. And I believe yesterday -- the Halsey ---

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Q It occured yesterday and three days ago.

ADMIRAL CROWE: Yesterday we had an F-15 in the neighborhood of the Halsey; but they communicated, and he went around the Halsey at safe distance and responded to our request. But

CONTINUED ON PAGE 10-1

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this is an unusual development and --

MR. HOWARD: We're going to take a couple more questions and wrap up.

ADMIRAL CROWE: I'm sorry.

Q Was this an accident waiting to happen?

ADMIRAL CROWE: You could in a sense, of course, characterize all combat operations as an accident waiting to happen. We have said from the very outset of our involvment there that when you're using force, when you're putting combat operations on to support your policy, and it is a policy that is resisted and not agreed to by another party, who is likewise willing to do things, you're running risks. We've never pretended otherwise. We have been very successful with our -- using our strength to keep down these kinds of accidents and incidents. I think that if -- we have contacted airliners before. We have had them respond. They have varied course. That policy has been very successful and again, I repeat, if a country is going to wage combat operations in a certain area and then send a commercial airline in the area during that, of course it's an accident waiting to happen. And if airliners do not pay attention to these instructions and guidance that we have put out, and the warnings we put out, then that poses a problem. We do deeply regretCROWE: We're trying to detect that -- or determine that right now. I would like to emphasize your point for a moment. F-14, on corridors, out of corridors -- the important points here are the commanding officer has a responsibility to protect his people, his unit. He is engaged already in a surface action. He has a minimum amount of time. It is logical to conclude that while he is firing, and they are approaching him, and an aircraft lifts off from Iran, goes toward him, steady course, high speed, decreasing altitude, will not vary, will not contact him, it's a more than logical conclusion that he may very well be in jeopardy.

Q Admiral, on the origination of the flight. Did it come from -- I don't know what city. I missed that.

ADMIRAL CROWE: We believe Bandar Abbas.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 11-1

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Q It did -- that's a military base, isn't it?

ADM. CROWE: No, it's joint -- civil and military.

Q Just let me finish with that. You tracked that plane on takeoff?

ADM. CROWE: We don't know, but maybe we did.

MR. HOWARD: Admiral, to your left, George -- Bob's been trying to ask a question for a long time.

ADM. CROWE: Okay, Bob. Go ahead.

Q Is the first time an Iranian commercial airliner has acted in this way?

STAFF: He's had a name change. (Laughter)

ADM. CROWE: I don't have a specific example of where it has before. We have multination airliners in the Gulf. In general, our policy has been respected, responded to. Occasionally we have an airliner that ignores it. But usually they are at very high altitude. The reason that these accidents are avoided mainly is that civilian airliners fly at very high altitudes, and particularly because of that area. This one did not.

Q Admiral, the ship captain's responsibility notwithstanding, an F-14 being an American-made plane, shouldn't it be one of the easier aircraft to identify, especially stacking its information radiated against a four-engine commercial airliner?

ADM. CROWE: It depends on, of course, what it does. And it depends on how much information you have on it. It depends on the attitude which it's flying. It depends on the altitude. It depends on the atmospheric conditions. It depends on how much time you've got to process the data. And unfortunately, this has been the -- one of the major difficulties in the Persian Gulf from the outset. We're fighting in a lake. And when flights come, feet wet, out of Iran, very few seconds -- no matter what.

Q Admiral, aren't comparisons going to be made with -- this was the case of US mistaken identity and a commercial airliner was shot down. The Soviet Union was a case of mistaken identity in Korean 007. What is the difference, to your view, between this shoot down and that one?

ADM. CROWE: I think there are two very fundamental differences. There are probably a whole host of them, with more thought. But the fundamental differences are, of course, that it was not war zone, there was not combat in progress, there was not

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DEFENSE DEPT. 07/08/88 11-3

combat there normally; and, secondly, the KAL 007 was not armed in any way, form, or fashion.

CONTINUED ON 12-1

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DEFENSE DEPT. 07/08/88 12-1

Nor was, as far as I can tell or determine, was any attempt made to -- by Korean -- to make very high altitude, and even after the completion of the incident, I don't know any claim was made that it was there for some sort of espionage. It was not accused of being an intelligence gatherer. That was certainly not the case.

Again, I'm very much Admiral Crowe.

END

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THE WHITE HOUSE

OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY

For Immediate Release July 3, 1988

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I am saddened to report that it appears that the proper defensive action by the USS VINCENNES this morning in the Persian Gulf an Iranian airliner was shot down over the Strait of Hormuz. This is a terrible human tragedy. Our sympathy and condolences go out to the passengers, crew, and their families. The Defense Department will conduct a full investigation.

We deeply regret any loss of life. The course of the Iranian civilian airliner was such that it was headed directly for the USS VINCENNES, which was at the time engaged with Iranian gunboats that had attacked our forces. When the aircraft failed to heed repeated warnings, the VINCENNES followed standing orders and widely published procedures, firing to protect itself against possible attack.

The only US interest in the Persian Gulf was peace and this tragedy reinforces the need to achieve that goal with the possible speed.

END

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FROM BRITENET.WTON [illegible] PG. 8 [illegible] PG. 8

PT. file

PRESS STATEMENT

The British Government profoundly regret the loss of life on the Iranian airliner and extend their deep sympathy to the bereaved.

This has been a tragedy for all concerned.

We have been in touch with the United States and they have kept us informed of their investigations.

We understand that, in the course of an engagement following an Iranian attack on US forces, warnings were given to an unidentified aircraft apparently closing with a US warship, but these warnings received no response. We fully accept the right of forces engaged in such hostilities to defend themselves.

This tragic accident underlines the urgent need for an early end to the Iran/Iraq conflict including an end to all attacks on shipping.

3 July 1988

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FM WASHINGTON
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 1647
OF 031620Z JULY 88
INFO FLASH MODUK, GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD

INCIDENT IN THE GULF

1. THE PENTAGON HAVE ADMITTED TO US THAT THE US HAVE MISTAKENLY SHOT DOWN IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ A CIVILIAN AIRLINER. THIS HAS NOT YET BEEN CONFIRMED PUBLICLY.

2. THE PENTAGON GAVE US A BRIEFING ON THE INCIDENT THIS MORNING. MAIN POINTS WERE:

(A) IRANIAN SMALL BOATS ATTACKED A US HELICOPTER IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ THIS MORNING:

(B) US FIRE WAS RETURNED, APPARENTLY SINKING TWO IRANIAN BOATS:

(C) DURING THIS ENGAGEMENT, THE USS VINCENNES (AEGIS - CLASS CRUISER) IDENTIFIED ON RADAR AN AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM BANDAR ABBAS WHICH CLOSED WITH THE USS VINCENNES. THE AIRCRAFT'S TRACK AND FLIGHT PATH WERE CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF AN IRANIAN F14 CLOSING ON THE USS VINCENNES IN SUPPORT OF THE IRANIAN SMALL BOAT ATTACK:

(D) THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE IRANIAN F14 ACTIVITY OUT OF BANDAR ABBAS OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS:

(E) THE USS VINCENNES WARNED THE APPROACHING AIRCRAFT ON ALL APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL FREQUENCIES AT 0649Z (WHEN THE AIRCRAFT WAS AT 20 NAUTICAL MILES DISTANCE) AND AGAIN AT 0651Z (16 NAUTICAL MILES DISTANCE) BUT RECEIVED NO RESPONSE:

(F) GIVEN THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS, AFTER THE SECOND WARNING, WELL WITHIN RANGE FOR A MISSILE ATTACK ON THE USS VINCENNES AND HAD NOT RESPONDED TO WARNINGS, COMMIDEASTFOR GAVE AUTHORITY FOR THE AIRCRAFT TO BE ENGAGED:

(G) THE AIRCRAFT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED TO BE A CIVILIAN AIRLINER ON AN UNSCHEDULED AND UNANNOUNCED FLIGHT BETWEEN BANDAR ABBAS AND DUBAI. IRANIAN CLAIMS THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS AN A300 AIRBUS HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED (THE PENTAGON CURRENTLY BELIEVE THAT IT MAY HAVE BEEN A SMALLER AIRLINER).

3. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE NOT YET CONFIRMED PUBLICLY AND TO THE PRESS THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS A CIVILIAN AIRLINER, NOR THAT IT WAS THE US THAT SHOT IT DOWN. BUT EARLIER PENTAGON STATEMENTS THAT THE US HAD SHOT DOWN AN IRANIAN F14 ARE NOW BEING BACK-PEDALED.

4. AN ANNOUNCEMENT AND NEWS CONFERENCE HAVE BEEN SCHEDULED FOR APPROXIMATELY 1800Z. WE SHALL REPORT IMMEDIATELY.
5. PLEASE ADVANCE TO FCO RESIDENT CLERK AND NO 10 DUTY OFFICER.

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GULF AIRLINER - SHOOTING INCIDENT
SUMMARY
1. US MISTAKENLY SHOT DOWN CIVILIAN AIRLINER OVER STRAITS OF HORMUZ WHILE CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF IRANIAN SMALL BOAT ATTACK ON US HELICOPTER
DETAIL
2. DURING AN INCIDENT INVOLVING IRANIAN SMALL BOAT ATTACK ON US HELICOPTER IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, USS VINCENNES IDENTIFIED ON RADAR AN AIRCRAFT OUT OF BANDAR ABBAS WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY CLOSED WITH HER. TRACK AND FLIGHT PATH WERE CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF AN F14 CLOSING USS VINCENNES TO SUPPORT SMALL BOAT ATTACK AND CONSIDERABLE F14 ACTIVITY OUT OF BANDAR ABBAS OVER PAST FEW DAYS. USS VINCENNES WARNED APPROACHING AIRCRAFT ON ALL APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL AIR SAFETY FREQUENCIES AT 0649Z AND AGAIN AT 0651Z BUT RECEIVED NO RESPONSE. WARNINGS WERE WHEN AIRCRAFT WAS AT 20 NAUTICAL MILES AND 16 NAUTICAL MILES RESPECTIVELY. WHEN NO RESPONSE WAS GIVEN AFTER SECOND WARNING AND WITH AIRCRAFT WELL WITHIN MISSILE RANGE FOR AN ATTACK ON USS VINCENNES. PERMISSION WAS SOUGHT AND GRANTED FROM COMMDEASTFOR TO ENGAGE.
3. AIRCRAFT SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED TO BE A CIVILIAN AIRLINER ON AN UNSCHEDULED AND UNANNOUNCED FLIGHT BETWEEN BANDAR ABBAS AND DUBAI. IRANIANS CLAIM AIRCRAFT WAS AN AIRBUS BUT PENTAGON CURRENTLY BELIEVE SMALLER AIRCRAFT INVOLVED. DETAILS STILL FAR FROM CLEAR
4. STATEMENT BY ADMIRAL HOWE, CJCS, EXPECTED SHORTLY.
BT

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

3 July 1988

From the Private Secretary

THE GULF

General Powell telephoned me from the White House at 1400Z this afternoon to say that the Americans were now clear that they had shot down an Iranian Airbus over the Gulf. So far as he could reconstruct the situation, the American Navy had been engaged in operations against Iranian small boats which had been attacking a tanker or tankers. Their radar picked up an aircraft descending towards them, following a pattern used in the past by Iranian military aircraft threatening US ships. They interrogated it and, from the response, assessed it as an F14. This was corroborated by another US Navy ship and the order was given to fire. For some hours they thought they had brought down an F14 but now believed it to be the Airbus. The Pentagon will be putting out a statement, probably at about 1700 hours our time, which would be a straightforward and frank admission of what had happened and would give the facts. It would also, of course, contain an expression of regret. The President would subsequently put out a further statement. General Powell said that he would read this to me as soon as it was available, although it might not be for two or three hours (he is in an aircraft en route from Nashville to Washington). I said that we would not make any statement until after the Americans had spoken. We would, of course, express regret at the tragedy and sympathy for the bereaved. I thought we would also express understanding for how the incident arose.

You will no doubt be working on a statement. I shall be glad of an opportunity to see it and show it to the Prime Minister before it is issued. I think that the main elements should be :

- an expression of profound regret for the loss of life and sympathy for the bereaved. The incident is a tragedy for everyone concerned.

- the hope that the tragedy will finally bring home to all parties the dangers of the present situation in the Gulf and the need to achieve a peaceful solution.

I am copying this letter to the Resident Clerk (Ministry of Defence) and the DIO in the Cabinet Office.

C. D. POWELL

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr [illegible]
DS2A1L

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 June 1988

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF: CO-OPERATION WITH THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM

Thank you for your letter of 22 June covering a draft Memorandum of Understanding setting out the arrangements for an integrated RN/RNLN/Belgian Mine Counter-Measures force in the Gulf. I have shown this to the Prime Minister who agrees that the MOU should be signed and an integrated force established under British command.

I am copying this letter to Bob Peirce (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

Ian Andrews, Esq.
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 June 1988

Dear Charles

Naval Operations in the Gulf - Cooperation with the Netherlands and Belgium

Ian Andrews wrote to you on 22 June about this subject. The Foreign Secretary saw the papers last night and is content with what is proposed.

I am copying this letter to Ian Andrews and Trevor Woolley.

Yours ever

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL


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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

Prime Minister

It now appears satisfactory. Content that we proceed to signature of Memorandum of Understanding?

MO 3/21L

22nd June 1988

Dear Charles

CDP 23/6

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF - CO-OPERATION WITH THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM

In my letters of 1st and 9th June, I reported the progress of discussions with the Dutch and Belgian governments about increased co-operation between our respective mine countermeasures forces in the Gulf. As we hoped, a draft Memorandum of Understanding setting out the arrangements for an integrated RN/RNLN/Belgian MCM force has now been prepared; a copy is attached.

We and the FCO consider that its provisions are highly satisfactory and that it meets fully the criteria laid down by the Prime Minister for any integrated MCM arrangement in the Gulf. Specifically, the Dutch and Belgians are now prepared to accept permanent operational control from the Royal Navy's CINCFLEET Headquarters at Northwood, and operational tasking from the RN Commander of the CIMNEL Flotilla. A tri-national co-ordination team, using existing staff, would meet at Northwood to consider the operational directives to be given to the integrated force. Similarly, co-ordination at the local level would be effected by attaching, alternately, a Belgian or Netherlands officer to the staff of the RN commander of the integrated unit as Staff Officer Operations. The RN are confident, given the extensive contacts between the three navies in NATO waters, that these arrangements will ensure that the integrated unit of 5 MCMVs would function smoothly under effective RN direction. But as was always envisaged, "Full Command" over matters such as personnel rotation, administration and discipline would remain the responsibility of national naval headquarters. (The Belgians, in particular, attach some presentational importance to this).

The United Kingdom would provide most of the logistic support for the integrated force, such as provisioning and repairs, as the Belgians are withdrawing ZINNIA, the command and support ship for the joint Dutch/Belgian force, for financial reasons, from 1st July. The MOU makes clear that such support would be provided on a repayment

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

basis in accordance with the normal NATO principles. As at present, and where necessary, protection for the Dutch and Belgian MCMVs would be given by ARMILLA destroyers or frigates. Common Rules of Engagement based on those for the ARMILLA Patrol have also been agreed.

The impending withdrawal of ZINNIA, means that continuation of the Dutch and Belgian MCMV commitment to the Gulf is dependent upon some form of integration with the RN to provide the necessary support for their single remaining vessels. There are clear political advantages to the UK in helping to preserve widespread Western European naval involvement in the Gulf and in combatting the threat from mines to shipping of all nations. Hitherto, we have often stressed the importance of the Dutch and Belgian presence. They (and other WEU nations) would be bewildered if we were now to show ourselves unwilling to assist them in maintaining it. We would also stand to lose the credit we now enjoy with the Americans for stiffening the European will to stay the course in the Gulf. Moreover, from the naval standpoint, adding 2 extra MCMVs to our present force of 3 would improve operating efficiency and almost double our ability to tackle further Iranian mining.

For these reasons, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Mr Stewart, strongly recommends that the draft MOU should now be signed and an integrated tri-national MCMV force (to be codenamed CALENDAR) established under Royal Navy operational control, with effect from 1st July. The Belgians have asked for the MOU to be signed by national naval commanders rather than by Ministers and no formal signing ceremony is planned.

FCO officials are in full agreement with this course of action and a submission is being made to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary overnight. In the meantime, the Dutch Defence Minister, Dr van Eekelen, is under pressure to make an early statement about his Government's future intentions to the Dutch Parliament and I should be grateful to know whether, subject to any views that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary may have, the Prime Minister is content that we should proceed as proposed.

I am sending copies of this letter to Bob Peirce (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(I C F ANDREWS)
Private Secretary

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, AS REPRESENTED BY THEIR MINISTERS OF DEFENCE, ON INTEGRATED MINECOUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS IN THE GULF AREA

1. It is the desire of the Governments of Belgian, Netherlands and United Kingdom as represented by their Ministers of Defence that their respective minecountermeasures units/vessels in the Gulf area should cooperate in an integrated group. This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) sets out the main principles governing mission, command, control, operation and administration, which will be worked out in detail in an operation order named CALENDAR and agreed by respective CINCFLEETS.

2. Any problem not specifically covered by this MOU will be settled by consultation between the Belgium, Netherlands and United Kingdom Ministries of Defence, in the first instance by the WEU Naval Points of Contact.

IMPLEMENTATION

3. This MOU will come into effect upon the 1st July 1988.

4. In any emergency the MOU may be terminated by each nation without notice. However all parties undertake to use their best endeavours to avoid premature termination and to mitigate the consequences should such termination nevertheless become necessary.

5. In circumstances short of emergency, this MOU may be terminated after one month's notice given by any one party.

MISSION

6. In order to contribute to safety in international waters and to render MCM protection to international shipping, the integrated MCM force will by its presence deter minelaying and carry out defensive MCM operations as required in both international waters and, subject to agreement by littoral states, territorial seas in the Gulf South of the Iranian Advice Zone and east of 51E, and in the Gulf of Oman.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

7. The political policy of the Belgian/Netherlands/United Kingdom unit in the Gulf is de-escalatory and it is to observe strict neutrality in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. The operations of the integrated force will be conducted in compliance with maritime international law and Regulations at Sea.

8. The Rules of Engagement for the integrated MCM force will be agreed by the Belgian, Netherlands and United Kingdom Ministries of Defence.

PROTECTION

9. Integrated MCM force operations in areas with a significant risk of surface and/or air attack will only be undertaken under the protection of the Armilla Patrol frigates or destroyers or,

by mutual agreement, by other friendly navies.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

10. Belgian, Netherlands and United Kingdom units assigned to the integrated MCM force will remain under the full and operational command of their respective national authorities.

11. The force operating in the Gulf area will be under the Operational Control(OPCON) of CINCFLEET. Operational directives will be issued by the UK Senior Naval Officer Middle East (SNOME) while task directives for the MCM force will be issued by the UK Task Unit Commander.

ORGANISATION

12. All matters concerning the mission, ROEs, command and control, press releases and all other sensitive issues with political aspects will be coordinated by the respective Ministries of Defence, in the first instance by the WEU Naval Points of Contact.

13. A Tri-national Coordination Team, situated in CINCFLEET Headquarters at Northwood(UK) will coordinate the operational directives for the integrated MCM force. An officer, drawn alternately from the Belgian and Netherlands navies, will assist the staff of the UK Task Unit Commander of the MCM force as Staff Officer Operations.

LOGISTICS

14. Logistics are a national responsibility and will be dealt with by the ships individually in accordance with national procedures. Within the integrated force all units will as far as possible on a reciprocal basis assist each other in the best possible way.

FINANCE AND CONTROL

15. Services and supplies provided by one navy to another within the integrated MCM-force will be financially settled in accordance with standard NATO procedures.

CLAIMS AND LIABILITY

16. Each participant waives any claim it may have against any other participant for injury or death suffered by any of its service personnel, or loss or damage to any property owned by it, arising out of the performance of official duties in connection with this arrangement.

17. Where any third party claims arise out of the performance of official duties in connection with this arrangement, the cost of such claims shall be dealt with as follows:

a. where only one participating government is legally liable for any such claims, the claims, including the cost of settlement, will be dealt with and settled by that participating government.

b. where more than one participating government is legally liable for any such claims, the Government of the United Kingdom will deal with and settle such claims, and

the cost of such claims, including the cost of settlement, will be shared equally between those participating governments.

18. The participants will consult one another before claiming any reimbursement or making any payments.

19. Any disagreement regarding the interpretation or application of this MOU will be resolved by consultation between the Governments concerned and will not be referred to an International Tribunal or third party.

Signed in three originals in the English language,

For and on behalf of the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of Belgium

The Chief of Naval Staff

Date Signature

For and on behalf of the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

The Commander in Chief Royal Netherlands Navy

Date Signature

For and on behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland

The Commander in Chief Fleet

Date Signature

DATED THE FIRST OF JULY 1988

back

INT SITU PT 9



(2)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 3/21E

9th June 1988

Dear Charles.

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF - CO-OPERATION WITH THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM

In my letter of 1st June, I promised to let you have a further progress report this week.

The Belgian Government met last Friday and decided that, while it confirmed the previous decision to withdraw its naval forces from the Gulf - and its support ship would be withdrawn from 30th June 1988 - a Mine Counter Measures Vessel would be retained on station until, at the latest, 31st December 1988. It also announced its wish to pursue the establishment of an integrated Anglo-Dutch-Belgian MCMV force.

Officials discussing the wording of a memorandum covering such a force were able to reach broad agreement on the principal clauses, including the command arrangements. Full command would be retained by national authorities, but operational control would be vested in CINCFLEET who would act as the Task Force Commander (CTF) advised, as necessary, by a tri-national co-ordination cell drawn from officers on his NATO Staff. The chain of command would pass through the UK Senior Naval Officer Middle East and an RN Task Unit Commander to the Commanding Officers of the ships. The Secretary of State and his Dutch and Belgian counterparts agreed that this formed a suitable basis for agreement when they met briefly in Caen on 6th June.


Officials are hopeful that a tripartite arrangement which meets the Prime Minister's requirements for effective RN control can be achieved in the near future. They will now attempt to agree the details of a memorandum and I will write to you again when that has been completed.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Bob Peirce (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(I C F ANDREWS)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

IRAQ : Iran/Iraq Relations pt 9



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 3/21V

1 June 1988

Dear Charles,

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF - CO-OPERATION WITH THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM

Your letters of 18th and 30th March 1988 conveyed the Prime Minister's approval to our continuing to negotiate with the Dutch and the Belgians about the integration of Mine Counter Measures (MCM) Forces in the Gulf.

We understand that the new Belgian Defence Minister - M. Coeme - is very shortly to recommend that his Government should reverse the previous caretaker government's decision to withdraw from the Gulf, and he has proposed a draft Memorandum of Understanding providing for an integrated Anglo/Belgian/Dutch MCM force under permanent British Command. This meets our most important requirement, and represents a good basis for further negotiations, which are scheduled to take place in Brussels later today. I hope to let you have a further progress report early next week.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Bob Peirce (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(I C F ANDREWS)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

IRAQ: Iraq/Iran Related pt 9



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GULF : POSSIBLE RETURN OF AIRCRAFT CARRIER CLEMENCEAU

SUMMARY

1. LE MONDE AND NAVAL SOURCES INDICATE THAT CLEMENCEAU MAY SOON BE WITHDRAWN. QUAI FLATLY DENY THIS.

DETAIL

2. YESTERDAY'S LE MONDE REPORTED THAT THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER CLEMENCEAU MAY LEAVE THE GULF ZONE IN MID-JULY AFTER A PERIOD OF DUTY LASTING SOME ELEVEN MONTHS. THE CLEMENCEAU WOULD RETURN TO TOULON AND NOT GO BACK TO THE GULF ZONE. LE MONDE ADDS THAT OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE FRENCH NAVAL FORCE WILL REMAIN ON STATION IN THE AREA.

3. FRENCH NAVY SOURCES HAVE BEEN TELLING OUR NAVAL ATTACHE FOR SOME TIME THAT THE CLEMENCEAU'S PRESENCE IN THE GULF ZONE IS NO LONGER OPERATIONALLY NECESSARY AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD WITHDRAW IT AS SOON AS THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS WERE RIGHT.

4. DANA, IRAN/IRAQ DESK OFFICER AT THE QUAI HAS TOLD US, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS NO TRUTH IN THE LE MONDE ARTICLE. HE CLAIMS THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWING THE CLEMENCEAU FROM THE GULF ZONE IS QUOTE NOT EVEN BEING STUDIED UNQUOTE: GUIDANCE IN THIS SENSE HAS BEEN SENT TO FRENCH EMBASSIES IN THE GULF. WHEN ASKED WHETHER RUMOURS ABOUT THE CLEMENCEAU ARE LINKED WITH MOVES TO RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH IRAN, DANA CLAIMED THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT LET HER DESIRE TO RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS AFFECT HER NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE GULF ZONE.

COMMENT

5. THE DIFFERENT MESSAGES COMING FROM THE FRENCH MOD (WHO PROBABLY BRIEFED LE MONDE) AND FROM THE QUAI MAY REFLECT A POLICY DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO MINISTRIES. THE MOD ARE KEEN TO WITHDRAW THE CLEMENCEAU FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS. THE QUAI WISH FRANCE TO DO NOTHING WHICH WOULD SEEM TO UNDERMINE THE FIRM POSITION

TAKEN BY CHIRAC, AND NOT CONTRADICTED BY ROCARD/DUMAS, THAT FRENCH POLICY COMMITMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST (AND IN PARTICULAR HER SUPPORT FOR IRAQ) WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE PROCESS OF RE-ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN. IT WOULD BE SURPRISING, HOWEVER, IF THE SCALE OF THE FRENCH PRESENCE IN THE REGION WERE NOT REVIEWED AT AN EARLY DATE BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT (CF PARIS TELNO 496, PARA 4).

FERGUSSON

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FCO TELNO 280 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: IRAN/IRAQ

SUMMARY

1. IN US VIEW, SOVIET POSITION ON ARMS EMBARGO STILL FIRMLY NEGATIVE. NO HINT OF A SUMMIT SURPRISE.

DETAIL

2. WE HAD A FURTHER EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH BURLEIGH (DAS/NEA) ON 27 MAY, DRAWING ON TUR, BAGHDAD TELNO 355 AND FCO TELNO 715 TO MOSCOW.

3. BURLEIGH COMMENTED THAT ZAHAWI'S SUGGESTION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE READY TO MOVE ON AN ARMS EMBARGO WAS PUZZLING. IT CONTRADICTED THE REGULAR IRAQI LINE (WHICH TARIQ AZIZ HAD AGAIN GIVEN TO GENERAL WALTERS) THAT THE SOVIET UNION WERE PLAINLY DRAGGING THEIR FEET. ZAHAWI NORMALLY FOLLOWED TARIZ AZIZ'S LEAD CLOSELY. IF THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN SPINNING A LINE, ONLY ZAHAWI SEEMED TO HAVE SWALLOWED IT.

4. BURLEIGH SAID THAT US VIEWS REMAINED BASICALLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE RUSSIAN POSITION. THERE WAS NO SIGN THAT THE RUSSIANS PLANNED ANY SURPRISE AT THE SUMMIT (THOUGH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SHULTZ WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THEM). SOVIET REFERENCE TO POTENTIAL IRANIAN INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WAS A FLIMSY PRETEXT (HE NOTED THAT BRUTENTS HAD PLAYED THIS DOWN TO MIERS). BUT UNDERLYING SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO CO-OPERATE IN AN EMBARGO AGAINST IRAN WAS NO LESS REAL. FACTORS FOR THE RUSSIANS PROBABLY INCLUDED:

I) THEY STOOD TO GAIN LITTLE IN THE ARAB WORLD FROM COOPERATING, NOW THAT THEY HAD DELAYED FOR SO LONG:

II) FIVE POWER COOPERATION IN SCR 598 HAD VISIBLY EVAPORATED, LEAVING THE ARMS EMBARGO AS A WESTERN INITIATIVE WITH WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WERE BEING REQUIRED TO FALL INTO LINE.

(III) FURTHER MORE SERIOUS US-IRANIAN CLASHES COULD CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO ADVANCE THEIR INTERESTS IN IRAN, AS THEY HAD TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO DO FOR A PERIOD LAST AUTUMN.

IV) IRAQI SUCCESSES HAD TAKEN THE EDGE OFF ARAB PRESSURE ON THEM.

5. ON NEXT STEPS, BURLEIGH HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO THE IDEAS

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REPORTED IN OUR TELNO 1296. THE US DEMARCHE TO ARAB GOVERNMENTS ATTENDING THE ALGIERS SUMMIT WOULD ISSUE ON 27 MAY (ADVOCATING A STIFF SUMMIT RESOLUTION AND PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS AND CHINESE). AT THE UN, THE US WERE NOT HOPEFUL (DESPITE PICCO'S ASSURANCES) THAT THE UNSG WOULD INSIST ON A WRITTEN IRANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF HIS SCR 598 ADHERANCE FORMULA. WITHOUT THAT, THE SCOPE FOR FURTHER ACTION TO BREAK DOWN THE IRAQI POSITION WAS LIMITED.

6. BURLEIGH WOULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY, SO BADLY WAS IRAN DOING IN THE WAR, THAT EVEN THE HARD-LINERS IN TEHRAN MIGHT SEE ADVANTAGE IN A CEASEFIRE AS A SHORT-TERM MANOEUVRE. IF THERE WAS SOME SUCH OPENING FROM TEHRAN, IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE THE IRAQIS IN THEIR PRESENT MOOD THAT IT WAS ANYTHING MORE THAN A TACTIC TO STEM IRAQI SUCCESSES AND EARN IRAN A BREATHING SPACE.

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INFO ROUTINE RIYADH, WASHINGTON

THE GULF SITUATION/IRAN-IRAQ WAR

SUMMARY

1. THE SULTAN WILL SEE IF OMAN CAN PLAY A BRIDGE BUILDING ROLE BETWWEN IRAN AND OTHER GCC STATES AFTER THE HAJ. SENDING QAIS ZAWAWI TO RIYADH. MODERATELY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT TRENDS IN IRAN. SEEKING TO BUILD UP THE IMPRESSION OF OMAN AS AN ACTIVE REGIONAL POWER.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I SAW HIM ON 25 MAY THE SULTAN COMMENTED THAT HE FELT THAT THE SITUATION WAS A LITTLE IMPROVED. THE TEMPO OF HOSTILITIES HAD DROPPED. HE HAD SPENT THREE HOURS WITH AQAZADEH, THE IRANIAN PETROLEUM MINISTER, TWO DAYS BEFORE. AFTER DISCUSSION INVOLVING THE MINISTER'S DELEGATION, AQAZADEH HAD ASKED FOR A TETE-A-TETE SESSION. HE HAD THEN ASKED THE SULTAN WHAT HE THOUGHT OMAN COULD DO TO HELP TO IMPROVE IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER GCC COUNTRIES. (IN AN ASIDE THE SULTAN ADDED THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD SEND NO PILGRIMS - THIS WAS ENCOURAGING.) HE SAID THAT HE HAD REPLIED TO THE IRANIANS THAT THERE WAS NOTHING HE COULD DO UNTIL AFTER THE HAJ. IF THAT PASSED OFF WITHOUT TROUBLE, HE WOULD SEE WHETHER HE COULD PLAY A ROLE, BUT THAT IRAN WOULD HAVE TO OFFER SOME CLEAR REASSURANCES PARTICULARLY TO KUWAIT (AQAZADEH APPARENTLY COMMENTED THAT A CLEAR CUT STATEMENT FROM KUWAIT THAT SHE WOULD REMAIN STRICTLY NEUTRAL IN ACTUAL HOSTILITIES WOULD HELP).

3. THE SULTAN SAID THAT HE HAD ALSO BEEN STRUCK BY A COMMENT BY AQAZADEH THAT THE ARABS SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT IRANIAN HOSTILITY TO THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONTINUE FOR EVER. IF AND WHEN IRAN WAS READY TO MAKE AN OPENING TO THE US THE LATTER WOULD RESPOND READILY GIVEN HER VIEW OF THE REGION'S GEO-POLITICS.

4. THIS CONVERSATION HAD ENCOURAGED THE SULTAN'S VIEW THAT THERE

WAS A GROUP OF PRAGMATIC MINISTERS AND OTHERS IN THE GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN WHO RECOGNISED THE NEED TO REDUCE IRAN'S ISOLATION. HE ACCEPTED HOWEVER THAT THESE WERE NOT NECESSARILY THE PEOPLE TO WHOM KHOMEINI WAS MOST LIKELY TO LISTEN BRFORE MAKING HIS DECISIONS. HE SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT EITHER THE DECISION TO START LAYING MINES AGAIN OR THAT TO ATTACK THE MUBARAK FIELD ON 18 APRIL HAD BEEN COLLECTIVE DECISIONS IN TEHRAN. (THE UAE HAD TOLD HIM THAT IRAN HAD APOLOGISED FOR THE LATTER AND CLAIMED THAT IT WAS A DECISION OF LOCAL COMMANDERS IN THE HEAT OF BATTLE.) HE BELIEVED THAT THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE OTHER GOVERNMENTS COULD PLAY WAS TO STRENGHEN THE HAND OF THIS GROUP WHENEVER OPPORTUNITY AROSE.

5. I SUBSEQUENTLY WENT OVER THE GROUND IN A BIT MORE DETAIL WITH QAIS ZAWAWI WHO IS TO BE SENT ON A MISSION TO KING FAHD NEXT WEEK TO EXPLORE THE SAUDI POSITION BOTH ON THIS AND ON OPEC (SEE MIFT) . I SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DRAW FIRM CONCLUSIONS ABOUT TRENDS IN TEHRAN BUT THE TREND TOWARDS ECONOMIC RADICALISM SEEMED UNLIKELY TO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF ANY DIPLOMATIC PRAGMATISTS. I OUTLINED WHAT I THOUGHT THE LIKELY SAUDI ATTITUDE WOULD BE ON THE LINES OF RIYADH TELNO 285, AND WHY WE FORESAW A NEED FOR FURTHER PRESSURE ON IRAN IN NEW YORK IF IRAQI ATTITUDES DID NOT LET HER OFF THE HOOK. I ALSO CAUTIONED HIM ABOUT POSSIBLE IRANIAN USE OF SURROGATES TO CAUSE TROUBLE IN JULY.

COMMENT

6. THE SULTAN CLEARLY HOPES OMAN MAY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY AS A HELPFUL CHANNEL FOR VIEWS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS. THE INTERVIEW HE GAVE ANDREW MCEWEN OF THE TIMES YESTERDAY WAS DESIGNED TO EMPHASISE OMAN'S ROLE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS, BUT HE IS NOT IN A HURRY. THE MESSAGE WAS UNDERLINED BY THE FACT THAT HE ALSO YESTERDAY ACCEPTED THE CREDENTIALS OF THE FIRST AMBASSADORS OF THE SOVIET UNION, PDRY, AND SYRIA. FINALLY, HE SAID THERE WAS MUCH HE LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH US LATER IN THE SUMMER.

ALSTON

YYYY

CONFIDENTIAL

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary 16 May 1988

**IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS:
LETTER FROM THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER**

Thank you for your letter of 16 May about the letter from the Iranian Prime Minister. I am confident that the Prime Minister would agree to an oral reply in the terms proposed in your letter.

(C. D. POWELL)

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 May 1988

Dear Charles

Iraqi use of CW: Letter from the Iranian Prime Minister

The attached letter to the Prime Minister from her Iranian counterpart was delivered by a message to the FCO over the Easter long weekend. It concerns recent Iraqi use of chemical weapons against villages in Iraqi Kurdistan, on which you will have seen the Cabinet Office Assessments.

The Iranian letter, which appears to be a round-robin addressed to a number of Heads of Government, contains the expected invective against Iraq for using CW, in contravention of international law. It claims, with some justice, that Iraq can only continue using CW, and justifying it as necessary in a war situation, because of a lack of effective international action. It also suggests that repeated use of CW with impunity makes such use appear acceptable and proliferation more likely. The Iranians call for strong (but unspecified) international action against Iraq.

We would have had little difficulty in responding positively to such a letter, if it had come from someone other than the Iranians. If it had not arrived on the eve of the hijack of the Kuwaiti plane to Mashad a positive reply might indeed have been appropriate. As it is, we need to take into account unanswered questions about Iranian involvement in that hijack as well as the state of our bilateral relations and our policy of maintaining impartiality in the conflict, in particular not allowing ourselves to be used for Iranian propaganda purposes.

These considerations rule out a written reply from the Prime Minister. But the Foreign Secretary proposes that, on the Prime Minister's instructions, officials should now convey an oral response to the Iranians through their Charge d'Affaires here. In this response officials would speak in the following terms: the UK is firmly opposed to the use of chemical weapons. We have unequivocally condemned the use of CW by Iraq in Halabja and other Kurdish villages. Any Iranian use of CW is equally condemned. We believe that any suspected use of CW must be treated very seriously by

/the

the international community. That is why we voted in favour of the resolution passed in New York on 9 May following the report of the Secretary-General's investigation team. The British Government abandoned its CW capability in the 1950s. We remain in the forefront of international efforts to achieve a worldwide ban on chemical weapons and will continue our efforts to prevent the proliferation of CW, in particular through export controls of CW precursors.

Officials would go on to point out that without the current conflict between Iran and Iraq there would be no CW use in the region. We strongly support SCR 598 as the only basis for a negotiated settlement. Iran bears a heavy responsibility for the continuation of the conflict. Iran must accept that the conflict cannot be won militarily and that a negotiated settlement is inevitable. SCR 598 takes account of Iran's legitimate concerns, as it does those of Iraq, and we urge Iran to comply immediately with SCR 598 and to enter into serious discussion with the Secretary-General on implementation of the Resolution on the basis of his latest proposals.

We do not propose to mention the Iranian role in freeing the British hostages on the hijacked Kuwaiti airliner [redacted] We would make it clear that there would be no signed reply from the Prime Minister.

Yours ever

Bob Peirce

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

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C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

Embassy of The Islamic Republic of Iran

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE ALMIGHTY

The Prime Minister
Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP
10 Downing Street
London

Excellency,

Please accept my warm salutations and greetings, and expression of my wishes for your success.

You have certainly informed by the news media about one of the most horrible war crimes of contemporary history, a crime unprecedented in history, because they have been committed by a government at an unimaginably large scale against people of its own country. I would like you to know that no words or no pictures can communicate the depth of this horrendous crime to those who have not seen for themselves the scene of the crime.

Repeated and extensive chemical bombardment of the Iraqi city of Halabcheh and several other cities in Iraq and Iran, should be felt by the clear conscience of the world with the same deep distress that has pained us and our Moslim people. Here and there, in the city of Halabcheh, with a population of seventy thousand, mothers and children and the men who desperately tried to save them from the barbaric chemical attacks and repeated air strikes, perished in a matter of a few seconds.

In order to feel better the depth of this tragedy, several thousands more should be added to the list of the victims of this tragic event, they are the ones injured, some of them fatally, by chemical weapons. There is no doubt that those who have been saved , will certainly suffer the dire complications of these poisons to the end of their lives.

Those who have remained indifferent to this crime, despite the many warnings of the Islamic Republic of Iran, are all accomplices in this crime. Even in cases where an organization like the United Nations, has sent expert teams to the area and has issued statements and adopted resolutions on the basis of the documented reports, in which the Iraqi Bathist regime has been deemed responsible and condemned, no serious and effective measure has so far been taken to prevent the commission of these crimes.

Embassy of The Islamic Republic of Iran

Mention should be made of the fact that most regrettably the Iraqi regime has acted in such a way to make others believe that these inhuman crimes, that violate all international laws and regulations, and that can be in no way justified, are linked to the war itself.

The Iraqi regime, on the sole pretext that the war is going on allows itself to infringe all international laws and regulations related to war. This position was officially announced and defended in the statement recently made by the rulers of Baghdad.

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the Iraqi adoption of such an unreasonable position is only based on this regime's confidence in the passive attitude of international organization and influential powers, who it knows will never embark on any practical measures to counter such crimes.

It is more than evident how unfounded and unreasonable this postion-taking is : Because faced with such a position-taking, one may feel inclined to believe that the limitations and prohibitions stipulated in the international laws and regulations related to war, are only provided for peace time, and for any reason that a war goes on, one is then allowed to resort to such inhuman acts.

Now, we predict that the Iraqi regime, in pursuit of its policy of constantly expanding its crimes, carried out since the beginning of the war, is going to bring about a critical development, which was heralded by the chemical bombardment of cities in Iraq and Iran.

The Islamic Republic of Iran expressly declares that if serious steps are not taken by the international community to prevent the Iraqi regime from the commission of these war crimes particularly the use of chemical weapons, we shall witness much more disastrous scenes and humankind should expect a more horrible future.

There is no need to say that if today serious steps are not taken to stop these war crimes and prevent the use of chemical weapons, and if, with its repetition, these inhuman acts become a routine daily practice that is no more distressing, we should expect its dire consequences to come forth everywhere both in the war imposed on us and in the

Embassy of The Islamic Republic of Iran

everyday life of the people of the world.

It is very much necessary to take note of the fact that in most parts of the world, chemical weapons can be produced very easily, and that they can be deployed with the same ease. Therefore, if the use of this inhuman weapon becomes a commonplace practice, the humankind will live in constant worry and anxiety, which will certainly be beyond what our world today can tolerate.


With a view to preventing a disaster that can jeopardise the whole humanity. Strong reactions are internationally called for in the face of these cruel and horrible acts committed by Saddams's regime.

And it is our belief that international laws and regulations, including the Geneva Convention of 1925, have been prepared with the same objective.

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate that the Muslim people of Iran will resist all aggression, and shall continue their legitimate defence and deal with all possible developments in accordance with their humanitarian principles and effective policy until such time when the aggressor is punished.

With the assurance of highest consideration,

Mir Hossein Mossavi
Prime Minister
Islamic Republic of Iran
31st March 1988



SECRET 23

file KB
cc FPC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 May 1988

THE GULF: NAVAL PROTECTION

Thank you for your letter of 6 May about the Gulf, covering a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Reagan's recent message.

The Prime Minister welcomes the American decision to extend 'distress assistance' to certain categories of neutral shipping in the Gulf, while accepting that we cannot go beyond our present practice. She preferred a shorter and less defensive reply. I enclose the version which she has signed and should be grateful if it could be despatched as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

R. N. Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth office.

SECRET

SECRET 22

SLH

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T66/88

SUBJECT CC MASTER OPS

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

9 May 1988

Dear Ron.

Thank you for your message of 22 April about developments in the Gulf. We were of course glad to do everything we could to support the highly professional and effective United States action on 18 April. It has undoubtedly helped to contain the Iranian threat.

I strongly endorse your suggestion of closer informal coordination between Western navies over minesweeping. I understand that an arrangement has been drawn up for an informal division of Gulf waters into areas of 'prime interest' to the various Western naval forces operating there. This is welcome.

I understand why you have decided to introduce 'distress assistance' for certain categories of neutral shipping under attack in the Gulf. It is not an option for us: the Armilla Patrol already accompanies over sixty ships a month in and out of the lower Gulf, more than double the number of accompaniments of all the other Western navies put together. We simply do not have the resources to do more. But we do render humanitarian assistance to merchant ships of other nationalities under attack, and our commanders have discretion to interpose their vessels between the attacker and the victim, and could of course use force if they felt themselves to be threatened. We shall certainly continue to offer humanitarian assistance on this basis.

SECRET

I entirely agree on the need for a more intensive diplomatic effort at the UN. Iraqi use of chemical weapons has blurred the issue rather. But the basic problem remains Iran's refusal to implement SCR 598. We must therefore press the Russians and Chinese hard to finalise the draft arms embargo Resolution.

Warm regards

Yours ever

Margaret

The President of the United States of America

SECRET

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CC PC

Prime Minister

I think it would be a mistake to wring our hands over the American decision to extend protection. Of course there are some risks but benefits too in increasing the pressure on Iran. I have therefore shortened & firmed up the reply. Agree to sign?

CDP 6/5

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 May 1988

Dear Charles

The Gulf: Naval Protection

I wrote to you on 26 April about President Reagan's message of 22 April to the Prime Minister about the Gulf.

As you know, President Reagan's letter has been overtaken by events. On 29 April the Americans announced that they would be offering ' distress assistance' to certain categories of neutral shipping under attack in the Gulf. This is a considerable formal extension of their regime for protection of merchant shipping. The decision was announced without full consultation with us and other allies.

Your letter of 4 May reported discussion of this subject that evening between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Officials have now considered the implications further. The Americans claim that the UK will not be asked to follow suit. However, the draft reply to President Reagan touches on the main difficulties which the decision poses for us.

- Ships of the Armilla Patrol already have some latitude under 'humanitarian assistance'. But the public change in US ROE may encourage an expectation of UK protection among non-entitled ships and more 'taggers-on' to the Patrol, thus stretching our resources further and prejudicing our protection of entitled ships.

- We must not lose the Europeans. Not all our allies have been strongly supportive of US actions in the Gulf. Many (like Belgium) see the US as pro-Iraqi and do not want to be closely associated with the perceived US stance. It should remain one of our major objectives - for political and military reasons - to maintain and consolidate our European allies' commitment to a Gulf naval presence.

Yes, but not at the expense of discouraging the Americans from extending their protection, surely.

There is also a risk that by reducing the Iranian military options the American action will increase the likelihood of Iranian attacks on shipping and oil installations of the Gulf states.

The second strand of American thinking is in favour of closer (informal) coordination between western navies

SECRET

over minesweeping operations. We welcome this. Allied Naval Commanders in the Gulf have prepared an arrangement for the informal division of Gulf waters into areas of 'prime interest' to them. Under this arrangement, the UK (with Belgium and the Netherlands) would undertake a special overseeing role in a band between the lines of longitude 55E to 57E in the southern Gulf, and the straits of Hormuz. This coincides closely with the area in which the Armilla Patrol is already operating. The arrangement is strictly informal. A formal division of the Gulf into 'national zones' is not feasible. Even collectively we do not have the resources to ensure non stop surveillance of the sea lanes or that they are kept clear of mines. Meanwhile, we are close to an agreement on the integration of Dutch and Belgian MCMVs into our own Cimnel group under British command, which would maintain their commitment to a naval presence in the Gulf.

Third, the Americans want a new, intensive diplomatic effort to implement SCR 598. We agree. Following the US action in the Gulf and recent Iraqi military successes, there may be some scope for greater flexibility by both sides, though there are no signs of a fundamental change in the Iranian position. We understand that no advance was made at the Shultz/Shevardnadze meeting. It would be premature to try to table the arms embargo resolution now: we must wait until the dust has settled on the war of the cities and on Iraqi use of CW so that attention can be refocussed on Iranian non-compliance. Even then the Russians will no doubt try to argue that the expanded US role in the Gulf makes an arms embargo against Iran inappropriate. But, while we are encouraging the Secretary-General to pursue his discussions with the parties (within a strict time-frame), we are continuing to press the Russians and Chinese to finalize the arms embargo Resolution so that it is ready to be tabled at the earliest practicable opportunity.

I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Reagan.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin and Trevor Woolley.

Yours ever

Archie

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

SECRET

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:

DEPARTMENT: PRIME Minister

TEL. NO:

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

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Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO:

President Reagan

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

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DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Thank you for your message of 22 April about developments in the Gulf. We were of course glad to do everything we could to support the highly professional and effective US action on 18 April. It has undoubtedly helped to ~~consolidate your very considerable success in~~ containing the Iranian threat.

The UK remains committed to playing an active role in the Gulf, both in protecting shipping and in seeking an end to the conflict. The Armilla Patrol, which ~~as you know~~ protects UK-owned as well as UK-flagged vessels, has taken on a steadily increasing workload. It now accompanies over 60 ships a month in and out of the lower Gulf - more than double the number of accompaniments of all the other Western navies put together.

DSR 11C
(Revised 5/87)

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We value particularly the cooperation which has developed between Western navies over minesweeping. I strongly endorse your suggestion of closer informal coordination in this field. We have been happy to explore the ideas you put forward. I understand that an arrangement has been drawn up for an informal division of Gulf waters into areas of 'prime interest' to the various Western naval forces operating there. I am pleased at this progress towards closer informal coordination.

I recognise the reasons for your latest decision to introduce "distress assistance" for certain categories of neutral shipping under attack in the Gulf. I appreciate your understanding in not asking us to do likewise. With the current heavy workload, our resources are already stretched. However I should like you to know that in rendering humanitarian assistance to merchant ships of other nationalities under attack, our commanders have discretion to interpose their vessels between the attacker and the victim, and could of course use force if they felt themselves to be threatened. We shall continue to offer humanitarian assistance on this basis.

The steps you have proposed for extending US naval protection could lead to a greater risk of confrontation with Iran. One of our concerns is that certain of European allies might be troubled by the changes you have introduced, which could conceivably

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(Revised 5/87)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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increase the pressures for withdrawal in some quarters. One of the notable features of this year has been the collective sense of purpose shown by the West in the Gulf in pursuit of our legitimate defensive interests. We have played our part in promoting a military presence there by as many European countries as possible. We shall do all we can to keep our allies fully committed, particularly in view of the need for improved minesweeping coordination, to which we both attach high priority.

We should be interested to know the reactions of the Gulf states to your proposals. We should in any case like to see them make a more direct contribution to protecting shipping going to and from their ports.

I entirely agree on the need for a more intensive diplomatic effort at the UN. It is just possible that the changed military situation may induce both sides to show some flexibility. We continue to believe that a twin-track approach in New York is right. We must press the Russians and Chinese hard to finalize the draft arms embargo Resolution. Recent Iraqi military activity, especially the use of CW, has blurred the issue of non-compliance with SCR 598. But as soon as attention can once again be focussed where it belongs, on the fact that Iran still refuses to implement SCR 598, we should be ready with an agreed draft. Meanwhile we are encouraging the Secretary-General to follow up his recent exchanges with the parties,

Iraqi use of chemical weapons has blurred the issue rather. But we must nonetheless get basic problem remains Iran's refusal to implement SCR 598. We must therefore

provided there is a strict time-frame.

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
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RAAF. situation pt 9.

CCPC

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 3/21V

6 May 1988

CDP 6/5.

Dear Charles,

THE GULF: NAVAL PROTECTION

I have seen Robert Culshaw's letter to you of today's date about the Gulf. The advice was prepared jointly by FCO and MOD officials and submitted in parallel to Ministers. For the record, my Secretary of State is content with what is proposed.

I am copying this letter to Robert Culshaw (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Trevor Wooley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(B R HAWTIN)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



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bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 May 1988

Dear Robert,

THE GULF

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a very brief exchange this evening about the recent changes announced by the Americans to their policy on providing protection for neutral-flag shipping in the Gulf as well as the apparent change to the Rules of Engagement for American naval vessels encountering Iranian craft suspected of laying mines. It was agreed that the Foreign Secretary would discuss the possible implications of these changes for the operation of the Armilla Patrol with the Defence Secretary.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

yr sincerely,

Charles Powell

Robert Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1156
OF 022350Z MAY 88
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, CABINET OFFICE

CABINET OFFICE FOR FOR ASSESSMENTS STAFF
OUR TELNO 1145: US/GULF: US RESPONSE TO IRANIAN MINE-LAYING
SUMMARY
1. INDICATIONS THAT NEW US ROE MAY ALLOW ACTION IN RESPONSE TO SUSPICION OF IRANIAN MINE-LAYING, OR INTENTION TO LAY MINES.
DETAIL
2. ACCORDING TO A RELIABLE SOURCE IN STATE, AT THE SAME MEETINGS ON 30 APRIL AT WHICH THE PRESIDENT CONFIRMED THE NEW US POLICY OF QUOTE DISTRESS ASSISTANCE UNQUOTE, HE ALSO CONFIRMED NEW ROE GOVERNING THE US RESPONSE AGAINST IRANIAN SHIPS ENGAGED IN MINE-LAYING. OUR SOURCE EXPECTED THAT ARMILLA COMMANDERS WOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD OF THIS CHANGE OF ROE BUT WE REPORT IT HERE, IN CASE THIS HAS NOT HAPPENED.
3. THESE NEW ROE APPARENTLY ALLOW US FORCES TO CHALLENGE ANY (IRANIAN) VESSEL WHICH IS SUSPECTED, ON THE BASIS OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OR PAST OR PRESENT BEHAVIOUR, OF BEING ENGAGED IN A MINE-LAYING MISSION. THIS CHALLENGE CAN BE PRE-EMPTIVE: I.E. IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT ANY MINES SHOULD HAVE BEEN LAID BEFORE ACTION IS TAKEN. IN THE CASE OF VESSELS SUSPECTED OF SUCH ACTIVITY (BUT NOT THOSE CAUGHT IN THE ACT, IN WHICH CASE IMMEDIATE MILITARY INTERVENTION IS AUTHORISED), US FORCES ARE REQUIRED FIRST TO ASK THE VESSELS TO ALLOW VISIT AND SEARCH TO DETERMINE ANY EVIDENCE OF INTENTION TO LAY MINES.
4. OUR SOURCE SAID IT WAS CLEARLY IMPLIED IN THE PAPERS HE HAD SEEN THAT ANY REFUSAL OF A REQUEST FOR VISIT AND SEARCH WOULD BE TAKEN AS PROOF OF GUILT.
COMMENT
5. SINCE IT IS IMPLAUSIBLE THAT ANY IRANIAN VESSEL WOULD EVER AGREE TO A US REQUEST TO VISIT AND SEARCH, IT WOULD SEEM THAT, UNDER THESE NON ROE, STRONG SUSPICION ALONE OF INVOLVEMENT IN MINE-LAYING COULD TRIGGER US ACTION AGAINST THE PRESUMED OFFENDER. THIS CHANGE, EVEN MORE THAN THE INTRODUCTION OF DISTRESS ASSISTANCE, WOULD SEEM TO LOWER SUBSTANTIALLY THE THRESHHOLD FOR FURTHER US-IRANIAN CLASHES. WE SHOULD PERHPAS PROMPT AN AUTHORITATIVE US BRIEFING ON MILITARY CHANNELS, IF NONE HAS YET BEEN OFFERED.

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CABINET OFFICE FOR ASSESMENTS STAFF
OUR TELNO 1145-6: US/GULF: DISTRESS ASSISTANCE
SUMMARY
1. DETAILS OF US DEMARCHE ABOUT NEW US PROTECTION POLICY FLAG STATES TO BE ASKED TO ACQUIESCE IN THE NEW US REGIME.
DETAIL
2. US OFFICIALS HAVE WORKED URGENTLY OVER THE WEEKEND TO PUT FLESH ON THE DECISION IN PRINCIPLE, ANNOUNCED ON 30 APRIL (SEE TURS), TO EXTEND US PROTECTION IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES TO NEUTRAL SHIPS UNDER ATTACK IN THE GULF (QUOTE DISTRESS ASSISTANCE UNQUOTE). OUR CONTACTS HAVE TOLD US THAT, ALLTHOUGH CERTAIN DETAILED ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED, THE ADMINISTRATION FELT READY BY LATE ON 2 MAY TO LAUNCH A BROAD DEMARCHE TO INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS TO EXPLAIN THE NEW POLICY. A CONTACT IN STATE HAS SHOWN US IN CONFIDENCE THE NEAR-FINAL TEXT OF THE CABLE OF INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH IS LIKELY TO ISSUE OVERNIGHT FOR ACTION BY US EMBASSIES, INCLUDING IN LONDON, ON 3 MAY.
3. THE CABLE IS FOR ACTION IN ALL COUNTRIES IDENTIFIED BY THE DIA AS HAVING FLAG VESSELS SERVING IN THE PERSIAN GULF IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ALL WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, NORTH KOREA, CUBA AND LIBYA (DECISION PENDING ON WHETHER ALSO TO EXCLUDE SYRIA). US AMBASSADORS IN THOSE COUNTRIES ARE INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS URGENTLY AT SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL, TO HAND OVER THE TEXT OF CARLUCCI'S 30 APRIL ANNOUNCEMENT, AND TO ADD THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
QUOTE
IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK THE US IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO CERTAIN FREE WORLD SHIPS WHICH MEET THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA, PROVIDED THEIR STATES OF REGISTRY HAVE INDICATED IN ADVANCE THAT THEY HAVE NO OBJECTION TO SUCH ASSISTANCE. TO QUALIFY FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE A VESSEL MUST MEET THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA:

(A) IT FLIES A NON-BELLIGERENT FLAG:
(B) IT OPERATES OUTSIDE DECLARED WAR/EXCLUSION ZONES IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS:
(C) IT IS NOT RESISTING LEGITIMATE VISIT AND SEARCH BY A PERSIAN GULF BELLIGERENT:
(D) IF IT IS AN INBOUND VESSEL, ITS MASTER HAS DECLARED THAT IT IS NOT BOUND FOR A BELLIGERENT PORT AND THAT IT IS NOT CARRYING CONTRABAND TO A PERSIAN GULF BELLIGERENT: OR, IF IT IS AN OUTBOUND VESSEL, IT IS NOT SAILING FROM A BELLIGERENT PORT AND NOT CARRYING BELLIGERENT PROPERTY:
(E) ITS MASTER HAS REQUESTED ASSISTANCE: AND
(F) A US WARSHIP OR AIRCRAFT, WHOSE MISSION PERMITS IT TO RENDER ASSISTANCE, IS IN THE VICINITY.

FLAG COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT INFER FROM THIS MESSAGE THAT THE US HAS UNDERTAKEN ANY COMMITMENT TO ASSIST THEIR FLAGGED VESSELS. SUCH ASSISTANCE MAY ONLY BE RENDERED IF THE CONDITIONS LISTED ABOVE ARE MET: AND US AUTHORITIES WILL RETAIN DISCRETION AS TO WHETHER TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN EACH INSTANCE.

STATES WHICH WISH TO AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THE US OFFER SHOULD COMMUNICATE THE ABOVE CRITERIA FOR ELIGIBILITY TO THEIR SHIPPING INTERESTS.

STATES WHICH WISH TO DECLINE US ASSISTANCE SHOULD INFORM THE US GOVERNMENT, AND NOTIFY THEIR OWN SHIPPING INTERESTS THAT THEY CANNOT EXPECT TO BE ASSISTED.

THE NEW US POLICY WILL GO INTO EFFECT AS RESPONSES ARE RECEIVED: THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER ANNOUNCEMENT.

UNQUOTE

4. US EMBASSIES ARE FURTHER INSTRUCTED TO SEEK QUOTE STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THIS POLICY CHANGE, PARTICULARLY FROM THOSE FLAGGED COUNTRIES WHICH WILL BENEFIT DIRECTLY UNQUOTE.

5. OUR SOURCE ADDED THAT COUNTRIES ACCEPTING US PROTECTION ON THIS BASIS ARE LIKELY SHORTLY TO BE ASKED TO GIVE THE US ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER THEIR VESSELS MEET THE CRITERIA RELATING TO AREA OF OPERATION, CONTRABAND AND BELLIGERENT PROPERTY.

6. THERE IS APPARENTLY CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY IN THE ADMINISTRATION ABOUT:

I) THE STATUS WITHIN THIS POLICY OF OIL PLATFORMS AND OTHER FIXED OFF-SHORE INSTALLATIONS: AND

II) THE ACCURATE IDENTIFICATION OF SHIPS CARRYING CONTRABAND.

ON II) ABOVE, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE US COMMANDER ON THE SCENE WOULD MERELY ENQUIRE FROM A MERCHANT VESSEL WHETHER IT WAS CARRYING CONTRABAND AND WOULD TRY TO DETERMINE WHETHER VISIT AND SEARCH HAD BEEN REQUESTED, INCLUDING IF POSSIBLE BY ENQUIRING

FROM THE BELLIGERENT WARSHIP. IN GENERAL, IF A BELLIGERENT ATTACKS A NEUTRAL VESSEL WITHOUT FIRST REQUESTING VISIT AND SEARCH TO ESTABLISH PRESENCE OF CONTRABAND, THE US COMMANDER ON THE SCENE WILL BE AUTHORISED TO ASSIST THE NEUTRAL VESSEL.

7. PRIVATELY, SEVERAL US OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US SINCE 30 APRIL OF THEIR UNEASE AT THE HASTE OF THE DECISION AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS NEW POLICY. THEY ARE IN PARTICULAR CONCERNED THAT, BY CURTAILING CONSULTATIONS IN MID-STREAM, THE ADMINISTRATION RISK PUBLIC EXPOSURE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US AND EUROPEAN POLICY AND DAMAGE TO THE IMPORTANT COOPERATION ON THE GROUND BETWEEN ALLIED COMMANDERS, PARTICULARLY OVER MINE COUNTER MEASURES. THESE OFFICIALS HOPE THEY CAN PRE-EMPT ANY DAMAGE (QUOTE PICK UP THE PIECES UNQUOTE), IN PART BY NOW PROVIDING, ALBEIT AFTER THE HORSE HAS BOLTED, THE ABOVE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF US POLICY.

8. WE HAVE HEARD VARIOUS EXPLANATIONS FOR THE HASTE WITH WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION MOVED AT THE END OF LAST WEEK. MOST POINT TO SUSTAINED PRESSURE FROM CARLUCCI AND ARMITAGE FOR AN EARLY DECISION. TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SUCCESSES OF THE US OPERATIONS ON 18 APRIL, READY ACQUIESCENCE BY POWELL (NSC) AND LITTLE RESISTANCE FROM SHULTZ PERSONALLY OVER A POLICY HE CONSIDERS TO BE PRIMARILY A DOD INTEREST.

OUR CONTACTS IN STATE NEVERTHELESS CLAIM SOME SUCCESS IN HAVING INSISTED THAT STATES OF REGISTRY BE REQUIRED TO ACQUIESCE IN US PROTECTION OF THEIR SHIPPING. THEY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THAT THESE STATES SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED POSITIVELY TO REQUEST US ASSISTANCE IN ADVANCE, BUT THEY BELIEVE THE PRESENT COMPROMISE IS SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. THEY HAVE TOLD US THAT, IN PRESSING FOR THIS, THEY HAD OUR KNOWN STRONG VIEWS ON THIS POINT VERY MUCH IN MIND.

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MIPT:
US/GULF: INCREASED US NAVAL ASSISTANCE
1. DEFENCE SECRETARY CARLUCCI MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON 29 APRIL:
QUOTE THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES TO SHIPS IN DISTRESS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND STRAIT OF HORMUZ IN KEEPING WITH LONGSTANDING, TIME-HONORED NAVY AND MARITIME TRADITION. SUCH AID WILL BE PROVIDED TO FRIENDLY, INNOCENT NEUTRAL VESSELS FLYING A NON-BELLIGERENT FLAG, OUTSIDE DECLARED WAR/EXCLUSION ZONES, THAT ARE NOT CARRYING CONTRABAND OR RESISTING LEGITIMATE VISIT AND SEARCH BY A PERSIAN GULF BELLIGERENT. FOLLOWING A REQUEST FROM THE VESSEL UNDER ATTACK, ASSISTANCE WILL BE RENDERED BY A US WARSHIP OR AIRCRAFT IF THIS UNIT IS IN THE VICINITY AND ITS MISSION PERMITS RENDERING SUCH ASSISTANCE. WITH THIS ASSISTANCE, WE ANTICIPATE NO INCREASE IN OUR CURRENT FORCE LEVELS.
WE ARE NOT THE POLICEMEN OF THE GULF, NOR DO WE WISH TO BE. FOR OVER 200 YEARS US POLICY HAS BEEN TO HELP PROTECT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. THIS ASSISTANCE IS A LOGICAL AND HUMANITARIAN OUTGROWTH OF RECENT EVENTS IN THE GULF WHICH FURTHER STRENGTHENS OUR ADHERENCE TO THIS PRINCIPLE. WE CANNOT STAND BY AND WATCH INNOCENT PEOPLE BE KILLED OR MAIMED BY MALICIOUS, LAWLESS ACTIONS WHEN WE HAVE THE MEANS TO ASSIST, AND PERHAPS PREVENT THEM. WE DO NOT INTEND TO DESCRIBE OUR SPECIFIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT OR THE METHODS WE PLAN TO USE IN RENDERING THIS ASSISTANCE. WE SEE NO REASON TO GIVE ADVANTAGE TO THOSE WHO WISH US ILL.
WITH REGARD TO MINES, I HAVE CONSULTED WITH OUR ALLIES WHO WERE ATTENDING THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP MEETING IN BRUSSELS LAST WEEK. WE ALL AGREED THAT WE SHOULD PROVIDE EACH OTHER MUTUAL SUPPORT AND COOPERATION IN THE INTEREST OF KEEPING THE

INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS FREE FROM THIS THREAT.
FINALLY, THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS A TILT IN EITHER DIRECTION IN THE WAR. OUR POLICY HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE ONE OF STRICT NEUTRALITY. WE, ALONG WITH THE REST OF THE CIVILISED INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WANT THIS WAR TO END. IN THIS RESPECT WE SUPPORT STRONGLY IMPLEMENTATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598 AND PASSAGE OF A SECOND RESOLUTION IMPOSING AN ARMS EMBARGO ON THAT BELLIGERENT THAT DOES NOT ACCEPT 598 AS A MEANS TO REACH A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT OF THIS TRAGIC WAR. WE ALSO WANT TO SEE AN END TO THE WANTON WASTE OF HUMAN LIFE THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED THIS WAR. IN THAT REGARD, WE ESPECIALLY DEPLORE THE USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE BY EITHER BELLIGERENT WHICH HAS BECOME ONE OF THE MOST REGRETTABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS PROTRACTED CONFLICT.
THIS POLICY WILL GO INTO EFFECT ONCE WE HAVE INFORMED THOSE FREE WORLD, NON-BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES THAT MAINTAIN SHIPPING INTERESTS IN THE GULF. UNQUOTE.
2. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO NO. 10

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FOLLOWING FROM PS/DEFENCE SECRETARY
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SUBJECT: NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE GULF.

1. VAN EEKELEN (NL) CHAIRED A MEETING THIS AFTERNOON TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITIES OF GREATER CO-ORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES IN THE GULF. CARLUCCI AND ADMIRAL CROWE (CHAIRMAN JCS)(US), DE DONNEA (BELGIUM), ZANONE (ITALY) AND MR YOUNGER AND ADMIRAL FIELDHOUSE (CDS) WERE PRESENT. MINISTERS AGREED, IN PRINCIPLE, TO EXPLORE THE SCOPE FOR GREATER CO-ORDINATION OF MINESWEEPING ACTIVITIES WITH A VIEW TO PRESERVING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. A MEETING OF COMMANDERS APPARENTLY ALREADY ARRANGED ON THE SPOT ON USS TRENTON ON 1ST MAY WOULD PROVIDE A CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES. IN BRIEFING THE PRESS, VAN EEKELEN WILL SAY THAT, FOLLOWING THE USEFUL DISCUSSION IN THE HAGUE, WEU MINISTER CONCERNED HAD MET WITH THE U S TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR BETTER CO-ORDINATION OF MINESWEEPING ACTIVITIES IN FUTURE.

2. INTRODUCING THE MEETING, VAN EEKELIN SAID THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CONSIDER THE PRESENT POSITION IN THE GULF AND HOW OPERATIONS MIGHT BE CONDUCTED IN FUTURE. HE SAID WEU OFFICIALS HAD HAD A USEFUL DISCUSSION IN THE HAGUE THIS MORNING AND HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT (SEE MIFT FOR TEXT).

3. CARLUCCI (U S) SAID THE STATEMENT WAS HELPFUL. HE EXPLAINED THAT PRIOR TO THE RECENT ENGAGEMENTS IN THE GULF, THEIR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) HAD ONLY ALLOWED PROTECTION OF AMERICAN FLAG VESSELS OR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AFTER SHIPS OF OTHER NATIONS HAD BEEN ATTACKED. THE PRESIDENT HAD SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED TO CHANGE THE ROE SO THAT THE U S COULD DEFENED NON-U S FRIENDLY MILITARY SHIPPING AND PLATFORMS. THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE ROE SHOULD CONTINUE TO APPLY NOW THAT THE IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY WAS OVER. MOVING TO THIS KIND OF REGIME OUTSIDE THE EXCLUSION ZONE MADE SOME SENSE AND WOULD NOT NEED ADDITIONAL RESOURCES. CONGRESS AGREED, IN

PRINCIPLE, THAT THIS WOULD MAKE SENSE BUT WANTED HIM TO CONSULT HIS ALLIES ABOUT CLOSER CO-ORDINATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMON ROE. CARLUCCI ACCEPTED THAT COMMON ROE WERE DIFFICULT AND HE WAS TRYING TO STOP UNHELPFUL PRESS SPECULATION ON THIS POSSIBILITY. BUT HE WOULD, AT THE VERY LEAST, LIKE TO BE ABLE TO TELL CONGRESS THAT THE ALLIES AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO CLOSER CO-ORDINATION OF MINESWEEPING ACTIVITIES.

4. VAN EEKELEN SIAD HE WAS QUITE PREPARED TO AGREE TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES.

5. MR YOUNGER SAID THERE WERE TWO SEPARATE ISSUES. ON ACCOMPANYING MERCHANT VESSELS, WE DID NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO PROTECT MORE THAN BRITISH-OWNED AND BRITISH-FLAGGED VESSELS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PROTECTION WE COULD OFFER TO BELGIAN AND DUTCH MINE-SWEEPERS. WE COULD ALSO, OF COURSE, OFFER ASSISTANCE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. HE DID NOT THINK CO-ORDINATION OF ROE WAS FEASIBLE OR APPROPRIATE. BUT ON MINESWEEPING HE WAS HAPPY TO LOOK AT THE POSSIBILITIES, THOUGH WITH OUR AVAILABLE RESOURCES WE COULD NOT COVER THE WHOLE GULF. ADMIRAL FIELDHOUSE ADDED THAT THERE COULD BE SCOPE FOR DEFINING PRIME AREAS OF INTEREST IN WHICH THE VARIOUS NAVIES WOULD CARRYOUT MCM SURVEILLANCE, COORDINATE MINESWEEPING ACTIVITIES AND REACT TO MINE REPORTS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. THE PROBLEM WAS THE NEED FOR FRIGATE PROTECTION OF SMALL SHIPS. ADMIRAL CROWE SAID THAT THE U S COULD PROVIDE AIR COVER. CDS COMMENTED THAT SUCH COVER WOULD BEST BE CO-ORDINATED ON THE SPOT.

6. DE DONNEA (BELGIUM) AGREED THAT IT WAS SENSIBLE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE PRESENT DE FACTO CO-ORDINATION WORKED WELL OR WHETHER IT NEEDED IMPROVEMENT. BUT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ANY PUBLIC REFERENCE TO CO-ORDINATION WITH THE U S. HIS COUNTRY'S POSITION WAS THAT THEY WERE STRONGLY NEUTRAL IN THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. WHETHER RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, THE U S WERE NOT PERCEIVED AS HAVING SUCH A NEUTRAL STANCE. CARLUCCI COMMENTED SHARPLY THAT THE RECENT U S ATTACKS HAD BEEN LIMITED AND IN RESPONSE TO IRANIAN PROVOCATION. THE U S HAD NOT JOINED FORCES WITH IRAQ. IF THEY HAD WANTED TO FIGHT A WAR WITH IRAN, THEY WOULD BE DOING THINGS VERY DIFFERENTLY. BUT THEY WOULD SINK ANY IRANIAN SHIP CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF MINELAYING AND SCUTTLE ANY VESSELS WHICH THEY BOARDED AND FOUND TO CONTAIN EVIDENCE OF INTENTION TO LAY MINES. MR YOUNGER COMMENTED THAT IT MIGHT HELP DE DONNEA IF MINISTERS EMPHASISED THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERING ONLY CO-OPERATION IN MINESWEEPING AND IN MAINTAINING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

7. ZANONE (ITALY) AGREED THAT STANDARDISATION OF COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS AND AGREEMENT ON POSSIBLE AREAS AND ROUTES IN WICH TO CONCENTRATE SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES FOR MINES WERE WORTHWHILE. HE SUGGESTED THAT ANY DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUB-SECTORS COULD BE LEFT TO COMMANDING OFFICERS ON THE SPOT. WHEREVER POSSIBLE CO-OPERATION SHOULD BE HANDLED PRAGMATICALLY.

8. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION, CARLUCCI STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR FORMAL CO-ORDINATION. HE ONLY SOUGHT APPROVAL FROM HIS COLLEAGUES FOR COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR GREATER CO-ORDINATION IN MINESWEEPING ACTIVITIES. HE WOULD LIMIT KNOWLEDGE OF ANY SUCH APPROVAL TO THE PRESIDENT, SHULTZ AND ONE OR TWO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT THE U S WOULD BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE ON PROTECTION FOR ALLIED MINESWEEPERS. HE ADDED THAT THE UAE HAD AGREED TO FLY A COMBAT AIR PATROL. THERE WAS NO EXCUSE FOR THEM NOT TO DO MORE. MINISTERS AGREED TO A MEETING OF COMMANDERS ON 1ST MAY ON USS TRENTON TO LOOK AT THE POSSIBLITY. MINISTERS ALSO TOOK NOTE OF AN OFFER FROM ADMIRAL CROWE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON U S MILITARY ACTIVITIES, ANALOGOUS TO THAT PROVIDED TO IRAQ, IN THE INTERESTS OF DECONFLICTION AND ENSURING THAT THEIR OWN SHIPS WERE NOT HIT.


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OUR TELNO 1067 AND FCO TELNO 178 TO RIYADH: PROTECTION OF SHIPPING IN THE GULF

1. CARLUCCI'S PRESENTATION IN BRUSSELS WILL DOUBTLESS THROW FURTHER LIGHT ON THE US POSITION ON OPPORTUNITY ASSISTANCE. SUBJECT TO THAT, AND AS FURTHER BACKGROUND, OUR CONTINUING IMPRESSION HERE IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE NOT YET IRONED OUT THEIR INTERNAL DIFFERENCES.

2. CARLUCCI AND ADMIRAL CROWE ARE BOTH SAID TO FAVOUR SOME AD HOC EXPANSION OF US PROTECTION TO COVER NEUTRAL SHIPPING. (YOU WILL RECALL THAT IT WAS CARLUCCI DURING HIS VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA LAST AUTUMN WHO PROMISED PRINCE SULTAN THE ORIGINAL US ASSESSMENT ON OPPORTUNITY ASSISTANCE.) REFLECTING THIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARMITAGE (DOD) TOLD THE VISITING HOUSE OF COMMONS SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 25 APRIL THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND AN EXPANSION OF US ROE, WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT CONSULTATIONS PRODUCED ALLIED AGREEMENT: IT WAS NOT ESSENTIAL THAT ALL SHOULD HAVE THE SAME ROE.

3. BY CONTRAST, STATE DEPARTMENT SEEM (PREDICTABLY) TO GIVE GREATER WEIGHT TO KNOWN ALLIED CONCERNS AND TO POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL RESERVATIONS ABOUT AN EXPANDED US ROLE, UNSUPPORTED BY THE ALLIES. IT WAS A CONTACT IN STATE WHO TIPPED US OFF ABOUT US THINKING AS IT DEVELOPED LAST WEEK (OUR TUR). AND MURPHY, BRIEFING THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON 26 APRIL, SAID THAT HE DOUBTED WHETHER A BROADER US ROLE IN ISOLATION FROM ALLIES WAS POLITICALLY SUSTAINABLE ON THE HILL.

4. POWELL (NSC), ALSO BRIEFING THE COMMITTEE ON 25 APRIL, TOOK A NEUTRAL LINE. HE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD REACHED NO DECISIONS AND WOULD BE CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH ALLIES. HE THEN MERELY POSED THE QUESTION: HOW SHOULD WE ALL REACT IF A NEUTRAL SHIP IS ATTACKED UNDER THE NOSE OF OUR WARSHIPS QUERY.

5. THERE IS NO INDICATION IN ALL THIS THAT THE US HAVE FOUND ANY MORE SATISFACTORY ANSWERS THAN WHEN THE SUBJECT WAS LAST CONSIDERED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS HERE EARLY THIS YEAR.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 April 1988

Dear Charles

CDP 26/4.

The Gulf

Your letter of 23 April to Tony Galsworthy enclosed a copy of a message from the Prime Minister to the Prime Minister from President Reagan about recent events in the Gulf.

The US Defense Secretary has proposed a discussion in Brussels over lunch on 27 April (in the margins of the NPG) with his British, Dutch, Belgian and Italian opposite numbers in order to review operational roles in the Gulf. We propose to send you a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Reagan immediately after we have probed US thinking further at this meeting.

Discussions are continuing in parallel with the Dutch and Belgians on further integration of our naval forces (your letter of 30 March).

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin.


Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

IRAQ : Iran/Iraq Prg.



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Cde 18

CC PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 April 1988

Dear Tony,

THE GULF

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Reagan about recent events in the Gulf. As you will see, it contains a proposal for closer co-ordination between Western naval forces in the area. It also seems to suggest dividing the Gulf into zones between Western navies for the purpose of detecting and sweeping mines, (although it is not explicit on this point). I should be grateful for a draft reply, prepared in co-ordination with the Ministry of Defence, which the Prime Minister could send next week.

BF

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

C. D. POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

MEMO April 23

To: Charles Powell

From: Kim Pendleton

I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this to the FCO duty clerk at the same time as it is delivered to Number Ten.

K

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17A

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

April 23, 1988

CDN 23/4.

Dear Prime Minister:

Enclosed is the text of a letter from President Reagan that I have been asked to pass along to you.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Charles H. Price, II
Ambassador

Enclosure: SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
Ten Downing Street,
London, SW1.

SECRET

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Faxed to Chequers 1845 23/4

17

PRIME MINISTER

I attach a message from President Reagan which came in this morning, about the Gulf.

As you will see, it has two proposals:

(i) closer co-ordination between Western naval forces and with the GCC States;

(ii) allocating separate zones of the Gulf to Western navies for the purposes of mine detection and sweeping (an idea which you have long favoured).

There is no reflection in the message of the apparent decision by the Americans to extend protection to neutral ships attacked by the Iranians in the vicinity of American warships, nor any suggestion that others should follow suit. But if it is confirmed that the Americans intend to do this, we may need to look at the question again ourselves.

C.D.?

C. D. POWELL

23 April 1988

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US Declassified

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PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T54/88

April 22, 1988

SUBJECT cc MASTER OPS

DEAR MARGARET:

INCREASINGLY AGGRESSIVE IRANIAN TERRORIST AND MILITARY ACTIONS DURING RECENT WEEKS AGAINST NON-BELLIGERENT TARGETS HAVE BEEN VERY DISTURBING DEVELOPMENTS IN AN ALREADY DANGEROUS REGION. IN THE FACE OF A HEIGHTENED THREAT TO OUR SHARED INTERESTS IN THE GULF, I CONCLUDED THAT THE U.S. HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO RESPOND IN A MEASURED WAY TO IRAN'S NEW MINING ATTACK LAST WEEK, AND TO ITS SUBSEQUENT INITIATION OF ACTION AGAINST OUR SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT, DESPITE OUR WARNINGS.

I APPRECIATED THE SUPPORTIVE RESPONSE OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO THIS SITUATION, BOTH ITS PUBLIC COMMENT AND THE ACTION OF ITS NAVAL VESSELS IN THE GULF. YOUR ENCOURAGEMENT OF POSITIVE ACTIONS BY THE OTHER WEU GOVERNMENTS, IN THEIR NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE GULF AND AT THE APRIL 18-19 WEU MINISTERIAL MEETING, IS ALSO GREATLY APPRECIATED. THIS SOLID FRONT BY THE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY STRENGTHEN THE WILL OF THE GCC STATES. I AM CONFIDENT IT IS ALSO THE BEST MEANS EVENTUALLY TO REDUCE IRAN'S ATTACKS UPON NON-BELLIGERENT SHIPPING AND TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD ENDING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. THIS REMAINS OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE.

HOWEVER, THIS WILL REQUIRE TIME, PATIENCE AND FIRMNESS COUPLED WITH RESTRAINT IN THE GULF TO GET THROUGH WHAT SHOULD BE A TEMPORARY PERIOD OF INCREASED DANGER. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE BEST MEANS OF DOING THIS IS FOR THE COMMANDERS OF THE SEPARATE WESTERN NAVAL FORCES IN THE GULF TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION MORE CLOSELY THAN HERETOFORE. THIS COULD INCLUDE CLOSER COORDINATION WITH THOSE GCC STATES WHO ARE WILLING TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN MEETING THE THREAT. THIS WOULD BUILD UPON THE EXEMPLARY COOPERATION DISPLAYED AT THE TIME OF THE MINE ATTACK UPON USS ROBERTS AND SUBSEQUENTLY WHEN UK, ITALIAN, FRENCH, DUTCH, AND BELGIAN UNITS ALL HELPED DEAL WITH THE NEW MINE PROBLEM.

IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE USE OF LIMITED AVAILABLE WESTERN -- AS WELL AS GULF ARAB -- NAVAL RESOURCES, OUR COMMANDERS MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED TO EXPLORE WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD PROVIDE BETTER OVERALL SURVEILLANCE OF THOSE AREAS FREQUENTED BY MERCHANT SHIPPING, PARTICULARLY WHERE THE IRANIANS HAVE CONTINUED TO LAY MINES. THROUGH VIGILANCE AND PRESENCE ON OUR PART, WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO

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DETECT ANY MINES BEFORE THEY HARM NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS AND OUR COMBATANTS, AND THEREBY FORCE IRAN TO RECOGNIZE THE FUTILITY OF ITS ATTEMPTS TO INTERFERE WITH PEACEFUL INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING IN THE PERSIAN GULF. SUCH INFORMAL, OPERATIONAL COORDINATION WOULD SEEM TO HAVE MORE PROSPECT OF SUCCESS THAN A MORE FORMAL EFFORT AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL AND COULD REDUCE THE RISK TO US ALL.

AT THE SAME TIME, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE A NEW, INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT IN THE UNSC TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 598 AND BRING AN END TO THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. THE RECENT IRAQI MILITARY SUCCESS AT AL FAW, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE GREAT INCREASE IN CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AS THE RESULT OF DELIBERATE MILITARY ATTACKS UPON CITIES PLUS THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ARGUE STRONGLY FOR SUCH AN EFFORT. GEORGE SHULTZ IS EXPLORING THIS ISSUE IN MOSCOW. UPON HIS RETURN, OUR GOVERNMENTS SHOULD DISCUSS IT FURTHER, AND MORE CLOSELY COORDINATE OUR ACTIONS IN THE UN.

WE REGARD THE INCIDENT CONCERNING THE MINING OF THE USS ROBERTS AS CLOSED. WE HAVE REITERATED BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY TO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT THAT WE DO NOT DESIRE A MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH IRAN AND SEEK MORE NORMAL RELATIONS, BUT WE DO INTEND TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS AGAINST UNPROVOKED ATTACKS.

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SIC ACA/U2G/I9P
TO COPY ADDRESSEES: PERSONAL FOR HEADS OF MISSION

OUR TELNO 1016: US/GULF
SUMMARY
1. THE CLASHES WITH IRAN HAVE STIMULATED A HIGH-LEVEL REVIEW OF ALL ASPECTS OF US POLICY AND OPERATIONAL PRACTICE IN THE GULF, FOCUSSED AS BEFORE ON INCREASING COOPERATION WITH WESTERN AND GCC ALLIES AND THE POSSIBLE WIDENING OF THE US PROTECTION REGIME IN ORDER TO KEEP THE IRANIANS GUESSING. EARLY MESSAGES LIKELY FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER WESTERN AND GCC HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.
DETAIL
2. AS IMMEDIATE EMOTIONS HAVE SUBSIDED AFTER THE US-IRANIAN CLASHES IN THE GULF ON 18 APRIL, THERE ARE SIGNS OF A REVIVAL IN THE US DOMESTIC DEBATE ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY IN THE GULF. PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL ATTENTION HAS BEGUN TO FOCUS ON:
(I) THE SLOW PACE OF EFFORTS TO PUT AN END TO THE WAR:
(II) THE INCREASING RISKS OF THE US BEING DRAWN INTO EXTENDED CLASHES WITH IRAN:
(III) THE (ALLEGED) ABSENCE OF ALLIED ASSISTANCE IN US EFFORTS TO CONTAIN AND DETER IRANIAN AGGRESSION:
(IV) THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE US PROTECTION REGIME (US -FLAG AND KUWAITI REFLAGGED VESSELS ONLY): AND
(V) THE VEXED ISSUE OF THE WAR-POWERS ACT.
3. THE LEVEL OF CONTROVERSY IS STILL VERY LOW. THERE IS NONE OF THE FURORE RAISED LAST YEAR BY THE MINING OF THE BRIDGETON AND THE ATTACK ON THE USS STARK. BUT, SEVEN MONTHS BEFORE THE ELECTION, THE ADMINISTRATION WANTS TO DO ALL IT CAN TO AVOID GULF POLICY AGAIN BECOMING A HOT POLITICAL ISSUE. THEY HAVE ACCORDINGLY LET IT BE KNOWN THAT THEY ARE CONDUCTING A FURTHER REVIEW OF ALL ASPECTS OF US POLICY AND OPERATIONAL PRACTICE IN THE GULF.
4. THE WASHINGTON POST OF 21 APRIL REPORTED FURTHER THAT ONE OPTION UNDER CONSIDERATION WAS FOR US PROTECTION TO BE EXTENDED ON AN AD HOC BASIS TO NON-US FLAG SHIPS AND INSTALLATIONS, IN ORDER

TO INCREASE IRANIAN UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE US REACTION TO ANY HARRASSMENT BY THEM OF NEUTRAL SHIPPING. OUR CONTACTS HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THIS IS AGAIN UNDER DISCUSSION, BUT ADD THAT FULL WEIGHT IS BEING GIVEN TO THE KNOWN LEGAL AND PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES AND THAT EARLY DECISIONS ARE UNLIKELY.

5. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE CONCERNED AT THE IMPLICATIONS OF IRAN'S IMMEDIATE RECOURSE ON 18 APRIL, IN RESPONSE TO US ACTIONS, TO ATTACKS ON THIRD PARTY TARGETS. IN THE HEAT OF EVENTS ON 18 APRIL, IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE US TO DEFEND THE UAE'S MUBARAK OILFIELD INSTALLATIONS. BUT UNDER ESTABLISHED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE US TO RESPOND TO FURTHER IRANIAN ATTACKS ON THIRD PARTY TARGETS, EVEN IF IRAN ANNOUNCED THAT THESE WERE IN RETALIATION FOR US ACTIONS. STATE DETECT SIGNS OF INCREASING GCC CONCERN ON THIS POINT.

6. PROPONENTS OF EXTENDING THE US PROTECTION REGIME (SAID TO INCLUDE CARLUCCI HIMSELF) APPARENTLY CLAIM THAT, IF DONE ON AN AD HOC BASIS SIMILAR TO OPPORTUNITY ASSISTANCE, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO INCREASE US FORCE LEVELS (THESE ARE HOWEVER, AGAIN BEING REVIEWED AND THE PENTAGON ANNOUNCED ON 21 APRIL THAT THE FORRESTAL CARRIER BATTLE GROUP, AND A FURTHER FOUR GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATES AND A DESTROYER WOULD LEAVE THE US FOR THE GULF SHORTLY ON LONG-PLANNED DEPLOYMENTS TO THE REGION.)

7. WE HAVE INFORMALLY DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE INCREASED RISK OF US-IRANIAN CONFRONTATION IF IRAN'S OPTIONS IN RESPONSE TO IRAQI SHIPPING ATTACKS ARE FURTHER RESTRICTED. OUR CONTACTS ACKNOWLEDGE THIS. IT IS APPARENTLY A CENTRAL POINT OF DEBATE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN EXTENDING THE US PROTECTION REGIME (THE STICK) AND SIMULTANEOUSLY SIGNALLING TO IRAN THAT THE US WANTS TO LIMIT CONFRONTATION AND ASSIST A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR (THE CARROT). THERE IS NO AGREEMENT ON WHETHER ANY COMBINATION OF STICK AND CARROT CAN MOVE THE IRANIANS TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WHILE KHOMEINI LIVES.

8. ONE CONTACT HAS TIPPED US OFF (IN STRICT CONFIDENCE) THAT, AS PART OF THE FIRST STAGES OF THE US REVIEW, PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL SHORTLY BE SENDING MESSAGES TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE OTHER WESTERN ALLIES WITH NAVAL FORCES IN THE GULF. HE WILL APPARENTLY RAISE AGAIN IN GENERAL TERMS THE QUESTION OF INCREASING WESTERN NAVAL COOPERATION IN THE GULF. HE WILL MAKE NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS BUT WILL ENDORSE THE CURRENT INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN LOCAL COMMANDERS AND SUGGEST THESE AS A BASIS FOR INCREASED COOPERATION.

9. THIS CONTACT SAID THAT IDEAS FOR ZONING, SUCH AS SENATOR NUNN'S ELABORATE, PUBLIC PROPOSAL FOR A SERIES OF NATIONAL PROTECTION ZONES, WERE AT THE FAR END OF THE SPECTRUM OF WHAT THE ADMIN-

What an astonishing thing for us to say. It invites the Iranians to attack neutral shipping.

ISTRATION MIGHT EVENTUALLY SUGGEST. THEY HAD DEVELOPED NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS YET. ONE OBJECTIVE ALREADY IDENTIFIED WAS THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TO PREVENT FURTHER MINING.

10. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES COVERING THESE ISSUES, THOUGH IN EVEN MORE GENERAL TERMS, ARE APPARENTLY ALSO TO BE SENT TO GCC GOVERNMENTS (EXCEPT QATAR).

COMMENT

11. THE CONTACT WHO TOLD US OF THE IMPENDING MESSAGES COMMENTED THAT OUR STRONG VIEWS ON MULTINATIONAL COORDINATION IN THE GULF WERE WELL KNOWN: AND THAT, IF THESE WERE AGAIN REFLECTED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT, IT WOULD PROVIDE SOLID AMMUNITION TO THOSE WHO ARE TRYING TO HOLD THE LINE HERE AGAINST ANY MOVE TOWARDS OPPORTUNITY ASSISTANCE, OR THE LIKE.

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TEHRAN UNDER MISSILE AND AIR ATTACK: JAPANESE IMPRESSIONS

1. H OF C CALLED ON THE JAPANESE CHARGE ON 19 APRIL, AND WAS GIVEN IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) A DETAILED ORAL ACCOUNT OF A REPORTING TELEGRAM FROM THE JAPANESE EMBASSY IN TEHRAN, DATED 16 APRIL, DESCRIBING THE EFFECTS OF TWO MONTHS OF MISSILE AND AIR BOMBARDMENT. FOLLOWING IS A RESUME.

2. TEHRAN HIT BY 120 MISSILES OVER 50 DAYS. CITY OF 10 MILLION OR MORE COULD NOT BE DEMOLISHED BY THIS SCALE OF ATTACK, BUT MISSILES WELL TARGETTED, MOSTLY LANDING NEAR CENTRE OF CITY, EACH DEMOLISHING SEVERAL BUILDINGS, NO ATTEMPT TO REBUILD. IMPRESSION OF WIDESPRAD AND SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE.

3. CASUALTY LISTS CENSORED. DIPLOMATS ESTIMATE MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND KILLED, SEVERAL THOUSANDS INJURED BY BLASTS, FALLING BUILDINGS, MISSILE FRAGMENTS. MISSILE STRIKES CAUSE SEVERE TREMORS THROUGHOUT CITY, BREAKING WINDOWS OVER 10 KMS RADIUS, HAVE CONSIDERABLE INTIMIDATORY EFFECT. CAUSE PSYCHOLOGICAL SHOCK AND MOUNTING STRESS. AIR RAID WARNING SYSTEM NO LONGER WORKING: EFFECT GREATLY INCREASED BY LACK OF WARNING OF ALMOST DAILY STRIKES.

4. DURING NEW YEAR HOLIDAY FROM MID-MARCH TO 1 APRIL CENTRE OF TEHRAN WAS LEFT ALMOST DESERTED, WITH NEGLIGIBLE TRAFFIC. SINCE RETURN TO WORK VOLUME OF TRAFFIC HAS BEEN MARKEDLY LESS THAN BEFORE. ANYONE WHO CAN HAS LEFT THE CITY, THE RICH GOING TO VILLAS OR HOTELS IN THE SURROUNDING COUNTRY, THE POOR SLEEPING ROUGH IN THE MOUNTAINS. SOME ESTIMATE THAT HALF THE POPULATION OF TEHRAN HAVE MOVED OUT.

5. EFFECT OF ATTACKS ON POPULATION MIXED SOME PEOPLE SEEM TO BE GETTING USED TO THE DANGER, OTHERS TO BE SUFFERING INCREASING ANXIETY. NO SIGN OF OVERT ANTI-GOVERNMENT OR ANTI-WAR FEELING.

6. MOST FOREIGNERS HAVE LEFT IRAN OR AT LEAST THE CAPITAL. MOST

FOREIGN COMPANY OFFICES ARE TEMPORARILY CLOSED. ALL EMBASSIES HAVE CEASED TO ISSUE VISAS, AND THINNED OUT THEIR OTHER OPERATIONS. FEW CASUALTIES AMONG FOREIGNERS BUT MANY OF THEIR HOUSES DESTROYED OR DAMAGED. STAFF HOUSES OF THE SOVIET, INDONESIAN, THAI, SPANISH AND ITALIAN EMBASSIES HAVE BEEN HIT. ONE MISSILE EXPLODED IN THE GARDEN OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION CAUSING SOME CASUALTIES FROM FLYING GLASS. MINOR CASUALTIES ALSO IN THE SOVIET, YUGOSLAV AND THAI EMBASSIES. MOST EMBASSIES HAVE EVACUATED FAMILIES AND NON-ESSENTIAL STAFF. TELEX LINES NO LONGER FUNCTIONING, ALL EMBASSIES HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH COMMUNICATIONS. REMAINING STAFF ARE IN CONSIDERABLE DANGER FROM HITS ON THEIR OFFICES OR HOUSES, OR WHEN DOING BUSINESS AT GOVERNMENT OFFICES, INCLUDING THE MFA, NEAR THE TOWN CENTRE. SOME DIPLOMATS HAVE ALREADY SUFFERED MINOR INJURIES ON THE WAY TO THE MFA.

7. SINCE THE IRAQI USE OFCHEMICAL WEAPONS ON THE NORTHERN FRONT, THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE CIRCULATED, AND PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS, DETAILS OF ANTI-CW MEASURES TO BE CARRIED OUT IF A CW ATTACK IS MADE ON TEHRAN. DRILLS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, CAUSING GREAT ANXIETY ABOUT A CHEMICAL ATTACK ON THE CAPITAL. EMBASSIES OF EC COUNTRIES HAVE ORDERED

GAS MASKS, CW SUITS AND POISON GAS ANTIDOTES.

8. THE IRANIANS ARE THOUGHT TO HAVE FIRED 66 SCUD-B MISSILES SINCE 11 MARCH, TO HAVE BOUGHT 40 OR 45 SSCUD-B FROM NORTH KOREA FOR URGENT DELIVERY, TO HAVE 100 SILK WORMS, 100 C-801S AND POSSIBLY GABRIEL AND FROG 7 MISSILES STILL AVAILABLE. THE CHINESE MILITARY ATTACHE HAS INFORMATION THAT THE IRANIANS ARE PAYING US DOLLARS 280,000 EQUIVALENT PER SCUD-B.

9. FINALLY, THE JAPANESE SAID THEY HAVE AVAILABLE RELIABLE FIGURES FOR IRANIAN OIL SALES WHICH THEY WILL GIVE US ON REQUEST. GRATEFUL TO KNOW IF WE SHOULD ASK FOR THESE. GRATEFULALSO TO KNOW WHETHER YOU WOULD WELCOME FURTHERREPORTING FROM THIS SOURCE, OR WHETHER YOU ARE BEING KEPT INFORMED BY THE JAPANESE IN LONDON OR TOKYO. THE JAPANESE HERE TOLD US THEY HAD NOT BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE THESE REPORTS AVAILABLETO US, BUT WERE DOING SO AT THEIR OWN INITIATIVE IN EXCHANGE FOR BRIEFING ON THE GULF SITUATION AND COOPERATION OVER HYPERFIX.

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CABINET OFFICE FOR ASSESSMENTS STAFF

OUR TELNO 1012 : US/GULF : REPORTED FIRINGS OF SILKWORM MISSILES
SUMMARY
1. CONTRARY TO MEDIA REPORTS, US HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT IRAN FIRED SILKWORM MISSILES IN THE GULF ON 18 APRIL.
DETAIL
2. THE US MEDIA REPORT PROMINENTLY ON 19 APRIL THAT IRAN FIRED FIVE SILKWORM MISSILES IN THE COURSE OF THE EXCHANGES ON 18 APRIL. THE STORY SEEMS TO HAVE ORIGINATED WITH A MEMBER OF THE PRESS POOL ON THE USS WILLIAMS. IN RESPONSE TO PRESS ENQUIRIES, THE PENTAGON ARE NOW QUOTING ADMIRAL CROWE AS SAYING THAT TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE NO SILKWORMS WERE FIRED.
3. WE HAVE CHECKED THE BACKGROUND WITH THE US COMMUNITY. THERE IS STILL A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONFUSION ABOUT THE EVENTS OF 18 APRIL. BUT WE ARE TOLD THAT AT ONE POINT THE USS WILLIAMS DID DETECT RADAR EMISSIONS CONSISTENT WITH THE SILKWORM TARGET ACQUISITION RADAR COMING FROM THE AREA OF QUESHM ISLAND IN THE SOUTHERN GULF, WHERE THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SILKWORM SITES. ON THAT BASIS, THE SHIP APPARENTLY TOOK EVASIVE ACTION. BUT NO MISSILES WERE SEEN, NONE WERE SHOT DOWN, AND NONE HIT SHIPS OR PLATFORMS IN THE AREA. THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ARE THEREFORE ALMOST CERTAIN THAT NO SILKWORMS WERE FIRED.
4. WE HAVE HEARD TWO EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EMISSIONS DETECTED BY THE WILLIAMS. THE IRANIANS MAY HAVE TURNED ON TARGET ACQUISITION RADARS AT ONE OF THE SILKWORM SITES (THOUGH WITHOUT FIRING A MISSILE). ALTERNATIVELY, THE WILLIAMS MAY HAVE PICKED UP EMISSIONS FROM THE IRANIAN FRIGATE SAHAND, WHICH APPARENTLY FIRED A SEA KILLER MISSILE WHEN IT WAS IN A POSITION BETWEEN THE WILLIAMS AND THE AREA OF QUESHM ISLAND. THE SEA KILLER MISSED THE WILLIAMS: BUT ITS RADAR APPARENTLY OPERATES ON A SIMILAR WAVE BAND TO THAT OF THE SILKWORM, AND THE RADAR SIGNATURES OF

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THE TWO MISSILES ARE SIMILAR. THE US HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF UNUSUAL ACTIVITY AT THE SILKWORM SITES.

5. IN SHORT, THIS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A FALSE ALARM PLAYED UP BY THE PRESS ON THE WILLIAMS. OUR US CONTACTS ADD THAT USE OF SILKWORMS REMAINS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY OPTIONS STILL OPEN TO THE IRANIANS IN THE GULF: ALTHOUGH SILKWORM FIRINGS WOULD NOW BE A MAJOR ESCALATORY STEP GIVEN THE PRESENT RELATIVE LULL IN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE GULF: AND THE IRANIANS COULD BE IN NO DOUBT THAT THIS WOULD PROMPT A VERY FIRM US RESPONSE. THE US COMMUNITY'S PRESENT (TENTATIVE) ASSESSMENT IS THAT IRAN WILL FOR THE MOMENT TRY TO AVOID FURTHER DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH US FORCES WHILE PURSUING OTHER OPTIONS, INCLUDING FURTHER ATTACKS ON NON US-FLAGGED MERCHANT SHIPPING.

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INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, AMMAN, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK

V. Good MS

SIC U2H
MY TELNO 286: IRAN/IRAQ: RECAPTURE OF FAO.

SUMMARY

1. IRAQIS ANNOUNCE COMPLETE RECAPTURE OF FAO AFTER A 36 HOUR OPERATION AND CLAIM HEAVY IRANIAN LOSSES. DETAILS OF OPERATION (INCLUDING IRAQI CASUALTIES) STILL UNCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS MAY HAVE BEEN USED. FAO'S RECAPTURE LIKELY TO EASE IRAQ'S MILITARY POSITION GENERALLY AND TO RELIEVE THOUGH NOT REMOVE THREAT TO KUWAIT FROM IRANIAN SILKWORMS. ALSO BONUS IN ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598. ASSUMING NO UNACCEPTABLE CASUALTIES, A SIGNIFICANT BOOST TO IRAQI MORALE AFTER SET-BACKS IN NORTH AND DEMONSTRATION TO ARAB SUPPORTERS OF IRAQ'S CONTINUING ABILITY NOT ONLY TO HOLD OUT BUT TO TAKE SUCCESSFUL INITIATIVES.

DETAIL

2. AS FORSHADOWED BY A SERIES OF OPTIMISTIC MILITARY COMMUNIQUES, BAGHDAD RADIO ANNOUNCED AT 1900 ON 18 APRIL THAT FAO HAD BEEN LIBERATED. THOUSANDS OF IRANIAN CASUALTIES ARE CLAIMED AND ACCORDING TO THE COMMANDER OF THE REPUBLICAN GUARD, MAJ-GEN AL RAWI, NO IRANIAN TROOPS NOW REMAIN ON FAO. THE COMMUNIQUE ENDED BY CALLING FOR A BALANCED PEACE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN AND FOR IRAN TO ACCEPT UN SCR 598 IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS DECLARED SEQUENCE (SIC).

3. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS GREETED WITH NOISY BUT STRUCTURED FEUX DE JOIE (UNDERLINED) IN BAGHDAD AND HAS BEEN GIVEN EUPHORIC PUBLICITY IN THE MEDIA. TODAY'S PRESS CARRIES PHOTOGRAPHS OF SADDAM HUSSAIN WITH FORCE COMMANDERS AND VICTORIOUS TROOPS IN THE SOUTH.

COMMENT

4. THE DEAN OF THE ATTACHE CORPS HAS ASKED THE IRAQIS TO ARRANGE A MILITARY BRIEFING. IN THE MEANTIME THE MEDIA HAVE GIVEN FEW DETAILS OF THE COURSE OF THE FIGHTING. THE SPEED OF THE OPERATION, IN THE FACE OF WELL-PREPARED IRANIAN DEFENCES, SUGGESTS THAT

DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE TERRAIN THE IRAQIS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DEPLOY ARMOUR ON A LARGE SCALE WHICH MAY HAVE REDUCED THEIR OWN CASUALTIES (OF WHICH, TYPICALLY, THE IRAQIS HAVE GIVEN NO DETAILS). WE HAVE ONE REPORT THAT A SOUTH KOREAN COMPANY HAS BEEN WORKING FOR THE PAST 5 OR 6 MONTHS TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS FOR IRAQI ARMOUR AT FAO (DESPITE THE RAINY WINTER) BUT HAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE COMPANY WAS EMPLOYED TO BUILD APPROACH ROADS, BUT IT IS HARDER TO SEE HOW IT COULD SUCCESSFULLY HAVE SUFFICIENTLY DRAINED IRANIAN-HELD TERRITORY, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE IRANIANS' OWN SKILLS IN COUNTERING SUCH WORK. CHEMICAL WEAPONS MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN USED. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT, MOST UNUSUALLY IN THE CASE OF A VICTORY ON SUCH A SCALE, THERE HAVE SO FAR BEEN NO TELEVISION PICTURES FROM FAO, POSSIBLY TO ALLOW TIME FOR THE BATTLEFIELD TO BE ''SANITISED''. WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE ALLEGED USE OF CW, AND THE USE OF KUWAITI TERRITORY (BUBIYAN ISLAND) IN THE COURSE OF THE ASSAULT (PRESUMABLY, IF TRUE, THE OPERATION AGAINST MAMLAHA - PARA 3 OF MY TUR).

5. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHAT CASUALTIES THE IRAQIS HAD TO TAKE, ESPECIALLY IN THE ELITE REPUBLICAN GUARDS UNITS, AS A PRICE FOR FAO'S RECAPTURE. CARS ARE NOW BEING ORDERED TO THE SOUTH TO BRING BACK BODIES AND IN DUE COURSE WE SHOULD OBTAIN AT LEAST AN IMPRESSION, EVEN THOUGH THE IRAQIS WILL NOT RELEASE OFFICIAL FIGURES. BUT THE SPEED OF FAO'S RECAPTURE, AND INDEED THE VERY FACT THAT THE IRAQIS WERE WILLING TO ATTEMPT THE OPERATION, SUGGESTS SOME SKILFUL (AND WELL CONCEALED) PLANNING AND A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF DETERMINATION AFTER SEVEN AND A HALF YEARS OF WAR. COMING AFTER THE SET-BACKS IN THE NORTH AND THE RENEWED WAR OF THE CITIES (TOGETHER WITH THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN NEW YORK) AND IN THE FACE OF WELL DUG IN OPPOSITION THIS, THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT RECAPTURE OF IRAQI TERRITORY IN THIS WAR, WILL HAVE PROVIDED A MAJOR MORALE BOOST TO THE IRAQI REGIME AND PEOPLE. IT WILL ALSO HAVE SHOWN WIDER ARAB AND WORLD OPINION THAT IRAQ HAS THE ABILITY NOT ONLY TO RESIST IRAN BUT TO UNDERTAKE FIRM MILITARY OPERATIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY IN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH WITHOUT OVER-EXTENDING ITSELF. I EXPECT SADDAM HUSSAIN'S BIRTHDAY CELEBRATIONS ON 28 APRIL TO EXPLOIT THE VICTORY TO THE FULL.

6. THE RECAPTURE OF FAO WILL BRING A NUMBER OF BENEFITS WHICH SADDAM HUSSAIN WILL HAVE HAD IN MIND WHEN DECIDING TO ATTEMPT THE OPERATION:

A) THE RELEASE OF TROOPS, NOTABLY THE REPUBLICAN GUARD UNITS, FOR REDEPLOYMENT ELSEWHERE, PARTICULARLY IN THE NORTH (SUBJECT TO ANY POSSIBLE IRANIAN RETALIATION ELSEWHERE IN THE SOUTH):

B) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EASIER DEFENCE LINE WHICH COULD ALSO RELEASE TROOPS (ALTHOUGH THE IRAQIS WILL CERTAINLY NOT GARRISON

FAO AGAIN WITH THE POPULAR ARMY AS WAS THE CASE BEFORE THE IRANIAN ATTACK IN 1986):
C) THE EASING OF PRESSURE ON UMM QASR AND ZUBAIR AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES THERE (ALTHOUGH IRANIAN SHELLING OR MISSILE ATTACKS MAY CONTINUE, THERE WILL NOW BE A REDUCED THREAT OF ANY GROUND ATTACK SINCE IRAN NO LONGER POSSESSES A JUMPING OFF POINT):
D) KUWAIT WILL NO LONGER FACE ATTACK BY IRANIAN SILKWORMS AT FAO (ALTHOUGH OTHER LAUNCHING SITES ON IRANIAN TERRITORY MAY STILL HAVE KUWAIT CITY WITHIN RANGE). THIS, TOGETHER WITH THE KUWAIT AIRLINES HIJACK AND LAST MONTH'S IRANIAN ATTACK ON BUBIYAN, COULD ALL HAVE PROMPTED KUWAIT TO GRANT AN IRAQI REQUEST TO USE BUBIYAN FOR THE ATTACK OR AT LEAST TURN A BLIND EYE.
7. A FURTHER BONUS, EVEN IF NOT A CENTRAL CONSIDERATION, WILL BE THE ELIMINATION OF FAO AS A POSSIBLE IRANIAN BARGAINING CHIP IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS OVER IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598, AND THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF IRAQI CONTROL OVER THE ENTIRE WEST BANK OF THE SHATT AL ARAB. THIS, AND THE POSSIBLE ACQUISITION OF NUMEROUS IRANIAN POWS, COULD ENABLE IRAQ TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN THE COURSE OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS. FIRST INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, AS REPORTED IN PARA 2 ABOVE, ARE THAT OVER SEQUENTIALITY AT LEAST THE IRAQIS ARE NOT SHOWING PUBLICLY ANY FLEXIBILITY.

CLARK

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

Prime Minister 13
CDP

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 April 1988

Dear Robert,

THE GULF

I should record that I spoke on the secure line to General Powell in the White House at 1110Z this morning about the situation in the Gulf.

General Powell said that the United States hoped to draw the line under yesterday's events. They were not planning any additional strikes although they would naturally defend themselves against an Iranian attack. Their forces were in a proper state of alert and the rules of engagement had been somewhat modified. I said that we had received rather strange reports that large numbers of aircraft were airborne over the Gulf this morning. General Powell was dismissive of these and repeated that the United States was planning no additional strikes. His information was that the situation in the area was quiet.

General Powell did not mention that - as we have heard may be the case from other channels - that the United States might be seeking our agreement to move Tanker aircraft from the United Kingdom to the Gulf area.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

R. N. Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET

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10/4

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 April 1988

THE GULF

The United States Ambassador contacted me at 0430 this morning to say that he had urgent instructions to carry out about the Gulf. We subsequently met at 0545.

The Ambassador said that within the next few hours - his instructions were timed 0300 BST - American forces would be striking Iranian military targets which had been used to attack non-belligerent shipping in the Gulf. He had no details of the precise targets or the exact time of the action. We were requested to keep knowledge of proposed action secret until it had taken place.

The Ambassador continued that the action was a direct response to mining in the Gulf by the Iranians which had led to an American warship striking a mine. The Americans had conclusive evidence that the mines were of recent Iranian manufacture, from the same plant as the mines on the Iranian Ajr, and had been planted shortly beforehand. Warnings were being given to British and other allied naval ships in the Gulf so that they could take any appropriate defensive action. He was asked to obtain HMG's reaction.

I said that I would pass on the information to the Prime Minister and the Foreign secretary. We would obviously want to know details of the targets. But assuming that the response was proportionate, I had little doubt that we would think the action justified and be prepared to say so.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

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FM WASHINGTON
TO FLASH FCO
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OF 181700Z APRIL 88
AND TO FLASH MODUK, CABINET OFFICE
INFO IMMEDIATE GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD

ADVANCE COPY

SIC
CABINET OFFICE FOR ASSESSMENTS STAFF

MY TELNO 1004 AND TELECON PRENTICE/MED : US/GULF

1 ARMITAGE (DOD) TELEPHONED TO BRIEF ME ON EVENTS IN THE GULF. HE DESCRIBED THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS:

(A) THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TWO IRANIAN PLATFORMS, DURING WHICH THE IRANIANS FIRED ONE ZSU 23 MISSILE:

(B) THE QUOTE LA COMBATANTE UNQUOTE TYPE PATROL BOAT WHICH THE US HAD SUNK AFTER IT FIRED A HARPOON MISSILE:

(C) THE ATTACK ON THE US SERVICE CRAFT AND UK-FLAG SHIP WHICH RESULTED IN THE US SINKING ONE SMALL IRANIAN VESSEL AND DAMAGING ANOTHER:

(D) THE FRIGATE SAHAND HAD BEEN ATTACKED AFTER FIRING ON PATROLLING US A6S. THE FRIGATE WAS LISTING HEAVILY AND ON FIRE, AND LIKELY TO SINK:

(E) THE FRIGATE SABALON HAD BEEN HIT BY A LASER GUIDED BOMB AFTER PROVOCATION, AND HAD REPORTED TO IRAN THAT IT WAS QUOTE SICK UNQUOTE. THE US HAD SENT IT A MESSAGE THAT IT WOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO PORT, BUT THAT THEY WOULD SINK IT IF IT DID NOT CEASE HOSTILE ACTION.

(F) TWO IRANIAN F4S FROM THE MAINLAND HAD BEEN FIRED ON BY THE USS WAINWRIGHT. ONE HAD LANDED AT KISH ISLAND AND THE OTHER HAD LANDED ON THE MAINLAND SIGNALLING IT WAS AN EMERGENCY.

2 ARMITAGE SAID THAT THE US HAD INDICATED THAT THEY CONSIDERED ACTION TO BE OVER, BUT THIS DEPENDED ON IRANIAN REACTIONS. I SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TO ARGUE THAT US ACTIONS WERE TAKEN IN SELF DEFENCE RATHER THAN IN RETALIATION.

ACLAND

ADVANCE 4718

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SIC U2H
MY TELNO 281: IRAN/IRAQ: MILITARY ACTIVITY.

SUMMARY

1. IRAQIS LAUNCH OFFENSIVE ON IRANIAN POSITIONS AT FAO. SOME PROGRESS REPORTED, BUT STILL A LONG WAY FROM RECAPTURING IT. MISSILE ATTACKS CONTINUE.

DETAIL

2. BAGHDAD RADIO BEGAN PLAYING MARTIAL MUSIC EARLY YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND TOLD THE POPULACE TO PREPARE FOR AN IMPORTANT COMMUNIQUE FROM THE ARMED FORCES. WHEN IT CAME IT REPORTED AN IRAQI OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED AGAINST THE IRANIAN POSITIONS AT FAO EARLY ON 17 APRIL. CODENAMED ''BLESSED RAMADHAN'', THE AIM OF THE OFFENSIVE IS THE LIBERATION OF THE ENTIRE FAO PENINSULA.

3. THE OPERATION IS A JOINT ONE BETWEEN UNITS OF THE ELITE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD AND 7 CORPS. THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD ATTACKED FROM THE WEST AND WAS SAID TO HAVE TAKEN THE ENTIRE SALT FLATS (MAMLAHA) AREA BY 0630 LOCAL ON 17 APRIL, WHILE 7 CORPS ATTACKED IRANIAN POSITIONS ON THE SHATT AL ARAB AND WAS APPROACHING FAO FROM THE NORTH. THE IRAQIS CLAIMED THAT THEIR FORCES WERE CONTINUING TO ADVANCE WITH THE IRANIANS RETREATING IN DISORDER.

4. CELEBRATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN STAGE-MANAGED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY (STUDENTS AT BAGHDAD UNIVERSITY WERE TOLD TO REPORT FOR THEM AT NOON, OVER TWO HOURS BEFORE THE FIRST OFFICIAL ANNOUNCE-2.3,5) BUT LOOK AS THOUGH THEY MAY HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT PREMATURE. AFTER THE INITIAL TWO COMMUNIQUES ON THE OPERATION NOTHING FURTHER HAS BEEN RELEASED. TV COVERAGE HAS BEEN NOTICEABLY ABSENT.

5. ELSEWHERE THE IRAQIS HAVE CONTINUED THEIR MISSILE ATTACKS, ADDING A MISSILE ON SHIRAZ (THE FIRST) TO THEIR TALLY FOR 17 APRIL, AND HAVE FIRED THREE MORE ON 18 APRIL ON QOM, ISFAHAN AND TEHRAN. IRAQI AIRCRAFT WERE ACTIVE, WITH 318 SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF THE FAO OPERATIONS, BUT THIS DOES NOT REPRESENT HEAVY

COMMITMENT OF AIRCRAFT WHEN COMPARED WITH EARLIER OFFENSIVES. IRAN CONTINUED ITS SHELLING OF IRAQI BORDER TOWNS BUT HAS NOT SO FAR RESPONDED WITH MISSILES.

COMMENT

6. THE IRAQIS SEEM, FOR ONCE, TO HAVE TAKEN THE IRANIANS AND EVERYONE ELSE, BY SURPRISE. WE HAD NOTED A BUILD-UP OF IRAQI FORCES IN THE SOUTH FOR SOME TIME WHICH WE CONSIDERED TO BE PURELY DEFENSIVE. THE VENTURE IS LIKELY TO PROVE AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND COSTLY OPERATION FOR IRAQ. THE IRANIANS HAVE HAD TWO YEARS (FRO WAS TAKEN IN FEBRUARY 1986) TO DIG IN AND THE GROUND IS UNSUITABLE FOR IRAQ'S HEAVY EQUIPMENT. ANY ADVANCE WILL THEREFORE BE BY INFANTRY, WHICH IS LIKELY TO PROVE COSTLY IN MANPOWER. THE IRAQIS HAVE HITHERTO SHOWN THEMSELVES RELUCTANT TO UNDERTAKE SUCH OPERATIONS. THEY WILL PRESUMABLY SEEK TO EXPLOIT WHAT FACTORS ARE IN THEIR FAVOUR - THE SHATT AL ARAB IS UNUSUALLY FULL AND FAST, POSSIBLY MAKING IRANIAN RE-SUPPLY DIFFICULT, AND THE IRAQI AIRFORCE, IF USED EFFECTIVELY, IS A POWERFUL WEAPON. HOWEVER, CONDITIONS FOR THE ATTACK YESTERDAY WERE FAR FROM IDEAL: THE SKY WAS OVERCAST AND THE WEATHER BLUSTERY.

7. IT IS PUZZLING WHY THE IRAQIS HAVE DECIDED TO TRY TO RETAKE FAO. THEY HAD EFFECTIVELY SEALED THE IRANIANS IN AND THE LAND THEY HAVE SO FAR RETAKEN IS WORTHLESS. THE LIKELIEST EXPLANATION IS THAT, IN PART, THEY NEEDED A PROPAGANDA COUP TO DISTRACT FROM THE LESS HAPPY SITUATION IN THE NORTH WHERE THE IRANIANS ARE STILL PRESSING. IT MAY ALSO BE THAT LIEUTENANT GENERAL MAHER ABDUL RASHID, THE CHARISMATIC 7 CORPS COMMANDER, HAS CONVINCED THE PRESIDENT THAT HE CAN ACHIEVE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST OF RIDDING THE FAO PENINSULA OF THE IRANAINS - A MOVE LIKELY ALSO TO WIN FAVOUR WITH IRAQ'S ARAB ALLIES, NOTABLY KUWAIT WHICH HAS BEEN HIT BY IRAN SILKWORM MISSILES BASED AT FAO IN THE PAST. MFA OFFICIALS WERE CONFIDENT TODAY THAT FAO WOULD BE LIBERATED AND, IF SO, IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE A MORALE BOOSTER, PROVIDED THE SACRIFICES ARE NOT TOO GREAT. BUT, IF THE ATTACK FALTERS AND STOPS SHORT OF FAO, THE ''VICTORY'' WILL HAVE ACHIEVED LITTLE AT CONSIDERABLE EXPENSE. BUT NO ONE IS GOING TO QUESTION THE WISDOM OF THE MOVE, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT.

CLARK

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(ENGLAND)

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EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

April 18, 1988

Seen by PM
10/4

Dear Geoffrey:

Enclosed is a letter which Secretary Shultz has asked me to pass along to you about this morning's strikes against certain Iranian military targets in the Persian Gulf. As a follow-on to the discussion I had earlier this morning with Charles Powell about which I understand you were immediately briefed, I am sending a copy to Charles to convey to the Prime Minister.

I understand the White House plans to make an announcement about the strikes very soon and may have done so by the time you receive this letter. We expect the White House statement to provide details of the strikes.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Charles H. Price, II
Ambassador

The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., M.P.,
Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Downing Street,
London, SW1.

CONFIDENTIAL

April 18, 1988

Dear Geoffrey:

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS TODAY ORDERED U.S. MILITARY FORCES TO STRIKE CERTAIN IRANIAN MILITARY TARGETS IN THE PERSIAN GULF. THE ACTION HAS JUST COMMENCED. THESE TARGETS HAVE BEEN USED TO ATTACK NON-BELLIGERENT SHIPPING IN THE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS OF THE GULF.

-- I WANTED TO INFORM YOU OF OUR ACTION AND ADVISE YOU OF THE REASONS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION. THE PRESIDENT HOPES STRONGLY THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL SUPPORT THIS DECISION PRIVATELY AND IN ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

-- WE HAD HOPED THAT ACTIONS THE UNITED STATES TOOK LAST FALL IN RESPONSE TO PROVOCATIONS BY IRAN WOULD HAVE SERVED TO CONVINCE IRAN OF THE UNITED STATES' SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE AND OUR RESOLVE TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS IN THE GULF.

-- FOUR TIMES LAST FALL, WE INFORMED THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT IRAN'S MINELAYING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS, OR IN THE WATERS OF NEUTRAL STATES. WE MADE CLEAR WE DID NOT SEEK FURTHER CONFRONTATION WITH IRAN, BUT INDICATED WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET ANY ESCALATION OF MILITARY ACTIONS BY IRAN WITH STRONG COUNTERMEASURES, DESIGNED TO DETER FURTHER AGGRESSION.

-- THIS ACTION IS IN DIRECT RESPONSE TO IRAN'S NEW MINING OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS, ONE OF WHICH STRUCK AND SEVERELY DAMAGED THE USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS APRIL 14. TEN AMERICAN SAILORS WERE INJURED DURING THAT MINING ATTACK.

-- WE HAVE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE MINE WHICH STRUCK THE ROBERTS WAS ONE OF SEVERAL MINES LAID RECENTLY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SEA LANES OFF BAHRAIN. WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE MINES WERE MANUFACTURED RECENTLY IN IRAN. LATER TODAY, WE WILL BE MAKING PUBLIC PHOTOGRAPHS OF ADDITIONAL MINES THE U.S. NAVY LOCATED AND DESTROYED IN THE AREA WHERE THE ROBERTS WAS STRUCK.

-- THE ACTIONS WE ARE TAKING ARE A NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO THE UNLAWFUL USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. IT IS A LAWFUL EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE ENSHRINED IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. WE ARE SO NOTIFYING THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

SECRET

-- THESE BELLIGERENT ACTIONS BY IRAN, IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF THE RIGHT OF NEUTRAL NATIONS TO FREE PASSAGE, UNDERSCORE THE URGENCY OF STRONG INTERNATIONAL MEASURES IN THE UNITED NATIONS TO PASS A FOLLOW-ON RESOLUTION TO RESOLUTION 598. AS THE MINING INCIDENT LAST WEEK MAKES CLEAR, IRAN'S BASIC BEHAVIOR REMAINS IMPROPER AND THEREFORE UNACCEPTABLE.

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS INSTRUCTED ME TO RAISE HIS CONCERNS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE THIS WEEK IN MOSCOW AND TO UNDERSCORE THE NEED FOR RAPID SECURITY COUNCIL PASSAGE OF A FOLLOW-ON RESOLUTION.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

George P. Shultz

SECRET

MED

PSG drafts advice in the form of a telegram to the Hague, for Private Secretary, to issue this afternoon

PS (2 copies)

Mr Powell, No: 10

PS/Mr Mellor

PS/PUS Mr Boyd Mr Slater News D

Mr Munro Sir O Wiggins SCD Legal Advisers

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

April 18, 1988

Dear Geoffrey,

We wanted you to have our latest position on UNSC Resolution 598 before your departure for The Hague.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Charles H. Price, II
Ambassador

Enclosure: Confidential

The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W. 1

IRAN-IRAQ FOLLOWUP TO RESOLUTION 598

-- AS YOU KNOW, THE U.S. HAS BEEN FORCED TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION IN SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST CERTAIN IRANIAN MILITARY TARGETS IN THE PERSIAN GULF ON APRIL 18. WE DID THIS BECAUSE OF THE INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE WE HAVE THAT IRAN HAS NEWLY LAID MINES IN THE GULF WITH THE CLEAR INTENTION OF TARGETTING NON-BELLIGERENT, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INCLUDING U.S. VESSELS, IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS OF THE PERSIAN GULF. SEVERE INJURIES TO MEMBERS OF THE CREW AND DAMAGE TO THE USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS OCCURRED ON APRIL 14 WHEN AN IRANIAN-LAID MINE STRUCK THE VESSEL. WE HAVE ACTED WITH SUCH FORCE AS WE CONSIDER NECESSARY TO DETER FURTHER MINING ATTACKS. OUR ACTION WAS PROPORTIONATE TO THE THREAT POSED BY IRAN'S ILLEGAL MEASURES.

-- IT REMAINS THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT NOT TO SEEK MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH IRAN OR A WIDENING OF THE CONFLICT IN THE AREA.

-- THE U.S. CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE TENSION AND VIOLENCE IN THE GULF IS THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. THE THREAT TO REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY AND THE EVER-PRESENT POSSIBILITY OF A SPILLOVER OF THE WAR TO THIRD COUNTRIES REMAINS HIGH. MEANWHILE THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS OF BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN ARE SUFFERING EXTRAORDINARY ASSAULT -- MOST RECENTLY FROM MISSILES AND CHEMICAL WARFARE AS WELL AS ARTILLERY. IN OUR VIEW, NEITHER BELLIGERENT IS ABLE TO ACHIEVE A DECISIVE MILITARY VICTORY IN THIS WAR.

-- THE DEEP AND WIDELY-SHARED CONCERN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS REFLECTED IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL'S UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION 598 ON JULY 20, 1987.

-- IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECALL THAT 598 IS A MANDATORY RESOLUTION, THUS REQUIRING EITHER COMPLIANCE AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION BY BOTH PARTIES OR, IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPLIANCE, APPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT MEASURES.

-- IRAQ IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTED RESOLUTION 598 IN JULY AND HAS SEVERAL TIMES, MOST RECENTLY THIS MONTH, AGAIN REITERATED THAT ACCEPTANCE.

-- IRAN, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT 598. ACCORDING TO THE MOST RECENT REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE UNSC, IRAN STILL HAS NOT ACCEPTED 598, THOUGH IT HAS STATED A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION.

-- THERE HAS BEEN A SLOWLY BUILDING CONSENSUS IN THE UNSC THAT IRAN'S FORMAL ACCEPTANCE OF 598 IS REQUIRED IF FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION IS TO BE POSSIBLE. THIS HAS NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING FROM IRAN.

-- INSTEAD, IN DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF 598, IRAN HAS AGAIN RESORTED TO MINING INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE PERSIAN GULF. IT HAS ALSO LAUNCHED FRESH GROUND-OFFENSIVES AGAINST IRAQ.

NB

-- WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NOW INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE THAT IRAN HAS BEEN COMPLICIT IN THE HIJACKING OF THE KUWAITI AIRWAYS AIRCRAFT NOW IN ALGIERS, REFLECTING CONTINUING IRANIAN WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT TERRORISTS, CRIMINALS AND MURDERERS IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS.

-- THIS WEEK IN MOSCOW SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL BE DIRECTLY ADDRESSING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE THE CHALLENGE FACING THE UNSC -- THE URGENT NEED FOR ACTION TO ENFORCE 598.

-- WE HAVE BELIEVED FOR SOME TIME THAT THE RIGHT ENFORCEMENT MEASURE WOULD BE AN ARMS EMBARGO DIRECTED AGAINST IRAN AS THE NONCOMPLIANT PARTY TO RESOLUTION 598 -- NONCOMPLIANT BECAUSE IT REFUSES TO ACCEPT 598.

-- AN ARMS EMGARGO WILL NOT END THE WAR, BUT IT WILL MAKE IRAN'S PURSUIT OF THE WAR MORE DIFFICULT -- AND IT MAY HELP, OVER TIME, CONVINCE THE IRANIANS TO NEGOTIATE A RESOLUTION 598 MECHANISM.

-- WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE SO AND THAT THE TIME IS RIGHT -- NOW -- TO MOVE DECISIVELY.

-- WE ASK THAT YOU JOIN US IN ACTION AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL OVER THE COMING DAYS. WE SHOULD WORK TO PERFECT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH WAS CIRCULATED TO ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS IN DECEMBER. WE SHOULD ADOPT THAT RESOLUTION IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.



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TO DESKBY 150900Z FCO
TELNO 988
OF 150054Z APRIL 88
INFO DESKBY 150900Z MODUK, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, RIYADH
INFO DESKBY 150900Z ROME

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SIC

MOD FOR SEC(O)(C) AND DJOC
MINING OF US WARSHIP IN THE GULF
SUMMARY

1. US FRIGATE STRUCK BY MINE IN THE GULF: NO-ONE KILLED BUT 10 INJURED. POSSIBILITY OF SOME PROPORTIONATE US RESPONSE: BUT NO FINAL DECISIONS UNTIL 15 APRIL.

DETAIL

2. THE PENTAGON SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED ON 14 APRIL THAT EARLIER THAT DAY THE USS SAMUEL B ROBERTS (FFG7 CLASS FRIGATE) STRUCK A MINE SOME 70 MILES EAST OF THE BAHRAIN BELL. CONTACTS IN THE US NAVY ADD THAT AT THE TIME IT WAS STRUCK THE VESSEL WAS JUST OUTSIDE THE SWEPT CONVOY CHANNEL. THERE ARE NOW REPORTED TO BE 10 US SAILORS INJURED, ONE WITH SEVERE BURNS. THE SHIP SUSTAINED DAMAGE IN THE ENGINE ROOM AND IS NOW HEADING FOR DUBAI UNDER ITS OWN AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM.

3. THE AMERICANS ARE STILL SEEKING FULL DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT. CONTACTS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TELL US THAT THE SHIP AVOIDED 3 MINES BEFORE STRIKING THE FOURTH. BUT THE US NAVY ARE NOT YET CERTAIN THAT THE OTHER THREE OBJECTS WERE MINES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT US MINESWEEPERS ARE NOW EN ROUTE TO THE SCENE AND WILL BEGIN A SEARCH OF THE AREA AT FIRST LIGHT. THERE IS AS YET NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE AS TO WHETHER THESE WERE OLD OR NEWLY-SOWN MINES OR WHETHER THEY WERE MOORED OR FLOATING. BUT THE ROBERTS SUSTAINED SOME SHRAPNEL DAMAGE TO HER SUPERSTRUCTURE, WHICH INDICATES THAT THE MINE WAS ON THE SURFACE WHEN IT EXPLODED. THERE ARE ALSO SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE MINES WERE NEWLY-SOWN, INCLUDING THE FACT THAT A NUMBER OF SHIPS HAD PASSED THROUGH THE SAME AREA EARLIER WITHOUT INCIDENT. IT MAY ALSO BE RELEVANT TO THE QUESTION OF IRANIAN MOTIVES THAT THE NEXT US-ESCORTED CONVOY SCHEDULED TO PASS THROUGH THE AREA INCLUDES THE BRIDGETON.

4. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH LATE ON 14 APRIL WITH CONTACTS IN STATE, THE NSC, THE PENTAGON AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE INTER-AGENCY POLICY REVIEW GROUP (ARMACOST/ARMITAGE

LEVEL) MET ON 14 APRIL. ONE CONTACT TELLS US THAT THERE IS ALREADY CONSENSUS AT THAT LEVEL THAT THERE SHOULD BE A US RESPONSE (ALTHOUGH OTHERS HAVE BEEN SLIGHTLY LESS CATEGORICAL). THE MEETING APPARENTLY IDENTIFIED A RANGE OF OPTIONS FOR US RETALIATION, ALL OF THEM ''MODEST''. NONE INCLUDED ACTION AGAINST THE IRANIAN MAINLAND. A NUMBER OF CONTACTS HAVE MADE THE POINT THAT THE FINAL US DECISION WILL DEPEND AT LEAST PARTLY ON WHETHER THE MINES TURN OUT TO HAVE BEEN NEW OR OLD. (THEY WOULD WELCOME AN EARLY ACCOUNT OF ANY EVIDENCE WE COLLECT ON THIS.)

5. SHULTZ RETURNS FROM GENEVA TONIGHT, AND IS DUE TO MEET WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS EARLY ON 15 APRIL. DECISIONS COULD FOLLOW RAPIDLY AFTER THAT.

COMMENT

6. THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH DECISIONS WILL BE TAKEN HERE ON 15 APRIL IS BOUND TO BE AFFECTED TO SOME EXTENT BY THE BOMB BLAST IN NAPLES ALSO ON 14 APRIL, IN WHICH AT LEAST ONE US SAILOR IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN KILLED. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE US HAVE NO EVIDENCE YET OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT INCIDENT. BUT THE FACT THAT THE US HAVE SUFFERED CASUALTIES IN TWO INCIDENTS ON THE SAME DAY (THE SECOND ANNIVERSAY OF THE RAID ON LIBYA) MAY STRENGTHEN THE CASE IN AMERICAN MINDS FOR A PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE TO THE GULF MINING INCIDENT.

ACLAND

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SIC
MOD FOR SEC(O)(C) AND DJOC
OUR TELNO 988 (NOT TO ALL): MINING OF US WARSHIP IN THE GULF
1. ACCORDING TO US SOURCES, DIFFICULT SEA AND WEATHER CONDITIONS ON 15 APRIL PREVENTED THE RECOVERY OF THE MINES. BUT TWO OR THREE HAVE AGAIN BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE SEA BY HELICOPTERS AND BY THE USS TRENTON, CONFIRMING THEM AS MK0-8 MINES AS FOUND ON THE IRAN AJR (THEY ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM A DISTANCE BY FIVE HORNS ON THEIR OUTER CASING). THE MINES DO NOT APPEAR EITHER DISCOLOURED OR ENCRUSTED WITH SEA GROWTH. THERE IS THEREFORE A STRENGTHENING PRESUMPTION HERE THAT THEY ARE NEWLY LAID.
2. WE HAVE HAD EXTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH US OFFICIALS DURING 15 APRIL, INCLUDING THE SCHEDULED MIL/MIL TALKS ABOUT THE GULF IN THE PENTAGON. FROM ALL THE INDICATIONS, AN EARLY US PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE STILL SEEMS LIKELY, PARTICULARLY IF THE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE RESUMED THEIR MINING ACTIVITIES. THE US ARE TRYING TO TRACE THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE IRANIAN VESSEL, THE AK CHARAK, BELIEVED MOST LIKELY TO HAVE LAID THESE MINES. IT WAS LAST SEEN IN BANDAR ABBAS ON 12 APRIL.
3. US OFFICIALS HAVE ASSURED US THAT WE WILL BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE OF ANY US OPERATION, AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS. WE UNDERLINED DURING THE MIL/MIL TALKS AND WITH OTHER CONTACTS THE NEED FOR MAXIMUM ADVANCE NOTICE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE CURRENT ALLIED NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE AREA OF THE MINING INCIDENT.

ACLAND

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MDLIAN 8172

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FM WASHINGTON
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 922
OF 080420Z APRIL 88
INFO PRIORITY THE HAGUE
INFO ROUTINE BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, GULF POSTS, BONN, PARIS

DUTCH NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE GULF

1. THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR TOLD ME ON 6 APRIL THAT HE HAD BEEN MAKING STRONG REPRESENTATIONS TO THE HAGUE THAT IF THEY WITHDREW A MINEHUNTER FROM THE GULF IT SHOULD BE PARTIALLY REPLACED BY A VISITING FRIGATE FROM TIME TO TIME. HE ADDED THAT IF THE HAGUE AGREED WITH THIS, THEY WOULD CERTAINLY WANT THE FRIGATE TO BE UNDER UK COMMAND, AND THEY WOULD PROBABLY LOOK FOR RN PROTECTION FOR THE (FEW) DUTCH MERCHANT SHIPS IN THE GULF.

2. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS HAS BEEN RAISED IN LONDON OR THE HAGUE, AND DO NOT WANT TO CROSS WIRES. AND I UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT PROTECTION. BUT THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE AMERICANS ATTACH TO THE EUROPEAN ROLE IN THE GULF IN THE WIDER CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE ON BURDEN-SHARING IS RELEVANT. WE KNOW FROM STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE US IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF BELGIAN AND DUTCH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GULF. ANYTHING THAT COULD BE DONE TO MINIMISE THE IMPACT OF ANY WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE VERY WELCOME IN SHOWING THAT THE EUROPEANS ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO PLAY THEIR PART.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

30 March 1988

COORDINATION OF NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

Thank you for your letter of 29 March about the latest developments in discussions with the Dutch and Belgian governments about an integrated minesweeping force in the Gulf under permanent British command.

The Prime Minister takes the view that the usefulness - both politically and militarily - of this attempt to establish an integrated force is getting progressively less. But there is still just enough in it to make it worthwhile continuing discussions on the basis set out in your letter.

I am copying this letter to Ian Andrews (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Robert Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 March 1988

Coordination of Naval Operations in the Gulf

We exchanged letters on 17/18 March on proposals for an integrated British, Dutch, Belgian minesweeping force in the Gulf under permanent British command. This letter reflects extensive further discussion since then between FCO and MOD officials.

At a tripartite meeting of officials in the Hague on 25 March to discuss this, the Dutch, with Belgian support, persisted with their idea of Britain providing protection for their merchant ships in the Gulf. As foreshadowed in my letter, we made it clear that such ideas could only be considered if the Dutch provided a frigate. The Dutch and Belgians nevertheless linked protection of shipping and MCMV integration; indeed the Belgians made an unhelpful public statement the same day which spoke of withdrawal of their MCMV force after 1 July unless certain conditions (including integration and protection of shipping) were met. The meeting produced a proposal for the Dutch to deploy a frigate to join Armilla for a period each year proportional to the extra load protection of Dutch and Belgian shipping implied. The Dutch would withdraw their MCMVs (likely to be reduced from 2 to 1 in any case), but the Belgians would maintain one MCMV (but not the second MCMV, or their support vessel) in the Gulf. This would leave an integrated force of 4 MCMVs (the minimum viable), with British support ships.

It has proved impossible to de-link MCMV integration and protection of shipping in Dutch and Belgian minds. However, the current proposal, while by no means ideal, and requiring detailed study by all sides, would achieve our twin objectives of keeping the Dutch and Belgian Navies involved in the Gulf, and not conceding any extension of Armilla's responsibilities without a contribution to Armilla's resources. The Dutch frigate would of course be under British command for the time she was with Armilla, and the Belgian MCMV would come under permanent British command at all levels.

Before taking this matter any further, the Foreign Secretary would be grateful for confirmation that the Prime Minister is content that we should proceed on this basis, subject to consulting her again when a detailed proposal has been put together, including an analysis of the likely additional burden of shipping protection.

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

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IRAQ: Iran/Iraq PT9.



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FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO DESKBY 290930Z FCO
TELNO 412
OF 282335Z MARCH 88
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, BAGHDAD

YOUR TELNO 162: IRAN/IRAQ

SUMMARY
1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DISCUSSIONS WITH EMISSARIES FROM IRAN AND IRAQ, AND NEWLY EXPRESSED READINESS BY THE RUSSIANS TO DO BUSINESS ON A SECOND RESOLUTION SOON THEREAFTER, MAY REVIVE THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH EARLIER THAN EXPECTED. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE TO MEET ON 29 MARCH TO CONSIDER AMONG OTHER THINGS A POSSIBLE MORALE-BOOSTING MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

DETAIL
2. THE ANALYSIS IN PARA 1 OF YOUR TUR IS PRETTY MUCH COMMON GROUND AMONG THE THREE WESTERN PERMANENT MEMBERS. BUT I HOPE THAT THE DELAY BEFORE THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH CAN BE RESUMED MAY NOT BE AS LONG AS YOU FEAR. FEELING AGAINST IRAQ IS HIGH AMONG SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS, NOTABLY OVER CW AND THE WAR OF THE CITIES. BUT IRAN'S STANDING IS ALSO LOW, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF EVIDENT IRANIAN PREVARICATION (MY TELNO 370), AND THE OCCUPATION OF NEW IRAQI TERRITORY IN THE NORTH. EVERYONE IS FED UP WITH THEIR ACRID COMPLAINTS AGAINST EACH OTHER. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S FORTHCOMING ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WITH EMISSARIES FROM THE PARTIES IS CERTAIN TO LEAD TO NEW ACTIVITY IN THE COUNCIL, WHICH MAY GIVE US OPPORTUNITIES TO TAKE BACK THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE.

3. MUCH DEPENDS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS, AND HERE THERE IS EVIDENCE OF CHANGE. WHEN I SAW THE SOVIET PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON 28 MARCH, HE CONFIRMED THAT THE SHULTZ/SHEVERDNADZE MEETING HAD BEEN INCONCLUSIVE ON IRAN/IRAQ: ALL NOW DEPENDED ON WHAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD ACHIEVE OVER THE NEXT WEEK OR SO. WE AGREED THAT THE FIVE SHOULD MEET SOON, PERHAPS TO CONSIDER A JOINT MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR HIS FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I NOTED THAT BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ TENDED TO PLAY OFF THE FIVE AGAINST EACH OTHER, AND WONDERED WHETHER WE SHOULD NOT MAKE THE MOST OF OUR COLLECTIVE WEIGHT BY SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE DIRECTLY TO THE TWO PARTIES. BELONOGOV SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER THE IDEA.

4. BELONOGOV ALSO, TO MY SURPRISE, MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE VERY MUCH IN BUSINESS ON A SECOND RESOLUTION. HE NOW HAD INSTRUCTIONS ON THE BRITISH DRAFT, AND WOULD HAVE AMENDMENTS TO SUGGEST. BUT THESE WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S FORTHCOMING ROUND (PRESUMABLY BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET WISH TO INSERT REFERENCES TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ROLE AND THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT). HE LATER STRESSED THE NEED UNEQUIVOCALLY TO CONDEMN CW USE, AND SAID THE SOVIET UNION WOULD SUPPORT ANY RESOLUTION OR PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION TO THAT END (AS, I ASSUME, WOULD WE). WHETHER HE REGARDS THE TWO IDEAS AS LINKED, WAS NOT CLEAR.

5. AS TO A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE (ON WHICH YOU WILL HAVE SEEN MY TELNO 406), I HOPE WE CAN STIFLE OUR RELUCTANCE IF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WISHES TO GO AHEAD. HE NEEDS ANOTHER PAIR OF HANDS, AND A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE COULD GIVE A CONTINUITY AND MOMENTUM TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THEY LACK AT PRESENT. THERE IS CERTAINLY A RISK THAT HIS ACTIVITIES COULD FURTHER DELAY A SECOND RESOLUTION: BUT THAT IS ONLY PART OF THE EXERCISE, AND WE COULD HOPE TO KEEP A GRIP OF HIS ACTIVITIES THROUGH THE FIVE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE A PITY IF IT WERE TO SEEM THAT AN APPOINTMENT HAD BEEN MADE AGAINST OUR WISHES.

6. AS REGARDS AMERICAN VIEWS, THE U S MISSION HERE STILL SEEMS TO BE FOCUSSED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE ARMS EMBARGO RESOLUTION. BUT THEY WOULD PROBABLY AGREE WITH OUR OWN ANALYSIS AND WILL NO DOUBT AGAIN ARGUE IF NECESSARY AGAINST ANY PRECIPITATE MOVE. NEVERTHELESS, AS IN THE PAST WE MAY NEED TO WEIGH IN AT A HIGH LEVEL: A PREMATURE AMERICAN ATTEMPT TO BULLDOZE A RESOLUTION THROUGH THE COUNCIL WOULD FAIL, AND WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE IN FUTURE TO GET ONE ADOPTED LATER.

7. A MEETING OF THE FIVE AMBASSADORS HAS NOW BEEN FIXED FOR TOMORROW AFTERNOON, 29 MARCH. I PROPOSE TO URGE THE SUGGESTION OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FIVE AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (PARA 3 ABOVE: WE ARE PUTTING THE AMERICANS AND FRENCH IN THE PICTURE) AND SEE IF OTHER USEFUL IDEAS EMERGE. BELONOGOV PROPOSES TO TELL THE REST WHAT HE TOLD ME ABOUT SOVIET VIEWS ON A SECOND RESOLUTION. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY FURTHER POINTS YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO MAKE.

TICKELL

CAB 1

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(67)

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 March 1988

IRAN/IRAQ

Thank you for your letter of 18 March, with which you enclosed a draft reply from the Prime Minister to the Amir of Kuwait's recent message about the Gulf conflict, sent in his capacity as Chairman of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.

I am confident the Prime Minister would be content with the reply which may issue (but could you please dispense with "tragic" in the first line of paragraph 2 and "senseless" in the second line of paragraph 4).

BF.

C D POWELL

R. N. Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 March 1988

Dear Charles

Iran/Iraq

A message has been received from the Amir of Kuwait in his capacity as Chairman of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. I enclose a copy. The message was apparently sent to all the leaders of UN Security Council Member States. It calls for more action in New York following the exchange of missiles between Baghdad and Tehran.

The Foreign Secretary believes that there is some benefit to be gained by the Prime Minister sending a short reply, highlighting the efforts made so far to obtain implementation of SCR 598, and encouraging OIC support. OIC Foreign Ministers are meeting in Amman on 21 March. I enclose a draft, in the form of a telegram.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO
TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK
TELNO
OF 141430Z MARCH 88
INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT

YOUR TELNO 250: IRAN/IRAQ: MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. Grateful if you would pass on to Kuwaiti Permanent Representative the following reply from the Prime Minister to the Amir of Kuwait's 1 March message:

Quote: Thank you for your message of 1 March on behalf of the Organisation of Islamic Conference.

I share your dismay at the recent escalation of the ~~tragic~~ conflict between Iran and Iraq, and we are particularly concerned that this has resulted in the death and injury of so many innocent civilians. We have made strenuous efforts to persuade both sides to desist and are glad that they ~~appear to have~~ responded to international pressure, in calling a truce: we hope that the latest outbreak will similarly be ended quickly.

There has, as you know, been a continuous and strenuous effort on the part of the UN Secretary-General and the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council to bring about a halt to all hostilities through the implementation of SCR 598. I agree that the delays in the full compliance with this mandatory Resolution by Iran and Iraq have led to yet further unnecessary bloodshed, and I can assure you that we are doing everything possible to try

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Catchword: to enforce

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	UNCLASSIFIED		PRIORITY

<<<<

to enforce compliance urgently. ~~We~~ The UK is at the forefront of work within the Security Council to prepare a mandatory arms embargo, ~~and~~ we are continuing to try to make progress on this, in the absence of voluntary implementation by the two parties to the conflict.


The whole international community is united in the wish to see this ~~senseless~~ conflict stopped, and I trust that we can count on the continued support of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference for the work of the Security Council to this end. Unquote.

HOWE

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LIMITED
IRAN/IRAQ

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For distribution order see Page Catchword:


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18. III.

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144030
MDADAN 7673

Mr Taylor SIr
Draft response + Sub" PLD

2-3

Mr Collcutt
I wonder who else this has gone to.

UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 250
OF 012340Z MARCH 88
INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT

IRAN/IRAQ: MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

1. THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KUWAIT HAS HANDED ME FOR ONWARD TRANSMISSION A MESSAGE DATED 1 MARCH ADDRESSED TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE AMIR OF KUWAIT, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANISATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. THE UNOFFICIAL KUWAITI TRANSLATION IS AS FOLLOWS (ARABIC ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG):

BEGINS:
EXCELLENCY,

A NEW TRAGIC DEVELOPMENT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR: A WAR WHICH ITSELF IS A BLOODY TRAGEDY THAT HAS CLAIMED THE LIVES OF HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS FROM BOTH SIDES SINCE ITS INCEPTION MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS AGO. BOMBARDMENT HAS RESUMED ON TOWNS AND POPULATED AREAS, WHERE CHILDREN, WOMEN AND THE ELDERLY, WHOSE ONLY HOPE IS TO LIVE IN PEACE, CANNOT DEFEND THEMSELVES OR AVOID THE BOMBS DROPPED ON THESE AREAS.

ON BEHALF OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD, AND IN THE NAME OF LOVE FOR PEACE AND BROTHERHOOD AMONG HUMANITY ADVOCATED BY ISLAM AND PREACHED BY ALL THE PROPHETS, AND ON BEHALF OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, FOR WHOSE CURRENT SESSION I BEAR RESPONSIBILITY, I SHOULD LIKE TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND I URGE THE SECURITY COUNCIL, PARTICULARLY ITS PERMANENT MEMBERS, TO BEAR IN MIND THAT EVERY DAY THEIR EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION TO PUT AN END TO THIS WAR IS DELAYED ENTAILS FURTHER CASUALTIES AMONG INNOCENT PEOPLE FROM BOTH WARRING PARTIES.

I HOPE THAT THIS MESSAGE WILL REPRESENT YET ANOTHER INCENTIVE TO INITIATE EXPEDITIOUS ACTION IN THIS DIRECTION SO AS TO FULFILL THE ASPIRATIONS OF ALL PEOPLES OF THE WORLD FOR PEACE IN AN AREA WHICH HAS LONG YEARNED FOR PEACE.

PLEASE ACCEPT, YOUR EXCELLENCY, MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

JABER AL AHMAD AL JABER AL SABAH
AMIR OF KUWAIT
CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION OF

144030
MDADAN 767

THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

ENDS.

TICKELL

YYYY

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 March 1988

MINESWEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

Thank you for your letter of 17 March about renewed Dutch and Belgian interest in an integrated minesweeping force in the Gulf but - unlike the earlier proposal - under permanent British command at all levels.

I have discussed this with the Prime Minister who sees no objection to our pursuing the new Dutch proposal further, provided that it results in a formal commitment by both governments to accept that the integrated force would be under permanent British command.

I am copying this letter to Ian Andrews (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C D POWELL

R. N. Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 March 1988

Prime Minister

Agree to a joint UK/Dutch/Belgian MCM force under permanent British command at all levels? (We shall of course seek formal confirmation from the Belgians that they can accept this.)

Yes

Dear Charles

Minesweeping Operations in The Gulf

In the margins of the Informal Meeting of EC Foreign Ministers on 5-6 March the Dutch Foreign Minister raised afresh with the Foreign Secretary the question of an integrated command for the UK, Dutch and Belgian minesweepers in the Gulf.

Van den Broek said that a permanent integrated command would be important in ensuring that Dutch and Belgian contingents remain in the Gulf: to achieve this the Dutch were now prepared to accept permanent British command at all levels. Tindemans separately told the Foreign Secretary that the Belgians could accept the Dutch proposal (however we understand that the Belgians are not pushing for such integration, and that there is some doubt in Brussels whether the current transitional Belgian Government is able constitutionally to take such a decision).

The Foreign Secretary believes that it remains strongly in our interests to avoid any withdrawal of Dutch or Belgian naval contingents from the Gulf. For domestic political reasons, the Dutch are keen to move beyond the enhanced coordination arrangements instituted following your letter of 26 January. The Foreign Secretary believes the Dutch and (we hope) Belgian change of heart on British command represents significant progress, since it removes the difficulties with a rotating command identified by the Prime Minister in your letter of 26 January. It may offer us the best solution available: helping the Dutch and the Belgians to justify their continued presence, and making it harder for them to withdraw; and preserving our complete control over the tasks which our naval ships undertake, while enhancing the credibility of the somewhat reduced MCMV forces likely to remain in the Gulf. The Defence Secretary, whom the Foreign Secretary has consulted, shares this assessment.

/If

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If this Dutch proposal is to be pursued, there is a need for haste. The Dutch intend to make an announcement on the future of their MCMV force before the end of the month, following their Defence Minister's return from the Gulf. It would also be wise to try to agree arrangements before the possible entry of the Socialist Party into the Belgian ruling coalition, which would make any change unlikely. At this stage it is primarily for the Dutch to clear their lines with the Belgians. However, the Foreign Secretary would be grateful for confirmation now that the Prime Minister sees no objection to our pursuing the new Dutch proposal further.

The Dutch have also floated the idea that our agreement to extend the protection of the Armilla Patrol to Dutch shipping would help in presenting domestically the proposed placing of their MCMVs under British command. In reply the Foreign Secretary will make clear that any extension of the Armilla Patrol's protection could only be considered if the Dutch provided a frigate to augment the Patrol (in which case the balance of advantage might be ours), and could not be considered in the separate context of MCMV coordination.


I am copying this letter to Ian Andrews and Trevor Woolley.

Yours ever


(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DE2ABV



IRAQ : Internal Situation Rq



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YOUR TELNO 250: IRAN/IRAQ: MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PASS ON TO KUWAITI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE AMIR OF KUWAIT'S 1 MARCH MESSAGE:

QUOTE: THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 1 MARCH ON BEHALF OF THE ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

I SHARE YOUR DISMAY AT THE RECENT ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, AND WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THIS HAS RESULTED IN THE DEATH AND INJURY OF SO MANY INNOCENT CIVILIANS. WE HAVE MADE STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO PERSUADE BOTH SIDES TO DESIST AND ARE GLAD THAT THEY RESPONDED TO INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE, IN CALLING A TRUCE: WE HOPE THAT THE LATEST OUTBREAK WILL SIMILARLY BE ENDED QUICKLY.

THERE HAS, AS YOU KNOW, BEEN A CONTINUOUS AND STRENUOUS EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO BRING ABOUT A HALT TO ALL HOSTILITIES THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598. I AGREE THAT THE DELAYS IN THE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THIS MANDATORY RESOLUTION BY IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE LED TO YET FURTHER UNNECESSARY BLOODSHED, AND I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO TRY TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE URGENTLY. THE UK IS AT THE FOREFRONT OF WORK WITHIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO PREPARE A MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO. WE ARE CONTINUING TO TRY TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THIS, IN THE ABSENCE OF VOLUNTARY IMPLEMENTATION BY THE TWO PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT.

THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS UNITED IN THE WISH TO SEE THIS CONFLICT STOPPED, AND I TRUST THAT WE CAN COUNT ON THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE ORGANISATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE FOR THE WORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THIS END. UNQUOTE.

HOWE

YYYY

CSPC (2)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone ~~01-930 7022~~ 01-218 2111/3

MO 3/21V

2 March 1988

Prime Minister
CDP 3/3

Dear Charles,

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

Further to my letters of 5th and 19th February, you will wish to be aware of the current position on possible co-ordination of naval activity in the Gulf.

The most recent in the series of WEU Political Co-ordination meetings was held in the Hague on 15th February 1988. At a trilateral discussion in the margins, it was concluded that there would be value in the UK, Dutch and Belgian mine countermeasures vessels undertaking some co-ordinated tasks. This idea was followed up at a meeting of the Naval Staff Representatives in London on 24th February, where it was suggested that, in the absence of any current mine danger areas in the Gulf, joint exercises should be conducted to test and refine the procedures for joint clearance of any mines in future. Such exercises would be a logical extension of the co-operation which took place last year between the three navies in actual mine clearance. Forces taking part would remain under existing national command arrangements.

We propose, therefore, to participate in a preliminary joint UK/Dutch/Belgian exercise in the Gulf of Oman on 17th-18th March. This would be followed by a longer one, from 23rd-31st March 1988, in international waters off the UAE, and in an area where the threat is assessed to be no greater than in the Gulf of Oman. For presentational reasons, the Dutch as WEU President wish to invite the French and Italian navies to participate, though it is unlikely that either would agree to do so.

I am copying this letter to Robert Culshaw (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely
Brian Hawtin

(B R HAWTIN)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

IRAQ : Iran / Iraq PTA.





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AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO
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AND FCO MED FROM DA.

MISSILES/EXPLOSIONS IN BAGHDAD.

1. THERE WERE FOUR EXPLOSIONS HEARD IN BAGHDAD ON 28 AND 29 FEB 88 AT 282053, 290245, 290305 AND 290330 HRS LOCAL.

2. THE FIRST OF THESE EXPLOSIONS WAS STATED BY IRAQI MIL INT TO BE A SONIC BOOM FROM IRAQI FIGHTER.

3. THE SECOND AND THIRD EXPLOSIONS WERE CLAIMED AS MISSILES BY IRAN AIMED AT THE RADIO AND TV STATION AND TWO MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. THEY WERE ACKNOWLEDGED BY IRAQIS TO HAVE FALLEN ON RESIDENTIAL AREAS ''KILLING AND WOUNDING MANY CIVILIANS INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN''.

4. THE FOURTH EXPLOSION WAS CLAIMED AS A MISSILE BY IRAN BUT NOT ACKNOWLEDGED BY IRAQ.

COMMENT

5. AT 282053 HRS LOCAL A SONIC BOOM FOLLOWED BY AN EXPLOSION AND AFTER RUMBLE, THE CLEAR SIGNATURE OF A SCUD B, WAS HEARD FROM A WEST SOUTH WEST DIRECTION OF BAGHDAD. THIS AREA WHICH INCLUDES ABGHDAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN A MISSILE TARGET. THERE IS SOME COLLATERAL FROM A LOCAL WORKER FOR EUROPEAN EMBASSY THAT THE MISSILE FELL BETWEEN ABU GHARAIB AND BAGHDAD AIRPORT IN GENERAL AREA OF 331600N 440500E. THERE HAS BEEN NO IRANIAN CLAIM (NOT UNUSUAL WHEN A MISSILE OFF TARGET) AND ERGO NO IRAQI ACKNOWLEDGEMENT (A MISSILE AS CLOSE AS 8 - 9 MILES TO AIRPORT AND PROBABLY FALLING IN DESERT AREA

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WOULD BE JUDICIOUSLY DISCOUNTED BY IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

6. THE 290245 AND 290305 HRS MISSILES FELL TO THE SOUTH EAST OF BAGHDAD. THERE WERE CLEARLY HEARD AS SCUD BS AND THE FIRST OF THE TWO WAS SEEN BY THE US MARINE SCUD PATROL FROM THEIR ROOF. ONE DELICATE LOCAL SOURCE HAS GIVEN THE POINT OF IMPACT OF BOTH MISSILES AS ASTRIDE THE VILLAGE OF JAYF AL NAJAD (NOT LOC ON OUR MAPS) IN AREA 331220N 443150E. HE REPORTS THAT THEY WERE CLOSE TO A RESEARCH STATION AND THE BLAST CAUSED A NUMBER OF CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE TO THE STATION. THE AREA IS CLOSE TO TAMMUZ. WE ARE NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE RESEARCH STATION IS THE NUCLEAR ONE. DEFENCE SECTION STAFF ARE OUT ON GROUND AT PRESENT.

7. THE 290330HRS MISSILE CLAIMED BY IRAN BUT NOT ACKNOWLEDGED BY IRAQ WAS NOT CLEARLY HEARD IN BAGHDAD AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ON WHERE IT IMPACTED.

8. IT APPEARS THAT FOUR MISSILES COULD HAVE BEEN FIRED BY IRAN. IF IRAN IS USING THREE LAUNCHERS AS A NUMBER OF MY COLLEAGUES BELIEVE, ONE OF THESE WAS RELOADED AND FIRED IN AT LEAST FIVE HOURS.

9. REPORT ON GROUND RECCE AROUND TAMMUZ IF ACCESS IS GAINED WILL FOLLOW.

10. IRAQ REPORTS THAT IT HAS RETALIATED WITH ITS OWN MISSILES (ELEVEN SO FAR) ON TEHRAN. IF TRUE, IT IS THE FIRST TIME DURING THE WAR THAT A MISSILE HAS BEEN FIRED ON THE IRANIAN CAPITAL FROM WITHIN IRAQI BORDERS.

CLARK



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PART TWO OF TWO

IRAN/IRAQ AND GULF

14. SHULTZ'S PRESSURE FOR POSITIVE SOVIET MOVEMENT ON AN ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION ELICITED NO MORE THAN THE USUAL EQUIVOCATION. US EXPERTS FLOATED THE IDEA OF BUILDING INTO THE RESOLUTION A MORATORIUM OF 30 DAYS DURING WHICH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD MAKE A FINAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORT AND THEN REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDING FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE MORATORIUM IF THIS SEEMED JUSTIFIED. THE AMERICANS HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE SOME APPEAL TO THE RUSSIANS. GORBACHEV EMPHASISED TO SHULTZ THE NEED TO HANDLE IRAN VERY CAREFULLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GULF, SINCE IRANIAN ATTITUDES WERE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PROCESS OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN - WHERE, GORBACHEV ACKNOWLEDGED, THE IRANIANS WOULD LIKE TO INSTAL A FUNDAMENTALIST REGIME.

MIDDLE EAST

15. SHULTZ BRIEFED SHEVARDNADZE ON THE OBJECTIVES OF MURPHY'S CURRENT MISSION AND OF HIS OWN FORTHCOMING TOUR: HE URGED SOVIET COOPERATION IN INFLUENCING THEIR CLIENTS IN A HELPFUL DIRECTION.

ANGOLA

16. SHULTZ STRESSED US WILLINGNESS TO WORK INTENSIVELY TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA. IF THE RUSSIANS COULD HELP TO EXTRACT FROM ANGOLA AND CUBA A FIRM DATE FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SOUTH AND A REASONABLE SCHEDULE FOR PHASED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NORTH, AND IF THESE TIME-SCALES WERE ATTRACTIVE, THE SOUTH AFRICANS MIGHT THEMSELVES

BE PERSUADED TO WITHDRAW. THE RUSSIANS EXPRESSED INTEREST, WHILE ARGUING THE NEXT MOVE WAS UP TO THE AMERICANS RATHER THAN TO THEM. (MATLOCK COMMENTED THAT THESE RATHER ENCOURAGING EXCHANGES WERE HIGHLY SENSITIVE).

17. THERE WERE LESS SUBSTANTIAL EXCHANGES ON CAMBODIA (VORONTSOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS FOLLOWING SIHANOUK'S INITIATIVE WITH INTEREST) AND CENTRAL AMERICA. IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE FURTHER EXCHANGES AT OFFICIAL LEVEL ON REGIONAL ISSUES PRIOR TO THE NEXT SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN MARCH.

HUMAN RIGHTS

18. THESE HAD BEEN COVERED BOTH BETWEEN PRINCIPALS AND BY AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER'S WORKING GROUP. GORBACHEV TOLD SHULTZ THAT ALTHOUGH THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATISATION WAS NOW UNDER WAY IN THE SOVIET UNION, IT WAS STILL AT A VERY EARLY STAGE: HE WELCOMED SHULTZ'S RECOGNITION THAT INTERNAL CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION WAS BEING UNDERTAKEN FOR INTERNAL REASONS AND NOT IN DEFERENCE TO PRESSURES OR EXHORTATION FROM OUTSIDE. IN THE WORKING GROUP, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD CLAIMED THAT THE RECENTLY INTRODUCED RESTRICTIONS WHICH ALLOWED SOVIET JEWS TO EMIGRATE ONLY AT THE INVITATION OF A ''CLOSE RELATIVE'' HAD RESULTED FROM A BUREAUCRATIC ERROR AND THAT THEY HAD BEEN LIFTED UNTIL THE END OF 1988 AT WHICH POINT NEW (AND BY IMPLICATION MORE LIBERAL) LEGISLATION WOULD BE INTRODUCED.

19. SHULTZ CALLED ON ACADEMICIAN SAKHAROV AT THE LATTER'S FLAT: THIS WAS THEIR FIRST MEETING. ON THE QUESTION OF A MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE, SAKHAROV TOLD SHULTZ THAT HE FAVOURED THIS PROVIDED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AGREED TO RELEASE ALL ITS REMAINING POLITICAL PRISONERS AND TO BRING THE AFGHAN WAR TO AN END. FULL SOVIET OBSERVANCE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, SAKHAROV ARGUED, WOULD NEED MAJOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS IN THE SOVIET UNION, OVER A LONG PERIOD, AND THAT THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE MIGHT FACILITATE THIS PROCESS. SHULTZ APPARENTLY TOOK THESE POINTS SERIOUSLY.

BILATERAL MATTERS

20. THE BILATERAL ISSUES ADDRESSED WERE RELATIVELY MINOR: SIGNATURE OF A FISHERIES AGREEMENT, DISCUSSION OF COOPERATION IN THE BASIC SCIENCES (WITH THE AMERICANS RESISTING THE EXTENSION

OF SUCH COOPERATION TO TECHNOLOGY) AND QUESTIONS OF COAST-GUARD SEARCH AND RESCUE.

21. MATLOCK DESCRIBED THE ATMOSPHERE OF ALL THE DISCUSSIONS, INCLUDING SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV, AS NOTABLY AMIABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE. GORBACHEV DID NOT PRESS THE TEMPER BUTTON WHEN SHULTZ ADDRESSED HUMAN RIGHTS AND WAS RELAXED THROUGHOUT. SHEVARDNADZE, AS USUAL, WAS BOTH FRIENDLY AND INDEFATIGABLE.

CARTLEDGE

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
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MO 3/21V

19th February 1988

MEA
We may need this back for PM queries
CDP 22/2

Dear Charles,

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

You will wish to be aware that the Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr Stewart) will be answering an inspired PQ later today announcing the reduction of our Mine Counter-Measures vessels force in the Gulf, from four ships to three which I mentioned to you most recently in my letter of 5th February. The answer also refers to the paying off, in about 6 months time, of HMS ABDIEL, which has reached the end of her useful life. I attach a copy of the answer.

flap

I am sending a copy of this letter to Robert Culshaw (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Brian Hawtin

(B R HAWTIN)
PS/S of S

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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FRIDAY 19 FEBRUARY 1988

MR PATRICK THOMPSON (CONSERVATIVE) (NORWICH NORTH)

157 Mr Thompson To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will make a statement on the United Kingdom's mine countermeasure vessels capability in the Gulf area.

A N S W E R

(Mr Ian Stewart)

We have been reviewing the size of our MCMV force in the Gulf. In the light of our experience to date in operations to clear mine danger areas both in the Gulf of Oman and off Qatar, we have concluded that in the present circumstances the mine clearance task can be satisfactorily met by retaining three MCMVs and associated afloat support in the Gulf area to operate in support of the ARMILLA patrol. To this end HM Ships DULVERTON, MIDDLETON and ATHERSTONE are in the course of taking over the Mine Counter-Measures task in the Gulf hitherto fulfilled by HM Ships HURWORTH, BICESTER, BROCKLESBY and BRECON. The support vessel HMS ABDIEL is also returning to the UK, and is due to be paid off in about six months' time. HMS ABDIEL's support role in the Gulf is now being carried out by HMS HERALD.

Ministry of Defence
19 February 1988

IRAQ - Iran/Iraq Related Ar 9...



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MODUK FOR SEC (O)(C)
FCO TELNO 202: PROTECTION OF SHIPPING IN THE GULF: RESPONSE TO THE SAUDIS

SUMMARY

1. US PLAN TO RESPOND TO PRINCE SULTAN THIS WEEK SETTING STIFF CONDITIONS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF OPPORTUNITY ASSISTANCE. NO US COMMITMENTS WILL BE MADE AT THIS STAGE AND SAUDIS NOT EXPECTED TO TAKE THE SUBJECT FURTHER.

2. THE ADMINISTRATION MAY BE CLOSE TO A SEPARATE DECISION TO EXTEND PROTECTION IN THE GULF TO MAJORITY US-OWNED BUT NON-US-FLAGGED SHIPPING.

DETAIL

3. MINISTER TOOK ACTION ON 8 FEBRUARY WITH ARMITAGE (ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OSD) AND OAKLEY (NSC), DEPLOYING THE POINTS IN TUR.

4. BOTH ARMITAGE AND OAKLEY WERE RECEPTIVE TO OUR APPROACH AND FULLY ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION TO LIMIT THE SCOPE FOR SAUDI WEDGE-DRIVING. ARMITAGE SAID THAT THE NON-PAPER, WHICH CARLUCCI PROMISED TO PRINCE SULTAN, WAS NOW NEARLY COMPLETE. THE US AMBASSADOR IN RIYADH WOULD BE INSTRUCTED, PROBABLY THIS WEEK, TO GIVE IT TO SULTAN. THE US RESPONSE WAS ESSENTIALLY TO OFFER THE SAUDIS FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PROTECTION OF NEUTRAL SHIPPING IN THE GULF, SUBJECT TO:-

I) SAUDI/GCC AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO PLAY A ROLE IN PROTECTION OF SHIPPING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS:
II) EXPANSION OF US ACCESS TO GCC FACILITIES:
III) GCC PERMISSION FOR THE US TO PLAY A ROLE IN GCC TERRITORIAL WATERS, (PARTICULARLY OMAN):
IV) ADMINISTRATION CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS.

TO THESE CONDITIONS OAKLEY LATER EXPLICITLY ADDED:

V) AGREEMENT OF THE WESTERN ALLIES (PARTICULARLY UK AND FRANCE) TO THE NEW PROTECTION REGIME.

5. ARMITAGE EMPHASISED THAT THE US WOULD BE MAKING NO NEW COMMITMENTS AT THIS STAGE. NEITHER HE NOR OAKLEY EXPECTED THE

SAUDIS TO HAVE ANY INTEREST IN THE US PROPOSAL. BUT BOTH SAID THE US WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS QUOTE OPPORTUNITY ASSISTANCE UNQUOTE FURTHER IF THE SAUDIS SHOWED WILLING. THAT WOULD REPRESENT A HUGE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANCE BY THE GCC, WHICH THE US WOULD WELCOME. BUT IT WAS ALTOGETHER UNLIKELY TO HAPPEN. OAKLEY THOUGHT IT LIKELY THE EXCHANGE WOULD COME TO DEAD HALT THOUGH KING FAHD'S ANXIETIES WOULD NOT DISAPPEAR.

6. MINISTER SAID THAT OUR THINKING WAS BROADLY SIMILAR BUT THAT GIVEN THE LIMITS ON OUR RESOURCES AND THE PRESENT BURDEN ON THE ARMILLA PATROL, WE WOULD HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT QUOTE OPPORTUNITY ASSISTANCE UNQUOTE, EVEN IF THE GCC WERE TO RESPOND IN SOME WAY. IT WOULD BE ALL THE MORE ESSENTIAL FOR US TO CONSULT CLOSELY IF THE SAUDIS TAKE THE BAIT. ARMITAGE UNDERTOOK TO INFORM US AT ONCE, IF AGAINST THE ODDS THE SAUDIS SHOWED ANY INTEREST.

PROTECTION OF MAJORITY-OWNED US SHIPPING

7. ARMITAGE SAID THAT SEPARATELY HE WAS WORKING ON A PROPOSAL TO EXTEND US NAVAL PROTECTION IN THE GULF TO MAJORITY US-OWNED BUT NON-US-FLAGGED SHIPPING. HE IMPLIED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE NOW CLOSE TO A MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION AND ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD CAUSE US ANY PROBLEMS. MINISTER REPLIED THAT, ON THE FACE OF IT, THE US WOULD APPEAR TO BE MOVING INTO LINE WITH EXISTING UK PRACTICE. WE WOULD HOWEVER NOT WANT OUR SHIPPING LOBBY TO BEGIN TO COMPARE UK PRACTICE, IN ONLY ACCOMPANYING QUALIFIED SHIPPING, UNFAVOURABLY WITH US ESCORT PROTECTION. ARMITAGE SAID THE US WOULD BE SENSITIVE TO THIS POINT IN THEIR HANDLING OF ANY ANNOUNCEMENT. OAKLEY, ON THE SAME ISSUE, NOTED THAT THERE WAS A GREATER THREAT TO US THAN UK SHIPPING, WHICH AMONG OTHER FACTORS ACCOUNTED FOR THE DIFFERENCE IN OUR OPERATIONAL PRACTICE.

8. ON RESOURCES, ARMITAGE SAID THAT THE US NAVY (USN) EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO MEET THE DEMANDS BOTH FROM THIS POSSIBLE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SHIPS US QUALIFIED TO RECIVE PROTECTION AND FROM ANY HYPOTHETICAL MOVE TO QUOTE OPPORTUNITY ASSISTANCE UNQUOTE WITHOUT ANY INCREASE IN CURRENT FORM LEVELS (INCLUDING THE ADJUSTMENTS PLANNED THIS MONTH). TO ACHIEVE THIS THEY WOULD RELY TO A GREATER EXTENT ON DETERRENCE AND LESS EXCLUSIVELY ON CLOSE PHYSICAL PROTECTION. OAKLEY SAID SIMILARLY THAT THE USN HAD ERRED ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION AFTER THE MINING OF THE BRIDGETON. IT WAS STILL ALL-IMPORTANT TO AVOID ANOTHER EMBARRASSMENT BUT SOME RELAXATION OF CURRENT ESCORTING PRACTICE WAS LIKELY.

COMMENT

9. OAKLEY PROMISED TO GIVE US A COPY OF THE CONCEPT PAPER ONCE IT WAS COMPLETE. WE MAY HAVE IT ON 9 FEBRUARY. SHOULD THERE

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MDADAN 4998

BE ANY POINTS OF DIVERGENCE FROM THE ABOVE, WE WILL REPORT IMMEDIATLY.

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MIPT: IRAN/IRAQ AT THE UN: ARMS EMBARGO: DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE FIVE

SUMMARY

1. THE RUSSIANS ENGAGED IN SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON OUR DRAFT ARMS EMBARGO RESOLUTION. THE CHINESE ALSO COMMENTED. AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS FURTHER ON 10 FEBRUARY, AND TO ENVISAGE EARLY CIRCULATION OF THE DRAFT TO THE NON PERMANENT MEMBERS IN A FORM TO BE DECIDED. SOME HARD WORK AHEAD, BUT THE BRAKES ARE APPARENTLY OFF.

DETAIL

2. ON 5 FEBRUARY THE COUNSELLORS OF THE FIVE MET TO CONSIDER THE BRITISH DRAFT RESOLUTION CIRCULATED ON 27 JANUARY (MY TELNO 113). THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE INSISTED FIRST ON A DISCUSSION OF THE UN NAVAL FORCE PROPOSAL (SEE MIFT, NOT TO ALL). SMIRNOV DREW ATTENTION REPEATEDLY TO ANDREW MCEWEN'S ARTICLE IN THE TIMES OF 28 JANUARY. HE ASKED WHETHER IT WAS ACCURATE IN REPORTING THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION HAD BEEN AGREED BY BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. WE TOLD HIM THAT IT CONTAINED MANY INACCURACIES AND THAT HE SHOULD NOT BELIEVE ALL HE READ IN THE PAPERS.

3. THE FRENCH AND AMERICANS, BY PREARRANGEMENT, THEN MADE A NUMBER OF POINTS ON OUR DRAFT DESIGNED TO ADD NEGOTIATING FAT AND TO BELIE PRIOR COLLUSION. BOTH SAID THEY WISHED THE TIME LIMIT (OPERATIVE PARA 9) TO BE LONGER THAN 2 YEARS. THE FRENCH ALSO QUERIED THE NEED FOR THE LIST OF WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN OPERATIVE PARA 2(A). WE EXPLAINED OUR REASONS FOR ESTABLISHING A CLASS OF ITEMS, AND THE NEED FOR PRECISION WHERE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING MIGHT BE INVOLVED. THE CHINESE POINTED OUT IRONICALLY THAT WE HAD NOT GONE SO FAR IN SCR 418 (ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA). THE AMERICANS ARGUED FOR A NEW PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH NOTING THAT IRAQ HAD ACCEPTED SCR 598 AND WAS READY TO CO-OPERATE IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

4. THE CHINESE, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS AMBASSADOR, MADE THREE POINTS. FIRST CHINA VALUED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS WITH THE TWO SIDES AND WISHED TO SEE HIM UNDERTAKE A FURTHER ROUND WITH

THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SECONDLY THE NAMING OF THE NON-COMPLIANT PARTY IN THE DRAFT WAS A QUESTION TO BE DECIDED ONLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EVENTUAL REPORT ON THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES FOLLOWING A FURTHER ROUND. IT WOULD ALSO DEPEND ON THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS. THIRDLY HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE CHINA ATTACHED TO THE VIEWS OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS. IN THE LIGHT OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THEM ON THE DRAFT, FURTHER CHINESE VIEWS WOULD BE MADE KNOWN.

5. SMIRNOV STATED SOVIET READINESS TO DISCUSS THE DRAFT. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS AMBASSADOR HE MADE SIX POINTS. FIRST, AS IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT WAS A MAJOR OBJECTIVE, A REFERENCE TO THIS SHOULD BE MADE IN AN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH AND NOT (AS AT PRESENT IN THE DRAFT) ONLY IN A PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH. SECONDLY THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MAKING FURTHER EFFORTS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, ALSO IN AN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH. THIRDLY THE DRAFT RESOLUTION NEEDED A STRONGER PREAMBULAR SECTION, ON THE LINES OF SCR 418, TO EXPLAIN WHY THE COUNCIL WAS TAKING THE SERIOUS STEP OF AN ARMS EMBARGO. FOURTHLY OPERATIVE PARA 2(A) WAS TOO COMPLICATED BY COMPARISON WITH SCR 418, AND LIKE THE FRENCH HE PREFERRED A GENERAL FORMULA WITHOUT A LIST. FIFTHLY THERE SHOULD BE NO TIME LIMIT (OPERATIVE PARA 9) AS IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE EMBARGO WOULD LAPSE WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598, UPON A DECISION OF THE COUNCIL. LASTLY HE SUPPORTED THE CHINESE VIEW ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATION WITH THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS.

6. THERE FOLLOWED A DISCUSSION ON HOW THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS MIGHT BE CONSULTED ON THE DRAFT, IN VIEW OF THE FIVE BEING UNLIKELY TO REACH FIRM AGREEMENT ON IT WITHOUT HAVING FIRST HEARD THE VIEWS OF THE TEN. THE WESTERN PERMANENT MEMBERS SPOKE AGAINST A CHINESE PROPOSAL THAT THE DRAFT BE PUT TO THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS AS A BRITISH TEXT, BUT INDICATED WAYS IN WHICH IT MIGHT GO FORWARD SIMPLY AS A PAPER UNDER DISCUSSION AMONG THE FIVE ON WHICH THE VIEWS OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS WERE BEING SOUGHT. THEY ALSO ARGUED THAT BEFORE DOING THIS THE FIVE SHOULD MAKE A DETERMINED EFFORT TO REACH AS MUCH AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE, AND TO DEFINE THE AREAS ON WHICH THE VIEWS OF THE OTHERS WOULD BE SOUGHT. THIS SEEMED ACCEPTABLE TO THE CHINESE AND RUSSIANS, WITH THE LATTER STRESSING THAT THE FIVE NEEDED TO DO SERIOUS WORK ON THEIR OWN FIRST. SMIRNOV COVERED HIMSELF BY ADDING THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE FIVE MIGHT CONSULT THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS, AND NO VIEW YET ON HOW LONG MIGHT BE REQUIRED BEFORE DOING SO. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE COUNSELLORS WOULD MEET AGAIN AT 1600Z ON 10 FEBRUARY IN ORDER TO

EXAMINE THE DRAFT IN DETAIL AND TACKLE THE POINTS RAISED AT TODAY'S MEETING.

COMMENT

7. THE RUSSIANS MADE CLEAR THEY WERE READY TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY ON THE DRAFT, BUT ALSO THAT THEY HAD SERIOUS CONCERNS THEY WISHED TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE CHINESE ABSTAINED FROM SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT, BUT INDICATED (AS WE HAD SUSPECTED) THAT THEY WOULD TAKE NO FINAL POSITION UNTIL THE MAJORITY OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS HAD SET A LEAD, AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD DONE HIS BEST TO EXTRACT MOVEMENT FROM THE TWO SIDES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 598. WITH CAREFUL HANDLING WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO FIND SOME FORMULA FOR CONSULTING NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS BEFORE THE FIVE HAVE WORKED OUT A FINAL TEXT BUT AFTER THEY HAVE AGREED MOST OF THE ESSENTIALS BETWEEN THEM.

8. PLEASE SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

TICKELL

YYYY

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(2)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/21L

5th February 1988

Dear Charles,

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

Thank you for your letter of 28th January. Mr Younger spoke subsequently on the telephone to his Dutch and Belgian colleagues to explain the ideas set out in my letter to you of 28th January. The three Ministers agreed that these proposals should be followed up by officials.

A meeting took place in Brussels on 2nd February to consider arrangements consistent with our three options, although in the absence of full integration neither the Dutch nor the Belgians were prepared to commit naval staff permanently to a co-ordinating cell at Northwood. Instead, it was agreed to intensify existing arrangements to co-ordinate planning at three levels: between naval experts in the three Defence Ministries, between national commanders at the respective Fleet Headquarters, and between the local force commanders in the Gulf. These enhanced contacts preserve entirely national control but will provide a useful opportunity to co-ordinate forward plans including, for example, route survey and other preparatory activity, as well as responses to actual mining threats as they arise.

There is no intention of giving any particular publicity to these arrangements, which will come into effect quickly. But all three participants will draw on the attached general text in response to any enquiries. We may also draw upon it, as necessary, as we proceed with the reduction of our MCM force from four to three vessels.

I am sending copies of this letter to Robert Culshaw (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(B R HAWTIN)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

COOPERATION BETWEEN UK/NL/BE IN MINE COUNTERMEASURE OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

Following the meeting in London on 21 January of the Defence Ministers of UK, NL, Be and drawing on the highly satisfactory experience of mutual support and cooperation in mine counter measure activities over recent months naval experts have been reviewed arrangements for local coordination and for consultation between the respective Fleet HQ's and Ministries of Defence. In order to strengthen and intensify the exchanges that take place under these arrangements additional measures to increase the frequency and depth of contact at all levels have been agreed. The purpose is to ensure the best possible operational operations to concert the respective national contribution to deal with mining threats as they arise. Existing arrangements for the protection of MCM-vessels will continue.

IRAQ: Relations...
Pt 9



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Pl. file

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OUR TELNO 245: MR MELLOR'S MEETING WITH ARMACOST: US/GULF: PROTECTION OF SHIPPING

SUMMARY

1. MR MELLOR AGAIN REGISTERS UK RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE WEST EXTENDING THEIR SHIPPING PROTECTION REGIME IN THE GULF. ARMACOST CONFIRMS THAT THE CONCEPT OF OPPORTUNITY ASSISTANCE TO SHIPPING POSES SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION ALSO, INCLUDING POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES WITH CONGRESS. AS PART OF ANY US OFFER TO SAUDI ARABIA, THE GCC WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DO MORE FOR THEMSELVES.

2. STATE SEPARATELY TELL US OF ATTEMPT BY PRINCE BANDAR TO DRIVE WEDGE BETWEEN US, UK AND FRENCH POSITIONS. STATE SUSPECT THAT FRENCH HAVE ALREADY SOLD THE PASS IN RIYADH. A US REPLY TO THE SAUDIS IS BEING DRAFTED IN STATE BUT THERE IS STILL NO AGREED INTER-AGENCY LINE. WE HAVE UNDERLINED TO STATE OUR WISH FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION BEFORE THEY REPLY TO RIYADH.

DETAIL

3. MR MELLOR MET ARMACOST ON 2 FEBRUARY. THEIR DISCUSSION CONCENTRATED ON THE GULF. UN ISSUES ARE COVERED IN MIFT.

4. ARMACOST TOLD MR MELLOR HE WAS ABOUT TO ATTEND A FURTHER NSC POLICY REVIEW GROUP (PRG) MEETING TO DISCUSS PRIMARILY THE VEXED QUESTION OF EXTENDING PROTECTION TO NEUTRAL NON-US FLAGGED SHIPPING (QUOTE OPPORTUNITY ASSISTANCE UNQUOTE). THE US HAD NEVER BEEN CONVINCED THAT THE IRANIANS WERE SELF-CONSCIOUSLY TARGETTING SAUDI-RELATED SHIPPING. THE LAST FEW WEEKS HAD PRODUCED EVEN LESS EVIDENCE OF THIS. BUT THERE WAS AN INSTINCTIVE WISH, IN THE US NAVY IN PARTICULAR, TO DO MORE FOR NEUTRAL SHIPPING UNDER ATTACK. BUT THE IRANIANS WOULD BE CERTAIN TO TEST ANY NEW RED-LINE. A CHANGE WAS THEREFORE LIKELY TO CREATE FURTHER INCIDENTS. THERE WERE ALSO CLEAR LEGAL DIFFICULTIES AND SOME US EXPERTS WERE NOW ADVISING THAT ANY CHANGE IN US RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WOULD REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL CONSENT. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD SECURED BROAD SUPPORT IN CONGRESS FOR THEIR CURRENT GULF POLICY AFTER A DIFFICULT PERIOD LAST SUMMER. THEY DID NOT WANT

TO REVIVE DOMESTIC CONTROVERSY OR HAVE THE GULF BECOME AN ISSUE IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION POLITICS.

5. IN DECIDING HOW TO RESPOND FURTHER TO THE SAUDIS, THE US WOULD PLACE GREAT WEIGHT ON DRAWING THE GCC INTO A ROLE IN THE PROTECTION OF SHIPPING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. THEY ALSO WANTED TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HARMONY BETWEEN THE WESTERN ALLIES, THOUGH RECENT FRENCH ACTIONS AND ATTITUDES HAD CAUSED PROBLEMS. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD ARMACOST THAT THEIR ADMIRAL'S PRESS BRIEFING ON FRENCH ROE HAD NOT BEEN AUTHORITATIVE BUT WOULD NOT BE REPUDIATED, IE THEY WERE TRYING TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS.

6. MR MELLOR ENDORSED ARMACOST'S ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH OPPORTUNITY ASSISTANCE. THE UK HAD STRONG RESERVATIONS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO PLAY THE BALL BACK TO THE GCC AND ENQUIRE WHAT MORE THEY WOULD DO THEMSELVES. THE ARMILLA PATROL ALREADY HAD A CRUSHING WORKLOAD. THERE WAS NO SCOPE TO INCREASE IT. BUT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, IF ONE ALLIED PARTNER ADOPTED NEW ROE, FOR THE OTHERS NOT TO FOLLOW SUIT. THE AIM SHOULD BE TO STAND FIRM AGAINST SAUDI PRESSURE WITHOUT DAMAGING THE POSITIVE IMPRESSION ALL OUR EFFORTS HAD CREATED IN THE REGION OVER MANY MONTHS. ARMACOST AGREED.

7. CONTACTS IN STATE AND DOD HAVE SINCE TOLD US THAT THE PRG MEETING ON 2 FEBRUARY PRODUCED NO PROGRESS TOWARDS AN AGREED INTER-AGENCY POSITION. STATE HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PREPARE A DRAFT RESPONSE TO PRINCE SULTAN IN THE HOPE THAT DISCUSSION OF A SPECIFIC TEXT WILL HELP THE PRG TO REACH SOME CONCLUSION. THEY WANT TO REPLY TO RIYADH WITHIN TWO WEEKS. WE HAVE UNDERLINED TO BOTH STATE AND DOD THAT WE WANT TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS ISSUE, AND THAT WE WOULD SEE A PARTICULAR NEED FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS (BEFORE A US REPLY WAS SENT TO THE SAUDIS) IF THE INTER-AGENCY PROCESS CAME OUT IN FAVOUR OF A MOVE TOWARDS OPPORTUNITY ASSISTANCE.

8. THERE IS EVIDENCE OF SAUDI ATTEMPTS TO WEDGE-DRIVE BETWEEN THE FRENCH, AMERICANS AND OURSELVES. ACCORDING TO STATE, PRINCE BANDAR CLAIMED TO MURPHY
ON 1 FEBRUARY THAT BOTH WE AND THE FRENCH HAVE REPLIED POSITIVELY TO KING FAHD AND THAT ONLY THE US WERE DRAGGING THEIR HEELS. STATE ATTACHED NO CREDIBILITY TO THE REFERENCE TO THE U.K. POSITION BUT THEY REMAIN VERY SUSPICISOUS OF THE FRENCH
BANDAR SAID THAT CHIRAC HAD TOLD HIM THEY WERE
EXTENDING THEIR PROTECTION DE FACTO, JUST AS THE SAUDIS WANTED

9. THE AMERICANS HAVE ALSO HEARD ECHOES FROM THE SAUDIS OF THE KUWAITI LINE IN EARLY 1987 THAT THE PROBLEM IS NOT HOW TO PROTECT KUWAIT OR SAUDI ARABIA BUT HOW TO PRESERVE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. THE SAUDIS CLAIMED DISINGENUOUSLY THAT THERE WAS

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THEREFORE NO CALL FOR INVOLVEMENT OF GCC FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS, WHICH WOULD BE PROVOCATIVE TO IRAN.
10. SEE M I F T.

ACLAND

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MO 6/17/9V

1st February 1988

CDP
2/2.

Ian Alex,

IRAN/IRAQ AT THE UN - SANCTIONS

Hap (25th Jan)

We spoke about your letter of ~~21st~~ January to Charles Powell seeking agreement to a change of strategy in the arms embargo negotiations at the UN.

This is just to record that it remains the Defence Secretary's view that an arms embargo is likely to have only a limited effect on the ability of the two combatants to pursue the conflict. For this reason in particular, Ministry of Defence officials supported the Department of Trade and Industry in their efforts to protect existing contracts and to limit the embargo to 'arms of relevance to the conflict'. But Mr Younger accepts that it is more important to have an effective, watertight embargo; he therefore had no objections to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's proposals.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD, the Home Secretary, the Secretaries of State for Employment, Transport and Energy, the Attorney General, the Governor of the Bank of England and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

David Ball

(D C J BALL)
Private Secretary

Robert Culshaw Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

IRAQ : Mt. Sit PT9



SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 January, 1988.

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

Thank you for your letter of 28 January setting out the ideas which the Defence Secretary intends to put to the Dutch and Belgian Defence Ministers about improved co-ordination of minesweeping activities in the Gulf. I am confident that the Prime Minister would be content with any of the three possibilities set out in your letter.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Robert Culshaw (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

(C.D. Powell)

B.R. Hawtin, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

4

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930~~ XXXXX 7022 218 2111/3

MO 3/21L

28th January 1988

Dear Charles

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

The Defence Secretary will be speaking later today to Dr Van Eekelen and M. De Donnea to explain the decision against establishing an integrated MCM force in the Gulf. At the same time, he would like to float with them alternative means of achieving the operational advantages of improved co-ordination of MCM activities which Ministers agreed on Tuesday to be desirable.

Mr Younger has it in mind to suggest three possibilities. All would represent an improvement over existing arrangements without involving the difficulties of integration or foreign command of British MCM vessels. In descending order of preference (in terms of operational advantages) they are:

a. Operational command of both the UK's CIMNEL force of MCMVs and the joint Dutch and Belgian MCM force (known as OCTOPUS) to be assumed by CINCFLEET at Northwood. The two forces would remain organisationally separate, though, as in the past, there would be the closest local co-ordination between their commanders, especially on joint operations. Tactical control of OCTOPUS would continue to be exercised by a Belgian or Dutch officer and their national responsibilities for matters such as discipline and logistic support for their ships would be unaffected. A Dutch or Belgian manned OCTOPUS Cell would be set up at Northwood.

b. The establishment of a tasking co-ordination cell for both OCTOPUS and CIMNEL at Northwood, again with appropriate Dutch/Belgian representation but with no command connotations.

c. Enhancement of the present trilateral sub-group of WEU Naval Points of Contact. Membership to be expanded to include representatives of Fleet HQs and Political Military officials, as well as naval experts from MODs. Its function would be to undertake systematic joint operational planning rather than general policy, with an increased frequency of meetings.

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Before he speaks to Dr Van Eekelen and M. De Donnea, the Defence Secretary would be grateful to know that the Prime Minister sees no objection to arrangements of the sort described above.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Robert Culshaw (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Yours sincerely,

Brian Hawtin

(B R HAWTIN)
Private Secretary

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 January 1988

Dear Robert,

IRAN/IRAQ AT THE UNITED NATIONS:
ARMS EMBARGO

Thank you for your letter of 25 January dealing with the extent of an arms embargo against Iran and how existing contracts should be dealt with.

The Prime Minister is content for our Permanent Representative at the United Nations to take the line proposed in your letter.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD, Philip Mawer (Home Office), Nicholas Wilson (Department of Employment), Roy Griffins (Department of Transport), Stephen Haddrill (Department of Energy), Michael Saunders (Law Officers' Department), John Footman (Bank of England) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

R. N. Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 January 1988

Dear Ian,

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

The Prime Minister held a meeting this evening to discuss the proposal in the Defence Secretary's minute of 21 January for the creation of an integrated Mine Counter Measures force in the Gulf, comprising British, Dutch and Belgian vessels under single command. The Defence Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Transport Secretary, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Percy Cradock were present.

Summing up the discussion, the Prime Minister said that a joint force under single command could not easily be squared with the assurances given to Parliament about the role of British MCM vessels when they had originally been despatched to the Gulf. The notion of a rotating command, meaning that British MCM vessels would in practice be under foreign command, would create serious presentational problems. It was one thing to have it in the NATO area, but quite different out of area, in a war situation. The most that could be envisaged was a statement to the effect that in future remaining British, Belgian and Netherlands MCM vessels would work together as a de facto unit under local British coordination. This would offer many of the operational advantages of the proposal in the Defence Secretary's minute while minimising the presentational difficulties. There should be no explicit reference to a joint or integrated force or to single command. It should be possible for the Belgian and Dutch governments to accept the concept of local British coordination, since this only reflected the actual situation in the area and the respective strengths of our forces there. The concept of a Dutch frigate operating temporarily with the Armilla patrol should be explored further without commitment.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for Transport and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES POWELL

Ian Andrews, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 January 1988

Prime Minister
Agree on these two points?
CDP 25/1

Dear Charles,

Yes

Iran/Iraq at the United Nations: Arms Embargo

The Foreign Secretary's minute of 23 July to the Prime Minister discussed possible sanctions against any party which did not comply with Security Council Resolution 598, and sought agreement to the principle of an arms embargo. Recent developments at the UN prompt us now to seek agreement to a change of strategy on two particular issues, protection of existing contracts and the extent of the arms embargo.

Background

Since last July there has been considerable contact between the UN Secretary-General and the parties. He has put forward detailed plans for the implementation of SCR 598; Iraq has accepted, subject to acceptance by Iran; Iran has neither accepted nor rejected the Resolution, but has indulged in delaying tactics. The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 10 December that there was no prospect of movement and sought a "fresh and significant impulse" from the Council.

After considerable prevarication by the Russians, the Five Permanent Members began consideration of an arms embargo resolution at the end of December. HMG's objective now is quickly to agree the elements of an arms embargo: it is in our interest to table a draft resolution, at least among the Five Permanent Members, during our Presidency (which ends on 31 January).

Officials are working hard on the text of a draft resolution which follows the South African precedent but avoids exposing us to pressure for undesirable widening of the South African embargo. The Foreign Secretary would be grateful now for the Prime Minister's agreement on two issues, as follows.

/Protection

Protection of existing contracts

Our aim is to make the arms embargo as effective as possible, and to avoid arousing any suspicion about our own commitment to observe it. We hoped in July that an eventual resolution need not rule out the fulfilment of existing contracts. But it is now clear that this would leave a huge and unacceptable loophole for continuing arms supplies (for example, Silkworms from China). We need instead an arms embargo which is as watertight as possible, to prevent other states from continuing arms supplies. The costs to British industry of tightening the embargo in this way would be limited, because for some years we have not supplied lethal equipment to Iran. However, there are in excess of fifty licences covering £10 million of business which would need to be revoked under the terms of the proposed embargo. Actual exports of non-lethal military equipment have averaged only £1.5m per year. There would also be a cost to ECGD in the region of £5 - 8 million if all the contracts with military and quasi-military customers for which they have approved cover, were to be frustrated. We should welcome confirmation that Lord Young thinks this is a price worth paying. (I should add that legal advice is that HMG would incur no liability for compensation under UK law if existing contracts were to be frustrated by measures taken in implementation of a mandatory Resolution).

Extent of an arms embargo

For similar reasons we want the scope of the embargo to be as comprehensive as possible. It is essential in framing the Resolution to avoid loopholes which the unscrupulous would exploit. The US and France have already pointed out to us that a formula covering only "arms of relevance to the conflict" would introduce a dangerous ambiguity. They are right (though in July we thought it would have the advantage of not ruling out the export of Plessey radars for use only on Iran's northern border - a prospect which now looks unrealistic in the short term). The Foreign Secretary therefore recommends now that we should make the coverage of the arms embargo as unambiguous as possible and insist on a time limit for (or periodic renewal of) the Resolution. This will prevent competitors from gaining an advantage, either by taking over UK suppliers' existing contracts or by stealing our potential business.

Unless the Prime Minister or any copy recipient sees objection, we propose on 27 January to instruct our Representative at the UN along the lines indicated above.

/I

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I am copying this minute to the Private Secretaries to members of OD, the Home Secretary, the Secretaries of State for Employment, Transport and Energy, the Attorney-General, the Governor of the Bank of England and to Trevor Woolley.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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IRAQ: Iraq/Iran Relations PT9

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The Rt. Hon. Lord Young of Graffham
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

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Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs
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Your ref
Date 27 January 1988

CDP
27/1

Dear Robert

IRAN/IRAQ AT THE UNITED NATIONS : ARMS EMBARGO

Lord Young has seen your letter of 25 January to Charles Powell.

Lord Young accepts the necessity for a UN arms embargo against Iran but is concerned where possible to minimise the consequences for UK companies and for ECGD.

Lord Young also accepts that it is impracticable to seek protection generally for existing contracts held by UK firms or to confine the embargo to equipment relevant to the War with Iraq. He hopes, however, that it may prove possible to try to secure exclusion from the resolution of emergency life-saving equipment which would allow Martin Baker to honour its recently secured contract worth £0.9 million for aircraft ejector seats and the prospect of supplying a further £1 million of spares in 1988.

The extent of losses by individual companies and of contingent claims on ECGD would depend in part on the timing of the resolution. But some losses would be inevitable and the

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consequent frustration of contracts would be damaging to the companies concerned. Some would result in significant claims on ECGD whose losses could be much greater than the figures you mention if Iran retaliated by withholding payment in respect of other existing commitments.

Breach of the principle of contract sanctity cannot be good for our continuing substantial civil trade with Iran or for our longer term interest in the market. Lord Young agrees, however, that defining the embargo as precisely as possible and setting a time limit offers the best prospect of limiting wider damage to our longer term commercial interests. He suggests that the operation of the UK Guidelines should be reviewed in the light of the UN resolution eventually adopted.

Finally UK tabling of the draft resolution could provoke Iranian discrimination against our trade. From the commercial aspect Lord Young suggests that it would be obviously preferable if the initiative was taken by another of the permanent members of the Security Council.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD, the Home Secretary, the Secretaries of State for Employment, Transport and Energy, the Attorney-General, the Governor of the Bank of England and to Trevor Woolley.


Yours sincerely

Alison Brimelow

ALISON BRIMELOW
Private Secretary

the Enterprise initiative

IRAQ : Iran/Iraq Relations pt 9



CDS 2088/1

22 Jan 88

PS/Prime Minister

Copy to:

PS/Secretary of State
PS/Minister(AF)
VCDS
DCDS(C)

GULF OPERATIONS - INTEGRATION OF UK/NL/BE MCMV FORCE

Reference:

A. Private Secretary's note dated ~~21~~ Aur January 1988.

1. Further to our telephone conversation this morning on command and control of the proposed integration of our Mine Counter Measures force in the Gulf with those of the Netherlands and the Belgians, I believe some clarification would be helpful to complement the earlier note sent to the Prime Minister on this subject.

2. There are three separate levels of command - Full Command, Operational Command and Operational Control. The full definitions are attached. Full command is to be retained by national authorities and all matters of administration and jurisdiction will remain with them. Operational command is conferred exclusively on our Commander-in-Chief Fleet who will direct the operational conduct of the combined Mine Counter Measures force through our Senior Naval Officer Middle East. Operational Control over the minesweepers themselves, which is strictly limited in scope, will be assigned to the rotational commander to enable him to accomplish specific missions as directed by Commander-in-Chief Fleet. He will report back through the Senior Naval Officer Middle East to Commander-in-Chief Fleet. Thus command of the minesweepers passes through two levels of British Officers and only control is periodically delegated to a foreign officer.

3. There are many precedents for Operational Control of our naval forces being passed on occasion to other national authorities. The Standing Naval Force Channel for example, which comprises minesweepers from 7 nations including UK, is currently under the Operational Control of a Belgian. The Standing Naval Force Atlantic similarly has rotating operational control. These are the arrangements with which we would move, if needs be, to war. Both these forces habitually operate within the NATO area but there are further precedents for combined operation Out of Area - Operation HARLING for example, which involved the clearance of mines from the Red Sea by British Minesweepers amongst others, was technically under Egyptian operational control.

4. I am confident that we will retain the proper degree of command over our Mine Counter Measures forces in the Gulf under the proposed new arrangements.



CDS

Attachment:

1. Definitions of Command.

ATTACHMENT 1 TO
CDS 2088/1
DATED 22 JAN 88

DEFINITIONS OF COMMAND

1. Full Command. The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exits only within national services. The term 'command', as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no NATO commander has full command over the forces that are assigned to him. This is because nations, in assigning forces to NATO, assign only operational command or operational control.

2. Operational Command. The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics.

3. Operational Control. The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

PRIME MINISTER

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

You are to have a meeting on Tuesday afternoon with the Defence Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Transport Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff about the suggestion that our minesweeping force in the Gulf should be integrated with those of Belgium and the Netherlands. You objected strongly to this proposal when it was first put to you. Your particular objection was to putting British vessels under foreign command.

We have blocked the proposal following your intervention, but unfortunately news of it is fairly widespread since there have been leaks to the press. We have made clear that no decisions have been taken.

There seem to me to be two powerful objections to the proposal:

- Your own concern about putting our own vessels under foreign command. I attach a note by John Fieldhouse which tries to rationalise this by explaining that it is only at one level they will be under foreign command; and that anyway there are precedents for this. But the truth is that this is a far more high risk operation than any of the precedents. There is a real danger of a naval engagement and loss of life. In those circumstances it is essential that our ships should be clearly and visibly under British command. There is also the consideration that much of the political benefit we have gained from having our minesweepers in the Gulf comes from their being an identifiable British contribution. We have no incentive to blur that clear national identification by merging them into a mixed force.

- There is also the consideration that you have taken the lead in zapping the idea of a United Nations naval force in the Gulf, and for very good reasons. It will be a bit perverse if we ourselves now take the lead in putting together an integrated naval force. It is all too likely to be quoted against us if the idea of a UN force is revived.

These reasons seem to me to be compelling. I suppose that if the Defence Secretary was able to negotiate an arrangement whereby we were assured of British command at every level the case for agreeing might be slightly stronger. Even so I would have reservations for the other reasons given above.

The other point to bear in mind is that this whole idea is really just a cover for the Belgians and Dutch to reduce the numbers of their minesweepers in the Gulf and for us to jump aboard with a reduction too.

C.D.P.

Charles Powell

22 January 1988

MJ2BWL

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 January 1988

Dear Ian.

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

The Prime Minister has this evening seen the Defence Secretary's minute of 21 January recording his provisional decision that we should integrate our Mine Counter Measures force in the Gulf with those of the Netherlands and Belgians under a single rotating command. She is very taken aback that discussion of this matter should have reached the point it has without any consultation with her whatsoever. Her own position is quite clear. She is not prepared to put our minesweepers under either Netherlands or Belgian command. Indeed, she is not certain that she has the necessary authority to do so. All action should therefore be halted immediately and we will arrange a Ministerial meeting at the earliest possible opportunity - which is likely to be Monday 25 January - to discuss the matter further. In the meantime the Netherlands and Belgian governments should be informed with the utmost urgency that the Defence Secretary's colleagues wish the proposals to be considered collectively before any decisions are reached.

I am copying this letter to Tony Galsworthy (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Roy Griffins (Department of Transport) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

Ian Andrews, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

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PRIME MINISTER

NAVAL FORCES IN THE GULF

I have instructed the Ministry of Defence to halt all action relating to the proposed joint minesweeping force and am arranging a Ministerial meeting which, for technical reasons, cannot be before Monday.

I have told the Ministry of Defence that the Netherlands and Belgian governments should be told that the proposals need to be discussed collectively with Ministers before conclusions are reached and that no announcement of any sort should be made.

CDP

CDP
21 January 1988

CONFIDENTIAL

The MOD assure me that the whole project has now been stopped in its tracks & that Monday is soon enough for a meeting.

C [redacted]

MO 3/21L

PRIME MINISTER

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

For some months the Royal Navy's Mine Counter Measures (MCM) force of 4 vessels has been conducting successful operations in the Gulf region. Under arrangements established under WEU auspices their activities have been co-ordinated with those of other European navies with MCM assets deployed to the area (France, Italy, Netherlands and Belgium). Particularly close co-operation has been established with the 2 Dutch and 2 Belgian MCM vessels, for which in defined circumstances ships of the Armilla Patrol provide protection. The joint UK/NL/Be operation off Qatar in November during which 5 mines were found was perhaps the most successful post war example of European co-operation out of area.

2. While no mines are reported to have been laid in recent weeks, the threat remains serious and it is necessary to maintain MCM assets in the region both as a deterrent and to respond to any mine-laying that may occur. In discussion with my Dutch and Belgian colleagues I have decided that the threat can most effectively be met by combining our MCM assets into an integrated force under single command. Operational tasking will be the responsibility of CINCFLEET, following consultation with national authorities. the command of the combined force will rotate between the 3 nations, starting with Belgium.

3. I believe the establishment of a joint force on these lines will be a most welcome manifestation of the ability of European nations to take common action in their defence interests out of area. It will be well received in Washington. The improved effectiveness of a

combined force will make it possible to meet current tasks with a reduced force level and I shall therefore be reducing the RN deployment to 3 MCM vessels: Dutch and Belgian reductions to one vessel each are likely to follow.

4. I have agreed with Mr Van Eekelen and Mr De Donnea that, subject to final political agreement, the creation of the integrated force should be announced on Monday 25th January in the attached terms and that the new arrangements should come into effect in mid-February. I should be grateful to know that you are content with what is proposed.

5. In the course of our discussion it emerged that the Dutch (but not the Belgians) would be willing to deploy a frigate to the Gulf region for a 3-month period later this year. They would like it to be integrated into the Armilla Patrol, with command arrangements similar to those envisaged for the joint MCM force. There are some obvious advantages in this proposal, notably the further demonstration of European co-operation under WEU auspices. At the same time there would be sensitive issues to consider, in relation particularly to the role of Armilla and the extent to which it could or should afford protection to non-British shipping. One possibility would be for the Dutch frigate's role to be confined to the protection of the joint MCM force. I have agreed that officials should without commitment explore the proposition and its implications with the Dutch. I will keep you informed if any firm proposals emerge.

6. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Transport and Sir Robin Butler.

C.Y.

Ministry of Defence
21st January 1988

PARLIAMENTARY ANNOUNCEMENT

British, Dutch and Belgian mine counter measure vessels in the Gulf region have successfully contributed to countering the mine threat in that area. Under WEU auspices arrangements exist for all member nations with such vessels in the region to coordinate their activities. Additionally, arrangements exist for RN warships of the ARMILLA patrol to provide protection in defined circumstances to Dutch and Belgian MCMV. The three nations have now agreed that in present circumstances the mining threat can best be countered by fully integrating their respective contributions into a single MCM force, with effect from mid-February. The arrangements for command of the joint force, which will be codenamed GROTIUS, envisage command being taken by each nation in turn. It will initially be held by the senior Belgian officer. The joint MCM force will operate with common ROE, will continue to liaise with other WEU navies under existing arrangements, and will be available to respond to mining threats as they arise. Existing arrangements for RN protection to the MCMV will continue to apply. The combined force will be drawn from the MCM assets of the three Navies currently deployed in the region and its greater operational efficiency and potential will enable reductions in the total force level to be made.

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SIC ZAC

FROM DAVIES (SEC(O)(C) MOD
SUBJECT: UK/US TALKS ON NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF
SUMMARY

1. CONSTRUCTIVE MEETING IN WHICH US SIDE PRESENTED USEFUL DETAIL ON THE THREAT AND THEIR OPERATIONS: UK REPORTED ON WEU ACTIVITY. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF SAUDI REQUESTS FOR EXTENSION OF PROTECTION TO SHIPPING, RELATED TO US REVIEW OF FORCE LEVELS AND PROTECTION REGIME. NO IMMEDIATE CHANGE LIKELY ON EITHER SCORE. US SIDE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN CONTINUED PUBLIC, CONGRESSIONAL AND ARAB SUPPORT. THERE WERE NO-ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE UK TO TAKE ON ANY NEW COMMITMENTS.

DETAIL

2. THE US SIDE GAVE A VERY FULL ACCOUNT OF THEIR VIEW OF THE THREAT, SHOWING PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE SILKWORM THREAT FROM FAO AND ABOUT STYX DELIVERIES. (THE US CONTINUE TO DETECT FEW SIGNS ON THE GROUND OF A LAND OFFENCE NEAR BASRA.) THEY FOLLOWED WITH A FULL ACCOUNT OF THEIR OPERATIONAL CONCEPT. FULL RECORD OF BOTH WILL BE DISTRIBUTED SEPARATELY. I GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF RECENT WEU DISCUSSIONS, FORECASTING POSSIBILITY OF INTEGRATION OF BRITISH, DUTCH AND BELGIAN MCM FORCES.

3. THE US RESPONSE TO THE SAUDI REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF PROTECTION TO SHIPS TRADING THROUGH THEIR PORTS, HAD INCLUDED A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THE LOCAL STATES MUST BE WILLING TO HELP THEMSELVES. THE US HAVE PROMISED THE SAUDIS A CONCEPT PAPER ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED WHICH MAY BE READY BY END-JANUARY. WE OUTLINED OUR IDEAS FOR STIMULATING GCC SELF-HELP

4. THE US SIDE SAID THAT, IN PARALLEL, CARLUCCI HAD CALLED FOR A REVIEW OF US FORCE LEVELS, AND OF THEIR OPERATIONAL PATTERN. DESPITE MEDIA REPORTS, NO DECISIONS HAD YET BEEN TAKEN. A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS WAS BEING COVERED, INCLUDING ONE TO EXTEND THE

PROTECTION REGIME TO INCLUDE, ON REQUEST, THIRD PARTY SHIPS UNDER ATTACK. THE IMPLICATIONS WERE NOT UNDER ESTIMATED, NOT LEAST FOR FORCE LEVELS, TO WHICH NO INCREASES WERE CONTEMPLATED. ALLIES WOULD BE KEPT CLOSELY INFORMED.

5. IT WAS A NOTABLE FEATURE, IN CONTRAST TO PREVIOUS MEETINGS, THAT THE US SIDE BELIEVED THAT THE SUCCESS OF THEIR OPERATIONS HAD CREATED A NEW MOOD OF CONFIDENCE, WITH CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FROM THEIR PUBLIC, CONGRESS AND THE ARABS.

6. THERE WAS CONTINUED UNDERSTANDING FOR THE UK APPROACH AND TRIBUTES TO ARMILLA'S SUCCESSFUL OPERATION. THERE WERE NO ATTEMPTS TO CHALLENGE OUR PROHIBITION ON OPERATING IN THE NORTHERN GULF: AND THE ''SECTORISATION'' APPROACH WAS BARELY MENTIONED EVEN THOUGH CENTCOM WERE REPRESENTED.

7. YOUNG (MED) WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON UN ISSUES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET NAVAL FORCE PROPOSAL, AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 15 JANUARY.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 January 1988

Prime Minister CDT 021.
CDS 8/1
NMS

Dear Charles,

Protection of Merchant Shipping in the Gulf

FILED ON SAUDIA ARABIA: Relations PT4

Your letter of 3 January reporting the Prime Minister's discussion with Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia asked for a report on the possibilities of strengthening cooperation with the Americans and other Western naval units present in the Gulf. This preliminary comment reflects our discussion at official level with the MOD.

We are aware of Saudi concern at the increasing attacks on shipping bound to and from Saudi ports. Shipping attacks in the Gulf in 1987 were almost double the 1986 figure, with 36 in December alone (15 Iraqi and 21 Iranian). While Iran has generally avoided ships of those countries with naval forces in the Gulf, attacks on ships trading with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have intensified. In December the Armilla Patrol accompanied a record 59 British/Dependent Territory-flagged or majority-British-owned ships through the Straits of Hormuz and the lower Gulf.

Although RN and USN operations differ (we do not convoy, while our criteria of entitlement to protection are currently much wider than those of the US), liaison and cooperation both in Washington and on the ground are excellent. We have responded effectively to US requests to search for mines off the UAE and Bahrain. Official talks on the Gulf and other areas are due to take place in Washington at the end of next week. We shall take the opportunity to examine ways of improving cooperation, short of integration of forces. Mr Carlucci will have returned from his visit to the Gulf and may have brought proposals for extending naval protection beyond nationally-flagged shipping on the lines suggested by Prince Bandar. At first sight, such proposals present both legal and resource problems. But we shall need to discuss them in detail with the Americans.

Cooperation among the Western Europeans is effective within strictly defined limits. We operate closely with the Belgians and Dutch. At official-level meetings with

/them

them later this week we shall be exploring the possibilities for greater integration. We shall be talking at naval staffs level to the other WEU members at another meeting this week. Although we exchange forward deployment plans with the French and Italians, and local liaison with them is adequate, the scope for enhanced cooperation remains limited given the strictly national character of their task forces. They are not likely to go beyond their previous positions at the forthcoming WEU meeting.

We are also giving thought to ways in which the Saudis and other GCC members might be brought to contribute more directly to the protection of shipping using their ports.

We shall make a fuller report, with recommendations, after the meeting in Washington. We shall also provide a draft message of reply for the Prime Minister to send to King Fahd.

I am copying this letter to Ian Andrews and to Trevor Woolley.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

SAUDI ARABIA : UK
Relations Pt 4


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